

Msc 1285

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

NOT ISSUABLE

Introductory Volumes

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 The Great Conversation | 12 LUCRETIVS |
| 2 The Great Ideas I | EPICETVS |
| 3 The Great Ideas II | MARCVS AVRELIVS |
| | |
| 4 HOMER | 13 VIRGIL |
| 5 AESCHYLVS | 14 PLVTARCH |
| SOPHOCLES | 15 TACITVS |
| EURIPIDES | 16 PTOLEMY |
| ARISTOPHANES | COPERNICVS |
| 6 HERODOTVS | KEPLER |
| THVCYDIDES | 17 PLOTINVS |
| 7 PLATO | 18 AVGVSTINE |
| 8 ARISTOTLE I | 19 THOMAS AQUINAS I |
| 9 ARISTOTLE II | 20 THOMAS AQUINAS II |
| 10 HIPPOCRATES | 21 DANTE |
| GALEN | 22 CHAUCER |
| 11 EUCLID | 23 MACHIAVELLI |
| ARCHIMEDES | HOBBS |
| APOLLONIUS | 24 RABELAIS |
| NICOMACHVS | 25 MONTAIGNE |
| | 26 SHAKESPEARE I |
| | 27 SHAKESPEARE II |

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28 GILBERT
GALILEO
HARVEY

(5)

29 CERVANTES

30 FRANCIS BACON

31 DESCARTES
SPINOZA

32 MILTON

33 PASCAL

34 NEWTON
HUYGENS

35 LOCKE
BERKELEY
HUME

36 SWIFT
STERNE

37 FIELDING

38 MONTESQUIEU
ROUSSEAU

39 ADAM SMITH

40 GIBBON I

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43 AMERICAN STATE
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THE FEDERALIST
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47 GOETHE

48 MELVILLE

49 DARWIN

50 MARX
ENGELS

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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

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VOLUME I



WILLIAM BENTON *Publisher*

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CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY TOKYO

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PREFACE

I. THE NATURE OF THE SYNTOPICON

By calling this work "a Syntopicon of *Great Books of the Western World*" the editors hope to characterize its nature to indicate the function it performs in relation to the set as a whole and to assert its originality as an intellectual instrument. The relation of these two volumes of *The Great Ideas* to the rest of the set is the key to the nature of the Syntopicon and its originality as an instrument. Apart from this relation *The Great Ideas* though to some extent readable in itself does not perform the function for which it was created—to show that the 443 works which comprise Volumes 4 to 54 can be seen and used as something more than a collection of books.

The great books are pre-eminently those which have given the western tradition its life and light. The unity of this set of books does not consist merely in the fact that each member of it is a great book worth reading. A deeper unity exists in the relation of all the books to one tradition—a unity shown by the continuity of the discussion of common themes and problems. It is claimed for this set of great books that all the works in it are significantly related to one another and that taken together they adequately present the ideas and issues, the terms and topics, that have made the western tradition what it is. More than a collection of books then, this set is a certain kind of whole that can and should be read as such.

The Great Ideas results from and records such a reading of the great books. The aim of this syntopical reading was to discover the unity and continuity of western thought in the discussion of common themes and problems from one end of the tradition to the other. The Syntopicon does not reproduce or present the results of this reading in a digest to save others the trouble of reading the great books for themselves. On the contrary it only lays down the lines along which a syntopical reading of the great books can be done, and shows why and how it should be done. The

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Because of the traditional and proved importance of the thought and opinion contained in the great books, the *Syntopicon* in the editors' opinion creates an intellectual instrument which is comparable to though quite distinct from, the dictionary and the encyclopaedia. The dictionary is a basic reference work in the sphere of language. The general encyclopaedia is a basic reference work in the sphere of fact, concerned with all matters ascertainable in the present state of historical and scientific knowledge. The *Syntopicon*—these two volumes taken together with the rest of the set—is a basic reference work in the sphere of ideas, comprehending the wisdom and understanding accumulated thus far in all major fields of inquiry. As its utility is realized it will, the editors hope, take its place beside the dictionary and the encyclopaedia in a triad of fundamental reference works.

II THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYNTOPICON

The Great Ideas consists of 102 chapters, each of which provides a synoptical treatment of one of the basic terms or concepts in the great books. As the Table of Contents indicates, the chapters are arranged in the alphabetical order of these 102 terms or concepts from *ANCELY* to *LOVE* in Volume I and from *MAS* to *WORLD* in Volume II.

Following the chapter on *WORLD* there are two appendices. Appendix I is a Bibliography of Additional Readings. Appendix II is an essay on the Principles and Methods of Synoptical Construction. These two appendices are in turn followed by an Inventory of Terms.

THE 102 CHAPTERS

Each of the 102 chapters is constructed according to the same pattern. Each consists of five parts—an Introduction, an Outline of Topics, References, Cross-References, and Additional Readings. The inner structure of the *Syntopicon* is constituted by the order and relation of these five parts and by the integral relation of the Inventory of Terms to the 102 chapters as a whole.

various uses of the Syntopicon, described in Section III of this Preface, all derive from its primary purpose—to serve as a guide to the reading of *Great Books of the Western World* as a unified whole.

The lines along which a syntopical reading of the great books can and should be done are the main lines of the continuous discussion that runs through the thirty centuries of western civilization. This great conversation across the ages is a living organism whose structure the Syntopicon tries to articulate. It tries to show the many strands of this conversation between the greatest minds of western civilization on the themes which have concerned men in every epoch, and which cover the whole range of man's speculative inquiries and practical interests. To the extent that it succeeds, it reveals the unity and continuity of the western tradition.

It was with these considerations in mind that the editors called *The Great Ideas* a syntopicon of the great books—literally, a collection of the topics which are the main themes of the conversation to be found in the books. A topic is a subject of discussion. It is a place at which minds meet—to agree or disagree, but at least to communicate with one another about some common concern. Just as a number of minds, or what they have to say, can be related by their relevance to a common theme, so a number of topics can be related by their relevance to a common term—a single concept or category which generates a number of problems or themes for discussion. Hence the Syntopicon is organized first, by a listing of the ideas that are the important common terms of discussion, and, then, by an enumeration of the topics that are the various particular points about which the discussion of each of these ideas revolves.

The full title of this work—*The Great Ideas as Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World*—thus indicates not only that its structure consists of terms and topics, but also that it functions as a guide to the great books from which its terms and topics are drawn. But the title may fail to indicate another equally important function which the Syntopicon performs when it is taken together with the great books. By serving as a guide to the syntopical reading of the great books, it does more than transform them from a mere collection of books into a unified whole; it transforms them into a new kind of encyclopaedic whole—a new kind of reference library. Without in any way interfering with all the values the great books have as books to be read individually, the Syntopicon gives

them the further unity of a unified reference library in the realm of thought and opinion.

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Following the chapter on WORLD there are two appendices. Appendix I is a Bibliography of Additional Readings. Appendix II is an essay on the Principles and Methods of Syntopical Construction. These two appendices are in turn followed by an Inventory of Terms.

THE 102 CHAPTERS

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(1) *INTRODUCTION* Each chapter begins with an essay which comments on the various meanings of the idea under consideration, and takes note of the problems it has raised and the controversies it has occasioned in the tradition of western thought

The Introduction to a great idea is designed to serve as a guide to its topics and, through them, to the content of the references. For certain of the most important topics, it frequently provides, in the words of the authors themselves, a foretaste of the great conversation contained in the passages referred to. The Introduction usually expands on the necessarily brief statement of the themes or issues in the Outline of Topics, and furnishes some comment on the structure of the Outline as a whole, and on the relation of particular topics to one another.

The Introduction serves one other purpose. It indicates some of the connections between the idea it discusses and other great ideas, thus functioning as a commentary on the Cross References. In some cases, the Introduction also calls attention to the way in which certain works recommended in the Additional Readings supplement the references to the great books in the discussion of certain aspects of the idea under consideration.

(2) *OUTLINE OF TOPICS* In each chapter, the Outline of Topics follows the Introduction. It states the major themes of the conversation to be found in the great books on the idea of that chapter. It exhibits the internal structure of the idea by presenting its topics in relation to one another. There are about 3000 topics in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average of 30 to a chapter though the actual number varies from as few as six topics in 1 chapter to as many as 76.

The 3000 topics provide a statement of the scope and variety of subjects with which the great books deal in a substantial and significant fashion. Since the topics are divided among 102 chapters according to the great ideas under which they fall, the user of the Syntopicon can find a particular topic by turning to the chapter on the idea which is a central term expressed in the statement of that topic or, if not actually present in the phrasing of the topic, is implied by it.

Almost all the topics involve one or more terms other than the name of the great idea under which they fall. Hence, by consulting the Inventory of Terms, the user of the Syntopicon can ascertain whether the particular subject in which he is interested is represented by one or more of the 3000

topics. As will be seen below the prime function of the Inventory is to enable the user of the Syntopicon to find topics in which he is interested and which he could not otherwise find except by examining the Outlines of Topics, chapter by chapter.

Since the references to the great books are organized by topics, the individual topic, rather than a great idea is the elementary unit of the Syntopicon. From the standpoint of the references, the great ideas are collections of topics. The same is true of all the other terms listed in the Inventory of Terms. For each of these one or more topics are the headings under which the discussion of the subject can be found in the great books. The user of the Syntopicon must therefore, always use a topic rather than a term to discover what the great books have to say on a particular subject. However with the help of the Inventory of Terms, he can always use a term to find the topics which either state or approximately represent the subject of his interest.

For the convenience of the reader the Outline of Topics in each chapter is keyed to the pages of the Reference section which immediately follows. In the Outline, the number to the right of a particular topic indicates on which page of the Reference section it begins.

(3) **REFERENCES** The References are the heart of each chapter. As the Introduction and the Outline of Topics are designed to help the reader use the References, so the References, organized topically are designed to enable him to turn to the great books for the discussion of a particular subject. For each topic they locate, by volume and page the relevant works and passages in *Great Books of the Western World*. There are about 163,000 references in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average of 1500 to a chapter though the actual number varies from as few as 284 references in a chapter to as many as 7065.

Under each topic, the references are arranged in the order in which the authors and their works appear in *Great Books of the Western World*. References to the Bible when present are always placed first. The order of references enables the user of the Syntopicon either to follow the discussion of some theme through the great books in the historical sequence, or to select particular authors or the authors of a particular period according to his interest.

Ideally, a synoptic reading of the great books in relation to any single topic should cover all the works or passages cited under that topic. Ideally, such a reading should proceed, in the first instance at least, in the order in which the references are presented. Reading the materials in chronological order enables the reader to follow the actual development of thought on a topic. In many passages, later authors explicitly refer to earlier ones, and even more frequently, the expression of later views presupposes an understanding of earlier ones, on which they are based or with which they take issue.

But the individual reader may deviate from this ideal procedure in a number of ways, according to his particular interests. He may wish only to sample the materials referred to under a given topic, or he may wish to examine what a certain group of authors have to say on a particular topic. The reader may know sufficiently well the position of certain authors on the topic in question, and so may turn his attention to other authors whose works are cited there, or he may wish to examine thoroughly the thought of certain authors while merely forming a general impression of what others have to say. The Reference section is so constructed that it permits the reader, almost at a glance, to follow any one of a wide variety of procedures.

A brief explanatory note, repeated at the beginning of every Reference section, gives the minimum necessary directions for going from the references to the passages to which they refer. For the sake of brevity it offers only such information as is uniform for all of the works cited. If the reader wishes complete information concerning the way in which each particular work is cited, he will find this set forth by authors and titles, in the Explanation of Reference Style, which immediately follows this Preface (see pg. xxiii) and is also printed for the reader's convenience at the opening of Volume II. The Explanation of Reference Style contains a complete account of all the symbols and abbreviations used in the Reference section and gives examples of the usual typographical form of the references.

Only one further point requires comment here. In some chapters a few topics contain no references. These topics serve in the Outline as headings for other topics grouped analytically under them. The user of the Synopicon who wants to know what the great books have to say on a particular subject, and finds that subject represented by a topic without reference

content will find in its subordinate topics references to the great books on various aspects of the general subject he has in mind

(4) **CROSS REFERENCES** The Cross References follow the References in each chapter. They direct the reader to other chapters in which similar or related matters are considered. By relating the topics of one chapter to those of other chapters the Cross References show the interconnection of the great ideas.

In general the order of the Cross-References follows that of the Outline of Topics. Each entry in the Cross-References indicates by its phrasing the subject of the topic in a given chapter to which topics in other chapters are related or similar.

The phrasing of the Cross-References enables the reader to determine whether the topics in the other chapters mentioned are *similar* or *related* to the topic in this chapter. The *related* topics will usually offer a quite different set of references.

The user of the Syntopicon will find that topics in different chapters often resemble one another both in their phrasing and in the references set forth under them. In a few cases they are identical or almost identical. But *similar* topics will usually differ in their reference content because the meaning of a topic is partly determined by the idea under which it falls, and by the surrounding topics which form its context. Hence, in most cases the reader who turns to similar topics in other chapters will find some proportion of different references.

(5) **ADDITIONAL READINGS** *Great Books of the Western World* comprises 443 works by 74 authors. If we add the 77 books of the Bible which are syntopically treated along with these published works the number is 520. But this large number does not represent all the books which make signal contributions to the great conversation in the sphere of each of the great ideas.

The list of Additional Readings which is the last part of each chapter is a list of books recommended as companions to the works and passages cited in the Reference section. For the ideas and topics of each chapter they supplement or amplify the discussion to be found in the great books. They represent some of the works in the wider field of literature, in which the great books occupy a central position.

In each list of Additional Readings, the recommended titles are divided into two groups first, works written by authors represented in *Great Books of the Western World*, and second, works by other authors. Each group is listed chronologically. Whenever they are available, translations of foreign works are suggested. The existence of English translations is always indicated by the use of English titles, these are usually accompanied by the title in the original language.

The 102 lists of Additional Readings, each constructed for the idea and topics of a particular chapter, contain in all 2603 titles by 1181 authors. For the convenience of the reader, the authors and titles in the 102 separate lists of Additional Readings are compiled into a single list in the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which is Appendix I (see Volume II, pg 1143).

In the Bibliography of Additional Readings the authors' names are in alphabetical order and the works of each author are listed alphabetically under his name. In addition, the Bibliography provides useful information concerning authors and works, such as birth and death dates of authors, date and place of writing or publication, names of editors or translators, names of publishers, and names of standard collections in which individual works appear. A note, preceding the Bibliography, explains the principles of its construction.

THE INVENTORY OF TERMS

The Inventory of Terms is an integral part of the Syntopicon placed for convenience at the end of Volume II.

The Syntopicon is both a book to be read and a reference book. The Table of Contents sets forth its contents as a book to be read. But since this is limited to listing the 102 great ideas chapter by chapter, it cannot indicate the scope and range of the Syntopicon as a reference book. The Inventory of Terms performs that function, it serves as a table of contents for the Syntopicon as a reference book.

The person who wishes to use the Syntopicon as a reference book, in order to learn what the great books have to say on a particular subject, must be able to find that subject among the 3000 topics. The primary function of the Inventory of Terms is to enable him to find the topic or topics which either clearly express or approximately represent the subject of his inquiry. It does so by citing for each term listed the topics in which that

term is a principal element. It cites these by giving the name of the chapter in which the topic appears, and the number of the topic in that chapter. The reader can find the topic in which he is interested by looking in the Inventory for the term or terms that would appear in a statement of the subject.

The user of the Syntopicon may have a broader interest than can be expressed in a particular topic. He may wish to examine the whole range of discussion of a basic concept whether that be one of the great ideas or some other term. This may involve, not one or two topics, but a large number as is certainly the case for the great ideas, and for many other important concepts as well. Since the Inventory of Terms cites all the topics in which each term is significantly involved it enables the reader to investigate the whole range of the discussion in the great books relevant to the term.

Among the terms listed in the Inventory are the names of the 102 great ideas. This does not duplicate the information furnished by the Table of Contents. For each of the great ideas, the Table of Contents locates only the whole chapter which deals with that great idea whereas the Inventory of Terms usually cites topics in many other chapters, in addition to the chapter on that idea itself. For the reader who wishes to explore the discussion of a great idea as thoroughly as possible, the Inventory of Terms supplements the topics to be found in the chapter on that idea and even those mentioned in the Cross-References of that chapter.

The 1800 terms in the Inventory are listed alphabetically and for each term the relevant topics are cited in the alphabetical order of the chapters in which the topics occur. Sometimes the topics are divided into two groups, of primary and secondary importance. Within each group the chapters are alphabetically arranged.

The Inventory is likely to present only one difficulty to the person who consults it in order to find a particular topic. The first step in the location of a topic is accomplished when the reader turns in the Inventory to the term that he thinks is involved in a statement of the subject of his interest. But finding a number of topics cited there, he must choose among them.

There are two ways for him to proceed: (1) he can examine the topics one after another until he finds the one which satisfies him as a statement of the subject or (2) he can use the names of the chapters in which the topics occur as a clue to finding the topic which states the subject of

his inquiry. Since the content of particular topics is largely determined by the idea under which they fall, the chapter names will quite frequently prove a reliable guide.

A brief note, at the beginning of the Inventory of Terms, explains its construction and furnishes directions for its use. Nothing more need be said here of its structure, or of its utility in making the Syntopicon a reference book. But a word should be added about the significance of the Inventory in relation to the great ideas.

The division of the Syntopicon into 102 chapters may give rise to the notion that its editors think there are only 102 ideas worth discussing. The number of really great, that is, primary or pivotal ideas may be smaller or larger than 102. That number represents an editorial judgment which was made in the course of constructing the Syntopicon. How it was reached is explained elsewhere (see Appendix II, Section I), but here it should be said that it does not represent a judgment by the editors that the 102 terms selected by them are the only concepts or ideas which have notable significance in the tradition of western thought. The Inventory of Terms manifests exactly the opposite judgment. Its 1800 words or phrases express important concepts. Though many of these will immediately be seen to have much less comprehensive or critical meaning than the 102 major terms of the Syntopicon, they all have general currency or importance in some special field of inquiry. They also represent notions or topics which fall under one or more of the 102 great ideas.

THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF SYNTOPICAL CONSTRUCTION

The essay on the Principles and Methods of Syntopical Construction is Appendix II (see Volume II, pg. 1219). It is intended as a supplement to this Preface. The foregoing brief descriptions of the parts of the Syntopicon indicate its structure, but they do not explain how it was constructed.

The work of creating each part of the Syntopicon raised many difficult intellectual and editorial problems. These problems and especially the principles and methods by which they were solved may be of interest to the reader after he has had some experience in using the Syntopicon but probably not before. The editors decided to make the essay on the Syntopicon's construction an appendix to the work rather than burden the Preface with an account of the methods employed and an exposition of

the principles adopted. While freeing the Preface from the burden of fuller explanations they nevertheless hoped to provide systematic answers to questions which might arise in the reader's mind as a result of using the Syntopicon.

III THE USES OF THE SYNTOPICON

The foregoing discussion of the nature and structure of the Syntopicon has expressed the purpose for which it was designed but it does not fully state all its possible uses. There are four basic types of usefulness which the editors hope the Syntopicon will have. Two of these have already been mentioned. It has been pointed out that the Syntopicon is both a reference book and a book to be read. But the Syntopicon is also intended to serve as an instrument of liberal education through the aid it can give to a certain kind of study and teaching of the great books. It is not inconsistent with its primary function as a reference book that it should in addition, prove to be an instrument of research and discovery.

(1) *The Syntopicon as a reference book.*

The description (in Section II of this Preface) of the parts of the Syntopicon and their function in the structure of the whole includes some indication of how it may be used as a reference book. Here we are concerned with its general character as a reference work as evidenced by the types of questions it has been constructed to answer.

In contradistinction to books of other sorts reference books are designed to help the reader who comes to them with inquiries on particular subjects. If in addition to answering the question he brings, they raise further questions in his mind and excite him to further inquiries which in turn they are able to satisfy, they are more than answer books. They are pedagogues leading the mind from question to question in the pursuit of learning. Reference books at their best perform an educational function not simply by answering questions but by arousing and sustaining inquiry.

Nevertheless the field of any reference book is defined in the first instance by the types of questions it is able to answer. The specific type of inquiry which the Syntopicon is able to satisfy and which gives it its special character as a reference book, can be formulated by the question *What*

his inquiry. Since the content of particular topics is largely determined by the idea under which they fall, the chapter names will quite frequently prove a reliable guide.

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Nevertheless, the field of any reference book is defined in the first instance by the types of questions it is able to answer. The specific type of inquiry which the Syntopicon is able to satisfy and which gives it its special character as a reference book can be formulated by the question *What*

do the great books have to say on this subject? This is not the only question the Syntopicon is designed to answer, but it is the primary one.

The topics are the units through which the Syntopicon functions as a reference book, since it is under the topics that the references to the great books are assembled, and it is through reading the works or passages recommended by these references that the person who consults the Syntopicon finds the answer to his question, *What do the great books have to say on this subject?*

The range and variety of the particular subjects of inquiry on which the Syntopicon can be consulted, is indicated *quantitatively* by the number of topics and terms—2987 topics are covered in the 102 chapters, 1798 terms are listed in the Inventory of Terms. *Qualitatively*, the range and variety of the inquiries the Syntopicon is able to satisfy, can be seen only through an examination of the topics, chapter by chapter, or by an examination of the chapter titles in the Table of Contents and the words or phrases listed in the Inventory of Terms.

To every question expressed in this way—*What do the great books have to say on this subject?*—the Syntopicon helps the reader to discover the answer *for himself* by a syntopical reading of the great books in the light of the topics and guided by the references assembled under them. This fact distinguishes the Syntopicon from all other familiar reference books, which contain *within themselves* the answers to the questions on which they are consulted. The Syntopicon does not contain the answers, but only a guide to where the answers can be found in the pages of the great books. The references which constitute this guide do not tell the reader *what* the great books have to say on a particular subject. They only tell him *where* to read in the great books in order to discover for himself the thought and opinion, the imagination and emotion, in which the authors of these books have expressed their minds on this or that particular subject. For this reason it was said earlier in this Preface that only when it is taken together with the great books themselves does the Syntopicon create a reference library in the sphere of thought and opinion.

While this is true for the primary type of question which the Syntopicon is designed to answer through its system of references to the great books, it is not true, at least not to the same extent, for the subordinate types of questions now to be considered.

The question *What themes have been discussed in the tradition of a certain thought under this idea?* is answered in the first instance by the Outline of Topics in the chapter on each of the great ideas. If the reader becomes interested in the actual content of the discussion under one or more of these topics, he will then be asking the primary sort of question to which the references, assembled under these topics, provide the beginning of an answer and the great books the fullness of it.

The question *To which of the other great ideas is this idea related and how is it related?* is answered by the Cross-References in the chapter on each of the great ideas. The Cross-References enumerate the topics in other chapters which are related to the topics covered by the idea in question. The introductory essay on the idea also usually contains references to other Introductions in which related ideas are considered. By reading the Introduction and examining the Cross-References, a person can use the Syntopicon to discover at least initially the connections between one great idea and others.

The question *What books other than those published in this set contain important discussions of this idea?* is answered to some extent by the Additional Readings listed in the chapter on each of the great ideas.

The question *What is the history of the idea its various meanings and the problems or controversies it has raised?* is answered at least initially by the Introduction to the chapter on each of the great ideas. Here as before if the reader's interest is aroused to further inquiry the topics, the references under them the passages in the great books referred to, and the books listed in the Additional Readings, provide the means for a fuller exploration of the idea, in varying degrees of thoroughness and ramification.

(-) *The Syntopicon as a book to be read*

With respect to its 100 essays on the great ideas, the Syntopicon is first of all a book to be read. These essays are arranged in the alphabetical order of the ideas, but they need not be read in that order. Each is intended to be intelligible in its own independently of the others.

The reader can therefore begin according to his interests with any one of the Introductions to the great ideas. No matter where he begins, he will find that the reading of no other Introduction is presupposed. But he will also find that each Introduction traces some of the connections between the particular idea which it treats and other great ideas.

With whatever idea he begins the introductory essay will at least suggest other ideas as subjects of related interest. These in turn will turn his attention to, and may arouse his interest in, still others. Since each of the great ideas is directly or remotely related to many others—perhaps to all—through a network of connections radiating from each idea as a point of origin, the reader, starting at any point in the realm of thought, can explore the whole of it by going from any one idea to all the rest by circuits or pathways of his own choosing.

The reading of one or more Introductions should also turn attention to the Outlines of Topics in these same chapters, and, through them and the references organized under them, to the great books themselves. As in integral parts of the Syntopicon, the Introductions to the great ideas are not intended to satisfy the reader's interest, but rather to arouse it, and then direct it to the great books. The name "Introduction" specifies the function these essays were designed to perform. When they function effectively as introductions to the Outlines of Topics and the References, they implement the use of the Syntopicon, not simply as a reference book, but as an instrument of liberal education.

(3) *The Syntopicon as an instrument of liberal education*

The Syntopicon serves the end of liberal education to the extent that it facilitates the reading of the great books and, beyond that, the study and teaching of them. To make the nature of this educational contribution clear, it is necessary to distinguish between the *integral* and the *syntopical* reading of great books.

Integral reading consists simply in reading a whole book through. But syntopical reading does not consist simply in reading parts of a book rather than the whole. It involves the reading of one book in relation to others, all of them relevant to the consideration of the same topic.

In some cases, as the References show, whole works are cited along with passages from other works, which may be as short as a paragraph or as long as a chapter or a series of chapters. For the most part, a syntopical reading consists in reading passages of varying length rather than whole works, but the point remains that the essence of syntopical reading lies in the juxtaposition of many authors under the same topic and in consequence, the *reading together* of their works, in whole or part.

Neither of these two types of reading can ever be a substitute for the other nor can either be taken as sufficient in itself. On the contrary each is incomplete without the other. Those who begin by reading in the great books and reading them syntopically must eventually read at least some of them integrally. Those who have already read some of the great books *through* must read them syntopically to discover what an integral reading of the great books seldom reveals, except perhaps, to the most mature student or conscientious scholar. For each of these two sorts of persons—the beginning reader and the more advanced student or scholar—the Syntopicon functions differently and the syntopical reading of the great books serves a different purpose.

FOR THE BEGINNING READER—in the extreme case, a person who has read none of the great books—a syntopical reading done in accordance with the references under even a few topics, works in three ways: initiatively, suggestively, and instructively.

It works *initiatively* by overcoming the initial difficulty that anyone faces when confronted by a collection of books as vast and, in a sense, as overpowering as *Great Books of the Western World*. The problem is where to begin and in what order to proceed. There are many solutions to this problem, usually in the form of courses of reading based on different principles of selection, but these usually require the reading of whole books or at least the integral reading of large parts of them.

It is a matter of general experience that this kind of solution seldom achieves the intended result. A syntopical reading of the great books provides a radically different sort of solution which *promises* to be more effective. It initiates the reading of the great books by enabling persons to read in them on the subjects in which they are interested and on those subjects, to read relatively short passages from a large number of authors. It assumes only that every educable mind has some interest in one or more of the themes, problems, or ideas on which the great books touch.

A syntopical reading may also work *suggestively*. Starting from a reader's existing interest in a particular topic, it may arouse or create an interest in other topics related to those which initiated his reading in the great books. The syntopical reading of a collection of authors under a particular topic may also impel the reader to look beyond the passages cited. Except

when they cite whole works, the references cite passages which necessarily exist in a context ultimately the context of the whole book. Few of these passages are absolutely self-contained. For few of them can it be said that it will be finally satisfactory to read them without looking further into the author's thought. Hence, proceeding along the natural lines of his own interests, the reader may be led from reading small parts of certain books to reading larger parts and, eventually, to reading whole books. If this process is repeated, each syntopical reading may occasion and stimulate a more and more extensive integral reading of the great books.

Working intuitively and suggestively, syntopical reading opens the great books at the pages of maximum interest to the individual and, by the force of the passages read and their dependence on context, carries him from reading parts to reading whole works. Syntopical reading works *instructively* when it guides the mind in interpreting and understanding the passages or works being read. It does this in three ways.

First, the topic in connection with which the passage is being read serves to give direction to the reader in interpreting the passage. But it does not tell him what the passage means since the passage cited may be relevant to the topic in any one of a number of ways. Hence the reader is called upon to discover precisely what relevance the passage has to the topic. To learn to do this is to acquire a major skill in the art of reading.

Second, the collection of a number of passages on the same topic, but from different works and different authors, serves to sharpen the reader's interpretation of each passage read. Sometimes when passages from the same book or author are read in sequence and in the context of one another, each becomes clearer. Sometimes the meaning of each of a series of contrasting or conflicting passages from different books or authors is accentuated when they are read against one another. And sometimes the passages from one author by amplifying or commenting on the passages cited from another, materially help the reader's understanding of the second author.

Third, if the individual does a syntopical reading of the great books under a number of distinct topics, the fact that the same passage will often be found cited under two or more topics will have its instructive effect. As relevant to distinct topics the passage must have an amplitude of meaning which the reader will come to perceive when he interprets it somewhat differently in relation to different topics. Such multiple inter-

pretation not only is a basic exercise in the art of reading but also tends to make the mind habitually alert to the many strains of meaning which any rich or complex passage can contain.

In this description of the ways in which a syntopical reading instructs in the art of reading the great books we have emphasized only the influence of the topic under which the reading is done and the effect of reading one passage in relation to another or in relation to several distinct topics. But to assure or reinforce its instructive effect, two other factors may operate in the background of a syntopical reading. One is the whole Outline of Topics, which places a particular topic in the context of other topics under the same idea. The other is the Introduction to that idea which may help the reader to interpret the particular topic thereby increasing the effectiveness of that topic as a guide to the interpretation of the works or passages referred to under it.

IF WE TURN NOW FROM THE BEGINNING READER to the more mature student or scholar—in the extreme case, a person who has read through many if not all, of the great books—we shall see that a syntopical reading works in a different way. It no longer need function initiatively or suggestively nor for the competent reader need it serve instructively to develop skill in the art of reading. But it does provide the occasion and the materials for a more intensive and critical reading of passages already read and it supplements the reading of whole works independently of one another by requiring an examination of these works, or passages from them in mutual relation as relevant to the same topic.

It is the general experience of highly competent readers that a great book can be read through many times without the attainment of such complete mastery that the reader knows the relevance of every passage in it to every theme it touches. On the contrary the integral reading of a great book even when done more than once seldom reveals even a large part of its meaning. Only the most intensive scholarly study of a particular book or author ever arrives at such mastery.

Short of that reading a great book through one or more times will inevitably leave unnoticed or only partly recognized many passages of critical significance to a particular theme or problem. Only when the book is read with that particular subject in mind will these passages, hitherto unobserved be found.

The truth of this can be verified by accomplished readers of the great books if they will examine, under particular topics, passages from books they have already read or even studied to some extent. Unless their previous reading of the books was done in the light of the particular intellectual interest represented by this topic, they are likely to find some passages that they never saw before, or at least never fully recognized as having the significance they take on when read syntopically—in the light of this topic and in relation to other works and passages relevant to the same theme.

The Syntopicon can thus serve those who have already done, to a greater or less extent, an integral reading of the great books. The method of syntopical reading not only provides a different and rewarding way of reading them, but also carries the study of them to deeper and deeper levels of understanding. It overcomes the defects of the ordinary integral reading in several ways. It involves reading the great books in relation to one another rather than in isolation. It supplements the knowledge of whole works by concentration on the significance of parts. Taking each of 3000 topics as the occasion for a purposeful reading in all the great books, it makes possible the close study of each work in relation to all the problems or issues on which it bears.

There is still another way in which the method of syntopical reading can advance the study of the great books, or rather a studious use of them. Here the aim is not to study the books themselves, but to consider a problem or an issue to the solution or clarification of which they contribute.

The particular problem may involve many topics in one or more chapters. It may involve a number of great ideas and many subordinate terms. The organization of the Syntopicon enables the student of such a problem to discover the range of the terms and topics traditionally involved in its consideration. The References enable him to examine systematically, in their chronological order or in any order he wishes, the record of western thought concerning this problem, so far as it is contained in the great books. The Additional Readings supplement these materials by citing other books which bear upon the problem more or less directly.

It does not seem an exaggeration to say that a person who has done all the syntopical reading suggested by the References and the Additional Readings on a particular problem will have a fairly adequate knowledge of that problem and its proposed solutions in the development of western

thought. The Syntopicon should be able to save the person who is beginning his inquiry into a certain problem much of the preliminary labor of research and advance him rapidly to the point where he can begin to think independently about it, because he knows what thinking has been done. For the scholar already advanced in his research on a given problem, it may still be possible for the Syntopicon to serve some good purpose as a reminder or a check. It may even uncover a neglected passage or throw new light upon one by placing it in the context of other passages.

WHAT HAS JUST BEEN SAID about the studious or scholarly use of the Syntopicon suggests how it may serve as an instrument in teaching the great books or in using them as teaching materials. For the most part, the great books enter the curricula of schools and colleges engaged in liberal education only by way of courses in which some of these books, or most of them are read integrally. Even when they are read in selections rather than as wholes they are, for the most part, used as materials in a general course of study, rather than as applicable to the study of particular subject matters.

Without detracting from or competing with the unquestionable value of such procedures, the Syntopicon offers another pedagogical use of the great books. The method of syntopical reading makes them available in the teaching of courses concerned with particular subject matters or in the conduct of seminars devoted to the study of particular problems. In certain cases, it may encourage the reading of the great texts in place of textbooks.

For a particular problem or subject matter whose name is either one of the great ideas or a major term in the Inventory of Terms, the Syntopicon suggests some, if not all, of the topics which deserve to be studied and some, if not all, of the works which deserve to be read in whole or part. It thus provides a set of materials organized so as to be adaptable to the method and interest of the individual teacher. For example, at one extreme the teacher can use the Syntopicon merely as a guide to supplementary reading; at the other extreme, he can use it to construct his own set of textual materials, selected from the References and the Additional Readings and organized in the framework of a sequence of topics.

(4) *The Syntopicon as an instrument of discovery and research*

What has already been said about the use of the Syntopicon by the serious student, or even the advanced scholar, in the sphere of a particular problem or subject matter, obviously covers part of the Syntopicon's utility as an instrument of research or discovery. But there are three special types of inquiry for the pursuit of which the Syntopicon seems to be especially adapted.

The first of these is the study of the history of ideas. The chapter on each of the 102 great ideas presents the record of thought in the form of references to the great books, organized under each topic. Since the references are arranged in the order in which the authors and works appear in the set of great books, and since with few exceptions, this is a strictly chronological order, the record of thought is presented in an order suited to the historian's interest. The Additional Readings, which supplement the great books in the record, are also arranged chronologically. Hence the Syntopicon provides an organization of materials eminently useful to the scholar engaged in the historical study of ideas.

The second type of special inquiry concerns the thought of a single author, in its historical relation to the thought of predecessors who influenced him and followers influenced by him. If that author happens to be one of the authors of the great books, the Syntopicon can facilitate such research, since for hundreds of distinct topics it places references to the work of the particular author in the context of references to other authors—earlier, later or contemporary—whom he may have influenced or by whom he may have been influenced.

The third type of special inquiry is limited to the thought of a particular period rather than a particular author. Within this limitation the historical interest may extend to all the great and near great minds who formed the thought of this period as well as to all the ideas with which they dealt. So far as the formative minds of the particular period are represented by authors of the great books and by other authors cited in the Additional Readings, the Syntopicon can assist such research. Instead of using its references vertically from one end of the tradition to the other, as would the student of the history of an idea, the student of an epoch of thought would cut through the references horizontally. He would take all the authors and books which fell within the period under considera-

tion he would examine the materials referred to under every idea or topic which appeared to have been considered by the minds of that period.

In these three types of historical inquiry the Syntopicon is at best an auxiliary instrument in the service of scholarship. If it proves to be more than that for the ordinary student it will probably be less than that for the accomplished scholar whose documentary resources in a particular field are more extensive than those from which the Syntopicon is constructed. This is especially true of those problems in the history of ideas which have been investigated by prolonged research. But some problems have not been so investigated and the Syntopicon may have something to contribute to the study of these. It is even possible that the Syntopicon may uncover or call attention to new problems, or may cause the reformation of old problems in a new way.

THE GRAND RESEARCH suggested by the existence of the Syntopicon is not historical, however, but philosophical. Stated simply it is the project of creating in and for the twentieth century a synthesis or summation of western thought past and present which will serve the intellectual needs of our time as analogous syntheses or summations have served antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the period of the enlightenment.

The 100 great ideas, the 1800 other terms, and the 3000 topics of the Syntopicon are a fair representation of the objects as the materials to be found in the 443 works here published and the 2600 other works listed in the Additional Readings are a fair representation of the content of western inquiry and discussion. The Syntopicon is, therefore, an instrument adapted to the sort of research which might produce a summation of western thought from the beginning to the present.

Because the existence of the Syntopicon makes it possible and suggests that it be undertaken the project envisaged might be called a Program of Syntopical Research. Because the method of this research like the method which produced the Syntopicon would be thoroughly dialectical in character the intellectual summation which would be its product could be called a Summa Dialectica.

MORTIMER J. ADLER, *Editor*

Chicago 193-

EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE

THE references have a uniform typographical style but the manner of referring to particular works varies in certain respects. The Explanation of Reference Style describes the typographical construction of the references, with some comment on the variations. It is divided into four parts:

- I General Typographical Style
- II Style of Bible References
- III Punctuation Symbols Abbreviations
- IV Table of Authors, Titles, and Author's Divisions Cited

I GENERAL TYPOGRAPHICAL STYLE

The two examples below illustrate the general typographical pattern of the references in *Great Books of the Western World* and the headings above the examples call attention to the five elements commonly present in the construction of the references:

Volume Number	Author's Name	Title of Work	Author's Divisions	Page Sections
35	Locke	<i>Human Understanding</i>	Book II Chapter 1	178a 200d
41	Gibbon	<i>Decline and Fall</i>		365b 378d

(1) Volume Number

The volume number indicates in which volume of *Great Books of the Western World* the work or passage referred to can be found. Most volumes contain the work of one author. When a single volume contains the works of two or more authors, the volume number is given for each author. When the work of a single author is contained in two volumes, the volume number is assigned according to the contents of the volume.

(2) Author's Name

The author's name immediately follows the volume number except in the case of the *American State Papers* and the *Federalist* which are included in Volume 43. Authors' names are usually given in shortened form.

(3) Title of Work

The title follows the author's name, with the two exceptions above noted. Titles are also frequently abbreviated or shortened. When two or more works are cited for a single author, the titles are listed in the order in which the works appear in the volume.

(4) Author's Divisions

By author's divisions is meant all such subdivisions of a work as book, part, section, chapter, paragraph, line number. The phrase *author's divisions* does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author, they may have been made by an editor of his work.

Author's divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the judgment of the editors, their inclusion would prove meaningful or helpful to the reader. References to Locke, for instance, as in the example, always cite author's divisions, whereas references to Gibbon, as in the example, do not.

For some works, author's divisions are completely given, as for Locke. For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given. Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given.

Line numbers in brackets, are given for all works of poetry, including those published in prose translations. For Goethe's *Faust* the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the English translation as well as to the lines of the original German. For other poetical works in translation—the works of Homer, the Greek dramatists, Lucretius, Virgil, and Dante—the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original languages, for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this edition furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the equivalent lines in the English translation. For all poetical works written in English, the line numbers are the numbers of the English lines. In the case of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* the numbering of the lines is consecutive for all the tales written in verse.

In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9), the figures and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page, column, and approximate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel Bekker. In references to the *American State Papers* (in Volume 43),

the bracketed line numbers refer to the lines on the pages of this edition only.

In references to the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas (in Volumes 19 and 20) the author's division "Part I-II" stands for Part I of the Second Part, and "Part II-II" stands for Part II of the Second Part. In the case of the *Summa Theologica* the author's divisions cited may include not only questions and articles, but the subdivisions of articles. In such cases the page sections correspond in extent to that of a whole article, to enable the reader to see the subdivision of an article, when it is cited in the context of other parts to which it is related.

Author's divisions precede page sections except in the case of footnote and no. numbers, which follow page sections. When more than one passage is cited within the same author's division the author's division is not repeated as, for example

33 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk. II 403a-404a 405d-406a

(5) Page Sections

The pages of *Great Books of the Western World* are printed in either one or two columns. The upper and lower halves of a one-column page are indicated by the letters a and b. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand column; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand column. These half and quarter page sections are based on divisions of a full text page.

Page sections give the page numbers and locate the sections of the page in which the passage referred to begins and ends. For example, in the reference

53 James *Psychology* 116a-119b

the passage cited begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. In the reference

7 Plato *Symposium* 163b-164c

the passage cited begins in the lower half of the left hand column of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand column of page 164.

In references to works printed in two columns, the format of the page

(3) Title of Work

The title follows the author's name, with the two exceptions above noted. Titles are also frequently abbreviated or shortened. When two or more works are cited for a single author, the titles are listed in the order in which the works appear in the volume.

(4) Author's Divisions

By author's divisions is meant all such subdivisions of a work as book, part, section, chapter, paragraph, line number. The phrase author's divisions does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author, they may have been made by an editor of his work.

Author's divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the judgment of the editors their inclusion would prove meaningful or helpful to the reader. References to Locke, for instance, as in the example, always cite author's divisions, whereas references to Gibbon, as in the example, do not.

For some works author's divisions are completely given, as for Locke. For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given. Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given.

Line numbers, in brackets, are given for all works of poetry, including those published in prose translations. For Goethe's *Faust* the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the English translation as well as to the lines of the original German. For other poetical works in translation—the works of Homer, the Greek dramatists, Lucretius, Virgil, and Dante—the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original languages, for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this edition furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the equivalent lines in the English translation. For all poetical works written in English the line numbers are the numbers of the English lines. In the case of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, the numbering of the lines is consecutive for all the tales written in verse.

In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9) the figures and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page, column, and approximate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel Bekker. In references to the American State Papers (in Volume 43),

III PUNCTUATION SYMBOLS ABBREVIATIONS

(1) Punctuation

Diagonal line When a series of references to one author includes two or more of his works published in the same volume a diagonal line is used to separate references to one work from references to another. The diagonal line is used in the same way to separate references to different books of the Bible. For example

OLD TESTAMENT Exodus 33:1-23 / Job 11:7-9

43 MILL. LIBERTY 302d 303a / Representative Government 317b d 331d

Semi Colon When a series of references includes the citation of two or more passages in the same work a semi-colon is used to separate the references to these passages. For example

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 1:1-14 9:1-22

38 POSSIENAL Society Contract bk. II 403a-404a 405d-406a

46 HEIL. Philosophy of History PART II 265c 266a PART IV 345c 348a

Comma When a comma separates the title of a work or an author's division of a work from the page sections which follow, passages cited are only a part of the whole work or of the author's division indicated. For example, in the references

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a b 44d 45

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73a 4b

the passages from Plutarch are only a part of *Lycurgus* and the passage from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of *Gulliver's Travels*.

When the title of a work or an author's division of a work, is not separated by a comma from the page sections which follow, the reference is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author's division. For example, in the references

11 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 45a 87b

the whole of *Lycurgus* and the whole of Part II of *Gulliver's Travels* are cited.

sometimes places continuous reading matter in the a and c sections of the upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the page. This occurs when a work or an author's division begins in the lower, or ends in the upper, half of the two column page. Where continuous reading matter thus appears in discontinuous page sections, it is indicated by a, c or b, d. For example

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 64b d 77a c

means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in the upper half of page 77.

Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their location on the pages referred to. When a footnote or a note is not specifically cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text referred to. The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indicated in the body of that text.

Chaucer's works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns, the inside column of each page contains the Middle English text, the outside column a Modern English version. Since both columns contain equivalent passages, the references to this volume employ page sections (a and b) which divide each page only into an upper and a lower half.

II STYLE OF BIBLE REFERENCES

All Bible references are to book, chapter, and verse in both the King James and Douay versions of the Bible. When the King James and Douay versions differ in the title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows. For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45--(D) *II Esdras* 7 46

In references to the Bible a colon is used to separate chapter and verse numbers, and a comma separates the numbers of verses in the same chapter. For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 6 1-4 16-18

IV TABLE OF AUTHORS' TITLES AND AUTHORS' DIVISIONS CITED

The following pages present a tabulation of the contents of *Great Books of the Western World* Volumes 4-54. The authors are enumerated in the order in which they appear in the successive volumes of the set and under each author's name the titles of his works are listed in the order of their appearance.

In the references, the name of the author is frequently given in shortened form. In this table, their full names are given followed by their life dates when these are ascertainable. Because some volumes contain the works of two or more authors who may be separated by centuries, the order in which the authors are cited in the references sometimes departs from the strict chronological order. The life dates help the reader to place the authors and their works in the right chronological order.

In the references, the title of a work is frequently given in an abbreviated or shortened form. In this table, the titles are first given exactly as they appear in the references. Whenever this is an abbreviated or shortened title, the full title follows.

The table also includes a notation of the author's divisions that are used in references to particular works.

A dash in the column headed *Authors' Divisions Cited* means that references to the work or works in question cite no sections on. Where the author's divisions cited for the same or several titles there are named only once either opposite the first or at the end of the column.

Titles in brackets are section titles which appear in the full part of the work, but do not occur in the references. The names of the authors of *The Federalist* (in Volume 43) are bracketed because they do not appear in the references.

Volume Number Author and Title

Authors' Divisions Cited

4. Virgil

The Iliad

The Odyssey

BOOK, LINE

5. Aristotle (c. 325-455 B.C.)

The Nicomachean Ethics

Agamemnon

The Persians

Choephoros

The Seven Against Thebes

Electra

Prometheus Bound

LINE

(2) Symbols

esp The abbreviation *esp* precedes one or more especially relevant passages which are contained within the page boundaries of a larger passage or a whole work that has just been cited

Whenever passages contained within a single reference are especially referred to, a comma after the page sections separates these passages For example

42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a 441d *esp* 435c 436b 437c d 438d 441d

Whenever passages contained within a single reference to the Bible are especially referred to, a comma is also used to separate these passages For example

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 1-8 *esp* 2 11-16 2 27-29 7 21-25 8 27

passim The word *passim* following a reference signifies that the work or passage referred to discusses the topic under which it is cited, intermittently rather than continuously For example

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d 463c *passim* / *Athenian Constitution* CH 1-41 553a 572d *passim*

(3) Abbreviations

The following is a list of the abbreviations used in the references Unless an abbreviation for the plural is listed below, the singular abbreviation is used for both singular and plural words

A	ARTICLE	[n]	note
AA	ARTICLES	OT	OLD TESTAMENT
ANS	ANSWER	par	paragraph
APH	APHORISM	PRLF	PREFACE
BK	BOOK	PROP	PROPOSITION
CH	CHAPTER	Q	QUESTION
COROL	COROLLARY	QQ	QUESTIONS
(D)	DOUAY	REP	REPLY
DEF	DEFINITION	SC	SCENE
DE MONST	DEMONSTRATION	SCHOL	SCHOLIUM
DIV	DIVISION	SECT	SECTION
EXPL	EXPLANATION	SUPPL	SUPPLEMENT
[fn]	footnote	TR	TRACTATE
INTRO	INTRODUCTION		

REFERENCE STYLE

Author & Date of Cit.

Volume Number Author and Title

8 ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Categories
 Interpretation—On Interpretation
 Prior Analytics
 Posterior Analytics
 Topics
 Sophistical Refutations—On Sophistical Refutations
 Physics
 Meteorology—On the Heavens
 Generation and Corruption—On Generation and Corruption
 Meteorology
 Meteorology
 Soul—On the Soul
 Sense and the Sensible—On Sense and the Sensible
 Memory and Reminiscence—On Memory and Reminiscence
 Sleep—On Sleep and Sleeplessness
 Dreams—On Dreams
 Pro longing—On Pro longing by Dream
 Longevity—On Longevity and Shortness of Life
 Youth, Life, and Breathing—On Youth and Old Age On
 Life and Death On Breathing

CHAPTER LINE

BOOK CHAPTER LINE

CHAPTER LINE

BOOK CHAPTER, LINE

CHAPTER, LINE

9 ARISTOTLE

History of Animals
 Parts of Animals—On the Parts of Animals
 Motion of Animals—On the Motion of Animals
 Generation of Animals—On the Generation of Animals
 Ethics—On Ethics
 Politics
 The Athenian Constitution
 Rhetoric
 Poetics—On Poetics

BOOK, CHAPTER, LINE

CHAPTER LINE

BOOK, CHAPTER, LINE

CHAPTER PART LINE

BOOK CHAPTER, LINE

CHAPTER, LINE

10 HIPPOCRATES (fl. 400 B.C.)

The Oath
 Sacred Medicine—On Sacred Medicine
 On the Waters Places—On the Waters and Places
 Prognosis—The Book of Prognosis
 Regimen in Acute Disease—On Regimen in Acute Diseases
 Epidemics—Of Epidemics
 On the Nature of the Elements—On the Elements of the Human Body
 Surgery—On the Surgery
 On the Use of the Knife—On the Use of the Knife
 On the Use of the Knife
 On the Use of the Knife
 On the Use of the Knife

paragraph

paragraph APPENDIX

BOOK SECTION paragraph CASE

paragraph

THE GREAT IDEAS

Volume Number	Author and Title	Author's Divisions Cited
1	SOPHOCLES (c 495-406 B.C.)	
	<i>Oedipus the King</i>	<i>Electra</i>
	<i>Oedipus at Colonus</i>	<i>Trachiniae</i>
	<i>Antigone</i>	<i>Philoctetes</i>
	<i>Ajax</i>	
2	EURIPIDES (c 480-406 B.C.)	
	<i>Rhesus</i>	<i>Electra</i>
	<i>Medea</i>	<i>The Bacchantes</i>
	<i>Hippolytus</i>	<i>Hecuba</i>
	<i>Alcestis</i>	<i>Heracles Mad</i>
	<i>Heracleidae</i>	<i>The Phoenician Maidens</i>
	<i>The Suppliants</i>	<i>Orestes</i>
	<i>The Trojan Women</i>	<i>Iphigenia Among the Tauri</i>
	<i>Ion</i>	<i>Iphigenia at Aulis</i>
	<i>Helen</i>	<i>The Cyclops</i>
	<i>Andromache</i>	
3	ARISTOPHANES (c 445-c 380 B.C.)	
	<i>The Acharnians</i>	<i>The Frogs</i>
	<i>The Knights</i>	<i>The Lysistrata</i>
	<i>The Clouds</i>	<i>The Thesmophoria usae</i>
	<i>The Wasps</i>	<i>The Ecclesiazusae</i>
	<i>The Peace</i>	<i>The Plutus</i>
	<i>The Birds</i>	
4	HERODOTUS (c 484-c 425 B.C.)	
	<i>The History</i>	
5	THUCYDIDES (c 460-c 400 B.C.)	
	<i>Peloponnesian War—The History of the Peloponnesian War</i>	
6	PLATO (c 428 c 348 B.C.)	
	<i>Charmides</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
	<i>Lysis</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
	<i>Laches</i>	<i>The Republic</i>
	<i>Protagoras</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>
	<i>Euthydemus</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
	<i>Cratylus</i>	<i>Parmenides</i>
	<i>Pnaedrus</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
	<i>Ion</i>	<i>Sophist</i>
	<i>Symposium</i>	<i>Statesman</i>
	<i>Meno</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
	<i>Euhyphro</i>	<i>Laws</i>
	<i>Apology</i>	<i>The Seventh Letter</i>
	<i>Crito</i>	

— except *Republic*
and *Laws* BOOK

Volume Number 47709 and Title

Author's Divisions Cited

14 PLUTARCH (c. 46-c. 120 A.D.)

(The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans)

Theseus	Camon
Rom. Lus	Lucullus
Romul. s. Theseus—Rom. Lus a	Camon Lucullus—Camon and
Theseus Compared	Lucullus Compared
Lycurgus	Nicias
Nicias	Crassus
Lycurgus s. Nicias—Lycurgus a	Crassus Nicias—Crassus a d
Nicias Compared	Nicias Compared
Sol	Sertorius
Polycola	Eumenes
Polycola S. Ion—Polycola a d	Eumenes Sertorius—Eumenes and
S. Ion Compared	Sertorius Compared
Themistocles	Agellus
Camillus	Pompey
Pericles	Agellus Pompey—Agellus and
Fabius	Pompey Compared
Fabius Pericles—Fabius a d	Alexander
Pericles Compared	Cassius
Alcibiades	Phocion
Coriolanus	Cassius the Younger
Alcibiades Coriolanus—Alcibiades	Agis
and Coriolanus Compared	Cleomenes
Timoleon	Themistocles
Aemilius Paulus	Cassius Gellius
Aemilius Paulus Timoleon—	Cassius Gellius
Aemilius Paulus d. Timoleon	Cassius d. Tiberius Gellius Agis
Commodus	nd Cleomenes—Cassius d
Pelopidas	Themistocles nd Agis and
Marcellus	Cleomenes Compared
Marcellus Pelopidas—Marcellus	Demosthenes
nd Pelopidas Compared	Cicero
Antisthenes	Demosthenes Cicero—Demosthenes
Marcus Cato	a d Cicero Compared
Antisthenes Marcus Cato—Antisthenes	Demetrius
and Marcus Cato Compared	Antony
Philostratus	Antony Demetrius—Antony and
Flaminius	Demetrius Compared
Flaminius Philostratus—	Dion
Flaminius and Philostratus	Marcus Brutus
Commodus	Brutus Dion—Brutus and
Pyrrhus	Dion Compared
Cassius Marcellus	Antony
Isander	Antony
S. Isander	Galba
Lysander S. Isander—Lysander d	Quintus
S. Isander Compared	

<i>Volume Number</i>	<i>Author and Title</i>	<i>Author's Divisions Cited</i>	
10	HIPPOCRATES (continued)		
	<i>Aphorisms</i>	SECTION para raph	
	<i>The Law</i>	}	
	<i>Ulcers—On Ulcers</i>		
	<i>Fistulae—On Fistulae</i>		para raph
	<i>Hemorrhoids—On Hemorrhoids</i>		
	<i>Sacred Disease—On the Sacred Disease</i>		—
10	GALEN (c 130-c 200 A D)		
	<i>Natural Faculties—On the Natural Faculties</i>	BOOK, CHAPTER	
11	EUCLID (fl c 300 B C)		
	<i>Elements—The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements</i>	BOOK DEFINITION POSTULATE COMMON NOTION PROPOSITION LEMMA	
11	ARCHIMEDES (c 287-212 B C)		
	<i>Sphere and Cylinder—On the Sphere and Cylinder</i>	BOOK DEFINITION ASSUMPTION	
	<i>Books I II</i>	PROPOSITION COROLLARY LEMMA	
	<i>Measurement of a Circle</i>	PROPOSITION	
	<i>Conoids and Spheroid—On Conoids and Spheroids</i>	DEFINITION LEMMA PROPOSITION	
	<i>Spirals—On Spirals</i>	PROPOSITION DEFINITION	
	<i>Equilibrium of Planes—On the Equilibrium of Planes</i>		
	<i>Books I II</i>	BOOK POSTULATE PROPOSITION	
	<i>The Sand Reckoner</i>	—	
	<i>Quadrature of the Parabola</i>	PROPOSITION DEFINITION	
	<i>Floating Bodies—On Floating Bodies Books I II</i>	BOOK POSTULATE PROPOSITION	
	<i>Book of Lemmas</i>	}	
	<i>Method—The Method Treating of Mechanical Problems</i>		PROPOSITION
11	APOLLONIUS OF PERGA (c 262-c 200 B C)		
	<i>Conics—On Conic Sections</i>	BOOK DEFINITION PROPOSITION	
11	NICOMACHUS OF GERASA (fl c 100 A D)		
	<i>Arithmetic—Introduction to Arithmetic</i>	BOOK	
12	LUCRETIVS (c 98-c 55 B C)		
	<i>Nature of Things—On the Nature of Things</i>	BOOK LINE	
12	EPICETUS (c 60-c 138 A D)		
	<i>The Discourses</i>	BOOK CHAPTER	
12	AURELIUS (MARCUS AURELIUS) (121-180 A D)		
	<i>The Meditations</i>	BOOK SECTION	
13	VIRGIL (70-19 B C)		
	<i>The Eclogues</i>	Number of Eclogue	Line
	<i>The Georgics</i>	Number of Georgic	Line
	<i>The Aeneid</i>	BOOK	Line

Volume Number Author and Title

Author's Divisions Cited

22 CHaucer, Geoffrey (continued)

[The Canterbury Tales]

The Summoner's Tale

The Word of the Franklin

The Friar's Prologue

The Friar's Tale

The Physician's Tale

The Host's Prologue

The Prologue of the Pardoner's Tale

The Pardoner's Tale

The Shipman's Prologue

The Summoner's Tale

The Prior's Prologue

The Prior's Tale

Prologue to Sir Thopas

Sir Thopas

Prologue to Melibee

The Tale of Melibee

The Monk's Prologue

The Monk's Tale

The Prologue of the Nun's Priest's Tale

The Nun's Priest's Tale

Epilogue to the Nun's Priest's Tale

The Second Nun's Prologue

The Second Nun's Tale

The Canon's Yeoman's Prologue

The Canon's Yeoman's Tale

The Manciple's Prologue

The Manciple's Tale

The Poet's Prologue

The Poet's Tale

L'Euvre

paragraph

paragraph

23 Milton, John (1608-1674)

The Prince

CHAPTER

24 Milton, John (1608-1674)

Lycidas—Lycidas, a Pastoral Poem
of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil

INTRODUCTION PART CONCLUSION

25 Milton, John (1608-1674)

The Prince

BOOK

26 Milton, John (1608-1674)

The Essay

27 Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)

1st Henry VI—The First Part

of the History of the

and Henry VI—The Second Part

of the History of the

3rd Henry VI—The Third Part

of the History of the

Richard III—The Tragedy of

the King Richard III

The Comedy of Errors

The Taming of the Shrew

The Tenth Muse Lamented

Lost

Romeo and Juliet

Richard II—The Tragedy of King

Richard II—The Second

A Midsummer Night's Dream

A Midsummer Night's Dream

King John—The Life and Death of

King John

The Merchant of Venice

1st Henry IV—The First Part of

the History of the Fourth

and Henry IV—The Second Part of

the History of the Fourth

Much Ado About Nothing

Henry V—The Life of King Henry the Fifth

The Tempest

The Tempest—PROLOGUE ACT SCENE EPILOGUE LINE

Volume Number	Author and Title	Author's Divisions Cited
15	TACITUS P. CORNELIUS (c. 55-c. 117 A.D.) <i>The Annals</i>	<i>The Histories</i> BOOK
16	PROLEMY (c. 100-c. 178 A.D.) <i>The Almagest</i>	BOOK
16	COPERNICUS NICOLAUS (1473-1543) <i>Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres—On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres</i>	BOOK
16	KEPLER JOHANNES (1571-1630) <i>Epitome—Epitome of Copernican Astronomy</i> IV and V <i>The Harmonies of the World</i> V	BOOK —
17	PLOTINUS (205-270) <i>First Sixth Ennead—The Six Enneads</i>	TRACTATE CHAPTER
18	AUGUSTINE SAINT (354-430) <i>The Confessions</i> <i>The City of God</i> <i>Christian Doctrine—On Christian Doctrine</i>	BOOK paragraph BOOK PREFACE CHAPTER PREFACE BOOK CHAPTER
19	AQUINAS SAINT THOMAS (c. 1225-1274) <i>The Summa Theologica</i> First Part Part I of the Second Part Questions 1-48	PROLOGUE PART QUESTION ARTICLE ANSWER CONTRARY REPLY
20	AQUINAS SAINT THOMAS <i>The Summa Theologica</i> Part I of the Second Part (continued) Questions 49-114 Part II of the Second Part Questions 1-46 179-189 Third Part Questions 1-26 60-63 Supplement to the Third Part Questions 69-99	PROLOGUE PART QUESTION ARTICLE ANSWER CONTRARY REPLY
21	DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265-1321) <i>The Divine Comedy</i> HELL PURGATORY PARADISE	Number of Canto Line
22	CHAUCER GEOFFREY (c. 1340-1400) <i>Troilus and Criseida</i> [<i>The Canterbury Tales</i>] <i>The Prologue</i> <i>The Knight's Tale</i> <i>The Miller's Prologue</i> <i>The Miller's Tale</i> <i>The Reece's Prologue</i> <i>The Reece's Tale</i> <i>The Cook's Prologue</i> <i>The Cook's Tale</i> <i>Introduction to the Man of Law's</i> <i>Prologue</i> <i>The Prologue of the Man of Law's</i> <i>Tale</i>	BOOK STANZA Line except prose parts (see below) <i>The Tale of the Man of Law</i> <i>The Wife of Bath's Prologue</i> <i>The Tale of the Wife of Bath</i> <i>The Friar's Prologue</i> <i>The Friar's Tale</i> <i>The Summoner's Prologue</i> <i>The Summoner's Tale</i> <i>The Clerk's Prologue</i> <i>The Clerk's Tale</i> <i>The Merchant's Prologue</i> <i>The Merchant's Tale</i> <i>Epilogue to the Merchant's Tale</i>

Vol me Number Author and Title

22 CHAUCER GEOFFRE (cont nued)

[The Canterbury Tale]

The Sq uare Tale

The W id of the Frankl n

The Fra h s Pr logue

The F a h n s Tale

The Physician s Tale

The W id s f the H st

The P l gue f the Pard ner s Tale

The Pa d n s T le

The Sh fman s P l g e

The Sh oman T le

The Prio es s P lo ue

The Pri res s Tale

Pol gue to S r Th pas

S r Th pas

Pr logue to Melibeus

The Tale of Melibeus

The Monk s Prologue

The Monk s T e

The Prologue of the Nun s Priest s Tale

The Nun s Priest s Tale

Epil gue to the N s Priest s Tale

The Seco id Nun s Prologue

The Se nd V n s T e

The Canon s Yeoman s Prologue

The Canon s Yeoman s Tale

The Mancipl s Prolog e

The Manc ple s Tale

The Pa son s Prologue

The P rson s Tale

Li Enou

paragraph

para raph

23 M CHAV LLI N o d (469-1527)

The Pr ce

CHAPTER

24 HO a THOM s (588 1679)

Levi than—Levi tha o M iter Form and Power

f a Comm n lth Ecclesiastic l and Civil

INTRODUCTION PART CONCLUSION

24 R SE s FR I (c 495 553)

Garg nti a d P ni nel

BOOK

25 M VTA N M HRL E QUE DE (533 1592)

The En ys

26 SHAK E RE WILLI (564 616)

Li H ry VI—Th First Pa s

f l g H ry VI S xth

2 d He ry VI—Th Seco d Part

f K l Hen y th Sixth

3 d H ry VI—Th Thrd P t

f K g He ry th S xth

Rich d III—Th T edy f

K g R l s d the Th d

The C m dy of Error

Tu A d us

Th T m f the Sh w

Th Two G it m of Vero

Lo Lado I t

R o d Ju t

R hrd II—The Tragedy of King

Rich d the Second

A M dsum er l gh s Dreams

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THE GREAT IDEAS I

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Chapter I ANGEL

INTRODUCTION

INFLUENCED by a long tradition of religious symbolism in painting and poetry, our imagination responds to the word "angel" by picturing a winged figure robed in dazzling white and having the bodily aspect of a human being.

This image common to believers and unbelievers, contains features which represent some of the elements of meaning in the abstract conception of angels as this is found in the writings of Jewish and Christian theologians and in related discussions by the philosophers. The human appearance suggests that angels, like men, are persons; that they are most essentially characterized by their intelligence. The wings suggest the function of angels—their service as messengers from God to man. The aura of light which surround them suggests, according to established conventions of symbolism, the spirituality of angels. It suggests that to imagine angels with bodies is to use a pictorial metaphor.

Another interpretation might be put upon this aura of light if one considers the role which the notion of angels has played in the history of thought. Whether that role has entered into discussions of God and man, of matter and soul, of knowledge and love and even of time, space and motion, it has cast light upon these other topics. The illumination which has been and can be derived from the idea of angels as a special kind of being or nature is in no way affected by doubts or details of their exact nature.

Whether such beings exist or not, the fact that they are conceivable has significance for theory and analysis. Those who do not believe in the existence—or even the possible existence—of utopias nevertheless regard them as illustrations useful analytically in appraising accepted realities. What an ideal society would be like can be considered apart from the question

of its existence and so considered its functions as an hypothesis in political and economic thought. What sort of being an angel would be if one existed can likewise serve as an hypothesis in the examination of a wide variety of theoretical problems.

The idea of angels does in fact serve in precisely this way as an analytical tool. It sharpens our understanding of what man is, how his mind operates, what the soul is, what manner of existence and action anything would have apart from matter. Hence it suggests how matter and its motions in time and space determine the characteristics of corporeal existence. Pascal's remark—that "man is neither angel nor brute and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute"—points to the different conceptions of man which result from supposing him to be either angel or brute rather than neither. Such views of human nature considered in the chapters on *ANIMAL* and *MAN* cannot be fully explored without reference to theories of the human mind or soul in its relation to matter and to body. As the chapters on *MIND* and *SOUL* indicate, theories carrying the names of Plato and Descartes, which attribute to the human mind or soul the being and powers of a purely spiritual substance or entity, seem to place man in the company of the angels. In this tradition Locke applies the word "spirits" equally to human minds and to supra-human intelligences.

It would be misleading to suppose that the idea of angels is primarily a construction of the philosophers—a fiction invented for their analytical purposes—or that it is simply a conception of a supra-mundane reality concerning the existence and nature of which they dispute. In the literature of western civilization angels first appear by name or reference in the Old

and the New Testaments Readers of the Bible will remember many scenes in which an angel of the Lord performs the mission of acquainting man with God's will. Among the most memorable of such occasions are the visits of the angels to Abraham and Lot and the angelic ministry of Gabriel in the Annunciation to Mary.

In one book of the Bible Tobias (Tobit as it is called in the King James Apocrypha) one of the leading characters is the angel Raphael. Through most of the story he appears as a man but at the end after he has accomplished his mission he reveals his identity. "I am the angel Raphael," he declares.

one of the seven who stand before the Lord

And when they had heard these things they were troubled and being seized with fear they fell upon the ground on their face.

And the angel said to them: "Peace be to you. Fear not."

For when I was with you I was there by the will of God: bless ye him and sing praises to him.

I seemed to eat and to drink with you but I use an invisible meat and drink which cannot be seen by men.

It is time therefore that I return to him that sent me.

And when he had said these things he was taken from their sight and they could see him no more.

AS A RESULT of scriptural exegesis and commentary the angels become a fundamental topic for Jewish theologians from Philo to Maimonides and for such Christian theologians as Augustine, Scotus Erigena, Gregory the Great, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and Schleiermacher. They figure in the great poetry of the Judæo-Christian tradition—in the *Divine Comedy* of Dante, in *Paradise Lost* of Milton, and in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* and Goethe's *Faust*.

The philosophers especially in the 17th and 18th centuries are motivated by Scripture or provoked by theology to consider the existence, the nature, and the activity of angels. Hobbes for example attacks the supposition that angels are immaterial on the ground that the notion of incorporeal substance is self-contradictory, and undertakes to re-interpret all the scriptural passages in which angels are described as spirits. After examining a great many he says that to mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is found would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, "I say there is no text in that part of the

Old Testament which the Church of England holdeth for Canonical from which we can conclude there is or hath been created any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit or Angel) that hath not quantity and in sum which is not (taking Body for that which is somewhat or somewhere) Corporeal."

All the passages can be interpreted Hobbes thinks simply in the sense in which angel means messenger and most often a messenger of God which signifies anything that makes known his extraordinary presence. "If instead of existing only when they carry God's word to men the angels are supposed to live permanent being then they must be corporeal. As in the resurrection men shall be permanent and not incorporeal," Hobbes writes, so therefore also are the angels. To men that understand the signification of these words *substance* and *incorporeal*—and mean by *incorporeal* having no body at all, not just a *subtle* body—the words taken together imply a contradiction. Hence Hobbes argues that to say an angel or spirit is (in that sense) an incorporeal substance is to say in effect that there is no angel or spirit at all. Considering therefore the signification of the word *angel* in the Old Testament and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature, Hobbes concludes that the angels are nothing but supernatural apparitions of the fancy raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God thereby to make his presence and commandments known to mankind and chiefly to his own people.

Locke seems to take the exactly opposite position. Asserting that we have no clear or distinct idea of substance in general, he does not think spirits any less intelligible than bodies.

The idea of *corporeal substance* he writes is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of *spiritual substance* or spirit and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit we can no more conclude its non-existence than we can for the same reason deny the existence of body. Just as we form the complex idea of bodies by supposing their qualities such as figure and motion or color and weight to co-exist in some substratum so by supposing the activities we find in ourselves—such as thinking, understanding,

willing knowing and the power of beginning motion etc —to co-exist in some substance we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit

Not only does Locke think that we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material but he also finds the traditional doctrine of a hierarchy of angels quite acceptable to reason. It is not impossible to conceive nor repugnant to reason that there may be many species of spirits as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them.

Locke goes even further—beyond the mere possibility of angels to the likelihood of their real existence. His reasoning resembles the traditional argument of the theologians on this difficult point. When we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker he writes we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the Universe and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection as we see they gradually descend from us downwards.

Such speculations concern the existence and the order of angels are usually thought to be the province of the theologian rather than the philosopher. But Bacon like Locke does not think it unfitting for the philosopher to inquire into such matters. In natural theology—for him a part of philosophy—Bacon thinks it is improper from the contemplation of nature and the principles of human reason to dispute or urge anything with vehemence as to the mysteries of faith. But it is otherwise he declares, as to the nature of spirits and angels this being neither unsearchable nor forbidden but in a great part level to the human mind on account of their affinity.

He does not further instruct us concerning angels in the *Advancement of Learning* but in the *Novum Organum* he illustrates his point on their nature as well as ours by touching on one characteristic difference between the human and the angelic mind. Discussing there the theory of induction he holds that it is only for God

(the bestower and creator of forms) and perhaps for angels or intelligences at once to recognize forms affirmatively at the first glance of contemplation.

Unlike most of the great ideas with which we are concerned the idea of angel seems to be limited in its historical scope. It is not merely that since the 18th century the discussion has dwindled but also that the idea makes no appearance in the great books of pagan antiquity—certainly not in the strict sense of the term whereby angel signifies a creature of God spiritual in substance and nature and playing a role in the divine government of the universe.

There are nevertheless analogous conceptions in the religion and philosophy of the ancients and in philosophy at least the points of resemblance between the analogous concepts are sufficiently strong to establish a continuity of discussion. Furthermore elements in the thought of Plato Aristotle and Plotinus exercised a critical influence on judæo-Christian angelology.

Gibbon relates how the early Christians made the connection between the gods of polytheism and their doctrine about angels. It was the universal sentiment both of the church and of heretics, he writes that the daemons were the authors the patrons and the objects of idolatry. Those rebellious spirits who had been degraded from the rank of angels and cast down into the infernal pit were still permitted to roam upon the earth to torment the bodies and to seduce the minds of sinful men. The daemons soon discovered and abused the natural propensity of the human heart towards devotion and artfully withdrawing the adoration of mankind from their Creator they usurped its place and honors of the Supreme Deity.

In the polytheistic religions of antiquity the demi-gods or inferior deities are beings superior in nature and power to man. The polytheist and the philosopher the Greek and the barbarian writes Gibbon were alike accustomed to conceive a long succession an infinite chain of angels or daemons or deities, or æons or emanations, rising from the throne of light. In Plato's *Symposium* for example Diotima tells Socrates that Love is intermediate be-

tween the divine and the mortal and interprets between gods and men conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men and to men the commands and replies of the gods he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them. Love Diotima explains is only one of these spirits and intermediate powers which are many and diverse.

Such demi gods are intermediate by their very nature. Although superhuman in knowledge and action they still are not completely divine. Occupying a place between men and gods they are according to Plato by nature neither mortal nor immortal. Their existence is necessary to fill out the hierarchy of natures. They are links in what has come to be called the great chain of being.

The analogy with the angels arises primarily from this fact of hierarchy. Both pagan and Christian religions believe in an order of super natural or at least superhuman beings graded in perfection and power. In both these beings serve as messengers from the gods to men they act sometimes as guardians or protectors sometimes as tempters deceivers and enemies of man. But the analogy cannot be carried much further than this. The angels according to Christian teaching are not inferior gods or even demi gods. As compared with the intermediate spirits of pagan religion they are less human in character as well as less divine. Nevertheless the reader of the great poems of antiquity will find a striking parallelism between the heavenly insurrection which underlies the action of *Prometheus Bound* and the angelic warfare in *Paradise Lost*.

IN THE WRITINGS of Plato Aristotle and Plotinus philosophical inquiry turns from the sensible world of material things to consider the existence and nature of an order of purely intelligible beings. As there is an inherent connection between being perceptible to the senses and being material so that which is purely intelligible must be completely immaterial. If ideas exist independently—in their own right and apart from knowing or thinking minds—then they constitute such an order of purely intelligible entities.

At this point a number of difficult questions arise. Are the intelligibles also intelligences? or

are they an order of knowers as well as a realm of knowables? Can they be regarded as substances? And if so do they have a mode of action appropriate to their mode of being—action which is other than knowing action which in some way impinges on the course of events or the motions of the physical world?

Plotinus answers affirmatively that the purely intelligible beings are also pure intelligences but he does not conceive them as having any power or action except that of knowledge. Another answer to these questions given in antiquity and the Middle Ages is that the intelligences are the celestial motors the movers of the heavenly bodies. Since we see Aristotle write that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe which we say that the first and unmovable substance produces there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle moves eternally) each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. These secondary movers Aristotle thinks are of the same number as the movements of the stars and not only must they be eternal and unmovable as is the prime mover but also without magnitude or immaterial.

Plato offers an alternative hypothesis—that the celestial bodies are alive and have souls. This hypothesis like Aristotle's tends in the Middle Ages to be restated in terms of the theory of angels. Aquinas reports Augustine as thinking that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings their souls must be akin to the angelic nature. He himself holds that spiritual substances are united to them as movers to things moved the proof of which he says lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end in which having attained it it rests this does not appear in the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances.

The question whether intelligences govern the planets also occupies the attention of an astronomer like Kepler. Although he denies any need for such intelligences—among other reasons because planetary motion is not circular but elliptical—he argues that the celestial movements are the work either of the natural power of the bodies or else a work of the soul.

act uniformly in a co-dance with those bodily powers." But whether or not they are to be regarded as *motus* as well as *potentia* and *knowers* the intelligences represent for ancient and medieval thought a mode of being exempt from the vicissitudes of physical change even as it is separate from matter.

When modern philosophers consider spirits or spiritual being they seldom deal with the ancient speculations about pure intelligibles or separate intelligences without being influenced by the theological doctrine of angels which developed in medieval thought.

The extent of this doctrine may be judged from the fact that the *Summa Theologiae* of Aquinas contains a whole treatise on the angels, as well as additional questions on the speech of angels, their hierarchies and orders, the division between the good and the bad angels, and their action on men—the guardianship of the good angels and the assaults of the demons. That these additional questions are contained in the treatise on divine government throws some light on their theological significance.

The primary fact about the angelic nature is immateriality. An angel is immaterial both in its substantial being and in its characteristic activity which, says Aquinas, is an altogether immaterial mode of operation. Being immaterial, they are also incorruptible. "Nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter." Consequently "Aquinas writes 'a body is composed of matter and form comes to be actual when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being as happens in the angels it cannot lose its being.' To signify that they are intelligences existing apart from matter the angel is a sometimes called 'subsisting form' and sometimes separate substance."

Although they are imperishable in being and in immaterial life, the angels are not like God truly eternal. "That eternity of beings which Thou createdst in the beginning is not eternal duration," Augustine writes, but it is in some way coeternal unto Thee. "Is created then a beginning. Yet while coeternal, on the other hand they temporal creatures in continual flux, but according to Aristotle they 'partake of Eternity' through their

sweetness of that most happy contemplation of Thyself cleaving close unto Thee placed beyond all the rolling vicissitudes of time. It is for this reason that the angels are spoken of as a eternal.

The familiar question concerning the number of angels able to stand on a needle's point—if it was ever asked by medieval theologians—merely poses the problem of how an incorporeal substance occupies space. The way in which Aquinas discusses angels in relation to place discloses how the question serves to raise generally significant issues concerning the nature of space and quantity and their relation to reality. He points out that a body occupies place in a circumscribed fashion, i.e., its dimensioned quantity is contained within the space whereas "an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to the place. An incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact and is not contained by it.

To an objector who thinks that since unlike bodies angels do not fill a place several can be in the same place at the same time Aquinas replies that two angels cannot be in the same place because "it is impossible for two complete causes to be immediately the cause of one and the same thing." Since an angel is where he acts, and since by the power of his action he contains the place at which he acts "there can not be but one angel at one place."

Angels are also said to go from one place to another without traversing the intervening space and without the lapse of time. Considering their immateriality such action is less remarkable for angels to perform than is the action of electrons, which according to modern quantum mechanics jump from one orbit to another of the atom without taking time or passing through inter-orbital space.

The immateriality of angels has other consequences which throw comparative light on the conditions of corporeal existence. In the world of physical things we ordinarily think of a species as including a number of individuals. While all men have the same specific nature they differ numerically or individually. But because angels are immaterial substances, it is held that each angel is a distinct species. "There is which is species but differ in

tween the divine and the mortal and interprets between gods and men conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men and to men the commands and replies of the gods. He is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them.' Love, Diotima explains, is only one of these spirits and intermediate powers which are many and diverse.

Such demi-gods are intermediate by their very nature. Although superhuman in knowledge and action, they still are not completely divine. Occupying a place between men and gods, they are, according to Plato, by nature neither mortal nor immortal. Their existence is necessary to fill out the hierarchy of natures. They are links in what has come to be called the great chain of being.

The analogy with the angels arises primarily from this fact of hierarchy. Both pagan and Christian religions believe in an order of super-natural or at least superhuman beings graded in perfection and power. In both, these beings serve as messengers from the gods to men; they act sometimes as guardians or protectors, sometimes as traducers, deceivers and enemies of man. But the analogy cannot be carried much further than this. The angels, according to Christian teaching, are not inferior gods or even demi-gods. As compared with the intermediate spirits of pagan religion, they are less human in character, as well as less divine. Nevertheless, the reader of the great poems of antiquity will find a striking parallelism between the heavenly insurrection which underlies the action of *Prometheus Bound* and the angelic warfare in *Paradise Lost*.

IN THE WRITINGS of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, philosophical inquiry turns from the sensible world of material things to consider the existence and nature of an order of purely intelligible beings. As there is an inherent connection between being perceptible to the senses and being material, so that which is purely intelligible must be completely immaterial. If ideas exist independently—in their own right and apart from knowing or thinking minds—then they constitute such an order of purely intelligible entities.

At this point a number of difficult questions arise. Are the intelligibles also intelligences? Are

they an order of knowers as well as a realm of knowables? Can they be regarded as substances? And if so, do they have a mode of action appropriate to their mode of being—action which is other than knowing, action which in some way impinges on the course of events or the motions of the physical world?

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Although they are immortal, able to be eternal and to have eternal life, the angels are not like God who is eternal. That heaven of heavens which Thomas describes as being some intellectual creature, Augustine writes, but it is in no way coeternal with God. As created the angels have a beginning. Yet while not eternal, neither are they temporal creatures in the usual sense, but according to his time they partake of God's eternity through the

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number Aquinas explains agree in form but are distinguished materially. It therefore the angels are not composed of matter and form it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species.

Furthermore as Aquinas states in another place among incorporeal substances there can not be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature. Each species is necessarily higher or lower than another so that the society of angels is a perfect hierarchy in which each member occupies a distinct rank. No two angels are equal as on the supposition that they share in the same specific humanity all men are. Yet such names as seraphim and cherubim and the distinction between archangels and angels indicate an organization of spiritual substances into various groups—according to the tradition into nine orders or subordinate hierarchies.

The nine orders or ranks of angelic being are described by Dante in the *Paradiso* as distinct circles of love and light. Using these metaphors he thus reports his vision of the heavenly hierarchy: I saw a Point which was raying out light so keen that the sight on which it blazes must needs close because of its intense brightness. Perhaps as near as a halo seems to girdle the light which paints it when the vapor that bears it is most dense at such distance around the Point a circle of fire was whirling so rapidly that it would have surpassed that motion which most swiftly girds the world and this was girt around by another and that by the third and the third then by the fourth by the fifth the fourth and then by the sixth the fifth. Thereon the seventh followed so wide spread now in compass that the messenger of Juno entire would be narrow to contain it. So the eighth and ninth.

Beatrice explains to him how the relation of the circles to one another and to the Point which is God depends upon their measure of love and truth whereby there is in each heaven a marvellous agreement with its Intelligence of greater to more and of smaller to less. She then amplifies her meaning. The first circles have shown to thee the Seraphim and the Cherubim. Thus swiftly they follow their own bonds in order to liken themselves to the Point as most they can and they can in proportion

as they are exalted to see. Those other loves which go around them are called Thrones of the divine aspect because they terminated the first triad. The next triad that in like manner bourgeois in this sempiternal spring which the nightly Aries despoils not perpetually in Hosannah with three melodies which sound in the three orders of joy: first Dominations and then Virtues the third order is of Powers. Then in the two penultimate dances the Principalities and Archangels circle the last wholly of Angelic sports. These orders all gaze upward and downward so prevail that towards God all are drawn and all draw.

THE THEORY of angels raises many questions regarding the similarity and difference between them and disembodied souls. But for comparison with men perhaps the most striking consequences of the theory of angels as bodiless intelligences concern the manner of their knowledge and government. The comparison can be made on quite different views of the nature of man and the soul. In fact diverse conceptions of man or the soul can themselves be compared by reference to the angelic properties which one conception attributes to human nature and another denies.

Lacking bodies the angels are without sense perception and imagination. Not being immersed in time and motion they do not reason or think discursively as men do by reasoning from premises to conclusion. Whereas human intellects according to Aquinas obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation as they advance from one known thing to another the angels from the knowledge of a known principle straightway perceive as known all its consequent conclusions with no discursive process at all. Their knowledge is intuitive and immediate not by means of concepts abstracted from experience or otherwise formed but through the archetypal ideas infused in them at their creation by God. That is why Aquinas goes on to say angels are called intellectual beings as contrasted with such rational natures as human souls which acquire knowledge of truth discursively. If men possessed the fulness of intellectual light like the angels then in the first grasping of princi-

ples they would at once comprehend their whole range by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them

It would appear from this that conceptions of the human intellect which minimize its dependence on sense and imagination and which emphasize the intuitive rather than the discursive character of human thought attribute angelic power to man. The same may be said of theories of human knowledge which account for its origin in terms of innate ideas or implanted principles. Still another example of the attribution of angelic properties to man is to be found in the supposition that human beings can communicate with one another by telepathy. The angels are telepathic: one angel it is said can make its ideas known to another simply by an act of will and without any exterior means of communication.

Lacking bodies the angels are without bodily emotions free from the human conflict between reason and passion and completely directed in the right—the motion of their will—by what they know. In the *Divine Comedy* Beatrice speaks of the angelic society as one in which the Eternal Love disclosed himself in new loves. Addressing to the divinity between the good and the bad angels she tells Dante those whom thou seest here were modest in grateful recognition of thy Goodness which had made them apt for intelligence so great wherefore the reason was exalted with abundant grace and by their merit so that they have full and steadfast will. Yet their vision and love of God is not equal. In heaven the Primal Light that irradiates it all is received in it by as many modes as are the splendors with which the Light is itself. Whence since the affection soiled upon the act that conceives in this nature the sweetness of love divinely glows and warms.

Such a society governed by knowledge and love has no need of the application of force or force for angels are united to one another in such a way that no misunderstanding or dissensions can occur among them. The philosophical march it who proposes the ideal of a human society without restraint or coercion seems therefore to be angelic among men or at least to be willing for heaven on earth. Conceiving government on earth in other terms

the writers of *The Federalist* remark that if men were angels no government would be necessary. If they had considered that the angelic society is governed by love alone and without force they might have said if men were angels no coercion would be necessary in their government.

ONE OF THE GREAT theological dogmas asserts that from the beginning the angels are divided into two hosts—the good and evil spirits. The sin of Lucifer or Satan and his followers is that of disobedience or rebellion against God motivated by a pride which refuses to be satisfied with being less than God. As Satan himself says in *Paradise Lost*:

pride and worse Ambition threw me down
Warning: Heaven against Heaven's matchless King
All his good produced ill in me
And wrought but malice I fired up so high
I desired subjection and thought one step higher
Would set me highest and in a moment quit
The debt immense of endless gratitude

And that word
I said in forbidding me and my dread of shame
Among the spirits beneath whom I seduced
Then to submit boasting I could subdue
Thou omnipotent

The theologians try to define precisely the nature of Satan's pride in wishing to be God. To be as God Aquinas explains can be understood in two ways first by equality secondly by likeness. An angel could not seek to be as God in the first way because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible. And even supposing it were possible it would be against natural desire because there exists in everything the natural desire to preserve its own nature which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently no creature of a lower nature can ever covet the grade of a higher nature just as an ass does not desire to be a horse.

It must be in the other way then Aquinas thinks that Satan sinned by wishing to be like God. But this requires further explanation. To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way as to that likeness whereby everything is likened unto God. And so if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike he commits no sin provided that he desires such likeness in proper order that is to

say that he may obtain it from God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like God even in the right way but of his own power and not of God's. In another way he may desire to be like God in some respect which is not natural to one e.g. if one were to desire to create heaven and earth which is proper to God in which desire there would be sin.

In this last way Aquinas asserts the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely for thus he would be denying his own non-being since no creature can exist except by participating under God. But he desired as the last end of his beatitude something which he could attain by virtue of his own nature turning his appetite away from the supernatural beatitude which is attained by God's grace.

In the original sin of Lucifer and the other fallen angels as well as in all subsequent intervention by Satan or his demons in the affairs of men lie the theological mysteries of the origin of evil in a world created by God's love and goodness and of the liberty of those creatures who while free can only do God's will. As indicated in the chapter on Sin the fall of Adam from grace and innocence involves the same mysteries. Man's destiny is connected with the career of Lucifer in traditional Christian teaching not only on the side of sin but also with regard to man's redemption—salvation replacing the fallen angels by the souls of the elect in the heavenly choir.

Among the most extraordinary moments in our literature are those in which Lucifer talks with God about mankind as in *Paradise Lost* or about a particular man as in the Book of Job or in the Prologue in Heaven in *Faust*. Their pagan parallel is the speech of Prometheus to a silent Zeus but Prometheus unlike Satan is man's benefactor and he can defy Zeus because the Fates whose secret he knows rule over the gods. Lucifer on the contrary seems always to be in the service of God. When he appears to Ivan in the *Brothers Karamazov* he protests I love men genuinely and against the grain I serve to produce events and do what is irrational because I am

commanded to. If it were otherwise the warfare between the powers of light and darkness would have to be construed as a battle between equals which according to Christian orthodoxy is the Manichean heresy that regards the world as the battle ground of the forces of good and evil.

The word angelic usually has the connotation of perfect moral goodness but that must not lead us to forget that the demons are angelic in their nature although of a diabolical or evil will. Nor should the fact of Satan's subservience to God cause us to forget that Christian theology tries not to underestimate the power of the devil in his goings and comings on earth. Satan tried to tempt even Christ and throughout the New Testament the destruction of the diabolical influence over men occupies a prominent place. The intervention of the devil in man's life provides if not the theme the background of Goethe's *Faust*.

As the theory of demonic influences and diabolical possession is an integral part of the traditional doctrine of angels so in modern times demonology has been a major focus of attack upon theological teaching concerning spirits. Moralists have thought it possible to explain human depravity without recourse to the seductions of the devil and psychiatrists have thought it possible for men to go mad or to behave as if bewitched without the help of evil spirits. The idea of the devil according to Freud is a religious fiction—the best way out in acquittal of God for those who try to reconcile the undeniable existence of evil with His omnipotence and supreme goodness.

The characteristic skepticism of our age has been directed against the belief in angels generally. It casts doubt by satire or denies by argument the existence of spirits both good and evil. Yet all arguments considered it may be considered whether the existence of angels—or in philosophical terms the existence of pure intelligences—is or is not still a genuine issue. Or are there two issues here one philosophical and the other theological one to be resolved or left unresolved on the level of argument the other to be answered dogmatically by the declarations of a religious faith?

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk ii [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk ii [265-83] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45-(D) II *Esdra*s 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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6 SOPHOCLES *Trachiniae* 170a 181a c / *Philoctetes* (1409-1471) 194d 195a c

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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* bk i [1-41] 1a c bk ii [581 660] 22b 23b bk v [396-404] 66b

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and Lo 31(31-61) 100b-10 a, 100b-10
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FF Long Tom/ as 152b-c

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41 G o Derate 1F in 135b 275a 227c
42 H GEL Prison by f HARRY LUTRO, 1968

2) - 753c T 14. 753d 753e .8b-171c

4 Gr 11 Feltz, part II [33-332-] 131a
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2. The philosophical derivation of pure
Intelligences spiritual substances & "ra-
human persons"

17 FLOTIN - Second H-... TR IX, CH I 6D-
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Enroll TR I, CH - 200d 200

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12 40 1. Same as Tachyphaga. 2 9 22.

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20 SOUTH S. S. 36-12 THEODORE PART 1: 177-1
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1 3) 109a xxviii (1 5) 148d 147c xxix (13
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23 Home L-2-1-1, PART III 4b-176d PART
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4 BASE-AB German and P. 2/27, BR 11
1. 213

30 Bacon ~~Letter~~ of Letter 1242 /
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31 DESCART Oyama - and Refers 22nd 195a
3. Memo. Engraving 22nd 195b

3. WILTON FARMER LEE SK II 4 1241 1140
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35 LOCKE HUNTER C-~~SECRET~~ SK II CH XV
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35 BARKLEY HAZEL AKA/25 SGT
41 d-415b SGT 12-11-4-20-4-3

41 Gibson, Debra and E. 135b 135d

4. R. vt. Post Recon. 23 d / Fed. Pres.
Voting Rec. / Voting 2:34 p.m. 1964

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45 H cell. Presence of History part 45d

230a
- The celestial motors = secondary prime
movers: the intelligences attached to the
celestial bodies

7 Pl to Totals 4 d/Less KX 6 b
8 1st Total H minus KX = [94-66]
3 for CR: 393b-38-c/16a 17 KX
8 503b-50-c/16a 17 KX

12 LUCASSEN, James of Tarry ex v (110-14)
6 -63a

13 \ CH A-22 K 713 1906

6 KEPLER E-77 91 a b 93a-b 932a 932b
9 9a 93a / H-77 91 a b 93a-b 932a 932b
103.b esp 1033b-1034b

17 Provinces Second E-mail, tr II, CH 3, 12a-11a
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tr V, CH 6 103b-104a / F x-i E-mail tr IV
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- (2) *The philosophical consideration of pure intelligences spiritual substances supra human persons* 2a *The celestial motors or secondary prime movers the intelligences attached to the celestial bodies*

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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b Q 50 A 3 ANS and REP 3 272a 273b Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a 278c Q 52 A 2 279b 280a Q 66 A 2 ANS 345d 347b Q 70 A 3 365b 367a Q 76 A 6 REP 3 396a d Q 110 A 1 REP 2-3 564c 565d A 3 ANS 566d 567b Q 115 A 4 REP 1 589d 590c Q 117 A 4 RPT 599b d PART I-II Q 6 A 5 REP 2 648b 649a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 01 A 2 REP 10 1017c 1020c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [67-96] 10b e PARADISE I [103 126] 107b e II [112-138] 109a VIII [16-39] 116d 117a [97-114] 118a VIII [52-72] 126a XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [37-45] 150c
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 104b 105d

2b Our knowledge of immaterial beings

- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8-10 132d 136a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII PAR 2-9 99c 101c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 50 A 2 ANS 270a 272a Q 84 A 7 REP 3 449b 450b Q 88 A 1-2 469a 472c Q 94 A 2 503a 504a ■ III A 1 REP 3 568c 569b PART I-II Q 3 A 6 ANS 627b 628a A 7 628a d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 1 ANS and REP 9 1025c 1032b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 41d 42a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 122c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 11 165a b CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 13 207d 208b SECT 15 17 208c 214b BK III CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b CH VI SECT 23 305a ■ BK IV CH III SECT 17 317c SECT 27 321d 322a CH VI SECT 14 336a b CH XI SECT 12 357c d CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 27 418a b SECT 81 428c d SECT 89 430b c SECT 135-145 440a 442a

3 The conception of angels in Judaeo-Christian doctrine

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII VII 264b d 360a c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 50-64 269a 338d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXVIII XXIX 148d 151d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 174b 176d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 93a 110b esp [84-191] 95b 97b [423-431] 102b BK V [769-904] 192a 195a BK VI [320 353] 203a 204a

3a The first creatures of God their place in the order of creation

OLD TESTAMENT *I Kings* 8 27-(D) III *Lamentations* 8 27 / *II Chronicles* 2 6 18-(D) *II Paralipomenon* 2 6 18 / *Psalms* 8 4-5 115 16 148 4-(D) *Psalms* 8 5-6 113 16 148 4 / *Isaiah* 6 1-3-(D) *Isaiah* 6 1-3 / *Ezekiel* 1-(D) *Ezekiel* 1 / *Daniel* 7 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 18 10 / *John* 1 51 / *Acts* 23 8 / *Hebrews* 1 2 esp 1 1-8 2 1-9 / *I Peter* 3 22 / *Revelation* 5 11-14-(D) *Apocalypse* 5 11 14

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII 99b 110d BK XIII PAR 4 111c / *City of God* BK XI 322b d 342a c BK XXII CH I 586b d 587b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 45 A 5 ANS and REP 1 245c 247a Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 50 A 1 3 269b 273b Q 61 314d 317c Q 62 A 1 317d 318c A 3 319c 320b Q 65 A 3 341c 343c Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 3 347b 348d A 4 ANS and REP 1 348d 349d Q 67 A 4 ANS and REP 4 352a 354a Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c Q 90 A 3 482c-483a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XII [32 27] 70 PARADISE VII [121-148] 116b c XIX [40-51] 135c XXIX [1-48] 150b d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 174d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 132b c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [86-102] 137a b BK V [800-868] 192b 194a / *Samson Agonistes* [667-673] 354a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 11 12 271b 272b BK IV CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

3b The angelic nature

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 103 20-22 104 4-(D) *Psalms* 102 20-22 103 4 / *Isaiah* 6 1 3-(D) *Isaiah* 6 1-3 / *Ezekiel* 1 10-(D) *Ezekiel* 1 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Hebrews* 1 2 esp 1 1-3 / *II Peter* 2 10-11 / *Revelation* 18 1-(D) *Apocalypse* 18 1

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII PAR 7 100d 101a PAR 9 101b c PAR 12 101d 102a PAR 18-22 103b 104a / *City of God* BK XXI CH 1 560a d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 50-53 269a 284d Q 79 A 1 REP 3 414a d Q 87 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 465a-466c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [1 48] 150b d [127 145] 151c d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 174b 176d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 218d 225d 226a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [84-191] 95b 97b [423-431] 102b BK V [800-868] 192b 194a BK VI [320-353] 203a 204a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 87a-88a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K II CH X
 S CT 9. 143a b BK III CH I SECT II 12
 271b-272b

The evil nature and incorruptibility of
 a gels

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 9 101b-c
 par 12 101d 102a par 15 16 107b-103a par
 15-2. 103b-104a par 3 104c / *City of God*,
 BK XII CH 15 351b-352d K III CH 1 360a b

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 1
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 A 1 ART 513c 514c Q 104 A 3 A 3 and REP
 1 534c 535c

II DANTE *Divine Comedy* P R DI VII [64-69]
 115d [1 143] 116b-c

23 H *Leviathan* P RT III 175d 176d

24 RABBI *Gargara and Pate fruct* BK III
 173a-c

2. MILTO *Paradise Lost* K [6-150] 96a 9 a
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 194a [349-352] 194b K 7 [96-35] 202b
 204 ep [350-353] 203a 204a [430-436] 205b

3 The angelic intellect and angelic knowl-
 edge

Old Te *Genes* 16-1 3 9-15
 2 5 18 / d 1 6 1 16 132d 14 / *11 Sam* 14
 1420- (D) 11 *Amos* 1420 / *Isaiah* 10-3
 New T *1st Mt* 7 *Matthew* 24 35 36 / *Mark*
 132b-3 / *1 Timothy* 3 16 / *1 Peter* 12
 / *Revelation* 1821 24 2 9-2- (D)
Amos 16 82 24 9-2-

18 A *Confessions* BK XII pa 2 101d
 10-a par 6 102d 103a par 2 103c-d / *City*
 / *God*, BK X 1120-22 296a 297 BK X 112
 299d 300a K X 11 328d-329b CH 3 15
 329c 331 CH 9 330a b K X 7. CH 6 426c
 42 K XIII. A 586b d 58 b CH 9.
 614b-d

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* VI Q 2.
 A 2 and A 2 31d 32. Q 2 A 4 REP 2
 52b-54c Q 54-59 284d 305b Q 64 1 334
 335c Q 5 3 384d 385c Q 9 3
 K 3 414-d 2 5 414d-416a 8 445
 20d 3 421-422b 1 A 5 423d-424d
 Q 9 4 422b-423c A 3 P 443d
 444d A 449b-450b Q 85. A 2 A 3
 451 453c 5 A 5 45 d-458d Q 8
 A 2 and 462a-466c A 3 A 3 46 b
 462a Q 89. 3 A 4 5d-4 6c A 4 445
 4 5c-4 Q 11 A 597 598c P R 2-11
 Q 8 2 628d 627c

20 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 50
 611 12 Q 5 1 A 10d P 2 12b-13c
 1 Q 5. A 1 2 410a-412

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* P R DI VII [10-
 5] 135c A 13 2] 132a b X VII [95-
 1] 149d 150a XXX [0-8] 151 [12 145]
 151-d

30 B *Confessions* Oration, BK III APH 1, 149

32 MILTO *Paradise Lost* BK I [14 255] 98b-
 99a BK II [142 151] 113b K III [654 735]
 149b-151b ep [651-693] 150a-b BK V [355-
 505] 183b-185a ep [355-413] 183b-184a. [469-
 505] 183b-185a K VI [66-9] 233b-234a

33 PASCAL *Prover* 9, 2 1

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X
 SECT 9 143a-c CH XIII SECT 13 207d 208b
 SECT 35 213c-d BK III CH I SECT 3 268d
 CH XI 3 CT 23 302a b BK IV CH III SECT 6
 315a b SECT 23 320a-c CH XVII SECT 14
 378c-d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 81
 423c-d

36 STEWART *Traveller Sketch* 318b

3 The angelic will and angelic love

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 9 101b-c
 par 11 101d 102b par 15 102b-c par 18
 103b-c par 21 22. 103d 104a par 29 105c /
City of God BK IX. CH 10 229a 29 a BK X
 CH 7 302d 303a K X 1 CH 3 343d-344b
 CH 6-9 345b-348b BK XIII CH 1 586b d
 587b

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 59-
 60 306b-314c Q 61a A 318d 319c Q 64 A
 2 3 33d-33 c

20 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 50
 A 611 12a P RT II-11 Q 5 A 2 411b-412a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* P R DI VII [31-
 39] 112a XXX [70-139] 142a-c XX VII 148d
 150b ep [106-114] 150a XXX [52-66] 150d
 151 [12 145] 151c-d

3 MILTO *Paradise Lost* BK V [332-743] 187
 K VII [61-643] 245b-246a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I CH XXI
 SECT 50-51 191b-c

47 GO *The Faerie Queene* P RT II [1 6-6-824] 294a
 287b [1 524 12 11] 288b-294b

3/ Angelic union in character in general

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 45
 A 5 445 and REP 245c 247a Q 51-3 275a
 284d Q 91 A 2 R P 1 485b-486b 4 REP 2
 48 d-488c Q 106-107 540c 552b Q 10-111
 564c 571d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* P RT I 174c 175c d

2. MILTO *Paradise Lost* BK VII [107 114]
 234b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K II CH
 XXI S CT 13 207d 208b

3g The angelic hierarchy-the equality ord
 and number of the angels and their rel
 non to one another

Old Te *Gen* 1 *Prophet* 80 1- (D) *Prophet*
 792 / *Isaiah* 6 1 3-16- (D) *Isaiah* 6 1-8
 3 16 / *Ezekiel* 10 112-2- (D) *Ezekiel* 10
 112- / *Daniel*

Apocrypha T 1 15 1- (D) OT T 1121
 1 12

- (3) *The conception of angels in Judaeo-Christian doctrine* 3g *The angelic hierarchy the inequality order and number of the angels and their relation to one another*

NEW TESTAMENT *Colossians* 1 16 / *I Thessalonians* 4 16—(D) *I Thessalonians* 4 15 / *Hebrews* 12—23 / *Jude* 9 / *Revelation* 5 11—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 11

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk xii par 12 102a par 31 106c d / *City of God* bk viii ch 24 283b bk xvii ch 30 617c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 758c Q 50 A 1 3—4 272a 274b Q 63 A 7 331c 332b A 9 REP 3 333b d QQ 106—109 545c 564b PART I II Q 4 A 5 REP 6 632c 634b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 759b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112—138] 109a xxviii 148d 150b xxiix [127 145] 151c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk v [600 904] 188b 195a esp [769—799] 192a [809 845] 193a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk iv ch iii SECT 27 321d 322a ch xvi SECT 12 370c 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 81 428c d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243—270] 7a b PART II [11 844—12 111] 288a 294b

- 4 Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls their relation to the blessed in the heavenly choir

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 4 18 19 / *Psalms* 8 4 5—(D) *Psalms* 8 5—6

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 2 23 33 / *Mark* 12 18—27 / *Luke* 20 27 38 / *I Corinthians* 6 2—3 / *Hebrews* 1 13—14 2 7 12 23 23 / *Revelation* 22 8—9—(D) *Apocalypse* 22 8 9

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk xii par 23 104b c / *City of God* bk vii ch 30 261d bk viii ch 14 18 273d 277a ch 25 283b c bk ix ch 5 13 288b 292d ch 22 296d 297a bk xi ch 29 339a b bk xiii ch 1 360a b bk xvi ch 6 426c 427a bk xxi ch 10 569d 570b bk xxii ch 9 614b d / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 23 630a c ch 30 632c 633b ch 33 633d 634b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II 7 A 2 REP 2 31d 32c Q 23 A 1 REP 3 132c 133b Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 275b 276b QQ 54—60 284d 314c passim Q 62 317c 3 5b passim Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 3 347b 348d Q 75 A 7 384d 385c Q 76 A 2 REP 1 388c 391b A 5 ANS 394c 396a Q 79 A 1 REP 3 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 8 ANS and REP 3 421c 422b Q 84 A 3 REP 1 443d 444d A 7 ANS 449b 450b Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c A 5 ANS 457d—458d Q 87 A 1 ANS and REP 3 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b—468a Q 89 A 3 ANS 475d 476c

A 4 ANS 476c 477a A 7 REP 2 478d 479c Q 93 A 3 493d 494c Q 97 A 1 ANS 513c 514 Q 108 A 1 ANS 552c 553c A 8 561a 562a Q 117 A 2 597c 598c PART I II Q 2 A 3 REP 1 617b 618a Q 4 A 5 REP 6 632c 634b Q 5 A 1 REP 1 636d 637c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 6 11a 12a Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 12b 13c PART II II Q 5 A 2 411b—412a PART III Q 6 A 3 REP 1 742a 743a Q 8 A 4 759b d PART III SUPPL. Q 69 A 3 REP 5 887d 889c Q 10 A 3 CONTRARY 897d 900d Q 89 A 3 1007d 1008b A 8 1011b—1012a Q 95 A 4 1046d 1047d Q 96 A 9 1062d 1063b Q 99 A 3 1081d 1083a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a vii [121 148] 116b c viii [22 39] 116d 117a xix [40—66] 135c d xxi [73 102] 139a b xxix [13—36] 150b c xxxi 153b 154c xxxii [87—114] 155c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [31 3 2] 43d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80d 81a / *Notum Organum* bk ii AP II 15 149a

3* MILTON *At a Solemn Music* 13a b / *Paradise Lost* bk ii [345 353] 118b 119a bk iii [65—715] 149b 151b esp [631 693] 150a b bk iv [358 365] 160a b bk v [388 450] 183b 185a [469—505] 185b 186a bk vi [316 353] 203a 204a bk viii [66—178] 233b 236a bk x [888 908] 293b 294a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b 418 243a , 93 326b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch x SECT 9 143a c ch xxiii SECT 13 207d 208b bk iv ch iii SECT 17 317c ch xvii SECT 14 378c d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 319a 394a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 51 163b c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 894 12 111] 289b 294b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk vii 295b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* bk ii 22c 23a

- 5 The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 4 18

NEW TESTAMENT *I Peter* 2 4 / *Jude* 6

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk x par 67 88b c / *City of God* bk ix 285b d 298a c passim bk xi 322b [342a c] passim esp ch ii 13 328d 330b ch 19 20 332b 333a bk xii ch 1—9 342b d 348b bk xiii ch 1 586b d 587b / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 33 633d 634a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c QQ 3—4 325b 338d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE xix [49—81] 150d 151a

23 HORACE *Lexanthan* PART III 174d 175a PART IV 258d 259b

- (3) *The conception of angels in Judaeo-Christian doctrine* 3g *The angelic hierarchy the inequality order and number of the angels and their relation to one another*

NEW TESTAMENT *Colossians* 1 16 / 1 *Thessalonians* 4 16—(D) 1 *Thessalonians* 4 15 / *Hebrews* 12 2 23 / *Jude* 9 / *Revelation* 5 11—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 11

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII PAR 12 102a PAR 31 106c d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 24 283b BK XVII CH 30 617c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 50 A 3—4 272a 274b Q 63 A 7 331c 332b A 9 REP 3 333b d QQ 106—109 545c 564b PART I II Q 4 A 5 REP 6 632c 634b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 759b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112—138] 109a XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [127 145] 151c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [600—904] 188b 195a esp [769 799] 192a b [909—845] 193a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH III SECT 27 321d 322a CH XVI SECT 12 3, 0c 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 8 428c d

47 COETSE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243—70] 7a b PART II [11 84 12 111] 288a 294b

- 4 Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls their relation to the blessed in the heavenly choir

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 4 18 19 / *Psalms* 8 4 5—(D) *Psalms* 9 5—6

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 23 33 / *Mark* 11 18—27 / *Luke* 20 27—33 / 1 *Corinthians* 6 2 3 / *Hebrews* 1 13 14 7 12 2 3 / *Revelation* 22 8—9—(D) *Apocalypse* 22 8 9

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII PAR 23 104b c / *City of God* I BK VII CH 30 261d 1K VIII CH 14 18 273d 277a CH 25 283b c BK IX CH 5 13 288b 292d CH 22 296d 297a BK XI CH 29 339a BK XIII CH 1 360a b BK XVI CH 6 426c 427a BK XVI CH 10 569d 570b BK XVIII CH 29 614b d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 23 630a CH 30 632c 633b CH 33 633d 634b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 2 31d 32c Q 23 A 1 REP 3 132c 133b Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 275b 276b QQ 54—60 284d 314c passim Q 62 317c 325b passim Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 3 347b 348d Q 75 A 7 384d 385c Q 76 A REP 1 388c 391a A 5 ANS 394c 396a Q 79 A 1 REP 3 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 8 ANS and REP 3 421c 422b Q 84 A 3 REP 1 443d 444d A 7 ANS 449b—450b Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c A 5 ANS 457d 458d Q 87 A 1 ANS and REP 3 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b 468a Q 89 A 3 ANS 475d 476c

A 4 ANS 476c—477a A 7 REP 2 478d—4 9c Q 93 A 3 493d—494c Q 97 A 1 ANS 513c 514 Q 108 A 1 ANS 552c 553c A 8 561a 562a Q 117 A 2 597c 598c PART I II Q A 3 REP 1 617b 618a Q A 5 REP 6 632c 631b Q 5 A 1 REP 1 636d 637c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50 A 6 11a 12a Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 2 12b—13c PART II II Q 5 A 2 411b—412a PART III Q 6 A 3 REP 2 742a 743a Q 8 A 4 759b d PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 3 REP 5 887d 889c Q 0 A 3 CONTRARY 897d 900d Q 89 A 3 1007d 1008b A 8 1011b—1012a Q 95 A 4 1046d 1047d Q 96 A 9 1062d 1063b Q 99 A 3 1081d 1083a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [3 49] 111a VII [121 148] 116b VIII [22 39] 116d 117a XIX [40 66] 135c XX [73 10] 139a XXIX [13—36] 150b XXXI 153b 154c XXXII [95—114] 155c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [314 322] 43d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80d 81a / *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a

32 MILTON *At a Solemn Music* 13a b / *Paradise Lost* BK II [345 353] 118b 119a BK III [6—4 35] 149b 151b esp [681—693] 150a b BK IV [358 365] 160a b BK V [388 450] 183b 185a [469—505] 185b 186a BK VI [316 333] 203a 204a BK VIII [66—178] 233b 236a BK X [483 908] 293b 294a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b 418 243a 793 326b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 9 143a CH XXIII SECT 13 207d 208b BK IV CH III SECT 17 317c CH XVII SECT 14 378c d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 319a 394a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 51 163b c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363a b

47 COETSE *Faust* PART II [11 894 12 111] 289b 294b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII 295b c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 22c 23a

- 5 The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels

OLD TESTAMENT *Jol* 4 18

NEW TESTAMENT *1 Peter* 2 4 / *Jude* 6

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X PAR 67 88b c / *City of God* BK IX 285b 298a passim BK XI 322b d 342a c passim esp CH II 13 328d 330b CH 19 20 332b 333a BK XII CH I—9 342b d 348b BK XVII CH 1 586b d 587b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I II 33 633d 634a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 4 A ANS 257b 258c Q 63 A 3 325b 338d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [49—81] 150d 151a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 174d 175a PART IV 258d 259b

to 6a

32 M LTON *Paradise Lost* κ 1 93a 110b esp
[2 292] 94a 99b [357-6 3] 106a b κ 11
[2 9-3] 115a 117a [477 452] 121b κκ 111
[613 3] 148b 151b κiv [110] 152b-155a
[88-1 15] 169b-174b κκ [577-] κ 11 [912]
187b-216a passim

47 G THE *Fa n PROLOGUE* [243 92] 7a 8
48 *VELLILLE M by Duck* 219b

4 The origin of the division between angels
and demons the sin of Lucifer or S i n

Old Test κ vt *Isaiah* 14-4 27-(D) *Isaiah*
14-4 27

Apocrypha *II sdom fS lom n 224*-(D) OT
Bo k of II sdom 224 5

New Test ment *II Peter* 3 / *Jud* 6 / *Res la*
1 n 127 10-(D) *Apo aplyse* 127 0

18 *ACCELYTIVE Confessio* κ κ pa 67 88b-c /
Cry of God κ κ 1 c 19-20 326d 333a κκ
κ 1 c 1 343d 344b κκ 6-9 345b-348b κκ
κ 1 c 1 586b d 587b

19 *Aql* κ *Summa Theologica* κ 1 c 4
1 257b-258c q 63 325b-333d

21 D T *D ire Comedy* *HELL* 11 [22-51] 4b-c
κ κ 1 { 1 361 51c *una* κ 1 κ { 27 21 }
70c p *RADI* κ κ { 30- } 135c *xvii* [19-
66] 150d 151a

22 C L c κ *Monks Tale* [400 -0 2] 434a

III BACO *Adia cement of Learn* g 83a

3 M LTON *P duse Lor* κκ 1 93a 110b esp
[7-83] 94 95 κκ iv [32 04] 153a 154b
κ v [600-904] 188b-195a

47 *GOETHE Fa n* κ κ [1 5] 246a
47a

5 *DOST* κ κ *Brothers La am* κ κ 1
344c d

56 Th society of the demons the rule of S i n
or the powers of darkness ss

Apocrypha *Eccl* κ κ 39 28-(D) OT
Exclenatru 19 33 34

De T κ *Matthew* 9 34 10 25 22 3
/ *Mark* 32 / *Luke* 11 34 3 / *Joh* 8 3-59 /
Ephes 1 13 6 2 / *I Cor* 13 17 /
/ *J* 1 39 / *Rete* n 29 3 9 1
15 2-(D) *Ap ship* 29 3 9 1 11 18

18 A κ *Cry of God* κκ κκ 11 541a-c
Christ Doctrine κκ 11 37 673d-674

19 Aq *Summa Theol* κ κ 1 c 63
8-9 332 333d q 109 562a 564b

21 D *D ire Comedy* *HELL* 11 52d esp 11
[1-4] 11 13b *xvi* [9-39] 25c-d,
κ κ 130a 34c *xx* 7 [1 4] 411c-*xxx* v
16-31 31

22 C L c κ *F n Tale* [602-7-2 0] 229a 283b
/ *S m ner Prolog* c 284b-285a

23 I I a *Less than* κ κ 11 195a PART IV
247 248

3 M LTON *Paradise Lost* κκ [42 63] 98b-
99a κκ 1 { 1 11a 122b esp [11 42]
111b-11 a κ v [9-9] 154b a [600-904]
188b-195

33 *PASCAL Proc cal Le* κκ 116a

47 *GO TH Fa n* κ κ 1 [2335-2604] 56b-63b
esp [463 2531] 60 61b [3835 42 2] 93b-
103a κ κ 11 [11 63-67] 283a 284a

6 The role of the angels in the government of
the universe

Old Testa ment *Genesis* 3 24 28 12 / *Psalms*
103 0-2-(D) *Psalms* 102 0-2 / *Dan* c
10 / *Zachariah* 17-21 4 1-6 8-(D) *Zacha*
κ 1 17 1 4 1-6 8

New T *TAL ENT Matthew* 24 31 / *Mark* 13 27
/ *J* 1 1 / *Rete* 10n 52 11 14 8 20
passim-(D) *Apocalypse* 52 11 14 8-20 pas-
sim

18 *ACCELYTIVE Cry of God* κκ κκ 11 30 261d
κκ 11 c 1 24 283a b κκ κ 11 308a b
κκ 21 311c 312a κκ κκ 11 7 359 360a c
κκ 1 c 1 426a c κκ κκ 11 586b d

19 *Aql* κ *Summa Theologica* κ κ 1 c 45
κ 5 κ and κκ 1 245c 247a q 63 κ κ 1
331c 332b q 64 κ 4 κ 337d 338d q 66
κ 3 κκ 2 347b-348d q 89 κ 8 κκ 2 479c
480c q 9 κ 2 κκ 1 3 485b-486b κ 4 κκ 2
487d-488c q 106-114 545c 85c

21 *DIRE D ire Comedy* *HELL* 11 [67-96]
10b c p *REATORY* 11 [10-51] 54c 55a κ
[22 61] 64c κ { 1 361 75b-d κ 11 [40 63]
78d 79 κκ v [33 154] 91a b *PARAD* 11
[112 135] 109 111 [91 148] 117d 118c *xiii*
[5] 126a *xxviii* [1 0-139] 150a *xviii*
[13 45] 150b-c

24 *RA ELAIS Gargantua and Pa Jagrue* κκ 11
117d

3 *M LTON Pa ad e Lor* κκ 11 [119-134] 113b-
114 [3 249] 116b [402 416] 120a κ v 111
[550-60] 229a 230a / *Areopagus* a 410a

6a The ministry of the good angels in the
affairs of men, guard angels

Old Testa ment *Genesis* 16 7 12 18 1 19 2
2 9-1 22 19 24-40 32 1 24 3 48 3
16 / *F od* 14 19- 23 20-23 32 34 35 2 /
Numbers 2 16 22 2 35 / *Josh* 4 5 3 15-
/ *Josue* 5 13 16 / *Judg* 1 2 1 4 6 1 24 3
/ *II Sam* 1 4 5 1 -(D) 11 11 11 24 15
17 / *I Ker* 19 5-8-(D) 111 11 8 19 5-8 /
II Kings 19 32 35-(D) IV 11 8 19 3 35
/ *II Cf om* 1 21 1 30-(D) 11 *P ralph* men n
21 2 5 / *II Cf* 0 1 1 32 21-(D) 11 *P*
1 *pomen* n 32 21 / *Psalms* 34 7 35 5 6 91 10-
13-(D) *P r lms* 33 8 34 7 6 90 10-3
Isa 6 6-7 37 37-(D) 11 11 6 6-7 3 36
/ *D* d 32 8 6 22 8-12-(D) *D a* 1 3 9 5
6- 8-12 / *Hose* 12 2 4-(D) *Qie* 2 2-4
/ *Zachariah* 17 21 3-(D) *Zacha* 11 11
21 3

Apoc v 1a T but 31 5 12-(D) OT T 1 a
325 5 12 / *B ru* 11 6 7-(D) OT *Baruch*
6 6 / *Son of Three* Cf *Idren* 2 26-(D) OT
D 1 3 49-50 / *B and De gon* 31 4 -
/ (D) OT *D* 1 14 30-41

- (6) *The role of the angels in the government of the universe* 6a *The ministry of the good angels in the affairs of men guardianship*

Apocrypha *Tobit* 38—(D) OT *Tobias* 38 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 2 4—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 2 24 25

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 1 18 25 2 13 19 20 13—4 30 36 43 47 51 18 10 24 31 28 1 7 / *Mark* 1 13 13 27 / *Luke* 1 1 38 2 8 15 16 22 / *John* 5 4 12 28 29 / *Acts* 5 17—20 7 52—53 8 26 10 1—7 22 30 32 12 5 11 23 9 27 21—24 / *Galatians* 3 19 / *Hebrews* 1 13—14 / *Revelation* 1 1 7 11 14 6 20 15—18 19 17 18 22 16 —(D) *Apocalypse* 1 1 7—11 14 6 0 15—18 19 17—18 22 16

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk xii par 37 108d / *City of God* bk viii ch 2 283b c bk x ch 8 303a d ch 12—13 306d 307c bk xiv ch 9 516a c / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 30 632c 633b ch 33 633d 634b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 66 A 3 REP 2 347b 348d Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d 464d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 91 A 2 RFI 1 3 485b 486b QQ 111—113 568b 581d PART I II Q 3 A 7 REP 2 628a d Q 5 A 6 641a 642a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 98 A 3 241c 242b PART III SUPPL Q 76 A 3 912b d Q 89 A 3 1007d 1008b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL viii [65] 1c [103] 11c 13b PURGATORY v [85—1—9] 59d 60c viii [1—108] 64a 65b 1c [70 145] 66c 67b vii [73 136] 71a d xviii [40—63] 78d 79a PARADISE xxxii [85 114] 155c d

22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Tale* [15 588 825] 463b 467b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 174d 175a 175c d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 132b = 158c 159b 168c

27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC II [38—50] 270d 71a

32 MILTON *Comus* 33a 56b esp [170—29] 37a 38b / *Paradise Lost* bk ii [1024 1033] 133b bk iv [549—588] 164b 165a [7, 6 843] 169b 170b bk v [224—247] 180a b bk vi [393—912] 215b 216a bk viii [630 643] 246a / *Areopagitica* 410a b

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 124a / *Pensées* 722 309b 312a 846 339a b

47 COETIVE *Faust* PART II [11 676—12 111] 284a 294b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 409b 410a

5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk vii 185a c

- 6b *The intervention of the demons in the affairs of men temptation possession*

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 / *I Samuel* 16 14 23 —(D) *I Kings* 16 14—23 / *I Kings* 22 20—23—

(D) *II Kings* 22 20—23 / *I Chronicles* 21 1—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 21 1 / *II Chronicles* 18 20 —(D) *II Paralipomenon* 18 20—22 / *Job* 1 2

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 4 1 11 8 28 34 9 32 34 12 2 30 43 15 13 19 24 30 36—43 17 14 18 / *Mark* 1 13 4 15 5 1 20 / *Luke* 4 1—13 8 2 3 12 26—36 11 14 26 22 3—6 / *John* 8 31 59 10 19 21 13 21 27 / *Acts* 5 1 11 8 5—8 10 37 38 16 16 18 / *Roman* 8 38 39 / *II Corinthians* 10 11 11 13 15 / *Galatians* 1 8 / *Ephesians* 2 2 / *I Thessalonians* 1 18 / *I Peter* 5 8—9 / *Revelation* 2 10 9 12 13—(D) *Apocalypse* 2 10 9 12 13

10 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk x par 67 88b c / *City of God* bk ii ch 4 26 164c 166d bk viii ch 15 24 274d 283b bk ix ch 18 295c d bk x ch 9 11 303d 306d ch 21 22 311c 312b bk xiv ch 18 480d 482a bk xv ch 9 516a c / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 23 24 648a 649a bk iii ch 37 673d 674a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 9 REP 3 333b d Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d 464d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 114 581d 582 e

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 80 159d 162d PART III Q 8 1a, 8 761d 763b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL viii [65] 1c [103] 11c 13b PURGATORY v [85 136] 40a 41b PURGATORY [91 157] 50c 51b PURGATORY v [85 129] 59d 60c viii [1—108] 64a 65b

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [4778 4805] 240b 241a / *Friar's Tale* 278a 284a / *Philician's Tale* [12 055—072] 368a b / *Pardoner's Tale* [12 778 825] 380b 381b / *Priest's Tale* par 20 508b 509a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 69c 71a PART III 174d 175a 195a PART IV 258c 261a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk ii 93d 94a bk iii 169d 173d bk iv 261a 265a 285c 288d 300b d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT II SC III [356—399] 220c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk i [27 36] 94a [331 621] 100b 107a bk ii [310 339] 118a 119b [496 503] 122a [1024 1033] 133b bk iv [3—113] 153a 155a [358 392] 160a 161a [502 535] 163b 164a [776 1015] 169b 174b bk vi [893—912] 215b 216a bk ix [404 794] 256a 264b

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 140a / *Pensées* 84 325b 843 3 7b 338a 850 340a

40 CANNON *Decline and Fall* 184c d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE 7a 9b PART I [48 517] 14a b [1178 336] 29b 56a esp [13—2 1384] 32b 34a [1530 1867] 37a 44b [3776—3834] 92a 93b [4176 4 05] 102a 103a PART II [4941—4970] 122b 123a [5357 5392] 132b 133a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 21d 22b bk iv 85b e bk v 130b 132c bk vi 169c 170b bk vii 175b 176b bk x 293a =

7 God and Satan

18 A LISTINE City of God κ π 530a 560a c
passim

19 AQUIN S mma Theologica PART I Q 63
325b-333d esp a 3 327b-328b

20 AQUIN S mma Theologica PART I Q 80
a 1 e 2 3 159d 160c

21 DANTE Di Comedy i ll. cxxiv 51b-52d

22 CILICA Fra s Tale 278a 284a

23 HORACE Letitia PART III 195a

24 MILTO Pa ad se Lost 93a 333a esp bk i ii

93a 134a κ i i [56-131] 136b 138a bk iv

[106-105] 174b bk v [221 245] 180 b bk

v [63]-bk vi [89a] 187b-215b bk x [1-62]

274b-275b [460-584] 284b-287a

33 PAS L Peniter 84 325b 820 331b 826

332b-333 846 339a b

34 DOITO sw Brothers ha amatoz bk vi

337a 346a

7 Warfare between the powers of light and dark and the struggle for dominion over man

OLD TESTAMENT I Samuel 16 14 23-(D)

I ha g 6 14 23 / Job i 2 / Zechariah 3 i

7-(D) Zacharias 3 i 7

Apocrypha Tobit 8 3-(D) OT Tobias 8 3

NEW TESTAMENT I Matthew 4 ii 1 22 30

13 19 24 30 36-43 2 4 / Mark 1 13 5 20

1 / Luke 4 13 8 26-36 10 17 20 14 23

22 31 34 / J h 32 3 / Acts 8 5-8 19 11

20 26 29 / Romans 6 20 / I Corin

th 10 20- / I II Crnth ans 2 10-11

4 3 4 10 2-5 11 13 15 / Eph 2 4 7 6 10-

18 / II Th 10 10 12 28-9 / Timothy 4 1- /

II Tm th 2 24 26 / II Tr 12 2 3 15 /

J me 47 / I Pter 5 8-9 / I John 3 8-12 /

Jud 9 / Revelation 2 9-3 3 9-13 12 14

16 13 4 2 c i -(D) Apocalypse 2 9-13

3 9-13 12 14 16 13 4

18 AL TI F Co f m m s bk i v p r 24 27

25b 26a κ v par 2 32d 33a bk x pa 67

82b / City of God κ cii 5 165c 166b

bk c i 6 345b-346c bk x v ii 13

541 542d / Christ on Doct ne bk i c 3

643a κ i 137 673d 674

19 AQUIN S mma Theol g a PART I Q 8 A 1

a 4 34d 35c 3 κ 36b 37 42 49 3

266d 268a q 63 2 a 326c 327b

20 AQUIN Summ Theol g a PART II 11 11 11 11

q 74 a 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

21 D 2 Divine Comedy II ll. c [63]-11

(i 11 11 13b xx 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

65b xi 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

22 CILICA Fra s Tale [722-724] 284

23 II a Let Am 1 247a 248a

32 AL TOY Per dise Lost bk ii [890-900] 130b

133 a 11 415 135b-144b κ iv [6 9-

9] 262a 264

33 PASCAL Provincial Letters 116a b

40 GIBSON Decl ne a d F B 81b-c

41 GIBSON Decl ne a d Fall 330b

47 GO THE Pa st ologue 7a-9b PART I

[1335 1378] 33a 34a PART II [11 612-843]

282b 288a

48 MELVILLE Wobey D ch esp 4b-5a 117a 121b

131a 138a 144a b 370b 372a 418a-419b

52 DOSTOEVSKY B others karama oi bk iii 50c

54b esp 54a b bk iv 86b-c bk v 130b 136b

bk vi 151b-d 169c 170b bk vii 175b 176c

185a-c bk xi 342d 343b

7 Lucifer in the service of God

OLD TESTAMENT Job i 2 / Psalms 8 49-(D)

Psalm 77 49

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18 AUGUSTINE City of God κ viii cii 24 283a

b bk x cii 21 311c 312a bk xii cii 27 359c

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31 MILTON Pa ad se Lost κ i [157 168] 97a

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8 Criticism and satire with respect to the belief in angels and demons

23 HORACE Letitia II κ i 51d 52b 69c 71a

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24 RABELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel II

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25 MONTAIGNE Essay 500 501a

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38 MONTESSQUIEU Spirit of Laws bk xii 86d

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46 HEGEL Philosophy of History = κ iv 354c

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22b κ x 337 346a

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CROSS REFERENCES

- For Other discussions relevant to the theory of angels see ETERNITY 4a IDEA 1c KNOWLEDGE 7b MIND 10c SOUL 4d(2) and for the metaphysical consideration of immaterial substances see BEING 7b(-)
- The theological doctrine of the fallen angels see SIN 3 3b and for the related doctrines of Heaven and Hell see ETERNITY 4d GOOD AND EVIL 1d 2b IMMORTALITY 5c-5f PUNISHMENT 5e(1)
- The theory of the celestial motors see ASTRONOMY 8b CHANGE 14

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

- AUGUSTINE *De Genesi ad Litteram*
 AQUINAS *On Being and Essence* CH 4
 — *Summa Contra Gentiles* BK II CH 46-55 91-101 BK III CH 104-110
 — *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* QQ 8-9 *De Malo* Q 16 *De Inima* A 7
 — *On Spiritual Creatures* AA 1-3 5-8
 — *De Substantiis Separatis*
 DANTÉ *Commedia (The Banquet)* SECOND TREATISE CH 5 7
 MACHIAVELLI *Belfagor*

II

- PHILO JUDAEUS *On the Cherubim*
 PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* (M)
 DIONYSIUS *On the Celestial Hierarchy*
 ERIGENA *De Divisione Naturae* BK I (4 7-9) II (6 2) IV (7-9) V (13)
 MAIMONIDES *The Guide for the Perplexed* PART I CH 49 PART II CH 2-7
 BONAVENTURA *Breviloquium* PART II (6-8)
 R. BACON *Opus Majus* PART VII
 ALIÖ *The Book of Principles (Sefer ha Ikkarim)* BK 15 CH 1-
 CALVIN *Institutes of the Christian Religion* BK 1 CH 14 (3)
 LUTHER *Table Talk*
 DÖNNE *Are and Angels*
 SUAREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XII (14) XXXIV (3 5) XXXV XLI (2) LI (3 4)
 MARLOWE *The Tragic History of Doctor Faustus*

- HEYWOOD *The Hierarchy of the Blessed in Hell*
 H. LAWRENCE *Of Our Communion with the Angels*
 CAMFIELD *A Theological Discourse of Angels and Their Ministries*
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 SWEDENBORG *Angelic Wisdom Concerning the Divine Providence*
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 W. SCOTT *Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft*
 J. H. NEWMAN *The Powers of Nature in Vol II Parochial and Plain Sermons*
 HEINE *Gods in Exile*
 LOFTE *Microcosmos* BK IV CH 2
 MICHELLE *Satanism and Witchcraft*
 IRAYER *The Golden Bough* PART IV BK 1 CH 4 PART VI PART VII CH 4-7
 WENDELL *Were the Witches of Salem Guilty?* in *Stelligers*
 LEA *Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft*
 IRVING *The Revolt of the Angels*
 FARNELL *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*
 WILLIAMS *The Place of the Lion*
 CLOVER *The Daemon Environment in Greek Byzantium*
 LIEBOWITZ *The Medical Man and the Witch During the Renaissance*
 LONIER *The Angels*
 C. S. LEWIS *Out of the Silent Planet*
 — *The Screwtape Letters*

Chapter 2 ANIMAL

INTRODUCTION

ALPHABETICAL ordering places ANIMAL after ANGEL in this list of ideas. There is a third term which belongs with these two and but for the alphabet might have come between them. That term is MAN.

These three terms—and a fourth! God which rounds out the comparison—are conjoined in Shakespeare's statement of what is perhaps the most universal reflection of man upon himself: What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! Animal angel god—in each of these man has seen himself. And at different moments in the history of thought he has tried to identify himself with one to the exclusion of the others.

Yet predominantly man has regarded himself as an animal even when he has understood himself to be created in God's image and to share with the angels through the possession of intellect the dignity of being a person. As his understanding of himself has varied so has he altered his conception of what it is to be an animal.

In terms of a conception of personality which involves the attributes of reason and free will man has legions as well as morally and meta-physically drawn a sharp line between persons and things and placed brute animals in the class of things. According to the principle of classification being alive or even being sensitive does not give animals any more than plants and stones, the dignity or status of persons.

When man's animality—either in terms of his intellectual faculties or his evolutionary origin—has seemed a legitimate definition of his nature man has attributed to animals many of

his own traits: his intelligence and freedom even his moral qualities and political propensities. Nevertheless he has seldom ceased to regard himself as the paragon of animals possessing in a higher degree than other animals the characteristic properties of all.

There are exceptions to this however. Animals have been glorified by man for skeptical or satiric purposes.

Montaigne for example doubts that man can lay claim to any special attributes or excellences and further suggests that in some particulars at least men are less able and less noble than the beasts. Relying on legends found in Pliny and Plutarch which describe the marvelous exploits of animals he argues that it is not upon any true ground of reason but by a foolish pride and vain opinion that we prefer ourselves before other animals and separate ourselves from their conditions and society.

Why Montaigne asks should we attribute to I know not what natural and servile inclination the works that surpass all we can do by nature and art? We have no grounds for believing that beasts by natural and compulsory tendency do the same things that we do by our choice and industry. Rather we ought to be continues from like effects to conclude like faculties and consequently confess that the same reason the same method by which we operate are common with them or that they have others that are better.

Nor can we excuse our presumption of superiority by the fact that we are compelled to look at animals from our human point of view.

When I play with my cat Montaigne writes "who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she makes me? We mutually divert one another with our monkey tricks. If I have my hour to begin or to refuse she also has hers. Suppose animals were to tell us what they

thought of us. The defect that hinders communication betwixt them and us—why may it not be on our part as well as theirs? 'Tis yet to determine. Montaigne thinks where the fault lies that we understand not one another for we understand them no more than they do us by the same reason they may think us to be beasts as we think them.

If Montaigne's view were to prevail, no special significance could be given to brute as opposed to rational animal. For that matter the same holds true whenever man is conceived as just an animal paragon or not. Animals are brute only when man is not—only when to be human is to be somehow more than an animal different in kind, not merely in degree.

Satirists like Swift idealize an animal nature to berate the folly and depravity of man. In his last voyage, Gulliver finds in the land of the *Houyhnhnms* a race of human-looking creatures; the Yahoos, who by contrast with their noble masters, the horses, are a miserable and sorry lot. Here it is the Yahoos who are brutes bereft as they are of the intelligence and virtue which grace the splendid *Houyhnhnms*.

THE COMPARISON of men and animals takes still another direction in the allegories of fable and poetry. From Aesop to the medieval *Bestiaries* there is the tradition of stories in which animals are personified in order to teach a moral lesson. In the *Duane Comedy* Dante uses specific animals to symbolize the epitome of certain passions, vices, and virtues. The intent of his allegory is however never derogatory to man as man. But when Machiavelli allegorizes the qualities required for political power, he advises the prince knowingly to adopt the beast and to choose the fox and the lion. This tends to reduce human society to the jungle where strength and guile compete for supremacy.

The comparison of men and animals fails to touch the distinction or lack of distinction between animals and plants. This is basic to the definition or conception of animal nature. As in the case of men and animals, this problem can be approached in two ways: either from the side of plant life, and with respect to those functions which seem to be common to all living things; or from the side of animal life, and with respect to those functions which seem to belong only to

animals, never to plants. On either approach the issue remains: whether plants and animals are different in kind, not merely in degree.

On the one hand it may be argued that sensitivity, desire, and locomotion (even perhaps sleeping and waking) are in some form or degree to be found in all living things. On the other hand it may be argued that such functions as nutrition, growth, and reproduction, though obviously common to plants and animals, are performed by animals in a distinctive manner. If plants manifest all the vital powers or activities present in animals, or if in functions common to both, animals differ only in degree, then the scale of life would seem to be a continuous gradation rather than a hierarchy.

The opposite position, which affirms a difference in kind and consequently a hierarchy, is taken by Aristotle. In his biological writings as well as in his treatise *On the Soul*, he draws a sharp line between plant and animal life by reference to faculties or functions absent in the one and found in the other. Aristotle first points out that living may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay, and growth. Hence he goes on: we think of plants also as living for they are observed to possess in themselves an unquenchable power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions; they grow up and down, and everything that grows increases in bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all, and continues to live so long as it can absorb nutriment.

This led him to assign to plants what he calls a nutritive or vegetative soul, whereby they have the three basic faculties common to all living things—nutrition, growth, and reproduction. But Aristotle does not find in plants any evidence of the functions performed by animals, such as sensation, appetite, and local motion. These are the characteristic powers of the animal soul, called by him the sensitive soul, because sensation is the source both of animal desire and animal movement.

Galen follows Aristotle in this distinction. In his *Natural Faculties* he limits his investigations to the functions common to all living things. He uses the word natural for those effects such as growth and nutrition, common to plants as well as animal, which in his view

are opposed to such activities as feeling and voluntary motion peculiar to animal, that he calls effects of the soul or psyché. It may seem surprising at first that Galen's study of nutrition, growth, and reproduction—not only of the functions themselves but of the bodily organs and processes involved in these functions—should be restricted to their manifestation in animals and not in plants as well. The reason may be that for the naturalists of antiquity the biological functions of vegetable matter did not yield their secrets readily enough to observation. A treatise on plants not written by Aristotle but attributed to his school begins with the remark that life is found in animals and plants but whereas in animals it is clearly manifest in plants it is hidden and less evident.

This view of the world of living things as divided into the two great kingdoms of plant and animal life prevailed through centuries of speculation and research. But from the time that Aristotle began the work of classification it has been realized that there exist numerous examples of what Bacon called "bordering instances" such as exhibit those species of bodies which appear to be composed of two species or to be the rudiments between the one and the other.

Within the last hundred years the difficulty of classifying such specimens, particularly those which seem to fall between plant and animal has raised the question whether the traditional division can be maintained. If we look even to the two main divisions, namely to the animal and vegetable kingdoms, writes Darwin, "certain low forms are so far intermediate in character that naturalists have disputed to which kingdom they should belong. Yet Darwin does not find the evidence available to him sufficient to determine whether all living things have descended from one primordial form or whether the evolution of life is to be represented in two distinct lines of development."

Since Darwin's day the researches of scientists like Loeb and Jennings on the behavior of micro-organisms and the phenomena of tropisms (e.g. the sunflower's turning toward the sun) and the study of what appears to be local motion in plants have contributed little of equal evidence relevant to the issue. It is, however, still considered open and arguable.

The fact that organisms exist which do not readily fall into either classification may signify continuity rather than separation between plants and animals but it may also be taken to mean that more acute observations are required to classify these so-called intermediate forms. Plant tropisms may or may not require us to deny that sensitivity belongs to animals alone. The apparent local motion of plants may be a mode of growth or a random movement rather than a directed change of place to place and the attachment to place of apparently stationary animals, such as barnacles and mussel, may be different from the immobility of rooted plants.

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these major issues concerning plants, animals, and men as continuous or radically distinct forms of life, the study of animal organisms—their anatomy and physiology—acquires much of its critical significance.

Anatomy is an ancient science. Several surgical treatises of Hippocrates display an extensive knowledge of the human skeletal structure and the disposition of some of the organs of the human body. The dissection of animals as well as gross observation provides Aristotle with a basis for the comparative anatomy of different species of animal. For Galen as well as Aristotle much of this anatomical study was motivated by an interest in the structure and relation of the organs involved in the local motion of the body as a whole and in local motions within the body such as the motions of the alimentary or reproductive systems.

It remains for a later investigator, schooled in the tradition of ancient biology, to make the startling discovery of the circulation of the blood through the motions of the heart. Harvey not only does this but he also suggests the functional interdependence of respiration and circulation based on his observation of the intimate structural connections between heart, arteries, veins, and lungs. His contribution is at once a departure from and a product of the scientific tradition in which he worked for though his conclusions are radically new he reaches them by a method of research and reasoning which follows the general principles of Aristotle and Galen. His insistence, moreover,

thought of us. The defect that hinders communication between them and us: why may it not be on our part as well as theirs? 'Tis yet to determine Montaigne thinks where the fault lies that we understand not one another for we understand them no more than they do us by the same reason they may think us to be beasts as we think them.

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der lacks, the lizard an organ of locomotion which the oyster lacks. The sponge lives in one manner so far as locale is concerned and the spider in another. Reptiles have one manner of locomotion, birds another. So ample were Aristotle's data and so expert were his classifications that the major divisions and sub-divisions of his scheme remain intact in the taxonomy constructed by Linnæus.

The radical character of Darwin's departure from the Linnæan classification stems from a difference in principle rather than a correction of observational errors or inadequacies. Where Aristotle and all taxonomists before Darwin classify animals by reference to their similarities and differences, Darwin makes inferred genealogy or descent the primary criterion in terms of which he groups animals into varieties, species, genera and larger phyla.

Naturalists according to Darwin try to arrange the species genera and families in each class, on what is called the Natural System. But what is meant by this system? Some authors look at it merely as a scheme for arranging together those living objects which are most alike and for separating those which are most unlike.

The end, utility and utility of this system are indubitable, but Darwin thinks that its rules cannot be explained or its difficulties overcome except on the view that the Natural System is founded on descent with modification—that the characters which naturalists consider as showing true affinity between any two or more species are those which have been inherited from a common parent. All true classification being genealogical—that community of descent is the hidden bond which naturalists have been unconsciously seeking—and not some unknown plan of creation or the enunciation of general propositions and the mere putting together and separating objects more or less alike.

In Darwin's opinion on classification must be strictly genealogical in order to be natural. Only by the principle of descent—the one it is only known cause of similarity—is organic being such as we arrange all organic beings through all time in groups under groups, see the nature of the relation: lupus by which hall is a dog and a fox to gain in the mind by complex relation, and various lines of affinities into a few grand classes and understand the

wide opposition in value between analogical or adaptive characters and characters of true affinity. Furthermore the importance of evolutionary characters and of rudimentary organs in classification becomes intelligible on the view that a natural arrangement must be genealogical. By reference to this element of descent not only shall we be able to understand what is meant by the Natural System but also Darwin adds our classifications will come to be as far as they can be so made genealogical and will then truly give what may be called the plan of creation.

Whereas the Aristotelian classification is static in principle having no reference to temporal connections or the succession of generations, the Darwinian is dynamic—almost a moving picture of the ever shifting arrangement of animals according to their affinities through common ancestry or their diversities through genetic variation. Connected with this opposition between static and dynamic principles of classification is a deeper conflict between two ways of understanding the nature of scientific classification itself.

The point at issue is whether the classes which the taxonomist constructs represent distinct natural forms. Do they exist independently as objects demanding scientific definition or are the scientist's groupings somewhat arbitrary and artificial? Do they divide and separate what in nature is more like a continuous distribution with accidental gaps and unevenness? This issue in turn tends to raise the metaphysical question concerning the reality and basis of species, which relates to the problem of the difference between real and nominal divisions and the difference between natural and arbitrary systems of classification.

On these matters Aquinas and Locke have much to say as well as Aristotle and Darwin. Further discussion of such questions is to be found in the chapters on DEFINITION and EVOLUTION. Insofar as problems of classification and the nature of species have a bearing on evolution they are treated in that chapter as are the related issues of continuity or hierarchy in the world of living things and of difference in degree or kind as between plants and animals and animals and men. The last two problems also occur in the chapters on LIFE and MAN.

on the necessity of finding a functional purpose for an organic structure stands as the classic rejoinder to Francis Bacon's recommendation that formal and final causes be separated from material and efficient causes in the study of nature. Bacon assigns the first two types of cause to metaphysics and limits physics to the last two.

Harvey's work on the generation of animals is another example of the continuity between ancient and modern biology. In some respects Aristotle's researches on the reproductive organs and their functions are more general than Harvey's. They represent for him only part of the large field of comparative anatomy and have significance for the study of mating habits in different classes of animals. Yet on the problem of the act of generation itself its causes and consequences, especially the phenomenon of embryonic development, Harvey's treatise reads partly as a conversation with Aristotle and partly as the record of original observations undertaken experimentally.

Respect for our predecessors and for antiquity at large, he writes, inclines us to defend their conclusions to the extent that love of truth will allow. Nor do I think it becoming in us to neglect and make little of their labors and conclusions, who bore the torch that has lighted us to the shrine of philosophy. The ancients, in his opinion, by their unweaned labor and variety of experiments, searching into the nature of things, have left us no doubtful light to guide us in our studies. Yet Harvey adds: no one of a surety will allow that all truth was engrossed by the ancients, unless he be utterly ignorant of the many remarkable discoveries that have lately been made in anatomy. Referring to his own method of investigation, he proposes as a safer way to the attainment of knowledge that in studying nature we question things themselves rather than by turning over books.

It is particularly with respect to animal generation that the great books exhibit continuity, as well as indicate the logical conditions of their solution. The issue of spontaneous generation, as opposed to procreation, runs through Aristotle, Lucretius, Aquinas, Harvey, and Darwin. The problem of sexual and asexual repro-

duction, with all the relevant considerations of sexual differentiation and sexual characteristics, is to be found in Aristotle, Darwin, and Freud. Questions of heredity, though they are raised with new significance by Darwin and William James, have a lineage as ancient as Plato.

Scientific learning has of course advanced in recent times with regard to the nature and behavior of animals. On such topics as heredity, the work of Mendel, Bateson, and Morgan is crucial, or to take another example, our knowledge of the functioning of the respiratory and the nervous system has been greatly enlarged by the researches of Haldane, Sherrington, and Pavlov. Yet even in these areas the background of recent scientific contributions is to be found in the great books—in the writings, for example, of Harvey, Darwin, and William James.

ANOTHER INTEREST which runs through the whole tradition of man's study of animals lies in the problem of their classification—both with respect to the principles of taxonomy, itself, and also in the systematic effort to construct schemes whereby the extraordinary variety of animal types can be reduced to order. In this field Aristotle and Darwin are the two great masters. If the names of Buffon and Linnaeus also deserve to be mentioned, it must be with the double qualification that they are followers of Aristotle on the one hand, and precursors of Darwin on the other.

The Aristotelian classification is most fully set forth in the *History of Animals*. There one kind of animal is distinguished from another by many properties: by locale or habitat, by shape and color and size, by manner of locomotion, nutrition, association, sensation, by organic parts and members, by temperament, instinct, or characteristic habits of action. With respect to some of these properties Aristotle treats one kind of animal as differing from another by a degree—by more or less—of the same trait. With respect to other properties, he finds the difference to consist in the possession by one species of a trait totally lacking in another. He speaks of the lion as being more ferocious than the wolf, the crow as more cunning than the raven, but he also observes that the cow has an organ of digestion which the spi-

act opposite of action based upon free will. It is completely determined by the inherent pattern of the instinct. It may vary in operation with the circumstances of the occasion, but it does not leave the animal the freedom to act or not to act or to act this way rather than that. Such freedom of choice, Aquinas holds, depends on reason's ability to contemplate all the reasons, none of which is the human will bound by natural necessity.

Aquinas does not limit human reason and will to a role analogous to the one he ascribes to instinct and emotion in animal life. Their power enables man to engage in speculative thought and to seek remote ends. Nevertheless, on the level of his biological need man must resort to the use of his reason and will where other animals are guided by instinct. Man has by nature, Aquinas writes, his reason and his hands, which are the organs of reason since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety and for any number of purposes. Just as the products of reason take the place of hair, hoofs, claws, teeth, and horns—fixed means of defense or of clothing—as is the case with other animals—so reason serves man's needs in the view of Aquinas as instinct serves other animals.

Others like Darwin, James, and Freud seem to take a different view. They attribute instinct to men as well as to animals. In their opinion its influence on determined behavior is influenced by intelligence and affected by memory and imagination. In animals as well as in men. They recognize however that instinct predominates in some of the lower forms of animal life, and acknowledge that the contribution of intelligence is great only among the more highly developed organisms.

Man has a far greater variety of instincts than the lower animal, writes James, and any one of these instincts taken in itself is as blind as the lowest instinct can be but owing to man's memory, power of reflection, and power of inference they come each one to be felt by him as if he were related to them and experienced the results in connection with a few of those results. On the same grounds, James argues that *every creature acts upon animals as memory may or will be kind after being once received and must be accompanied*

with foresight of its end just so far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance."

If instinct, in animals or men were sufficient for solving the problems of survival, there would be no need for what James calls sagacity on the part of animals, or of learning from experience. Like Montaigne, James assembles anecdotes to show that animals exercise their wits and learn from experience. No matter how well endowed an animal may originally be in the way of instincts, James declares, his resultant actions will be much modified if the instincts combine with experience. If in addition to impulses he have memories, associations, inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale.

In his consideration of the intellectual contrast between brute and man, James places the most elementary single difference between the human mind and that of brutes in the deficiency on the brute's part to associate ideas by invariants so that characters the abstraction of which depends on this sort of association, must in the brute always remain divorced. Darwin similarly makes the difference in degree between human and animal intelligence a matter of greater or less power to associate ideas. In consequence human instincts are much more modified by learning and experience than the instincts of other animals, as in turn the higher animals show much greater variability in their instinctive behavior than do lower organisms.

It is not necessary to deny that men alone have reason in order to affirm that in addition to instinct animals have intelligence in some proportion to the development of their sensitive powers, especially their memory and imagination. The position of Aristotle and Aquinas seems to involve both points. But if we attribute the extraordinary performances of animals to their intelligence alone, rather than primarily to instinct then we are led to conclude with Montaigne that they possess no more than a sensitive intelligence, or a reasoning instinct.

Why does the mind make better with it here in one place and so better in another? Montaigne asks. Why now one sort of knot and then another if she has not deliberation thought and conclusion? And in another

ON THE THEME of comparisons between animals and men two further points should be noted

The first concerns the soul of animals. When soul is conceived as the principle or source of life in whatever is alive, plants and animals can be said to have souls. Like Aristotle, Augustine distinguishes three grades of soul in universal nature: one which has only the power of life; the second grade in which there is sensation; the third grade, where intelligence has its throne.

Though he also follows Aristotle in defining three kinds of soul, Aquinas distinguishes four grades of life and in so doing differentiates between *perfect* and *imperfect* animals. There are some living things, he writes, in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power, such as immovable animals as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive power, as perfect animals which require many things for their life and consequently movement to seek the necessities of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely men.

On this theory, man, viewed in terms of his animal nature, is a perfect animal. Viewed in terms of his reason or intellect, he stands above the highest animals. Yet having a soul is not peculiar to man, just as being alive or sensitive or mobile is not. But when, as with Descartes, soul is identified with intellect—as a thing which thinks, that is to say, a mind, or an understanding or a reason—and in addition soul is conceived as a spiritual and immortal substance, then the conclusion seems to follow that animals do not have souls.

For Descartes, the theory of the animal as a machine or automaton follows as a further corollary. If there had been such machines possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, Descartes claims that we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals. Hobbes likewise would account for all the actions of animal life on mechanical principles. For what is the heart but a spring, he asks, and the

nerves but so many strings and the joints but so many wheels giving motion to the whole body? The animal is thus pictured as an elaborate system of moving parts inflexibly determined to behave in certain ways under the impact of stimulation by external forces.

The doctrine of the animal automaton is sometimes generalized as by La Mettrie, a follower of Descartes, to include the conception of man as a machine. The same conclusions which are reached from the denial of soul in animals seem to follow also from the theory that the soul, even in the case of man, is material or a function of matter. According to those who like Lucretius hold this view, the phenomena of life, sensation and thought can be explained by the movement of atomic particles and their interaction.

The second point concerns the relation between instinct and intelligence in animals. The nature of animal instincts (or innate habits) is considered in the chapters on EMOTION and HABIT, as is the nature of animal intelligence in the chapters on MAN and REASONING. But here we face the issue whether instinct functions in animals as reason does in man, to meet the exigencies of life, or whether in both, though varying in degree, intelligence cooperates with instinct to solve the problems of adjustment to environment.

Those who like Aquinas regard instinct and reason as the alternative and exclusive means which God provides for the ends of animal and human life necessarily tend to interpret animal behavior in all its detail as pre-determined by elaborate instinctive endowments. Accordingly, animal behavior, even when voluntary, rather than purely the action of physiological reflexes, is said not to be free, or an expression of free choice on the part of the animal, for as is pointed out in the chapter on WILL, Aquinas calls behavior voluntary if it involves some knowledge or consciousness of the objects to which it is directed.

Instinctive behavior, such as an animal's flight from danger or its pursuit of food or a mate, involves sense perception of the objects of these actions, as well as feelings or emotions about them. But though it is voluntary in the sense in which Aquinas uses that word, instinctive behavior is according to him the

exact opposite of act on based upon free will. It is completely determined by the inborn part of the instinct. It may vary in operation with the circumstances of the occasion but it does not leave the animal the freedom to act or not to act or to act this way rather than that. Such freedom of choice Aquinas holds depends on reason's ability to contemplate alternatives to none of which is the human will bound by natural necessity.

Aquinas does not limit human reason and will to a role analogous to the one he ascribes to instinct and emotion in animal life. Their power enables man to engage in speculative thought and to seek remote ends. Nevertheless on the level of his biological needs man must resort to the use of his reason and will where other animals are guided by instinct. Man has by nature, Aquinas writes, his reason and his hands, which are the organs of organs since by this it means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety and for any number of purposes. Just as the product of reason takes the place of hair, hoofs, claws, teeth and horns—fixed means of defense or of clothing as is the case with other animals—so reason serves man's need in the view of Aquinas as instinct serves other animals.

Others like Darwin, James and Freud seem to take a different view. They attribute instinct to men as well as to animals. In their opinion instinctively determined behavior is influenced by intelligence and affected by memory and imagination in animals as well as in men. They recognize, however, that instinct predominates in some of the lower forms of animal life and acknowledge that the contribution of intelligence is great only among the more highly developed organisms.

Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any other animal. Let James and any one of these impulses taken in itself is as blind as the lowest instinct can be but owing to man's memory power of reflection and power of inference they come each one to be felt by him. After he has come to yield to them and experienced their result in connection with a free judgment of those results. On the same grounds James argues that every instinctive act in an animal with memory must be to be blind after feeling its repeated and must be accompanied

with foresight of its end just so far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance.

If instinct in animals or men were sufficient for solving the problems of survival there would be no need for what James calls sagacity on the part of animals, or of learning from experience. Like Montaigne, James assembles anecdotes to show that animals exercise their wits and learn from experience. No matter how well endowed an animal may originally be in the way of instincts, James declares, his resultant actions will be much modified if the instincts combine with experience if in addition to impulses he has memories, associations, inferences and expectations on any considerable scale.

In his consideration of the intellectual contrast between brute and man, James places the most elementary single difference between the human mind and that of brutes in the deficiency on the brute's part to associate ideas by similarity, so that characters the abstraction of which depends on this sort of association must in the brute always remain drowned. Darwin similarly makes the difference in degree between human and animal intelligence a matter of greater or less power to associate ideas. In consequence human instincts are much more modified by learning and experience than the instincts of other animals, as in turn the higher animals show much greater variability in their instinctive behavior than do lower organisms.

It is not necessary to deny that men alone have reason in order to affirm that in addition to instinct animals have intelligence in some proportion to the development of their sensitive powers, especially their memory and imagination. The position of Aristotle and Aquinas seems to involve both points. But if we attribute the extraordinary performances of animals to their intelligence alone rather than primarily to instinct then we are led to conclude with Montaigne that they possess not merely a sensitive intelligence but a reasoning intellect.

Why does the spider make her web tighter in one place and slacker in another? Montaigne asks. Why not one sort of knot and then another if she has not deliberation, thought and conclusion? And in another

place he asks: What is there in our intelligence that we do not see in the operations of animals? Is there a polity better ordered, the offices better distributed, and more inviolably observed and maintained than that of bees? Can we imagine that such and so regular a distribution of employments can be carried on without reason and prudence?

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Aeschylus includes the taming of animals among the gifts of Prometheus who first brought under the yoke beasts of burden who by draft and carrying relieved men of their hardest labors. yoked the proud horse to the chariot teaching him obedience to the reins to be the adornment of wealth and luxury. The *Iliad* pays eloquent testimony to the change in the quality of human life which accompanied the training of animals to respond to human command. Homer's reference to *Castor as breaker of horses* indicates the sense of conquest or mastery which men felt when they subdued wild beasts and the oft-repeated Homeric epithet *horse taming* which is intended as a term of praise for both the Argives and the Trojans implies the rise of a people from barbarous or primitive conditions—their emancipation from the discomforts and limitations of animal life.

Aristotle points out that one mark of wealthy men is the number of horses which they keep for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. For the same reason he explains in old times the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies.

Legend and history are full of stories of the loyalty and devotion of animals to their human masters and of the reciprocal care and affection which men have given them. But motivated as it is by their utility for economic or military purposes the breaking of animals to human will also frequently involves a violent or wanton misuse.

The use or even the exploitation of animals by man seems to be justified by the inferiority of the brute to the rational nature. As plants exist for the sake of animals so animals according to Aristotle exist for the sake of man the tame for use and food the wild if not all at least the greater part of them for food and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Aristotle's conception of the natural slave discussed in the chapter on SLAVERY uses the domesticated animal as a kind of model for the treatment of human beings as tools or instruments.

Though he does not share Aristotle's view that some men are by nature slaves Spinoza takes a comparable position with regard to man's domination and use of animals. The law against killing animals he writes is based upon an empty superstition and womanish tenderness rather than upon sound reason. A proper regard indeed to one's own profit teaches us to unite in friendship with men and not with brutes nor with things whose nature is different from human nature. I by no means deny he continues that brutes feel but I do deny that on this account it is unlawful for us to consult our own profit by using them for our pleasure and treating them as is most convenient to us inasmuch as they do not agree in nature with us.

But other moralists declare that men can be friend animals and insist that charity if not justice should control man's treatment of beasts. Nor is such contrary teaching confined to Christianity or to the maxims of St. Francis, who would persuade men to love not only their neighbors as themselves but all of God's creatures. Plutarch for instance argues that although law and justice we cannot in the nature of things employ on others than men nevertheless we may extend our goodness and charity even to irrational creatures. In kindness to dumb animals he finds the mark of the gentle nature—the sign of a man's humanity. Towards human beings as they have reason behave in a social spirit says Marcus Aurelius but he also writes: As to animals which have no reason and generally all things and objects do thou since thou hast reason and they have none make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit.

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PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53] *Psychology* 116a-119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page; the letters c and d refer to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

ALTERNATE DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CHAPTER) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets, as given in certain cases, e.g. 10 d BK II [165-283] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D). Examples: Old Testament *Genesis* 1:1-45—(D) *II Esdras* 7:46.

SPERES. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

FORMATTING. Additional format concerning the style of the references: see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*; consult the Preface.

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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part i 49a d
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 286a 287b 290c 291b
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 369d 370b
 433c 435a 456b-458a esp 457a d
 30 BACON *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 27
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 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* part v 59a c
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch ix
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 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xiv 103a c

- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337c d
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 244a 245b
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 261c 262a 301c
 302a 397d 398a 402b c 406c 432c-434c
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 9b 13a passim esp 13a
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 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 647a
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1a(2) *Animal memory imagination and intelligence*

- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* bk xvii [290-327] 280a c
 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 112b c
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk ii 319c 320b
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk i ch i [980 28
 b-7] 499a b / *Soul* bk iii ch 3 [42^b14 427^b9]
 660a 661b ch 10 [433 8 12] 665d ch 10
 [433^b27] ch ii [434^b9] 666c d / *Memory and
 Reminiscence* 690a 695d
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk i ch i
 [488^b-5 7] 9d bk viii ch i [588 18 31]
 114b d [589 1 3] 115b bk ix ch i [608 11
 32] 133b d ch 7 [612^b18-32] 138b c ch 46
 [630^b17-23] 156a / *Ethics* bk vii ch 3
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 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* bk iv [962
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk x par 26 78b
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* part i q 18
 a 4 ans and rep 3 5-6 411d-413d part ii
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part i 50a 51b 52b
 53d 64b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 218c 219b 229d 230b
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 454a
 31 DESCARTES *Rules* xii 19d 20a
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk viii [369-451]
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 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch x
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 35 HUME *Human Understanding* sect ix div 83
 487c d
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* part iv 163b-164b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a 341d 342a
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 291d 294c 296c
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 3b 6b esp 5b 13a 14a
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1a(3) *Animal appetite desire and emotion in animals*

- 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk xvii [426-455] 126c d /
Odyssey bk xvii [290-327] 280a c
 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk ii 146c d
 7 PLATO *Symposium* 165c 166b / *Republic* bk
 ii 319c 320b / *Laws* bk vi 712b
 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* bk iii ch 9 ii 664d 667a
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vi ch 18
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- BE IX CH 4 [611g-14] 136d CH 3 [6 12a-
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- 10 GALEN General Faculties BK III C 16 202d
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- 12 LACRETIUS Nature of Things BK III [136-160]
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- 22 CH I 2 Manicule Tale 104 33] 490a b
- 23 HO B LATINIAN PA T 1 61 -d 61a-c
- 25 VI VT II E ESSAY 224c 225b
- 27 S A KE RE AMR LEAF CTI BC V (109-
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- 28 H A RT On Animal Generation, 346a 347d
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- 31 GY DEZ Ethics v RTM ROF 5 S MOL 415b
- 33 ROX S C Ingu liy 343d 345a
- 46 BONV L f h son 21 d 316a
- 48 VEL TEL VI by Deck 289b-291b
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543d 54 d
- 51 T LA OT War e d Pr c BK XII, 5 b K
n 609d-606a
- 53 JANE Psy hology 14 b 49b-51a 700b-711a
parmi, esp 702a 703a 717b 723b-725 72ab
- 54 F General Introduction 607d-609b esp
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- 1 (4) Locomotion, degrees of animal motility
- B IAS OTL So i BK III CH 9-1 664d 667a
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- 9 ARISTOTLE History f Animals K I K I
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- 12 LACRETIUS Nature of Things BK V [83-89] 72a b
- 19 AGRI S 5 sum Th logic P RT I Q 19
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- 24 R BELAIS Gory w 3 and P aguel, BK III
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- 31 DESC RTES Rats CH 19d 20a
- 35 LOCK Humani l deves dno BK II CH IV
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- 49 DR D Devere of V n 279a 280c 371d
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- 1a(5) Sleeping and waking in animals
- 8 ARISTOTLE Sleep 676a 701d
- 9 A TOTL History of A mals BK I: CH 19
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- 12 LACRETIUS Nature f Things BK IV [707-961]
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- 20 ARISTOTLE Somn Theologica v TITUS LIPPI
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97 d
- 38 FO MEAL I eq slay 337c
- 1b The distinction between plants and animals
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classify
- 7 PLATO Timaeus 469d-470a
- 8 ARISTOTLE Torax BK VI CH 10 [145-23 35]
202b-c / Physica BK II CH 8 [199-10-13]
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- 9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals BK IV CH 6
[531-3-9] 58d BK V CH 1 [539-15 25] 65b-d
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- 10 GAL V A S IF CH S BK I CH 2 167a b
- 12 LACRETIUS Nature of Things BK II [100-1] 23d 4a
- 12 AL ELIAS V durations BK VII SECT 7 286a
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(1 *General theories about the animal nature* 1b
The distinction between plants and animals in faculty and function cases difficult to classify)

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 23 256b c
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18
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 398c 457c d 461b d
 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 30
 159c d
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IV
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 271d 272b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 119c
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 241b c / *Descent of
 Man* 372b c
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a
 54 FREUD *Unconscious* 429c d

1c *The distinction between animal and human
 nature*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1:20-30 / *Psalms* 8 esp
 8:4-8—(D) *Psalms* 8 esp 8:5-9 / *Ecclesiastes*
 3:18-22
 5 Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* [436-505] 44c
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 5 Euripides *Trojan Women* [669-672] 275d
 7 Plato *Laches* 35b d / *Protagoras* 44a 45a /
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 8 Aristotle *Topics* BK V CH 3 [132-17-22]
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 9 Aristotle *History of Animals* BK I CH I
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 10] 201d 202a BK IV CH 10 [686-25-637^a5]
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 itics* BK I CH 2 [1253^a7-18] 446b BK III CH 9
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- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 109b c
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 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 16 262d
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X PAR II 74a b
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 / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1
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 A 3 ANS 661d 665c Q 11 A 2 667b d Q 12
 A 5 672a c Q 13 A 673c 64c Q 15 A
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 688b
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50
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 22 CHaucER *hought of Tale* [1303-1333] 181b
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52b 53a b 54a
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 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 207a c 215a 232c
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC IV [3-39]
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 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 19d 20a / *Discourse*
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 31 SPINOZA *Letters* I III III PROP 57 SCHOL
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 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [449-540] 227a
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 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a 339 344 233a b
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 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO SECT I
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- [illegible]

(1 *General theories about the animal nature* 1b
The distinction between plants and animals
in faculty and function cases difficult to
classify)

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BA VII CH 23 256b c
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18
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 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 278b / *Circula*
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 398c 457c d 461b d
 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 30
 159c d
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IV
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 271d 272b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 119c
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 241b c / *Descent of*
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 53 JAMES Psychology 8a
 54 FREUD *Unconscious* 429c d

1c *The distinction between animal and human*
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- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 20-30 / *Psalms* 8 esp
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 3 18-22
 5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [436-505] 44c
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 5 EURIPIDES *Trojan Women* [669-672] 275d
 7 PLATO *Laches* 35b d / *Protagoras* 44a 45a /
Cratylus 93a b / *Timaeus* 452d 453a / *Laus*
 BA II 653b BK VII 723c d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK V CH 3 [132 17 22]
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 357b BK VI CH 2 [1139 17-0] 387d CH 13
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- 11 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b c
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 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 16 262d
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BA V par 11 74a b
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 / *City of God* BK VII CH 3 256b c BK VI
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 / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 625c 627a
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1
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 CONTRARY 618d 619c Q 6 A 2 616a Q 10
 A 3 ANS 664d 665c Q 11 A 2 667b d Q 1
 A 5 672a c Q 13 A 2 673c 674c Q 15 A
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50
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 22 CHALCOPH *Knight's Tale* [1303 1333] 181b
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52b 53a b 54a
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 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 207a 208a 215a 232c
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC 1 [32 37]
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 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 19d 20a / *Discourse*
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 31 SPIZIA *Libri* PART III PROP 57 SCHOL
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 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BA VII [449 549] 227a
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 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b 339 344 233a b
 418 243a / *Vacuum* 357a 358a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO SECT I
 93a b BK II CH VI SECT 4 11 144d 146a pas
 sim esp SECT 10-11 145d 146a CH XXVII SECT

1c The distinction between animal and human nature)

1c(2) Comparison of animal with human intelligence

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 319c 320c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 8 [199 20-23] 276c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980 28-981 12] 499a c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488^b 0-27] 9d BK VIII CH I [538 18^b 4] 114b II BK IX CH I [608 10-19] 133b d 134a CH I 7 [612^b 18-32] 138b c / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [641^b 5-10] 164b c BK IV CH I 10 [686^a 22-687^a 23] 218b d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 3 [731 21-8] 271c d BK II CH I 6 [744 7-31] 285c / *Ethics* BK VI CH I 7 [1141^a 20 35] 390a b BK VII CH I 3 [1147^b 3-5] 397d / *Politics* BK I CH I 5 [1254^a 20-25] 448b
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH I 12 172d 173c
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 9 292b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 76 A 5 REP 4 394c 396a Q 79 A 8 REP 3 421c 422b Q 83 A 1 ANS 436d 438a Q 96 A 1 ANS and REP 4 510b 511b PART I-II Q 1 A 5 672a c Q 17 A 2 687d 688b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III SUPPL Q 79 A 1 ANS 951b 953b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52b 53a II 53d 54a 59b III 63a 64b c 79b c PART II 100a c PART IV 267b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215a 224a 231d 232c
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428a b 454a
- 30 BACON *Nocturn Organum* BK I APH 73 117d 118a BK II APH 35 163d 164a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 19d 20a / *Discourse* PART V 59d 60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a d 226a d
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12 LUCRETILS Nature f Th gr bk V [83-836]

71b-72a

18 AL LSTINE City of God bk XII ch 21 357a

b ch 27 359 360a c bk XVI ch 7 427a b

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I QQ 1

72 367a 369d

32 ALITO Paradise Lost bk II [357-550]

225b-229a

34 NE TON O c t bk III 542b

42 K Y Judgement S 8d 580a esp 579b-c

581b-58c

47 GOETHE Fa q P T II [8245-8 64] 201a

49 DARWIN Origin f Species Ia 251a c esp Ia

7d, 63b-64d 85b-c 217d 219a, 230a 243d /

II scet f Man 26 d

8b Di e se theores of nimal generat on pr-

creasun and spo taneous generat on

7 Plato Timaeus 476b-477a c

8 ARISTOTLE Meteorol gy K IV ch I [3, 9^b6-

8] 483c ch 3 [35^b9-13] 485d ch II [359^a9-

7] 49 c / Met hiner K II ch 9 [1034 32-

5] 5 7e d bk XII ch 6 [1 71^a29 31] 601c

ch 7 [1 1^a30-1 71^a2] 603a

9 ARISTOTLE History of f mals bk V ch I

[39^a 5^a13] 65b-66a ch II [43^a18-19] 70b

c 15 [40^a 7-51^a1] 73c ch 15 [4^a12]-c

16 [43 7] 74b-75b ch 10 [550^a31-51 13]

77d 78a [51^a19-55 7] 78c 79c ch 21

[523 16-23] 80a II ch 31 [556^b2]-ch 32

[557^a14] 83c-84b bk VI ch 15 [6 95a 96 /

Generat on f A mals K I C I [7 5 18-

7 62] 255b-256 ch 16 [21 3 1] 260d 261

bk I ch 1 [712^b14] 272d 273a ch 3 [737^a1

5] 277d bk I C I 9 299b-300a ch II

[61 24 63^a1] 302d 304d

12 L cr tils Nature f Th gr bk II [565-943]

26a 27 bk [783-82] 71b-d

18 AUGUSTINE City f God bk XII ch II 349a b

K X T ch 7 427a b

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica P RT I Q 25

A 2 REF 144c 145b Q 45 A 8 REF 3 249b-

2 0a Q 71 A 1 R 1367 368b H 72 A 1

R 5 368b-369d Q 92 A 1 AN and RE

438d-489d Q 118 AA 1 2 600a-603b Q 119

A 2 607b-608d

20 A Q V S Summ Thologica P RT I P Q 60

A 1 A 49d 50c

(8) *The generation of animals* 8b *Diverse the ories of animal generation procreation and spontaneous generation*

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 114b-c

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 105a b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338b d 390b e 400d 401a 406c d 412c 413a 428c ■ 449a ■ 454d 455a 468b 472c

30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK II APH 50 192a b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1c 61a

8c Modes of animal reproduction sexual and asexual

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157d 158b / *Timaeus* 476b d / *Statesman* 587a 588a

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH II [537^b - 538^a 21] 64b d BK V-VII 65a 114a c esp BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VI CH I 8 97b 99c / *Generation of Animals* 255a 331a c esp BK I CH I-2 255a 256c BK I CH I-BK II CH I 269c 276a BK II CH 5 282a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 3 185a 186d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 2 ANS 607b 608d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 338a 496d esp 390b 429

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 47c-49c 220a ■ / *Descent of Man* 390c 391b 395a 399c pas sim

54 FREUD *Instincts* 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 655b 651d 659d 660c

8c(1) Sexual differentiation its origins and determinations primary and secondary characteristics

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b / *Timaeus* 476b d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK II CH 3 [501^b20-25] 24a BK III CH 7 [516 15 o] 40c CH II [518 30-34] 42d 43a CH I 9 [5 1 21 31] 46b CH 20 [522 11 21] 47a ■ BK IV CH I [524^b31 525 13] 50d 51a CH 2 [5 53^a34 526 6] 52b CH 3 [5 7^b30 34] 54c d CH II 1 64b 65a c BK V CH II [540^b14 28] 67b CH 7 [541^b30]-CH 8 [542 1] 68c CH 14 [544^b32 545 22] 71c 72a CH 18 [550^b17 21] 77c d CH 28 [555^b18 23] 82c CH 30 [556^b11 13] 83b BK VI CH 2 [55 2, 29] 86a CH 10 [565^b13 15] 91d CH 19 [573^b32-574 1] 99d BK VII CH I [582 27 32] 107d 108a CH 3 [583^b14 29] 109b ■ CH 6 [58^b21 - 7] 111d BK VIII CH 2 [589^b29-590 4] 116b c BK IX CH I [608 21 619] 133b ■ 134a / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH I [661^b33 662 5] 189a ■ BK IV CH II [688 20-26] 219d 220a [688^b30 34] 220c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 2 256a c CH 18 [723 23 31] 263b c CH 19-20 266c 269c BK II CH I [731^b19 732 12] 272a ■ BK III CH 10 [759^b1 7] 300c

BK IV CH I 2 304b d 308d esp CH I [766 30-38] 307c d CH 3 [767^b3 14] 309a BK V CH 7 [86^b16 788 13] 328c 330a

11 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 9 12d 13b

12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK IV [122, 1232] 60b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 9 A 1 ANS and REP I 488d-489d Q 98 A 2 ANS 517d 519a Q 99 A 2 520a d Q 115 A 3 REP 4 588c 589c ■ 115 A 1 REP 4 600a 601c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. Q 81 A 3 966a ■ A 4 REP 2 966d 967d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 346b 400c 401b 402c d 454a b 462b 481c

30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spiritu of Laws* BK XVI 116d 117a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 339b 340c 361a 561d esp 364a 366b 373b 374c 384c d 586b 587d 594a 595b

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659d 661c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 785a [In I] / *New Introductory Lectures* 853d 855b

8c(2) The reproductive organs their differences in different classes of animals

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 476b d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 3 [489 9 14] 10b CH 13 [493 24] CH 14 [191^b6] 15b c CH 17 [417 -4-34] 19c d BK II CH I [500 3 5] 22c 23a CH 10 [503 4 7] 25b c CH 13 [504^b18 19] 27a BK III CH I 32a 35a BK IV CH I [524 2 9] 49a c [5 431^b-525 9] 50d CH I [527 11 30] 53c d BK V CH 2 [540 3] CH 3 [540 33] 66c 67a CH 5 [540^b29-541 12] 67b c CH 8 [541^b, 12] 68a b BK VI CH 9 [564^b10] CH 10 [564^b24] 90d 91a CH 10 [565 12 22] 91b c CH 11 [566 14] 92a b CH 12 [56, 11] CH 13 [567 24] 93b CH 32 105b c BK IV CH 30 [631^a 25] 157a [632 2 2,] 157c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 5 [680 12 681 5] 210b 211c CH 10 [689 3 34] 220d 221b CH 12 [69 26-27] 227a CH 13 [697^a10-14] 228d 229a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 16 255a 261b BK III CH 5 [755^b 756 3] 296c 297a CH 6 [756^b30-75, 13] 297d 298a CH 8 [758 7 15] 299a BK IV CH I [765^b35, 66b26] 307a 308a CH 4 [772^b27 773 25] 314d 315b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH I 3 199d 201a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 10c 11a 15a c BK II 70b c 95a 97b BK III 131b ■ 143a 144c 178b 185d 192b 193b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338d 352d 401b 405c 452c 473b 476b 477b 479c 485a

30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 310a b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 136b / *Descent of Man* 264d 265a 272a d 339b c 364a ■

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 592a

(8) *The generation of animals* 8b *Diverse the ories of animal generation procreation and spontaneous generation*)

- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 114b c
 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 105a b
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338b d 390b c 400d 401a 406c d 412c 413a 428c d 449a ■ 454d 455a 468b 472c
 30 BACON *Nolun Organum* BK II APH 50 192a b
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1c 61a

8c Modes of animal reproduction sexual and asexual

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 157d 158b / *Timaeus* 476b d / *Statesman* 587a 588a
 8 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH II [53¹ 2 538 21] 64b d BK V-VII 65a 114a c esp BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VI CH I 8 97b 99c / *Generation of Animal* 255a 331a c esp BK I CH I 2 255a 256c BK I CH 21-BK II CH I 269c 276a BK II CH 5 282a d
 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 3 185a 186d
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 2 ANS 607b 608d
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 338a 496d esp 390b 429c
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 4 c 49c 220a b / *Descent of Man* 390c 391b 395a 399c pas sim
 54 FREUD *Instincts* 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 655b 657d 659d 660c

8c(1) Sexual differentiation its origins and determinations primary and secondary characteristics

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b / *Timaeus* 476b d
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK II CH 3 [501²⁰⁻²⁵] 24a BK III CH 7 [516 15 0] 40c CH II [518 30 4] 42d 43a CH IV [521 21 31] 46b CH 0 [522 11 21] 47a b BK IV CH I [5-4³¹-525 13] 50d 51a CH 2 [525³⁴ 5 6 6] 52b CH 3 [527³⁰⁻³⁴] 54c d CH II 64b 65a c BK V CH 5 [540¹⁴ 28] 67b CH 7 [541³⁰]-CH 8 [542 1] 68c CH 14 [544³²⁻⁵⁴⁵ 2] 71c 72a CH 18 [550¹⁷⁻¹] 77c d CH 28 [555¹⁸ 3] 82c CH 30 [556¹¹ 13] 83b BK VI CH 2 [559 27 29] 86a CH 10 [565¹³ 15] 91d CH 19 [573³²⁻⁵⁷⁴ 1] 99d BK VII CH I [582 27 3] 107d 108a CH 3 [583¹⁴ 29] 109b c CH 6 [587²¹⁻²⁷] 111d BK VIII CH 2 [589²⁹⁻⁵⁹⁰ 4] 116b c BK IX CH I [608 1] 119] 133b d 134a / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH I [661³³⁻⁶⁶² 5] 189a b BK IV CH 10 [688 20-6] 219d 220a [689³⁰ 14] 220c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 2 256a c CH 18 [723 23 4] 263b c CH 19-■ 266c 269c BK II CH I [731¹⁸ 73 12] 272a b BK III CH II [759¹ 7] 300c

BK IV CH I-2 304b d 308d esp CH I [66³⁰⁻³⁹] 307c d CH 3 [6, 5-14] 309a BK V CH 7 [86¹⁶ 785 13] 328c 330a

- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 9 12d 13b
 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [12 1233] 60b
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A ■ ANS and REP I 488d 489d Q 98 A 2 ANS 517d 519a Q 99 A 2 520a d ■ 115 A 3 REP 4 588c 589c Q 118 A 1 REP 4 600a 601c
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 81 A 3 966a c A 4 REP 2 966d 967d
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 346b 400c 401b 402c d 454a b 462b 481c
 30 BACON *Nolun Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVI 116d 117a
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 339b 340c 364a 561d esp 364a 366b 373b 374c 384c d 586b 587d 594a 595b
 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659d 661c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 785a [in I] / *New Introductory Lectures* 853d 855b

8c(2) The reproductive organs their differences in different classes of animals

- 7 PLATO *Timaeus* 476b d
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 3 [489 8 14] 10b CH 13 [493 4] CH 14 [191⁶] 15b c CH 17 [497 24 34] 19c d BK II CH I [500 3 5] 2c 23a CH 10 [503 4 7] 25b c CH 13 [504¹⁸ 19] 27a BK III CH I 32a 35a BK IV CH I [524 2 9] 49a c [5 431-542 8] 50d CH - [5 7 11 30] 53c d BK V CH 2 [540 1] CH 3 [540 33] 66c 67a CH 5 [540²⁹⁻⁵⁴¹ 12] 67b ■ CH 6 [541¹² 12] 68a b BK VI CH 9 [564¹⁰] CH 10 [564²⁴] 90d 91a CH 10 [565 12 2] 91b c CH 11 [566 2 14] 92a b CH 12 [567 11]-CH 13 [567 24] 93b CH 32 105b c BK IX CH 50 [631¹ 25] 157a [632 2 2] 157c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [69 12] 691 210b 211c CH 10 [689 3 34] 220d 221b CH 12 [695 26 27] 227a CH 13 [697¹⁰ 14] 228d 229a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 16 255a 261b BK III CH 5 [555⁵ 7 6 6] 296c 297a CH 6 [750³⁰⁻⁷⁵⁷ 13] 297d 298a CH 8 [758⁷ 15] 299a CH 17 CH I [765³³ 766²⁶] 307a 308a CH 4 [772²⁷ 73 25] 314d 315b
 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 2 3 199d 201a
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 10c 11a 15a ■ BK II 70b c 95a 97b BK III 131b d 143a 144c 178b 185d 192b 193b
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338d 352d 401b 405c 452c 473b 476b 477b 479c 485a
 30 BACON *Nolun Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 310a b
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 136b / *Descent of Man* 264d 265a 272a d 339b c 364a b
 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 592a

10 H1 POCRATES *Aphorisms* SECTV par 33 139a
25 HAR XY On *Animal Generation* 363a 382d
364a 481 482b 482d-483a 484b 488a
488c

9 The period of gestation, parturition delivery birth

OLD TESTAM T *Genesis* 524 56 3527 3 /
f 6 39 1 4

AROC PHL *Hand n f Soumo* 12-(D) OT
Book of Wisdom 72

6 HE ORORE *H con* AK III 112d 113b AK
VI 297b-e 298b-d

9 AM TOTLE *History of Animals* AK I CH II
143¹³ 171 70b CH 12 1 43 3 70c CH 14
145⁶⁻⁹ 72b 146¹¹ 141 73a b CH 17 149¹⁹
142 a 76a 149¹ 3 76b-c CH 15 550⁶ 6-
23 77b 550⁶⁻⁹ 4 77c CH 15 553² 11 79d
AK I CH 2 559¹ 16 85b 560¹⁷ 4 87
b CH 4 562 15 31 89a CH 10 565²² 3 1
91 565²⁴ 3 92 CH 11 566 15 16 92b
CH 2 566¹ 9-20 92d CH 3 567²³ 27
93c-d CH 17 96b-97b CH 8 572³¹ 573 32
98d 99a CH 19 573² 99c CH 20 574¹ 100a
b CH 1 575²³ 29 101 CH 2 575¹
26-27 101 576² 5 101d 102 CH 23
577²¹ 1 102d 103a CH 26 578¹ 29
579¹³ 103d 104b CH 30 579¹⁹ CH 3
579¹³ 104d 105 CH 33 579³¹ CH 35
580¹⁹ 105c 106a AK VII CH 1 581 16-
107d CH 3 583¹¹ CH 4 584¹² 109b 110c
CH 9 585¹⁶ CH 10 585¹¹ 113a d AK I
CH 21 603³⁴ 604 3 129d CH 24 604²⁹
605¹ 130c / *Generation of Animals* AK I C
11 719² 30 259a b AK II CH 8 748² 31
287c AK III CH 2 752 1 753a-d AK IV
CH 4 772 3 314b-c CH 6 775¹⁴ 32
317b-c CH 8 777²² CH 10 778¹ 319b-
320a-c / *Politics* AK VII CH 6 1335¹ 2 1
5-0a 1335 12 19 540c

10 HIPPOCRATES *for Hares* Place par 4
10a d par 7 11 c / *Aphorisms* c par
29-6 138d 139d

10 G LAM *Nator / Facultie* AK I n 3 200a
201 CH 208c d

24 RA LAL *Gargantua d Pant gru L* 2 1
5c-6b 8c 9c

28 HAR X On *Animal Generation* 343d 353a
II 381b-382d 406a b 458-459d 476c

36 SYR X *Tristram Shandy* 268a b 270 274
49 VI X L *W by Dick* 254a 255a 287a b

49 DARW *Origin of Species* 91a / *D scent of*
Man 341b d [in 3] 384b-c

81 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* AK IV 180d 183b
54 F X *Psychology* 709 710a

54 F X *New Introductory Lectures* 854c

92 Character stics of the off pri gat b rib

9 A ISTOLE *History of Animals* AK VI CH 20
574²⁰ 29 100 CH 3 579²¹ CH 31 579¹⁹
104d 105b CH 33 580¹⁴ CH 35 580²⁹
105d 106a / *Generation of Animals* AK IV CH 6
574¹⁵ 775⁶ 316c 317 AK V 320a 331a-c
passim

49 DARW *Origin of Species* 222b-223b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b-50a 691 b 710a

10 Heredity and environment: the genetic
det mination of individual differences
and s milarities

7 PLATO *Republic* AK III 340b-341

9 AM TOTLE *History of Animals* AK I CH 19
573 3-7 491 99d CH 9 572⁶ 30 104c
AK VI CH 6 575¹ 9-586¹⁴ 112d 112b / *Paris*
f Ann ls AK I CH 1 560¹⁴ 25 162 d
164 27 39 164d 165a CH 1 1 1 14-CH 15

7 PLATO *Republic* AK 362b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* AK I
550¹ 3 33 22b-c CH 3 550¹² 2 27 b

AK III CH 20 521¹ 1-CH 1 523 13 46d-48c
AK V CH 15 550³² 46 77b-c CH 22 553²⁴
554⁶ 80c 81b CH 6-27 82a-c CH 33
553⁴ CH 33 553¹⁴ 84d 85a-c AK VI CH 4
88d 89b CH 6-9 89c 90d CH 12 560¹⁶-
561¹ 92d 93a CH 14 568¹³ 569¹⁴ 94c
95a CH 20 574¹⁷ 13 100b CH 21 575⁹ 12
101b CH 22 576¹¹ 12 102a b CH 26-27
103d CH 33 580² 5 105c d AK VII CH 3
583⁶ 33 108d 109a c 55 585 29-33 111b
CH 11 114a-c AK VIII CH 1 587 31-588³
115b AK IX CH 4 611⁹ CH 5 611²¹ 136d
CH 7 611 26-613 16 138c d CH 8 613¹⁷ 33
139a-c CH 11 614 31 31 140c CH 29 143c-d
CH 32 34 144b-145c passim CH 37 621¹ 1
146d 147a CH 49 631¹³ 17 156d 157a
/ *Parts of Animals* AK I CH 10 655 19-34
219d 220d / *Generation of Animals* AK III CH
2 521¹ 53¹ 293d 294b CH 10 295¹⁶-
296¹ 300c AK IV CH 8 318b-319c / *Politics*
AK I CH 8 1230¹ 15 450b-c AK II CH 17
5330³ 23 541a b

12 LOCKE *Treatise of Things* AK V 406-815
71c

28 IL X *Mo ion of the Heart* 288d / *On*
Animal Generation 350c-d 361b 362c 381b-
382d 402 b 439a d 461b 464c d 487c
488a

33 P ICAL *Height of for* 415a

35 LOCKE *Carl Government* CH VII SECT 78-80
42b-43a

36 ST X *Tristram Shandy* 316b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b 337b 340c

44 BOSWELL *Johnso* 510b-c

48 VI TALL *Woly Dick* 286b-287b

49 DARW *Origin of Species* 110c 111b / *De*
scent of Man 289d 290a 339d 340c 441c d
443b-444a

81 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* AK IV 661d
662c-d

53 JAL S *Psychology* 709 710a

54 F X *New Introductory Lectures* 854c

92 Character stics of the off pri gat b rib

9 A ISTOLE *History of Animals* AK VI CH 20
574²⁰ 29 100 CH 3 579²¹ CH 31 579¹⁹
104d 105b CH 33 580¹⁴ CH 35 580²⁹
105d 106a / *Generation of Animals* AK IV CH 6
574¹⁵ 775⁶ 316c 317 AK V 320a 331a-c
passim

49 DARW *Origin of Species* 222b-223b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b-50a 691 b 710a

10 Heredity and environment: the genetic
det mination of individual differences
and s milarities

7 PLATO *Republic* AK III 340b-341

9 AM TOTLE *History of Animals* AK I CH 19
573 3-7 491 99d CH 9 572⁶ 30 104c
AK VI CH 6 575¹ 9-586¹⁴ 112d 112b / *Paris*
f Ann ls AK I CH 1 560¹⁴ 25 162 d
164 27 39 164d 165a CH 1 1 1 14-CH 15

7 PLATO *Republic* AK 362b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* AK I
550¹ 3 33 22b-c CH 3 550¹² 2 27 b

(8) *The generation of animals*

8d Comparison of human with animal reproduction

- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk I ch 5 [489 36-18] 10d 11a bk v-vii 65a 114a c esp bk v ch 1 65a 66a ch b [542 17-31] 68d 69a bk vi ch 18 97b 99c bk vii 106b d 114a c / *Generation of Animals* bk I ch 9 11 258d 259b bk II ch 1 [732 24-733^b 23] 272c 274a ch 4-7 278b 288b esp ch 4 [737^b 25-739^b 33] 278c 280d / *Politics* bk I ch 2 [1252 26-31] 445c bk vii ch 16 [1335 11-18] 540a

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk xvii ch 24 609b 610a

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 75 A 0 REP 1 383c 384c Q 92 A 1 ANS 488d 489d Q 98 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 517d 519a Q 118 A 1 500a 603b

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xiv [34-78] 91d 92a

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 399a b 424d 425c

- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338a 496d esp 449a 454a 463d 464a 470c 472c

- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 555a 556a

- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b d 348d

- 47 CORTIUS *Faust* PART II [683S 6847] 167b

- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 256c 257a 354b 355a

- FREUD *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 121d

9 The development of the embryo birth and infancy

9a Oviparous and viviparous development

- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk I ch 5 [489 34-19] 10d 11a bk v ch 18 [549^b 30-550 31] 76d 77b bk vi ch 3 87c 88d ch 10 [564^b 26-565 12] 91a b ch 13 [57^b 27 568 4] 93d 94a bk vii ch 7 112b c / *Parts of Animals* bk iv ch 12 [693^b 21-22] 22c / *Generation of Animals* bk I ch 8-13 258b 260b bk II ch 1 [732 24 733^b 23] 272c 274a ch 4 [737^b 25] 280b c [739^b 21-33] 280c d bk III ch 1 [749 12 33] 290b d ch 1 [751 5] ch 4 [755 34] 292a 296 / *Politics* bk I ch 3 [1 56^b 11 15] 450b c

- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 277c d 298b c / *On Animal Generation* 338a 496d esp 449a 454a 463d 464a 470c 472c

9b The nourishment of the embryo or foetus

- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk v ch 18 [550 16-24] 77a bk vi ch 3 87c 88d ch 10 [564^b 6-565 12] 91a b [565^b 10] 91c d ch 13 [568 1 4] 94a bk vii ch 8 112c 113a / *Generation of Animals* bk I ch 11 [730 33 39] 270d bk II ch 4 [740^b 17-741 2] 281a d ch 7 [745^b 22-746 28] 287a c bk III ch 1 [751 6-7] 292a ch 4 [752 24 28] 293b 294a [753 36-754 15] 294c 295b ch 3 [754^b 1-755 6] 295c

- 296a bk iv ch 6 [775^b 24] 317c d ch 8 318b 319c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 118 A 1 REP 4 600a 601c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. Q 80 A 4 REP 5 959c 963a

- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 298b-c / *On Animal Generation* 366d 367b 373b-c 378b d 379b 381a 396b 398d 399c 408b 415b 438c 443b 446c 447a 458a-461d esp 461a d 463b 466b 471d 472a 481d 482b 483c 485c 488c

9c The process of embryogeny the stages of foetal growth

- ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk v ch 4 [1014^b 0-22] 535a

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- The comparison of human and animal societies see STATE 1a

the one or the many exercise political power and dominate the state. By this criterion of number aristocracy is always differentiated from monarchy and democracy.

Though he uses the word oligarchy to name what others call aristocracy, Locke defines the three forms of government by reference to numbers. When the majority themselves exercise the whole power of the community, Locke says, "then the form of the government is a perfect democracy. When they put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, then it is an oligarchy, or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy." Kant proceeds similarly, though again in somewhat different language. The relation of the supreme power to the people, he says, is conceivable in three different forms: either one, in the state rules in *every* all, or *some* united in relation of equality with each other, rule over all the others, or *all* together rule over each individually, including themselves. The form of the state is therefore either *autocracy* or *aristocracy* or *democracy*.

Here, claims, however, that purely quantitative distinction like these are only superficial and do not afford the concept of the thing. The criterion of number does not seem to suffice when other forms of government are considered. It fails to distinguish monarchy from tyranny or despotism, which may consist of rule by one man, as has usually been the case, but nearly. Number alone likewise fails to distinguish aristocracy from oligarchy. In the deliberations of the Medean conspirators, which Herodotus reports, or in events the rule of a certain number of the wealthiest is set against both democracy and monarchy and identified as oligarchy. How, then, shall aristocracy be distinguished from oligarchy?

There seem to be two answers to this question. In the *Statesman* Plato adds to the characteristic of number the criterion of law and the absence of law. The holders of political power, whatever the number, may govern either according to the established laws, or by arbitrary caprice in violation of them. To guarantee the laws, which are based upon long experience and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be

the Eleatic Stranger declares in the *Statesman*, "a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law."

Taking the division of governments according to number "the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all. Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny depending on whether an individual rules according to law or governs neither by law nor by custom, but . . . pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives." By the same criterion the rule of the few divides into aristocracy which has an auspicious name and oligarchy. While democracy is subject to the same division, Plato makes the same name apply to both its good and bad forms.

The second way in which aristocracy differs from oligarchy is also brought out in the *Statesman*. Since "the science of government" according to Plato is among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or at any rate of a few, really found to possess science. "Because of this demand for science" which presupposes virtue and competence in ruling, monarchy and aristocracy came to be defined as government by the single best man or by the few best men in the community.

A high degree of competence or virtue is, however, not the only mark by which the few may be distinguished from the many. The possession of wealth or property in any sizeable amount also seems to divide a small class in the community from the rest, and Plato at times refers to aristocracy simply as the government of the rich. Yet if wealth is the criterion by which the few are chosen to govern, then oligarchy results at least in contrast to that sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is excellence of mind and character. Aristocracy is called aristocracy, writes Aristotle, "either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens."

By these additional criteria—never by numbers alone—the ancients conceive aristocracy. When it is so defined it always appears to be a good form of government but never the only good form, or even the best. The same

Chapter 3 ARISTOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

THE forms of government have been variously enumerated differently classified and given quite contrary evaluations in the great books of political theory. In the actual history of political institutions as well as in the tradition of political thought the major practical issues with respect to the forms of government—the choices open the ideals to be sought or the evils to be remedied—have shifted with the times.

In an earlier day—not merely in ancient times but as late as the 18th century—the form of government called aristocracy presented a genuine alternative to monarchy and set a standard by which the defects and infirmities of democracy were usually measured. If aristocracy was not always regarded as the ideal form of government the principle of aristocracy always entered into the definition of the political ideal.

Today both in theory and practice aristocracy is at the other end of the scale. For a large part of mankind and for the political philosopher as well as in prevailing popular sentiment aristocracy (together with monarchy) has become a subject of historical interest. It is a form of government with a past rather than a future. It no longer measures but is measured by democracy. If the aristocratic principle still signifies a factor of excellence in government or the state it does so with a meaning now brought into harmony with democratic standards.

This change accounts for one ambiguity which the word aristocracy may have for contemporary readers. Formerly its primary if not only significance was to designate a form of government. It is currently used to name a special social class separated from the masses by distinctions of birth talent property power or leisure. We speak of the aristocracy as we

speak of the elite and the four hundred or we follow Marx and Engels in thinking of the feudal aristocracy as the class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie. The *Communist Manifesto* wastes little sympathy on the aristocrats who while seeking an ally in the proletariat forgot that they [too] exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different. For Marx and Engels the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie alike represent the propertied classes but they differ in the manner in which they came by their property and power. The landed gentry and the feudal nobility got theirs largely by inheritance the bourgeoisie by industry and trade.

Today for the most part we call a man an aristocrat if justly or unjustly he claims a right to certain social distinctions or privileges. We seldom use that word today to indicate a man who *deserves* special political status or pre-eminence though we do sometimes use it to name the proponent of any form of government which rests upon the political inequality of men.

Since the discussion of aristocracy in the great books is largely political we shall here be primarily concerned with aristocracy as a form of government. The general consideration of the forms of government will be found in the chapter on GOVERNMENT. Here and in the other chapters which are devoted to particular forms of government we shall consider each of the several forms both in itself and in relation to the others.

THERE IS ONE element in the conception of aristocracy which does not change with changing evaluations of aristocratic government. All of the writers of the great political books agree with Plato that aristocracy is a government of the few according as the few rather than

the one or the many exercise political power and dominate the state. By this criterion of number aristocracy is always differentiated from monarchy and democracy.

Though he uses the word *oligarchy* to name what others call aristocracy, Locke defines the three forms of government by reference to numbers. When the majority themselves exercise the whole power of the community, Locke says, then the form of the government is a perfect democracy. When they put "the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, then it is an oligarchy or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy." Hunt proceeds similarly though in somewhat different language. "The relation of the supreme power to the people he says, is considerable in three different forms either one, in the state rules over all or overruled in relation of equality with each other and over all the others or all together rule over each individually including themselves. The form of the state is therefore either *autocracy* or *aristocracy* or *democracy*."

Hunt claims, however, that purely quantitative distinction like these are only superficial and do not afford the concept of the thing. The criterion of number does not seem to suffice when other forms of government are considered. It fails to distinguish monarchy from tyranny or despotism which may consist of rule by one man, as has usually been the case historically. Number alone likewise fails to distinguish anocracy from oligarchy. In the deliberations of the Medean conspirators, which Herodotus reports in detail, the rule of a certain number of the worthies is set against both democracy and monarchy and identified as oligarchy. How then, shall anocracy be distinguished from oligarchy?

There seem to be two answers to this question. In the *Symposium* Plato adds to the characteristic of number the "criterion of law and the absence of law." The basis is of political power: whatever their number may govern either according to the established laws, or by arbitrary caprice in violation of them. "To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and perverted the multitude to pass them, would be"

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Taking the division of governments according to number "the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all." Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny depending on whether an individual rules according to law or governs neither by law nor by custom, but pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives. By the same criterion the rule of the few divides into aristocracy which has an auspicious name and oligarchy. "While democracy is subject to the same division Plato makes the same name apply to both its good and bad forms."

The second way in which anocracy differs from oligarchy is also brought out in the *Symposium*. Since "the science of government" according to Plato is "among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two or at any rate of a few really found to possess science." Because of this demand for "science" which presupposes virtue and competence in ruling, monarchy and anocracy came to be defined as government by the single best man or by the few best men in the community.

A high degree of competence or virtue is, however, not the only mark by which the few may be distinguished from the many. The possession of wealth or property in any sizeable amount also seems to divide a small class in the community from the rest and Plato at times refers to aristocracy simply as the government of the rich. Yet if wealth is the criterion by which the few are chosen to govern, then oligarchy results, at least in contrast to that sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is excellence of mind and character. Aristocracy is called aristocracy, writes Aristotle, "either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens."

But these additional criteria—neither numbers alone—the ancients once called anocracy. When it is so defined it always appears to be a good form of government but never the only good form or even the best. The same

criteria also place monarchy among the good forms and—at least in Plato's *Statesman*—democracy is a third good form when it is lawful government by the many, the many being competent or virtuous to some degree. In this triad of good forms aristocracy ranks second best because government by one man is supposed to be more efficient or because in the hierarchy of excellence the few may be superior but only the one can be supreme. Aristotle however seems to rank aristocracy above monarchy.

If we call the rule of many men who are all of them good aristocracy and the rule of one man royalty he writes then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty.

THE INTRODUCTION of democracy into the comparison tends to complicate the discussion. Not only are the many usually the poor but they are also seldom considered pre-eminent in virtue or competence. According to the way in which either wealth or human excellence is distributed both oligarchy and aristocracy organize the political community in terms of inequalities in status, power and privilege. This fact leads Rousseau for example to use the different kinds of inequality among men as a basis for distinguishing three sorts of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary.

Natural aristocracy according to Rousseau is based on that inequality among men which is due primarily to age and is found among simple peoples where the young bowed without question to the authority of experience. Elective aristocracy arose in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality and riches or power were put before age. This form in Rousseau's opinion is the best and is aristocracy properly so called. The third which is characterized as the worst of all governments came about when the transmission of the father's power along with his goods to his children by creating patrician families made government hereditary.

This emphasis upon inequality radically separates aristocracy from democracy. From Aristotle down to Montesquieu, Rousseau and our own day equality has been recognized as the distinctive element of democracy. Disregarding slaves who for the ancients were political

prisoners Aristotle makes liberty the other mark of democracy—all freemen having apart from wealth or virtue an equal claim to political status. As the principle of an aristocracy is virtue, Aristotle writes, so wealth is the principle of an oligarchy and freedom of a democracy.

To the defenders of democracy ancient or modern aristocracy and oligarchy stand together at least negatively in their denial of the principle of equality. To the defenders of aristocracy oligarchy is as far removed as democracy since both oligarchy and democracy neglect or underestimate the importance of virtue in organizing the state. Yet oligarchy more than democracy is the characteristic perversion of aristocracy. It also puts government in the hands of the few but it substitutes wealth for virtue as the criterion. The democratic critic of aristocracy usually calls attention to the way in which oligarchy tries to wear the mask of aristocracy. However far apart aristocracy and oligarchy may be in definition he insists that in actual practice they tend to become identical in proportion as wealth or noble birth or social class is taken as the sign of intrinsic qualities which are thought to deserve special political recognition.

The defenders of aristocracy have admitted the tendency of aristocratic government to degenerate into oligarchy. Its critics are not satisfied with this admission. They deny that aristocracy has ever existed in purity of principle—they deny that the governing few have ever been chosen solely for their virtue. Machiavelli assumes it to be a generally accepted fact that the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people

and give vent to their ambitions. Montesquieu although more optimistic about the possibility of a truly virtuous aristocracy recognizes its tendency to profit at the expense of the people. To overcome this he would have the laws make it an essential point that the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes

and should likewise forbid the nobles all kinds of commerce and abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level.

But perhaps the strongest attack upon aristocracy in all of the great political books is

CHAPTER 3 ARISTOCRACY

made by Mill in his *Representative Government*. He admits that the governments which have been remarkable in history for sustained mental ability and vigour in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristocracies. But he claims that whatever their abilities such governments were essentially bureaucracies and the dignity and estimation of their rulers and members were quite different things from the prosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens and were often wholly incompatible with it. When their actions are dictated by sinister interests as frequently happens the aristocratic class assumes to themselves an endless variety of unjust privileges sometimes benefiting their pockets at the expense of the people sometimes merely tending to exalt them above others or what is the same thing in different words to degrade others below themselves.

Yet except by those political thinkers who deny the distinction between good and bad government and hence the relevance of virtue to institutions which are solely expressions of power the aristocratic principle is seldom entirely rejected. Even when the notion of a pure aristocracy is dismissed as an ideal which can never be fully realized the aristocratic principle reappears as a counsel of perfection in the improvement of other forms of government.

Even so one difficulty remains which tends to prevent an aristocracy from being realized in practice quite apart from any question of its soundness in principle. It lies in the reluctance of the best men to assume the burdens of public office. The parable told in the Book of Judges applies to aristocracy as much as to monarchy.

The trees went forth in time to anoint a king and in a dream said unto the olive tree, Reign thou over us.

But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave my fatness, he which by me they have no God, and myself be promoted over them?

And the trees said to the fig tree, Come thou and reign over us.

But the fig tree said to them, Should I forsake my sweetness and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees?

Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou and reign over us.

And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine, which have I God and man should go to be promoted over the trees?

Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou and reign over us.

And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow, and if not, let fire come out of the bramble and devour the cedars of Lebanon.

Socrates thinks he has a solution for this problem. In the *Republic* he proposes a new way to induce good men to rule. Since money and honor have no attraction for them, necessity must be laid upon them and they must be induced to serve from fear of punishment. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves or indeed as good.

THE POLITICAL ISSUES in which monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy represent the major alternatives cannot be clarified without recourse to the distinction between government by laws and government by men.

It has already been noted that in the *Statesman* Plato makes respect for the laws and violation of the laws the marks of good and bad government respectively. But he also proposes that the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. The imperfection of law could then be avoided because one or a few men of almost superhuman wisdom would govern their inferiors even as the gods could direct the affairs of men without the aid of established laws. But if no man is a god in relation to other men, then in Plato's opinion it is better for laws or customs to be supreme and for men to rule in accordance with them.

The larger issue concerning rule by laws and rule by men is discussed in the chapters on *Constitution and Monarchy*. But here we must observe how the difference between the two types of rule affects the understanding of all other forms of government. This can be seen in terms of Aristotle's distinction between royal

criteria also place monarchy among the good forms and—at least in Plato's *Statesman*—democracy is a third good form when it is lawful government by the many the many being competent or virtuous to some degree. In this triad of good forms aristocracy ranks second best because government by one man is supposed to be more efficient or because in the hierarchy of excellence the few may be superior but only the one can be supreme. Aristotle however seems to rank aristocracy above monarchy.

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But perhaps the strongest attack upon aristocracy in all of the great political books is

ism of aristocracy as a distinct form of government is largely superseded by the consideration of the role which the aristocratic principle plays in the development of republican institutions.

The writers of *The Federalist* for example returned in several places to the charge that the corruption which then a. defending shows tendencies toward aristocracy or oligarchy. Yet in their consideration and defense of the new instrument of government in essence, they argued, they frequently agreed to promote the aristocratic in nature.

In writing their own measures to the "mixed republic" and "pure democracy"—that is, government by elected representatives on the one hand, and by the direct participation of the whole people on the other—the Federalists also gave an aristocratic bent to the very notion of representation. They seem to share the opinion of Macauley that "as most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to be chosen, so the people though capable of electing, others to account for their administration, are incapable of conducting administration themselves."

Thus Madison praves the delegation of the government to a small number of citizens elected by the rest as tending to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country. He further points out that "it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, considered for the purpose."

On such a view the people's representatives in the legislature, or other branches of government are supposed to be not their masters, but their betters. For the American conservative, as for Edmund Burke the representative serves his constituents by making independent decisions for the common good, not by doing their bidding. This theory of representation, to which Mill and other democratic thinkers are in part supposed that the representative knows better than his constituents what is for their good.

The effort to ensure leadership by superior men may involve the aristocratic principle, yet

it is also claimed by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to be a necessary safeguard for popular government. The senate for instance is not only to provide a check on the executive, but is also to serve as a salutary check on the government (which) doubles its security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. The electoral college aims directly at placing the immediate election of the president in the hands of "men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station under circumstances favorable to deliberation." In addition it may serve as an "obstacle" opposed to cabal, intrigue and corruption, which are the "most deadly adversaries of republican government."

In all these respects, as well as in the restriction on suffrage which it permitted the states to impose the unamended American constitution appears to have adopted an aristocratic principle in government. Whether the motivation of its provisions was in fact simply aristocratic, or whether it was partly or even largely of archaical leadership being the note of men of "good" family and substantial property—will always be a question to be decided in the light of the documents and the relevant historic evidence.

More democratic than the American constitutionalists of the 18th century certainly so with regard to the extension of suffrage, John Stuart Mill appears to be no less concerned than they are to introduce aristocratic elements into the structure of representative government.

According to Mill, two grave dangers confront a democracy "Danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body and in the popular opinion which controls it and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority." Claiming that much of the blame for both dangers lies in the rule of the majority, Mill looks for means to overcome the situation in which "the numerical majority alone possess practically any voice in the State."

His major remedy was a system of proportional representation. This would supposedly

and political government which closely resembles the modern conception of the difference between absolute or despotic government on the one hand and limited constitutional, or republican government on the other.

There are passages in which Aristotle regards absolute rule by one or a few superior men as the divine or godlike form of government. When one man or a few excel all the others together in virtue and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled, it is right in Aristotle's opinion for the government to be royal or absolute rather than political or constitutional—whether one man rules or a few. Royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, he says. It is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family.

But in other passages Aristotle seems to regard absolute government as a despotic regime appropriate to the family and the primitive tribe, but not to the state, in which it is better for equals to rule and be ruled in turn. In either case it makes a difference to the meaning of aristocracy as also to monarchy, whether it be conceived as absolute or constitutional government.

When it is conceived as absolute government, aristocracy differs from monarchy only on the point of numbers—the few as opposed to the one. Otherwise aristocracy and monarchy are defended in the same way. The defense usually takes one of two directions. One line of argument which stems from Plato and Aristotle claims that inequality in wisdom or virtue between ruler and ruled justifies absolute rule by the superior. The other line is followed by those who like Hobbes maintain that since sovereignty is absolute, unlimited and indivisible, the difference between kinds of government consisteth not in the difference of Power, but in the difference of Convenience or Aptitude to produce the Peace and Security of the people. When they are conceived as forms of absolute government, aristocracy and monarchy are attacked for the same reason—to those who regard absolutism or despotism in government as unjust because it violates the basic equality of men—an absolute monarchy and a despotic aristocracy are both unjust.

Aristocracy, however, can also be conceived as a form or aspect of constitutional govern-

ment. Montesquieu, for example, divides governments into republican, monarchical and despotic, and under republican places those in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power, thus including both democracy and aristocracy. In both laws, not men, are supreme, but the spirit of the laws is different. In democracy, the spring or principle by which it is made to act is virtue resting on equality; in aristocracy, 'moderation is the very soul', a moderation founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity. Hegel's comment on this theory deserves mention. The fact that moderation is cited as the principle of aristocracy, he writes, implies the beginning at this point of a divorce between public authority and private interest.

For Aristotle, in contrast to Montesquieu, the two major types of constitution are the democratic and the oligarchical, according as free birth or wealth is made the chief qualification for citizenship and public office. Aristocracy enters the discussion of constitutional governments mainly in connection with the construction of the polity or mixed constitution. Although in most states the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich, he points out that there are three grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government: freedom, wealth and virtue.

When the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich, the admixture of the two elements, Aristotle says, is to be called a polity. But sometimes the mixture of democracy with oligarchy may include an ingredient of aristocracy, as in the distribution of offices according to merit. The union of these three elements is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best, and more than any other form of government, except the true and the ideal, it has in Aristotle's judgment a right to this name. Polity and aristocracy, as mixed constitutions, are fusions of some of the same elements; hence, he says, it is obvious that they are not very unlike.

BEGINNING IN the 18th century, and with the rise of representative government, the discus-

vet proof in government by the one or few who are eminent in wisdom or virtue. Each, perhaps, concedes only part of the truth. Certainly those who acknowledge a political wisdom in the preponderant voice of the many but who also recognize another wisdom in the skilled judgment of the few cannot wish to exclude either from exerting its due influence upon the course of government.

Still another issue has to do with education. Shall educational opportunity be as universal as the franchise? Shall those whose native endowments fit them for political leadership be trained differently or more extensively than their fellow citizens? Shall vocational education be given to the many and liberal education be reserved for the few?

These questions provide some measure of the extent to which someone's thinking is anocracy or democracy—or involves some admixture of both strains. In the great discussion of these questions and issues, there is one ever

present ambiguity. We have already noted it in considering the reality of the line between aristocracy and oligarchy. The agreement or disagreement of Mill and Aristotle, of Burke and Plato, of Hamilton and Paine, of Veblen and Pareto, or John Dewey and Matthew Arnold cannot be judged without determining whether the distinction between the many and the few derives from nature or convention.

It is this distinction which Jefferson had in mind when, writing to Adams in 1813, he said: "There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, the government of society. The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy."

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The general theory and evaluation of aristocracy
 - 1a. Aristocracy as a good form of government
 - 1b. Criticisms of aristocracy as unrealizable or unjust
2. The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government
 - 2a. Aristocracy and monarchy
 - 2b. Aristocracy and constitutional government: the policy of mixed constitution
 - 2c. Aristocracy and democracy
 - 2d. Aristocracy and oligarchy
 - 2e. Aristocracy and tyranny
3. The causes of decay, erosion or instability in aristocracies: aristocracy and revolution
4. Aristocracy and the issue of rule by men as opposed to rule by law
5. The training of those fitted for rule: aristocratic theories of education
6. The selection of the best men for public office: the aristocratic theory of representation in modern constitutional government
7. Historic and poetic exemplifications of aristocracy

constitute a democratic improvement by securing representation for every minority in the whole nation—on principles of equal justice. But it may also serve to increase an aristocratic element since it affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. This would be brought about by making possible the election of hundreds of able men of independent thought who would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority with the result that Parliament would contain the 'very élite of the country.

To make still more certain that men of superior political intelligence exert an effect upon government Mill also proposes a plurality of votes for the educated and the establishment of an upper legislative chamber based on a specially qualified membership. Such proposals seem to indicate Mill's leanings toward aristocracy not only because they aim at procuring a government of the best but also because they are designed to prevent a government based on a majority of manual labourers with the consequent danger of too low a standard of political intelligence.

THE ISSUES RAISED by the theory of aristocracy or by the aristocratic principle in government seem to be basically the same in all centuries however different the terms or the context in which they are expressed. Even when as today a purely aristocratic form of government does not present a genuine political alternative to peoples who have espoused democracy there remains the sense that pure or unqualified democracy is an equally undesirable extreme. The qualifications proposed usually add an aristocratic leaven.

One issue concerns the equality and inequality of men. The affirmation that all men are created equal does not exclude recognition of their individual inequalities—the wide diversity of human talents and the uneven distribution of intelligence and other abilities. Nor does it mean that all men use their native endowments to good purpose or in the same degree to acquire skill or knowledge or virtue.

To grasp the double truth—that no man is essentially more human than another though one may have more of certain human abilities

than another—is to see some necessity for the admixture of democratic and aristocratic principles in constructing a political constitution. But the issue is whether distributive justice requires as a matter of right that the best men should rule or hold public office.

Some political philosophers like Plato and Aristotle tend to take the aristocratic view that men of superior ability have a right to govern—that for them to be ruled by their inferiors would be unjust. This theory places greater emphasis on the inequality than on the equality of men. Their democratic opponents insist that the equality of men *as men* is the fundamental fact and the only fact having a bearing on the just distribution of suffrage. That certain individuals have superior aptitude for the exercise of political authority does not automatically confer that authority upon them. The inequality of men in merit or talent does not establish a political right as does their equality in human nature. The selection of the best men for public office is on this theory not a matter of justice but of expediency or prudence.

Another issue concerns the weight to be given the opinion of the majority as against the opinion of the wise or the expert when as frequently happens these opinions diverge or conflict. As the chapter on OPINION indicates, the experts themselves disagree about the soundness of the popular judgment.

Where Thucydides believes that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows because the latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, Herodotus observes that it seems easier to deceive the multitude than one man. Where Hegel holds it to be a dangerous and a false prejudice that the People alone have reason and insight and know what justice is, John Jay declares that the people of any country (if like the Americans intelligent and well informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. And Hamilton adds that the people commonly intend the public good.

Sometimes the same author seems to take both sides of the issue as Aristotle does when though he says that 'a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual' he

(2 *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government the polity or mixed constitution*)

43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II, 275b-276a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b BK IX 384c 388a,c passim

2c Aristocracy and democracy

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 520a c 533a c BK VIII 579c 581 582b-c 590a B

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d 408b-409d / *Statesman* 598b-604b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 11 [1281 39-42] 479b-c CH 13 [1284 3 b-2] 482a d BK IV CH 7 [1 93^b 12 18] 493b BK V CH 7 [1307^b 27] 509a b CH 8 [1307^b 39-1308^b 24] 510a B [1308^b 31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 31 566 c] 608a b

11 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Summa* 62b-c / *Dion* 792d 802a,c esp 800c

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 91b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 92 14 ANS 2 9b-230c Q 102 14 ANS 307d 309d

23 MACIIVELLA *Prince* CH IX 1 c 16a passim

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II, 104d 105a

27 SENECA *De Beneficiis* 10c 11 [1 100] 362a 362a 10c 11 [140-161] 3 0d a 1a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 34 25b-226b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 7c BK VI 5b-11a BK VII 23d BK VIII 44d

45 BK VIII 50d 53d 54a BK IX 58b BK X 64d BK XI 60b-c BK XII 104b

38 RUSSELL *Principles of Political Economy* 59c-d / *Social Contract* 241a c

42 LOCKE *Two Treatises of Government* 104d

42 LOCKE *Two Treatises of Government* 104d

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[1160^b 32 1161 2] 413a B / *Politics* BK II CH 10 [1272 27^b 10] 468c 469a CH 11 469a-470b BK III CH 5 [1278 15-24] 475b c CH 7 476c 477a esp [1279^b 4-10] 476d 47 a CH 13 [1283 25^b 10] 481b d CH 15 [1 86^b 12 10] 485a BK IV CH 2 [1289 26^b 4] 488b c CH 4 [1290^b 17-20] 489d CH 5 [1292 39^b 6] 491d 492a CH 7 [1 93^b 12-12] 493a b CH 8 [1293^b 30-1294 28] 493c-494a CH 12 [1 97^b 6-9] 497b BK V CH 7 508c 509d CH 12 [1 16 39^b 10] 519m / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 31 1366^b 608a b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 35d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* I 141^a II Q 92 14 ANS 229b 230c

23 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII 164, 133a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a B

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 7b c BK V 23a 23a BK VI 151c 152a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b

39 SMITH *He c h of Nations* BK III 165c 166a BK V 309c 310d

42 HUME *Science of Right* 450a c

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 292d 293b

2c Aristocracy and tyranny

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 533a c

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d BK VIII 411d 421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 679c 680b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1330 40-1331^b 7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 32 1366 6] 608a b

15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 193c 191a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 92 14 ANS 229b 230c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 273a b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 38a 238a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 10 71c

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a BK VI 34d 35a BK VIII 52c d BK XI 70c 78d 9b BK XII 109a b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 48 157b-c NUMBER 70 213d 214a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 3 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9b c EPILOGUE 1 668a 669d

3 The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution

Old Testament I Samuel 7 15-8 5-(D) I Kings 7 15 8 1

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108b-c

(2) *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government: the polity or mixed constitution*

- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a-409c 419b ■
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 270 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b BK IX 384c 388a c passim

2c *Aristocracy and democracy*

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 520a ■ 533a c BK VIII 579c 581c 582b c 590a ■
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d 408b 409d / *Statesman* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH II [1281 39-25] 479b c CH I3 [1 84 3 1-2] 482a d BK IV CH I [1-93] 18 [149] 493b BK V CH I [130, 3-27] 509a b CH 8 [1307-39-1378-24] 510a b [1307] 31 [1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365] 22 [1366] 4 608a b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 105 A 1 ANS 307d 309d
 23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IX 14c 16a PLACID
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC 1 [1-47] 351a d ACT II SC 1 [1 106] 361a 362a ACT III SC 1 [140-161] 370d 371a
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 204 225b 226b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 7c BK III 9b 11a BK V 23a b 23d BK VII 44d 45c BK VIII 51d 53d 54a BK IX 58b BK X 64a d BK XII 90b c BK XI 109b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK IV 427a d
 41 CIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c d
 42 LANT *Science of Right* 450a d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125b d NUMBER 57 176d 179b passim NUMBER 58 181b c NUMBER 60 185b 187a
 43 MILL *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* 353b 354b 361b d 366a 369b passim 376b ■
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c ■ 141a 211b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91b c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART III 285b d 310a c

2d *Aristocracy and oligarchy*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 3 [1131 24 20] 378d BK VIII CH 10 [1160] 11 16] 412d

- [1160] 3 [1161] 2] 413a ■ / *Politics* BK II CH 10 [1272 27 10] 468c-469a CH II 469a-470b BK III CH 5 [1278 15 24] 475b c CH 7 476c 477a esp [1279] 4 10] 476d-477a CH 13 [1283 25 26] 481b d CH 15 [1 367 10] 483a BK IV CH 2 [1289] 6-64] 488b c CH 4 [1290] 17-20] 489d CH 5 [1292 39-40] 491d 492a CH 7 [1293] 2 12] 493a b CH 8 [1293] 30-1294 24] 493c-494a CH 12 [1297] 6-9] 497b BK V CH 7 508c 509d CH 12 [1316 39-40] 519c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365] 22 [1366] 603a b

- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 35a 37b 47a 48a
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 35d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *HELL* VII [64, 1] 23a b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 7b c BK V 23a 25a BK IX 151c 152a
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b
 39 SMITH *History of Nations* BK III 165c 166a BK V 309c 310d
 42 LANT *Science of Right* 450a c
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d
 43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 92d 293b

2e *Aristocracy and tyranny*

- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 533a-c
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d BK VIII IX 411d-421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 679c-680b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1310 40-1311 7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365] 32-1366 6] 608a b
 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 193c 194a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 273a b
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 380 238a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XVIII SECT 201 71c
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a BK VI 34d 35a BK VIII 52c d BK XI 70 78d 79b BK XV 109a b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 49 157b c NUMBER 70 213d 214a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 3 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9b c EPILOGUE 1 668a 669d

- 3 *The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies: aristocracy and revolution*
 OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel* 7 15-8 5- (P)
I Kings 7 15 8 5
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108b c

2 *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government, the polity or mixed constitution*

43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2, 9 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 216a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk vi 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b bk ix 384c 388a c passim

3 *Aristocracy and democracy*

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 107c 108c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 520a e 533a e bk viii 579c 581 582b c 590a ii

7 PLATO *Republic* bk viii 401d 402d 408b 409d / *Statesman* 598b 604b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk iii ch ii [1281 39-25] 479b c ch i 3 [123 482a d bk ii ch 7 [1307-27] 509a b ch b [130, 39 1308-24] 510a b [1308-31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1305-2 1366 1608a b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus* *Luma* 62b c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk vi 97b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 9, A 4 ans 229b 230c Q 105 A 1 ans 307d 309d

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* ch ix 14c 16a passim

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC 1 [1-47] 351a d ACT II SC 1 [106] 361a 362a ACT III SC 1 [140-161] 370d 371a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 204 225b 226b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a 7c bk iii 9b-11a bk v 23a b 23d bk viii 44d 45c bk viii 51d 53d 54a bk ix 58b bk x 64a d bk xii 90b c bk xi 109b

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* bk iv 427a d

41 GIBBOY *Decline and Fall* 81c d

42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125b d NUMBER 57 16d 179b passim NUMBER 58 181b c NUMBER 60 185b 187a

43 MILL *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* ch 353b 354b 364b d 366a 369b passim 376b c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c d 141a 211b c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91b-c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART III 285b d 310a ii

1 *Aristocracy and oligarchy*

7 PLATO *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b-604b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk v ch 3 [1131 24 29] 378d bk viii ch 10 [1160-11 16] 412d

[1160-3 -1161-2] 413a ii / *Politics* bk ii ch 10 [1272-27 110] 468c-469a ch ii 469a-4 6b bk iii ch 5 [12, 8 15 24] 475b c ch 7 4 6c 477a esp [1279-4 10] 476d 477a ch 13 [1283 25 26] 481b-d ch ii 15 [1286-1 16] 485a bk iv ch 2 [1289 26-4] 488b-c ch 4 [1-90-17-20] 489d ch 5 [1292 39 40] 491d 492a ch 7 [1 93-2 12] 493a b ch 8 [1 93-30-1294 28] 493c-494a ch 12 [1 97-6-9] 497b bk v ch 7 508c 509d ch 12 [1316 39-10] 519c / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1363-22 1366] 608a b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk ii 35d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 9, A 4 ans 229b 230c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, xvi [64, 8] 23a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 7b-c bk v 23a 25a bk vi 151c 152a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* bk iii 419b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk iii 165c 166a bk v 309c 310d

42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a ii

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 271c d PART III 92d 293b

2e *Aristocracy and tyranny*

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 533a c

7 PLATO *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d bk viii ix 411d 421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* bk iv 619c 680b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk v ch 10 [1310 40-1311-7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1363-2 1366-6] 608a b

15 TACITUS *Historiae* bk i 193c 194a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 9, A 4 ans 229b 230c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 273a ii

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 180 238a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch viii sect 1 71c

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a bk vi 34d 35a bk viii 52c d bk xi 70c 18d 9b bk xi 109a b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 58 157b ii NUMBER 60 213d 214a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2, 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 9b c EPILOGUE 1 668a 669d

3 *The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies* aristocracy and revolution

OLD TESTAMENT I Samuel 7 15-8 5-(D) I Kings 7 15 8 5

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 108b-c

(2) *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government the polity or mixed constitution.*)

- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b-c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b BK IV 383c 388a c passim

2c *Aristocracy and democracy*

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c
 8 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 520a c 533a b BK VIII 579c 581-582b c 590a b
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d 408b-409d / *State man* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH II [1.81 39-5] 479b c CH 13 [1.94 3 25] 482a d BK IV CH 7 [1.93 12 18] 493b BK V CH 7 [1307 25-27] 509a b CH 8 [1306 39-1307 24] 510a b [1308 31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365 2 1366 1] 608a b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 105 A 1 ANS 307d 309d
 13 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IV 14c 16a passim
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1.47] 351a d ACT III SC I [1.106] 361a 362a ACT III SC I [1.140 161] 370d 371a
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 94 225b-226b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 7c BK III 9b-11a BK IV 23a b 23d BK VII 44d 45c BK VIII 51d 53d 54a BK IX 58b BK X 64a d BK XII 90b c BK XV 109b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK IV 421a d
 41 CIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c d
 42 LAWY *Science of Right* 450a d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125b d NUMBER 57 1/6d 179b passim NUMBER 58 181b c NUMBER 60 185b 187a
 43 MILL *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* 353b 354b 364b d 366a 369b passim 376b
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c d 141a 211b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 73 91b c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART III 285b-d 310a-c

2d *Aristocracy and oligarchy*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1131 24 29] 378d BK VIII CH 10 [1160 11-16] 412d

- [1160 3 -1161 2] 413a b / *Politics* BK II CH 10 [1.7 27 27 10] 468c-469a CH II 469a-410b BK III CH 5 [1278 15 4] 475b-c CH 7 4 6c 477a esp [1.79 24 10] 476d-477a CH 13 [1283 25 26] 481b d CH 15 [1.56 1 10] 485a BK IV CH 1 [1299 26-27] 488b-c CH 4 [1.90 17-20] 489d CH 5 [1292 39 40] 491d 492a esp [1.93 2 1.93 2 1.93 2] 493a b CH 8 [1.93 30-1294 4] 493c-494a CH 12 [1297 6-9] 497b BK V CH 7 508c 509d CH 12 [1316 39-40] 519c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365 22 1366 6] 608a b

- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 35d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [64 1] 23a b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 7b-c BK IV 23a 25a BK XV 151c 152a
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 165c 166a BK V 309c 310d
 42 LAWY *Science of Right* 450a-c
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d
 43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d-364d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 292d 293b

2e *Aristocracy and tyranny*

- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 533a-c
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d BK VIII 411d 421a / *State man* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 619c-680b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 10 [1310 40-1311 7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365 32 1366 1] 608a b
 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 193c 194a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 273a b
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 380 238a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XVIII SECT 1 71c
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a BK VI 34d 35a BK VIII 52c d BK VI 70c 78d 79b BK XI 109a b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 46 157b c NUMBER 50 213d 214a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9b-c EPILOGUE 1 668a 669d

3 *The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution*

- OLD TESTAMENT I Samuel 7 15-8 5-(1)
 I Kings 7 15-8 5
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108b c

(2) *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government the polity or mixed constitution*

- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b BK IX 384c 388a c passim

2c *Aristocracy and democracy*

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 520a e 533a c BK VIII 579c 581 582b c 590a b
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d 408b 409d / *Statesman* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH II [1281 39-25] 479b c CH II [1283 3 25] 482a d BK IV CH I 93^b 12 18] 493b BK V CH 7 [130, 7-27] 509a b CH 8 [1307^b 39-1308^a 24] 510a b [1308^b 31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 23-1366 2] 608a b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Summa* 62b-c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 105 A 1 ANS 307d 309d
 23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IX 14c 16a passim
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1 47] 351a d ACT II SC I [1 106] 361a 362a ACT III SC I [140 161] 370d 371a
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 74 225b 226b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 7c BK III 9b 11a BK V 23a b 23d BK VII 44d 45c BK VIII 51d 53d 54a BK IX 58b BK X 64a d BK XII 90b c BK XV 109b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK IV 427a d
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c d
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125b d NUMBER 57 176d 179b passim NUMBER 58 181b c NUMBER 60 185b 187a
 43 MILL *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* 353b 354b 361b d 366a 369b passim 376b c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c d 141a 211b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91b c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART III 285b d 310a c

2d *Aristocracy and oligarchy*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b 604b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 3 [1131 24 29] 378d BK VIII CH 10 [1160^b 11 16] 412d

[1160^b 32 1161 2] 413a b / *Politics* BK II CH 10 [1272 27-30] 468c 469a CH II 469a-470b BK III CH 5 [1278 15 24] 475b e CH 7 476c 477a esp [1279^b 4 10] 476d 477a CH 11 [1283 25 26] 481b d CH 15 [1286^b 12 10] 485a BK IV CH 2 [1289 26-34] 488b-c CH 4 [1290^b 17-20] 489d CH 5 [1292 39-40] 491d 492a CH 7 [1293^b 12-12] 493a b CH 8 [1293^b 30-1294^a 28] 493c-494a CH 12 [1297^b 6-9] 497b BK V CH 7 508c 509d CH 12 [1310 39-40] 519c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 22 1366^b 6] 608a b

- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 35d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [64 8] 23a b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 7b-c BK V 23a 25a BK XV 151c 152a
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 165c 166a BK V 309c 310d
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a c
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d
 43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 292d 293b

2e *Aristocracy and tyranny*

- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 533a c
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d BK VIII 411d 421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 619c 680b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1310 40-1311^b 7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b 32 1366 6] 608a b
 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 193c 194a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 273a b
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 380 238a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XVIII SECT 201 71c
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a BK VI 34d 35a BK VIII 52c d BK XI 70c 78d 79b BK XV 109a b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 48 157b c NUMBER 70 213d 214a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9b-c EPILOGUE I 668a 669d

- 3 *The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution*
 OLD TESTAMENT I Samuel 7 15 8 5-(D)
 1 Kings 7 15-8 5
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108b c

- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peeloponnesian War* bk v 482d
482a bk iii 5 9c 583c 58 a 589a 590a-c
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk i-iv 339b-350a bk
viii 403a-404a / *Cratylus* 485a-c / *Seventh
Letter* 806d-807b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk ii, ch 9 [1 07 34]
466d-46 ch 2 [2 356-12 47] 4 0c bk
iii, ch 15 [1256^b 2 16] 485a bk v ch 3
[13 37 1 1 504b-c ch 4 [130a, 18-29] 505d
506a ch 7 508c 509d ch 8 [1307^b 39-1308^b 24]
510a b ch 12 [316^b 39-3] 519c
- 11 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 35c d 47a-48a / *Coro-
leus* 180a 184a / *Lysander* 361a 368a-c /
Cassius Gracchus 683b-c / *Cicero* 08a-b
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* k i 1b-2a 3a-b / *His-
toriae*, bk i, 193c 194a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *Hell*, x t [64 8]
23a-b p RAD E, xv x t 128b-132a
- 23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* ch i - 8a ch ix
14c 16a
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 158a b
- 38 MO T SOCI I *Spirit of Laws* bk ii, 6c 7b
bk ii 10c 11 bk 23a-25a bk vii 45b
x viii 52c 53a bk x 64a-d bk xi 91c
92b bk xiii, 96d-97a bk xx, 151 152a
- 38 ROL EAU *Social Contract* bk iii, 411c-d
418c-419b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk 420b-c
- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 451a
- 43 FIDELMAN *WCM* bk i 0a-d
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 366a 367b
- 46 H GEL *Philosophy of Right* p RT III par 3,
91c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 355d
35 esp 356c 357a 367 b
- 50 MARX E. *Das Communist Manifesto* 423d-
424b 429c-430b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk ii, 1100c 666c-
669d

- Tartarus* 442c-d / *Seelenzug* 607b-608a /
Laut bk ii, 725b bk xii, 94b-98b esp
96d-98b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk iii ch 4 [12-14 15]
474a-d ch 18 487 b bk iv ch 13 [1300^b 3-8]
500d bk vi, ch 8 [322^b 37 1323^b 5] 526d bk
vi ch 14 [1332^b 13 1333 16] 537b-538a /
Rhetoric bk i ch 8 [136^b 32 39] 608a b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 38a-45c / *Aischides*
156b-158b / *Marcius Cato* 286c 287b / *Lysan-
der* 354b d 355a / *Dion* 81b, d 68b
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk i 34c-d bk xiii 125d
126a / *Historiae* bk i 267c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *PARADISE*, iii [115-
145] 118b-c
- 23 HO BBS *Letters* INTRO, 47b-d PART I
9a-b c PART II 112d 154a 158c d 164a-c
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* k i
18b-19d 24a 30c bk ii 75a-77a 8b-83b
- 25 MO TAI E *Essays* 60a-62a 63d-64a 71d
72b
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Chapter 4 ART

INTRODUCTION

THE word art has a range of meanings which may be obscured by the current disposition to use the word in an extremely restricted sense. In contemporary thought art is most readily associated with beauty, yet its historic connections with utility and knowledge are probably more intimate and pervasive.

The prevalent popular association reflects a tendency in the 19th century to annex the theory of art to aesthetics. This naturally led to the identification of art with one kind of art—the so called *fine arts*, *beaux arts*, or *Schöne Kunst* (arts of the beautiful). The contraction of meaning has gone so far that the word art sometimes signifies one group of the fine arts—painting and sculpture—as in the common phrase literature, music, and the fine arts. This restricted usage has become so customary that we ordinarily refer to a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a manner which seems to assure that the word art is exclusively the name for something which can be hung on a wall or placed on a pedestal.

A moment's thought will of course correct the assumption. We are not unfamiliar with the conception of medicine and teaching as arts. We are acquainted with such phrases as the industrial arts and arts and crafts in which the reference is to the production of useful things. Our discussions of liberal education should require us to consider the liberal arts which however defined or enumerated are supposed to constitute skills of mind. We recognize that art is the root of artisan as well as artist. We thus discern the presence of skill in even the lowest forms of productive labor. Seeing it also as the root of artifice and artificial, we realize that art is distinguished from and sometimes even opposed to nature.

The ancient and traditional meanings are all present in our daily vocabulary. In our thought the first connotation of art is fine art in the thought of all previous eras the useful arts came first. As late as the end of the 18th century Adam Smith follows the traditional usage which begins with Plato when, in referring to the production of a woolen coat, he says: The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production.

In the first great conversation on art—that presented in the Platonic dialogues—we find useful techniques and everyday skills typifying art by reference to which all other skills are analyzed. Even when Socrates analyzes the art of the rhetorician, as in the *Gorgias*, he constantly turns to the productions of the cobbler and the weaver and to the procedures of the husbandman and the physician. If the liberal arts are praised as highest, because the logician or rhetorician works in the medium of the soul rather than in matter, they are called arts only in a manner of speaking, and by comparison with the fundamental arts which handle physical material.

The Promethean gift of fire to men, which raised them from a brutish existence, earned with it various techniques for mastering matter—the basic useful arts. Lucretius, writing in a line that goes from Homer through Theophrastus and Plato to Bacon, Adam Smith, and Rousseau, attributes the progress of civilization and the difference between civilized and primitive society to the development of the arts and sciences: Ships and tillage, walls, laws, arms, roads, dress, and all such like things, all the prizes, all the elegancies too of life without

exception, poems, pictures, and the chiselling of fine-wrought statues, all these things practiced together with the acquired knowledge of the untiring mind taught men by slow degrees as they advanced on the way step by step."

At the beginning of this progress Lucretius places man's discovery of the arts of metal working, domesticating animals, and cultivating the soil. "Metallurgy and agriculture," says Rousseau, "were the two arts which produced this great revolution"—the advance from primitive to civilized life. The fine arts and the speculative sciences come last, not first in the progress of civilization.

The fine arts and the speculative sciences complete human life. They are not necessary—except perhaps for the good life. They are the dedication of human leisure and its best fruit. The leisure without which neither could come in being nor prosper is found for man and fostered by the work of the useful arts. Aristotle tells us that is "why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt for there the plenty of leisure was allowed to be at leisure."

THERE IS ANOTHER ambiguity in the reference of the word "art." Sometimes we use it to name the effects produced by human workmanship. We elliptically refer to *works of art* as art. Sometimes we use it to signify the cause of the things produced by human work—that skill of mind which directs the hand in its manipulation of matter. Art is both in the artist and in the work of art—in the one as *cause* in the other as the *effect*. But it is effected by a certain ennoblement of matter—a transformation produced not merely by the hand of man, but by his thought or knowledge.

The more generic meaning of art seems to be that of art as cause rather than as effect. There are many spheres of art in which no tangible product results, as in navigation or military strategy. We might of course call a successful or a victorious work of art but we tend rather to speak of the art of the navigator or the general. So, too, in medicine and teaching we look upon the health or knowledge which results from healing or teaching as natural. We do not find art in them, but rather in the skill of the healer or teacher who has helped

to produce that result. Hence even in the case of the shoe or the statue art seems to be primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects produced.

Aristotle in defining art as a capacity to make in doing a true course of reasoning, identifies it with making as distinct from doing and knowing. Though art like science and moral action, belongs to the mind and involves experience and learning, imagination and thought it is distinct from both in aiming at production in being knowledge of *how* to make something or to obtain a desired effect. Science on the other hand is knowledge *that* something is the case, or that a thing has a certain nature. Knowledge is sometimes idealized with science, to the exclusion of art or skill, but we depart from this narrow notion whenever we recognize that skill consists in *knowing how* to make something.

Even in speculative matters," writes Aquinas, "there is something by way of work, e.g. the making of a syllogism, or a fitting speech or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works of the speculative reason are by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but *liberal* arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts which are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are in a fashion servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man as regards his soul is free. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any suchlike work, are called sciences simply and not arts."

The discussion of medicine in the great books throws light on the relation of art and science in their origin as well as their development. Hippocrates writes of medicine as both an art and a science. In his treatise on *Acute Medicine* he says, "It appears to me necessary to every physician to be skilled in nature and science to know—if he would wish to perform his duties—what man is in relation to the attributes of food and drink, and to his other occupations, and what are the effects of each of them on every one. And it is not enough to know simply that cheese is a bad article of food, as disagreeing with whose eats of it to satiety, but what sort of disturbance it creates, and wherefore

and with what principle in man it disagrees. Whoever does not know what effect these things produce upon a man cannot know the consequences which result from them nor how to apply them. As a science medicine involves knowledge of the causes of disease the different kinds of diseases and their characteristic courses. Without such knowledge diagnosis prognosis and therapy would be a matter of guesswork—of chance as Hippocrates says—or at best the application of rule-of-thumb in the light of past experience.

But the scientific knowledge does not by itself make a man a healer ■ practitioner of medicine. The practice of medicine requires art in addition to science—art based on science but going beyond science in formulating general rules for the guidance of practice in particular cases. The habit of proceeding according to rules derived from science distinguishes for Galen the artist in medicine from the mere empiric. The antithesis of artist and empiric—suggesting the contrast between operation by tested rule and operation by trial and error—parallels the antithesis between scientist and man of opinion.

IT HAS SELDOM if ever been suggested that an art can be originally discovered or developed apart from some science of the subject matter with which the art deals. This does not mean that an individual cannot acquire the habit of an art without being taught the relevant scientific knowledge. An art can be learned by practice skill can be formed by repeated acts. But the teacher of an art cannot direct the learning without setting rules for his pupils to follow and if the truth or intelligibility of the rules is questioned the answers will come from the science underlying the art.

According to Kant every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the foundation which first enables a product if it is to be called one of art to be represented as possible. In the case of fine art which he distinguishes from other kinds of art as being the product of genius Kant claims that it arises only from a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given. Yet he maintains that a rule is still at its basis and may be gathered from the performance *re* from the product

which others may use to put their own talent to the test.

Granting that there is no art without science is the reverse true and ■ science possible without art? The question has two meanings. First are there arts peculiarly indispensable to the development of science? Second does every science generate a correlative art and through it work productively?

Traditionally the liberal arts have been considered indispensable to science. This has been held to be particularly true of logic. Because they were intended to serve as the instrument or *the art* for all the sciences Aristotle's logical treatises which constitute the first systematic treatment of the subject deserve the title *Organon* which they traditionally carry. Bacon's *Novum Organum* was in one sense an effort to supply a new logic or art for science and to institute a renovation of the sciences by the experimental method.

As an art logic consists of rules for the conduct of the mind in the processes of inquiry inference definition and demonstration by which sciences are constructed. Scientific method is in short the art of getting scientific knowledge. In the experimental sciences there are auxiliary arts—arts controlling the instruments or apparatus employed in experimentation. The experiment itself is a work of art combining many techniques and ■ in many products of art the water clock the inclined plane and the pendulum of Galileo the prisms mirrors and lenses of Newton.

The second question—whether all sciences have related arts and through them productive power—raises one of the great issues about the nature of scientific knowledge discussed in the chapters on *Philosophy and Science*.

For Francis Bacon and to some extent Descartes art is the necessary consequence of science. At the beginning of the *Novum Organum* Bacon declares that knowledge and human power are synonymous since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect for nature is only subdued by submission and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule. The distinction Bacon makes here between the speculative and practical parts of knowledge corresponds to the distinction between science

and art or as we sometimes say pure and applied science. He opposes their divorce from one another. If science is the indispensable foundation of art and consists in a knowledge of causes, art in Bacon's view is the whole fruit of science, for it applies that knowledge to the production of effects.

His theory of science and his new method for its development are directed to the establishment of man's empire over creation which is founded on the arts and sciences alone. Just as the present state of the arts accounts for the immense difference between men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies, so further advances in science promise the untold power of new inventions and techniques.

On Bacon's view not only the value but even the validity of scientific knowledge is to be measured by its productivity. A useless natural science—a science of nature which cannot be used to control nature—is unthinkable. With the exception of mathematics every science has its appropriate magic or special productive power. Even metaphysics in Bacon's conception of it has its true natural magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of its causes.

The opposite answer to the question about science and art is given by Plato, Aristotle, and others. No distinction between speculative and productive sciences. They differ from Bacon on the verbal level by using the word practical for those sciences which concern moral and political action rather than the production of effects. The sciences Bacon calls practical they call productive but under either name these are the sciences of making rather than doing—sciences which belong in the sphere of art rather than prudence. But the significant difference lies in the evaluation of the purely speculative sciences which consist in knowledge for its own sake divorced from art and morals or from the utilities of production and the necessities of action.

In tracing the history of the sciences, Aristotle notes that those men who first found the useful arts were thought wise and superior. But as more arts were invented and some were

directed to the necessities of life others to recreation the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former because their branches did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already established the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. So that the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever the artist wiser than the man of experience the master rather than the mechanic and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. That the theoretic sciences are useless in the sense of not providing men with the necessities or pleasures of life is a mark of their superiority. They give what is better than such utility—the insight and understanding which constitute wisdom.

The Baconian reply condemns the conception that there can be knowledge which is merely contemplation of the truth. It announces the revolution which for John Dewey ushered in the modern world. The pragmatic theory of knowledge had its origin in a conception of science at every point fused with art.

THE ANCIENTS trying to understand the natural phenomena of change and generation found that the processes of artistic production provided them with an analytic model. Through understanding how he himself worked in making things man might come to know how nature worked.

When a man makes a house or a statue he transforms matter. Changes in shape and position occur. The plan or idea in the artist's mind comes through his manipulation of matter to be embodied and realized objectively. To the ancients a number of different causes or factors seemed to be involved in every artistic production—material to be worked on, the activity of the artist at work, the form in his mind which he sought to impose on the matter, thus transforming it, and the purpose which motivated his effort.

In the medical tradition from Aristotle through Galen to Harvey there is constant emphasis upon the artistic activity of nature.

Galen continually argues against those who do not conceive Nature as an artist. Harvey consciously compares the activity of nature in biological generation to that of an artist. Like a potter she first divides her material and then indicates the head and trunk and extremities like a painter she first sketches the parts in outline and then fills them in with colours or like the ship builder who first lays down his keel by way of foundation and upon this raises the ribs and roof or deck even as he builds his vessel does nature fashion the trunk of the body and add the extremities.

Of all natural changes the one most closely resembling artistic production appears to be generation especially the production of living things by living things. In both cases a new individual seems to come into being. But upon further examination artistic production and natural generation reveal significant differences—differences which divide nature from art.

Aquinas considers both and distinguishes them in his analysis of divine causation. In things not generated by chance he points out that there are two different ways in which the form that is in the agent is passed on to another being. In some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being as in those that act by their nature as a man generates a man or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to intelligible being as in those that act by the intellect and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind.

Thus in biological procreation the progeny have the form of their parents—a rabbit producing a rabbit a horse a horse. Put in artistic production the product has not the form of the artist but the form he has conceived in his mind and which he seeks to objectify. Further more in generation and in other natural changes as well the matter which undergoes change seems to have in itself a tendency to become what it changes into as for example the acorn naturally tends to become an oak whereas the oaken wood does not have in itself any tendency to become a chair or a bed. The material the

artist works on is entirely passive with respect to the change he wishes to produce. The artistic result is in this sense entirely of his making.

The realm of art or of the artificial is thus opposed to the natural and differentiated from it. Kant for whom art is distinguished from nature as making is from acting or operating in general claims that by right it is only production through freedom i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of action that should be termed art. Consequently art is that which would not have come into being without human intervention. The man-made object is produced by man not in any way but specifically by his intelligence by the reason which makes him free.

Animals other than man are apparently productive but the question is whether they can be called artists. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But according to Marx what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi* and in which he must subordinate his will.

As indicated in the chapter on ANIMAL, some writers like Montaigne attribute the productivity of animals to reason rather than to instinct. Art then ceases to be one of man's distinctions from the brutes. But if man alone has reason and if the productions of art are works of reason then those who refer to animals as artists speak metaphorically on the basis of what Kant calls an analogy with art. As soon as we call to mind he continues that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labor we see at once that it is a product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their Creator that we ascribe it as art.

This in turn leads to the question whether nature itself is a work of art. Let me suppose the Eleatic Stranger says in the *Sophist* that things which are said to be made by nature

the work of divine art and that things which are made by man out of these are the work of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.

If we suppose that the things of nature are originally made by a divine mind, how does their production differ from the work of human artists or from biological generation? The answer given in Plato's *Timaeus* considers the original production of things as a fashioning of primordial matter in the patterns set by the eternal archetypes or ideas. In consequence, the divine work would be more like human artistry than either would be like natural reproduction. The emanation of the world from the One accord_g to Plotinus and the production of things out of the substance of God in Spinoza's theory appear on the other hand to be more closely analogous to natural generation than to art.

Both analogies—of creation with art and with generation—are dismissed as false by Christian theologians. God's making, is absolutely creative. It presupposes no matter to be formed, nor do things issue forth from God's own substance, but out of nothing.

Thus Augustine asks: How didst Thou make the heaven and the earth? And he answers:

It was not as a human artificer forming on body from another, according_g to the discretion of his mind, which can in some way invest with such a form as it seeth in itself by its inward eye. Verily neither in the heaven nor in the earth didst Thou make heaven and earth, nor in the air or waters, seeing these also be long in the heaven and the earth, nor in the whole world didst Thou make the whole world, because there was no place where to make it before it was made, that it might be. For that is, but because Thou art? Therefore Thou first made them, and in Thy Word Thou madest them. According to this view human art cannot be called creative, and God cannot be called an artist except metaphorically.

The issue concerning various theories of creation, or of the origin of the universe, is discussed in the chapter on World. But here we must observe that, according to the view we take of the similitude between human and di-

vine workmanship, the line we are able to draw between the realms of art and nature becomes shadowy or sharp.

THE DISCUSSIONS OF ART in the great books afford materials from which a systematic classification of the arts might be constructed, but only fragments of such a classification are ever explicitly presented.

For example, the seven liberal arts are enumerated by various authors, but their distinction from other arts, and their ordered relation to one another, do not receive full explanation. There is no treatment of grammar, rhetoric and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato's consideration of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy in the *Republic*, nor is there any analysis of the relation of the first three arts to the other four—traditionally organized as the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*.

However, in Augustine's work *On Christian Doctrine* we have a discussion of these arts as they are ordered to the study of theology. That orientation of the liberal arts is also the theme of Bonaventura's *Reduction of the Arts to Theology*. Quite apart from the problem of how they are ordered to one another, particular liberal arts receive so rich and varied a discussion in the tradition of the great books that the consideration of them must be distributed among a number of chapters, such as LOGIC, RHETORIC, LANGUAGE (for the discussion of grammar) and MATHEMATICS.

The principles of classification of the fine arts are laid down by Kant from the analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which men avail themselves in speech with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible. Since such expression consists in word, gesture and tone, he finds three corresponding fine arts: the art of speech, formative art, and the art of the play of sensations. In these terms he analyzes rhetoric and poetry, sculpture and architecture, painting and landscape gardening, and music.

A different principle of division is indicated in the opening chapters of Aristotle's *Poetics*. The principle that all art imitates nature suggests the possibility of distinguishing and relating the various arts according to their char-

acteristic differences as imitations—by reference to the *object* imitated and to the *medium* and *manner* in which it is imitated by the poet, sculptor or painter and musician. Color and form, Aristotle writes, are used as means by some, who imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imitations. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony in prose or in verse. Aristotle's treatise deals mainly with this art—poetry; it does not develop for the other fine arts the analysis it suggests.

Aristotle's principle also suggests questions about the useful arts. Are such arts as shoe-making and house-building imitations of nature in the same sense as poetry and music? Does the way in which the farmer, the physician, and the teacher imitate nature distinguish these three arts from the way in which a statue is an imitation, or poem, or a house?

The Aristotelian dictum about art imitating nature has of course been as frequently challenged as approved. Apart from the issue of its truth, the theory of art as imitation poses many questions which Aristotle left unanswered. If there are answers in the great books, they are there by implication rather than by statement.

THE MOST FAMILIAR distinction between arts—that between the useful and the fine—is also the one most frequently made in modern discussion. The criterion of the distinction needs little explanation. Some of man's productions are intended to be used, others to be contemplated or enjoyed. To describe them in terms of imitation, the products of the useful arts must be said to imitate a natural function (the shoe, for example, the protective function of calloused skin). The imitation merely indicates the use, and it is the use which counts. But in the products of the fine arts, the imitation of the form, quality, or other aspect of a natural object is considered to be the source of pleasure.

The least familiar distinction among the arts is implied in any thorough discussion, yet its divisions are seldom, if ever, named. Within the sphere of useful art, some arts work toward a result which can hardly be regarded as an

artificial product. Fruits and grains would grow without the intervention of the farmer, yet the farmer helps them to grow more abundantly and regularly. Health and knowledge are natural effects, even though the arts of medicine and teaching may aid in their production.

These arts, more fully discussed in the chapters on MEDICINE and EDUCATION, stand in sharp contrast to those skills whereby man produces the useful things which, but for man's work, would be totally lacking. In the one case, it is the artist's activity itself which imitates or cooperates with nature's manner of working; in the other, the things which the artist makes by operating on passive materials supplied by nature imitate natural forms or functions.

For the most part, the industrial arts are of the second sort. They transform dead matter into commodities or tools. The arts which cooperate with nature usually work with living matter, as in agriculture, medicine, and teaching. The distinction seems warranted and clear. Yet it is cut across by Adam Smith's division of labor into productive and non-productive. The work of agriculture is associated with industry in the production of wealth, but whatever other use they may have, physicians and teachers, according to Smith, do not directly augment the wealth of nations.

If to the foregoing we add the division of the arts into liberal and servile, the major traditional distinctions are covered. This last division had its origin in the recognition that some arts, like sculpture and carpentry, could not effect their products except by shaping matter, whereas some arts, like poetry or logic, were free from matter, at least in the sense that they worked productively in symbolic mediums. But by other principles of classification, poetry and sculpture are separated from logic and carpentry as fine from useful art. Logic, along with grammar, rhetoric, and the mathematical arts, is separated from poetry and sculpture as liberal from fine art. When the word liberal is used to state this last distinction, its meaning narrows. It signifies only the speculative arts, or arts concerned with processes of thinking and knowing.

The adequacy of any classification and the intelligibility of its principles must stand the test of questions about particular arts. The

These books frequently discuss the arts of animal husbandry and navigation, the arts of cooking and hunting, the arts of war and government. Each raises a question about the nature of art in general, and challenges any analysis of the arts to classify them and explain their peculiarities.

THERE ARE TWO OTHER major issues which have been debated mainly with respect to the fine arts.

One already mentioned concerns the unique character of art. The proponents of imitation would deny that there may be some perfect resemblance between a work of art and a natural object. A drama may remind us of human actions we have experienced; music may remind us of the tonal qualities and rhythms of the human voice; registering the course of the emotions. Nevertheless, the motivation of artistic creation lies deeper: it is not, as a desire to imitate nature, or to find some pleasure in such resemblances.

According to Tolstoy, the arts serve primarily as a medium of spiritual communication, because to create the ties of human brotherhood. According to Freud, it is emotion or subconscious expression, rather than imitation or communication, which is the deepest source of art: the poet or artist forces us to become aware of our inner selves in which the same impulses are all extant even though they are repressed. Freud's theory of sublimation of emotion or drive through art seems to contrast with Aristotle's theory of emotional catharsis or purification. But Freud is attempting to account for the origin of art and Aristotle is trying to describe an effect proper to its enjoyment.

The theories of communication, expression, or imitation seem to explain art or at least its social function. But there is also a conception of art which, to go beyond explanation, takes it as mysterious—the spontaneous product of inspiration. Of course, in discussing the work of an individual artist, we encounter this notion. We encounter it in Plato's *Ion*.

THE OTHER major controversy concerns the regulation of the arts by the state for human welfare and the public good.

Here as before the fine arts (chiefly poetry and music) have been the focus of the debate. It is worth noting, however, that a parallel problem of political regulation occurs in the sphere of the industrial arts. On the question of state control over the production and distribution of wealth, Smith and Marx represent extreme opposites, as Milton and Plato are poles apart on the question of the state's right to censor the artist's work. In this debate, Aristotle stands on Plato's side in many particulars, and Mill with Milton.

The problem of censorship or political regulation of the fine arts presupposes some prior questions. Plato argues in the *Republic* that all poets but "hymns to the gods and praises of famous men" must be banned from the State "for if you go beyond this and allow the licensed muse to enter either in epic or in iambic verse, not law and the reason of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed the best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State." Such a view presupposes a certain theory of the fine arts and of their influence on the citizens and the whole character of the community. Yet because both Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be far from negligible, they do not see any reason in individual liberty for the state to refrain from interfering with the rights of the artist for the greater good of the community.

To Milton and Mill, the measure of the artist's influence does not affect the question of the freedom of the arts from political or ecclesiastical interference. While admitting the need for protecting the interests of peace and public safety, Milton demands "Give me the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties." The issue for them is entirely one of liberty. They espouse the cause of freedom—for the artist to express or communicate his work and for the community to receive from him what he has to offer.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The generic notion of art skill of mind in making
- 2 Art and nature
 - 2a Causation in art and nature artistic production compared with natural generation
 - 2b The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production
 - 2c The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man
- 3 Art as imitation
- 4 Diverse classifications of the arts useful and fine liberal and servile
- 5 The sources of art in experience imagination and inspiration
- 6 Art and science
 - 6a The comparison and distinction of art and science
 - 6b The liberal arts as productive of science means and methods of achieving knowledge
 - 6c Art as the application of science the productive powers of knowledge
- 7 The enjoyment of the fine arts
 - 7a Art as a source of pleasure or delight
 - 7b The judgment of excellence in art
- 8 Art and emotion expression purgation sublimation
- 9 The useful arts
 - 9a The use of nature by art agriculture medicine teaching
 - 9b The production of wealth the industrial arts
 - 9c The arts of war
 - 9d The arts of government
- 10 The moral and political significance of the arts
 - 10a The influence of the arts on character and citizenship the role of the arts in the training of youth
 - 10b The political regulation of the arts for the common good the problem of censorship
- 11 Myths and theories concerning the origin of the arts
- 12 The history of the arts progress in art as measuring stages of civilization

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To find the passages cited, use the numbers in header type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK 11 [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTION 1. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium*, m. 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

ART DIVISIONS 2. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad*, BK 11 [6, 283] 12d.

BIBL. REFERENCE 3. The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g., Old Testament *Jeremiah*, 7-45-(D) 11 *Eidrah*, 1, 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passum* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1. The generic notion of art: skill of mind in making

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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK 1, CH 1 [610^a 25 33] 162d / *Elements* BK 1, CH 7 [097^a 3 109^a 8] 343a-c BK 1 CH 4 388d 389a K 11, CH 7 [1 6-34 68 15] 421b-c / *Physics* CH 1 [5^a 35 39] 453b BK 11 CH 13 [11 30-35] 53c / *Rhetoric* K 1, CH 1 [134^a 1 593a [355^a 9-14] 594d 595a CH 2 [355^a 26-36] 595b [1350^a 6-1357^a] 596b-c
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- 11 PLATONISTS *F. & E. Excerpt*, TR VIII, CH 1 239b-240a
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- 25 MONTAGNE *Essays* 437b
- 28 HARRIS *On Animal Generation*, 333a
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK 1 APH 85 121d 122b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART 1 61b-c
- 42 KANT *Judgment*, 523c 524b 525c 527b
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- 47 GOETHE *Fantasy and Poesy* [134 1, 14a b
- 49 DART *Descent of Man*, 2 8b-c
- 50 MARX *Capital*, 85b-d
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2. Art and nature

- 2a. Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation
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- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK VI SECT 40 277d
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A 1 ANS and REP 1 2 595d 597c
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- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 4 107b
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217b d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328b passim
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b
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2b The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191^b7 1] 266d BK II CH I [193 9-19] 269b 270a CH 2 [194 21-13] 270c 271a CH 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1 7] 506a BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a esp CH 8 556b 557b BK VIII CH 3 [1043^b5 24] 567d 568b / *Soul* BK II CH I [412^b10-18] 642c d
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 9 A 2 REP 4 953b 955c Q 80 AA 1 2 956c 958b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [127 142] 107c d XIII [52-84] 126a b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b 415b
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- 50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b c 86d 87c

2c The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I 2 / *Leviticus* 26 1 / *Numbers* 33 52 / *Deuteronomy* 5 7 10 16 21 22 / *Job* 37 1-40 5--(D) *Job* 37 39 / *Isaiah* 40 18-26--(D) *Isaiah* 40 18 6
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c 428d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laos* BK I 760a 761d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 40 277d
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

1 PLATO *F with Ennead* TRIV C 131 174d
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/ *Cary of God* BK XXII CH 24 610 d / *Chris-
tian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c-d

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22 CHAUCER *Physic on s T le* [11 941-972] 366b-
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b

28 H A Y *On A mal Generat* on 427d-428c
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40 GIBB *Decline and F ll* 663d-664

42 LA PU *Reaso* 188c 189a / *Judgement*
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4 HOMOER *I d* A X 1 [4, 8-608] 135a 136c

7 PLATO *Cratyl* s 104c 106c 108c 110d /
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8 ARISTOTEL *Physic* BK I CH 2 [942a-26]
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9 ARISTOTEL *P hysic* BK III CH [8 b o-5]
4 9b A H 5 [134014 b 9] 545 546a
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12 L A R VI s Nat c f *Thi ge* BK V [1379-
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12 AUR LI s *Medicus* BK III SECT 2 259d
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16 H PL *Harmonie f the World* 1048a

17 PLOTIN s *First Ennead* TR VI 2 321d 23a
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XI [91 111]
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Athens ACT I SC I [28-38] 393d 394a [156-
160] 395b-c / *Winter s Tale* ACT IV SC IV
[77 1 8] 508c 509a / *Sonnets* LXVII-LXVIII
596 d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331c 333c
438c 444b-c 492b

29 CERVANT s *Don Quixote* PART I 82c d
184a 185b PART II 237b c 251d 252a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learn g* 33c d /
N m *Organum* BK II APH 29 159b-c

31 DES ART s *Medus* I ons I 76 b

32 MIL ON *Sam us Agonistes* 337a 338a

33 PASCAL *Pemices* 29 176 32 33 176a b 120
195a 134 196a

35 HUME *Human Understandi g* SECT I DIV 5
451d 453a

37 F ELDMO *Tom Jones* 121b d 123a 243a d

40 GIBB *On D cline and Fall* 158d

42 KANT *Judgements* 521b-524b 525a 528c esp
527b-528c 557a 558b

44 BOSWELL Johnson 196d 197a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy f R ght* PART I par III
29d 30a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 219b III

52 DO TOEVSKEY *Brothers* Ka ama ov BK X
284b-d

53 J ss *Psychology* 186b 686b 688a

54 F vd *Interpret t on of Dreams* 265c / *Civil-
izat on and its D c contents* 779 d

4 The e ccl mifications of the arts useful and fi e liberal and servile

7 PLATO *Euthydem* s 74b-76b / I n 145d
148a c / *Gorg* s 253 255 260a 262a 280d
282b / *Republic* III 305b 306a / *S ph* II
552c 553a 560b-561d 577c 579d / *Statesman*
592d 593a 593d 595a / *Philebus* 633a 635b
/ *Laus* K II 662c 663b BK X 760a III

8 ARISTOTEL *Physic* BK II CH 2 [194 33 b 9]
270d 271a / *M t phisic* BK I CH I [981b 13-
24] 500a

9 ARISTOTEL *Eth c* BK I CH I 339a b CH 7
[97c 5 23] 342c / *Politic* BK I CH II
[1238b 9-39] 452d-453b BK VIII CH 2 [1337b 3-
3] 542 d / *Rhetoric* c CH 2 [1355 6-36]
595b / *Poetic* c CH I 5 681a 682c

17 PLOTIN *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 31 175a
/ *Fifth Enn* d TR IX CH II 250c 251a

18 AUUSTINE *Christia Doctr ne* BK II CH 30
651 d

(2 *Art and nature 2a Causation in art and nature artistic production compared with natural generation*)

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH II [93 3-9] 129d / *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191 33-39] 267b BK II CH I [192^b 3-32] 268b d 269a CH 2 [194 33-38] 270d 271a CH 8-9 275d 278a c esp CH 8 [199 8-7] 276b d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 9 [335^b 18-336 13] 437b d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [390^b 2-14] 494c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1-7] 506a CH 9 [992 29-34] 510c BK VI CH I [1025^b 18 27] 547d BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a BK IX CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c BK XI CH 7 [1064 10-16] 592b BK XII CH 3 [1070 4-8] 599b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639^b 12-640 35] 161d 162d [641^b 13 29] 164c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 21-22 269c 271a BK II CH I [734 17-735 5] 274c 275c CH 4 [738^b 18 28] 279c [740 13-18] 281a [740^b 25-741 2] 281d CH 6 [743^b 20-25] 285a BK III CH II [762 15-20] 303b BK IV CH 2 [767 16-25] 308c CH 6 [775 20-23] 317b / *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^b 18 24] 345a b BK VI CH 4 [1140 11-16] 388d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a CH 12 172d 173c BK II CH 3 185a 186d CH 6 189a 190a
- 12 LUCRETII *Nature of Things* BK IV [823 857] 55a b
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK VI SECT 40 277d
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 3-4 130a 131a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 10 147c 148b TR IV CH 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 1-2 239b-240c CH 5 242a TR IX CH 2 247a / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH II 275c
- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 595d 597c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91 112] 16a H PARADISE I [94 142] 107b d II [112-138] 109a VIII [91-111] 117d 118a VIII [52-84] 126a b
- 22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [II 941-972] 366b-367a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47a H
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 93b d
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 385a c 400d 401a 407c 412b 415b 427d 428c 442d 443b 443d 444c 447d-448a 450c 492a b
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 252a
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 4 107b
- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 437a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217b d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328d passim
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 85b-d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b

2b The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191^b 1] 266d BK II CH I [193 9-19] 269b-270a CH [194 21-13] 270c 271a CH 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1 1] 506a BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a esp CH 8 556b 557b BK VIII CH 3 [1043^b 24] 567d 568b / *Soul* BK II CH I [112^b 10-18] 642c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [640 10-641^b 42] 162b 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [729 9]-CH 22 [730^b 32] 269b 271a BK II CH I [734^b 8 735 10] 275a d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp BK II CH 3 185a 186d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 3 281b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 2 3 21d 23a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH I 2 239b 240c TR IX CH 2 247a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 7 90d 91a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 91 A 3 ANS 486b 487d Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 9 A 1 REP 4 953b 955c Q 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [12 14] 107c d XIII [52-84] 126a H
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b-415b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d 43c 45a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [468-502] 185b 186a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 56-7 26b 27a ADDITIONS 32 121d 122a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a 166b 185c d PART II 266a 267b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b H 86d 87c

2c The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I 2 / *Leviticus* 61 / *Numbers* 33 52 / *Deuteronomy* 5 7 10 16 21 22 / *Job* 37 1-40 5- (D) *Job* 37 39 / *Isaiah* 40 18-26- (D) *Isaiah* 40 18 6
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c-4 8d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laos* BK X 760a 761d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 40 271d
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

- 1 PROCLUS *F. with Ennead* TR IV CH 31 I 4d
 175a / *F. fish Ennead*, TR VIII CH 5 242a
 1 A GUSTIN *C. nfe* II RI BK XI PAR 7 90d 91a
 / *City of God* K XI I CH 24, 610a d / *Chris-*
han Doctrine A I CI 30 632c d
 1 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3
 A 5 and EP 2 12c 14a Q 24 A 3 82c 83b A
 11 NS 84c 85c Q 15 91b-94a Q 16 A 1
 94b 95c II 17 A 1 100d 101d Q 22 A 2 2
 and REP 3 128d 130d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d
 221c QQ 44 46 238a 255d passim QQ 65-66
 339a 349d passim Q 74 A 3 REP 3 315a
 377 c Q 9 A 3 ANS 486b-487d Q 93 A 2
 REP 4 493a d Q 101 A 1 R P 1 3 528b-529a
 Q 104 A 2 534c 535c PART II Q 1 A 3
 610b-612b Q 23 A 2 A 3 673c 674c
 0 AQUIN S *Summa Theologica* ACT III Q 3
 A 8 ANS 729b 730b PART III SUPPL Q 75
 3 REP 4 938a 939d
 11 DA TE *Dante Comedy* HELL XI [91-111]
 16 b PARADISE VIII [9-111] 117d 118a IX
 [3-108] 119d X [17-21] 120b c XII [52-84]
 126a b X VII [70-117] 134b-d esp [109-111]
 134d
 22 CHAUCER *Physic a Tale* [11 94 9 2] 366b-
 367
 23 H A A Lemnahan MYTHO, 47a b
 25 HAR O *Animal General* u 427d-428c
 442d-443b 492 b
 32 M N P *First Last* BK III [694 735]
 1 0b-151b
 40 GIBSON *Decline of Fall* 663d-664a
 42 KA T P Re 188c 189 / *Judgement*
 51 b-513d
 40 DIRHI *Org f Species* 87a b
 3 ARTS AND SCIENCES
 4 H M II d K 2 II [4/8-6 8] 135 136c
 7 PLATO *Crityl* s 104 106c 108c 110d /
Republic A III 320 334b AK VI 382 c
 X 421 434 / *Tim* I 443b-d 455b-c /
Crityl 478c d / *S phist* 552c d 560b-561d
 577c 579d / *Statesman* 590c d / *Lau* II
 654 660a 662a BK X 760 II
 8 ARISTO *Physic* A I CH 2 [942a 26]
 270
 9 ARISTOTLE *P hys* BK CH I [281a10 15]
 4 9b-c I II 5 [1340 4 b 9] 545c 546a
 / *Rh* 101 X I CH [13 14] 613a /
Po 12c 681a 699a esp II -5 681a 684a
 12 L A HIL N I e of *This* BK V [1379-
 1383] 79
 12 AU II *Medu* / *As* BK II SC 2 259d
 60 K X EXT 1 303b
 20 K 2 II *mo f the* II Id 1048a
 17 PLATO US F *Enne d* TR I CH 2 31d 23a
 / *F. with Enne d* TR CH 147 148b /
F. fish En cad TR II I 2 239b-240 TR
 IX CH 2 247 II 2 20 252a / *S xch*
Enn d TR II I 275c
 18 A U I *Christi Doctrine* K II u 25
 649b-d
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theol gica* PART I Q 1 A 9
 REP 1 8d 9c Q 93 A 2 REP 4 493a d Q 11,
 A 1 ANS 595d 59 c
 21 DA TE *Dante Comedy* HELL XI [91-111]
 15a b PURGATORY X [22-99] 67c 68b XII
 [10-72] 0b-71a
 2 CHALCER *Troilus and Cresida* BK II STA 2A
 149 41a / *Physician s Tale* [11 941-97] 1366b-
 36 a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 4 a b PART IV
 262c
 27 SH KEEPE BK [Samuel ACT II SC II [5 6-593]
 46b ACT III SC II [1 39] 49a b / *Timon f*
Athen ACT I SC I [28-38] 293d 394a [15b
 160] 395b-c / *Timon s Tale* ACT I SC IV
 [77 1 8] 508c 509a / *Sonnets* LX III LXVIII
 596c d
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332c 333c
 438c 444b-c 492b
 29 CERVANTES *Don Q xote* PART I 82c d
 184a 185b PA II 337b-c 251d 2 2a
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learn g* 33c d /
Novum Organum BK II A I 29 159b c
 31 DE CARLES *Medusa* I 6a b
 32 M LTON *Sams n Agonistes* 337a 338a
 33 PA CAL *Penides* 9 176a 32 33 176a b 120
 195 131 196a
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 5
 452d-453a
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 121b d 123a 143a d
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 158d
 42 H T *Judgement* 521b-524b 525a 528c esp
 527b-528c 551a 558b
 44 B SWELL / *havo* 196d 197a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* s BK I par 63
 29d 30a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 219b-c
 52 DOSTOVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK X
 284b-d
 53 F MLS *Psychology* 186b 685b-688a
 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 263c / *Civil*
ization and its Discontents 179c d
 4 D ERSE classification of the arts useful and
 fi e liberal and serv le
 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 74b-76b / *Io* 145d
 148a c / *Gorg* s 253c 255c 260a 262a 280d
 282b / *Rep* blue BK I 305b-306a / *Sophist*
 552c 553a 560b-561d 577c 579d / *Statesman* n
 592d 593a 593d 595a / *Ph* letus 623 635b
 / *Laws* BK I 662c 663b BK X 760a II
 8 ARISTOTLE *Physic* BK II C I 2 [194 31] 91
 270d 271a / *Metaphysic* BK I C I 2 [981 23
 24] 500
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethi* s BK I CH I 339a b CH 7
 [1097 15 23] 342c / *Poetics* BK I CH II
 [1 289-39] 452d-453b BK VIII C I 2 [1317 3
 23] 542c d / *Rhetoric* BK I C I 2 [13 5 6-36]
 595b / *Poetics* II 3 681a 682
 17 PROCLUS *Fourth Enne d* TR I CH 31 175a
 / *F. fish Enne d* K IX III 250c 251
 18 AUG TINE *Christi n Doctrine* BK II CH 30
 651 d

(2 *Art and nature 2a Causation in art and nature artistic production compared with natural generation*)

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk. II ch. II [95 3-9] 129d / *Physics* bk. I ch. 8 [191 33-39] 267b bk. II ch. I [192^b8-32] 268b d 269a ch. 2 [194 33-38] 270d 271a ch. 8-9 275d 278a c esp ch. 8 [199 8-37] 276b d / *Generation and Corruption* bk. II ch. 9 [335^b18-336 13] 437b d / *Meteorology* bk. IV ch. 12 [390^b2-14] 494c / *Metaphysics* bk. I ch. III [988 1-7] 506a ch. 9 [99- 29-34] 510c bk. VI ch. I [1025^b18 27] 547d bk. VII ch. 7-9 555a 558a bk. IV ch. 2 571c 572a ch. 5 573a c bk. XI ch. 7 [1064 10-16] 592b = bk. XII ch. 3 [1070 4-8] 599b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk. I ch. I [639^b12 640 35] 161d 162d [641^b13 29] 164c d / *Generation of Animals* bk. I ch. 21 22 269c 271a bk. II ch. I [734 17-735 5] 274c 275c ch. 4 [738^b18 8] 279c [740 13-18] 281a [740^b25-741 2] 281d ch. 6 [743^b20 25] 285a bk. III ch. II [762 15-20] 303b bk. IV ch. 2 [767 16-25] 308c ch. 6 [775 20-23] 317b / *Ethics* bk. I ch. 9 [1099^b18 24] 345a b bk. VI ch. 4 [1140 11-16] 388d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk. I ch. 7 170c 171a ch. 12 172d 173c bk. II ch. 3 185a 186d ch. 6 189a 190a
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* bk. IV [823 857] 55a b
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk. III SECT 2 259d 260a bk. VI SECT 40 277d
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR. VIII ch. 3-4 130a 131a / *Fourth Ennead* TR. III ch. 10 147c 148b TR. IV ch. 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR. VIII ch. 1-2 239b 240c ch. 5 242a TR. IX ch. 2 247a / *Sixth Ennead* TR. II ch. II 275c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A 1 ANS ADD REP 1-2 595d 597c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XI [91 111] 16a b PARADISE I [94 142] 107b d II [112-138] 109a VIII [91-111] 117d 118a XIII [52 84] 126a b
- 22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [II 941-972] 366b-367a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 93b d
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 385a c 400d 401a 407c 412b-415b 427d 428c 442d 443b 443d 444c 447d 448a 450c 492a b
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 52a
- 30 BACON *Nolum Organum* bk. I APH 4 107b
- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 437a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk. II CH. XXVI SECT 2 217b-d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328d passim
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 85b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b

2b *The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk. I ch. 7 [191^b 12] 266d bk. II ch. I [193 9-19] 269b 270a ch. I [194 21^b13] 270c 271a ch. 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* bk. I ch. 6 [988 1 7] 506a bk. VII ch. 7-9 555a 558a esp ch. 8 556b 557b bk. VIII ch. 3 [1043^b 24] 567d 568b / *Soul* bk. II ch. I [412^b10-18] 642c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk. I ch. I [640 10-641^b42] 162b 165a / *Generation of Animals* bk. I ch. 20 [729 9]-ch. 22 [1 30^b32] 269b 271a bk. II ch. I [734^b8-735 10] 275a d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp bk. II ch. 3 185a 186d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk. VII SECT 23 281b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR. VI ch. 2 3 21d 23a / *Fifth Ennead* TR. VIII ch. I 239b-240c TR. IX ch. 2 247a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk. XI par. 7 90d 91a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 91 A 3 ANS 486b 487d Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL. Q 9 A 2 REP 4 953b 955c 80 AA 1 2 956c 958b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [137 14 107c d XIII [52 84] 126a b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b-415b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d 43c 45a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk. V [468-50] 185b 186a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par. 56-51 26b 27a ADDITIONS 32 121d 122a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a 166b 185c d PART II 266a 267b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b c 86d 87c

2c *The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-2 / *Leviticus* 26 1 / *Numbers* 33 52 / *Deuteronomy* 5 7 10 16 21 22 / *Job* 37 1-40 5-(D) *Job* 37-39 / *Isaiah* 40 18-26-(D) *Isaiah* 40 18 26
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk. X 427c 428d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laos* bk. X 760a 761d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk. VI SECT 40 277d
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

(4 *Diverse classifications of the arts useful and fine liberal and servile.*)

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 103 A 1 REP 2 529a 530a PART I-II Q 8 A 2 REP 3 656a d Q 9 A 1 ANS 657d 658d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 57 A 3 REP 3 37b 38a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk II 82c d BK III 190d 191a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 69d 70d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251b-c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38c 39d 56a b / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 8, 121d 122b
42 KANT *Judgement* 524a b 526a 527b 532a 536d

5 The sources of art in experience imagination and inspiration

- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 31 1-11 35 30-36 8
4 HOMER *Iliad* bk I [1-7] 3a bk II [484-493] 14d 15a / *Odyssey* bk I [1-10] 183a
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124a / *Ion* 142a 148a c / *Symposium* 160c d / *Apology* 202b d / *Gorgias* 253a 260a 262a / *Sophist* 561b d 577d 579d / *Laws* bk IV 684b-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk II CH 19 [100 3-9] 136c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^b25-982 1] 499b 500b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 26-^b13] 348d 349a BK X CH 9 [1180^b29-1181^b23] 435d 436a c / *Rhetoric* bk I CH I [1354 1-12] 593a BK III CH I [1404 13-19] 654b CH 2 [1405 3-9] 655b CH 10 [1410^b5-8] 662c / *Poetics* CH 17 [1455 22-36] 690c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* 1a 9a c esp par 1-8 1a 3b / *Articulations* par 10 94d
11 VIRGIL *Eclogues* IV [1-3] 14a VI [1-12] 19a / *Aeneid* BK I [1-11] 103a BK VII [37-44] 237a
14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes* 692d 695d
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH I 239b-240a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 68 A 4 REP 1 91b 92c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL II [7-9] 2c XXVII [1-12] 47c PURGATORY I [1 12] 53a XXIV [49-63] 90a b XIV [37-42] 98a PARADISE I [1-36] 106a b II [1-18] 107d [91 105] 108d XVIII [70-117] 134b d esp [109 111] 134d XXII [112-123] 140d XXIII [55-69] 141d 142a
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 262c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk I 2d 3a c BK III 129c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 52d 53a 309c 310c 450d-451a 523c 524a 532a b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT V SC I [1 27] 310d 371a / *Henry V* PROLOGUE 532b d ACT III PROLOGUE 543c d

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Sonnets* XXXII 591a b LXXVIII-LXAXV 598b-599b c-cv 601c 601c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332c 333c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 252a 340b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d 38c 39b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 43b / *Meditations* I 76a b
32 MILTON *On Shakespear* 1630 16a / *Paradise Lost* BK I [1 26] 93b 94a BK III [1-55] 135b-136b BK VI [1-39] 217a 218a BK IX [1 41] 247a 248a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 97a 98a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 198a B 302a b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 152a 155b 190b 191c 273a 274c 280a 296b d 298a
40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 185b 627b-d
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 528c
42 KANT *Judgement* 463a 464c 473a c 482b-483d 523d 524b 525c 532a esp 526a d 528c 530c 542b 543c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a-c 176a c PART II 263d 268b
47 GOETHE *Faust* DEDICATION 1a b PART II [9945-9960] 242a
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I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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- 5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* 40a 51d esp [109-113] 41b [248-256] 42d [459-461] 44d
- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 44a-45a / *Phaedrus* 138c 139a / *Symposium* 160c d / *Republic* bk ii 316c 319c / *Statesman* 589a c / *Philebus* 610d 613a esp 611d 613a / *Laws* bk ii 653a c 662c 663b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk viii ch 6 [1341^b2-8] 547a / *Rhetoric* bk iii ch 1 [1403^b15-1404 39] 653b d 654c / *Poetics* ch 3 [1448^b25] ch 5 [1449^b19] 682b-684a
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 3 1d 2b par 7 3a par 12 4b c par 14 5a
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk v [1028-1104] 74c 75c [1241-1457] 77b 80a c
- 13 VIRGIL *Georgics* I [121 146] 40b-41a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iv 299a 300b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38d 39a / *Notum Organum* bk i aph 109 128d 129c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 352a d
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 655d 656a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 239a b 252a c PART II 261b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278a 279c 298a 301c 329c 348d 349d 567c 571a esp 569d 570a, 570d
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama ov* bk x 284b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 727b-728a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512d 513a / *Group Psychology* 670a b 692a 693a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 778b d [fn 2] / *New Introductory Lectures* 862d
- 12 The history of the arts progress in art measuring stages of civilization
- 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk iv [104 111] 25a bk ix [185-189] 59a bk xi [15-46] 72b c bk xiii [368-617] 133d 136d / *Odyssey* bk ix [103 115] 230b
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 5b 5d 6a bk ii 49d 50a 75b 76a bk iii 102c bk vii 220d 221b
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk i 350b-d
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 479d / *Statesman* 602b-c / *Laws* bk ii 654c 655b bk iii 675c 676b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* ch 34 [183^b16-184^b8] 253a d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch i [981^b13 24] 500a bk xii ch 8 [1074^b11] 605a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 7 [1098^a21 5] 343c d / *Politics* bk ii ch 8 [1268^b23 1269^b9] 464d 465b / *Rhetoric* bk iii ch i [1403^b15 1404 39] 653b d 654c / *Poetics* ch 4-5 682c 684a
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1 4 1a 2c par 12 4b-c
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk v [3 4 31] 65b c [925 1160] 73b 76b [1241 1457] 77b 80a,c
- 13 VIRGIL *Georgics* I [121 146] 40b 41a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 127a 129b / *Marcellus* 252a 255a / *Aratus* 830b-c
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk xv 167c 168a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk xii ch 10 348b-c bk xviii ch 13 14 478d 479d bk xvii ch 24 610a c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 46 A 2 REP 4 253a 255a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy PURGATORY* xi [19-120] 69c 70a xxiv [49-63] 90a b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 85c PART II 267c 269b passim
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk ii 81d 82c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 101d esp 1a 15a 18b 20b 25c 29a 32c 33d 34a 35b-36c 38d 39a 51d 54b / *Notum Organum* bk i aph 85 121d 122d aph 120 134d 135d
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61a e
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 103b-115b esp 106a 107a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338d 340a 346d 347a 352a d 365b 366b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 6a d bk iii 173d 175b bk iv 191a bk v 308c 309a c 337d 338c
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 18b 24a c 88d 89d 157d 159a 171c 237c 239a 502d 503a 633b 634a c 641b 642b 655d 658b 661c 664d
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 195d 197a 225a c 291d 292c 298a 300b 327a 328a c 355a d 451c-452d 509d 510a e 522b-528a c esp 528a,c 573a 574a 590a 598a passim esp 596d 598a

Chapter 5 ASTRONOMY

INTRODUCTION

ASTRONOMY could take its place in this catalog of ideas on the ground that several of the great books are monuments of astronomical science exemplifying the imaginative and analytical powers which have made it one of the most remarkable triumphs of the human mind. Its claim might further be supported by the fact that other great books—of mathematics, physics, theology, and poetry—have a context of astronomical imagery and theory. But the inclusion of astronomy can be justified by what is perhaps an even more significant fact, namely that astronomical speculation raises problems and suggests conclusions which have central relevance for the whole range of the great ideas.

Man has used astronomy to measure not only the passage of time or the course of a voyage but also his position in the world, his power of knowing his relation to God. When man first turns from himself and his immediate earthly surroundings to the larger universe of which he is a part, the object which presses on his vision is the overhanging firmament with its luminous bodies moving with great basic regularity and upon closer observation with certain perplexing irregularities. Always abiding and always changing, the firmament which provides man with the visible boundary of his universe also becomes for him a basic in fact an inescapable object of contemplation.

Careful and precise astronomical observations antedate the birth of astronomy as a science. The earliest test in the heavenly bodies and their motions is often attributed to the usefulness of their predictions which can be made from a knowledge of celestial phenomena.

Whether the motives were entirely utilitarian or partly religious and speculative, the Egyptians and Babylonians we learn from Herodotus undertook practical study of the heavens. They observed and recorded with

immense persistence. They calculated and predicted. They turned their predictions to use through the priestly office of prophecy to foretell eclipses, tides, and floods, and they employed their calculations in the mundane arts of navigation and surveying to guide travel and fix boundaries. But they did not like the Greeks develop elaborate theories which sought to organize all the observed facts systematically.

With the Greeks, the down-to-earth everyday utility of astronomy seems to count for less than its speculative grandeur. The dignity which they confer upon astronomy among the disciplines reflects the scope and majesty of its subject matter. The Greek astronomer concerned as he is with figuring motions that range through the whole of space and are as old as time or as interminable, takes for his object the structure of the cosmos.

Aristotle and Plato pay eloquent tribute to the special worth of astronomy. In the opening chapters of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle associates astronomical inquiry with the birth of philosophy. Apart from usefulness, he says, men delight in the sense of sight, and he adds it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. They wondered first about the obvious difficulties, but little by little they advanced to greater matters and stated difficulties about the phenomena of the moon and sun and stars and about the genesis of the universe. In his own philosophical thought, Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens* is not only one of the basic natural sciences but certain of its principles have general significance for all the other parts of his physical science.

A wider view of the importance of astronomy is taken by Plato. In the *Timaeus* he dwells on the higher use and purpose for which God has given eyes to us. Had we never seen the

- TOlstoy *What Is Art?*
 FREUD *Leonardo da Vinci*
 — *The Theme of the Three Caskets*
 — *The Moses of Michelangelo*
 — *A Childhood Men ory from Dichtung und Wahrheit*

II

- EPICURUS *Letter to Herodotus*
 HORACE *The Art of Poetry*
 VITRUVIUS *On Architecture*
 QUINTILIAN *Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory)*
 BK XII
 BONAVENTURA *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*
 LEONARDO DA VINCI *Notebooks*
 — *A Treatise on Painting*
 CELLINI *Autobiography*
 SUAREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XLIV (13)
 CORNEILLE *Trois discours sur l'art dramatique*
 — *Examens*
 J. HARRIS *Three Treatises The First Concerning Art The Second Concerning Music Painting and Poetry The Third Concerning Happiness*
 BURKE *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*
 VOLTAIRE "Fine Arts" in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
 LESSING *Laocoon*
 BEATTIE *An Essay on Poetry and Music*
 HERDER *Plastik*
 JOSHUA REYNOLDS *Discourses on Art*
 SCHILLER *Letters upon the Esthetic Education of Man*
 SCHIELLING *Philosophie der Kunst*
 COLERIDGE *Biographia Literaria* CH 4
 SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea* VOL I BK III VOL III SUP CH 34-36
 WHEWELL *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* VOL II BK XI CH 8
 EMERSON *Art in Essays* 1
 E. DELACROIX *Journal*
 BAUDELAIRE *Curiosites esthetiques*
 COMTE *System of Positive Polity* VOL I *General View of Positivism* CH 5

- LOTZE *Microcosmos* BK VIII CH 3
 BURCKHARDT *The Civilization of the Renaissance, Italy*
 RUSKIN *Modern Painters*
 — *The Stones of Venice*
 — *Sesame and Lilies*
 TAINE *The Philosophy of Art*
 E. HARTMAN *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (2)
 ARNOLD *Essays in Criticism*
 VAN GOGH *Letters*
 MORRIS *Hopes and Fears for Art*
 — *Art and Socialism*
 — *The Arts of Art*
 GUYAU *L'art au point de vue sociologique*
 NIETZSCHE *The Will to Power* BK III (4)
 BRUNETIERE *An Apology for Rhetoric*
 FRAZER *The Golden Bough* PART I CH 17
 GROSSE *The Beginnings of Art*
 SHAW *The Sanity of Art*
 HIRN *The Origins of Art*
 MANN *Tomio Kroger*
 SANTAYANA *Reason in Art*
 CROCE *Aesthetic as Science of Expression*
 — *The Essence of Esthetics*
 HARRISON *Ancient Art and Ritual*
 BOSANQUET *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* II
 T. VEBLIN *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts* CH 2-4 6-7
 — *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts* CH 3
 ALAIN *Systeme des beaux arts*
 MARITAIN *Art and Scholasticism*
 — *An Introduction to Philosophy* PART II (6)
 ABERCROMBIE *An Essay Towards a Theory of Art*
 LALO *L'art et la morale*
 ORTEGA Y GASSET *The Dehumanization of Art*
 RANK *Art and Artist*
 H. DELACROIX *Psychologie de l'art*
 GILL *Art Non-sense*
 COOMARASWAMY *The Transformation of Art in Art*
 DEWEY *Art as Experience*
 MUMFORD *Technics and Civilization*
 ADLER *Art and Prudence*

CHAPTER 5 ASTRONOMY

Still another point of view on the importance of astronomy is represented in the skeptical and humanist attitude of Montaigne. I am very well pleased with the Milesian girl, he remarks, who advised the philosopher Thales rather to look to himself than to gaze at heaven. In saying this, or in quoting with approval the question asked of Pythagoras by Anaximenes—

To what purpose should I trouble myself in searching out the secrets of the stars having death or slavery continually before my eyes?—Montaigne intends more than a preference for the moral over the natural sciences. He regards astronomical inquiry as a prime example of man's natural and original disease—presumption. It is presumptuous to suppose that our minds can grasp and plot the course of the heavens when we fail to comprehend things much nearer at hand. Hence Montaigne advises everyone to say in the spirit of Anaximenes: Being assaulted as I am by ambition, avarice, temerity, superstition and having so many other enemies of life, shall I go cudgel my brains about the world's resolutions?

Hant can be as critical as Montaigne of the frailty of human knowledge. The investigations and calculations of the astronomers, he writes, have shown us the abyss of our ignorance in relation to the universe. But Hant—an astronomer himself as well as a moralist—does not therefore advise us to forsake the study of the heavens. On the contrary he recommends it not only for its scientific value but for its moral significance.

Two things Hant declares in a passage which has become famous fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. The two fit together to produce a single effect. Astronomy with its view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature. Morality elevates my worth as an intelligence by my personality in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world.

Hant's association of the starry heavens with the moral life is not so much an echo of as a variant upon, Plato's precept that we apply the courses of intelligence in heaven to the

courses of our own intelligence. But in one passage of Freud we find an almost complete return to the Platonic insight. Order has been imitated from nature, he writes, man's observations of the great astronomical periodicities not only furnished him with a model but formed the ground plan of his first attempts to introduce order into his own life.

ASTRONOMY HAS connections with biology and psychology as well as with mathematics and physics. The obvious fact that the sun supports terrestrial life—operating here as a unique and indispensable cause—occasions the inference by Aquinas that it may also operate as a cause in the production of new species by spontaneous generation from putrefying matter. This notion bears some resemblance to the theory in contemporary genetics of the effect of cosmic radiations upon gene mutations.

Unlike these notions in biology speculations concerning celestial influences upon psychological phenomena seem to cross the line between astronomy and astrology. Sometimes the influence upon man and his actions is found in the constellations attending a nativity; sometimes it is a particular influence of the sort still signified by the meaning of the word lunacy and sometimes omens and auguries are read in the aspect of the heavens.

The chapters on PROPHECY and SIGN AND SYMBOL deal with the issues raised by astrology. Problems more closely associated with astronomical science and speculation are treated in other chapters. The cosmological problem of the origin of the material universe is discussed in the chapters on ETERNITY, TIME, and WORLD; the question of its size in the chapter on SPACE; the question of whether the celestial spheres are themselves alive or are moved by intelligences or spirits in the chapters on ANGEL and SOUL; and the question of the nature of the heavenly bodies in the chapter on MATTER.

This last problem is of crucial significance in the history of astronomy itself. Opposed theories of the motions of the heavenly bodies become correlated with opposed theories concerning their matter—whether that is different in kind from terrestrial matter or the same. It is with reference to these related issues that what

stars and the sun and the heaven. Timaeus says none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. God invented and gave us sight; he continues to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed, and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries.

For Plato then man's intellectual relation to the heavens does more than innately philosophy. Man's self rule, his purity and peace of soul, is at stake in that relation. That is one reason why in both the *Republic* and the *Laws*, Plato makes astronomy a required part of the curriculum for the education of ruler. He who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and seen the connection of music with these things and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able the Athenian Stranger says in the *Laws*, to give a reason for such things as have a reason.

Plato considers the opposition to astronomy on religious grounds by those who think that men who approach celestial phenomena by the methods of astronomy may become godless because they see things happening by necessity and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good. His answer points out that one of the two things which lead men to believe in the gods is the argument from the order of the motion of the stars and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. It was a false understanding of these matters which gave rise to much atheism and perplexity.

THE ISSUES RAISED by Plato concerning the importance of astronomy for purification and piety, for education and politics, run through the tradition of western thought. Though they are somewhat transformed in the context of Jewish and Christian beliefs and altered by later developments in the science of astronomy itself, they remain as matters on which an author's strong assent or dissent forcefully reflects his whole intellectual position.

On the one hand, astronomers like Ptolemy

Copernicus and Kepler for all their differences on points of scientific theory, seem to concur in reaffirming Plato's conception of the bearing of their science on religion and morals. Lucretius and Augustine, on the other hand, while not agreeing with each other, seem to disagree with Plato. In the tradition of western thought they represent different types of opposition to the Platonic view.

Where Plato and his followers, including religious Christians like Copernicus and Kepler, hold that true piety profits from astronomical study, Lucretius hopes that astronomy may help to free men from religious superstitions. If when they gaze on the heavenly quarters of the great upper world and direct their thought to the courses of the sun and moon, they do so with a mind at peace because they see only the workings of natural law and no evidences of a controlling power in the will of the gods, then men achieve the natural piety of the scientist—different in the opinion of Lucretius from the false worship which is based on fear.

From his own experiences in dealing with the astronomy of the Manichean sect in relation to their religious doctrine, Augustine insists that the teachings of religion in no way depend upon astronomy. He denies that such knowledge is in any way essential to true piety. Though a man does not know even the circles of the Great Bear, yet is it folly to doubt, he writes, that he is in a better state than one who can measure the heavens and number the stars and poise the elements, yet neglecteth These Who hast made all things in number, weight, and measure.

When Faustus, the leader of the Manicheans, was found out to have taught falsely of the heaven and stars and of the motions of the sun and moon (although these things pertain not to the doctrine of religion), his religious teachings according to Augustine inevitably suffered ridicule because of his pretension that they derived support from a science of the heavenly bodies. Augustine would disengage theology from astronomy. His position anticipates that later taken by Cardinal Barbenius who, during the controversy over the Copernican hypothesis, is reported to have told Galileo that astronomy and religion have quite separate tasks: the one teaching how the heavens go, the other how to go to heaven.

world since it is only a part of a part i.e. the planetary region he deliberately adds the qualification. But I am speaking now of the Earth in so far as it is a part of the edifice of the world and not of the dignity of the governing creatures which inhabit it.

Whether or not it was the traumatic blow to the human ego which Freud conjectures, there can be little doubt that the shift from Ptolemy to Copernicus involved a real shock to the imagination. The Ptolemaic system conforms to the look of the world which is indeed the reason why it is still the one used in practical courses in navigation. Here again Kepler defends Copernicus by explaining why our uncultivated eyesight cannot be other than deceived and why we should learn from reason to understand that things are really different from the way they appear.

A certain disillusionment may result from this affirmation—repeated by every schoolboy who is taught the Copernican system—that despite what we see the sun does not move around the earth and the earth both rotates and revolves. It undermines the trust men placed in their senses and the belief that science would describe the world as they saw it. In order to save the appearances—that is to account for the phenomena, science might henceforward be expected to destroy any naive acceptance of them as the reality.

Furthermore though the Ptolemaic world was very large the Copernican universe was much larger. Whereas in the former the radius of the earth was deemed negligible in relation to the radius of the sphere of the fixed stars in the new universe the radius of the earth's orbit around the sun was negligible in relation to the same radius of the sphere of the fixed stars. It can hardly be doubted that this intensified some men's sense of almost being lost in an abyss of infinity. I see those frightful spaces of the universe which surround me. Pascal writes and I find myself tied to one corner of this vast expanse, without knowing why I am put in this place rather than in another. When he regards the world's immensity as the greatest sensible mark of the almighty power of God Pascal experiences an awe which for him is qualified by measure. Other men may experience the same feeling but less with reverence than with a

gnawing loneliness born of the doubt that so vast a cosmos—if cosmos it is rather than chaos—can have been beneficently designed as man's habitation.

Whatever the truth about the effect of the Copernican theory in the order of opinion, imagination and feeling it did produce a direct result on the intellectual plane. It more than any other single factor led to the overthrow of certain crucial doctrines which had been linked together in the physics and astronomy of Aristotle. It thus radically changed the fundamental principles in terms of which man had understood the order and unity of nature. That historic event deserves not only the name but the fame of the Copernican revolution.

The revolution in the realm of theory goes much deeper than the substitution of one mathematical construction for another to describe the motions of the world's great bodies. As Freud points out the heliocentric hypothesis associated with the name of Copernicus is as known to the Alexandrian astronomers of antiquity. It is for example attributed to Aristarchus by Archimedes in the *Sand Reckoner*.

As far as the earth's rotation is concerned Ptolemy admits it is quite plausible to suppose the heavens immobile and the earth turning on the same axis from west to east very nearly one revolution a day. As far as the appearances of the stars are concerned he goes on nothing would perhaps keep things from being in accordance with this simpler conjecture.

Why then does Ptolemy reject a supposition which is not only plausible but also in accounting for the appearances simpler? In part the answer may be that he does so because the contrary supposition conforms to our ordinary sense-experience of the earth's immobility and the motions of the heavens from east to west. But that is far from being the most important part of the answer. Ptolemy indicates the crucial part when he tells us that the otherwise plausible supposition of a rotating earth becomes altogether absurd when we consider the speed and direction of the motions of bodies within the earth's own atmosphere. His strongest count against the supposition is that it does not conform to the Aristotelian physics which

has come to be called the Copernican revolution represents one of the great crises certainly one of the most dramatic turning points in the development of astronomy and of physics and natural science generally

The Copernican revolution did not take place by the improvement and enlargement of astronomical observations alone nor even by the effect of these on alternative mathematical formulations. If it had not been accompanied by the radical shift from ancient to modern physics—especially with regard to the diversity or uniformity of the world's matter—the Copernican hypothesis concerning the celestial motions would have been no more than a mathematical alternative to the Ptolemaic hypothesis. Copernicus seems to advance it only as such but in the hands of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton it becomes much more than that. They rather than Copernicus seem to accomplish the revolution connected with his name.

When their contribution is neglected or inadequately grasped the Copernican revolution appears to be as is often popularly supposed merely a shift in astronomical theory. The problem being to organize mathematically the *apparent* motions of the heavens. Copernicus offers an alternative solution to that of Ptolemy. Instead of treating the earth as stationary and central in the cosmic system Copernicus attributes three motions to the earth by treating it as a planet which revolves around the sun, spins on its axis, and varies the inclination of its axis with reference to the sun.

What is usually supposed to be revolutionary about this hypothesis is its effect on man's estimate of himself and his place or rank in the universe. On either of the rival hypotheses the apparent motions of the heavens remain unaltered but not man's conception of himself or of the earth or of the universe in which the earth's orbit cuts so small a figure. As Kant suggests man's stature seems to shrink. He becomes a mere speck in the universe which has been enlarged to infinity or at least to an unimaginable immensity. He is displaced from its center to become a wanderer with his planet. Humanity's self-esteem according to Freud was thus for the first time deeply wounded; he refers to the theory that is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus as the first great outrage

which humanity had to endure from the hands of science.

It has been questioned whether this interpretation of the Copernican revolution fits all the documents in the case. Freud may be accurately reporting a popular feeling which since the 18th century has become a widespread consequence of Copernican and post-Copernican astronomy. But in earlier centuries when the Ptolemaic system prevailed or even after Copernicus, the appraisal of man's rank seems to depend more upon the position he occupies in the hierarchy of God's creatures—below the angels and above the brutes—than upon the place or motion of the earth or the size of the world.

Boethius for example finds the Ptolemaic universe large enough to remind man of the infinitesimal space he occupies. Dante too, comments on the smallness of the earth in the scheme of things. When in his visionary travel Dante reaches the Empyrean he looks down upon the earth and with my sight he tells us,

I returned through all and each of the seven spheres and saw this globe such that I smiled at its mean semblance and that counsel I approve as best which holds it of least account.

Kepler a passionate Copernican deeply concerned with the human significance of astronomy can be found arguing that the new hypothesis involves something more fitting for man than the old. In his last argument in defense of the Copernican view against that of Tycho Brahe as well as that of Ptolemy he declares it was not fitting that man who was going to be the dweller in this world and its contemplator should reside in one place as in a closed cubicle. It was his office to move around in this very spacious edifice by means of the transportation of the Earth his home. In order properly to view and measure the parts of his world the astronomer needed to have the Earth a ship and its annual voyage around the sun.

Yet the very fact that Kepler argues in this manner may be interpreted as indicating his sense of the drastic implications for man of the altered structure of the universe. Kepler may even be thought to announce the problem of the so-called Copernican revolution when in denying that the earth can any longer be reckoned among the primary parts of the great

our arguments in especial (1) From the nature of the two bodies. (2) From the nature of the motion. (3) From the nature of the place in which the motion occurs. (4) From the perfection of the circle. He then takes each of these arguments, and answers each in turn.

WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY about Kepler's attack upon the Ptolemaic astronomy cannot be understood without examining Ptolemy's defense of his theory—a defense which Copernicus meets in Ptolemy's own terms rather than, as Kepler does, by going outside them.

Though his expressed intention was to construct a mathematical theory of the celestial motions which would also conform to Aristotle's physics, Ptolemy when he finished, concluded that the computations he had been compelled to add in order to save the appearances¹ left him with a theory that did not conform to Aristotle's doctrine of the perfect circular motion of the heavenly spheres. Instead of abandoning Aristotle's physics, he defended his theory on the ground that astronomy being mathematical rather than physical, could admit such "catastrophic" complications if they served the purposes of calculation and of saving the appearances.²

In the thirteenth and last book of the *Abrégé*, when he faces the fact that his mathematical theories have become exceedingly difficult—and strained from the point of view of the Aristotelian reality—Ptolemy writes: Let no one, seeing the difficulty of our devices, find troublesome such hypotheses. It is proper to try and fit as far as possible the simpler hypotheses to the movements of the heavens and if this does not succeed, then any hypotheses possible. Once all the appearances are saved by the consequences of the hypotheses, why should I seem strange that such complications can come about in the movements of heavenly things? We ought not to judge the simplicity of heavenly things by comparison with what seems to be simple in the explanation of earthly phenomena. We should instead judge their simplicity from the unchangeableness of the nature in the heavens and their movements. For thus they would all appear simple, more than those things which seem so here with us.³

Ignoring the supposition that simplicity must be judged differently in different spheres, Copernicus challenges Ptolemy on his own grounds when he proposes simpler hypotheses to fit the movements of the heavens. But in doing so, he seems to adopt the transitional view of the mathematical character of astronomical hypotheses. Yet as will appear he does not adopt this view in the unqualified form in which Osiander states it in his Preface to the *Reformation of the Heavens*.⁴

It is the job of the astronomer," Osiander writes, "to use painstaking and skilled observation in gathering together the history of the celestial movements, and then—since he cannot by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these movements—to think or construct whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases, such that by the assumption of these causes, these same movements can be calculated from the principles of geometry for the past and for the future too.

"It is not necessary," he adds, "that these hypotheses should be true, or even probable; it is enough if they provide a calculus which fits the observations. When for one and the same movement varying hypotheses are proposed as eccentricity or epicycle for the movement of the sun, the astronomer much prefers to take the one which is easiest to grasp."

What distinguishes Kepler from both Ptolemy and Osiander is the way in which he is concerned with the truth of alternative hypotheses in astronomy. He looks upon the truth of an hypothesis as something to be judged not merely in mathematical terms according to the adequacy and simplicity of a calculating device, but to be measured by its conformity to the physical realities. At the very beginning of his *Epitome of Copernicus's Astronomy* he flatly declares that "astronomy is part of physics." And in the opening pages of the fourth book, he insists that astronomy has not one but two ends: to save the appearances and to contemplate the true form of the edifice of the World. It follows this immediately by observing that if astronomy had only the first end Tycho Brahe's theory would be as satisfactory as that of Copernicus.

Early in his scientific career before writing the *Epitome* Kepler asserts that one cannot

distinguishes between natural and violent motions assigns certain fixed directions to the natural motions of each of the four elements of matter and denies that these elementary kinds of terrestrial matter enter into the composition of the heavenly bodies

That Aristotle's physics and cosmology lie at the very heart of the issue is confirmed by the way in which Kepler later argues for the Copernican theory against Ptolemy. He does not defend its truth on the ground that it accounts for observable facts which the Ptolemaic hypothesis cannot handle. Nor does he prefer it merely because it is mathematically the simpler hypothesis. On the contrary, he specifically notes that anything which can be claimed on mathematical grounds for Copernicus over Ptolemy can be equally claimed for Tycho Brahe over Ptolemy (Brahe's theory was that while the other planets revolve around the sun, the sun with its planets revolves around a stationary earth). According to Kepler, the truth of these competing theories must finally be judged *physically*, not *mathematically*, and when the question is put that way, as it is not by Copernicus himself, Copernicans like Kepler, Galileo and Newton take issue with what had been associated with the Ptolemaic theory—the physics of Aristotle.

IN ORDER TO EXAMINE this issue it is necessary to state briefly here certain features of Aristotle's physics which are more fully discussed in the chapters on CHANGE, ELEMENT, MECHANICS and PHYSICS.

Just as Ptolemy's astronomy conforms to what we see as we look at the heavens, so Aristotle's physics represents a too simple conformity with everyday sense experience. We observe fire rising and stones falling. Mix earth, air and water in a closed container, and air bubbles will rise to the top, while the particles of earth will sink to the bottom. To cover a multitude of similar observations, Aristotle develops the theory of the natural motions and places of the four terrestrial elements—earth, air, fire and water. Since bodies move naturally only to attain their proper places, the great body which is the earth, already at the bottom of all things, need not move at all. Being in its proper place, it is by nature stationary.

Two other observations exercise a decisive influence on Aristotle's theory. The naked eye sees no type of change in the heavenly bodies other than local motion or change of place. Unlike terrestrial bodies, they do not appear to come into being or perish; they do not change in size or quality. Furthermore, whereas the natural local motion of sub-lunary bodies appears to approximate the path of a straight line, the local motion of the celestial bodies appears to be circular rather than rectilinear.

To cover these observations, Aristotle's theory posits a different kind of matter for celestial and terrestrial bodies. An incorruptible matter must constitute the great orbs which are subject to local motion alone and have the most perfect kind of local motion—that of a circle. Since they are subject to generation and corruption, to change of quality and quantity, and are in local motion along straight lines, terrestrial bodies are of a corruptible matter.

The interconnection of all these points is marked by Aquinas when he summarizes Aristotle's doctrine. Plato and all who precede Aristotle, he writes, held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements, and consequently that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer God. This theory, Aquinas continues, Aristotle disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since he says that the heavenly bodies have a natural movement different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible.

The same points which Aquinas relates in his defense of the Aristotelian theory, Kepler also puts together when he expounds that theory in order to attack it and the Ptolemaic astronomy which tries to conform to it. By what arguments did the ancients establish their opinion, which is the opposite of yours? he asks. By

But the unification of nature which Kepler began and Newton completed when set against Aristotle's physics may be even more radical than Newton's theory because of the amazing way in which it covered the widest variety of phenomena by the simplest most universal formulae considered by Kant to have established the truth of that which Copernicus at first assumed only as an hypothesis. But the larger contribution in Whitehead's opinion is the idea of the neutrality of situation and the universality of physical laws holding indifferently in every part.

Whatever position we take today concerning the kind of truth which is possessed by hypotheses in mathematical physics we do not demand in the part of the three Copernicans—Kepler, Galileo and above all Newton—that physical hypotheses account at once for all the phenomena of the inanimate universe. Whatever the truth of modern as opposed to ancient physics the Newtonian universe is so thoroughly established in our minds and feelings that when we are reminded of the other universe in which men lived before the Copernican revolution we tend to think it quaint incredible preposterous superstitious none of which it was.

Finally from the point of view of our understanding of natural science itself the astronomical controversy has been considering is almost an archetypal model. It is necessary of course to appreciate the real achievement of Ptolemy as well as of Copernicus and Kepler in order to realize how genuine and difficult the issues were. Facts unknown to all of them may now have closed the dispute decisively but issues in other spheres of modern science almost identical in pattern with that great astronomical one are not yet closed and to the degree that we are able to re-enact in our minds the motion of thought on both sides of the Copernican controversy we can confront comparable scientific issues—still open—with open minds.

Darwin for example finds in the astronomical controversy a precedent to which he can appeal in the defense of natural selection against its adversaries. The belief in the revolution of the earth on its own axis he writes was until lately not supported by any direct evidence. But the absence of direct evidence does not leave a scientific theory without foundation.

Darwin argues, if it has the power to explain several large classes of facts, which it can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain in so satisfactory a manner. Darwin defends the theory of natural selection as having such power. To those who object that this is an unsafe method of arguing he replies—citing an example from astronomy—that it has often been used by the greatest natural philosophers.

THE GREAT BOOKS of astronomy most luckily exhibit the essential pattern of that kind of natural science which has, in modern times, come to be called mathematical physics. Though that phrase may be modern the ancients recognized the special character of the sciences which apply mathematics to nature and which consult experience to choose among hypotheses arising from different mathematical formulations.

Outlining a curriculum for liberal education Plato in the *Republic* groups music and astronomy along with arithmetic and geometry as mathematical arts or sciences. In that context he treats them as pure mathematics. Astronomy is no more concerned with the visible heavens than music is with audible tones. Music is rather the arithmetic of harmonies, astronomy the geometry of motions. But in the *Timaeus* Plato turns mathematical formulae and calculations to use in telling what he calls a likely story concerning the formation and structure of the sensible world of becoming. Here rather than in the *Republic* we have according to Whitehead the usual conception of mathematical physics as well as deep insight into its nature and pattern.

Aristotle criticizes the notion of astronomy as a purely mathematical science. Just as the things of which optics and mathematical harmonics treat cannot be divorced from the sensible so the objects of astronomy are also the visible heavens. Astronomical experience Aristotle states supplies the principles of astronomical science. Yet though its subject matter is physical and its method is in part empirical astronomy like optics and harmonics takes the form of mathematical demonstration and it is for this reason that Aquinas later calls such disciplines mixed and intermediate sciences.

leave to the astronomer absolute license to feign no matter what hypotheses. He complains that astronomers too often constrain their thought from exceeding the limits of geometry.

It is necessary to go beyond geometry into physics to test the consequences of competing hypotheses which are equally good mathematically. You must seek the foundations of your astronomy, he tells his fellow scientists, in a more elevated science. I mean in physics or metaphysics.

Because Kepler thus conceives the task and truth of astronomy, Duhem in his great history of astronomy calls him a realistic Copernican. Galileo also, Duhem thinks, was a realistic Copernican. To confirm by physics the Copernican hypotheses, he writes, is the center towards which converge Galileo's observations as an astronomer and his terrestrial mechanics.

Newton was the third member of this triumvirate. For him there remained the solution of the problem of deducing Kepler's formulation of the planetary orbits in a manner consistent with Galileo's laws of motion in the dynamics of bodies falling on the earth's surface. But the very posing of this problem itself depended on the insight that terrestrial and celestial mechanics can proceed according to the same principles and laws. That insight entailed the complete overthrow of the ancient physics with its division of the universe into two distinct parts having different kinds of matter and different laws of motion.

COPERNICUS, who despite Osander's apologetics believed his theory to be true, did not himself face the great point at issue in the Copernican revolution—the material uniformity of the physical universe. We shall subsequently consider the question of the truth of astronomical hypotheses, but whether or not Copernicus and the Copernicans had in their own day a right to believe their theory true, it was the acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis as true which led Kepler and Galileo to deny the truth of Aristotelian physics.

If the earth is not at the center and stationary, then the basic doctrine of a natural direction in motion and a natural place of rest for the various elements is completely upset. If the earth is one of the planets, then anything true

on the earth—or of the earth, such as Gilbert's theory of the magnetic fields generated by the earth's axial rotation—could be equally true of all the other planets.

Read the philosophy of magnetism of the Englishman William Gilbert, writes Kepler, for in that book, although the author did not believe that the Earth moved, nevertheless he attributes a magnetic nature to it by very many arguments. Therefore it is by no means absurd or incredible that any one of the primary planets should be what one of the primary planets, namely the Earth, is. Such a statement plainly shows that when the earth becomes a planet, as it does in Copernican theory, no obstacle remains to the assertion of a homogeneity between the earth and the other planets both in matter and motion. The old physical dualism of a supralunar and a sublunar world is abandoned.

Not the movement of the earth, Whitehead remarks, but the glory of the heavens was the point at issue, for to assert the heavens to be of the same stuff and subject to the same laws as the rest of nature brings them down to the plane of earthly physics. That is precisely what Newton finally does when, in the enunciation of his Third Rule of reasoning in natural philosophy, he dryly but explicitly completes the Copernican Revolution. Those qualities of bodies, which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are, Newton maintains, to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.

In the bifurcated world of ancient theory, astronomy had a very special place among the natural sciences proportionate to the glory of the heavens. But with Newton it could be completely merged into a general mechanics whose laws of motion have universal application. That merger begun by Newton has been perfected since his day. The last obstacle to the generalization lay in the apparent discrepancies between electrical phenomena on the subatomic scale and gravitational phenomena on the astronomical scale. But in our own time the unified field equations of Einstein's theory of relativity embrace the very large and the very small motions of matter within a single conceptual scheme with radical consequences for the revision of the Newtonian or classical mechanics.

The logic of such verification has already been suggested in the discussion of the geocentric and heliocentric hypotheses. It is further considered in the chapter on Hypothesis. To be satisfactory an hypothesis must—in the language used earlier since Simplicius—save the appearances, that is, account for the relevant phenomena. But two hypotheses (as for example the geocentric and heliocentric) may, at a certain time, do an equally good job of saving the appearances. Then the choice between them becomes a matter of the greater mathematical elegance of one than the other.

That however does not give the mathematically superior theory a greater claim to truth. So far as reality is concerned it is only in Plato's words, a likely story—or as Aquinas points out with reference to the geocentric hypothesis, the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained—not however as if this reason were sufficient since some other theory might explain them.

Two hypotheses may be equally satisfactory for the range of phenomena they were both devised to fit. But only one of them may have the quite amazing virtue of fitting other sets of observations not originally thought to be related to the phenomena for which the hypoth-

esis was devised. The word *consilience* has been used to name the property of an hypothesis which—in addition to saving a limited field of appearances—succeeds in fitting many other phenomena which seem to have become related—to have jumped to *either* under its covering explanation. The heliocentric hypothesis, as developed by Newton's laws of motion and theory of gravitation, certainly has this property of consilience to a high degree for it covers both celestial and terrestrial phenomena and a wide variety of the latter.

Is the heliocentric hypothesis true then? If the truth of an hypothesis depends on the range of the phenomena it fits or saves, it might seem to be so, for by its consilience it accounts for phenomena that the Ptolemaic theory cannot handle. But though this may cause us to reject the unsuccessful hypothesis, does it establish beyond doubt the truth of the successful one? Or to put the question another way, is not our judgment here a comparative one rather than absolute? Are we saying more than that one hypothesis is more successful than another in doing what an hypothesis should do? Are we logically entitled to regard that success as the sign of its exclusive truth or must we restrict ourselves to the more modest statement that as the better hypothesis, it simply tells a more likely story about reality?

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The development of astronomy from Plato and Aristotle through Ptolemy Copernicus and Kepler to Galileo and Newton thus constitutes an extraordinary set of case histories for the study of what J. B. Conant calls the tactics and strategy of science and especially mathematical physics. But astronomy has one peculiar feature which distinguishes it from other branches of mathematical physics. It is empirical rather than experimental. The astronomer does not control the phenomena he observes. He does not like the physicist, chemist or physiologist produce an isolated system of events by means of the laboratory arts.

Harvey comments on this aspect of astronomy when he proposes an experiment that will enable the physiologist to do what the astronomer cannot do, namely deliberately prepare phenomena for examination by the senses. The astronomer must be content with the appearances as they are given. Defending psychoanalysis against attack on the ground that it admits of no experimental proof, Freud points out that his critics might have raised the same objection against astronomy: experimentation with the heavenly bodies is after all exceedingly difficult. There one has to rely on observation.

Since the invention of the telescope the astronomer has had instruments of all sorts to increase the range and accuracy of his observations, but the fact that the place where he uses such apparatus is called an observatory rather than a laboratory indicates that these instruments do not make astronomy an experimental science. Nevertheless as Bacon points out the telescope enabled Galileo to do more than improve upon the accuracy of prior observations. It brought within the range of observation certain celestial phenomena hitherto imperceptible to the naked eye, such as the phases of Venus, the satellites of Jupiter and the constitution of the Milky Way.

Concerning the last of these, Pascal later remarks that the ancients can be excused for the idea they had of the cause of its color. The weakness of their eyes, not yet having been artificially helped, they attributed this color to the great solidity of this part of the sky, but it would be inexcusable for us, he adds, to retain the same thought now that aided by the advantages of the telescope we have discovered

in the Milky Way an infinity of small stars. More abundant splendor has made us recognize the real cause of this whiteness.

BECAUSE IT IS a mixed science, both empirical and mathematical, astronomy advances not only with the improvement and enlargement of observation but also with new insights and developments in mathematics. Kant gives striking examples of how the work of the pure mathematicians contributes to the advance of physics and astronomy. Their discoveries are often made without any knowledge of their application to natural phenomena. They investigated the properties of the parabola, but writes in ignorance of the law of terrestrial gravitation which would have shown them its application to the trajectory of heavy bodies.

So again they investigated the properties of the ellipse without a suspicion that a gravitation was also discoverable in the celestial bodies, and without knowing the law that governs it as the distance from the point of attraction varies, and that makes the bodies describe this curve in their motion.

So amazing are such mathematical anticipations that Kant thinks Plato may be pardoned for supposing that pure mathematics could dispense with all experience in discovering the constitution of things. Whether or not Plato goes to this extreme, he does in the *Republic* seem to suggest the reverse of Kant's conception of the relationship between mathematics and astronomy. The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern, he writes, and with view to that higher knowledge—mathematics. Astronomy should be used to instigate discoveries in pure mathematics by suggesting good problems and by requiring formulations which transcend an interest in the truth about the heavens.

This twofold relation between mathematical discovery and empirical observation is present in the development of astronomy itself and in all branches of mathematical physics. But there is another aspect of the relationship which must be taken into account if we are to consider the problem of truth in such sciences. The way in which mathematical formulations fit the phenomena measures the truth of rival hypotheses with respect to the same reality.

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- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK II-III 557b 626a BK III 631b 652b 657b 674b BK IV-V 680a 739b BK V 744b 812a BK VI 818a 838a
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 907b 908b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 3-6 27c 28c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 29 651b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A I REP 2 175d 178a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46 105] 108b d
- 22 CHAUCER *Franklin's Tale* [II 582-605] 360b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 267a h
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 29c
- 24 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 320b
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK I APH 109 129b BK II APH 39 170b c APH 45 176a APH 46 178a b
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [284 291] 99b BK III [588-590] 148a BK V [261-263] 181a
- 33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III PHENOMENA 272a 275a PROP 41-42 342a 368b / *Optics* BK I 412a 423b
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 58-59 424a h
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 102a
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 299b c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 365b 367a
- 54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 815a
- 2b *The use of hypotheses the heliocentric and geocentric theories*
- 7 PLATO *Phaedo* 241c 242b 247c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 387d BK VII 395c 396b BK X 438c 439a / *Timaeus* 447b-d 452a h / *Laws* BK XII 797d 798a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I CH 3 [270¹ 24] 361c 362a BK II CH I 375b d 376a CH 8 381a 382a CH II [291¹⁰-CH 13 [293³³] 383b 385b CH 14 [296 24-297 9] 387d 388c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 7 [344⁵-9] 450b / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 8 [1073¹⁷ 1074 17] 604a e
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 3 234a c
- 11 ARCHIMEDES *Sand Reckoner* 520a h

- 11 LUGRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [5 6-33] 67d 68a [720-730] 70c
- 14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 55a b
- 16 PROLEMY *Almagest* BK I 7a 8b 9a 12b h III 83a 86b 93a BK IV 120a 122b BK IX 210b 273a 291a 296a BK XIII 429a b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a 507a 508b BK I 513b 515b 517b 521a BK III 628b-629a 633b 656b BK IV 675b 678a BK V 740a b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 852a 853a 851b 860b 887a 890a 907b 916a BK V 964b 966a 967a / *Harmonies of the World* 1014b 1016a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A I REP 2 175d 178a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 257d 261c 276c
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 107c 116a
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK II APH 5 139a APH 36 165c 166b APH 46 178b-c APH 48 186b-d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [552-58] 147b 148a BK IV [589-597] 165a b BK VIII [66-1] 233b 236a esp [122-158] 234b 235b
- 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 165a / *Vacuum* 368b 369a
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III PHENOMENA II 273d 274a GENERAL SCHOL 371b-372a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 226b-227a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 8d [In 2]
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 284a b
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 563a b EPILOGUE II 694d 696d
- 2c *The relation of astronomy to mathematics the use of mathematics by astronomy*
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 394d 396b *Timaeus* 451b-c 455b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I [78³¹-79 16] 108b c / *Physics* BK II CH I [193²⁵ 194 11] 270a c / *Heavens* BK II CH I [297 3-9] 388c / *Metaphysics* BK III CH I [94¹³-99 19] 516b-d BK XII CH 8 [1073¹⁷ 17] 603d 604a BK XIII CH 3 [107 8 9-14] 609a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639⁷-12] 161c d
- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 813d 814a
- 16 PROLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6a 14a 24b 26a 28b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 507a 508a BK I 510a h 532b 556b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK V 964b 965a 968a 986b passim
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 3-6 27c 28c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 29 651b-c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A I REP 2 175d 178a PART II Q 35 A 8 ANS 779c 780c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 9 A 2 REP 3 424b-425a

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Generat. et f. animal.* bk. iv ch. 10 [77^b 16-7^b 8^b] 319d 320a.c
- 12 LUCIUS *Nature of Things* bk. v [614 730] 69 70d
- 14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 58d 59c / *Solon*, 74a / *Caesar* 599d 600a
- 16 PROBLEMY *Almagest* bk. ii, 34b-38a bk. iii 77 86b 104b-107a
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spher.* bk. i 510b bk. ii 568a 576a bk. iii 616a-652b 672 674b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr. ii ch. 7-8 122d 124c ch. ii 13 126a 129a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk. xi par. 29-30 39d 36c / *City of God*, bk. xi ch. 6 325c d bk. xii c. 1 351b-352d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part. i q. 10 a. 6 ans 45c-46d q. 67 a. 4 ans and rep. 2 3 352a 354 q. 10 a. 2 ans and rep. 3 3 364b-365a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part. i sup. l. q. 77 a. 2 ans 943 946b q. 91 a. 2 rep. 1 3 58 1017c 1020c
- 21 DANTON *De ne Comedy* hell. i [37 45] 11b-c p. c. i. iv i [13 21] 53a b i [1-9] 54c i [35-84] 58a b x [1 1] 65d 66a xv [1 15] 75b-c xxv [-9] 91b-c xxvii [-6] 94c p. ra. d. se. i [38-48] 106c x [28-33] 120c xxviii [97 2] 148b-c
- 23 HORACE *Livyian* pa. v 267b
- 24 RALPH LAE *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, bk. ii 69b d 70
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 497b-c
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* bk. i aph. 46 177 178b
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk. i [40-44] 136b [555-623] 147b-149a [726-73] 151a x v [66-79] 179 bk. i [66-84] 233b-234a x [651-6 9] 288b-289
- 34 NEWTON *Principles of Natural Philosophy* bk. i 29b-10 bk. ii 291b-294b
- 35 LOCK *Human Understanding* bk. i bk. ii 37 37 158a 158a
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* tr. 169a
- 36 S. R. *Tristram Shandy* 229
- 41 CICERO *De re publica* d Fall 376a b
- 46 HAZARD *Philosophy of History* tr. 219a b 251a b
6. The heavenly bodies general
8. The special character of matter in the superlunary spheres
- N. W. T. S. M. V. T. *Corinthians* 15 40-41
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 247b-248c / *Timaeus* 448a 449c 451d-452 / *Lysis* bk. ii 797d 798a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heaven* bk. ch. 12 of 2 263 361b-362 bk. ii 9 [279 12] bk. ii 11 [84 6] 370b-376a bk. iii ch. 7 380c-d / *Metaphysics* bk. ii 141 41^b 81569 b bk. iii 1081 05 46-27 376b-d bk. iii ch. 6 [063 0-7] 591b bk. iii ch. 2 [1069 24 2] 598d 599a

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk. i ch. 5 [641^b 21-645^b] 168c d
- 12 LUCIUS *Nature of Things* bk. i [118-148] 6b-c [1052 1094] 14a c bk. v [534-563] 68a b
- 16 PROBLEMY *Almagest* bk. i 5a 6a 8b 10b-11b bk. xiii 429a b
- 18 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk. i 517b-518a 519b-520a
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk. iv 853b-857b 888b-890b 894a b 904b-905a 919b 929b-930b 931b-932a 934b 935b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr. i 35a 39d / *Third Ennead*, tr. v ch. 6 103b-104a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part. i q. 10 a. 5 ans 44b-45c a. 11 rep. 2 45c-46d q. 46 a. 1 rep. 2 3 250 252d q. 55 a. 2 ans 289d 290d [58 a. 1 ans 300c 301a a. 3 a. 5 301d 302d q. 63 a. 1 rep. 2 325c 326c q. 66 a. 2 343d 347b q. 69 a. 1 ans 354a 355c q. 70 a. 3 ans and rep. 2 365b-367a q. 75 a. 6 ans 383c 384c q. 84 a. 3 rep. 1 443d-444d q. 97 1 ans 513c 514c q. 104 a. 1 rep. 1 3 534c 536c q. 115 a. 3 ans 588c 589c q. 119 a. 1 ans 604c-607b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part. ii q. 49 a. 4 ans 5a 6a part. iii q. 5 a. 2 ans and rep. 3 736d 737c part. iii sup. l. q. 91 a. 3 rep. 3 1020d 1022c
- 21 DANTON *De ne Comedy* purgatory iii [8-3] 36a paradise ii [19-45] 108a [112 143] 109a b bk. iii [1 78] 148d 149c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a 257d 258b
- 28 GALILEO *Dialogue* bk. vi 110b-c
- 30 MONTAIGNE *Novum Organum*, bk. ii aph. 13 146c 147a
- 32 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* bk. iii rule 1 i 270b-271 p. op. i 7 2 6 282b exp. p. op. 7 281b-282b
- 41 GIBBONS *Decline and Fall* 226b
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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c d / *Apology* 204d 205a / *Timaeus* 449b-450c 451d-452b / *Philebus* 618b-619c / *Lysis* bk. x 762b-765c exp. 64a 765 bk. xii 797c 798b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heaven* bk. ii ch. 1 2 375b d 377c ch. ii 383b-384c / *Metaphysics* bk. xii ch. 8 603b-605 / *S.* i bk. i ch. 3 [406^b 26-407^a] 636b-637b
- 12 LUCIUS *Nature of Things* bk. v [6-90] 62 b [110-45] 62-63a
- 13 V. C. *Aeneid* bk. i [724 738] 230b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk. iv 854b-855 890a 895b 896a 897a 914a b 930b 932a 933a 959a 960 / *Harmonies of the World*, 1080b-1085b exp. 1083b-1085b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead*, tr. ii 40a 50a / *Third Ennead*, tr. i ch. 3 84b tr. iv ch. 6 99d tr. v ch. 6 103b-104 / *Fourth Ennead* tr. iv 116-117b-162d 112 27 168d 172a

(5) *Astronomy and cosmology the theory of the world or universe as reflecting astronomical conceptions*

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I 35a 39d
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE λ [7 21] 120b c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [890-920] 130b 131a [1010-1055] 133a 134a BK III [418-429] 144b [501-539] 146b 147a [52-587] 147b 148a BK VII [261-273] 222b 223a [551-557] 229a [617-623] 230b BK VIII [66-178] 233b 236a BK X [282-329] 280b 281b
 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 72 181a 184b
 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III HYPOTHESIS I-PROP 12 285a 286a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH III SECT 24 320c d
 42 HANT *Practical Reason* 360d 361a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 695c d
 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 562c

6 *Astronomy and theology astronomy as affecting views of God creation the divine plan and the moral hierarchy*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1:19 / *Joshua* 10:12-13—(D) *Josue* 10:12-13 / *Job* 9:6-9 38:1-38 / *Psalms* 19:1-6 147:4—(D) *Psalms* 18:1-7 146:4 / *Jeremiah* 33:22 51:15—(D) *Jeremiah* 33:22 51:15

- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43—(D) *OT Ecclesiasticus* 43 / *Song of Three Children* 34-51—(D) *OT Daniel* 3:56-73

- NEW TESTAMENT I *Corinthians* 15:40-41

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 396a / *Timaeus* 455b c / *Statesman* 386c 389c / *Lysis* BK VII 729d 730d BK XII 797d 798b

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196 25-24] 272d 273a BK VIII 334a 355d esp CH 4-6 338d 346b CH 10 353b 355d / *Heaven* BK II CH 1 375d 376a / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 6-8 601b 605a

- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a 814b

- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK I [55-771] 61d 71a esp [55-234] 61d 64a . [1161-1217] 76b 77a

- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XI SECT 27 306b

- 14 PELLARCH *Nicias* 435b-c

- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK V 295c

- 16 PTOLMEY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6b passim

- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510a 511a

- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 853b 854a 915b-916a 933a / *Harmonies of the World* 1017b-1018a 1025a b 1048a 1061a 1071b 1080b-1085b

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR II CH I 40a 41a TR IX CH 8-9 70a 72a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 17 150d 151b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 3-6 21c 28c BK VIII par 6-48 112a 124a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 16 644d 645a CH 3 650d 651c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 7 ANS and REP 2 138d 140a Q 50 A 3 A 1 and REP 3 272a 273b Q 58 A 1 300c 301a Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c A 7 ANS 331c 332a Q 66-68 343d 359b Q 70 362c 367a Q 100 A 2 REP 1 525a 526a Q 110 A 1 REP 2 564c 565d Q 115 AA 3-6 588c 592d

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 5 A 2 736d 737c PART III SUPPL. Q 77 AA 1 943a 947a Q 91 AA 2 3 1017c 1022c

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *HELL* VII [61-98] 10b c *XXIV* [100-139] 52b-d *PARADISE* I [94-142] 107b-d II [46 148] 108b 109b IV [22 63] 110d 111b VIII [16-39] 116d 111a [91-148] 117d 118c λ [1 45] 120b-d XIII [84] 126a λ XIII [124-154] 140d 141b XIII [97-120] 148b-c *XXVIII* 148d 150b

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT 4 SC III [85-101] 109a

- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 69 121a d

- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a

- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [694 732] 150b-151b BK V [153 184] 178b 179a BK VIII [66-178] 233b-236a esp [66-84] 233b-234a

- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 72 181a 184b 194 201b 242 217b 218a

- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCOL 369b 371a / *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

- 41 CASSIO *Decline and Fall* 226a b 22 b-c

- 42 HANT *Practical Reason* 360d 361a

- 47 COETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243 266] 7a b

- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c d

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 695d 696d

- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 562c / *New Introductory Lectures* 832a 876b d

7 *Astronomy and the measurement of time calendars and clocks days and seasons*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1:4-5 14 18 / *Isaiah* 38:7-8 60:19-21—(D) *Isaiah* 38:7-8 60:19-21 / *Jeremiah* 33:20 25—(D) *Jeremiah* 33-4 25

- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43:6-8—(D) *OT Ecclesiasticus* 43:6-8

- NEW TESTAMENT *Revelation* 21:23 24 22:5—(D) *Apocalypse* 21:23-24 22:5

- 5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [454 461] 44c d

- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [607-626] 496a λ

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49d 50a 79c

- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 487d

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 394d 396b / *Timaeus* 451a d

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK IV CH 14 [123 122] 224 1 303c d / *Metaphysics* BK X CH 1 [1052 34 1033 12] 579b-c

- 6 KEMPE *Epitome* BK IV 882b-893b 929a
933a K V 968a 979b esp 975a-9 7b 984b-
985b / *Harmonies of the World* 1018a b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR. C I 839c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae*, PART I Q 66
A 2, ANS 345d 347b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III SUPPL.
Q 1 A 2, A 5 945a 9-5b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK IV 110b-d
29 GALILEO *The New Sciences* FOURTH DAY
245b-d
30 BACON *The Organon* BK II APRI 43
186b-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK V [616-62] 188b-
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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 2, 281a
34 NEWTON *Principia* K III PROP II 43b-43b
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8(3) The laws of celestial motion, celestial mechanics

- 16 J. PLEA *Epitome* BK IV 885a-895b passim
897 90 a passim esp 897a, 904b-905a 933a
952a passim K V 975 979b / *Harmonies of the World*, 1018a b 1019b-1020b
24 NEWTON *Principia* K I, PRO 3 3RD SCHOL.
32b-35b O 4 COROL VI 36a PROP II 13
42b-46a esp AOP 1 42b-43b PROP 13 46b-
4 a PROP 17 48b-50a BK II PROP 51-53 and
SCIOL 259 267a BK III 269 373a passim esp
ACIL 1-10 270a 271a, P. I. OMN 41 PROP 7
272a 282b, PR 3 286a b PROP 35, SCHOL.
320b-324a, NO 40 337b-338a, OL 33aL
NOI, 369a, 371b-372a
35 HUYGENS *Horologium Astronomicum* 5 CT 1 DIV 9,
454c d
42 HALL *The Pure Reason* n. 8d [1a 2]
III TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 563b
EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c

8d. The creation of the heavens

- OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 1-8 14 9 14 /
1 *Genesis*, 9 6-(D) 11 *Exodus* 9 6 / *Job* 26 7
37 15 35 / *Psalms* 8 14 19 1 89 1 10 23
116 5-9 148 1-6-(D) *Psalms* 8 4-7 182
88 2 1 26 135 7-9 48 1-6 / *Proverbs* 3 9
827 / *Jeremiah*, 3 35 51 5-(D) *Jeremiah* 1
31 35 5 15 / *Amos* 5 5
NEW TESTAMENT Acts 14 5 1724-(D) *Acts*
14 14 17 24 / *1 Peter* 3 21 / *1 Peter* 3 21 /
Rev 12 14 7-(D) *Apocalypse* 47
7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-452b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK III, CH 1 [13 19]
335b / *Metaphysics* K I CH 10-2 320d 375d
9 ARISTOTLE *Physics* f *Animals* K I, CH 1
[64 3 9] 164c d
12 L. A. M. *Nature of Things* K [116-508]
66c-67 [1 4] 376d
18 AL. II *Coelestium* K XI PAR 4 11
90a 92b K XII PAR 2-9 99c 101 PAR 14 4
101b-110a BK XI PAR 6-48 112a 124a / *City*
f *God*, BK XI CH 7 326a-c, CH 9 326d 327d

- C I 19-21 332b-333d CH 3 33-c 335c E
XII CH 15 351b-352d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I 11 46,
A 1 REP 3 5-50a 252d A 3 ANS 2nd E P I
255a-d Q 66 A 1 ANS 2nd REP TO CONTRARY
343d 345c A 3 347b-348d A 4 ANS 2nd REP 5
348d 349d Q 67 A 4 352a 354a Q 63 A 1
354a-355c Q 70 A 1 2 362c 365a
21 D. A. E. *Deine Concedy* III, 11 [73-81] 10b
PARADISE II [121 145] 116b-c X [1-6] 120b
XXIX [13 45] 150b-c
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 214d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1 b-d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 54b-56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [108-35] 150b-
151b BK VII [193 356] 216 225b BK VIII
[15 1 8] 232b-234a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

9 The particular heavenly bodies

9a. The sun, its position, distance, size and mass

- OLD TESTAMENT Joshua 10 12-14-(D) / *Isaiah*
10 12 14 / *Psalms* 136 7-8-(D) *Psalms*
35-8 / *Isaiah* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19 -
(D) *Isaiah* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19-20 / *Joel*
2 10 31 3 15 / *Amos* 8 9
APOCALYPSE *Ecclesiasticus* 43 1-5-(D) OT
Ecclesiasticus 43 1-5
NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 24-9 30 / *Mark*,
13 24 25 / *Luke* 23 44 45
6 HERODOTUS *History* 13 BK II 53d 54b 79c
BK IV 130d 131a
6 THEOPHASTUS *Philostratus* *Historia* BK II, 394c
7 PLATO *Critias* 98a / *Apology* 204d 205a /
Republic BK VI 385c 386a / *Timaeus* 451b-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 7 [89 6-35]
380d CH 12 [291 9-92 7] 383c 384b CH 13
[193 34 294 12] 385c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 8
[345 7-9] 451c d
11 ARISTOTLE *Sund. Reckoner* 520a b
12 LACRATILUS *Nature of Things* BK V [564-574]
68b-c [592 4] 68d 6b [51 771] 6d 71a
14 PLATO *Republic* 138d
16 PROTOGEOM *Amphigloss* BK III 77a 107a BK V
171b-182b K 1 215a 222b
18 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly*
Spheres BK I 520b-529a BK III 676a-674b
K IV 710b-714a 716a 731a
16 J. PLEA *Epitome* BK IV 854b-856a 857b-
860b 873a-876a 882a-883b 885b-886b
895b-90 907b-916a passim / *Harmonies of the World*, 1014b-1016a 1080b-1085b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK III CH 1, 176d
177a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 70 A 1
REP 5 362c 364b Q 119 A 1 ANS 604c 607b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I SUPPL.
Q 9 A 1 REP 1016b-1017 A 2 101c 1020c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* VI ATO 1 11 [55-
84] 58a b PARADISE I [38-63] 106c d 2
[1 45] 120b-d

(8) *The heavenly bodies in general 8b Soul and intellect in the heavenly bodies)*

- CH 30 174b c CH 35 177c CH 42 180d 181b
TR VIII CH 2 209a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BA VII CH 6 248a b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18
A 1 REP 1 104c 105c Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b
Q 50 A 3 272a 273b Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a
278c Q 52 A 2 279b 280a Q 66 A 2 ANS
345d 347b Q 70 A 3 365b-367a Q 110 A 1
REP 2-3 564c 565d A 3 ANS 506d 567b Q
115 A 4 REP 1 589d 590c Q 117 A 4 REP 1
599b d PART II Q 6 A 5 REP 2 648b 649a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL
Q 79 A 1 ANS 951b-953b Q 91 A 2 REP 10
1017c 1010c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [67-96]
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138] 109a VIII [10-39] 116d 117a [97-114]
118a XIII [5-72] 126a XXVIII 148d 150b
XXIX [37-45] 150c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK II 38b BA V 104b-
105d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 482 258a
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 226b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243 270] 7a b

8c Celestial motion periodicity and the great year

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 438c-439a / *Timaeus*
451a 452b / *Statesman* 586c 587b / *Laos* BK
VII 730a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I-II 359a 389d /
Metaphysics BK XII CH 8 603b 605a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 3 [699 11]
CH 4 [700 5] 234a 235a
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK V [509-533]
67d 68a [614-649] 69a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 13 271b
BK XI SECT 27 306b
- 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BA I 7a 8b 12b 14a BK
IV 109a 112b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly*
Spheres BK I 513b 514b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 928a 933a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR II CH 1 40a 41a
/ *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 8 162b-d
- III AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V PAR 3-6 27c 28c
/ *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 29 651b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32
A 1 REP 2 175d 178a Q 115 A 3 ANS 588c
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 2
A 3 ANS 392d 393c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112-
148] 109a b XXVIII [97-120] 148b-c XXVIII
[1-78] 148d 149c
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 110b c
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY
245b d

- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 46, 117d
APH 48 185c-d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BA III [726-732] 151a
BK VII [339 386] 224b 225b
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BA II PROP 53 SCHOL
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BA II CH XIV
SECT 19-22 158b 159d passim
- 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 779c

8c(1) The eternity of celestial motion

- 7 PLATO *Timaeus* 447b c 450b-451a 460c d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BA I, III CH I-2 334a 337b
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362a CH 9 [279 12-24] 370b-d BA II CH I
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- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK V [55 10]
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- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 28 293d
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- 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK XIII 429a b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 846a 848b 888b-
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- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 3-5 67b-
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL
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- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [73-31]
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- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BA II APH 35
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- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BA III PROP 10 284a
285a / *Optics* BA III 540a 541b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98a b

8c(2) The form of celestial motion, circles the equant ellipses

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 394d 396b BK X
438c-439a / *Timaeus* 451a 452b / *Laos* BK
VII 730a d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BA VIII CH 8-9 348b 353b
/ *Heavens* BA I CH 2-5 359d 364a BK II CH 4
[287 2-31] 378c 379a CH 5 379b c CH 8 381a
382a CH 12 [293 4 14] 384c / *Metaphysics* BK
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CH 8 [1073¹⁷ 1074 14] 604a c
- 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 7a 8b BA III 83a
86b BK V 148b-157a BK IX 270b 291a 296a
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly*
Spheres 507a 508a BK I 513b-514b BK III
628b 629a BK IV 675b 678a esp 677b 6 8a
BA V 740a b 784b-785b

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- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 805b-893b 929a
933a K V 968a 979b esp 975a-977b 984b-
985b / *Harmonies of the World* 1018a b¹
17 PLOTI *Second Ennead* TRI CH 339c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 66
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL.
Q 77 A 2, A 1 945a 946b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 110b-d
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY
245b-d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* K II APIS 48
186b-d
II M LTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [616-62,] 188b-
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II PASCAL *Pensées* 72, 181a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP II 42b-43b
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8c(3) The laws of celestial motion, celestial
mechanics

- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888a-895b passim
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932a passim K V 975a 979b / *Harmonies of
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24 N W *Principles* BK I PROP 3 and CHOR.
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272 382b R P 13 285a b PROP 35 SCHOL
320b-324a, P OF 40 337b 338a, GENERAL
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35 H M H M n Understanding s CT IV 9
454c d
42 KANT *Pure Res on*, 8d [10a]
51 T LTON *W r nd Peace* BK XIII 563b
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8d The creation of the heavens

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1:8-13 19 23 /
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37:18 38 / *Psal* 1:8 3:4 9:1 89:11 2:25
136:5-9 148 6—(D) *Psalms* 8:4 3 8:2
88 2 1:26 135:5-9 48 1:4 / *Proverbs* 3:19
8:27 / *Jeremiah* 31:35 51 5—(D) *Jerem* as
3 33 51 5 / *Amos* 5:8
NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 14:15, 17:24—(D) *Acts*
4 4 17:24 / *II Coru* 1 / *I Peter* 3:2 /
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7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-452b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VI 1, CH I [314:23 19]
325b / *II Meteor* BK I CH 10-2 370d 375d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parva f Animala* BK I CH 1
[04 3 29] 164c
12 LUCIUM *Nat e f Things* BK V [4 6-508]
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18 AUGUSTIN *Confessiones* BK XI PAR 4 II
90 92b K X I PAR 2-9 99c 101c PAR 14 4
102b-110a BK X PAR 6-48 112 124 / *City
f G d* K XI CH 7 320a-c CH 9 326d 327d

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XII CH 15 351b-352d

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 46
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [73-81] 10b
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28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 214d
30 B CON *Advancement f Learning* 17b-d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 54b-56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [708-735] 150b-
151b K VII [192 386] 271b 225b BK VIII
[15 1 8] 232b-236a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

9 The particular heavenly bodies

9a The sun, its position, distance, size, and mass

- OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 10:12 14—(D) *Isaie*
10:12 14 / *Psalms* 136:7-8—(D) *Psalms*
135:7-8 / *Isaiah* 13:9-11 30:26 60:19-20—
(D) *Isaiah* 13:9-11 30:26 60:19-20 / *Joel*
2:10 31 3:15 / *Amos* 8:9
ARISTOTLE *Meteorology* 43 1-5—(D) OT
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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24-9-30 / *Mark*,
13:24 25 / *Luke* 23:44 45
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 53d 54b 79c
BK IV 130d 131a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 394c
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98a / *Apology* 204d 205a /
Rep 61c BK VI 385c 386c / *Timaeus* 451b-d
8 AN STOTER *Heavens* BK II CH 7 [289-26-35]
380d CH 12 [291-29-292-27] 383c 384b CH 13
[293-34 294 12] 385c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 8
[345-9] 451c d
11 ARCHIMEDIS *Sand Reckoner* 520a b
12 LUCRETIUS *De Rerum Naturae* K V [564-574]
68b-c [592 7 4] 68d 70b [751-771] 70d 71a
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 138d
16 PROCLAM *Almagest* BK III 77a 107a BK V
171b-182b K 7 215a 222b
16 COCCEIUS *Revolucio n f the Heavenly
Spheres* BK I 520b-529a K III 646a 674b
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16 H V L R *Epistola* BK IV 854b-856a 857b-
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the World*, 1014b-1016a 1080b-1085b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* K I CH 15 176d
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 70 A 1
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 115
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* P CA ORY IV [25-
84] 58a-b PARADISE I [38-63] 106c d X
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(9) *The particular heavenly bodies 9a The sun its position distance size and mass*

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 257d 258b
 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk vi 112d 113a
 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk ii aph 36 165c 166b
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a *passim* / *Objections and Replies* 231a 233c
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk iii [555-623] 147b 149a bk iv [539-543] 164a bk vii [354-373] 224b 225a bk viii [66-168] 233b-235b
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72 181a
 34 NEWTON *Principles* bk i PROP 66 118a 128b bk iii PHENOMENON iii 273d 274a PROP 2 276a b HYPOTHESIS i PROP 12 285a 286a PROP 25 299b 300b PROP 36 324a ii PROP 40 337b 338a / *Optics* bk iii 518a b
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98a b
 45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 819d

9b *The moon its irregularities*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* i 14-18 / *Psalms* 136 7-9—(D) *Psalms* 135 7-9 / *Isaiah* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19-20—(D) *Isaiah* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19 20 / *Joel* 2 10 31 3 12
 APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43 6-8—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 6-9
 NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24 29-30 / *Mark* 13 24 25
 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98a b / *Apology* 204d 205a / *Timaeus* 451b d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* bk ii CH II [291^b18-23] 383b CH II [291^b29-292^b27] 383c 384b CH II [297^a21-31] 389b ii
 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk v [471-479] 67b [575-584] 68c [629-649] 69b c [703-771] 70b 71a
 14 LUTARCH *Solon* 74a / *Aemilius Paulus* 220d 221b / *Nicias* 435b d / *Dion* 789b 790a
 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* bk iv-vi 108a 222b
 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk iv 675a 731a
 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk iv 876a 878a 918a 928a 952a 960a
 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH 5 43d 44a
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A I REP 5 362c 364b
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46-148] 108b-109b
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 188c
 26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC II [107 110] 295b / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT II SC I [103-114] 357a b
 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk ii aph 36 167a b
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk ii [662-666] 125b bk iii [708 735] 150b 151b bk v [257-266] 180b 181a bk vii [346-386] 224b-225b bk

viii [122-158] 234b 235b / *Samson Agonistes* [86-89] 341b

- 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 164a / *Pensées* 18 174b 175a 817 330b
 34 NEWTON *Principles* bk i PROP 43 45 92b 101a PROP 66 118a 128b bk iii PHENOMENON vi 275a PROP 3-4 and SCHOL 276b-28b PROP 22-38 294b 329a
 34 HUYGENS *Light* CH I 554b-555a
 9c *The planets their eccentricities retrogradations, and stations*
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk x 438c 439a / *Timaeus* 451a d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* bk ii CH 2 [285^b28-33] 377b c CH 7-12 380c 384c / *Metaphysics* bk xii CH II 603b-605a
 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* bk ix-xiii 270a 465b
 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk i 521b 529a bk v-vi 732a 838a
 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk iv 860b 872b 878b-882a 888b 905a 907b 910a 928a 932a *passim* bk v 961a 1004a / *Harmonies of the World* 1015b 1080b
 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH 5 44a
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A I REP 2 175d 178a
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46-148] 108b 109b A [1-27] 120b c XXII [124 154] 140d 141b
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 29c
 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk ii aph 36 165c 166b
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a *passim*
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk iii [481 483] 146a [573-587] 148a bk v [166-170] 179a [618-621] 188b 189a bk vii [557-564] 229a ii bk viii [122-122] 234b 235b bk ix [48-51] 248b bk x [657-661] 288b
 33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 368b 369a
 34 NEWTON *Principles* bk i PROP 13 and SCHOL 32b 35b PROP 4 COROL VI 36a PROP 11 42b 43b PROP 15 46b 47a PROP 17 48b-50a PROP 57-63 111b-115a PROP 65-69 116b 130b bk iii PHENOMENON I v 272a 275a PROP 12 276a b PROP 56 278b-281b PROP 8-10 282b-285a PROP 13 19 286a 291b
 34 HUYGENS *Light* CH I 556a 557b
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 102a
 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 227a
 45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 171b
 45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 632b
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk xiii 563b

9d *The earth its origin position shape and motions*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* i 10 / *Job* 38 4 7 / *Psalms* 90 2 102-105 119 90—(D) *Psalms* 89 2 101-106 118 90 / *Proverbs* 3 19 8 33 29 /

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- Isaiah 47:12 48:13—(D) Isaiah 47:12 48:13
 / Jeremiah 51:15—(D) Jeremiah 51:15
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 2 LACRITUS *Letter* f *Thales* BK [416-508]
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 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 160a / *Pensées* 2,
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 COERNUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly*
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- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 882a 887a 88 b
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 1
 A1 REP 5 362c 364d
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, II [46-143]
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 24 R. BELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I
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 B CO *Organum* BK II, APH 36, 165c
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 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [481 483] 146a
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 34 NEWTON *Principia* BK I, PROP 66, COROL
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 36 SWIFT *Gulliver's Travels* P RT III 102a
- 9f The comets and meteors
 ARISTOTLE *Meteorology* BK I CH 4 447d
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 14 PLUTARCH *Lysander* 358d 359c
 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK I 856b
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, XV [13 24]
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 30 B CO *Organum* BK II, APH 3
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 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [535-53] 105a
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 33 PASCAL *Variation* 358a
 34 NEWTON *Principia* BK III LEMMA 4 PROP 42
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 36 SWIFT *Gulliver's Travels* P RT III, 98a b 102b
 41 G O *Decline and Fall* 68c 69a 615a II
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10 The influence of the heavenly bodies upon
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 10 HYPOTHESES *Ant. Hecet. Places* par 1 7
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 18
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(10) *The influence of the heavenly bodies upon terrestrial phenomena.*

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 76 A 1 REP 2 939d 941a Q 77 A 1 ANS 943a 944d Q 86 A 2 ANS and REP 1-2 993c 994d Q 91 A 1 REP 1 1016b 1017c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112-148] 109a II VII [121-141] 116b c VIII [97 114] 118a X [1-27] 120b c XIII [52-8] 126a b
- 22 CHAUCER *Miller's Tale* [3187-3212] 212b 213a [3513-3533] 218a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk II 72c
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC III [85-101] 109a
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk I 14a
- 32 MILTON *Arcades* [61-73] 26b / *Paradise Lost* bk III [606-612] 148b bk IV [660-688] 166b 167b bk VIII [85 106] 234a b bk X [641-719] 288b 290a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 18 174b 175a
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98a b
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 226b

10a *The influence of the heavenly bodies on living matter generation and corruption*

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Chapter 6 BEAUTY

INTRODUCTION

TRUTH goodness and beauty form a triad of terms which have been discussed together throughout the tradition of western thought.

They have been called transcendental on the ground that everything which is in some measure or manner subject to denomination as true or false good or evil beautiful or ugly. But they have also been assigned to special spheres of being or subject matter—the true to thought and logic the good to action and morals the beautiful to enjoyment and aesthetics.

They have been called the three fundamental values with the implication that the worth of anything can be exhaustively judged by reference to these three standards—and no others. But other terms such as pleasure or utility have been proposed either as additional values or as significant variants of the so called fundamental three or even sometimes as more fundamental. Pleasure or utility for example has been held by men like Spinoza or Mill to be the ultimate criterion of beauty or goodness.

Truth goodness and beauty singly and together have been the focus of the age old controversy concerning the absolute and the relative the objective and the subjective the universal and the individual. At certain times it has been thought that the distinction of true from false good from evil beautiful from ugly has its basis and warranty in the very nature of things and that a man's judgment of these matters is measured for its soundness or accuracy by its conformity to fact. At other times the opposite position has been dominant. One meaning of the ancient saying that man is the measure of all things applies particularly to the true good and beautiful. Man measures truth goodness and beauty by the effect things have upon him according to what they seem to him to be. What

seems good to one man may seem evil to another. What seems ugly or false may also seem beautiful or true to different men or to the same man at different times.

Yet it is not altogether true that these three terms have always suffered the same fortunes. For Spinoza goodness and beauty are subjective but not truth. Because he has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for him, man Spinoza says judges that to be of the greatest importance which is most useful to him and he must esteem that to be of surpassing worth by which he is most beneficially affected. The notions of good and evil beauty and ugliness do not conform to any thing in the nature of things. The ignorant says Spinoza nevertheless call the nature of a thing good evil sound putrid or corrupt just as they are affected by it. For example if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye conduces to well being the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful while those exciting a contrary motion are called deformed.

BEAUTY HAS BEEN most frequently regarded as subjective or relative to the individual judgment. The familiar maxim, *de gustibus non disputandum* has its original application in the sphere of beauty rather than truth and goodness. Truth is disputable. Hume writes not taste. No man reasons concerning another's beauty but frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. Thus even when it was supposed that judgments of the true and the good could have a certain absoluteness or universality—or at least be considered as something about which men might reach agreement through argument—opinions about beauty were set apart as useless to dispute. Beauty being simply a matter of individual taste it

find no basis for argument or reasoning
jective ground for settling differences
on.

In the ancient *symposia* down to our own
have noted the great variety of traits,
sharply opposed, which have been con-
sidered beautiful at different times and places.
In its forms, Montaigne says of beau-
ty according to our appetite and liking,
"I paint it black and tawny with great
lips, big flat noses, and load the car-
riage with great rings of gold
to hang down to the mouth. In
the greatest ears are the most beautiful
they stretch them out as far as they can by

There are elsewhere nations that take
care to blacken their teeth, and hate to
have white elsewhere people that paint
red. The Italians fashion beauty, Greeks
praise the "panniers, gaunt and slender."
One makes it white, another brown,
soft and delicate, another strong and big.
Just as the preference in beauty is
by Plato to the phœnix figure the
ureans give it to the pyramidal or the
and cannot swallow a god in the form
bull."

Montaigne. Durand gives an extensive
list of the things men have found beau-
tiful, many of them so various and contradictory
that it would seem there could be no objective
basis for judgments of beauty. If any consensus
exists among individuals about what is beau-
tiful or ugly, the skeptics or relativists usually
claim it by reference to the prevalence of
certain prejudices, or customary standards,
which in turn vary with different times and
places, and at different times and places.
Beginning in the sphere of beauty, subjectivism
or relativism proceeds first to judgments
of good and evil, and then to statements about
truth, never in the opposite direction. It be-
comes complete when, as so frequently happens
in our own time, what is good or true is held
to be just as much a matter of private taste or
subjective opinion as what is beautiful.

The problem of the objectivity or subjec-
tivity of beauty can, of course, be separated
from similar problems with regard to truth and
goodness, but any attempt to solve it will neces-
sarily both draw on and bear on the discussion

of these related problems. The degree to which
the three problems must be considered in de-
pendently is determined by the extent to
which each of the three terms requires the con-
text of the other two for its definition and anal-
ysis.

BEAUTY IS, PERHAPS not definable in any strict
sense of definition. But there have been, never-
theless, many attempts to state with the brevity
of definition, what beauty is. Usually notions
of goodness, or correlative notions of desire and
love enter into the statement.

Aquinas, for example, declares that "the
beautiful is the same as the good, and they
differ in a respect only. The notion of good is
that which calms the desire while the notion
of the beautiful is that which calms the desire
by being seen or known. Thus, according to
Aquinas, implies that beauty adds to goodness
a relation to the cognitive faculty, so that good
means that which simply pleases the appetite
while the beautiful is something pleasant to
apprehend."

Because of its relation to the cognitive power,
Aquinas defines the beautiful as "that which
pleases upon being seen (*ad quod certum placet*).
Hence he continues, beauty consists in due
proportion, for the senses delight in things duly
proportioned because the sense too is a
sort of reason as is every cognitive power.

The pleasure or delight involved in the per-
ception of beauty belongs to the order of know-
ing rather than to desire or action. The know-
ing, furthermore, seems to be different from
that which is proper to science, for it is con-
cerned with the individual thing rather than
with universal natures, and it occurs intuitively
or contemplatively rather than by judgment
and reasoning. There is a mode of truth pecu-
liar to the beautiful, as well as a special kind
of goodness.

Fully to understand what Aquinas is saying
about beauty we are required to understand
his theory of goodness and truth. But enough
is immediately clear to give meaning to Eric
Gill's advice to those who are concerned with
making things beautiful. Look after goodness
and truth, he says, and beauty will take care
of herself.

To define beauty in terms of pleasure would

seem to make it relative to the individual for what gives pleasure—even contemplative pleasure—to one man may not to another. It should be noted however that the pleasure in question is attributed to the object as its cause. It may be asked therefore what in the object is the cause of the peculiar satisfaction which constitutes the experience of beauty? Can the same object just as readily arouse displeasure in another individual and a consequent judgment of ugliness? Are these opposite reactions entirely the result of the way an individual feels?

Aquinas appears to meet this difficulty by specifying certain objective elements of beauty, or conditions as he calls them. Beauty includes three conditions he writes *integrity or perfection* since those things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly due *proportion or harmony* and lastly *brightness or clarity* whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. Quite apart from individual reactions objects may differ in the degree to which they possess such properties—traits which are capable of pleasing or displeasing their beholder.

This does not mean that the individual reaction is invariably in accordance with the objective characteristics of the thing beheld. Men differ in the degree to which they possess good perception—and sound critical judgment—even as objects differ in the degree to which they possess the elements of beauty. Once again in the controversy concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of beauty there seems to be a middle ground between the two extreme positions which insists upon a beauty intrinsic to the object but does not deny the relevance of differences in individual sensibility.

William James would seem to be indicating such a position when in his discussion of aesthetic principles he declares: "We are once and for all so made that when certain impressions come before our mind one of them will seem to call for or repel the others as its companions." As an example he cites the fact that "a note sounds good with its third and fifth." Such an aesthetic judgment certainly depends upon individual sensibility and James adds to a certain extent the principle of habit will explain it. But he also points out that to explain all aesthetic judgements in this way would be ab-

surd for it is notorious how seldom natural experiences come up to our aesthetic demands. To the extent that aesthetic judgments express inner harmonies and discords between objects of thought the beautiful according to James has a certain objectivity and good taste can be conceived as the capacity to be pleased by objects which *should* elicit that reaction.

KANT'S THEORY of the beautiful to take another conception must also be understood in the general context of his theory of knowledge and his analysis of such terms as good, pleasure and desire. His definition like that of Aquinas, calls an object beautiful if it satisfies the observer in a very special way—not merely pleasing his senses or satisfying his desires in the ways in which things good as means or ends fit a man's interests or purposes. The beautiful according to Kant pleases *immediately apart from all interest*. The pleasure that results from its contemplation may be said to be the one and only disinterested and *free* delight for with it no interest whether of sense or reason extorts approval.

The aesthetic experience is for Kant also unique in that its judgment is represented as *universal* i.e. valid for every man yet at the same time it is incognizable by means of any universal concept. In other words all judgements of taste are singular judgements; they are without concept in the sense that they do not apply to a class of objects. Nevertheless they have a certain universality and are not merely the formulation of a private judgment. When we call the object beautiful Kant says we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice and lay claim to the concurrence of every one whereas no private sensation would be decisive except for the observer alone and his liking.

In saying that aesthetic judgments have subjective not objective universality and in holding that the beautiful is the object of a necessary satisfaction Kant also seems to take the middle position which recognizes the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment without denying that beauty is somehow an intrinsic property of objects. With regard to its subjective character Kant cites Hume to the effect that

"although critics are able to reason more plausibly than cooks they must still share the same fate. The universal character of the aesthetic judgment however keeps it from being completely subjective and Kant goes to some length to refute the notion that in matters of the beautiful one can seek refuge in the adage that every one has his own taste.

The fact that the aesthetic judgment requires universal assent even though the universal rule on which it is based cannot be formulated does not of course preclude the failure of the object to win such assent from many individuals. Not all men have good taste or having it have it to the same degree.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS—selective rather than exhaustive—show the connection between definitions of beauty and the problem of aesthetic training. In the traditional discussion of the ends of education there is the problem of how to cultivate good taste—the ability to discriminate critically between the beautiful and the ugly.

If beauty is entirely subjective—entirely a matter of individual feeling—then except for conformity to standards set by the customs of the time and place no criteria could seem to be available for measuring the taste of individuals. If beauty is simply objective—something immediately apparent to observation as are the simple sensible qualities—no special training would seem to be needed for sharpening our perception of it.

The genuineness of the educational problem in the sphere of beauty seems therefore to depend upon a theory of the beautiful which avoids both extremes and which permits the educator to aim at a development of individual sensibilities in accordance with objective criteria of taste.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS also provide background for the problem of beauty in nature and in art. As indicated in the chapter on ART the consideration of art in recent times tends to become restricted to the theory of the fine arts. So too the consideration of beauty has become more and more an analysis of excellence in poetry, music, painting and sculpture. In consequence the meaning of the word aes-

thetic has progressively narrowed until now it refers almost exclusively to the appreciation of works of fine art, where before it connoted any experience of the beautiful in the things of nature as well as in the works of man.

The question is raised then whether natural beauty or the perception of beauty in nature involves the same elements and causes as beauty in art. Is the beauty of a flower or of a flowering field determined by the same factors as the beauty of a still life or a landscape painting?

The affirmative answer seems to be assumed in a large part of the tradition. In his discussion of the beautiful in the *Poetics* Aristotle explicitly applies the same standard to both nature and art. To be beautiful he writes, a living creature and every whole made up of parts must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts but also be of a certain magnitude. Aristotle's notion that art imitates nature indicates a further relation between the beautiful in art and nature. Unity, proportion and clarity would then be elements common to beauty in its every occurrence though these elements may be embodied differently in things which have a difference in their mode of being as do natural and artificial things.

With regard to the beauty of nature and of art Kant tends to take the opposite position. He points out that the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest engaged. Apart from any question of use that might be involved he concludes that the interest aroused by the beautiful in nature is akin to the moral particularly from the fact that nature in her beautiful products displays herself as art not as a mere matter of chance but as it were designedly according to a law-directed arrangement.

The fact that natural things and works of art stand in a different relation to purpose or interest is for Kant an immediate indication that their beauty is different. Their susceptibility to disinterested enjoyment is not the same yet for Kant as for his predecessors nature provides the model or archetype which art follows and he even speaks of art as an imitation of nature.

The Kantian discussion of nature and art moves into another dimension when it con-

siders the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. We must look for the sublime. Kant says 'not in works of art nor yet in things of nature that in their very concept import a definite end e.g. animals of a recognized natural order but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude. In company with Longinus and Edmund Burke Kant characterizes the sublime by reference to the limitations of human powers. Whereas the beautiful consists in limitation the sublime immediately involves or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness which may appear indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement and to be as it were an outrage on the imagination.

Made aware of his own weakness man is dwarfed by nature's magnificence but at that very moment he is also elevated by realizing his ability to appreciate that which is so much greater than himself. This dual mood signals man's experience of the sublime. Unlike the enjoyment of beauty it is neither disinterested nor devoid of moral tone.

TRUTH IS USUALLY connected with perception and thought the good with desire and action. Both have been related to love and in different ways to pleasure and pain. All these terms naturally occur in the traditional discussion of beauty partly by way of definition but also partly in the course of considering the faculties engaged in the experience of beauty.

Basic here is the question whether beauty is an object of love or desire. The meaning of any answer will of course vary with different conceptions of desire and love.

Desire is sometimes thought of as fundamentally acquisitive directed toward the appropriation of a good whereas love on the contrary aims at no personal aggrandizement but rather with complete generosity wishes only the well being of the beloved. In this context beauty seems to be more closely associated with a good that is loved than with a good desired.

Love moreover is more akin to knowledge than is desire. The act of contemplation is sometimes understood as a union with the ob-

ject through both knowledge and love. Here again the context of meaning favors the alignment of beauty with love at least for theories which make beauty primarily an object of contemplation. In Plato and Plotinus, and on another level in the theologians the two considerations—of love and beauty—fuse together inseparably.

It is the privilege of beauty, Plato thinks, to offer man the readiest access to the world of ideas. According to the myth in the *Phaedrus*, the contemplation of beauty enables the soul to grow wings. This experience ultimately intellectual in its aim is described by Plato as identical with love.

The observer of beauty is amazed when he sees anyone having a godlike face or form, which is the expression of divine beauty and at first a shudder runs through him and again the old awe steals over him then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god. When the soul bathes herself in the waters of beauty her constraint is loosened and she is refreshed and has no more pangs and pains. This state of the soul enraptured by beauty, Plato goes on to say is by men called love.

Sharply opposed to Plato's intellectualization of beauty is that conception which connects it with sensual pleasure and sexual attraction. When Darwin for instance considers the sense of beauty he confines his attention almost entirely to the colors and sounds used as attractions of the opposite sex. Freud likewise while admitting that psychoanalysis has less to say about beauty than about most things claims that its derivation from the realms of sexual sensation seems certain.

Such considerations may not remove beauty from the sphere of love but as the chapter on Love makes clear love has many meanings, and is of many sorts. The beautiful which is sexually attractive is the object of a love which is almost identical with desire—sometimes with lust—and certainly involves animal impulses and bodily pleasures. The taste for the beautiful writes Darwin at least as far as female beauty is concerned is not of a special nature in the human mind.

On the other hand Darwin attributes to man alone an aesthetic faculty for the appreciation of beauty apart from love or sex. No other animal he thinks, is capable of admiring such scenes as the heavens at night a beautiful landscape or refined music but such high tastes are acquired through culture and depend on complex associations they are not enjoyed by barbarians or by uneducated persons. For Freud however the appreciation of such beauties remains ultimately sexual in motivation, no matter how sublimated in effect. The love of beauty he says is the perfect example of a feeling with an inhibited aim. Beauty and attraction are first of all the attributes of a sexual object.

The theme of beauty's relation to desire and love is connected with another basic theme—the relation of beauty to sense and intellect or in the realms of perception and thought. The two discussions naturally run parallel.

The main question here concerns the existence of beauty in the order of purely intelligible objects, and its relation to the sensible beauty of material things. Plotinus holding that beauty of every kind comes from a form or reason, traces the beauty which is in bodies, as well as that which is in the soul to its source in the eternal intelligence. This intelligible beauty lies outside the range of desire even as it is beyond the reach of sense perception. Only the admiration or the adoration of love is proper to it.

These distinctions in types of beauty—natural and artificial sensible and intelligible even perhaps material and spiritual—indicate the scope of the discussion though not all writers on beauty deal with all its manifestations.

Primarily concerned with other subjects many of the great books make only an indirect contribution to the theory of beauty, the moral treatises which consider the spiritual beauty of a noble man or of a virtuous character the cosmologies of the philosophers or scientists which find beauty in the structure of the world—the intelligible not sensible order of the universe the mathematical works which exhibit and sometimes enunciate an awareness of formal beauty in the necessary connection

of ideas the great poems which crystallize beauty in a scene in a face in a deed and above all, the writings of the theologians which do not try to do more than suggest the ineffable splendor of God's infinite beauty a beauty fused with truth and goodness, all absolute in the one absolute perfection of the divine being. The Divine Goodness observes Dante "which from Itself spurns all envy burning in Itself so sparkles that It displays the eternal beauties."

Some of the great books consider the various kinds of beauty not so much with a view to classifying their variety as in order to set forth the concordance of the grades of beauty with the grades of being and with the levels of love and knowledge.

The ladder of love in Plato's *Symposium* describes an ascent from lower to higher forms of beauty. He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, Diotima tells Socrates and who has learned to see beauty in due order and succession when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of non-dious beauty—beauty absolute separate simple and everlasting which without diminution and without increase or any change is imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love begins to perceive that beauty is not far from the end.

The order of ascent according to Diotima begins with the beauties of earth and mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty going from one fair form to all fair forms and from fair forms to fair practices and from fair practices to fair notions until from fair notions we come to the notion of absolute beauty and at last know what the essence of beauty is. Thus my dear Socrates she concludes, "is the life above all others which man should live in the contemplation of beauty absolute."

For Plotinus the degrees of beauty correspond to degrees of emancipation from matter. The more it goes towards matter the feebler beauty becomes. A thing is ugly only because not dominated by a form and reason the matter has not been completely informed by the idea. If a thing could be completely without reason and form, it would be abso-

siders the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. We must look for the sublime, Kant says, not in works of art nor yet in things of nature that in their very concept import a definite end, e.g. animals of a recognized natural order, but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude. In company with Longinus and Edmund Burke, Kant characterizes the sublime by reference to the limitations of human powers. Whereas the beautiful consists in limitation, the sublime immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of 'limitlessness' which may appear indeed in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement to be ill adapted to our faculty of presentation and to be as it were an outrage on the imagination.

Made aware of his own weakness, man is dwarfed by nature's magnificence, but at that very moment he is also elevated by realizing his ability to appreciate that which is so much greater than himself. This dual mood signals man's experience of the sublime. Unlike the enjoyment of beauty, it is neither disinterested nor devoid of moral tone.

TRUTH is usually connected with perception and thought, the good with desire and action. Both have been related to love and in different ways to pleasure and pain. All these terms naturally occur in the traditional discussion of beauty, partly by way of definition, but also partly in the course of considering the faculties engaged in the experience of beauty.

Basic here is the question whether beauty is an object of love or desire. The meaning of any answer will, of course, vary with different conceptions of desire and love.

Desire is sometimes thought of as fundamentally acquisitive, directed toward the appropriation of a good, whereas love, on the contrary, aims at no personal aggrandizement but rather, with complete generosity, wishes only the well-being of the beloved. In this context, beauty seems to be more closely associated with a good that is loved than with a good desired.

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Flowers *land*, on 165 33124, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 124 indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P or Secto. s. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 1 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Pto. Sympozium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author's Note One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, sec, ch, etc.) are some times included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Lucd.* xi [1-6; 23] 12d.

B: IN REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay errors differ in title of books or in the numbering of James error is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows. e.g. Old Test. James 7. 14-15 = (D) 11. 16. 16.

Synopsis: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant part of a whole sentence. *passum* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the citations, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Green Files*; consult the Preface.

The general theory of the beautiful

- 7 PLATO *Euchromis*, 81a b / *Cory* 101
102a 113c-d / *Phenacrus* 128b-d / *Symanteca*
15 a-d / *Phaenocarpa* 242c 243a / *Corylus* 266d
26 a / *Republia* 38 a 3 bd 373c 38 a
38c / *Parnassia*, 490b-c / *Lactis*, 38 11,
604 -662a
8 ANASTASIA Met *hymen* 38 cm 4 / 013
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601b-c
9 ANASTASIA *Poecetes* cm 7 / 11, 23 41a-3
604b-c
12 A 111 Met *hymen* 38 111, 38 23 239d
-604a 41V 38 239d
17 PLATO *For* *Euchromis* 7a 111, cm 10d 7a
7 21a 70a / *Secund* *Euchromis*, 7a 111, cm 17 60b-
71 / *Fija* *Euchromis*, 7a v cm 12, 239a-7
7a 111, cm 17 111, cm 2 239b-247b / *Saxia*
Euchromis, 7a 111, cm 15, 2 8a 7a 111, cm 11,
28b-c 7a 111, cm 2 332d 333b cm 31 33
336d 338b
18 A COTTON Co, *monis* 38 111, par 12 11-d
17 par 20 24b-c, par 24 2 25b-26a
2 par 53-81d-85a
19 ANASTASIA *Saxia* *Theraps* 38 111, cm 5,
4 38 23d 26c q91 3, 32 3486b-487d
4 1-11, q2 41 38 373 38-d

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 49a
A 2, REP 12b-4a PART II-II, Q 180 A - REP 3
660c-609c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I, APP. XVII, 371b-372d
- 33 PASCAL *Premes* 32 33 7 6m b
- 42 KANT / *metaph* 461 549d esp 479c-d, 483d,
491c, 493b-495a-c, 550a 560b-c 561d 562b
- 44 BOSWELL / *bio* - 194b
- 49 DAVINIA *Origin* / 5 French, 93a-d
- 52 DOSTO *1st Brother Karamazov* 2811, 54m b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 565a-b 566b-582a
- 54 FOSTER *Communism and its Discontents* 775a
c 7 9b-d

14. The beautiful and the good. beauty as a kind of fitness or order

- 7 Pl. to 1 juv, 21bc / *Symplocarpus*, 162d 163a
164c-d / *Gorgias*, 266d 67a / *Repahur* ex
m 333b 334b ex v 337d 338a / *Tonleus*,
4 +d-475a / *Succisa*, 594a-c / *Phidrus*
637d-638a / *Lous* ex m 651a-65 b 660a
662a
- 8 Ari TOTLE T nos am III, CH 3 [S^o-0-24]
165d / *Phydrus* ex m, CH 3 [16^o 0-19] 329c
330a / *Metaphysus*, ex v, CH 3 [93^o 5-15]
502d ex CH 1 (4 3²⁰-44) 533b ex x
CH 7 (0 4²³ 44) 602bc (10^o 50^o 0-32)
603a ex m, ex v, ex s, ex 0 603a-603c

lute ugliness. But whatever exists possesses form and reason to some extent and has some share of the effulgent beauty of the One even as it has some share through emanation in its overflowing being—the grades of beauty as of being signifying the remotion of each thing from its ultimate source.

Even separated from a continuous scale of beauty the extreme terms—the beauty of God and the beauty of the least of finite things—have similitude for a theologian like Aquinas. The word *visum* in his definition of the beautiful (*id quod visum placeat*—that which pleases upon being seen) is the word used to signify

the type of supernatural knowledge proper to the souls of the blessed—the beatific vision in which God is beheld intuitively, not known discursively, and in which knowledge united with love is the principle of the soul's union with God.

An analogy is obviously implied. In this life and on the natural level every experience of beauty—in nature or art, in sensible things or in ideas—occasions something like an act of vision, a moment of contemplation of enjoyment detached from desire or action and clear without the articulations of analysis or the demonstrations of reason.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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(1) *The general theory of the beautiful 1a The beautiful and the good beauty as a kind of fitness or order*

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk I ch 5 [645 4-26] 168d 169a / *Ethics* bk IV ch 2 [1122 34 1123 33] 369a 370b passim / *Politics* bk VII ch 4 [1326 30-35] 530c / *Poetics* ch 7 [1450^b-3 1451 15] 685b c
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk III ch I 175a 177c
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk II SECT I 256b d
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 47a
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk IV 868b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* tr V ch 12 234a = tr VIII 239b 246c / *Sixth Ennead* tr VII ch 22 333d 333b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk II par 12 11c d bk IV par 20 24b c par 21 27 25b 26a bk VII par 23 50b c / *City of God* bk XXII ch 24 610c 611b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 91 A 3 486b 487d Q 96 A 3 REP 3 512a c PART I-II Q 27 A 1 REP 3 737b d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 49 A 2 ANS and REP 1 2b-4a A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 50 A 3 REP 2 8b 9a Q 54 A 1 ANS 22d 23d PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 62a
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 476a 482b 486d-489a 521b 523c 540d 542a 544c 545b 546d 548c 550a 557c 558b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 268b 280b 281b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk VI 153b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 755a 865b
- 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 779b d

1b *Beauty and truth the beautiful as an object of contemplation*

- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c d / *Phaedrus* 124c 129d / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* bk V 370d 373c bk VI 383d 388a / *Theaetetus* 525c d / *Philebus* 630d 631d / *Lysis* bk II 660a 661b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk XII ch 7 [1072 23-24] 602b c bk XIII ch 3 [1078 32-36] 609d 610a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk IV SECT 20 265a b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr III ch I-2 10a d tr VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* tr VIII 239b 246c / *Sixth Ennead* tr VII ch 31-33 336d 338b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk VII par 23 50b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 39 A 8 ANS 210a 213a PART I II Q 27 A 1 REP 3 737b-d A 2 ANS 737d 738c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c PART III SUPP. Q 94 A 1 REP 2 1040d 1041b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Sonnets* XIV 588b LIV 594c
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b d
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 5 452d-453a
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 476a 479d esp 473a d 484d 485b 496d 501d 502a 518a d 521b 523c 525a c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267a 278a c PART IV 346d 347a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk VI 153b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 865b 866a 886b-888a
- 54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 880b

1c *The elements of beauty unity proportion clarity*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk III 333b 334b bk IV 342b-c / *Timaeus* 448a c 474d-475a / *Sophist* 261b-d / *Statesman* 594a = / *Philebus* 630d 631d 637c 638a / *Lysis* bk II 660a 661b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk VII ch 3 [246 10-19] 329c 330a / *Metaphysics* bk I ch 3 [984^b-1000^a] 502d bk XIII ch 3 [1078 39-40] 610a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk I ch 5 [645 4-26] 168d 169a / *Ethics* bk II ch 6 [1106^b-11] 352a bk IV ch 2 [1122 34 1123 33] 369a 370b passim ch 3 [1123^b 4 7] 370b / *Politics* bk III ch 11 [1281^b 10-15] 479b c ch 13 [1284^b 3-12] 482c d bk V ch 9 [1309^b 23-30] 512a bk VII ch 4 [1326 30-35] 530c / *Poetics* ch 7 [1450^b 23-1451 15] 685b-c
- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* bk I 814a 820a 826d 827a bk II 839d 840b
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1079b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr VI ch I 2 21a 22b / *Sixth Ennead* tr VII ch 22, 333b tr IX ch I 353d 354b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk IV par 20 24b c / *City of God* bk II ch 11 161b-c bk XI ch 22 334b bk XVII ch 14 464d bk XXII ch 19 604d 605a ch 24 610c 611b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 39 A 8 ANS 210a 213a Q 91 A 3 486b-487d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 49 A 2 REP 1 2b 4a Q 54 A 1 ANS 22d 23d PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 44c d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 28 176a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk II ch XII, SECT 5 148b
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 471b-473a 485c-491 493c-495a,c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 185c d PART I 219b c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 277a b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 301d 302a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b 755a

(3) *Beauty in relation to desire and love as object or cause*

- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95c / *Descent of Man* 301c 366b-c 481c 482b 571b 576b passim
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk I 4a 5d 6b 49a b bk II 80d 81a bk III 113a 115a 120c 123a 141b d bk VI 235a 238a bk VIII 316d 317d bk XI 497d 498b 530c d bk XII 541b 542b EPILOGUE I 659a 660b c
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk III 53d 54b
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 865b
 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 775b-c

4 *Beauty and ugliness in relation to pleasure and pain*

- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 266d 267a / *Philebus* 630d 631d / *Lysis* bk II 654a 656c bk VII 720c d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk VI ch 7 [146 21-32] 200a b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk I ch 5 [645 4-6] 168d 169a / *Ethics* bk III ch 10 [1118 1-16] 364c / *Politics* bk VIII ch 3 [1337 27-1338 29] 543a-c ch 5 [1340 24-29] 545d / *Rhetoric* bk I ch 6 [1362 5-9] 603b
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk III SECT 2 259d 260a
 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI ch I-7 21a 25a passim / *Fifth Ennead* TR V ch 12 234a c
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk X par 51-53 84b 85a
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 91 A 3 REP 3 486b-487d PART II Q 11 A 1 REP 2 666b d 667a Q 27 A 1 REP 3 737b-d Q 32 A 8 ANS 764c 765b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 62a c
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b d
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 371d
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 32 176a b
 42 KANT *Judgement* 471d 473a 476a-495a c esp 488a 489a 502d 503d 516d 518d 527b 528c esp 577d 528a 537a 539d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 220b c PART II 267b-268b
 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [8697-8811] 211b-214a [II 288-303] 274b-275a
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95a d / *Descent of Man* 301c 302a 568d 571b passim 577b d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk IV 190d 192b
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 157a 755a 757b esp 755a b 886b
 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 775b

5 *Judgments of beauty the objective and the subjective in aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste*

- 7 PLATO *Ion* 142a 148a e / *Symposium* 167a d / *Gorgias* 261a-c / *Republic* bk III 333b-334b

/ *Statesman* 593d 595a / *Lysis* bk II 654a 656b 660a 662a bk III 675c 676b bk VII 720c d

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk III ch II [1281 43 44] 479b e
 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk IV [1141 1170] 59a b
 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk III ch I 175a 177c
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk III SECT 2 259d 260a bk IV SECT 20 265a b
 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI ch 1 21d 23a / *Sixth Ennead* TR III ch II 287b-c
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk IV par 20 24b c bk VII par 3 50b c / *City of God* bk VIII ch 6 269b c
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c PART II Q 21 A 1 REP 3 737b-d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c PART III SUPPL 9 94 A 1 REP 2 1040d 1041b
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORI XI [79-120] 69c 70a xxvi [91-126] 93d 94b
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk IV 273d 274a
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 230b-231c
 26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT I SC 1 [98 110] 431d
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 371b 372d
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 32-33 176a b 105 193a 114 194b 381 238b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk II ch XII SECT 5 148a b
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 132 509c d
 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23d [In I] / *Judgement* 471b-473a 476a 495a c 513b 516b 516d 517c 524d 525a 540a 546d
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 202b 362b-c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 185c d PART II 264b 268c 280b c
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95a d / *Descent of Man* 301c 302a 462d-463a 569c 571c 577d esp 575d 577b c 595c 596a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk IV 191b 192b bk VIII 318a 320b
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 755b 757b 886b 888a
- 6 *The role of the beautiful in education*
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 167a d / *Gorgias* 261a-c / *Republic* bk II-III 320c 334b esp bk III 333b 334b bk VIII 409d / *Lysis* bk II 653a 663d bk III 675c 676b bk VII 720c d
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk VIII ch 3 542d 543d ch 5-7 544c 548a c
 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk IV ch II 242a d
 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III ch I 2 10a d TR VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* TR IV ch 2 240d 247b
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk VII par 23 50b c
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 381 238b
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 24a

- 10 1c

- 41 G1 NO *Decline and Fall* 300a b
 42 HANT *Judgement* 462b-d 485b-491c 493a b
 513d 514b 521b-523c, 528b-c 548c 549d
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 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* IN NO 185c d
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CHAPTER 6 BEAUTY

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups.

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 7 BEING

INTRODUCTION

THE words *is* and *is not* are probably the words most frequently used by anyone. They are unavoidable by implication at least in every statement. They have in addition a greater range of meaning than any other words.

Their manifold significance seems to be of a very special kind for whatever is said *not to be* in one sense of being can always be said *to be* in another of its senses. Children and practiced liars know this. Playing on the meanings of being or with *is* and *not* they move smoothly from fact to fiction, imagination to reality or truth to falsehood.

Despite the obviousness and commonplace-ness of the questions which arise with any consideration of the meanings of *is* the study of being is a highly technical inquiry which only philosophers have pursued at length. Berkeley gives one reason why they cannot avoid this task. Nothing seems of more importance he says towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing*, *reality*, *existence* for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things or pretend to any knowledge thereof so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words.

In the whole field of learning philosophy is distinguished from other disciplines—from history, the sciences and mathematics—by its concern with the problem of being. It alone asks about the nature of existence, the modes and properties of being, the difference between being and becoming, appearance and reality, the possible and the actual, being and non-being. Not all philosophers ask these questions nor do all who ask such questions approach or formulate them in the same way. Nevertheless the attempt to answer them is a task peculiar to

philosophy. Though it often leads to subtleties, it also keeps the philosopher in deepest touch with common sense and the speculative wonder of all men.

As a technical concept in philosophy *being* has been called both the richest and the emptiest of all terms in the vocabulary of thought. Both remarks testify to the same fact, namely that it is the highest abstraction, the most universal of predicates and the most pervasive subject of discussion.

William James is in that long line of philosophers which began with the early Greeks when he points out that in the strict and ultimate sense of the word *existence* everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object, whether mythical object, individual thinker's object or object in outer space and for intelligence at large. Even things which do not really exist have being insofar as they are objects of thought—things remembered which once existed, things conceivable which have the possibility of being, things imaginary which have being at least in the mind that thinks them. This leads to a paradox which the ancients delighted in pondering: that even nothing is something, even non-being has been for before we can say non-being is not, we must be able to say non-being is. *Nothing* is at least an object of thought.

Any other word than being will tend to classify things. The application of any other name will divide the world into things of the sort denominated as distinct from everything else. Chair, for example, divides the world into things which are chairs and all other objects but being divides something or anything from nothing and as we have seen even applies to nothing.

All other names. Aquinas writes "et

either less universal, or if convertible with it add something, have it at least in idea hence in a certain way they inform and determine it." The concepts which such words express are therefore a restricted universality. They apply to all things of a certain kind but not to all things things of every kind or type. With the exception of a few terms inseparably associated with being (or as Aquinas says, convertible with it) only being is common to all kinds of things. When every other trait peculiar to a thing is removed its being remains—the fact that it is in some sense.

If we start with a particular of any sort classifying it progressively according to the characteristics which it shares with more and more things, we come at last to being. According to this method of abstraction which Heidegger follows in his *Science of Logic* being is the emptiest of terms precisely because it is the commonest. It signifies the very least that can be thought of anything. On this view if all we are told of something is that it is—that it has being—we learn as little as possible about the thing. We have to be told that a thing is a material or a spiritual being, a real or an imaginary being, a living or a human being, in order to apprehend a determinate nature. Abstracted from every thing else being has only the positive meaning of exclusion, non being.

There is an opposite procedure by which the term being has the maximal rather than the minimal significance. Since whatever else a thing is, it is a being, its being lies at the very heart of its nature and underlies all its other properties. Being is indeterminate only in the sense that it takes on every sort of determination. Wherever being is found by thought it is understood as a determined mode of being. To conceive being in this way we do not remove every difference or determination, but on the contrary embrace all, since all are differences or determinations of being.

Aquinas, for example conceives being taken simply as including all perfections of being, "and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, being without qualification is taken as the most proper name for God. When Moses asked God His name he received as answer I AM THAT I AM. Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you." Used

in this sense being becomes the richest of terms—the one which has the greatest amplitude of meaning.

BOTH ways of thinking about being are relevant to the problem of the relations among the various meanings of being. Both are also related to the problem of whether being is one or many—the problem first raised by the Eleatics, exhaustively explored in Plato's *Parmenides* and recurrent in the thought of Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel.

The two problems are connected. If everything that exists only as a part of being as a whole or if the unity of being requires everything to be the same in being then whatever diversities there are do not multiply the meanings of being. Although he speaks of substance rather than of being, Spinoza argues that there cannot be any substance excepting God and consequently none other can be conceived. From this it follows that whatever is, is in God and nothing can be or be conceived without God.

Since there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute and since God is defined as a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence "it is absurd in Spinoza's opinion to think of any other substance. If there were any substance besides God it would have to be explained by some attribute of God and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute which is impossible.

Spinoza's definition of substance attribute and mode or affection, combined with his axiom that everything which is, is either in itself or in another enables him to embrace whatever multiplicity or diversity he finds in the world as aspects of one being. Everything which is not substance existing in and of itself exists in that one substance as an infinite attribute or a finite mode. The thing extended (*rem extensum*) and the thinking thing (*rem cognitivum*) he writes, are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God.

If, on the contrary there is no unitary whole of being, but only a plurality of beings which are alike in being and yet are diverse in being from one another then our conception of being

must involve a system of meanings a stem of many branches Descartes for example distinguishes between an infinite being whose essence involves its existence and finite beings which do not necessarily exist of themselves but must be caused to exist The infinite being which is God causes but does not contain within itself other finite substances and among finite things Descartes holds 'two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can exist apart from the other

In addition to God—that substance which we understand to be supremely perfect—Descartes defines two kinds of finite substance

That substance in which thought immediately resides I call Mind he writes and that substance which is the immediate subject of extension in space and of the accidents that presuppose extension *e.g.* figure situation movement in space etc. is called Body All these substances and even their accidents have being but not being of the same kind or to the same degree There are according to Descartes diverse degrees of reality or (the quality of being an) entity For substance has more reality than accident or mode and infinite substance has more than finite substance Its being is independent theirs dependent

The issue between Spinoza and Descartes—a single substance or many—is only one of the ways in which the problem of the unity or diversity of being presents itself Both Plato and Aristotle for example affirm a multiplicity of separate existences but though both are in this sense pluralists being seems to have one meaning for Plato many for Aristotle

According to Plato's distinction between being and becoming only the immutable essences the eternal ideas are beings and though they are many in number they all belong to one realm and possess the same type of being But for Aristotle not only do perishable as well as imperishable substances exist not only is there sensible and mutable as well as immaterial and eternal being but the being which substances possess is not the same as that of accidents essential is not the same as accidental being potential being is not the same as being actual and to be is not the same as to be conceived that is to exist in reality is not the same as to exist in mind

Again and again Aristotle insists that there are many senses in which a thing is said to be

Some things are said to be because they are substances others because they are accidents of substance others because they are in process towards substance or destructions or privations or qualities of substance or productive or generative of substance or of things which are relative to substance or negations of one of these things or of substance itself It is for this reason he continues that we say even of non being that it is non being and in another place he adds that besides all these there is that which is potentially or actually

All these senses of being according to Aristotle refer to one starting point namely substance or that which has being in and of itself That which is primarily *i.e.* not in a qualified sense he writes must be a substance But when he also says that that which is primarily is the what which indicates the substance of a thing he seems to be using the words substance and essence interchangeably This in turn seems to be related to the fact that although Aristotle distinguishes between actual and potential being and between necessary or incorruptible and contingent or corruptible beings he like Plato and unlike Aquinas Descartes or Spinoza does not consider whether the essence and existence of a being are identical or separate

It may be held that this distinction is implied since a contingent being is one which is able not to exist whereas a necessary being cannot not exist A contingent being is therefore one whose essence can be divorced from existence a necessary being one which *must* be precisely because its essence is identical with its existence But the explicit recognition of a real distinction between essence and existence seems to be reserved for the later theologians and philosophers who conceive of an infinite being as Aristotle does not

The infinity of a being lies not only in its possession of all perfections but even more fundamentally in its requiring no cause outside itself for its own existence That thing says Aquinas whose being differs from its essence must have its being caused by another That which has being but is not being is a being by participation Where Aristotle makes sub-

since the primary type of being and the starting point of all its other meanings Aquinas makes the infinite being of God whose very essence it is to be the source of all finite and participated beings in which there is a composition of existence and essence or of that whereby they are and that which they are.

Since being itself is that whereby a thing is, being belongs to God primarily and to all other things according to modes of derivation or participation. God and his creatures can be called beings but Aquinas points out not in the identical sense nor yet with utter diversity of meaning. A similarity—a sameness—in-diversity or analogy—obtains between the unqualified being of God and the being of all other things which have being subject to various qualifications or limitations.

All other questions about being are affected by the solution of these basic problems concerning the unity of being, the kinds of being and the order of the various kinds. If they are solved in one way—in favor of unity—certain questions are not even raised for they are genuine only on the basis of the other solution which finds being diverse. The discussion in the chapters on SAME AND OTHER, and on SIGN AND SYMBOL, of sameness, diversity and analogy is, therefore, relevant to the problem of how things are at once alike and unlike in being.

THE GREEKS notably Plato and Aristotle, began the inquiry about being. They realized that after all other questions are answered there still remains the question: What does it mean to say of any thing, that it is or is not? After we understand what it means for a thing to be a man, or to be alive, or to be a body we must still consider what it means for that thing simply to be in any way at all or to be in one sense and not to be in another.

The discussion of being in itself and in relation to unity and truth rest and not on runs through many dialogues of Plato. It is central in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*. The same terms and problems appear in Aristotle's scientific treatise which makes being its distinctive subject matter and which he sometimes calls first philosophy and sometimes theology. It belongs to this science, he declares, to consider

being, *qua* being—both what it is and the properties which belong to it *qua* being.

As pointed out in the chapter on METAPHYSICS it is an historical accident that this inquiry concerning being came to be called metaphysics. That is the name which according to legend the ancient editors gave to a collection of writings in which Aristotle pursued this inquiry. Since they came after the books on physics they were called *meta* physics on the supposition that Aristotle intended the discussion of being to follow his treatise on change and motion.

If one were to invent a word to describe the science of being it would be ontology, not metaphysics or even theology. Yet metaphysics has remained the traditionally accepted name for the inquiry or science which goes beyond physics—or all of natural science—in that it asks about the very existence of things, and their modes of being. The traditional connection of metaphysics with theology discussed in the chapters on THEOLOGY and METAPHYSICS seems to have its origin in the fact that Aristotle's treatise on being passes from a consideration of sensible and mutable substances to the problem of the existence of immaterial beings and to the conception of a divine being purely actual absolutely immutable.

In a science intended to treat of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred namely substance Aristotle says we must first sketch the nature of substance. Hence he begins with what he calls the generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances. He postpones until later his critical discussion of the ideas and the objects of mathematics, for some say these are substances in addition to the sensible substances yet he directs his whole inquiry to the ultimate question whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances. His attempt to answer this question in the twelfth book makes it the theological part of his *Metaphysics*.

THOUGH THEIR ORDER of discussion is different the metaphysicians of the 17th century like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, deal with many if not all major points in the analysis of being, but the Greek philosophers inau-

ated and the mediaeval theologians developed. Later philosophers whose main concern is with the origin and validity of human knowledge come to the traditional metaphysical questions through an analysis not of substance or essence existence or power but of our *ideas* of substance and power.

This transformation of the ancient problem of being is stated by Berkeley in almost epigrammatic form. Considering what is meant by the term *exist* he argues from the experience of sensible things that their *esse* is *percipi* nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. Locke too although he does not identify being with perception makes the same shift on the ground that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was apt to run into was to make a survey of our own understandings examine our own powers and see to what things they were adapted.

Once the problems of being are viewed first in terms of the mind the questions for the philosopher become primarily those of the relation of our definitions to real and nominal essences the conditions of our knowledge of existence and the identification of the real and ideal with perceptible matters of fact and intelligible relations between ideas.

For Kant the basic distinction is between the sensible and supra-sensible or the phenomenal and noumenal realms of being. From another point of view Kant considers the being of things in themselves apart from human experience and the being of natural things or what is the same for him the things of experience. The former are unconditioned the latter conditioned by the knowing mind which is formative or constitutive of experience.

The sole aim of pure reason Kant writes is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions in order to preposit the whole series of conditions and thus present them to the understanding *a priori*. Having obtained these conditions we can ascend through them until we reach the unconditioned that is the principles. It is with these ideas of pure reason that metaphysics according to Kant properly deals. Instead of being its object consists in three grand ideas: God

Freedom and Immortality and it aims at showing that the second conception conjoined with the first must lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.

Hegel on the other hand does not approach the problem of being or reality through a critique of knowledge. For Hegel as for Plotinus before him the heart of metaphysics lies in understanding that nothing is actual except the Idea or the Absolute and the great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and the transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. Plotinus calls the absolute not the Idea but the All one yet he tries to show that the One is the principle the light and the life of all things just as Hegel reduces everything to a manifestation of the underlying reality of the Absolute Idea.

Despite all such changes in terminology despite radical differences in philosophical principle or conclusion and regardless of the attitude taken toward the possibility of metaphysics as a science the central question which is faced by anyone who goes beyond physics or natural philosophy is a question about being or existence. It may or may not be asked explicitly but it is always present by implication.

The question about God for example or free will or immortality is first of all a question about whether such things *exist* and *how* they exist. Do they have reality or are they only fictions of the mind? Similarly questions about the infinite the absolute or the unconditioned are questions about that primary reality apart from whose existence nothing else could be or be conceived and which therefore has an existence different from the things dependent on it for their being. Here again the first question is whether such a reality exists.

Enough has been said to indicate why this discussion cannot consider all topics which have some connection with the theory of being. To try to make this Introduction adequate even for the topics outlined here under which the references to the great books are assembled would be to make it almost co-extensive in scope with the sum of many other Introductions—all in fact which open chapters dealing with metaphysical concepts or problems.

It is to be expected of course that the special

the existence of God, of an immortal free will should be treated in terms of God's immortality and will. I do not believe that such chapters can be written in any form, I finish this idea and many same and other.

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR—all still others cited in the Cross Reference—include topics which would have been included here if we were to consider these considerations.

of economy and intelligibility the opposite course. Limiting the scope of discussion to a few principal points in the history of being, we can also exhibit the relation of this chapter to others, the connection of the great ideas. The various aspects of being, (such as essence and existence, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, the real and the ideal) and the basic aspects of being (such as unity, goodness, etc.) therefore left for fuller treatment in other contexts. But two topics deserve mention here. One is the distinction between being and becoming, the other the relation of being to knowledge.

OF CHANGE OR MOTION—of coming to pass and passing away—is so evident to the senses as never been denied at least not as an actual phenomenon. But it has been regarded as irrational and unreal as an illusion perceived by the senses. Galen, for instance, in the Sophists' view, allowing that bread turning into blood becomes changed as a result of taste and touch but denying that change occurs in reality. They exclude away from reality as tricks and illusions of the senses which are affected now in one way and in another whereas the underlying reality does not admit of any of these.

familiar paradoxes of Zeno are *reductio ad absurdum* arguments to show that motion is impossible, full of self-contradiction. The way that, according to Parmenides, Zeno's master, the Eleatic school, lies in the insight that either is always was and will be, that nothing comes into being out of non-being or is out of being into nothingness. The doctrine of Parmenides provoked many

enthusiasts. Yet his opponents tried to preserve the reality of change without having to accord it the fullness of being. The Greek atomists, for example, think that change cannot be explained except in terms of permanent beings—in fact eternal ones. Lucretius, who expounds their views, remarks that in any change something unchangeable must remain over so that all things be not utterly reduced to nothing for when one thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before. The something unchangeable is thought to be the atom, the absolutely indivisible, and hence impervious part of matter. Change does not touch the being of the atoms, but only breaks up the union among them, and then joins anew the different elements with others and thus it comes to pass that all things change—that is, all things composite—not the simple bodies of solid singleness—when the clashing, motions, arrangement, position, and shapes of matter change about.

In a conversation with Cratylus, who favors the Heraclitean theory of a universal flux, Socrates asks: How can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? How can we reasonably say, Cratylus, he goes on, that there is any knowledge at all, if every thing is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding?

When he gets Glaucon to admit in the *Republic* that being is the sphere or subject matter of knowledge and knowing is to know the nature of being, Socrates leads him to see the correlation of being, not-being, and becoming with knowledge, ignorance, and opinion. If opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties then the sphere of knowledge and opinion cannot be the same. If being is the subject matter of knowledge something else must be the subject matter of opinion. It cannot be not-being for if not-being ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlate.

Since opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being because it is obviously intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, Socrates concludes that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time that sort of thing would appear also in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being and the corresponding

ated and the mediaeval theologians developed. Later philosophers whose main concern is with the origin and validity of human knowledge come to the traditional metaphysical questions through an analysis not of substance or essence existence or power but of our *ideas* of substance and power.

This transformation of the ancient problem of being is stated by Berkeley in almost epigrammatic form. Considering what is meant by the term *exist* he argues from the experience of sensible things that their *esse* is *percepti*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them. Locke too although he does not identify being with perception makes the same shift on the ground that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was apt to run into was to make a survey of our own understandings examine our own powers and see to what things they were adapted.

Once the problems of being are viewed first in terms of the mind the questions for the philosopher become primarily those of the relation of our definitions to real and nominal essences the conditions of our knowledge of existence and the identification of the real and ideal with perceptible matters of fact and intelligible relations between ideas.

For Kant the basic distinction is between the sensible and supra sensible or the phenomenal and noumenal realms of being. From another point of view Kant considers the being of things in themselves apart from human experience and the being of natural things or what is the same for him the things of experience. The former are unconditioned the latter conditioned by the knowing mind which is formative or constitutive of experience.

The sole aim of pure reason Kant writes is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions in order to preposit the whole series of conditions and thus present them to the understanding *a priori*. Having obtained these conditions we can ascend through them until we reach the unconditioned that is the principles. It is with these ideas of pure reason that metaphysics according to Kant properly deals. Instead of being its object consists in three grand ideas God

Freedom and Immortality and it aims at showing that the second conception conjoined with the first must lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.

Hegel on the other hand does not approach the problem of being or reality through a technique of knowledge. For Hegel as for Plotinus before him the heart of metaphysics lies in understanding that nothing is actual except the Idea or the Absolute and the great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and the transient the substance which is immortal and the eternal which is present. The *Timaeus* calls the absolute not the Idea but the All one yet he tries to show that the One is the principle the light and the life of all things just as Hegel reduces everything to a manifestation of the underlying reality of the Absolute Idea.

Despite all such changes in terminology despite radical differences in philosophical principle or conclusion and regardless of the attitude taken toward the possibility of metaphysics as a science the central question which is faced by anyone who goes beyond physics or natural philosophy is a question about being or existence. It may or may not be asked explicitly but it is always present by implication.

The question about God for example or free will or immortality is first of all a question about whether such things *exist* and *how* they exist. Do they have reality or are they only fictions of the mind? Similarly questions about the infinite the absolute or the unconditional are questions about that primary reality apart from whose existence nothing else could be conceived and which therefore has an existence different from the things dependent on for their being. Here again the first question is whether such a reality exists.

Enough has been said to indicate why the discussion cannot consider all topics which have some connection with the theory of being. To try to make this Introduction adequate even for the topics outlined here under which the references to the great books are assembled would be to make it almost co-extensive in scope with the sum of many other Introductions—although in fact which open chapters dealing with metaphysical concepts or problems.

It is to be expected of course that the special

adds. Plato was in a sense not wrong in *sophisticating* with that which or the arguments of the sophists deal say above all with the accidental. The accidental is akin to non-being, it thinks may be seen in the fact that which are in another sense come into and pass out of being by a process but which are accidentally do not. But he rejects the accidental as an object of he does not like Plato or Plotinus, the whole realm of sensible changing from the sphere of scientific knowledge in both metaphysics and physics treat of substances the one with regard to their *being* the other with regard to their *mutable*—their becoming or changing. Plotinus on the other hand the true is have an intelligible object and contain of anything sensible. They are different not to variable things suffering from of changes divided in space to which time of becoming and not being belongs. The eternal being which is not divided always in the same way which is not and does not perish and has neither space nor situation but rests immovable in.

According to another view represented by a substance is as such unknowable whether be body or spirit. We use the word substance to name the support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in which qualities are commonly called accidents. The sensible accidents are all that we know and we give the general name substance to the supposed but unknown support of those qualities as finding existing. Some these sensible accidents are what Locke calls primary qualities—the powers or potentialities by which things affect one another and also series.

But to the extent that our senses fail to discover the bulk, texture and figure of the minute parts of bodies on which their constitutions and differences depend we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities, as the attractive nots and marks whereby to name ideas of them in our mind. Nevertheless, powers which are qualities of accidents or substances—seem to be for Locke the

ultimate reality we can know. The secondary sensible qualities he writes are nothing but the powers which corporeal substances have to produce several ideas in us by our sense which ideas—unlike the primary qualities—are not in the things themselves otherwise than as anything is in its cause.

Hobbes exemplifies still another view. A man can have no thought he says representing anything not subject to sense. Hobbes does not object to calling bodies substances but thinks that when we speak of an incorporeal body or (which is all on) an incorporeal substance we talk nonsense for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense but are absurd speeches taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived Philosophers and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen.

He enumerates other absurdities, such as the giving of names of bodies to accidents or of accidents to bodies e.g. by those who say that extension is body. Criticism of the fallacy of reification—the fallacy first pointed out by Ockham and criticized so repeatedly in contemporary semantics—also appears in Hobbes warning against making substances out of abstractions or universals by giving the names of bodies to names or predicates.

WHENEVER A THEORY of knowledge is concerned with how we know reality as opposed to mere appearance it considers the manner in which existing beings can be known—by perception intuition or demonstration and with respect to demonstration it attempts to formulate the conditions of valid reasoning about matters of fact or real existence. But it has seldom been supposed that reality exhausts the objects of our thought or knowledge. We can conceive possibilities not realized in this world. We can imagine things which do not exist in nature.

The meaning of reality—of real as opposed to purely conceptual or ideal being—is derived from the notion of thinghood of having being outside the mind not merely in it. In traditional controversies about the existence of ideas—or of universals the objects of mathematics or relations—it is not the being of such things which is questioned but their reality their existence outside the mind. If, for example

faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance but will be found in the interval between them. This intermediate flux or sphere of becoming this region of the many and the variable can yield only opinion. Being the realm of the 'absolute and eternal and immutable [ideas] is the only object that one may be said to know.

Aristotle would seem to agree with Plato that change partakes equally of the nature of being and not being and cannot rightly be termed either pure and 'simple'. He points out that his predecessors particularly the Eleatics held change to be impossible because they believed that what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not both of which are impossible. It is impossible so they argued since what is cannot come to be (because it is already) and from what is not nothing could have come to be. Aristotle concedes the cogency of this argument on one condition namely that the terms being and not being are taken without qualification. But his whole point is that they need not be taken without qualification and should not be if we wish to explain change rather than make a mystery of it.

The qualification Aristotle introduces rests on the distinction between two modes of being—the potentiality and actuality correlative with matter and form. This makes it possible for him to maintain that a thing may come to be from what is not in a qualified sense. He illustrates his meaning by the example of the bronze which from a mere lump of metal comes to be a statue under the hands of the artist. The bronze he says was potentially a statue and the change whereby it came to be actually a statue is the process between potentiality and actuality. While the change is going on the bronze is neither completely potential nor fully actual in respect of being a statue.

Like Plato Aristotle recognizes that there is something indefinite about change. The reason he explains is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality—a thing that is merely capable of having a certain size is not undergoing change nor yet a thing that is actually of a certain size. Change is a sort of actuality but incomplete hard to grasp but not incapable of existing.

If to exist is to be completely actual the changing things and change itself do not exist. They exist only to the extent that they have actuality. Yet potentiality no less than actuality is a mode of being. That potentiality—power or capacity—belongs to being seen also to be affirmed by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's *Sophist*. Anything which possesses a sort of power to affect another or to be affected by another he says if only for a single moment however trifling the cause and however slight the effect has real existence. I hold he adds that the definition of being is simply power.

The basic issue concerning being and becoming and the issue concerning eternal as opposed to mutable existence recur again and again in the tradition of western thought. They are involved in the distinction between corruptible and incorruptible substances (which is in turn connected with the division of substances into corporeal and spiritual) and with the nature of God as the only purely actual or truly eternal being. They are implicit in Spinoza's distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* and in his distinction between God's knowledge of things under the aspect of eternity and man's temporal view of the world as process. They are relevant to Hegel's Absolute Idea which while remaining fixed progressively reveals itself in the ever changing face of nature and history. In our own day these issues enter as Dewey, Santayana and Whitehead in controversy as yesterday they engaged Bradley, William James and Bergson.

AS ALREADY NOTED Plato's division of reality into the realms of being and becoming has bearing on his analysis of knowledge and opinion. The division relates to the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible and between the opposed qualities of certainty and probability or necessity and contingency in our judgments about things. The distinction between essence and existence and between substance and accident separate aspects of modes of being which function differently as objects for the knowing mind.

Aristotle for example holds that there can be no scientific treatment of the accidental for the accidental is practically a mere name.

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ideas exist apart from minds the minds of men and God they have real not ideal existence. If the objects of mathematics such as numbers and figures have existence only as figments of the mind they are ideal beings.

The judgment of the reality of a thing James thinks involves a state of consciousness *sur generis* about which not much can be said in the way of internal analysis. The focus of this problem in modern times is indicated by James phrasing of the question: Under what circumstances do we think things real? And James gives a typically modern answer to the question.

He begins by saying that any object which remains uncontradicted is *ipso facto* believed and posited as absolute reality. He admits that for most men the things of sense are the absolutely real world's nucleus. Other things James writes may be real for this man or that—things of science abstract moral relations things of the Christian theology or what not. But even for the special man these things are usually real with a less real reality than that of the things of sense. But his basic conviction is that our own reality that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief. As sure as I exist!—this is our uttermost warrant for the being of all other things. As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the *cogito* go bail for the reality of all that the *cogito* involved so all of us feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force ascribe an all but equal degree of reality first to whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of

personal need and second to whatever farther things continuously belong with these.

The self or ego is the ultimate criterion of being or reality. The world of living reality as contrasted with unrealities James writes is thus anchored in the Ego. That is the hook from which the rest dangles the absolute support. And as from a painted hook it has been said that one can only hang a painted chain so conversely from a real hook only a real chain can properly be hung. *Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.* Whatever things fail to establish this connection are things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all. James would be the first to concede to any critic of his position that its truth and good sense depend upon noting that word practically for it is the world of practical realities with which he professes to be concerned.

WE CAN IN CONCLUSION observe one obvious measure of the importance of being in philosophical thought. The major *isms* by which the historians of philosophy have tried to classify its doctrines represent affirmations or denials with respect to being or the modes of being. They are such antitheses as realism and idealism materialism and spiritualism monism and pluralism even atheism and theism. Undoubtedly no great philosopher can be simply boxed. Yet the opposing *isms* do indicate the great speculative issues which no mind can avoid if it pursues the truth or seeks the ultimate principles of good and evil.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 Diverse conceptions of being and non being being as a term or concept the meanings of *is* and *is not* 131
- 2 Being and the one and the many 131
 - 2a Infinite being and the plurality of finite beings
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 - 3a The hierarchy of being grades of reality degrees of intelligibility
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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45-(D) II *Ezra* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Diverse conceptions of being and non being being as a term or concept the meanings of is and is not

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2. Being and the one and the many

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2a Infinite being and the plurality of finite beings

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2b The unity of a being

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11 NICOLO *Arithmetic* BK II 840a b

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdra* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS OF BEING AND NON BEING being as a term or concept the meanings of is and is not

7 PLATO *Republic* bk V 370d 373c / *Tima* 447b d 455c 458b / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Theaetetus* 517d 518b 520b 521d 522a / *Sophist* 561d 563b esp 562a 563a 565a 566b 567a 569a 571d 573b passim

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* ch 3 [16^b19-26] 25d 26a ch 13 [23 18-26] 35b-c / *Prior Analysis* bk I ch 36 [48 40^b9] 66d / *Posterior Analysis* bk II ch 7 [92^b13] 126c / *Topics* bk IV ch I [121 14-26] 169a b [121^b1-8] 169c ch 6 [127^b26-40] 176d 177a bk VI ch 7 [146 21-32] 200a b / *Sophistical Refutations* ch 5 [166^b37 167^b] 229d ch 7 [169^a20-24] 232d ch 25 [180 3-28^b] 248c / *Physics* bk I ch 2 [185 0-4] 260a b ch 3 [186^a23-187^a10] 261b-262a ch 5 [188 18-23] 263c bk III ch 6 [206 13 34] 284b d bk V ch I [225^a20-29] 305b-c / *Generation and Corruption* bk I ch 3 413c 416c passim / *Metaphysics* bk I ch 3-10 501c 511d passim bk III ch 3 [998^b14-28] 517b c bk IV ch 2 [1003 33-10] 522b ch 5 [1009^a22-38] 528d bk V ch 7 537c 538b bk VII ch I 550b d 551a ch 4 [1030 17-14] 552d 553b bk IX ch 10 [1051 34-12] 577c

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17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII ch 3, 28a b / *Third Ennead* TR VI ch 6-7 109d 111c TR VII ch 6 122a d / *Fifth Ennead* TR I ch 4 209d 210c TR II ch I 214c 215a TR VI ch 6 237b-d / *Sixth Ennead* TR II ch 7-8 27^a 273c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk VII part I 2 43b 44a / *City of God* bk VIII ch 11 272c bk XII ch 2 343c d / *Christian Doctrine* bk I ch 3 633c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q2 1 10c 75b passim esp Q 3 A 4 REP 1 16d 1 4 Q 11 A 1 46d 47d Q 13 A 5 ANS and REP 1 66b 67d A 10 ANS 72c 73c Q 14 A 9 ANS 83b d Q 16 A 3 REP 2 96b d Q 22 A 4 REP 3 131c 132b Q 29 A 1 REP 4 162a 163b 10 Q 45 38a 250a Q 48 A 2 REP 3 260c 261b Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 104 534c 538c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART II Q 2 A 5 esp REP 2-3 618d 619c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q6: A 1 REP 1 54d 55c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 269d 270c 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 292d 294a

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- 17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR II CH I 139c 140c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH II-16 315d 319d TR IX CH I-2 353d 355a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 3 REP 1 29c 30b Q II AA I-4 46d 50b passim Q 39 A 3 ANS 204c 205c Q 76 385c 399b passim Q 103 A 3 ANS 530a c PART I-II Q 12 A 3 REP 2-3 670d 671b Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d 689c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS AND REP 2 710a 711c A 9 719d 720c Q 17 806d 809d Q 19 A 1 REI 4 816a 818b PART III SUPPL Q 83 A 3 REP 4 978c 980d
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 153b 154a 213d 214a 224d 225d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROF L-13 359b d PART II DEF 7 373c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 26 154b c CH XVI SECT 1 165d d CH XXIII SECT 1-6 204a 205c CH XXIII SECT 37-CH XXIV SECT 3 213d 214d CH XXVII 218d 228c BK III CH VI SECT 2-5 268c 269d SECT 10 271b SECT 49 282c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b SECT 12 415b c SECT 99 432b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 120c 129c esp 121a 124d 126a 128b / *Judgement* 566c d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 104a 107b esp 104a b 215b 216a 406b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 ANS 15c 16a QQ 4-6 20c 30d Q 13 A 1 REI 2 73c 74b Q 21 A 1 REP 4 124b 125b Q 21 A 1 ANS 127d 128d Q 25 A 6 ANS 149a 150a Q 48 AA I-3 259b 262a Q 73 A 1 3,0a 371a A 3 REP 3 371d 372c Q 74 A 3 REP 3 371a 377a c PART I-II Q 2 A 5 618d 619c Q 18 AA I 4 694a 695d esp A 1 ANS AND REP 694a d A 1 ANS 694d 695c Q 29, A 5 ANS 747c 748b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 51 A 3 REP 2 24c 25b Q 55 A 4 REP 1 28c 29d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d PART II DEF 6 373c PART IV DEF 1 2 424a
- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 278b-c / *Practical Reason* 307b c

3a The hierarchy of being: grades of reality degrees of intelligibility

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 126a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* BK V 370c 373c BK VI VII 383d 398c BK IX 422c-425b esp 423b-424d / *Timaeus* 447a 455c / *Philebus* 637c 639a c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [23 18] 35b c / *Topics* BK VI CH 4 [141 26-142 2] 194c 195c / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 359d 360d BK II CH 12 383b 384c BK IV CH 3 [130 32 311 3] 402b c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 413c-416c BK II CH 10 [336 23 341 438d] / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [389 23 390 17] 493d 494b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 7 [988 34 65] 506c CH 8 [989 21-990 8] 507d 508a CH 9 508c 511c BK II CH 1 [993 19-31] 512a b BK IV CH 4 [1008 32-1009 5] 528b BK IX CH 9 [1071 4 22] 577a b BK XII CH 5 [1071 30-36] 601a CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 603d 606d BK XIII CH 2 [1077 14-114] 608b 609a BK XIV CH 4 [1091 29]-CH 5 [1092 17] 624a 625a / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [320 29-34] 661c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [644 20-645 5] 168c d / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 1 [731 24-33] 272a b / *Ethics* BK I CH III [1096 17-23] 341b c
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [724 751] 230b-231a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH 1 226a d TR VIII CH 3-10 28a 33a CH 12 33d 34a / *Second Ennead* TR III CH II-12 46b c CH 16-18 48b 50a TR IX CH 3 67b c / *Third Ennead* TR I CH I-2 82c 83d TR VII CH 8 10 132d 136a / *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / *Fifth Ennead* TR II CH I 214c 215a TR III CH II-12 222b 223c TR IV 226d 228b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 18 320c 321b TR VII CH 28-29 335b-336b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH II 272c BK XI CH 16 331a-c CH 22 334b-c BK XII CH 2-5 343c 345b BK XIV CH 13 387d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a CH 3 633c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS

3 Being and good

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I

NEW TESTAMENT *I Timothy* 4 4

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 125b / *Republic* BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b-448b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 5 [143 9-14] 196c CH 6 [143 19-27] 198d 199a CH 8 [146 9-147 11] 200c 201a CH 12 [149 31 39] 204b c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336 28-30] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 8 16] 506a b CH 7 [988 6-16] 506c d CH 9 [992 29-34] 510c BK XII CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 [1075 11-24] 605d 606a BK XIV CH 4 [1091 29]-CH 5 [1092 17] 624a 625a

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK II CH I [731 26-29] 272a / *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 23-29] 341c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b TR VII CH I 26c TR VIII CH 3-12 28a 34a / *Fifth Ennead* TR III CH 15-16 224c 226a TR IX CH 10 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH I 305c 306a TR VII CH 24-26 333d 334d CH III 335b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10 15b d par 12 16b BK IV par 24 25b c BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 3-7 44a-45d par 16-23 48c 50c / *City of God* BK XI CH 22 333d 334a BK XII CH 3 343d 344b

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2 9b-260c P RT I IL Q 1 A 3 615a-c Q 2
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21 Da TE *Dante Comedy*, PARADISE, 1 (103, 142
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30 BACON *Adjustment of Learning* 73a-c
31 SPINGAR *Eighty PART III, FROM 4-9 3984*

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART 1 224d
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4 Being and truth

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 71 74a / *Crygias* 86
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10) 66e / *Melophyia* BL 1. cu 1 S11b

II PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, tr. (CH 8 132
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18 31 cu m. Co f. (cont. 28 III par. 1 b)

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19 4q 1 A8 *Sacrae Theologiae*, p. 47 l. 9

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, IV [1302-1303]

21 DESCARTES DISCOURSE PART IV 51b-54
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3) 132b 126d 229c-d

11 ROP 10 CHOL 376d 377a ROP 1
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35 Locke, Human Understanding, bk. 2, ch. 19, § 11.

2 CR 8330d

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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a 37b 91d 93b 102c 103a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 23 17d PART III par 280 94d 95a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 237d 238a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 141a 1b 636a 852a
- 4a Being as the pervasive object of mind and the formal object of the first philosophy metaphysics or dialectic
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Republic* bk v 368c 373c bk vi-vii 383d 398c / *Parmenides* 486a-491c esp 489a c 507c 509a / *Theaetetus* 535b 536a / *Sophist* 561d 574c esp 571a c / *Philebus* 633a 635a esp 634b 635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk vi ch 12 [149^b 23] 203d 204a / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 9 [992^b 18-993¹⁰] 511a c bk ii ch i [993^b 19-31] 512a b bk iv 522a 532d bk vi ch i-bk vii ch i 547b d 551a bk xi ch 3-6 589a 592b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b / *Fifth Ennead* TR I ch 4 209d 210c TR v ch i-2 228b 229d TR ix ch ii 250c 251a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 REP 1-2 3b-4a Q 3 A 4 REP 1 16d 17c Q 5 A 2 24b 25a Q 11 A 2 REP 4 47d 48d Q 14 A 9 REP 1 83b d Q 16 AA 3-4 96b 97c Q 79 A 7 ANS 420d 421c A 9 REP 3 422b 423d Q 82 A 4 REP 1 434c-435c Q 87 A 3 REP 1 467b 468a PART I-II Q 3 A 7 ANS 628b d Q 9 A 1 ANS and REP 3 657d 658d Q 10 A 1 REP 3 662d 663d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 269b 270c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 40a 48d esp 40a 41b 43a c 43d 45a
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 53b d / *Objections and Replies* 261a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 44 COROL 2 and DEMONSTR 390a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch vii SECT 7 132d
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a c 119a c 120b [fn i] / *Judgement* 551a 552c 603d 607c esp 606d 607c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a PART III par 360 113d 114a c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 234b-c 245d 246c
- 4b Being as the measure of truth in judgments of the mind clarity and distinctness as criteria of the reality of an idea
- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 71c 74a esp 72b c / *Cratylus* 85a 89b / *Parmenides* 507c-509a esp 508d 509a / *Sophist* 558c d 575a 577b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 5 [1 10^b 12] 8b 9a ch iii [12^b 15] 17d 18a ch 12 [14^a 10-11] 20b

- / *Interpretation* ch 3 [16^b 19-26] 25d 26a
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- / *Posterior Analytics* bk i ch 19 [81^b 1 111c d] / *Physics* bk i ch i 259a b / *Metaphysics* bk iv ch 3-8 524b 532d bk v ch [1017 31-34] 538a ch 29 [1024^b 22 39] 546 547a bk vi ch 4 550a c bk ix, ch 10 577c 578a c bk xi ch 4-6 589d 592b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 14 A 8 REP 3 82c 83b Q 16 AA 1-2 94b-96b Q 16 A 3-Q 17 A 1 99d 101d Q 25 A 2 ANS 125c d PART II Q 2 A 3 ANS 617b-618a
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseyde* bk iv STANZA 154 108b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 56b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* i iv 75a 89b iv v 92d 95a vi 98c d / *Objections and Replies* 108a 115a c 121b 122c 124c 125b 126b-127c DEP III iv 130b POSTULATE iv-vii 131a c AXIOM vi 132a AXIOM x 132b PROP II iii 132c 133a 237c 238b 257d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 4 373b PROP 32 385c PROP 43 388c 389b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk i ch iii SECT 24-25 120a d bk ii ch viii SECT 1-6 133b 134a ch xiii SECT 11 150d 151b SECT 25 16 154a c ch xliii SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 32 212c d ch xliii 243c 248b PASSION esp SECT 19 247a b bk iii ch vi SECT 46-47 281d 282b bk iv ch v SECT 7-9 330b 331a ch x SECT 7 350d 351a ch 12 SECT 19-CH vi SECT 1 354a c ch xi SECT 12 357c d
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36b c 85d 88a 179c 182b / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 367d 368a / *Judgement* 603d 604b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 141a 142a 636a 638a 641a 879b 882a esp 881a b
- 5 Being and becoming: the reality of change the nature of mutable being
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 94c d 99b 104b 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124c 126c / *Symposium* 165c 168b 167a d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b 247b-248c / *Republic* bk ii 322d 323a bk v 368c 373c bk vi-vii 383d 398c bk viii 403a b / *Ti-maeus* 442a 477a c esp 447a d 455c-458b / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Theaetetus* 517d 534b / *Sophist* 561d 574c / *Statesman* 587a b / *Philebus* 610d 617d 631d 635a esp 634b 635a / *Laws* bk x 760a 765c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk i 259a 268d esp ch 1 267a d bk ii ch i 268b d 270a bk iii ch 1-3 278a 280c ch 6 [206^a 18-16] 284c 285a bk iv ch ii [219^a 23 31] 299c d bk v ch 6 319c 321a / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 360d 361a ch 9 [277^a 29-278^b 9] 369a b bk iv ch 3 [310^b 22 311 12] 402b c ch 4 [311^a 19-33] 403c / *Generation and Corruption* on 1 ch 3 413c 416c bk ii ch 9 436d 441a c / *Meta*

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9 Aristotle *Generation of Animals* bk v ch i
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10 G. E. L. *Natural Faculties* bk i, ch 2 167b-
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11 H. Gom. *On Aristotle's* bk i 811b-d

12 Lu. *Actus Naturae* f. Th. 21 k i [146-328]
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13 Al. *Metaphysics* bk ii sect 17 259c-
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14 H. L. *Metaphysics* f. Th. 21, 1051b

15 Plotinus *Second Ennead*, tr i ch 3 4 36b-
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16 Augustine *Confessions* bk iii, par 10 15b-d
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17 Aqu. *Summa Theologiae* PART 4, Q 2, A 3,
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18 Aqu. *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 1, A 1
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20 Descartes *Discourse* PART IV 52d / *Objec-
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21 S. C. *On Ethics* PART I DEF 2 335a PA 1 II,
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35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iii ch iv
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35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 89 430b-
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42 Kant *Pure Reason*, 15a-b 27a 33d esp 27a
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46 Hegel, *Philosophy of History* INTRO 178a
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51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xiv 608a-b

53 James *Psychology* 881a 884b passim

6 The cause of existence

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7 Plato *Timaeus* 447b-448a / *Laws* bk x
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8 Aristotle *Prior Analytics* bk ii ch i 2
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9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk i ch i
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12 Epicurus *Discourses* bk i ch 14 120d
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18 Augustine *Confessions* bk i par 10 3b-c /
Christian Doctrine bk i ch 32 633 -d

19 Aqu. *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 3
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28 H. v. O. *On Animal Generation* 443b-c

31 D. Scartus *Discourses* II RT V 55d 36a f
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31 Synops *Exodus*, P RT I D P 1 355 P OP 17
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32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80-134] 137a
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV
1 SECT 12 165b c CH XXVI SECT 2-2 217a c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2-4
413b-414a SECT 25-33 417d 419a SECT 36
419c d SECT 45-46 421b c SECT 48 422a
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443b

35 HUMER *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV
74 484a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 140b d 145c 177b 179b
/ *Practical Reason* 334b 337a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 245d
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7 The divisions or modes of being

7a The distinction between essence and existence as the act of being

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8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 3 [1047 30-
2] 572c

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH 6 122a d
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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 10 328c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3
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31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52d 53a /
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31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 8 355c AXIOM
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH V
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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 179c 182b 191d 192b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III para 30
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53 JAMES *Psychology* 640b [fn 1] 644b

7b The distinction between substance and attribute accident or modification, independent and dependent being

8 ARISTOTLE *Categorics* CH 2 [1-20] 5b c
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[1019 1-14] 540a BK VII CH 3 [1029^b 10]
551c d CH 4-6 552b 555a BK VIII CH 3
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21] 574d 575a BK X CH 2 580b d BK XII CH
I [1069 18 25] 598a CH 4-5 599d-601a CH 7
[1072^b 4-13] 602c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 2
[648^b 35]-CH 3 [635^b 22] 173b-174b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XII SECT 30
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17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 6
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 4^b
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30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 66 114d
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31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 41d PART II
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- 87b-88c / *Objections a d Reponses* DEF 130b-c
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- 5 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK 2 C 111
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- 2 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 74b-76c 130b-
 133 EXP 131c d 140b d 143a / *Practic* I
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- 16 HEIL *Philosophy of Right* DITIONE 6
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- 33 JAMES *Psychology* 572 b
- 1(i) The conceptions of substance
- 8 A TOTL *Caerons* 5 6a9a CH 7
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 580b d K X I c 98a-c BH X CH 2
 11 114 b 1 608b-609a
- 12 A B L S *Mediations* BK II SECT 23 281b
- 17 PLOTI *S th Enne d*, TR I C 1 3 252c
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- 19 AQ *S mma Theol g c* PART I Q 3
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- 20 Q *A Summa Theologica* BK II Q 4
 1 A 2nd RE 402 ~103d P T II Q Q 3
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- 21 ILO BUL *Les alian* P T III 172b
- 30 B O *Vocum Org num* K I A 37 168d
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- 31 DESC *res Objections and Replies* D
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- 31 S I CUA *Ethics* RTI DE 3 6 355b OP
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 15 1 360b-361d P 9 363c d RT
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II
 15 5 9 117c d BK CH XII BT 6 148b-c
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 4 247 d BH 21
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 6-7
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15b-c 63a 63d-64a
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- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PA T III par 146
 55c d / *Philosophy of History* IVTRO, 156d
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 221b 223a
- 7b(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, com-
 posite and simple substances, the kinds
 of substance in relation to matter and
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- B ARISTOTL *Physics* BK I CH 7 265b-267a
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eration and Corruption BK I CH 3 413c-416c /
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 99-5 19] 516a-d CH 4 [99-24 23] 518a-c II
 5 520c 521b CH 6 [100-211 32] 521b-d BK
 c 5 536b-c BK VII VIII 540b 5 d 5 od A XI
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 588a b [100-23 29] 588d 589a BK XII XIV
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- 12 EPICTET *Discourses* K IV CH I 240d
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- 12 ALR LIES *Mediations* BK IV SECT 1 262b-
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- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead*, TR IV CH 2 4
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- 18 A C TINE *Co sessions* K T I par 1 2 43b-
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- 19 AQL V S *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3
 11 20c Q 6 A 3 B P 1 29c 30b Q 7 A I ANS
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 2 RE 3 5 163b-164b Q 40 A I REP 213b-
 214b Q 45 A 4 244d 245c Q 5 269 275a

- (7b) *The distinction between substance and attribute accident or modification is dependent and dependent being 7b(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, composite and simple substances the kinds of substance in relation to matter and form*

- 1 Q 70 A 3 REP 2 365b 367a QQ 7, 76 378a 399b Q 77 A 1 ANS and REP 2-3 639c-401b Q 85 A 3 REP 3 457d 458d Q 86 A 3 463b-d Q 88 A 2 REP 3 471c 472c Q 104 A 1 ANS and REP 1 534c 536c Q 115 A 1 585d 587c A 3 REP 2 588c 589c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a PART II II Q 24 A 11 ANS 498b 499c PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 2 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 1 ANS and REP 2 885c 886c Q 79 A 2 REP 2 953b 955c Q 92 A 1 ANS 1025c 1032b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [121 148] 116b ■ AXIV [13-36] 150b c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 172a 177c PART IV 258b 261a 269d 271b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b d / *Nolum Organum* BK II AP1 37 168d 169c
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a / *Meditations* VI 96b 103d / *Objections and Replies* DEF VI VIII 130c d 153c 155c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROI 15 360a 361d PART II PROP 1-2 373d 374a PROI 6 374d 375a PROP 7 SCHOL 375b ■
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 16-18 151d 152c CH XV SECT II 165a b CH XVI SECT 2-4 178c 179c CH XVIII SECT 2 205a b SECT 15-37 208c 214b CH XVIII SECT 2 219b c BK III CH V SECT 15 295a c BK IV CH III SECT 6 313c 315b CH 2 SECT 4-19 351b 354c passim CH XVI SECT 12 370c 371a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 20 413a 418c SECT 35-38 419c 420a SECT 47-50 421c 422c SECT 67-81 426b 428d SECT 86-91 429c 431a passim SECT 133 142 439c 441c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 100d 101b 121a 128b 186b d 203d 204c / *Judgement* 557c 558b 565b d 566d 567a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b 160c 161a 165a b PART I 227d 228a
- 51 JAMES *Psychology* 118b 119b passim 220b 226a esp 221a 223a
- [107]^b 13-14] 606b / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [113 29] 643d 644a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 4 [699] 700 2] 234d 235a
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [15 35] 3d 4b [483-634] 7a 8d
- 16 PROBLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6a BK III 429a b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 929b 930b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Enn.* ad TR I CH 1 435a 37b CH 8 39c d TR IV CH 6 51d 52a / *Fewer Ennead* TR VII CH 10-12 198d 200a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 9 A 39c 40d Q 10 A 2 REP 1 41d 42c A 7 ANS and REP 1 42c 13b A 5-6 44b-46d Q 18 A 1 REP 3 106b 107c Q 2 A 1 ANS 128d 130d Q 46 A 1 REP 2 3 250a 252d Q 48 A 1 and REP 3 260c 261b ■ 50 A 5 274b-2 28 Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c Q 66 A 345d 347b Q 68 A 1 ANS 354a 355c Q 3 A 6 383c 384c Q 7b A 3 REP 1 2391a 393a Q 9, A 1 513c 514c A 4 515d 516d Q 104 A 1 REP 1 3 534c 536c Q 113 A 1 ANS 576d 577d PART I-II Q 22 A 1 REP 3 720d 721c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 85 A 6 182d 184a PART II-II Q 24 A 11 ANS 498b 499c PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 1 1016b 1017c 1A 4-5 10 1d 1025b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [161-34] 115d 116a [121 148] 116b c XIII [2-8] 126a b
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 12c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 6-8 356b 35 d PROP 12 359b-d PROP 15 SCHOL 361d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [116 156] 96a 97a BK II [94-105] 113a ■ BK IV [130 31] 203a b [430-436] 205b
- 33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a
- 34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 541b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III SECT 19 259c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 14 441a b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b 203d 04c / *Practical Reason* 348d 349a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 221b 222b 224a ■

7b(3) Corruptible and incorruptible substances

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [23 18 26] 35b ■ / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1-3 359a 362a CH 9 [279 12 14] 370b d BK I CH 10 BK II CH 1 310d 376a BK III CH 6 396a ■ / *Metaphysics* BK III CH 2 [996 21 28] 514d BK IV CH 5 [1009 36-39] 528d BK V CH 3 [1012^b 9 16] 536a BK VI CH 8 [1050^b 2] CH 9 [1051 21] 576b 577b BK X CH 10 586c d BK XI CH 6 [1063 10-17] 591b BK XII CH 1 [1069 30-32] 598b c CH 2 [1069^b 24 27] 598d 599a CH 3 [1070^a 20-27] 599c CH 6-8 601b-605a CH 10
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a / *Meditations* VI 96b-103d / *Objections and Replies* DEF VI VIII 130c d PROP IV 133 135d 136b 152d 155d esp 153c 155c 211d 225d 231a 232d 248b
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 14 COROL 2 360a PART II DEF 1 237b ■ PROP 1 237b 374a PROP 5-6 374c-375a PROP 7 SCHOL 375b c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIV SECT 18 152a c
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 580c d

7b(4) Extension and thought as dependent substances or as attributes of infinite substance

CHAPTER 7 BEING

(15) to 7b(6)

- i) Substance as subject to change and to different kinds of change the role of accidents or modifications

8 **ARISTOTLE Categories** CH 5 [10^a-19] 8b-9a / *Physics*, BK I, CH 6-8 CH 1 264c 21a / BK III CH 1 3 278a-280c, BK VIII 304a 35d / *Generation and Corruption*, BK I, CH 1-3 32a-42b BK II, CH 9-10 436d-439c / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 3 [93^b-98^a] 501d 502c BK III, CH 4 [99^a-24] 518a-c BK VII, CH 1-9 55a 58a BK VIII, CH 1 [104^a-24] 566b-d CH 3 [43^a, 23] 568a b CH 4-5 568d 569d BK IX, CH 1 5 6b d 5 1b CH 3 5 2a-c CH 6-7 573c 575a BK XI CH 9 593d 594d CH III 596a-d CH I [106^a-726] 596d-597d BK XII, CH -5 598a-601a / *Soul*, BK III CH 4 [6^a-11] 646d-647a

10 **GAL Natural Faculties** BK I CH 2 16 b-168c CH 5 169b-c BK II, CH 4, 13 a-b BK III, CH 1 203b-203a CH 15, 21d-21ad

17 **PLATO Second Ennead**, TR I CH 3, 4 36b-37b TR I CH 6 51d 52a TR II CH 1 2 60c 62b / *Third Ennead*, TR II CH 7, CH 7 110d 119a

19 **AQUINAS Summa Theologiae**, PAR I, Q 3 6, AN 18c 19a Q 9, 2 39c-40d Q 41 3 219d 221c 5 222b-223b Q 44 A 239b-240a Q 45 A 1-3 242a-247 passim 8 2 9b-250a Q 50, 5 274b-275a Q 53 280d 34d, Q 65 A 4 342b-343c Q 66, AA 1 2 343d 347b Q 67 A 2, AN and REP 1 301b-352a Q 3, A 3 371d 372c Q 3 6 383c 384c Q 6, A 4 393a 394c Q 8 A 2, A and REP 4 409a-410a Q 90, ANS and REP 1 481d-482 Q 92, 3, REP 1 490c-491b BK 95, A 1 516d-517d, Q 1 4 534c 538c Q 97, AA 1 2 538d 540c: A 5, ANS 54a 543b Q 1 5 AA 1 3 535d-539c A 6, ANS 591d 592d Q 1 8 A 1 600a 601c Q 19 604c-608d ART I II, Q 22, 1 725d 721

20 **AQUINAS Summa Theologiae** R II, Q 3 2, ANS 20d REP 2 13c 14b Q 52, A 2 13d 19a Q 41 A 2 191d 1 1 REP 1 3 21a-d Q 4, 2, A 3 349a-d P R III SC PL Q 5 3, AN 938a 939d, Q 50 A 4 959c 963a Q 82, A 1 2 968a-9 1a Q 83 A 1 9 4d 9 6b 5, ANS 981b-982c Q 84 983c 985b Q 6, AA 2 993c 996a

30 **BACON Novum Organum**, BK I, APH 66, 113a-b

31 **D SCARIS Objections and Replies** 162d 164d

31 **SPINOSA Ethics** ART I, PROP 6 356b-c, Q 12 4 355b-d, PROP 23 364d 365a, PROP 35 365c-366a BK I, NO 3 377d 3 8c

35 **LOCKE Human Understanding** BK I, CH XXXI 1c 1 203c-d CH XXXI, 1c 2 217a-d BK II, CH CT 4 280b-c

42 **HART Pure Reason**, 71b-6c, 8a-83b 86c 8 b 141b-d 143a passim

46 **LI Philosophy of History** INTRO, 156d 15 b 1, 8c-d

7b(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or modifications

8 **ARISTOTLE Categories** CH 2 [1^a 0-3] 5b-c CH 4 5d-6a CH 7 [27^a-36] 6b-c [36- 1] 7b CH 6-9 9a 16d / *Physics*, BK I, CH 13 [32^a 14] 48b-c / *Posterior Analytics*, BK I, CH 4 [7^a 33] 16] 100b-d / *Topics* BK I, CH 9 147a b [7^a 33] 16] 100b-d / *Physics*, BK I, CH 2 [18^a 20-186^a] 260a-d CH 4 [185^a-13] 263b BK II, CH 1 [19^a-3] 39] 269a BK I CH 3 [1 5-8] 289b-c BK II, CH 3 329a 330d / *Metaphysics*, BK CH 6 [101^b 16-31] 336a b CH 7 [10 7^a 33 30] 537d 538a CH 9 [17^a 27 10 5] 538c CH 30 547a-d BK II CH 1 [1 2 10-18] 550b CH 4-6 552b-555a BK III, CH 4 [104^a-8] 569b BK X CH 9 586a-c BK XII CH I [106^a-15- 2] 598a / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 6 [415^a 446^a] 683b-684c

12 **LACRITUS Nature of Things** BK I [419- 82] 607

17 **PLATO Second Ennead**, TR VI 60c-62d / *Sixth Ennead*, TR I, CH 4 24 253b-265b CH 30 265b-c

19 **AQUINAS Summa Theologiae**, P RT I Q 3 A 6 18c 19a Q 8, A 2 REP 3 35c 36b Q 9, ANS 39c-40d Q 23, A 2 138d 160 Q 29, A ANS and REP 4 163b-164b Q 41 A 2 ANS 239b-240a Q 42 1 4 ANS 244d 245c Q 54 A 1 285a-d A 286c 287b Q 66 A 1 REP 3 343d 345c Q 6 A 3 351b-352a Q 76 A 6 396a-d A 8 A 3 397d 399b Q 77 399b-407a passim Q 101 1 8c 1522c 523a Q 108 3 ANS 555d 558b Q 117, 1 A 3 2nd REP 3 585d 58 c A 11 AN 591d 592d Q 116 A 4 ANS 592d-593d P RT I-II Q 2, A 11 AN 619d 620d 11 7 651d-655a passim, Q 11 A 4 A 3 688d-689c Q 18 A 3 695d-696b 11 3 A 4 ANS and REP 2 774d 775d

20 **AQUINAS Summa Theologiae** P T II Q 49-4 2a 25d passim, ESP Q 49, AA 1 2 1b-4a Q 56 A 1 REP 3 30a-c PART II I Q 23 A 3 REP 3 483a-d Q 1 A 5, ANS and REP 1 492b-493d PART III, Q 2, A 11 16b-18b PART III, CTPL, Q 70, A 1 ANS 893d-895d Q 70, A 1 REP 4 951b-953b Q 8 A 3 9 8c 980d

23 **HUAS Letztlich** RT I 5 a b 59c-d

30 **BACON Novum Organum** BK I, APH 66 11-d 115a

31 **DESCARTES Discourse** ART I 41d / *Objections and Replies* III b-136b 130c 162d 163d 2, 8c 229c

31 **SPINOSA Ethics** PART I D 1-5 355b PROP 3 358a b OF 9, DEMON 1 363c-d PROP 9 OL 2 36- PROP 21 364 365a

35 **LOCKE Human Understanding** BK I CH III 133b-138b ESP SECT 8-10 134b-d CH I CT 3-6 147d 148c CH XII, 5 CT 17 0 152a-d CH XXXI, SECT 3 1 8d CT 75 200b-d CH XXXI, 5 CT 10 205d 206d SECT 7 213d 214b CH XXXI, 1c 2 238b-c CH XXXI

- 7b) *The distinction between substance and attribute accident or modification, independent and dependent being* 7b(6) *The nature and kinds of accidents or modifications*

SECT 2 239b d BK III CH IV SECT 16 263b c CH IX SECT 13 288a d

- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I-15 413a-416a SECT 25 417d 418a SECT 49 422b SECT 73 427b c SECT 78 428a b SECT 102 432d 433a

- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 122 505c d

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 503a b 572a b 650b 651a

- 7c) *The distinction between potentiality and actuality possible and actual being*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 9 [19 6v-4] 29b d CH 13 [23 18 26] 35b c / *Topics* BK V CH 8 [138^b 27-239 9] 191c d / *Physics* BK III CH 1-3 278a 280c BK IV CH 9 [217 20-26] 297a b / *Heavens* BK III CH 2 [301^b 33-302 9] 393b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 5 [1009 22-39] 528d BK V CH 2 [1014 7-9] 534b [1014 19 25] 534b c CH 7 [1017 35-9] 538a b CH 12 540b 541b BK IX 570b d 578a c BK XII CH 2 [1069^b 15-34] 598d 599a CH 5 600b 601a BK XIII CH 3 [1078 21-31] 609d CH 10 [1087 10-25] 619c / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [414 14-28] 644b c CH 5 [417 2-418 6] 647c 648d

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V 57d 60c / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 8 19 111c 119a TR IX CH 3 137d 138a / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH 15 17 260c 261d CH 25-30 265b 268c TR III CH 22 293d 294a CH 27 296b 297a

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 35 653c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 ANS 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 4 ANS 16d 17c A 5 ANS 17c 18b A 6 ANS 18c 19a A 7 ANS 19a c A 8 ANS 19d 20c Q 4 A 1 20d 21b A 2 ANS 21b 22b Q 5 A 1 23c 24a A 2 REP 2 24b 25a A 3 REP 3 25a d Q 6 A 3 REP 1 29c 30b Q 7 A 2 REP 3 31d 32c Q 9 A 1 ANS and REP 1 38c 39c A 2 ANS 39c 40d Q 11 A 1 REP 2 46d 47d Q 14 A 2 76d 77d A 3 ANS 77d 78b A 4 ANS 78b 79a Q 18 A 1 ANS 104c 105c A 3 REP 1 106b 107c A 4 REP 3 107d 108c Q 25 A 1 REP 1 143d 144c Q 45 A 5 REP 3 245c 247a Q 46 A 1 REP 1 250a 252d Q 54 A 1 ANS 285d A 3 ANS and REP 2 286c 287b Q 75 A 1 ANS and REP 2 378b 379c Q 86 A 3 463b d Q 115 A 1 ANS and REP 1 4 585d 587c PART II Q 10 A 1 REP 2 662d 663d Q 27 A 3 738c 739c

- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 86d 87a

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV DEF 4 424a

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 90c 91a / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a / *Judgement* 570c 571c

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b 160d 161c 178a 179d

- 7c(1) *The order of potentiality and actuality*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [23 21 6 35b c / *Physics* BK III CH 1 [201 19-2] 178d / *Heavens* BK IV CH 3 [310^b 22 311 12] 402b c / *Metaphysics* BK III CH III [1002^b 22 1003^b 521d BK V CH 11 [1019 1 14] 540a BK VII 9 [1034^b 16-19] 558a BK IX CH 8-9 575b-571c BK XII CH 3 [1071 30-36] 601a CH 6-7 601b 603b

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* VII v 57d 60c / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 7 111a b CH 11 113b c CH 14 15 115b 116c TR IV CH 3 137d 138a / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH 15 22 260c 264c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 8 ANS 19d 20c Q 4 A 1 REP 1 20d 21b A 2 ANS 21b 22b Q 9 A 1 ANS 38c 39c Q 11 A 2 REP 1 47d 48d Q 25 A 1 REP 2 143d 144c Q 94 A 3 ANS 504a 505a TRACT II Q 2 A 7 ANS 620d 621c Q 3 A 2 ANS 623d 624b Q 9 A 1 ANS 657d 658d Q 22 A 2 REP 1 721c 722c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50 A 2 REP 3 7c 8a Q 71 A 3 107c 108b PART III Q 10 A 3 ANS 769d 771b

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 14 107b d XIII [7-8] 126a b XXII [22 36] 150

- 7c(2) *Types of potency and degrees of actuality*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [22^b 35 23 1 34d 35b / *Physics* BK III CH 6 [206 18-21 281c BK IV CH 1 [208^b 209 1] 287b c A 1 CH II 3 [247^b 1 248 6] 330b d BK VIII CH 1 [33 30 331] 340a c / *Heavens* BK IV CH 3 [310^b 22-311 12] 402b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 12 540b 541b BK IX CH 1-9 570b d 577c BK XII CH 5 600b 601a / *Soul* BK II CH 1 [412 6-12] 642a [412 22-28] 642b BK III CH 4-5 661b-662d / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 1 [411^b 1-24] 679b

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1 [1103 26-24 348d 349b CH 5 [1106^b 7 10] 351c

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V 57d 60c

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 10 3b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 4 A 2 ANS 21b 22b Q 5 A 1 REP 1 23c 24a Q 14 A 2 ANS and REP 2 3 76d 77d Q 18 A 3 ANS and REP 1 106b 107c Q 25 143c 150a Q 45 A 4 ANS 262a 263a Q 50 A 2 270a 272a Q 52 A 1 2 278d 280a Q 58 A 1 300c 301a Q 63 A 1 REP 1 325c 326c Q 66 A 2 345d 347b Q 75 A 5 382a 383b A 6 REP 2 383c 384c Q 77 A 1 399c-401b A 3 401d 403a A 6 404c 405c Q 79 A 2 414d 416a A 10 423d-424d Q 87 A 2 ANS 466c-467b Q 92 A 4 REP 3 491b d Q 104 A 4 REP 2 538a c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART II Q 3 A 2 ANS 20d REP 1 623a 624b Q 10 A 1 REP 2 662d 663d Q 22 A 1 720d 721c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 49 A 3 4b 5a Q 50 A 2 7c 8a A 6 11a 12a Q 51

- 2 13c 14b q 55 A 2 ANS 27a-d q 71 A 4
REP 3 108b-109
- 15 LOC *Human Understanding* K H CH VII
C 8 132d 133 CH XXI SECT 4 178b-
179c SECT 7 199d 200b CH XXI 1 SECT 7
205d 206a SE 7 28 211b-d
- (3) *Process of the duality in relation to
matter and form*
- ARISTOTEL *Physics* BK I H 9 { 92 23 33}
268c BK III CH I { 193 9-23} 269b-270a K
H CH I 3 278a 280c / *Metaphysics* BK IV C 13
[323 311 2] 402b-c / *Generation and Cor-
ruption* BK I 13 413c-416c 7 421d-423b
CH 9 425d-426c / *Metaphysics* K I C 4
534d 535c BK II CH 16 { 104 5 16} 564c
BK III CH 6 569d 570d K II, CH 6-9 573c
577 BK X CH 9 593d 594d; K XII CH 5
600b-601 BK XII C 13 { 821 31} 609d /
S I K II, CH 1 2 642a-644c
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 3-8 28a
31c 1 3 32 33a CH 12 33d 34a / *Second
Ennead* TR IV C 6 51d 52 TR V 37d 60c /
Third Ennead TR VI CH 7 19 310d 319 TR
IX CH 3 137d 138a / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 2
208c 209b TR IX CH 3 247b-d / *Sixth Ennead*
T I C 1 25 30 265b-268c TR V CH 5-8 307
308a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I par 3-6 99d
100c par 8 101b par 9 101 pa 14 16
102b-103 par 24 26 104c 105b par 8-31
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P RTJ Q 3 2
1 and BK 3 15c 16a 4 A 8 16d 17c Q 4
1 20d 21b A 21b-22b Q 7 A 1 ANS
31 d 2 2 d 3 31d 32c Q 14 2
2 3 76d 77d Q 8 A 3 R P 1 106b-107c
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P 3 239b-240 Q 45 A 5 R 2 245 247
Q 5 A P 3 270 272a A 5 ANS 274b-
275 Q 5 2 2 289d 290d Q 6 A 7
AP 1 322d 323b Q 6 A 2 345d 347b Q 75
2 379c 380c A 5 382 383b Q 77 1
399c 401b Q 86 A 3 463b d Q 90
2 481d-482c Q 9 A 3 R 1 490c
491b Q 104 1 K nd EP 1 534c 536c
Q 105 4 538d 539c RT I-II Q 1
3 611b-612a Q 10 A 1 and R
2 662d 663d Q 22 A 1 A. and R P 1 720d
721c
- AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PA VI-II Q 49
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P R III 3 L Q 82 A REP 2 968a 970
Q 92 1025 1032b
- 21 D *The Comedy* P RAD SE I { 121 41}
107 d
- 28 HANSEN *On Animal Generation* 384c d
494 b
- 31 D *Object as nd Repl* 212a
46 11 *Phil phy f History* 1 TRO 156d
157b

7d The distinction between real and ideal
being, or between natural being and
being in mind

- 7 PLATO *Parmenides* 489a b
- 8 ARISTOTEL *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 36 { 48 4
9} 66d / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 7 { 1017 31-34}
538a BK VI H 4 550a c BK IX CH 3 { 1047
30-2} 572c CH 10 577c 578a c BK XII CH 7
{ 17 8-24} 602d 603a CH 9 { 104 4 35
1075 11} 605c d / *Soul* BK III, CH 4 { 4 9 13
29} 661b-c CH 8 { 431 20-43 9} 664b c /
Memory and Reminiscence CH I { 420 12-
45 14} 691c 692b
- 11 ARISTOTEL *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I
403b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII C 18 132d
133c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 2
A 1 RE 2 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 R P 2 16d 17c
■ II 1 ANS and REP 3 46d-47d Q 12 A 8
51c 52 Q 13 A 3 REP 3 64d 6 A 7 ANS
and REP 2 4-5 68d 70d A 9 ANS and R P 2
71b-72c A 12 74c 75b Q 14 A 1 NS and
P 3 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 2 3 76d 77d
A 6 REP 1 80a 81c A 8 ANS 82c 83b A 9
ANS 83b-d A 13 REP 2 3 86d 88c Q 15 A 1
ANS and R P 1 3 91b-92 A 3 REP 4 93b-94
Q 16, A 2 95c 96b A 7 R P 2 99a d Q 7 A 3
ANS 102d 103c Q 8 A 4 R P 2 3 107d 108c
Q 19 A 3 RE 6 110b 111c Q 29 A 1 REP 3
162 163b Q 30 A 1 R P 4 167a 168a A 4
170c 171b Q 34 A 1 R P 3 183b 187b Q 50
A 2 A 5 270a 272a Q 55 A 2 ANS and R P 2
289d 290d A 3 esp REP 1 291a d Q 56, A 2
A 5 and REP 3 292d 294a A 3 ANS 294a-d
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1 3 304c 305b A 7 NS 305c 306b Q 66 A 2
R P 2 345d 347b Q 67 A 3 ANS 351b-352a
Q 74, A 3 REP 3 375a 377 c Q 6 A 3 P 4
391a 393a A 6 REP 2 396a d Q 84 440b-451b
Q 8 2 A 4 453d-455b A 3 REP 1 4 455b-457a
A 5 RE 3 457d-458d Q 88 2 RE 4 471c
472c ART II Q 5 A 6 RE 2 641a 642a
Q 6 A 6 ANS and REP 2 649a 650 Q 8 A 1
ANS and R P 3 655b-656a Q 12 A 3 REP 2 3
670d 671b Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d 689c Q 22
A 2 A 5 and REP 3 721 722c Q 28 A RE 3
740b-741a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III Q 2
A 5 P 2 715a 716b PART II SU L Q 82
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- 23 HANSEN *Leuzhan*, PA I 53 PART II
172a d ART IV 262a d 270a-c
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* A TV SC V { 41}
349d 350a
- 29 CANTOR *Do Qua ote* esp RT I 1a 8c,
18d 22 PART 285a 288c
- 31 DE *Mediat* NS 71d 72a III 83b-
86a V 93a-94a / *Obj cy ns and Replies* 108b-
109d 121 D III IV 130b AXIOM V 131d
132a 157b-158a 212c 213

(7) *The divisions or modes of being 7d. The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind*

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d esp 371c 372c PART II PROP 5-9 374c 376c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XXIX SECT 2 238b-c CH XXXI SECT 2 239b-d CH XXXII SECT 14 18 245c 247a passim BK III CH III SECT 15-19 258b 260a CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 2-3 268c d SECT 8 270b c BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b-d CH IV SECT 6-8 325a-c CH IX SECT 14 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b 357a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1-96 413a 431d esp SECT 1 24 413a 417d SECT 29-44 418c 421a SECT 48-49 422a b SECT 82-84 428d 429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 44 468d 469c esp 469b-c SECT XII DIV 117 123 504a 506a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 24a 33d esp 25c 26a 28a b 31d 32c 85d 93c 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 551a 553c 604a b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 134c d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 158a 160b 188d 189a PART I 219d 220a 236a c 257c d PART IV 354b 364b c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 385b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 11b c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 128a b 142a b 176a 177a 191b-192a 302a 639a 645b esp 640a 644b 645b 659a 660b 851b-852a 865b 866a 868b 879b 886a esp 881a 882a 889a 890a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 597d 598a

7d(1) *The being of the possible*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK I-VI 368c 383a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 3 572a c / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429 18-23] 661c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 4-5 59c 60c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 ANS and REP 3 31d 32c Q 9 A 4 ANS 39c 40d Q 14 A 1 REP 3 76d 77d A 9 REP 1 83b d A 13 REP 2 3 86d 88c Q 18 A 4 REP 3 107d 108c A 4 A 1 REP 1-2 250a 252d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 1 367c d PART II PROP 8 375c 376a
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 85d 88a 95a d 97a b 176d 177a 179c 180c / *Judgement* 550a 578a esp 550c d 552c d 555a b 564a 565b 568a c 569a 570c 575b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 156d 157b 178a 179d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 233b [fn 1] 301b 302a

7d(2) *The being of ideas universals rights*

- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 87d 89a 113c 114a c / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228d 230c 231b-232b

- 240b 246c esp 242c 244b / *Republic* BK VI 368c 388a BK IX-V 426d-429c / *Timaeus* 447a d 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 486c-491a esp 489a-c / *Sophist* 567b 510a 574c / *Phaedrus* 610d 613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [17 5-9] 105d 106a CH 22 [83 23 33] 113c d CH 24 [85^a 31-33] 116c [85^b 1, 2] 117a / *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113 24 33] 158d BK VI CH 8 [147 5 11] 201a / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 22 [178^b 37 1, 9 10] 246c / *Physics* BK II CH 2 [193^a 31 194^a 6] 270b BK III CH 4 [23^a 4 9] 280d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 9 508c 511c BK III CH I [99^a 13 15] 514a [99^b 27-99^c 10] 514b CH 2 [99^d 34 13] 516a b [99^e 8-13] 516d CH 4 [99^f 24 100^a 4] 518c d [100^a 4 25] 519d 520c CH 6 [100^b 11-31] 521b d [100^c 5 1,] 521d 522c BK VII CH 8 [103^a 19-104^a 9] 556d 557a CH 10 [103^b 8 32] 559b CH 13 16 562a 563a BK VIII CH 6 569d 570d BK IX CH 8 [105^a 35 105^b 2] 576d 577a BK X CH 2 [105^c 9-23] 580b CH 10 586c d BK XI CH I [105^d 31 10] 587b-c CH I [105^e 21] CH 2 [106^a 27] 587d 588b CH 2 [106^b 36-30] 588c 589a BK XII CH I [106^c 2, 37] 598b CH 3 [106^d 4] CH 5 [107^a 2] 599b 601a BK XIII CH I [106^e 17, 33] 607a b CH 4-5 610a 611d CH 10 618c 619a c / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417^a 17 28] 648b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 341b 342c passim
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 3 58d 59c TR VI CH 3 62b-d / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8 132d 133c / *Fifth Ennead* TR XI CH I 229a TR VII 238a 239b TR IX CH 5-8 248a 250a / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH 5-8 307a 308c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b-c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A 4 REP 1 37c 38c Q 14 PREAMBLE 75c d Q 15 91b-94a A 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 29 A 4 REP 4 163b-164b Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256a 257b A 55 288d 291d A 57 AA 1 2 295a 297a Q 65 A 4 342b-343c Q 76 A 2 REP 4 388c 391a Q 79 A 3 ANS 416a-417a Q 84 AA 1-7 440d-450b Q 85 A 1 ANS and REP 1 451c-453c A 2 ANS and REP 2 453d 455b A 3 REP 1 455b 457a A 8 ANS 460b-461b Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d-464d Q 87 A 1 A 1 465a 466c Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a-471c A 2 ANS 471c 472c A 105 A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 110 A 1 REP 3 564c 565d A 2 ANS 565d 566d Q 115 A 1 ANS 585d 587c A 3 REP 2 588c 589c PART I II Q 29 A 6 ANS 748b-749a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 1 A 5 REP 2 715a 716b Q 4 A 4 ANS and REP 2 733a 734a PART III SUPPL. Q 92 A 1 A 1 1025c 1032b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 55b c 59d PART IV 262a b

3) to 7d(4)

- 3) B COV *idea cement of Law* m g 43d 44c / *Norman Organism*, BK I APH 51 111c BK II VII 2 137b-c AP 1 17 149b-d
- 1 DESCARTES *of the soul* III 84 85a / *Object as a d Repres* 121a-c DEE I IV 130a b XI M 1132a
- 11 SPINOSA *Ela* CT P NY II PROV 37 40 386b-358b
- 15 LOCKE *H man Underst and* BK I CH I 3 CT 15 98d 99 BK II M III 133b-138b *passim* C I XI SECT 8-9 145b-c CH XXI SECT 201a b CH XXX 238a 239b C I XXX 8 72 239b-d CH XXXI 5 CT 6-8 244b-d SECT 14 3 245c 247 BK III CH III SECT II 30 2 A 260a CH V 1 263d 283a *passim* CSP C I CT 31 33 217c 278c SECT 36-37 2 9 b A I CH VI SECT 4-5 324c-d SECT II 12 226b-d CH VI SECT 4 331d 332b CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b-57a
- 35 DE KEELE *Human Knowledge* IV THO ECT 12 6 408a-409d SECT 2 4 413b-414a ECT 48-49 422 b CT 86-91 429c-431
- 35 LI MA *Hu man Understand g* a CT XXI 1 1 2 505 d
- 42 HA T *Pu e Reason* 93c 99 112d 209d CSP 112d 120c 121a 128b 129c 145c 173b-190a 227b / *Fund Prin Metaphy* c f V rals 281c 282d / *Science of Right* 404d-408b 416b-417b / *J dgment* 461a-c 489b-c 504d 505 528d 530c 542b-544c 551a 552c 5 02c
- 46 HAC L *Philosophy of Right* P 2F 6a 7 TX par 2 9a PART 3 par 66-67 29 c par 71 31b-c AT II par 84 64b par 230 94d 95a D 171 M 2 115d / *Philosophy f History* I 80 156d 190b CSP 156d 157b 158a 160b 165a b P AT I 364b
- 53 J M *Po hol gy* 113a 115a CSP 113b-114a 178a b 300a 313a *passim* CSP 300a 301 304b 307 b 309 311a 641b-643a *passim* E 9 b 865b 881b-882a
- 7d(3) The be g of mathem tical objects
- 7 PLATO *Phaedo* 218b-229d / *Rep* *blue* BK VI 387b-c BK 392a 394c 395c 397a / *Ti met* I 535b-c 541b d / *S phist* 562c-d / *Phaed* 636b-c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Poetor* I 41c-41c BK I CH 3 / 96-1 / 108c CH 18 [51 40-5] 111b-c / *Top* I 7 C 6 [143] 33] 197b-c / *Physic* I 1 [193] 3 94 / 1270a-c K H 4 [2 3-9] 2 0d c 5 [204 8-31] 282a b BK I H 1 [08 9-24] 287b-c CH I [2 95-8] 299b CH 24 [223] 29] 303a / *Al taphysic* I 5 [985-22-986-21] 503d 504b BK 6 [987 34] 505c 506a 18 [989-29-990-32] 508a 9 [99 9-992-18] 509d 511 K III C I [995] 3 8] 514a [996-3-5] 514c 12 [997-2-998 19] 516b-d CH 5 [001-26] CH 6 [100 3] 520c 521 K III CH 2 [10 5 28-28] 551 b c 0 [035-32 03b 2] 559b-c CH II [1 3] 32 3-4] 560b-c K III CH 2 [060-36-29] 582c d CH 3 [1061 29 4]

- 589c BK III C I 1 [1 69 30-37] 598b C I 10 [1075-5 10 6] 6106c d BK III CH I 607a 610a CH 6-9 611d-618c BK XIV 619b d-626d / *Soul* BK III CH 7 [431-43 19] 604b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethic* BK I CH 6 [109 17 19] 341b BK I CH 8 [142 16-19] 391b
- 11 N COMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a 812a 813d 814b
- 17 PLOTINUS *S ith Ennead* TA II 310d 321b
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Al taphysic* BK I C 9 [990g-9-17] 508d K XIV CH I [038 15 4] 620b-d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethic* K I CH 6 [1096-18 22] 341b-c
- 17 PLOTINUS *S ith Ennead* TA CH 6-9 254d 257a
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- 20 AQUINAS *S mma Theologica* AT II Q 2 A 7 REP 2 718b-d
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XX SECT 2 238b c CH XXII SECT 2 239b d CH XXVII SECT 14 18 245c 247a passim BK III CH III SECT 15 19 258b 260a CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT -3 268c d SECT 8 270b c BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b-d CH IV SECT 6-8 325a c CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b 357a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1-96 413a 431d esp SECT 1-24 413a 417d SECT 9 44 418c 421a SECT 48-49 422a b SECT 82-84 428d-429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 44 468d 469c esp 469b-c SECT VII DIV 117-123 504a 506a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 24a 33d esp 25c 26a 28a b 31d 32c 85d 93c 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 551a 553c 604a b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 134c d
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 3 572a c / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429 18-23] 661c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 4-5 59c 60c
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 3 SCHOL 1 367c d PART II PROP 8 375c 376a
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 85d 88a 95a d 97a b 176d 177a 179c 180c / *Judgement* 350a 378a esp 550c d 552c 555a b 564a 565b 568a c 569a 570c 575b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 156d 157b 178a 179d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 233b [in i] 301b 302a

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77^a-91^a] 105d 106a CH II 2 [83 23 35] 113c d CH 24 [85 31-33] 116c [83^b 1 22] 117a / *Topic* BK II CH 7 [113 24 33] 158d BK IV CH 8 [147^a 5-11] 201a / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [178^b 37 179 10] 246c / *Physics* BK II CH 2 [193^b 31-194^a] 270b BK III CH 4 [104^a 9] 280d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b-506b CH 9 508c 511c BK III CH 1 [99^a 13 101^a] 100^a [99^a 27-99b 10] 514b c CH 2 [99^a 34 12] 516a b [99b 0-13] 516d CH 4 [99^a 24 100^a] 518c d [100^a 4 25] 519d 520c CH 6 [100^a 11-31] 521b d [100^a 3 1 1] 521d 522a c BK VII CH 8 [1033^b 19-1044 8] 556d 557b CH 10 [1035^b 28 32] 559b CH 13 16 562a 565a BK VIII CH 6 569d 570d BK IX CH 8 [1040^a 35 1041 2] 576d 577a BK X CH 2 [1053^a 9-31] 580b c CH 10 586c d BK XI CH 1 [1059 34 1060^a] 587b c CH 1 [1059^a 21]-CH 2 [1060^a 21] 588b CH 2 [1060 36-30] 588c 589a BK XII CH 1 [1069 27 37] 598b CH 3 [1070^a 1]-CH 5 [1071^b 1] 599b 601a BK XIII CH 1 [1076 1 33] 607a b CH 4-7 610a 611d CH 10 618c 619c / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417^b 17 28] 648b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 341b 342c passim
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 3 58d 59c TR VI CH 3 62b d / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8 132d 133c / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 1 227a TR VII 238a 239b TR IX CH 5 8 248a 250a / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH 5-8 307a 308c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A 4 REI 1 37c 38c Q 14 PREA 18b 75c d Q 15 91b 94a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 14 A 4 107d 108c Q 29 A 7 REP 4 163b-164b Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256b 257b Q 55 288d 291d Q 57 A 1 2 295a 297a Q 65 A 4 342b 343c Q 6 A 2 REP 4 388c 391a Q 79 A 3 ANS 416a-417a Q 84 A 1 7 440d-450b Q 85 A 1 ANS AND REP 1 451c 453c A 2 ANS AND REP 2 453d 455b A 3 REP 1 4 455b 457a A 8 ANS 460b 461b Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d 464d Q 8, A 1 A 1 465a 466c Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a-471c A 2 ANS 471c-472c Q 103 A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 110 A 1 REP 3 564c 565d A 2 ANS 565d 566d Q 115 A 1 ANS 585d 587c A 3 REP 2 588c 589c PART II Q 29 A 6 ANS 745b-749a
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- 13 A. COME *City of God* bk i par 2 50b-c / *City of God*, bk ii, ch 328c d / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii, ch 328c d

- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART 1 Q 5 A 2 ANS 24b-25a Q 12 A 1 50c 51c AA 3 4 51c 54c Q 16 AA 2 3 95c 96d Q 6, A 2, ANS 150c 151 Q 34 A 1 REP 2 185b-187b Q 50 A 1 A 2 205d REP 2 270a 272a Q 54 A 2 285d 286c Q 3 A 1 A 2 407b-409a Q 79, AA 1 10 423d-424d passim Q 84 AA 1 2 440d-443c AA 6-, 447c-450b Q 89, A 1 451c-453c 5 REP 3 457d-458d Q 56 A 1 461c-462a A 3 463b-d, q 88 468d-473a Q 89 A 4 476c-47 A Q 10, A 3 255 5-40c 541b PART 11 Q 2, A 8 ANS 678d-679c Q 1 A 1 REP 3 662d-663d
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- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51c 53b / *Meditations* 11, 81b-d
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- 42 K. T. POPE *Reason*, 33a 108a-c esp 39a-c, 41 93c / *Found. Pm.* 452a-f 4 510a 281 282d 282a 287d / *Judgment* 465a-c
- 46 H. T. POPE *Re 10* 34a 72c esp 34a-c 39 343 120d 111a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160d 161c

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- 7 PLATO *Nero* 174a 1 9b passim / *Emipiro* 196a b / *Gorgias* 152d 253b / *Republic* 384 386c esp 385b-c / *Theaetetus* 514b-515c 54 549c / *Sophist* 521a 552c / *Lysis* 21 763c-d / *Socratic Letter* 809a-810b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 5 [2 19-4] 6b-8a / *Prior Analytics* bk 1 ch 113b-115b ch 33 [96^a 7 121d 122a, 2 ch 3 10 123c 128d ch 13 131b-133c / *Topica* bk 1 ch 4 [1 23] 141b-c ch 5 [1 31 3 31] 144d ch 8 [3 1 146d ch 18 [105 13 39] 152d [105 9-32] 153a-c 2 ch 2 [1 3 24-34] 192a 2 ch 7, ch 4 207c ch 19-c 211a c passim / *Physics* bk 1 ch 3 [154^a 4 34] 261c 262a bk 2 ch 2 [193^a 30-9] 269c 270a 112 [94 11 4] 270c / *Metaphysics* bk 1 ch 13 493d-494d / *Metaphysics* bk 1 ch 3 [98^a 24-29] 501c ch 5 [98^a 19-2] 503b ch 6 [95^a 35-5] 505c [95^a 30-33] 506a 2 ch 2 [99^a 6-2] 512a b 2 ch 2 [99^a 1 21] 515a b 2 ch 1 ch 4 [100^a 29-5] 525c-d [100^a 20-10] 526c 527 2 ch 2 [101^a 7 5] 533b 2 ch 2 [102^a 25-1 26^a] 547d 548a 2 ch 2 ch 1 [102^a 31 3] 550d ch 4-6 537b-532a ch 6-7 528a 566a-c 2 ch 2 ch 3 566d 568d ch 6 569d 5 6d 2 ch 7 [106^a 19-25] 592 2 ch 2 ch 7 [107^a 37 107^a 2] 600c 2 ch 2 ch 1 [108^a 609a ch 4 [1 5 8-3] 610b-c / *Soul*, 2 ch 1 631a 632d 2 ch 2 [112 24] 642a-d 2 ch 2 ch 6 [4 26-11] 663b-c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* bk 1 ch 1 [64 14 3] 163d 164a ch 2 3 165d 167d

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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 157b 161a esp 158b 159b 458a 459b 855b 873a b 879b-886a esp 884b-885a 889a 890a

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- 7 PLATO *Sophist* 561d 564b 571d 574c esp 573a 574c

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [990^b 9 15] 508d BK IV CH 2 [1004 9-15] 523a BK V CH 7 [1017 18] 537d [1017 31-34] 538a BK VII CH 4 [1030 24-27] 553a CH 7 [1032^b 1-6] 555b c BK IX CH 3 [1047 30-32] 572c BK XII CH 1 [1069 18-41] 598a

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 24 [1402 3-6] 651b c

- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722-748] 53d 54a

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III PAR 12 16b / *City of God* BK XI CH 22 333d 334c BK XII CH 7 340c d

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 7 458 68d 70d Q 34 A 3 REF 5 188b 189a Q 48 A 2 esp REF 2 260c 261b Q 51 A 2 AMS 276b 277a PART I-II Q 8 A 1 REF 3 655b 656a

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 50d 53c 57b-c PART IV 262a d

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- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 397b 398a esp 598a

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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124d 127a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228a 232a / *Republic* BK V 370d 373c BK VI 383d 388a BK VII 396d 398c / *Timaeus* 447a d 450b e 455c 458a esp 457c 458a / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Sophist* 567a 568c / *State man* 595b c / *Philebus* 634b 635b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 4 [187 27^b] 262b e / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 29 [1024^b 22-27] 546c d

- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [308-332] 19a b

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR VI CH 1 60c 61b / *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 1 2 281a 282a

- 11 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II PAR 10 11a b BK III PAR 10 15b d BK VII PAR 23 50b-c BK X PAR 13 74c d PAR 16-19 75b-76b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654b-c

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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 372a c

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VII 133b 138b passim esp SECT 7 10 134b d, SECT 15-20 135c 136c CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 211d 212a SECT 31 212c d CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b BK III CH III SECT 15-18 258b 259c CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 9 270d 271a BK IV CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 15 17 417d-418b SECT 86-91 429c-431a passim SECT 101-102 432c 433a SECT 135 442 444a 441c SECT 148 442b d

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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 19a 19d 20c 27b 33d 53b 59b esp 58a b 86c 88c 91c 99a 101b 108a e 112b d 113c 115a 153a-c 164a 165c 172c 173a 227a 228b / *Practical Reason* 292a c 307d 314d 319c 321b 328a 329a 331a 337c 340a 342d esp 340c 341c 348b 353d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383c d / *Science of Right* 416b-417b / *Judgment* 465a c 474b 475d 500c d 501d 502a 506b 507a 510b c 530a 541a 542a 543a 543c 544c 551a 552c 558d 560c 564a c 5 0b 572b esp 571c 572a 574b-577a 579a 581a b 584c d 587d 588a 594d [fn 1] 599d 600d 603a b 604a b 606d 607c 611c 613a c

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I PAR 133-135 34d 35a ADDITIONS 52-53 124d 125a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART II 270d 271c PART IV 349b 350a

- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 120a 121a 385b

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 168b c

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 185a e 234a b 503a b 569b 570a 606b 608b esp 608a b 648a

- 54 FREUD *Unconscious* 430b e

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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126b d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 231b 232a / *Republic* c BK III 333b 334b e v 368c 373c BK VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 450b c 453b 454a 455c-458b esp 457b 458a / *Theaetetus* 517b 536b / *Sophist* 565a 569a esp 568a 569a / *Philebus* 610d-613a

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- 35 HUMPHREY *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 2 461a d
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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126b d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 231b 232a / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b // V 368c 373c BK VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 450b c 453b 454a 455c 458b esp 457b 458a / *Theaetetus* 517b 536b / *Sophist* 565a 569a esp 568a 569a / *Philebus* 610d-613a
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 4 355b PROP 8 SCHOL 2 357b d PROP 10 358a b PART II DEF 2 373b PROP 37 386b c PART III PROP 4 398d
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXIII SECT 1-16 204a 209a esp SECT 6 205b c SECT 14 208b e SECT 29-32 211d 212d CH XXXI SECT 3 240a b SECT 6-13 240d 243b CH XXXII SECT 18 246c 247a SECT 24 247c d BK III CH III SECT 12-20 257b 260a CH IV SECT 3 260b CH V SECT 14 267b c CH VI 268b 283a CH IX SECT 11-17 287d 290a CH X SECT 17-21 295d 297b CH XI SECT 15 3 303b 305b BK IV CH IV SECT 11-17 326b 328d CH VI SECT 4 16331d 336d CH VII SECT 7 1636b 362c passim esp SECT 9 360d 361b
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- 8f Judgments and demonstrations of existence: their sources and validity
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Chapter 8 CAUSE

INTRODUCTION

EXPLANATION is an ineluctable human tendency. Even philosophers who think that we cannot attain to knowledge of causes get in a lull in explaining why that is so, or will their disputes about the theory of causes to remove the word "because" from the vocabulary of common speech. It is as unavoidable as the word is. "The impulse to seek causes," says Tolsen, "is innate in the soul of man."

The question "Why?" remains after all other questions are answered. It is sometimes the only unanswerable question—unanswerable either in the very nature of the case or because there are restrictions men cannot surmount. Sometimes, as Dante says, man must be content with the *quid* "the knowledge that something is without knowing why." "Why?" is the one question which it has been deemed the better part of wisdom not to ask, yet it has also been thought the one question which holds the key to wisdom. As Virgil writes, in one of his most famous lines, *Felix qui potius rerum cognoscere causas* (Happy the man who has been able to know the causes of things).

The question "Why?" takes many forms and can be answered in many ways. Other knowledge may prove useful in providing the answers. A definition, for example, which tells us what a thing is, may explain why it behaves as it does or why it has certain properties. A narrative, which tells us how something happened by describing a succession of events, may also be part of the social explanation of some event in question.

In other circumstances, a demonstration or a statement of grounds or reasons may be explanatory. How do you know? is often a concealed form of the "Why?" question. To answer it we may have to give our reasons for thinking that something or other is the case or perhaps

give the genesis of our opinion. Things as different as a logical demonstration and a piece of autobiography seem to be relevant in accounting for our convictions as in accounting for our behavior; we may refer to our purposes and to our past.

THE GREEK word for cause, from which our English word "aetiology" is derived, came into the vocabulary of science and philosophy from the language of the law courts. In its legal sense it was used to point out where the responsibility lay. A suit at law is based upon a cause of action, he who demands redress for an injury suffered is expected to place the blame. The charge of responsibility for wrongdoing—the blame or fault which is the cause for legal redress or punishment—naturally calls for excuses, which may include a man's motives.

In the context of these legal considerations, two different meanings of cause begin to appear. One man's act is the cause of injury to another in the sense of being responsible for its occurrence. If the act was intentional it probably had a cause in the purpose which motivated it.

These two types of cause appear in the explanations of the historians as well as in trials at law. Herodotus and Thucydides, trying to account for the Persian or the Peloponnesian war, enumerate the incidents which led up to the outbreak of hostilities. They cite certain past events as the causes of war—the factors which predisposed the parties toward conflict and even precipitated it. The historians do not think they can fully explain why the particular events become the occasions for war except by considering the hopes and ambitions, or as Thucydides suggests, the fears of the contestants. For the ancient historians at least finding the causes includes a search for the motives

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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 — *Being and Some Philosophers*

The attack on final causes does not at the beginning at least, reject them completely. Bacon, for example, divides natural philosophy into two parts, of which one part physics inquires and handleth the material and efficient causes and the other which is metaphysics, handleth the formal and final causes. The error of his predecessors, of which he complains, is their failure to separate these two types of inquiry. The study of final causes is inappropriate in physics, he thinks.

"Thus misplaced," Bacon comments, hath caused a deficiency or at least a great imperfection in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. On this score he charges Plato, Aristotle, and Galen with impeding the development of science, not because final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired being kept within their own province but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a ratiocination and solitude in that tract.

Such statements as "the hairs of the eyelids are for a quagget and fence about the sight," or that the leaves of trees are for protection of the fruit or that the clouds are for watering of the earth are in Bacon's opinion "imperfect" in physics. He therefore praises the mechanical philosophy of Democritus. It seems to him to inquire into the particulars of physical causes better than that of Aristotle and Plato, whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology the other as a part of logic.

As Bacon's criticisms indicate the attack on final causes in nature raises a whole series of questions. Does every natural change serve some purpose, either for the good of the change, or for the order of nature itself? Is there a plan, analogous to that of an artist which orders the parts of nature, and their action one another as means to ends? A natural teleology which attributes final causes to everything, seems to imply that every natural thing is governed by an indwelling form working toward a definite end, and that the

whole of nature exhibits the working out of a divine plan or design.

Spinoza answers such questions negatively. "Nature has set no end before herself," he declares and all final causes are nothing but human fictions. Furthermore he insists, "this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause is considered as the effect, and vice versa." He deplores those who will not cease from asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly to the will of God the refuge of ignorance.

Spinoza denies that God acts for an end and that the universe expresses a divine purpose. He also thinks that final causes are illusory even in the sphere of human action. When we say that having a house to live in was the final cause of this or that house, "we do no more than indicate a particular desire which is really an efficient cause, and is considered as primary because men are usually ignorant of the causes of their desires."

Though Descartes replies to Pierre Gassendi's arguments on behalf of final causality by saying that they should be referred to the efficient cause, his position more closely resembles that of Bacon than of Spinoza. When we behold the uses of the various parts in plants and animals, we may be led to admire "the God who brings these into existence but that does not imply," he adds, "that we can divine the purpose for which He made each thing. And although in Ethics where it is often allowable to employ conjecture it is at times pious to consider the end which we may conjecture God set before Himself in ruling the universe certainly in Physics, where every thing should rest upon the securest arguments it is futile to do so."

The elimination of final causes from natural science leads Descartes to formulate Harvey's discoveries concerning the motion of the heart and blood in purely mechanical terms. But Harvey himself as Boyle points out in his *Question About the Final Causes of Natural Things* interprets organic structures in terms of their functional utility and Boyle defends the soundness of Harvey's method—employing final causes—against Descartes.

Guided as it is by the principle of utility or function, Harvey's reasoning about the circula-

which underlie other causes and help to explain how other factors get their causal efficacy

Thucydides explicitly distinguishes these two kinds of causes in the first chapter of his history. After noting that the immediate cause of the war was the breaking of a treaty he adds that the real cause was one which was formally most kept out of sight—namely the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon.

It is sometimes supposed that Thucydides owes his conception of causes to the early medical tradition. That might very well be the case for Hippocrates constantly seeks the natural causes of disease and in his analysis of the various factors involved in any particular disease he tries to distinguish between the predisposing and the exciting causes.

But the classification of causes was not completed in the Athenian law courts, in the Greek interpretation of history or in the early practice of medicine. Causes were also the preoccupation of the pre-Socratic physicists. Their study of nature was largely devoted to an analysis of the principles, elements and causes of change. Concerned with the problem of change in general, not merely with human action or particular phenomena such as crime, war or disease, Greek scientists or philosophers from Thales and Anaxagoras to Empedocles, Democritus, Plato and Aristotle tried to discover the causes involved in any change. Aristotle carried the analysis furthest and set a pattern for all later discussions of cause.

THE EXPLANATION OF a thing according to Aristotle must answer all of the queries comprehended under the question *why*. This question can be answered, he thinks, in at least four different ways, and these four ways of saying *why* something is the case constitute his famous theory of the four causes.

In one sense he writes that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists is called cause—the material cause. In another sense the form or the archetype is a cause—the formal cause. Again the primary source of the change or coming to rest is a cause—the efficient cause. Again the end or that for the sake of which a thing is done is a cause—the final cause. This, he concludes, perhaps ex-

hausts the number of ways in which the term cause is used.

The production of works of art to which Aristotle himself frequently turns for examples, most readily illustrates these four different kinds of causes. In making a shoe the material cause is that out of which the shoe is made—the leather or hide. The efficient cause is the shoemaker or more precisely the shoemaker's act which transforms the raw material into the finished product. The formal cause is the pattern which directs the work. It is, in a sense, the definition or type of the thing to be made which, beginning as a plan in the artist's mind, appears at the end of the work in the transformed material as its own intrinsic form. The protection of the foot is the final cause or end—that for the sake of which the shoe was made.

Two of the four causes seem to be less discernible in nature than in art. The material and efficient causes remain evident enough. The material cause can usually be identified as that which undergoes the change—the thing which grows, alters in color or moves from place to place. The efficient cause is always that by which the change is produced. It is the moving cause working on that which is susceptible to change, e.g. the fire heating the water, the rolling stone setting another stone in motion.

But the formal cause is not as apparent in nature as in art. Whereas in art it can be identified by reference to the plan in the maker's mind, it must be discovered in nature in the change itself as that which completes the process. For example, the redness which the apple takes on in ripening is the formal cause of its alteration in color. The trouble with the final cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable from the formal cause, for unless some extraneous purpose can be found for a natural change—some end beyond itself which the change serves—the final cause or that for the sake of which the change took place is no other than the quality or form which the matter assumes as a result of its transformation.

THIS SUMMARY OF Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes enables us to note some of the basic issues and shifts in the theory of causation.

reason of which is that matter does not receive form, so far as it is moved by an agent for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except from the intention of an end. Hence in operation the order of the four causes is final, efficient, material, and formal: or as Aquinas states it *first comes goodness and the end moving the agent to act; secondly the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly comes the form.*

THE THEORY of causes, as developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, proposes other distinctions beyond that of the four causes, such as the difference between the essential cause or the cause *per se* and the accidental or coincidental cause. As indicated in the chapter on CHANCE, it is in terms of coincidental causes that Aristotle speaks of chance as a cause.

A given effect may be the result of a number of efficient causes. Sometimes these form a series, as when one body in motion sets another in motion and that moves a third or to take another example, a man is the cause of his grandson only through his sons, he, often a son who later begets a son. In such a succession of causes, the first cause may be indispensable, but it is not by itself sufficient to produce the effect. With respect to the effect which it fails to produce unless other causes intervene, it is an accidental cause. In contrast, an essential cause is one which, by its operation, immediately brings the effect into existence.

Sometimes, however, a number of efficient causes may be involved simultaneously rather than successively in the production of a single effect. They may be related to one another as cause and effect rather than by mere coincidence. One cause may be the essential cause of another which in turn is the essential cause of the effect. When two causes are thus simultaneously related to the same effect, Aquinas calls one the principal, the other the instrumental cause, and he gives as an example the action of a workman sawing wood. The action of the saw causes a shaping of the wood, but it is instrumental to the operation of the principal cause, which is the action of the workman using the

and instrumental causes—become of great significance in arguments, metaphysical or theological, concerning the cause of causes—a first or ultimate cause. Aristotle's proof of a prime mover for example depends upon the proposition that there cannot be an infinite number of causes for a given effect. But since Aristotle also holds that the world is without beginning or end and that time is infinite, it may be wondered why the chain of causes cannot stretch back to infinity.

If time is infinite, a temporal sequence of causes reaching back to infinity would seem to present no difficulty. As Descartes points out, you cannot prove that that regress to infinity is absurd, unless you at the same time show that the world has a definite beginning in time. Though it is a matter of their Jewish and Christian faith that the world had a beginning in time, theologians like Maimonides and Aquinas do not think the world's beginning can be proved by reason. They do however think that the necessity of a first cause can be demonstrated and both adopt or perhaps adapt the argument of Aristotle which relies on the impossibility of an infinite regression in causes.

The argument is valid, Aquinas makes clear only if we distinguish between essential and accidental causes. It is not impossible, he says, to proceed to infinity *accidentally* as regards efficient causes. It is not impossible for man to be generated by man to infinity. But he holds there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are *per se* required for a certain effect, for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. In the latter case it should be observed the cooperating causes are simultaneous and so if there were an infinity of them that would not require an infinite time. The crux of the argument, therefore, lies either in the impossibility of an infinite number of simultaneous causes or in the impossibility of an infinite number of causes related to one another as instrumental to principal cause.

Among causes so related Descartes like Aquinas, argues that there must be one first or principal cause. In the case of causes which are so connected and subordinated to one another that no action on the part of the lower is possible without the activity of the higher, e.g. in

These two distinctions—between essential and accidental causes and between principal

tion of the blood—especially its venal and arterial flow in relation to the action of the lungs—appeals to final causes. He remarks upon the need of arguing from the final cause in his work on 'animal generation'. It appears advisable to me, he writes, to look back from the perfect animal and to inquire by what process it has arisen and grown to maturity, to retrace our steps as it were from the goal to the starting place.

Kant generalizes this type of argument in his *Critique of Teleological Judgement*. 'No one has ever questioned', he says, 'the correctness of the principle that when judging certain things in nature—namely organisms and their possibility—we must look to the conception of final causes. Such a principle is admittedly necessary even where we require no more than a *guiding thread* for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the character of these things by means of observation. Kant criticizes a mechanism which totally excludes the principle of finality—whether it is based on the doctrine of blind chance of Democritus and Epicurus or the system of fatality he attributes to Spinoza. Physical science, he thinks, can be extended by the principle of final causes without interfering with the principle of the mechanism of physical causality.

THE TENDENCY to dispense with final causes seems to prevail, however, in the science of mechanics and especially in the domain of inanimate nature. Huygens, for example, defines light as 'the motion of some sort of matter'. He explicitly insists that conceiving natural things in this way is the only way proper to what he calls the 'true Philosophy' in which one conceives the causes of all natural effects in terms of mechanical motions.

Mechanical explanation is distinguished by the fact that it appeals to no principles except matter and motion. The material and the moving (or efficient) causes suffice. The philosophical thought of the 17th century, influenced by that century's brilliant accomplishments in mechanics, tends to be mechanistic in its theory of causation. Yet being also influenced by the model and method of mathematics, thinkers like Descartes and Spinoza retain the formal cause as a principle of demonstration, if not of

explanation. Spinoza in fact claims that the reliance upon final causes would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics—which does not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth.

Nevertheless, the tendency to restrict causality to efficiency—a motion producing a motion—gains headway. By the time Hume questions man's ability to know causes, the term *cause* signifies only *efficiency* understood as the energy expended in producing an effect. Hume's doubt concerning our ability to know causes presupposes this conception of cause and effect, which asserts that there is some connection between them, some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other. The identification of cause with the efficient type of cause becomes a commonly accepted notion even among those who do not agree with Hume that we are ignorant of the manner in which bodies operate on each other and that their force and energy is entirely incomprehensible to us.

The narrowing of causality to efficiency also appears in the doctrine more prevalent today than ever before that natural science describes, but does not explain—that it tells us *how* things happen but not *why*. If it does not require the scientist to avoid all reference to causes, it does limit him to the one type of causality which can be expressed in terms of sequences and correlations. The exclusion of all causes except the efficient tends furthermore to reduce the causal order to nothing but the relation of cause and effect.

The four causes taken together as the sufficient reason for things or events do not as such stand in relation to an effect in the sense in which an effect is something separable from and externally related to its cause. That way of conceiving causation—as a relation of cause to effect—is appropriate to the efficient cause alone. When the efficient cause is regarded as the only cause having a power proportionate to the reality of its effect, the very meaning of *cause* involves relation to an effect.

In the other conception of causation, the causal order relates the four causes to one another. Of the four causes of any change or act, the first says Aquinas, is the final cause, the

the regular processes of nature still another and of divine causation is presupposed by the religious belief in supernatural events, such as the elevation of nature by grace and the deviations from the course of nature which are called miracles. All these considerations, and especially the matter of God's miraculous intervention in the regular course of nature, have been subjects of dispute among theologians and philosophers (and sometime physicists and historians). Some of these who do not deny the existence of a Creator or the divine government of the universe through natural law nevertheless question the need for divine cooperation with the action of every natural cause, or God's intervention in the order of nature.

Throughout these controversies the theory of causes defines the issues and determines the lines of opposing argument. But since other basic notions are also involved in the debate of these issues, the further consideration of them is reserved for other chapters, especially *GOD, NATURE, AND WORLD*.

THE DISCUSSION OF CAUSE takes a new turn in modern times. The new issues arise not from different interpretations of the principle of causality, but from the skeptic's doubts concerning our ability to know the causes of things, and from the tendency of the physical sciences to limit or even to abandon the investigation of causes.

According to the ancient conception of science, knowledge to be scientific must state the causes of things. The essence of scientific method according to the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle, consists in using causes both to define and to demonstrate. Sometimes genus and differentia are translated into material and formal cause; sometimes a thing is defined genetically by reference to its efficient cause, and sometimes teleologically by reference to its final cause.

The degree to which this conception of science is realized in particular fields may be questioned. The treatises of the astronomers, for example, do not seem to exemplify it as much as do Aristotle's own physical treatises or Harvey's work on the circulation of the blood. Yet until modern developments in mathematical physics, the ascertainment of causes seems to be the dominant conception of the scientific task

and until the separation widens between the experimental and the philosophical sciences, the possibility of knowing causes is not generally doubted.

Galileo's exposition of the new mechanics explicitly announces a departure from the traditional interest of the natural philosopher in the discovery of causes. The aim, he says, in his *Two New Sciences* is not to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion concerning which various opinions have been expressed by various philosophers, but rather to investigate and to demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion. The various opinions about causes are referred to as fantasies which it is not really worth while for the scientist to examine.

This attitude toward causes especially efficient causes characterizes the aim of mathematical physics both in astronomy and mechanics. For Newton it is enough—in fact, he says, it would be a very great step in philosophy—to derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena, though the causes of those principles were not yet discovered. And therefore I scruple not to propose the principles of motion and leave their causes to be found out. In other passages Newton disparages the search for hidden or occult causes as no part of the business of science.

Hume goes further. He insists that all causes are hidden. By the very nature of what causes are supposed to be and because of the manner in which the human mind knows, man can have no knowledge of how causes really produce their effects. We never can by our utmost scrutiny, he says, discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates or any connexion between it and its supposed effect.

All that men can be referring to when they use the words cause and effect, Hume thinks, is the customary sequence of one object followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. So far as any knowledge based upon reason or experience can go, the relation of cause and effect is simply one of succession, impressed upon the mind by a

the case where something is moved by a stone itself impelled by a stick which the hand moves

we must go on until we come to one thing in motion which first moves. But for Descartes until Aquinas this method of proving God as the first cause of all observable effects has less elegance than the so-called ontological argument in which the conception of God as a necessary being incapable of not existing immediately implies his existence.

The argument from effect to cause is traditionally called a *posteriori* reasoning in contrast to a *priori* reasoning from cause to effect. According to Aristotle and Aquinas the latter mode of reasoning can only demonstrate the nature of a thing not its existence. Aquinas furthermore does not regard the ontological argument as a form of reasoning at all but rather as the assertion that God's existence is self-evident to us which he denies.

The various forms which these arguments take and the issue concerning their validity are more fully discussed in the chapters on Being, God, and Necessity and Contingency. But here it is worth noting that Kant questions whether the *a posteriori* method of proving God's existence really differs from the ontological argument. It is according to him not only illusory and inadequate but also possesses the additional blemish of an *ignotum elenchus*—professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal but bringing us back after a short circuit to the old path which we had deserted at its call. Hence the causal proof does not in Kant's opinion succeed in avoiding the fallacies which he along with Maimonides and Aquinas finds in the ontological argument.

THE ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION figures critically in the speculation of the theologians concerning creation, providence and the government of the world.

The dogma of creation, for example, requires the conception of a unique type of cause. Even if the world always existed—a supposition which as we have seen is contrary to Jewish and Christian faith but not to reason—the religious belief in a Creator would remain a belief in that unique cause without whose action to preserve its being at every moment the world would cease to be.

On the assumption that God created the world in the beginning it is perhaps easy enough to see with Augustine how the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures differs from all other types of causation which cause motions or changes or even the generation of things rather than their very existence. It may however be more difficult to understand the creative action of God in relation to a world already in existence.

But a theologian like Aquinas explains that as long as a thing has being so long must God be present to it as the cause of its being—a doctrine which Berkeley later reports by saying that this makes the divine conservation to be a continual creation. Aquinas agrees that the conservation of things by God is not by a new action but by the continuation of that action whereby He gives being. But in the conservation of things Aquinas thinks that God acts through natural or created causes whereas in their initiation being is the proper effect of God alone.

The dogma of divine providence also requires a theory of the cooperation of the first cause with natural or secondary causes. Dante in describing the direction which providence gives to the course of nature uses the image of a bow.

Whatever this bow shoots falls disposed to its foreseen end even as a thing directed to its aim. That God governs and cares for all things may be supposed to reduce nature to a puppet show in which every action takes place in obedience to the divine will alone. Natural causes would thus cease to be causes or to have any genuine efficacy in the production of their own effects.

Some theologians have tended toward this extreme position but Aquinas argues contrariwise that natural causes retain their efficacy as instrumental causes subordinate to God's will as the one principal cause. Since God wills that effects be because of their causes he writes all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God and in another place he says whatever causes He assigns to certain effects He gives them the power to produce those effects. That the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.

In addition to the role of divine causality is

for the theologian, nothing is exempt from God's will. Since the realm of nature includes human nature, must not human acts be caused as are all other natural events? Are some human acts free in the sense of being totally uncaused, or only in the sense of being caused differently from the motions of matter? Are causality and freedom opposed principles within the order of nature, appropriate to physical and psychological action, or do they constitute distinct realms—as for Kant, the realms of phenomena and noumena, the sensible and the supra-sensible or as for Hegel, the realms of nature and history?

The different answers which the great books

give to these questions have profound consequences for man's view of himself, the universe and his place in it. As the issue of necessity and chance is central in physics or the philosophy of nature, so the issue of determinism and freedom is central in psychology and ethics, in political theory and the philosophy of history and above all in theology. It makes opponents of James and Freud of Hegel and Marx of Hume and Kant, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Lucretius and Marcus Aurelius. It raises one of the most perplexing of all theological questions for Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal and for the two great poets of God's will and man's freedom—Dante and Milton.

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customary transition (That one event leads to another becomes more and more probable—but never more than probable—as the sequence recurs more and more frequently in experience)

Hume's skepticism about causes and his re-interpretation of the meaning of cause gains wide acceptance in subsequent thought especially among natural scientists. William James for example considering the principle that nothing can happen without a cause declares that we have no definite idea of what we mean by cause or of what causality consists in. But the principle expresses a demand for some deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena than their merely habitual time sequence seems to be. The word 'cause' is in short an altar to an unknown god, an empty pedestal still marking the place for a hoped-for statue. Any really inward belonging together of the sequent terms he continues if discovered would be accepted as what the word cause was meant to stand for.

Though Hume holds that we cannot penetrate beyond experience to the operation of real causes imbedded in the nature of things he does not deny the reality of causation as a principle of nature. On the contrary he denies that anything happens by chance or that any natural occurrence can be uncaused. It is universally allowed. Hume says with approval

that nothing exists without a cause of its existence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But though there is no such thing as chance in the world our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding and begets a like species of belief or opinion.

In other words Hume's position seems to be that man's ignorance of real causes and the mere probability of his opinions about customary sequences of cause and effect indicate human limitations not limits to causal determination in the order of nature itself. Adversaries of Hume coming before as well as after him in the tradition of the great books take issue with him on both points.

Against Hume's determinism which is no less complete than Spinoza's Aristotle for example, affirms the existence of chance or real

contingency in the happenings of nature. Against Hume's reduction of statements about causes to probable opinion Kant insists that in the metaphysics of nature such judgments can be made with absolute certainty. These related issues are discussed in the chapters on CHANCE, FATE and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY.

In the development of the natural sciences since Hume's day his translation of cause and effect into observed sequences or correlations reinforces the tendency which first appears with Galileo and Newton to describe rather than to explain natural phenomena. Yet to the extent that the findings of science bear fruit in technology man's control over nature seems to confirm Bacon's view of science rather than Hume's—at least to the extent that the application of scientific knowledge to the production of effects implies a knowledge of their causes.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY—that nothing happens without a cause or sufficient reason or as Spinoza puts it nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow—has been made the basis for denials of human freedom as well as of chance or contingency in the order of nature. The problem of man's free will is discussed in the chapters on FATE, LIBERTY and WILL but we can here observe how the problem is stated in terms of cause with respect to both divine providence and natural causation.

If God's will is the cause of every thing which happens if nothing can happen contrary to His will or escape the foresight of His providence then how is man free from God's foreordination when he chooses between good and evil? If as the theologians say the very act of free choice is traced to God as to a cause in what sense can the act be called free? Is it not necessarily determined to conform to God's will and to His plan? But on the other hand if every thing happening from the exercise of free choice must be subject to divine providence must not the evil that men do be attributed to God as cause?

The problem takes another form for the scientist who thinks only in terms of natural causes especially if he affirms a reign of causality in nature from which nothing is exempt—just as

CHAPTER 8 CAUSE:

a to lb

11 A. 17 Pure Reason 15a b 17c d 46d-47c
57c d 58d 59b 63b 67d 68b [fn 1] 76c 83b
92a d 133 140b d 143a 152a 153 164a
171a 187c 189 214b d [fn 1] 225c 226b /
Fnd Prm Met physc of Morals 279b d
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7 PLATO Pha d 240c 245c / Ti meus 447b c
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762b-763b

8 A. 1 TOTLA P ster of An lytes bk I esp 2
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phy cs k c 1 3-0 501c 511d bk II ch 2
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d 1 30 547a d k I ch 2 3 548c 549d
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567d c I 3 [43] 5 241 567d 568b ch 4
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bk II ch 4-5 599d-601a

9 A. 1 TL P ris of Animals bk I ch 1
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mals bk I II [5 1 8] 255a b c I 20
[729] 1-1 c 12 [73 33] 269b 271a pass m
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10 A. 1 S mma Theologica p T I Q 2 A 3
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22b-23b Q 5 2 A 1 24b 25a A 4
25d 26c Q 11 3 A 49a c, Q 13 A 5
nd 1 66b-67d Q 14 8 A 8 d 8
82c 83b A 1 84c 85c A 6 REF 1 90b-
91b Q 19 6 A 113 114d Q 25 2 11
3 144 145b Q 36 A 3, A 194c 195d Q 39,
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A 2 R 7 253 255 Q 48 REF 4 259b-
260c Q 49, 2 264d 265d Q 51 A 1
3 275b-276b Q 5 3 28a 280 d Q 6,
339 343c Q 5 A 5 REF 3 382a 383b Q 82
4, 434c-435 Q 87 A 2, REF 3 466c
467b Q 1 4 534c 538c Q 1 3, A 5 542a
543b T Q A 5 REF 3 618d 619c
Q 1 A 653 654b

10 A. 1 S mma Theologica PART I Q 60
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A 1 nd p 137d 138c Q 6 I 5
nd I 141 c 185 A 1 4 178b-179b
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Q 76 A 1 ANS 939d-941a
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28 G LIBERT Loadq e bk II 36d
28 HAR EY On 1 mal Generation 335d 407c
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31 DESCARTES Med itatons IIS 87c 88c IV
90a b / Objections a d Replies 110c 111d
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161b 212a 213b-c 214c 229c d
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PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk. II (265, 283) 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH I-2 339a d CH 5 340d 341b esp [1096 5 10] 341a b CH 6 [1096⁸ 8-26] 341d 342a CH 7 342c 344a pas sim CH 9 [1099²⁵ 32] 345b BK III CH 3 358a 359a BK VI CH 2 [1139 17-35] 387d 388a CH 5 389a c passim CH 9 [1142¹⁷ 17-33] 391d 392b / *Politics* BK VII CH 13 [1331²⁴ 38] 536b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6-7 602d 607d CH 8 [1366 3-16] 608b c CH 10 [1369 3-27] 612b 613a
- 12 EPICURETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 2 177c 178d CH 10 185d 187a CH 14 189d BK IV CH 4 225a 228a
- 12 AURELIUS *Mediations* BK V SECT 16 271c d BK VI SECT 40-45 277d 278c BK VII SECT 44 282b-c BK VIII SECT 19-20 286d 287a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR IV CH 6 15a II
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 4 266d 267c CH 8 270a d BK XIX CH 1-3 507a 511a CH 13-17 519a 523a CH 20 523d 524a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3-5 625b 626a CH 22 629b 630a CH 31-33 633b 634b CH 35 634c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 25d 26c A 6 ANS 27c 28b Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 19 A 2 REP 2 109c 110b A 3 ANS 110b 111c AA 4-5 111c 113c Q 23 A 7 ANS 138d 140a Q 44 A 4 241a d Q 65 A 2 340b-341b Q 82 AA 1-4 431d-435c Q 83 A 3 ANS 438d 439c A 4 ANS 439c-440b Q 103 A 2 529a 530a PART I-II QQ 1-2 609a 622b Q 3 A 1 ANS 622c 623a Q 4 AA 1-4 629d 632c Q 5 A 6 REP 1 641a 642a Q 6 AA 1-2 644d 646c Q 8 AA 2-3 656a 657c Q 9 A 1 ANS 657d 658d A 3 ANS 659c 660a Q 10 A 2 REP 3 663d 664d Q 11 A 3 667d 668d Q 12 AA 2-4 670b 672a Q 13 A 3 674c 675a Q 14 A 2 678b c Q 15 A 3 682c 683b Q 16 A 3 685b 686a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 54 A 2 REP 3 23d 24c Q 57 A 5 ANS 39a 40a Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a A 4 ANS 223d 224d Q 95 A 3 228c 229b Q 107 A 1 ANS 325c 327b Q 114 A 4 REP 1 373a d PART II CH Q 27 A 6 ANS 524c 525c
- 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* 401a 432a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 53a b 76c d 90a PART III 237d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 330b 332a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 91d 92a
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 44c 45b PART III 50b
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 310a PART IV DEF 7 424b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 93 190b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 52-53 191d 192b SECT 62 194c d
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 235a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253d 254c 256a b

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- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a d 446d-447a 461c 463c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 43 23c d par 61 27b-c PART II par 119 123 43b 45d esp par 122 44a par 140 49b-54a PART III par 182 64a par 191 193 66b c par 34 108b c par 340 110b c, ADDITIONS 38 122c d 76-81 128a 129a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 162a 170c PART II 267a b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a 5b 203a 381b-382a 788a 789a

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- 7 PLATO *Meno* 188b 189a / *Phaedo* 240a 246c / *Gorgias* 260a 262a / *Timaeus* 465d-466a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [71¹⁹ 19-33] 98a b CH 13 107c 108c BK II CH I-2 122b d 123c / *Physics* BK I CH I [184 10-16] 259a BK II CH 3 [194¹⁶ 16-23] 271a b [195²¹ 21-28] 272b CH 7 275b-d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [390¹⁴ 19] 494d / *Metaphysics* BK I 499a 511d esp CH I-2 499a 501c CH 7 506b d CH 10 511c d BK III CH 2 [996 18-26] 514d 515b BK IV CH 2 [1003 33-39] 522b c BK VI CH I [1025¹¹ 18] 547b d BK VII CH 17 [1041 10-11] 565b d BK VIII CH 4 [1044 33 20] 569a b BK XI CH I [1059 17 23] 587a [1059 34-38] 587b CH 7 [1063³⁶ 36-1064³⁹] 592b BK XII CH I 598a-c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH I [646 6-13] 170a / *Gen of Animals* CH I 243a b / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I [715 1 18] 255a b BK II CH 6 [742¹⁷ 17-743 1] 283d 284a BK IV CH I [765 35-36] 306c BK V CH I [778⁷ 7-10] 320d / *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1098 34 2] 343d BK III CH 3 [1112¹⁵ 14] 358c d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1354 1 11] 593a
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 168b-169c CH 4 169a
- 12 IUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK III [1053 1075] 43c d BK V [526-533] 67d 68a
- 13 VIRGIL *Georgics* II [475-493] 65a b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 959a 960a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 2 18d / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH II 348b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 5 REP 2 112d 113c Q 8 A 7 CONTRARY 459c 460b PART I-II Q 3 A 8 ANS 628d 629c

- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II-II-II 1192
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12 MONTAIG *Essays*, 497d-498a
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15 HALEY *Cereuli*, on of the Blood, 316a b 319c
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16 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42-46a
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17 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART 2, 61d 62c /
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40 DEMO. ST 390b
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20 HUTCHESON *Light* CH I 553a b
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25 HALEY *Fund. Prin. Metaphysics f Morals*
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29 HALEY *Psychology* 2a 89b-90a 745b 885b-
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30 FOLMEL *General Introduction* 424b-c
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32 PLATO *Phaedo* 240b-246c / *Timaeus* 455a b
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50 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH I I
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53 ROSSIE *Uniquality* 3-8a-c
54 HALEY *Pure Reason* 46d-47c / *Fund. Prin.*
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55 LA CHIE *Elements of Chemistry* PART I 9b-
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50 MARX *Capital* 10b 11b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 470a c BK XIII 563b EPILOGUE II 675a 696d passim esp 677b-680b 687b 688a 694d 695c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 89b 90a 324b 668a 671a esp 670a b 745b 824b 825a 884b 886a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 454b c 483d 484a

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8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [71^b33-72 6] 98b e BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1-2 499a 501c BK II CH I [993^b19-31] 512a b BK III CH 2 [996 18-^b26] 514d 515b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 4 169a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 7 326a-c CH 29 339a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 5 ANS 66b 67d Q 14 A 8 REP I 82c 83b Q 19 A 5 ANS 112d 113c Q 57 A 2 ANS 295d 297a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 53a b 60a b 63a 78c d 79b 80a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 442c 443c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42a-c 43a c 45a-46a 46c-47c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d 111a APH 99 127b c BK II 137a 195d

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-7 178b 180a CH XXV SECT II-CH XXVI SECT 2 217a d

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 88a 90b passim

5d The limits of our knowledge of causes

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7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 447b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196^b5, 1273a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [982^b28-983^a71] 501a b BK III CH 2 [996 18 ^b26] 514d 515b

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 6 [742^b17-743 1] 283d 284a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [526-533] 67d 68a BK VI [703 711] 89c d

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17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH II 346b c

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34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 371b 372a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 4 178d 179c SECT 70 197a b CH XXIII SECT 28-29 211b 212a BK IV CH III SECT 10-16 315c 317c SECT 28-29 322a 323a CH VI SECT 5 16 332b 336d passim CH XII SECT 12 370b e

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51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 342a 344b BK X 405a b BK XI 469a-470c BK XIII 563a b EPILOGUE I 646c 647b 650b-c

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 90a 822b 885b-886a

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- 8 ARI TOTLE *Poetorum Analytica* BK II, CH II
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- 9 ARI TOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I, CH I
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- 19 HAPPA *Exome* BK IV 846b-84 857b-
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- 20 ARIOT *Summa Theologiae* PART III SUPPL,
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CHAPTER 8 CAUSE

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

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I Works by authors represented in this collection.

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 9 CHANCE

INTRODUCTION

ONE sense in which we use the word chance does not exclude the operation of causes. The chance event in this sense is not uncaused. But within this meaning of chance there is the question of *how* the chance event is caused.

On one view what happens by chance is distinguished from what happens by nature in terms of a difference in manner of causation—the difference between the contingent and the necessary. On another view the chance event does not differ causally from that which happens regularly or uniformly. The difference lies not in the pattern of causes, but in our knowledge of them. The chance event is unpredictable or less predictable because of our ignorance of its causes, not because of any real contingency in the order of nature.

There is still a third sense of chance in which it means that which happens totally without cause—the absolutely spontaneous or fortuitous.

These three meanings of *chance* at once indicate the basic issues in which the concept is involved. The third meaning is the most radical. It stands in opposition to the other two. Their opposition to one another can be considered after we examine the sense in which chance excludes every type of cause.

THE DOCTRINE of absolute fortuitousness is indeterminism in its most extreme form. The familiar phrase "a fortuitous concurrence of atoms" indicates the classical statement of this doctrine and identifies it in the great books with the theory of atomism. It would be more precise to say "with Lucretius' version of that theory" because it is with regard to chance that he departs from the teachings of Democritus and Epicurus, and adds an hypothesis of his own.

The swerve of the atoms, according to Lucretius, accounts for the origin of the world, the motions of nature, and the free will of man. But nothing accounts for the swerve of the atoms. It is uncaused spontaneous, fortuitous.

When the atoms are being carried downward straight through the void by their own weight they push a little from their path at times quite undetermined and at undetermined places, yet only just so much as you would call a change of trend. If they did not swerve all things would fall downward through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be: nor blows be brought to pass among the atoms: thus nature would never have brought anything to being.

Since the atoms differ in shape, size, and weight, it might be supposed that the heavier atoms, falling straight yet more rapidly, would overtake and hit the lighter atoms, thus bringing about their grouping or interlocking. But this supposition, says Lucretius, is contrary to reason. It may hold for things falling through water or thin air, but through the empty void all things, even of unequal weight, move with an equal velocity through the unresisting void. Therefore heavier things will never be able to fall on the lighter from above nor of themselves bring about the blows sufficient to produce the varied motions by which nature carries things on. Wherefore, Lucretius concludes, the atoms must swerve a little.

Once the atoms have collided the way in which they are locked together in the patterns of composite things, and all the subsequent motions of these things, can be accounted for by reference to the natural properties of the atoms. The atomic sizes, shapes, and weights determine how they behave singly or in combination. But the swerve of the atoms is not so determined. It is completely spontaneous.

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that the cause of the coincidence is unknown to us, but rather holds that no such cause exists to be known.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE chance event as an uncaused coincidence of causes is an ancient as well as a modern doctrine. In his *Physics* Aristotle distinguishes between what happens by nature and what happens by chance in terms of different types of causality. Chance, he writes, is reckoned among causes many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance. But the fact that its effects cannot be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part at once distinguishes the causality of chance from that of nature.

The early physicists, Aristotle observes, found no place for chance among the causes which they recognized. Others there are who, indeed, believe that chance is a cause but that it is inscrutable to human intelligence as is a divine thing and full of mystery. But to Aristotle himself "it is clear that chance is an accidental cause" and "that the causes of what comes to pass by chance are infinite. For this reason, he explains, chance is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man. Though he distinguishes between spontaneity and chance, he says that both are causes of effects which though they might result from intelligence or nature have in fact been caused by something incidentally.

What happens by nature happens regularly or for the most part through causal necessity. This necessity results from the operation of essential causes, causes in the very nature of the moving things. When the regularity fails, it is due to the intervention of some accidental cause. What happens by chance then or contingently is always due to an accidental (or better incidental) cause. As indicated in the chapter on CAUSE, an accidental as opposed to an essential cause is, in Aristotle's theory, one which does not by itself produce the effect. It does so only through the conjunction of other causes. But since it does not determine these other causes to operate, the effect—common to their combined activity—is produced by chance that is, by the contingency of several incidental causes working coincidentally.

A world in which chance really exists is remarkably different from a world in which necessity prevails, in which everything is determined by causes and there are no uncaused coincidences. William James vividly epitomizes their difference by calling the world of absolute necessity or determinism—the world of Spinoza or Hegel—a block universe in contrast to what he describes as a "concatenated universe." Voltaire before him in his *Philosophical Dictionary* had used the phrase "the concatenation of events" to express the meaning of chance.

The phrase evokes the right image: the picture of a world in which many concurrent lines of causality exercising no influence upon one another may nevertheless concatenate or be joined together to produce a chance result. The block universe presents the contrasting picture of a world in which each motion or act determines and is determined by every other in the fixed structure of the whole.

Spinoza claims for example that in nature there is nothing contingent but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner. Chance in other words, does not exist in nature. A thing is said to be contingent, Spinoza writes only with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction or if we actually know that it involves no contradiction and nevertheless we can affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of causes is concealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either as necessary or impossible and therefore we call it either contingent or possible. Hence for Spinoza contingency or chance is illusory rather than real—a projection of the mind's ignorance or of its inadequate knowledge of causes.

The issue between real indeterminism and absolute determinism—further discussed in the chapters on FAITH AND NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY—inevitably raises theological questions. Just as the theologian must reconcile man's free will with God's predestination so must he if he accepts its reality also reconcile chance with divine providence apart from which nothing can happen either necessarily or contingently.

For Augustine it would seem that divine

If each motion is always due to another and the new always springs from the old in a determined order and if the atoms do not by swerving break through the decrees of fate so that cause does not follow cause through infinite time whence asks Lucretius is it wrested from fate this will whereby we move forward where pleasure leads each one of us and swerve likewise in our motions neither at a fixed time nor at a fixed place but only when and where the mind itself has prompted us? The answer he gives is that there must be in the atoms another cause of motion besides blows and weights whence comes this power born in us since we see that nothing can come to be from nothing

BEING ABSOLUTELY fortuitous the swerve of the atoms is absolutely unintelligible. There is no answer to the question why they chance to swerve at undetermined times and places. This unintelligibility may not however make the fortuitous either unreal or impossible. It can be argued that chance may exist even though for our limited understanding it remains mysterious.

The same problem of intelligibility arises with respect to that meaning of chance wherein it is identified with coincidence or contingency. Here as in the case of the absolutely fortuitous chance belongs to reality or nature. Some things always come to pass in the same way and others for the most part writes Aristotle as an observer of nature but there is also a third class of events besides these two—events which all say are by chance. Things of this last kind he goes on to say are those which come to pass incidentally—or accidentally.

According to this theory a real or objective indeterminism exists. Chance or contingency is not just an expression of human uncertainty born of insufficient knowledge. Contingency however differs from the fortuitousness or spontaneity of the atom's swerve in that it is a product of causes not their total absence. Of the contingent event there is no definite cause in Aristotle's opinion but there is a chance cause i.e. an indefinite one.

In the chance happening two lines of action coincide and thereby produce a single result. This is our ordinary understanding of the way

accidents happen. The chance meeting of friends who run across each other at a railway station after a separation of many years is coincidence—a coinciding of the two separate and independent lines of action which brought each of them to the same station at the same time coming from different places going to different places and proceeding under the influence of different causes or purposes. That each of them can be explained by the operation of causes. That both are together cannot be explained by the causes determining their independent paths.

So understood the chance event exemplified what Aquinas calls a clashing of two causes. And what makes it a matter of chance is the fact that the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Precisely because it is accidental this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause from which it follows of necessity.

The illustration is not affected by considerations of free will. Whether men have free will or not whether free acts are caused or are uncaused suggests uncaused and spontaneous, the event we call a chance meeting remains accidental or more precisely a coincidence. Whatever the factors are which control the motion of each man they operate entirely within the single man's line of action. Prior to the meeting they do not influence the other man's conduct. If we could state the cause for the coincidence of the two lines of motion it would have to be some factor which influenced both lines. Were there such a cause and were it known to us we could not say that the meeting happened by chance. It would still be a coincidence in the merely physical sense of coming together but it would not be a coincidence causally.

That free will is irrelevant to this meaning of chance can be seen from the fact that the collision of particles which produces atomic fusion is regarded as resulting from chance or coincidence in a manner no different from the accidental meeting of friends. Causes control the speeds and directions of the colliding particles, but no cause determines their collision or in other words there is no cause for the coincidence of two separate lines of causation. Contemporary physics affirms a real or objective indeterminism insofar as it does not merely say

Regardless of what the objective situation is, the assurance with which we expect anything reflects the state of our knowledge about it.

The ancients who, for the most part regard chance as real and objective, treat probability as subjective. For them the different degrees of probability which men attach to their statements measure the inadequacy of their knowledge—and the consequent uncertainty of their opinions about matters which cannot be known but only guessed. Holding different theories of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, both Plato and Aristotle exclude the accidental and the contingent along with the particular from the objects of science. Since in their view certitude belongs to the essence of science—or of knowledge as contrasted with opinion—science for them deals not only with the universal but with the necessary.

In the *Republic* Socrates assigns opinion to the realm of becoming—the realm of changing and contingent particulars. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not restrict knowledge to the realm of eternal and immutable being but he does insist that physics, as a science of changing things, preserve the certitude of science by concerning itself only with the essential and the necessary. "That a science of the accidental is not even possible," he writes, "will be evident if we try to see what the accidental really is." It is a matter of chance that cold weather occurs during the dog-days, for this occurs neither always and of necessity nor for the most part though it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity nor for the most part. Now it is obvious why there is no science of such a thing.

Though he disagrees with Aristotle and Aquinas about the reality of chance or contingency, Spinoza agrees with them that knowledge—at least adequate knowledge—has the necessary for its object. Of individual things, he says, we can have no adequate knowledge and this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency. To be true to itself and to the nature of things, reason must perceive that truly that is to say as they are in themselves, that is to say not as contingent but as necessary.

The position of Aquinas is worth stating for

comparison. To the question whether our intellect can know contingent things he replies that the contingent considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known by the intellect. Hence, he goes on, if we consider knowable things in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

Among the sciences of contingent things, Aquinas includes not only the sciences of nature but also the moral sciences, because the latter dealing with human action must reach down to contingent particulars. In the sphere of morals as of nature, certainty can be achieved only on the level of universal principles. Deliberation about particular acts to be done moves on the level of probable opinion. In contrast to the moral scientist the man of action must weigh chances and make decisions with regard to future contingencies. It would be as foolish, Aristotle says, to expect the certitude of scientific demonstration from an orator or a judge as to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician.

It is not surprising that the modern theory of probability—or as it was later called by Boole, Venn and others, the logic of chance—should have its origin in the sphere of practical problems. Pascal's correspondence with Fermat illustrates the early mathematical speculations concerning formulae for predicting the outcome in games of pure chance. For Pascal the logic of chance also has moral implications. If we are willing to risk money at the gaming table on the basis of calculated probabilities, how much more willing should we be to act decisively in the face of life's uncertainties, even to risking life itself on the chance of eternal salvation.

When we act on an uncertainty we act reasonably. Pascal writes, for we ought to work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance. If the chance of there being an after life is equal to the chance of there being none—if the equiprobability reflects our equal ignorance of either alternative—then,

providence leaves no room for chance among natural things. After noting that causes are sometimes divided into a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause, he dismisses those causes which are called fortuitous by saying that they are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other.

In certain places Aquinas seems to talk in much the same fashion—as though chance existed only for our limited intellects and not for God. Nothing, he declares, hinders certain things from happening by luck or chance if compared to their proximate causes, but not if compared to divine providence according to which nothing happens at random in the world, as Augustine says. The example he uses to illustrate his point is that of two servants who have been sent by their master to the same place—the meeting of the two servants although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master who has purposely sent them to meet at one place in such a way that one has no knowledge of the other. In such a way also all things must of necessity come under God's ordering from which it follows that God directly causes the action of even accidental causes and their coincidence. The chance event would then be necessitated by God. It would be determined by His will, however indeterminate it might appear to us.

Yet in other places Aquinas writes that God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently. To some effects He has attached unfailing necessary causes from which the effects follow necessarily, but to other defectible and contingent causes from which effects arise contingently. For some minds this may only deepen the mystery rather than solve it. At least it leaves many questions unanswered.

Does Aquinas mean that a coincidence of causes is not itself uncaused? Does he mean that God causes the concatenation of events and that a sufficient reason for every contingency exists in God's will? If so, is chance an illusion, a function of our ignorance of divine providence? May chance be quite real on the level of

nature where no natural causes determine the coincidence while not real—at least not in the same sense—for God? Or does the statement that what divine providence plans to happen contingently happens contingently mean that chance remains a real feature of the universe even for God?

One thing is clear. In one sense of the word, the Christian theologians completely deny chance. If chance means something, which God does not foresee, something unplanned by His providence, then according to their faith nothing happens by chance. It is in this sense also that what happens by chance is opposed to what happens on purpose, or has a final as well as an efficient cause. As the chapter on CAUSE indicates, those who deny final causes in nature sometimes use the word chance to signify not lack of cause, nor even contingency, but only the blindness of causality—working to no end.

The controversy discussed in the chapter on WORLD—between those who see in the structure of the universe the grand design of a divine plan and those who attribute whatever order there is in nature to blind chance—further indicates the sense in which theologians like Augustine and Aquinas deny chance. But if chance means no more than contingency, then to affirm chance excludes not providence but fate, at least that sense of fate according to which everything is blindly necessitated. Here it is Spinoza's statement that in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature, which opposes the statement of Aquinas that the mode both of necessity and contingency falls under the foresight of God.

THE THEORY OF chance has obvious bearings on the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to the distinction between knowledge and opinion and between certainty and probability.

On any view of chance—whether it is real or illusory—when men call a future event contingent, they mean that they cannot predict it with certitude. So far as human prediction goes, it makes no difference whether the future event is necessarily determined and we lack adequate knowledge of its causes, or the event has a genuine indeterminacy in the way it is caused or

medicine and astrology. When the proconsul tells him that, as compared with medicine, astrology is a false art, Augustine, at this time himself much given to the books of the horoscope-casters," asks how the fact that "many things were foretold truly by [astrology]" can be explained. The proconsul answered, very reasonably that it was due to the force of chance, which is always to be allowed for in the order of things." Thus, Augustine says later "I saw it is obvious that such things as happened to be said truly from the casting of horoscopes were true not by skill but by chance and such things as were false were not due to want of skill in the art but merely that luck had fallen the other way."

Neither art itself, nor skill in its practice, can ever be perfect enough to remove chance entirely for the artist deals with particulars. Yet the measure of an art is the certainty which its rules have as directions for achieving the desired result and the skill of the artist is measured by the extent to which he succeeds by rule and judgment rather than by chance.

When Aristotle quotes Agathon's remark that art loves chance and chance loves art," he explains its sense to be that chance and art are concerned with the same objects"—that which does not come to be by nature nor from necessity. Hence art sometimes fails, either from uncontrollable contingencies or from insufficient knowledge of causes. All causes," says Hume, are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents."

IN THE REALM of human affairs—in morals, politics, and history—the factor of chance is usually discussed in terms of good and bad fortune. The word "fortune"—as may be seen in the root which it shares with "fortuitous"—has the same connotations as "chance." Aristotle treats fortune as the kind of chance that operates in the sphere of human action rather than as *real chance*. Fortune, he thinks, can be understood properly only to intelligent beings capable of deliberate choice. The sense of this distinction between chance and fortune seems to be borne out in history by the fact

that fortune, unlike chance, receives personification in myth and legend. Fortune is a goddess or like the Fates whom the combatants, a power with which even the gods must reckon.

The doctrine of chance or fortune occupies an important place in moral theory. Aristotle's classification of goods tends to identify external goods with goods of fortune—the goods which unlike knowledge and virtue we cannot obtain merely by the exercise of our will and faculties. Considering the elements of happiness, Aquinas groups together wealth, honor, fame, and power as goods of the same sort because they are due to external causes and in most cases to fortune.

The goods of fortune, as well as its ills, consist in things beyond man's power to command and, in consequence, to deserve. Recognizing the unpredictable operation of fortune, Epictetus, the Stoic, argues that we must make the best of those things that are in our power and take the rest as nature gives it. "We have the power to deal rightly with our own impressions." Hence the Stoics advise us to control our reactions to things even though we cannot control the things themselves. Yet men will always ask, as Hamlet does, "Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them?"

The fact that the goods and ills of fortune are beyond our power to control raises the further question of man's responsibility regarding them. We can hardly be held responsible for everything that happens to us, but only for those things which are subject to our will. This traditional moral distinction between the good or evil which befalls us by fortune and that which we willfully obtain or accomplish parallels the legal distinction between accidental and intentional wrongdoing.

What is true of the individual life seems to apply to history—the life of states and the development of civilization generally. For the most part the historians—Herodotus and Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon—find fortune a useful principle of interpretation. To Machiavelli history seems to be so full of accidents and contingencies—great changes in affairs beyond all human conjecture—that he tries to advise the prince how to make

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The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of skepticism, he writes, is action and employment and the occupations of common life. But unlike the ancients, Hume also thinks we should be content with probabilities in the sphere of the natural sciences. Certitude ■ attainable only by the mathematician who deals with the relations between ideas. Since the natural sciences deal with matters of fact or real existence and since to know such things we must rely entirely upon our experience of cause and effect, we cannot reach better than probable conclusions.

The scientist, according to Hume, weighs opposite experiments. He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments; to that side he inclines with doubt and hesitation, and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability then supposes an opposition of experiments and observations. A hundred instances or experiments on one side and fifty on another afford a doubtful expectation of any event, though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance.

Hume applies the logic of chance to weighing the evidence against and the testimony in favor of miracles, as well as to contrary hypotheses in science. As much as Spinoza, he denies the existence of chance or contingency in the order of nature. Chance ■ entirely subjective. It is identical with the probability of our opinions. In the throw of dice, the mind, he says, considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable, and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal. But there may also be a probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side, and according as this superiority increases and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionate increase. The case

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Since Hume's day, the theory of probability has become an essential ingredient of empirical science. The development of thermodynamics in the 19th century would have been impossible without it. This is also true of the quantum mechanics and atomic physics of our own time. But like the doctrine of chance, the theory of probability tends in one of two directions: either toward the subjective view that probability is only a quality of our judgments, measuring the degree of our ignorance of the real causes which leave nothing in nature undetermined, or toward the objective view that there is genuine indeterminism in nature and that mathematical calculations of probability estimate the real chance of an event's occurring.

THE ELEMENT OF chance also has a bearing on the general theory of art. The hypothesis of the melody which a kitten might compose by walking on the keyboard is obviously intended to contrast a product of chance with a work of art. The competent musician knows with certainty that he can do what the meandering kitten has only one chance in many millions of ever accomplishing.

In proportion as an art is developed and to the degree that its rules represent a mastery of the medium in which the artist works, chance is excluded from its productions. This point is strikingly exemplified in the history of medicine. If there had been no such thing as medicine, Hippocrates suggests, and if nothing had been investigated or found out in it, all practitioners would have been equally unskilled and ignorant of it, and everything concerning the sick would have been directed by chance. On the same principle, Galen distinguishes the physician from the empiric who, without knowing the cause, pretends that he is able to rectify the failures of function. The empiric works by trial and error—the very opposite of art and science—for trial and error can succeed only by chance. The physician, learned and skilled in medicine, works from a knowledge of causes and by rules of art which tend to eliminate chance.

Augustine reports a conversation with the proconsul concerning the relative merits of

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use of fortune in order to avoid being ruined by it. Such advice can be followed because in his opinion Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions but still leaves us to direct the other half or perhaps a little less.

Hegel on the contrary does not admit chance or fortune in his view of world history as a necessary development out of the concept of the mind's freedom alone. For Tolstoy also either necessity or freedom rules the affairs of men. Chance, he writes, does 'not denote any really existing thing but only a certain stage of understanding of phenomena. Once we succeed in calculating the composition of forces involved in the mass movements of men we

shall not be obliged to have recourse to chance for an explanation of those small events which made these people what they were but it will be clear that all those small events were inevitable.

As the contingent is opposed to the necessary as that which happens by chance is opposed to that which is fully determined by causes so fortune is opposed to fate or destiny. This opposition is most evident in the great poems especially the tragedies which depict man's efforts to direct his own destiny now pitting his freedom against both fate and fortune now courting fortune in his struggle against fate.

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CHAPTER 9 CHANCE

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 411 *Metaphysics* 1265 283/12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SETTING When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 531 *Metaphysics* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 71 *Plato's Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

ATHABASCA One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as *Plato's Republic*) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk. II 65 33/12d.

BIBLIOGRAPHY The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay version cited by (D) follows e.g. *Old Testament Jeremiah* 7:45—(D) *II Ezechiel* 46.

SPECIAL TOPICS The reader's attention to one or more especially relevant passages of the passage signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The conception of chance

1 Chance as the coincidence of causes

7 *Plato Timaeus* 455a b

8 *Aristotle Interpretation* ch 9 [18 5-9] 28c /

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- (1 *The conception of chance* 1b *Chance as the absolutely fortuitous, the spontaneous or uncaused*)

- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 132d 133a 140b d 143a / *Practical Reason* 331c 332a / *Judgement* 566a ■
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 454b c

- 2 *The issue concerning the existence of chance or fortune*

- 2a *The relation of chance to causality philosophical or scientific determinism*

- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk x 438c 439a / *Timaeus* 45c 456a 465d-466a / *Statesman* 587a 589c esp 587a b / *Law* bk x 759d 765d
8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* ch 9 28a 29d / *Posterior Analytics* bk ii ch ii [95 3-9] 129d / *Physics* bk ii ch 4 5 272c 274b ch 8 [199 33-26] 276c 277a / *Metaphysics* bk ii ch 5 [287^b 23-26] 379b ch 8 [289^b 22 28] 381b bk ii ch 3 [310^a 23-31] 401d / *Generation and Corruption* bk ii ch 6 [333 35-20] 434b c / *Metaphysics* bk v ch 30 547a d bk vi ch 2 [1027 8 18] 549b ch 3 547c d bk xi ch 8 [1065 6 4] 593b d bk xii ch 3 [1070 4-9] 599b / *Memory and Reminiscence* ch 2 [45 30 6] 694b
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk i ch 5 [640 12-4] 162b 163a / *Ethics* bk iii ch 3 [1112 30-33] 358b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 10 [1369 31-35] 612c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* bk ii [184 307] 17b 19a [1048 1066] 28b c bk v [55-58] 61d [181 194] 63b ■ [306-310] 65a [416-431] 66c d
12 AURILIUS *Meditations* bk vii sect 1 279b sect 49 282d bk ix sect 28 293d 294a sect 35-36 294d 295a sect 39 295a bk x sect 27 299d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr i ch 2 78d ch 3 79b c tr ii ch i 82c / *Fourth Ennead* tr iii ch 16 150c d tr iv ch 3 176d / *Sixth Ennead* tr viii ch 9 10 347a 348a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part i q 14 a 13 rep i 86d 88c q 19 a 8 116a d q 22 a 2 rep i 128d 130d a 4 131c 132b q 103 a 5 rep i 531b 532b a 7 rep 2 533b d q 115 a 6 591d 592d q 116 a i 592d 593d a 3 594c 595a
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part ii 113b-c part iv 272b
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I. Works by authors represented in this collection

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection

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Chapter 10 CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

FROM the pre-Socratic physicists and the ancient philosophers to Darwin, Marx, and James—and in our own day, Dewey and Whitehead—the fact of change has been a major focus of speculative and scientific inquiry.

Except by Parmenides and his school, the existence of change has never been denied. Nor can it be without rejecting all sense-perception as illusory, which is precisely what Zeno's paradoxes seem to do, according to one interpretation of them. But if argument cannot refute the testimony of the senses, neither can reason give support to it. The fact of change, because it is evident to the senses, does not need proof.

That change is, is evident; but what change is, is neither evident nor easy to define. What principles or factors are common to every sort of change, how change or becoming is related to permanence or being, what sort of existence belongs to mutable things and to change itself—these are questions to which answers are not obtainable merely by observation. Nor will simple observation, without the aid of experiment, measurement, and mathematical calculation discover the laws and properties of motion.

The analysis of change or motion has been a problem for the philosophers of nature. They have been concerned with the definition of change in relation to being, the classification of the kinds of change. The measurement of motion on the other hand and the mathematical formulation of its laws have occupied the experimental natural scientists. Both natural philosophy and natural science share a common subject matter, though they approach it by different methods and with different interests. Both are entitled to use the name physics for their subject matter.

The Greek word *physis* from which physics comes has, as its Latin equivalent, the word

natura from which nature comes. In their original significance both words had reference to the sensible world of changing things, or to its underlying principle—to the ultimate source of change. The physics of the philosopher and the physics of the empirical scientist are alike inquiries concerning the nature of things, not in every respect but in regard to their change and motion. The conclusions of both inquiries have metaphysical implications for the nature of the physical world and for the character of physical existence.

The philosopher draws these implications for being from the study of becoming. The scientist in turn, draws upon philosophical distinctions in order to define the objects of his study. Galileo, for example, in separating the problem of freely falling bodies from the motion of projectiles, employs the traditional philosophical distinction between natural and violent motion. The analysis of time and space (basic variables in Newtonian mechanics) the distinction between discontinuous and continuous change and the problem of the divisibility of a continuous motion—these are philosophical considerations pre-supposed by the scientific measurement of motion.

WE HAVE SO FAR used the words change and motion as well as becoming as if all three were interchangeable in meaning. That is somewhat inaccurate even for the ancients who regarded all kinds of change except one as motions; it is much less accurate for the moderns who have tended to restrict the meaning of motion to local motion or change of place. It is necessary therefore to examine briefly the kinds of change and to indicate the problems which arise with these distinctions.

In his physical treatises, Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of change. When the change

from contrary to contrary is *in quantity*, he writes it is growth and diminution when it is *in place* it is motion, when it is *in quality* it is alteration but when nothing persists of which the resultant is a property (or an accident in any sense of the term) it is coming to be and the converse change is passing away. Aristotle also uses other pairs of words — generation and corruption, becoming and perishing — to name the last kind of change.

Of the four kinds of change only the last is not called 'motion'. But in the context of saying that becoming cannot be a motion Aristotle also remarks that every motion is a kind of change. He does not restrict the meaning of motion to change in place which is usually called local motion or locomotion. There are then according to Aristotle's vocabulary three kinds of motion: (1) local motion in which bodies change from place to place; (2) alteration or qualitative motion in which bodies change with respect to such attributes as color, texture or temperature; (3) increase and decrease or quantitative motion in which bodies change in size. And in addition there is the one kind of change which is not motion — generation and corruption. This consists in the coming to be or passing away of a body which while it has being exists as an individual substance of a certain sort.

Becoming and perishing are most readily exemplified by the birth and death of living things but Aristotle also includes the transformation of water into ice or vapor as examples of generation and corruption. One distinctive characteristic of generation and corruption in Aristotle's conception of this type of change is their instantaneity. He thinks that the other three kinds of change are continuous processes taking time whereas things come into being or pass away instantaneously. Aristotle thus applies the word motion only to the continuous changes which time can measure. He never says that time is the measure of change but only of motion.

But the contrast between the one mode of change which is not motion and the three kinds of motion involves more than this difference with regard to time and continuity. Aristotle's analysis considers the subject of change — that

which undergoes transformation — and starting point and goal of motion. Every motion he says proceeds from something to something, that which is directly in motion being distinct from that to which it is in motion and that from which it is in motion for instance — we may take the three things wood, hot and cold of which the first is that which is in motion, the second is that to which the motion proceeds and the third is that from which it proceeds.

In the alteration which occurs when the wood changes quality just as in the increase or decrease which occurs with a body's change in quantity and in the local motion which occurs with a body's change of place that which changes persists throughout the change as the same kind of substance. The wood does not cease to be wood when it becomes hot or cold, the stone does not cease to be a stone when it rolls from here to there or the organism an animal of a certain kind when it grows in size. In all these cases the substratum — that which is the subject of change — persists and changes in its own properties. The body although persisting as the same body is now healthy and now ill and the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular and yet remains the same bronze.

Because the substance of the changing thing remains the same while changing in its properties — i.e. in such attributes or accidents as quality, quantity and place — Aristotle groups the three kinds of motion together as *accidental change*. The changing thing does not come to be or pass away absolutely but only in a certain respect. In contrast generation and corruption involve a change in the very substance of a thing. When nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum and the thing changes as a whole then according to Aristotle it is a coming to be of one substance and the passing away of another.

In such becoming or perishing it is matter itself rather than a body or a substance which is transformed. Matter takes on or loses the form of a certain kind of substance. For example when the nutriment is assimilated to the form of a living body the bread or corn becomes the flesh and blood of a man. When an animal dies its body decomposes into the ele-

ments of inorganic matter. Because it is a change of substance itself, Aristotle calls the one kind of change which is not motion *substantial change* and speaks of it as a coming-to-be or passing-away simply—that is, not in a certain respect but absolutely or without qualification.

These distinctions are involved in a long tradition of discussion and controversy. They cannot be affirmed or denied without opposite sides being taken on the fundamental issues concerning substance and accident, matter and form, and the causes of change or motion. The adoption or rejection of these distinctions affects one's view of the difference between inorganic and organic change, and the difference between the motions of matter and the changes which take place in mind. The statement of certain problems is determined accordingly—as, for example, the problem of the transmutation of the elements, which persists in various forms from the physics of the ancients through mediaeval alchemy and the beginnings of modern chemistry to present considerations of radioactivity and atomic fission.

SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY motion has been identified with local motion. I can conceive no other kind of motion, Descartes writes, and do not consider that we ought to conceive any other in nature. As it is expressed "in common parlance" motion he says, is nothing more than the act in which any body passes from one place to another.

This can hardly be taken to mean that change of place is the only observable type of change. That other kinds of change are observable cannot be denied. The science of mechanics or dynamics may be primarily or exclusively concerned with local motions, but other branches of natural science certainly chemistry dealing with qualitative transformations and the biological sciences study growth and decay, birth and death.

The emphasis on local motion as the only kind of motion while it does not exclude apparent changes of other sorts, does raise a question about their reality. The question can be put in several ways. Are the various apparently different kinds of change really distinct or can they all be reduced to aspects of one underlying

mode of change which is local motion? Even supposing that the kinds of change are not reducible to one another is local motion primary in the sense that it is involved in all the others?

When mechanics dominates the physical sciences (as has been so largely the case in modern times) there is a tendency to reduce all the observable diversity of change to various appearances of local motion. Newton for example explicitly expresses this desire to formulate all natural phenomena in terms of the mechanics of moving particles. In the preface to the first edition of his *Mathematical Principles* after recounting his success in dealing with celestial phenomena he says, "I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies by some causes hitherto unknown are either mutually impelled towards one another and cohere in regular figures or are repelled and recede from one another."

The notion that all change can be reduced to the results of local motion is not however of modern origin. Lucretius expounds the theory of the Greek atomists that all the phenomena of change can be explained by reference to the local motion of indivisible particles coming together and separating. Change of place is the only change which occurs on the level of the ultimate physical reality. The atoms neither come to be nor pass away nor change in quality or size.

But though we find the notion in ancient atomism, it is only in modern physics that the emphasis upon local motion tends to exclude all other kinds of change. It is characteristic of what James calls the modern mechanico-physical philosophy to begin by saying that the only facts are collocations and motions of primordial solids, and the only laws the changes of motion which changes in collocation bring. James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that "the ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the last unchanging causes of the processes of the world. If to this end 'we imagine the world composed of elements with unalterable qualities, then Helmholtz continues, the only

changes that can remain in such a world are spatial changes & movements and the only outer relations which can modify the action of the forces are spatial too or in other words the forces are motor forces dependent for their effect on spatial relations

In the history of physics Aristotle represents the opposite view. No one of the four kinds of change which he distinguishes has for him greater physical reality than the others. Just as quality cannot be reduced to quantity or either of these to place so in his judgment the motions associated with these terms are irreducible to one another. Yet Aristotle does assign to local motion a certain primacy. Motion in its most general and primary sense he writes is change of place which we call locomotion. He does not mean merely that this is the primary sense of the word but rather that no other kind of motion can occur without local motion being somehow involved in the process. Showing how increase and decrease depends on alteration and how that in turn depends on change of place he says that of the three kinds of motion it is this last which we call locomotion that must be primary.

THE SHIFT IN MEANING of the word motion would not by itself mark a radical departure in the theory of change but it is accompanied by a shift in thought which has the most radical consequences. At the same time that motion is identified with local motion Descartes conceives motion as something completely actual and thoroughly intelligible. For the ancients becoming of any sort had both less reality and less intelligibility than being.

Aristotle had defined motion as the actuality of that which is potential in a respect in which it is still potential to some degree. According to what Descartes calls its strict as opposed to its popular meaning motion is the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others. This definition—contrasted with the Aristotelian conception which it generally supersedes in the subsequent tradition of natural science—is as revolutionary as the Cartesian analytical geometry is by comparison with the Euclidean. Nor

is it an unconnected fact that the analytical geometry prepares the way for the differential calculus that is needed to measure variations their velocities and their accelerations.

The central point on which the two definitions are opposed constitutes one of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of nature. Does motion involve a transition from potential to actual existence or only the substitution of one actual state for another—only a transportation—as Descartes says from one place to another?

While motion is going on the moving thing according to Aristotle's definition must be partly potential and partly actual in the same respect. The leaf turning red *ut hile ut est aliter* has not yet fully reddened. When it becomes as red as it can get it can no longer change in that respect. Before it began to change it was actually green and since it could become red it was potentially red. But while the change is in process the potentiality of the leaf to become red is being actualized. This actualization progresses until the change is completed.

The same analysis would apply to a ball in motion. Until it comes to rest in a given place its potentiality for being there is undergoing progressive actualization. In short motion involves some departure from pure potentiality in a given respect and never complete attainment of full actuality in that same respect. When there is no departure from potentiality motion has not yet begun when the attainment of actuality is complete the motion has terminated.

The Aristotelian definition of motion is the object of much ridicule in the 17th century. Repeating the phrasing which had become traditional in the schools—the actualization of what exists in potentiality, in so far as it is potential—Descartes asks: Now who understands these words? And who at the same time does not know what motion is? Will not even one admit that those philosophers have been trying to find a knot in a bulrush? Locke also finds it meaningless. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition which would puzzle any rational man to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of if

ask a Dutchman what *bevee* in English, Locke continues should have received his explication in his own language that it is *actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*. Ask whether any one can imagine he could hereby have guessed what the word *bevee* engendered.

Locke does not seem to be satisfied with any definition of motion. The atomists, who define motion to be a passage from one place to another: what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is *passus* other than *motus*? Nor will the successive application of the superficies of one body to those of another which the Cartesians give us prove a much better definition of motion when well examined. But though Locke rejects the definition of the atomists and the Cartesians on formal grounds, he accepts their idea of motion as simply change of place, inasmuch as he dismisses the Aristotelian definition as sheer absurdity and rejects the idea that motion or change necessarily involves a potentially capable of progressive fulfillment.

As we have already remarked, the omission of potentiality from the conception of motion is a theoretical shift of the deepest significance. It occurs not only in Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* and in the atomism of Hobbes and Gassendi, but also in the *mechanics* of Galileo and Newton. According to these modern philosophers and scientists, a moving body is *always* actually somewhere. It occupies a different place at every moment in a continuous motion. The motion can be described as the successive occupation by the body of different places at different times. Though all the parts of the motion do not coexist, the moving particle is completely actual throughout. It loses no reality and gains none in the course of the motion since the various positions the body occupies are totally out of its material nature. It would, of course, be most difficult to analyze alteration in color or bulk, but growth in these terms must be remembered that efforts have been made to apply such an analysis though the reduction of all other modes of change to local motion.

The principle of inertia first discerned by Galileo, is critically relevant to the issue between these two conceptions of motion. It is

stated by Newton as the first of his axioms or laws of motion. Every body he writes continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a right line unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. As applied to the motion of projectiles, the law declares that they continue in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by the resistance of air or impelled downwards by the force of gravity.

In his experimental reasoning concerning the acceleration of bodies moving down inclined planes, Galileo argues that a body which has achieved a certain velocity on the descent would if it then proceeded along a horizontal plane continue infinitely at the same velocity—except for the retardation of air resistance and friction. Any velocity once imparted to a moving body he maintains, will be rigidly maintained as long as the external causes of acceleration or retardation are removed. So in the case of projectiles, they would retain the velocity and direction imparted to them by the cannon were it not for the factors of gravity and air resistance. Bodies actually in motion possess their motion in themselves as a complete actuality. They need no causes acting on them to keep them in motion but only to change their direction or bring them to rest.

The motion of projectiles presents a difficulty for the theory which describes all motion as a reduction of potency to act. If every thing that is in motion, with the exception of things that move themselves, is moved by something else, how is it Aristotle asks, that some things, e.g. things thrown continue to be in motion when their mover is no longer in contact with them? This is a problem for Aristotle precisely because he supposes that the moving cause must act on the thing being moved throughout the period of the motion. For the potentiality to be progressively reduced to actuality it must be continuously acted upon.

Aristotle's answer postulates a series of causes so that contact can be maintained between the projectile and the moving cause. The original mover he writes gives the power of being a mover either to air or to water or to something else of the kind naturally adapted for imparting and undergoing motion. The motion begins to cease when the motive force pro-

duced in one member of the consecutive series is at each stage less than that possessed by the preceding member and it finally ceases when one member no longer causes the next member to be a movent but only causes it to be in motion. It follows that inertia must be denied by those who hold that a moving body *always* requires a mover or even that a body cannot sustain itself in motion beyond a point proportionate to the quantity of the impressed force which originally set it in motion.

FOR THE ANCIENTS the basic contrast between being and becoming (or between the permanent and the changing) is a contrast between the intelligible and the sensible. This is most sharply expressed in Plato's distinction between the sensible realm of material things and the intelligible realm of ideas. What is that which always is and has no becoming? Timaeus asks and what is that which is always becoming and never is? He answers his own question by saying that that which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensations and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.

Even though Aristotle differs from Plato in thinking that change and the changing can be objects of scientific knowledge he too holds becoming to be less intelligible than being precisely because change necessarily involves potentiality. Yet becoming can be understood to the extent that we can discover the principles of its being—the unchanging principles of change. In pursuing the truth Aristotle remarks—and this applies to the truth about change as well as everything else—one must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change.

For Aristotle change is intelligible through the three elements of permanence which are its principles: (1) the enduring substratum of change and the contraries—(2) that to which and (3) that from which the change takes place. The same principles are sometimes stated to be (1) matter, (2) form and (3) privation: the matter or substratum being that which both lacks a certain form and has a definite potentiality for possessing it. Change occurs when

the matter undergoes a transformation in which it comes to have the form of which it was deprived by the possession of a contrary form.

Neither of the contrary forms changes. Or if the thing composite of matter and form changes with respect to the forms of its matter hence these principles of change are themselves unchanging. Change takes place *through* not *in* them. As constituents of the changing thing they are the principles of its mutable being: principles of its *being* as well as of its *being mutable*.

The explanation of change by reference to what does not change seems to be common to all theories of becoming. Lucretius, as we have already seen, explains the coming to be and passing away of all other things by the motions of atoms which neither come to be nor pass away. The eternity of the atoms underlies the mutability of everything else.

Yet the atoms are not completely immutable. They move forever through the void which, according to Lucretius, is required for their motion. Their local motion is moreover an actual property of the atoms. For them *to be is to be in motion*. Here then as in the Cartesian theory no potentiality is involved and motion is completely real and completely intelligible.

THE NOTIONS OF time and eternity are inseparable from the theory of change or motion. In the chapters on TIME and SPACE local motion involves the dimensions of space as well as time but all change requires time and time itself is inconceivable apart from change or motion. Furthermore as appears in the chapters on TIME and ETERNITY the two fundamentally opposed meanings of eternity differ according to whether they imply endless change or absolute changelessness.

Eternity is sometimes identified with infinite time. It is in this sense that Plato in the *Timaeus* refers to time as 'the moving image of eternity' and implies that time which belongs to the realm of ever-changing things resembles the eternal only through its perpetual endurance. The other sense of the eternal is also implied—the sense in which eternity belongs to the realm of immutable being. The eternal in this sense as Montaigne points out is not merely that which never had beginning nor never

will be ending, but rather that to which we can bring no mutation.

There are two great problems which use the word "eternity" in these opposite senses. One is the problem of the eternity of motion—the question whether motion has or can have either beginning or an end. The other is the problem of the existence of eternal objects—immutable things which have their being apart from time and change.

The two problems are connected in ancient thought. Aristotle, for example, argues that it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be, for it must always have existed. Since nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present to move it—a cause is required to sustain the endless motions of nature. This cause, which Aristotle calls "the prime mover," must be something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.

Aristotle's theory of a prime mover sets up a hierarchy of causes to account for the different kinds of motion observable in the universe. The perfect circular motion of the heavens serves to mediate between the prime mover which is totally unmoved and the less regular cycles of terrestrial change. The constant cycle of movement in the stars differs from the irregular cycle of generation and destruction on earth. For the first Aristotle asserts the necessity of something which is always moved with an increasing motion, which is motion in a circle. He calls this motion of the first heavenly sphere "the simple spatial movement of the universe" as a whole. Besides this, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal but are always acting in different ways, and so are able to account for the other cycle in nature—the irregular cycle of generation and corruption.

In addition, a kind of changelessness is attributed to all the celestial bodies which Aristotle calls eternal. Eternally in motion, they are also eternally in being. Though not immutable, they are supposed to be incorruptible substances. They never begin to be and never perish.

The theory of a world eternally in motion is challenged by Jewish and Christian theologians

who affirm, as an article of their religious faith, that in the beginning God created heaven and earth. The world's motions, like its existence, have a beginning in the act of creation. Creation itself, Aquinas insists, is not change or motion of any sort, except according to our way of understanding. For change means that the same thing should be different now from what it was previously. But in creation by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before, only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. Since creation is an absolute coming to be from non-being, no pre-existent matter is acted upon as in generation in artistic production, or in any of the forms of motion.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL and theological issues concerning creation and change, eternity and time are further discussed in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY and WORLD. Other problems arising from the analysis of change must at least be briefly mentioned here.

Though less radical than the difference between creation and change, the difference between the motions of inert or non-living things and the vital activities of plants and animals raises for any theory of change the question whether the same principles apply to both. The rolling stone and the running animal both move locally, but are both motions locomotion in the same sense? Augmentation occurs both in the growth of a crystal and the growth of a plant, but are both of them growing in the same sense? In addition, there seems to be one kind of change in living things which has no parallel in the movements of inert bodies. Animals and men learn. They acquire knowledge, form habits and change them. Can change of mind be explained in the same terms as change in matter?

The issues raised by questions of this sort are more fully discussed in the chapters on ANIMAL, HABIT and LIFE. Certain other issues must be entirely reserved for discussion elsewhere. The special problems of local motion—such as the properties of rectilinear and circular motion, the distinction between uniform and variable motion and the uniform or variable accelera-

tion of the latter—are problems which belong to the chapters on ASTRONOMY and MECHANICS. Change furthermore is a basic fact not only for the natural scientist but for the historian—the natural historian or the historian of man and society. The considerations relevant to this aspect of change receive treatment in the chapters on EVOLUTION, HISTORY, and PROGRESS.

Even these ramifications of discussion do not exhaust the significance of change. The cyclical course of the emotions and the alternation of pleasure and pain have been thought inexplicable without reference to change of state in regard to desire and aversion—the motion from want to satisfaction or from possession to deprivation. Change is not only a factor in the analysis of emotion but it is also itself an object of man's emotional attitudes. It is both loved and hated, sought and avoided.

According to Pascal, man tries desperately to avoid a state of rest. He does every thing he can to keep things in flux. Our nature consists in motion, he writes, complete rest is death. Nothing is so insufferable to man: he continues as to be completely at rest without pas-

sions without business without diversion, without study. He then feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. Darwin does not think that the desire for change is peculiar to man. The lower animals, he writes, are likewise capricious in their affections, aversions and sense of beauty. There is also reason to suspect that they love novelty for its own sake.

But men also wish to avoid change. The old Prince Bolkonski in *War and Peace* could not comprehend how anyone could wish to alter his life or introduce anything new into it. This is not merely an old man's view. For the most part it is permanence rather than transience, the enduring rather than the novel which the poets celebrate when they express man's discontent with his own mutability. The withering and perishing of all mortal things, the assault of time and change upon all things familiar and loved, have moved them to elegy over the evanescent and the ephemeral. From Virgil's *Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalium tangunt* to Shakespeare's *Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds*, the poets have mourned the inevitability of change.

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PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II {265 283} 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 7 45—(D) 11 *Ezra* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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- 10 AQUIN s *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 9
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- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 165c 166b / *Phaedo* 226d 228a 243c 246c / *Republic* bk iv 350d 351b / *Theaetetus* 519d 520b / *Sophist* 565a c / *Lysis* bk x 760a 762b 764c
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- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 2 167b d
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr vi ch 8 111c d / *Sixth Ennead* tr iii ch 22 293d 294c ch 27 296b-297a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A1 ANS 108d 109c Q 23 A1 REP 3 132c 133b Q 26 A1 REP 2 150b c Q 58 A7 REP 3 305c 306b Q 62 A7 REP 1 322d 323b PART II Q 18 A8 REP 1 699d 700b Q 23 A2 724c 725c
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 408c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 4-6 398d 399a PART IV PROP 29-35 431d-434a PART V AXIOM 1 452c
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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b c / *Gorgias* 267c 268a / *Timaeus* 460c d / *Lysis* bk x 760a 765d esp 761b-765d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 9 [11^b 1-7] 16c d / *Physics* bk iii ch 1 [200^b 29 32] 278b ch 2 [20 21]-ch 3 [202^b 29] 279 280c bk vii ch 1 326a 329a bk viii ch 10 [66^b 7 6-7] 354b-d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 3 [210 12 1] 361a ch 7 [275 1-29] 366a 367a ch 8 [277 13] 368c d bk iii ch 2 [300^b 8 301 12] 391d 392c [301^b 2-32] 392d 393b bk ii ch 3 401c 402c / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 6 [37 34] 421b-c ch 7-9 421d-426c bk ii ch 9-11 436d-439c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 6 [367 30-98 8] 506a ch 7 [358 31-16] 506c d bk ii ch 2 [1013^b 10] 533c d bk ix ch 14 570b d 573c ch 7 [1048^b 35 1049 18] 544c d bk xi ch 9 [1060 27 34] 594d bk xii ch 1 [1069^b 35-1070 9] 599a [1070 21 30] 599c d ch 4 [1070^b 22]-ch 8 [1074^b 14] 600b-605a [1075^b 1-37] 606b d / *Soul* bk ii ch 1 647b 648d bk iii ch 2 [426^b 6] 658a b
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- 17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* tr i ch 15 260c 264c tr iii ch 23 294d 295a
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- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 423d
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 8 [72^a 20-^b13] 264b d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 167b d CH 5 169b c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 21 27 293a 297a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 44 A 2 ANS 239b 240a Q 45 A 1 REP - 242a d Q 66 A 1 ANS 343d 345c Q I 18 A 2 REP 3 601c 603b PART II Q 1 A 3 ANS 611b 612a Q 23 A 2 ANS 724c 725c
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- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 167b 168b
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 5 235c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 67 A 2 REP 3 350b 351a Q 78 A 3 ANS 410a 411d Q 110 A 3 ANS 566d 567b
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A 1 104c 105c Q 27 A 2 ANS 154c 155b PART II Q 17 A 9 REP 2 692d 693d
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk. IV ch. 5 [212 31^b-2] 291d bk. VII ch. 4 [248 10^b-6] 330d 331b bk. VIII ch. 8-9 348b 353b / *Heavens* bk. I ch. 2-6 359d 365c ch. 7 [274^b22-29] 365d 366a [275^b12-18] 366d ch. 8 [277^b12-26] 368b c [277^b18-18] 368d / *Metaphysics* bk. XII ch. 6 [1071^b10-11] 601b ch. 7 [1072 20-22] 602b / *Soul* bk. I ch. 3 [406^b26-407^b13] 636b 637b
- 16 PROCLM *Almagest* bk. I 6a 7a 8b bk. III 86b bk. IX 270b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk. I 514a 517b 518a 519b 520b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk. IV 887a 913a 931b 933a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr. I ch. 3 36b c ch. 8 39c d tr. II ch. 1 40b c ch. 2 41b c / *Sixth Ennead* tr. III ch. 24 295b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part I q. 7 a. 3 ans 32c 33c q. 66 a. 2 ans 345d 347b
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk. VI 110b c
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* fourth day 240d 245b c
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk. II aph. 35 163a d aph. 48 186b d
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* def. III 5b def. V 6a 7a DEFINITIONS SCHOL. 11b 12a LAW I 14a LAWS OF MOTION SCHOL. 19b 20a bk. I PROP. 1-3 and SCHOL. 32b 33b bk. II PROP. 53 SCHOL. 265a 267a

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk. IV ch. 8 [21, 24 216 21] 295a d bk. V ch. 4 [228^b1, 229^b7] 309d 310a
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk. II [225 242] 17d 18a
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* first day 157b 160a third day 197b 198b 200a d 203d 205b d 209a c 224d
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk. II aph. 48 186b-d
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* def. III-IV 5b 6a LAW I II 14a b COROL. IV-VI 18a 19b

7c(3) Absolute or relative motion

- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk. IV [387 390] 49b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk. I 514b 515a 519a bk. II 557a b
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1015a II
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk. VI 115a d
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk. II aph. 36 165c 166b

34 NEWTON *Principles* DEFINITIONS SCHOL. 13a esp 9a b COROL. V VI 19a b BK. I 57-61 111b 114b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk. II ch. 2, 4 SECT. 7-10 149d 150d passim

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT. 110-113, 434b-435c

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7c(4) Terrestrial and celestial motion

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* ch. 1 224a c
- 16 PROCLM *Almagest* bk. I 5a 6a bk. IX 270b bk. III 86b 87a bk. IX 270b bk. XIII 439b
- 16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk. I 513b 514b 517b 518a 519b 520b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk. IV 888b-895b 894a 905a passim esp 904b 905a 929a 933a 934b 935b 940b 941a 959a 960a
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- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk. VI 110b c
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* fourth day 245b d
- 30 BACON *Notum Organum* bk. II aph. 36 163a b aph. 36 165d 166a aph. 48 186b d
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* la 2a bk. II 269a 3 2a passim esp ALL 1 III 270a 271a PROP. 17 276a 282b PROP. 35 SCHOL. 320b 324a CH. ERAL SCHOL. 371b 372a / *Optics* bk. III 540b 541b

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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* ch. 1 233a 235c passim / *Generation of Animals* ch. 3 243d 244a / *Generation of Animals* bk. IV ch. 3 [1-68^b16-24] 310b c
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk. II [80-90] 16a b [184-250] 17b-18b
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk. IV 894a 899a 900a 905a 906b 933b 934b 936a 937a 938b 939a
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH I
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 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [63-920]
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 17 PROCLUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 6-8 37d
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 71
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 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK I 13b 14d BK II
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 30 BACON *Notum Organum* BK I APH 50 111b
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk vii ch 1-2 326a 379a bk viii 334a 355d / *Heavens* bk iii ch 2 [300^b8-301 12] 391d 392c / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 7 421d 423b bk ii ch 6 [334^b6-9] 435a / *Metaphysics* bk iv ch 8 [1012^b22-32] 532d bk v ch ii [1018^b19-22] 539c d bk ix ch 8 [1049^b17-28] 575b c [1050 3-36] 575d 576b bk xii ch 4 [1070^b22-35] 600b ch 5 [1071 30-36] 601a ch 6-8 601b 605a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* ch i [698 10-15] 233a ch 3-6 234a 236b
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 14 120d 121a
- 16 PROLEMY *Almagest* bk i 5a b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 ANS 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b-15b Q 9 A 1 REP 1 38c 39c Q 19 A 1 REP 3 108d 109c Q 23 A 2 REP 3 144c 145b Q 46 A 1 REP 5 250a 252d Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a 278c Q 60 A 1 REP 2 310b 311a Q 75 A 1 REP 1 378b 379c QQ 105-119 538d 608d *passim* PART II Q 1 A 4 ANS 612a 613a A 6 ANS 614a c Q 6 A 1 REP 3 644d 646a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 109 A 1 ANS 338b 339c PART III SUPPL. Q 91 A 1 REP 3 1016b 1017c
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- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* bk vi 107c 110d
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- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk v [469-505] 185b-186a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 77 186a
- 42 HANT *Pur Reason* 140b d 145c 177b 179b 239a 240b / *Practical Reason* 334b 331a c / *Judgements* 597d 599d 610b 613a c

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- AGROCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 24 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 24 14
- NEW TESTAMENT *II John* 2
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b / *Republic* bk v 371a 373c / *Timaeus* 447a d 457b-458a / *Parmenides* 487c 491a / *Sophist*

- 568a / *Philebus* 634b 635b / *Sacra* 809c 810d
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 6 341b-342c
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 9 3a 1x xi par 9 11 91c 92b / *Christian Doctrine* bk 4 ch 8 10 626c 627b bk ii ch 1 38 654b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 4 25a d Q 10 A 3 REP 3 42c-43b Q 16 AA 7-8 99a 100d Q 44 A 1 REP 3 238b 239a Q 84 A 1 ANS and REP 3 440 442a Q 85 A 1 REP 2 451c 453c Q 86 A 3 463b-d Q 113 A 1 ANS 576a d
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INTRODUCTION

CITIZEN like comrade has been and still is a revolutionary word. Both words have been titles proudly adopted by men to mark their liberation from the yoke of despotism or tyranny. Both titles are still sought by those who have not yet gained admission to the fraternity of the free and equal.

The rank and status of citizenship first appeared in the ancient world with the beginning of constitutional government in the city states of Greece. The Greeks were conscious of this fact and proud of it. In terms of it they set themselves apart from the barbarians who were subjects of the Great King of Persia or the Egyptian Pharaoh. The Spartan heralds according to Herodotus thus address the Persian commander: "Thou hast experience of half the matter, but the other half is beyond thy knowledge. A slave's life thou understandest but never having tasted liberty thou canst not tell whether it is sweet or no. Ah! hadst thou known what freedom is, thou wouldst have bidden us fight for it not with the spear only but with the battle-axe."

Not only Herodotus and Thucydides but also the great tragic poets notably Aeschylus in the *Persians* record this Hellenic sense of distinction from the surrounding peoples who still lived in childlike submission to absolute rule. But the Greeks were also conscious that their political maturity as self-governing citizens was as Aristotle intimates in the *Politics* a recent development from the primitive condition in which tribal chieftains ruled despotically.

The basic distinction between *subjection* and *citizenship* is inseparable from the equally basic distinction between absolute and limited or between despotic and constitutional government. The difference between these two modes of government is treated in the chapter on

CONSTITUTION. It is sufficient here to note the difference in the authority and power possessed by rulers—according as it is absolute or limited—corresponds with a difference in the status, the degree of freedom and the rights and privileges of the people ruled.

IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND citizenship it is necessary to understand the several ways in which men can belong to or be parts of a political community. There are two divisions among men within a community which help us to define citizenship.

According to one of these divisions, the native born are separated from aliens or foreigners. In the Greek city states it was almost impossible for aliens to become citizens. Plutarch notes that Solon's law of naturalization which he qualifies as "of doubtful character" would not allow strangers to become citizens unless they were in perpetual exile from their own country or came with their whole family to trade there. The *metics* or aliens who were allowed in the city were usually a class apart.

In Rome the situation was different; it was possible for outsiders to receive the high honor of Roman citizenship. The aspiring genius of Rome, Gibbon writes, "sacrificed vanity to ambition and deemed it more prudent as well as honourable to adopt virtue and merit for her own wheresoever they were found among slaves or strangers, enemies or barbarians."

Most modern republics set up naturalization proceedings for the regular admission of some if not all immigrants to membership in the state. Yet a difference always remains between a citizen and a denizen or mere resident. Accordingly Rousseau criticizes Bodin for confusing citizens with townsmen. M. D'Almeida he says has avoided this error and is

his article on Geneva has clearly distinguished the four orders of men (or even five counting mere foreigners) who dwell in our town of which two only compose the Republic.

According to a second way in which men are divided within the political community free men are separated from slaves. The latter though they may be native-born, are not members of the political community but merely part of its property. A slave according to Aristotle is one who being a human being is also a possession. But he says in another place, property even though living beings are included in it is no part of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only but a community of equals.

On this principle Aristotle excludes more than the chattel slave from the status and privilege of citizenship. We cannot consider all those to be citizens, he writes who are necessary to the existence of the state for example children are not citizens equally with grown-up men. In ancient times and among some nations, he continues the artisan class were slaves or foreigners and therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship.

The slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, and the mechanics or laborers who are the servants of the community are to be counted as its "necessary people" but not as members of the state. When he discusses the size and character of the population for an ideal state Aristotle says, we ought not to include everybody for there must always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreigners but we should include only those who are members of the state and who form an essential part of it.

The exclusion of slaves and resident aliens from membership in the political community has a profound bearing on the meaning of the political concept expressed by the words the people. The people is not the same as the population—all those human beings who live within the state's borders. Even in societies which have abolished chattel slavery and in which suffrage tends to be unrestricted infants and aliens remain outside the pale of political life. The people is always a part—the active political part—of the population.

THE DISTINCTION OF CITIZEN FROM SLAVE, INFANT OR ALIEN does not complete the picture. The subjects of a king are not slaves nor are they citizens of a republic. Yet like citizens subjects have membership in the political community. They constitute the people the king serves as well as rules unless he is a tyrant for only if he is a tyrant does he treat them as if they were his property to be used for his own pleasure or interest. Sometimes a distinction is made between first and second class citizens and then the latter who occupy an intermediate position between citizenship and slavery are regarded as subjects. Since there are many forms of government Aristotle writes, there must be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens who are subjects so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others. The whole meaning of citizenship changes for Aristotle when the working classes are admitted to it.

From a somewhat different point of view Aquinas holds that a man can be said to be a citizen in two ways first absolutely secondly in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen absolutely if he has all the rights of citizenship for instance the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly. On the other hand any man may be called citizen only in a restricted sense if he dwells within the state even lowly people or children or old men who are not fit to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common welfare. Those who are thus disfranchised but are not slaves are subjects rather than citizens in the full sense.

It is possible of course for men to have the dual status of subject and citizen as is the case now in England and the self governing dominions of the British Commonwealth. This double status does not blur the distinction between citizen and subject rather it signifies the mixed nature of a form of government which is both royal—at least in its vestiges of monarchy—and constitutional. In the time of Locke when a great constitutional victory had been won against the despotism of the last Stuart the English people did not yet regard themselves as citizens. Observing that the title of citizen has never been given to the subjects of any prince not even the ancient Macedonians Rousseau finds himself compelled to add not

even the English of today though they are nearer liberty than anyone else

Unlike citizens the subjects of a king especially of one claiming absolute power have no voice in their own government and no legal means for protecting their natural rights as men. So long as the absolute ruler does not tyrannize he governs for the welfare of his people and so though a despot in the sense of wielding absolute power over political inferiors he is benevolent in the sense of serving rather than using them. But if he ceases to be benevolent and turns tyrannical his subjects have no recourse except rebellion. They must resort to violence in order to emancipate themselves from a condition which amounts to slavery.

A citizen on the other hand is safeguarded in his legal as well as in his natural rights and in some modern republics at least he is provided with juridical means for rectifying supposed injustices. For citizens the right of rebellion is the last not the only resort.

THE DISTINCT CONDITIONS of slavery subject and citizenship can be summarized by defining three ways in which rulers are related to the persons they rule. These three relations seem to have been first clearly differentiated by Aristotle.

He finds all three relationships in the structure of the household as that is constituted in antiquity. Of household management he writes:

there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves another of a father and third of a husband. In each case the kind of rule differs the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female or the man over the child.

As we have already seen Aristotle conceives the slave as a piece of property. When he says that the slave wholly belongs to his master or that he is a part of his master a living but separated part of his bodily frame he is obviously considering only the chattel slave. There are as the chapter on SLAVERY indicates other kinds or degrees of slavery less extreme than this.

But chattel slavery more clearly than the attenuated forms of servitude defines the nature of mastery. The master manages or uses

the slave as he manages and uses other instruments—animate tools or domesticated animals. The rule of a master Aristotle declares is exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master. Yet it accidentally considers the slave since if the slave perish the rule of the master perishes with him.

Thus conceived the slave lacks every vestige of political liberty. He is treated as radically inferior to his master—almost as if he were something less than a man. He has no voice in his own government nor is his welfare the paramount consideration of his ruler. In short we have slavery when one man governs another in the way in which a man manages his property using it for his own good.

When one man governs another in the way in which good parents administer the affairs of children as members of the household we have the type of rule which also appears in the relation between absolute kings or benevolent despots and their subjects. The rule of a father over his children is royal. Aristotle writes that he rules by virtue of both love and of the respect due to age exercising a kind of royal power. A king Aristotle adds is the natural superior of his subjects but he should be of the same kin or kind with them and such is the relation of elder and younger father and son.

From the analogous type of rule in the family we see two differences between the condition of a slave and that of a subject under absolute or despotic rule in the state. The inferiority of children unlike that of slaves is not their permanent condition. It is an aspect of their immaturity. They are temporarily incapable of judging what is for their good and so need the direction of their superiors in age experience and prudence. But children have some equality with their parents, to the extent that their humanity is recognized as the reason why they should not be ruled as slaves but governed for their own welfare.

The government of children Aristotle declares is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties but essentially for the good of the governed. In the same way the subjects of a benevolent despot or of any absolute monarch who rules paternalistically are said to be

governed for their own good. They are served or used by their rulers, and to this extent they have a degree of political liberty. But they do not have the complete liberty which exists only in self-government.

That occurs only under constitutional rule which for Aristotle has an imperfect analogue in the family in the relation of husband and wife. In the state however it is perfectly represented by the relation between the holders of public office and other citizens. In the constitutional state Aristotle says "the citizens rule and are ruled by turns for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal and do not differ at all. The citizen in other words is one who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state. Rousseau seems to have a similar conception of the citizen as both ruling and ruled though he uses the word subject to designate the citizen as ruled. "The people," he writes, "are called citizens as sharing in the sovereign power and subjects as being under the laws of the State."

Because the man who holds office in a constitutional government is first of all a citizen himself, and only secondly an official vested with the authority of a political agent, the citizen is a man ruled by his equals and ruled as an equal. Observing these facts Aristotle describes citizenship as the one and finite office set up by a constitution. It is indefinite both in tenure and by comparison with the various magistracies or other offices which have more definitely assigned functions. Since a citizen is ruled only by other citizens, and since he has the opportunity of ruling others in turn, citizenship involves political liberty in the fullest sense. This does not mean freedom from government, but freedom through self-government—all the freedom a man can have in society, liberty under law and proportioned to justice.

Two of these three political conditions—slavery and subjection—naturally receive fuller treatment in the chapter on Slavery. The discussion of the third, citizenship, belongs not only to this chapter but also to the chapter on Constitution and to other chapters which deal with forms of constitutional government such as Aristocracy, Democracy and Oligarchy.

For the same reason that the revolutionaries against absolutism or despotism in the 18th century use the phrase free government for republican institutions they also use citizen to designate a free man, a man who possesses the political liberty and equality which they regard as the natural right of men because they are men. In this respect they do not differ substantially from their Greek or Roman ancestors who prize constitutional government and citizenship as conditions of freedom and equality.

Furthermore like the constitutionalists of antiquity the republicans of the 18th century are with few if any exceptions, not democrats in the sense of extending the rights and privileges of citizenship to all adults. In the 18th century slavery still exists and a large part even of those who are not in economic bondage remains outside the pale of citizenship, disqualified by accidents of birth such as race or sex and by the lack of sufficient wealth or property which makes it necessary for them to labor in order to live. It is not only an ancient oligarch like Aristotle who thinks that the ruling class should be the owners of property for they are citizens, and the citizen of a state should be in good circumstances whereas mechanics should have no share in the state. In the 18th century as well as in ancient Greece extending the privileges of citizenship to indentured apprentices, day laborers or journeymen is a form of radicalism known as extreme democracy.

Hant may be taken as representative of an enlightened point of view in the 18th century. He finds that there are three juridical attributes that belong by right to the citizens: 1 constitutional freedom as the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent or approval; 2 civil equality as the right of the citizen to recognize no one as a superior among the people in relation to himself; and 3 political independence as the right to one's existence and continuance in society not to the arbitrary will of another but to his own merits and powers as a member of the commonwealth.

The last attribute leads Hant to distinguish between active and passive citizenship. Although he admits that this appears to stand in contradiction to the definition of a citizen as

such he concludes that there are some in the community not entitled to the full privileges of citizenship. It is his contention, widely shared in the 18th century, that suffrage which properly constitutes the political qualification of a citizen presupposes the independence or self-sufficiency of the individual citizen among the people.

Consequently he denies suffrage to every one who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others. Such a restriction, he says, includes the apprentice of a merchant or tradesman, a servant who is not in the employ of the state, a minor, and all women. They are passive parts of the state and do not have the right to deal with the state as active members of it, to reorganize it, or to take action by way of introducing certain laws. Kant insists, however, that it must be made possible for them to raise themselves from this passive condition in the State to the condition of active citizenship.

THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION shows the connection between the idea of citizenship and the two revolutionary movements which John Stuart Mill notes in the history of political thought and action. The first is the movement to obtain recognition of certain immunities called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which if he did infringe, specific resistance or general rebellion was held to be justifiable. This is the revolutionary effort to overthrow despotism and to establish constitutional government with the status of citizenship for at least some part of the population—frequently much less than half of the total.

The second revolutionary movement goes further. It presupposes the existence of government by law and aims to perfect it. It therefore seeks to obtain the establishment of constitutional checks by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, is made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. Since, according to Mill, it aims to make the consent of the governed effective through an adequate representation of their wishes, this movement inevitably leads to

the fight against franchise restrictions and for universal suffrage, which would admit every normal adult human being to the freedom and equality of citizenship.

The first revolution has a long history. It begins with the Greek city states which, having won this victory against the Persians, lost it to the Macedonian conquerors. It happens again after the establishment of the Roman republic after the expulsion of the Tarquins, and is undone when the Caesars assume absolute power. This part of the story is told with varying emotions by Plutarch and Polybius, Tacitus and Gibbon. During the Middle Ages the same struggle appears in the various efforts to establish the supremacy of law, particularly through the development of customary and canon law. The revolution still continues in the 17th and 18th centuries and the new heights it reaches are reflected in the writings of a constitutionalist like Locke and republicans like Rousseau, Kant, and the American Federalists. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are perhaps the classic documents of this historical phase.

The second revolution, particularly identified with the fight for universal suffrage, is a relatively recent event. Its roots may go back as far as Cromwell's time to the activity of the Levellers, and in the 18th century to the writings of John Cartwright. But what is, perhaps, its first full expression does not appear until Mill's *Representative Government*. In that book, Mill lays down the principles of the franchise reforms which began in the 19th century but which, as in the case of woman suffrage or the repeal of the poll tax, were carried through only yesterday or are still in progress.

Yet the struggle for universal suffrage—or, as Mill would say, against treating any human being as a political pariah—does have an ancient parallel in the conflict between democratic and oligarchical constitutions in Greek political life and thought. These two types of constitution were opposed on the qualifications for citizenship and public office. The oligarchical constitution restricted both to men of considerable wealth. At the other extreme, as Aristotle observes, the most radical forms of Greek democracy granted citizenship to the working classes and gave no advantage to the rich in

filling the magistracies for they selected officials from the whole citizenry by lot.

The parallelism goes no further than that Greek democracy even when it denied special privileges to the propertied classes never contemplated the abolition of slavery or the political emancipation of women.

THERE ARE OTHER differences between ancient and modern institutions which affect the character of citizenship. The problem of who shall be admitted to citizenship is fundamental in both epochs. Insofar as it connotes the condition of political liberty and equality the status of citizenship remains essentially the same. But the rights and duties, the privileges and immunities which belong to citizenship vary with the difference between ancient and modern constitutionalism.

Even if they had been written the constitutions of the ancient world would not have declared the rights of man and the citizen nor would they have had bills of rights appended to them. The significance of these modern innovations (which begin perhaps with Magna Carta) lies not in a new conception of citizenship but in the intention of juridical means to endow the primary office of citizenship with sufficient legal power to protect it from invasion by government.

In *The Federalist* Hamilton maintains that bills of rights are in their origin stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favour of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Defending the absence of a special bill of rights in the original Constitution he insists that the Constitution is itself in every rational sense and to every useful purpose a bill of rights. It declares and specifies the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government and defines certain immunities and modes of proceeding which are relative to personal and private concern.

Nevertheless, the right of free speech and free assembly and the right to trial by a jury of peers along with the immunity from unwarranted searches and seizures or from ex post facto laws and bills of attainder provided by the early amendments to the Constitution do

give the citizen additional protection against interference in the performance of his civic duties such as independent political thought and action or in the exercise of his human privileges such as freedom of religion or worship. The invention of these constitutional devices sprang from the bitter experience of coercion and intimidation under Star Chamber proceedings, royal censorship and unlimited police power. A citizen who can be coerced or intimidated by his government differs only in name from the subject of an absolute despot.

In addition to having these legal safeguards modern differs from ancient citizenship in the way in which its rights and privileges are exercised. The machinery of suffrage is not the same when citizens act through elected representatives and when they participate directly in the deliberations and decisions of government by voting in the public forum.

THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION for citizenship is in some respects stated in almost identical terms by such different political philosophers as Plato and John Stuart Mill.

In both the *Republic* and the *Laws* Plato emphasizes that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason which the law affirms. By this he means not only that education will affect the laws but also that the laws themselves have an educational task to perform. The educational program is thus planned and conducted by the state. The guardians—the only citizens in the *Republic* in the full sense of the term—are trained for public life first by the discipline of their passions and second by the cultivation of their minds. Their passions are disciplined by music and gymnastics; their minds cultivated by the liberal arts and dialectic.

In the democracy which Mill contemplates as an ideal the most important point of excellence is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. He does not outline a specific curriculum for the training of citizens but it is clear that he thinks their education cannot be accomplished in the schools alone. The superiority of democracy according to Mill lies in the fact that it calls upon the citizen to weigh interests not his own to be guided in case of conflicting claims by another

rule than his private partialities to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. In this school of public spirit a man becomes a citizen by doing the work of a citizen and so learning to act like one.

If the future citizen is to act like a free man must he not also be trained in youth to think like one? Vocational training prepares a man to be an artisan not a citizen. Only liberal education is adequate to the task of creating the free and critical intelligence required for citizenship. Hence in a state which rests on universal suffrage the educational problem becomes greatly enlarged in scope if not in intrinsic difficulty.

With the advent of universal suffrage which Mill advocates the state must face the responsibility for making liberal education available to every future citizen. To say that all normal children have enough intelligence to become citizens but to regard the native endowment of a large number of them as incapable of liberal education makes a travesty of citizenship. Will the child who cannot profit by liberal education be able to discharge the duties of the office to which he will be admitted upon coming of age?

THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER is always more difficult than the training of mind. In education for citizenship the problem of moral training involves the question—discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE—whether the good man and the good citizen are identical in virtue.

For Aristotle and seemingly also for Mill the virtue of the good man under an ideal constitution would be identical with that of the good citizen. As both ruling and being ruled the good citizen ought to be capable of both. Aristotle writes: "He should know how to govern like a freeman and how to obey like a free man—these are the virtues of a citizen. And although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject the virtue of a good man will include both for the virtue

of the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g. his justice will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds: the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey."

The virtues of the citizen direct him primarily in the performance of his obligations to the state. But if the welfare of the state is not the ultimate end of man if there are higher goods which command human loyalty if man's common humanity takes precedence over his membership in a particular state then civic virtue does not exhaust human excellence. There may be morally required of the good man that of the good citizen. The virtues of the saint and the patriot may be of a different order.

On this question the great books reveal a fundamental disagreement among moralists and political philosophers who differ as Plato and Hegel differ from Augustine and Aquinas, or from Locke and Mill on the place of the state in human life.

The ancients frequently appeal to a law higher than that of the state. Socrates forever stands as the classic example of one who would rather die than disobey his inner voice—the command of his conscience. A Stoic like Marcus Aurelius is willing to give unqualified allegiance to the political community only when it is the ideal city of man embracing the whole human brotherhood. My city and my country so far as I am Antoninus he says is Rome but so far as I am a man—whose nature is rational and social—it is the world.

For Christian theologians membership in the city of God is a higher vocation than citizenship in any earthly community—even when that is the city of man at its best. The city of God demands a higher order of virtue than the city of man. Referring to the earthly city Augustine says that the things which this city desires cannot justly be said to be evil for it is itself in its own kind better than all other human goods. For it desires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods. It is all right for men to seek these things for they are good things and without doubt the gifts of God. But Augustine goes on to say if they neglect the better things of the heavenly city which are secured by eternal victory and peace never-ending and so inordinately covet these present good things that they believe them to be the

only desirable things," then in Augustine's opinion they are misdirected in their love.

In giving precedence to the commandments of God the theologians do not deprecate the commands of the state or the obligations of citizenship. But those who belong to both cities may find themselves faced with a conflict between the law of the state and the divine law. In such circumstances, the faithful have no choice. They must obey God before man. Laws that are contrary to the commandments of God "ought as hold do not bind a man in conscience" and "should not be obeyed."

THIS CONFLICT BETWEEN human and divine law finds expression in antiquity in the *Antigone* of Sophocles. It was not Zeus who had published me that edict. Ant. one says of the human law she disobeys nor deemed I that the decrees were of such force that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For this life is not of to-day or yesterday but from all time and no man knows when they were first put forth.

The problem which Antigone faces can occur in as many other ways as there are possibilities of tension between individual conscience or de-

sire and political obligation. Whatever form this takes the conflict confronts the political philosopher with all the questions that constitute the problem of the individual and society or man and the state.

To what extent and in what respects is the individual's personality sacred and inviolable by the state? How much freedom from government has the individual? What right to demand? How much individual sacrifice has the state a right to expect? Is the state merely a means in the individual's pursuit of happiness or the end to which all other goods must be ordered? Is man made for the state or the state for man?

To questions of this sort the answers range from philosophical anarchism at one extreme to equally philosophical totalitarianism at the other with all degrees of individualism and communism in between. The general problem of man and the state with all its controversial issues runs through many other chapters—such as CONSTITUTION, GOOD AND EVIL, LAW, LIBERTY and STATE—but we have placed its principal formulation in this chapter because the concept of citizenship signifies the ideal condition of the human individual as a member of the political community.

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- 2 The conception of citizenship 17
 - 2a The status or office of citizenship in relation to the principle of constitutional government
 - 2b The distinction between citizen and subject: the distinction between the subjects of a constitutional monarchy and of a despotism 28
 - 2c The character and extent of citizenship under different types of constitutions
- 3 The qualification for citizenship: extent of suffrage
- 4 The rights, duties, privileges and immunities of citizenship
- 5 The virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the good man
- 6 Education for citizenship 9
- 7 Political citizenship and membership in the city of God 230
- 8 The idea of world citizenship: the political brotherhood of man
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rule than his private partialities to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. In this school of public spirit a man becomes a citizen by doing the work of a citizen and so learning to act like one.

If the future citizen is to act like a free man must he not also be trained in youth to think like one? Vocational training prepares a man to be an artisan not a citizen. Only liberal education is adequate to the task of creating the free and critical intelligence required for citizenship. Hence in a state which rests on universal suffrage the educational problem becomes greatly enlarged in scope if not in intrinsic difficulty.

With the advent of universal suffrage which Mill advocates the state must face the responsibility for making liberal education available to every future citizen. To say that all normal children have enough intelligence to become citizens but to regard the native endowment of a large number of them as incapable of liberal education makes a travesty of citizenship. Will the child who cannot profit by liberal education be able to discharge the duties of the office to which he will be admitted upon coming of age?

THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER is always more difficult than the training of mind. In education for citizenship the problem of moral training involves the question—discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE—whether the good man and the good citizen are identical in virtue.

For Aristotle and seemingly also for Mill the virtue of the good man under an ideal constitution would be identical with that of the good citizen. As both ruler and being ruled the good citizen ought to be capable of both. Aristotle writes: "He should know how to govern like a freeman and how to obey like a free man—these are the virtues of a citizen. And although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject the virtue of a good man will include both for the virtue

of the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g. his justice will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds: the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey."

The virtues of the citizen direct him primarily in the performance of his obligations to the state. But if the welfare of the state is not the ultimate end of man if there are higher goods which command human loyalty if man's common humanity takes precedence over his membership in a particular state then civic virtue does not exhaust human excellence. More may be morally required of the good man than of the good citizen. The virtues of the saint and the patriot may be of a different order.

On this question the great books reveal a fundamental disagreement among moralists and political philosophers who differ as Plato and Hegel differ from Augustine and Aquinas, or from Locke and Mill on the place of the state in human life.

The ancients frequently appeal to a law higher than that of the state. Socrates forever stands as the classic example of one who would rather die than disobey his inner voice—the command of his conscience. A Stoic like Marcus Aurelius is willing to give unqualified allegiance to the political community only when it is the ideal city of man embracing the whole human brotherhood. My city and my country so far as I am Antoninus he says is Rome but so far as I am a man—whose nature is rational and social—it is the world.

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk 11 [26, 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk 11 [65-83] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45-(D) II *Esdas* 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII IX 401d-420d / *Laus* BK VIII 733d 734a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH II 413b d *passim* / *Politics* BK III CH I 471b d 472c CH 5 475a d CH 13 [1283¹⁴ 1.84 3] 482a BK IV

- CH 3 488d 489b CH 8-9 493c 494d BK I CH [1301²⁵-1302 15] 502b 503b BK VI CH [1319¹²-33] 523a b CH II 524b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [136³ 9 1366 3] 603a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 14 2b-c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* CH II 4a 7c BK III 9a 11a BK V 18b d 25a 33 33a c *passim* BK VI 68b d 75a BK VII 81b d 85c BK VIII 99b 100c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 271a b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 223c 224a 405b 404d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114b d / *Science of Right* 450b d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 51c 52d *passim* NUMBER 14 60b
43 MILL *Representative Government* 350a 37b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 273d 274a

3 *The qualifications for citizenship extent of suffrage*

- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Frogs* [686-705] 572a b / *Lysistrata* [575-580] 590c d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 39b-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 416a / *Social Contract* 605d 608d / *Laus* BK V 690d 691b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1273³³ 34] 466c BK III CH 1-5 471b d 475d BK VI CH 4 [1319¹²-33] 523a b CH 6 524b c BK VII CH 4 [1326 3 25] 530a d CH 9 533a d *passim* CH 12 [1329 18-30] 533c d / *Athensian Constitution* CH 21 562b-c CH 26 par 3 4 563a CH 4 572b d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365²⁹-1366 3] 608a b
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 73d / *Pericles* 139c 140a
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 107 A 3 ANS and REP 2 316a 318b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 6b BK VI 114c 115b BK VIII 189a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 428a-432b *passim*
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 168d 169a BK IV 269d 271d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14a d 15c 17a b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c 450d 452a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 2 [204 205] 13b AMENDMENTS XIV SECT 1 2 18c d XV 19b XIX 19d XXIII 20d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 42 138d 139c *passim* NUMBER 5 165a c NUMBER 54 171a b NUMBER 57 177a 178c d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 380c 389b 395b c

4 *The rights duties privileges and immunities of citizenship*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 12 48-49 22:21 23:9 / *Leviticus* 19 33-34 24:22 / *Numbers* 35 30 / *Deuteronomy* 10 18 19 17 6 19 15 20 1-9

(5) *The virtues of the citizen and the virtues of the good man*

- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45b 48b c / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175a / *Aristides* 263d / *Lysander* 361a d / *Agessilaus* 480b d 481a / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Demosthenes* 699c 700a
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 191c d BK IV 267c d
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II 6b 10a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b-162d BK XIV CH 17 522b 523a CH 21 524a 525a CH 24-26 528b 529a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 61 A 5 58b 59d Q 92 A 1 esp REP 3 213c 214c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VI [58-75] 9a XI [1-66] 15a d XV [55-78] 21d XVI [64-78] 23a b XXVII [70] XXXIII [90] 48c 50c passim PURGATORY VI [58 151] 61b 62c XVII [91 123] 79b d PARADISE XV [97]-XVI [154] 129b 132a
- 22 HOBBS *Leviathan* CONCLUSION 279a c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 48a b 381a 388c 390c 391c 480b-482b 486b 489b 490c 491d
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* ACT V SC V [68-81] 596a c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 74b c 81d 82a 94b 95b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b 49a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 73 446c 447a
- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [843-870] 358a b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 6 173a
- 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 5-6 105a c
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 112a 115b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* CH 1a d BK III 9b 12a BK IV 13b d 15a 15c 16a BK V 18d 19d 21b 23a 31b c BK VII 44d-45c BK VIII 51a 52c 55c d BK XIX 137a c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323a 328a 360b d [fn 1] 366b d / *Political Economy* 369b 370a 372a 377b / *Social Contract* BK II 402b 403a BK III 411a c 412a b BK IV 428a 432b passim 434b 435a
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337d 338c 340c 343d 346c 347d
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 630b d 631a 644b 645c
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 55 174c d
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 329b 330a 334b 336c 341c passim esp 337a b 346c 350a passim
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 393a c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 268 84c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171b c PART II 272a d PART IV 365b c
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 314c 316a 321b c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 244d 245d BK XII 537b 538a BK XV 634a 635a EPILOGUE I 668a 669c EPILOGUE II 686c 687a

6 Education for citizenship

- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Frogs* [1008 1098] 576b 577c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 17a BK II 396c 397d

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 43a 47c / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a BK IV 3-5 BK V 366a c BK VI 380d 381a / *Statesman* 607b 608d / *Lysis* BK I II 645a 663d ep I 644b 645c BK VII 713c 731d BK VIII 73 b 735a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 2 [1003 1051] 339c d CH 9 [1099b29-32] 345b BK V CH 1 [1130b25-29] 378b BK X CH 9 434a 436a c / *Politics* BK II CH 5 [1263b36-1264a1] 459a [1264 26-32] 459c CH 7 [1266b27 35] 462b c BK III CH 4 [1277 14 29] 474a 475a BK IV CH 9 [1293b19 24] 494c BK V CH 9 [1307b22] 512b c BK VI CH 13 [1332 28 30] 537a b CH 14 [1332b42-1334 11] 537d 538d CH 15 [1334b7-28] 539b d CH 17 541a 542a c BK VIII 542a 548a c passim / *Athensian Constitution* CH 42 572b d

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14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 33c 34a 39a 45b / *Lycurgus Numa* 61b d 64a c / *Solon* 64b d 77a c passim / *Agessilaus* 480b d 481a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VIII [115 148] 118b c

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7 Political citizenship and membership in the city of God

- OLD TESTAMENT I Samuel II 9 18--(D) I Kings 8 9 18 / Jeremiah 29 4 7 esp 29--(D) Jeremiah 29 4-7 esp 29 7
- APOCRYPHA I Maccabees I 41-2 70--(D) OT I Maccabees I 43 2 70 / II Maccabees 6 8 7 42--(D) OT II Maccabees 6 8 7 42

CROSS REFERENCES

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 Other comparisons of citizens with subjects or slaves see JUSTICE 9d SLAVERY 6a-6c
 The bearing of different types of constitution on the character of citizenship and especially on the extent of the franchise see CONSTITUTION 5-5b DEMOCRACY 4-4a(2) 5b(2) OLIGARCHY 5-5a
 The political machinery such as elections and representation by which the citizen exercises his suffrage see CONSTITUTION 9-9b DEMOCRACY 5b-5b(4) GOVERNMENT 1h
 The consideration of civic virtue in relation to virtue generally see VIRTUE AND VICE 1b and for the problem of education for citizenship see ARISTOCRACY 5 DEMOCRACY 6 EDUCATION 8d STATE 7d VIRTUE AND VICE 7a
 Another discussion of the distinction between the city of man and the city of God see STATE 2g and for matters relevant to the ideal of world citizenship see LOVE 4c STATE 10f WAR AND PEACE 11d
 Descriptions of the historical struggle for citizenship and for the extension of the franchise see LABOR 7d LIBERTY 6b SLAVERY 6c TYRANNY 8

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

- MACHIAVELLI *The Discourses* BK I
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II

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MERRIAM *The Making of Citizens*

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Chapter 12. CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

THE idea of a constitution as establishing and organizing a political community the principle of constitutionality as determining a generic form of government having many varieties and the nature of constitutional government—these three problems are so intimately connected that they must be treated together. We have used the word "constitution" to express the root notion from which all other matters considered in this chapter are derived.

It is impossible to say precisely what a constitution is in a way that will fit the political reality of the Greek city states, the Roman republic and its transformation into the empire, medieval kingdoms and communes and their gradual metamorphosis into the limited monarchies and republics of modern times. No definition can adequately comprehend all the variations of meaning to be found in the great works of political theory and history. But there are a number of related points in the various meanings of "constitution" which indicate what is common to the understanding of such diverse thinkers as Plato and Locke, Aristotle and Rousseau, Kant and Mill, Montesquieu and Hegel, Aquinas, Hobbes and the American Federalists.

It has been said that the constitution is the form of the state. This can be interpreted to mean that the political as opposed to the domestic community requires a constitution in order to exist just as a work of art has the very principle of its being in the form which the artist imposes upon matter. In the context of his general theory of political association, Aristotle remarks that the man who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors may imply that the idea of a constitution is the creative principle by which the state was or g

nally formed—or at least differentiated from the tribe and family.

Kant gives explicit expression to the notion that the invention of constitutions is coeval with the formation of states. "The act by which a People is represented as constituting itself in to a State," he writes, "is termed the Original Contract" and this in turn signifies the rightfulness of the process of organizing the Constitution.

In this sense the constitution appears to be identical with the organization of a state. It would then seem to follow that every state no matter what its form of government is constitutional in character. But this would leave no basis for the fundamental distinction between constitutional and non constitutional—or what is usually called absolute royal or "despotic"—government.

That basic distinction among forms of government is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is first made by Plato in the *Statesman* in terms of the role of law in government. It occurs at the very opening of Aristotle's *Politics* with his insistence on the difference between the king and the statesman and between royal and political government. But Locke seems to go further than the ancients when he says that "absolute monarchy" is inconsistent with civil society and so can be no form of civil government at all.

In addition to affirming the gravity of the distinction between constitutional and non constitutional government, he seems to be denying that the latter can constitute the form of a truly civil society as opposed to a domestic society or the primitive patriarchy of a tribe. Yet Locke obviously does not deny the historic fact that there have been communities which otherwise appear to be states, that have the character or form determined by absolute

government His point therefore seems to be that among types of government absolute monarchy does not fit the nature of civil society

If constitution is used merely as a synonym for form or type then even a state under absolute monarchy or despotic government can be said to have a constitution Since every state is of some type it can be said that it has a certain constitution or that it is constituted in a certain way If however we use the word constitution to conform to the distinction between constitutional and non constitutional government we are compelled to say that there are states which do not have constitutions

With this distinction in mind the statement that the constitution is the form of the state takes on a different and more radical meaning It signifies that there are communities larger than and distinct from the family or the tribe which cannot be called states in the strict sense because they do not have constitutions Hegel for instance points out that it would be contrary even to commonplace ideas to call patriarchal conditions a constitution or a people under patriarchal government a state or its independence sovereignty In such conditions what is lacking he writes is the objectivity of possessing in its own eyes and in the eyes of others a universal and universally valid embodiment in laws Without such an objective law and an explicitly established rational constitution its autonomy is not sovereignty

From this it would appear that a despotically governed community such as ancient Persia is a political anomaly It is intermediate between the family and the state for it is like a state in its extent and in the size and character of its population yet it is not a state in its political form The truly political community is constitutionally organized and governed In this sense the English words political and constitutional become almost interchangeable and we can understand how these two English words translate a single word in Greek political discourse

AS THE FORM of the state the constitution is the principle of its organization Whether writ-

ten or unwritten whether a product of custom or explicit enactment a constitution Aristotle writes is the organization of offices in a state and determines what is to be the governing body and what is the end of each community

The idea of political office—of officials and official status—is inseparable from the idea of constitution That is why the concept of citizenship is also inseparable from constitution As the chapter on CITIZEN indicates citizenship is the primary or indefinite office set up by a constitution Citizenship is always the prerequisite for holding any other more definite office in a constitutional government from juryman to chief magistrate In specifying its qualifications for citizenship a constitution sets the minimum qualifications for all other offices which usually though not always demand more than citizenship of the man who is to fill them

A political office represents a share of political power and authority Those are to be called offices Aristotle explains to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding especially the last for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate As representing a share of political power and authority a political office can be said to constitute a share of sovereignty That would not seem to be true however for those who like Rousseau maintain that sovereignty is indivisible Yet Rousseau also admits that each magistrate is almost always charged with some government function and exercises a function of sovereignty

Since it is an arrangement of offices a constitution is therefore also a division or partition of the whole sovereignty of government or at least of the exercise of sovereignty—into units which have certain functions to perform and which must be given the requisite power and authority to perform them These units are political offices defined according to the functions and vested with a certain power and authority depending on their place and position within the whole

Hamilton's maxim that every power ought to be in proportion to its object formulate the equation by which the function of an office or its duties determines its rights and power

privileges and immunities. And except for the provision of a temporary dictatorship in the early Roman constitution or its modern constitutional equivalent in emergency grants of power to political officers under constitutional government all ways represent limited amounts of power and authority—limited in that each is always only a part of the whole.

A constitution defines and relates the various political offices. It determines the qualifications of office-holders. But it does not name the individuals who from all those qualified shall be selected for any office. Because its provisions are in this sort of generality a constitution has the character of law. This is equally true of written and unwritten constitutions of those shaped by custom and those enacted by constituent assemblies.

Unlike all other man-made laws a constitution is the law which creates and regulates government itself rather than the law which government creates and by which it regulates the conduct of men, their relation to one another and to the state. This is perhaps the basic distinction with regard to the laws of the state.

The fundamental law in every commonwealth, says Hobbes, is that which being taken away the commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved. Montesquieu distinguishes what he calls the law political which constitutes the state from ordinary legislation and Rousseau likewise divides the laws into the political or fundamental laws and the civil laws—those which determine the form of the government and those which the government once it is constituted enacts and enforces.

In addition to being the source of all other positive laws of the state—for it sets up the very machinery of lawmaking—a constitution is fundamental law in that it establishes the standard of legality by which all subsequent laws are measured. Aristotle observes that the justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity with constitutions. What may be a just enactment in one state may be unjust in another according to the difference of their constitutions.

In American practice and that modeled upon it a law which violates the letter or spirit of the

constitution is judged to be unconstitutional and is deprived thereby of the authority of law.

Every act of a delegated authority Hamilton writes in *The Federalist* contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal, that the servant is above his master, that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves, that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize but what they forbid.

The conception of a constitution as a law or set of laws antecedent to all acts of government inevitably raises the question of how or by whom constitutions are made. If the provisions of a constitution were precepts of natural law they would according to the theory of natural law be discovered by reason, not positively instituted. But though constitutions have the character of positive law they cannot be made as other positive laws are made—by legislators, i.e. men holding that office under the constitution.

The generally accepted answer is that a constitution is made by the people who form the political community. But as Madison observes some evidence exists to the contrary. It is not a little remarkable, he writes, that in every case reported by ancient history in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men but has been performed by some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity. He cites many examples from Plutarch to support this observation, but he adds the comment that it cannot be ascertained to what extent these lawgivers were clothed with the legitimate authority of the people. In some cases, however, he claims that the proceeding was strictly regular.

The writers of *The Federalist* are of course primarily concerned with a constitution that is not the work of one man but the enactment of a constituent assembly or constitutional convention. From their knowledge of British law they are also well aware that a constitution may

government His point therefore seems to be that among types of government absolute monarchy does not fit the nature of civil society

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Hamilton's maxim that every power ought to be in proportion to its object formulates the equation by which the function of an office or its duties determines its rights and powers

arbitrary and at pleasure so it ought to be
 created by established and promulgated laws
 Both the people may know this duty
 and be safe and secure within the limits of the
 law and the rulers too kept within their due
 bounds.

As Locke states the distinction between
 government by laws and government by men
 it seems to be identical with the distinction between
 constitutional and non constitutional
 government. In the latter an individual man
 invests himself with sovereignty and as sovereign
 puts himself above all human law being
 both its source and the arbiter of its legality.
 Such government is absolute for nothing limits
 the power the sovereign man exercises as a
 prerogative vested in his person. In constitutional
 government men are not sovereigns but
 office-holders having only a share of the sovereignty.
 They rule not through *de facto* power
 but through the juridical power which is
 vested in the office they hold. That power is
 both created and limited by the law of the constitution
 which defines the various offices of
 government.

ALTHOUGH ABSTRACTLY or in theory absolute
 and constitutional government are clearly distinct—
 more than that opposed—political history
 contains the record of intermediate types.
 These can be regarded as imperfect embodiments
 of the principle of constitutionality or
 as attenuations of absolute rule by constitutional
 encroachments. Despite their incompatibility
 in principle historic circumstances have
 managed to combine absolute with constitutional
 government. It is this combination which
 medieval jurists and philosophers call the
 mixed regime or the *regimen regale et politicum*
 royal and political government.

It may be thought that a foreshadowing of
 the medieval mixed regime can be found in
 Plato's Laws in the passage in which the
 Athenian Stranger says that monarchy and
 democracy are the two mother forms of states
 from which the rest may be truly derived. He
 then asserts that to combine liberty with
 dominion, you must have both these forms of
 government as a measure. Since the Persian
 despotism is cited as the highest form of monarchy
 and the Athenian constitution as the archetypal

type of democracy the combination proposed
 would seem to be a mixture of absolute with
 constitutional government. But the Athenian
 Stranger also says that there ought to be no
 great and unmixed powers if the arbitrary is
 to be avoided and since the whole tenor of the
 book as indicated by its title is to uphold the
 supremacy of law it is doubtful that a truly
 mixed regime is intended—a government which
 is partly absolute and partly constitutional.

Aristotle furthermore gives us reason to
 think that such a mixture would be unthinkable
 to a Greek. At least in his own vocabulary
 the terms royal and political are as contradictory
 as round and square. Royal or kingly government
 for Aristotle is absolute monarchy or
 the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all. In
 royal government there are no political offices
 and no citizens. The ruler is sovereign in his
 own person and the ruled are subject to his
 will which is both the source of law and
 exempt from all legal limitations.

To Aristotle political government means
 pure constitutionalism. It exists only where
 the citizens rule and are ruled in turn for
 when the state is framed upon the principle of
 equality and likeness the citizens think they
 ought to hold office by turns. To the generic
 form of constitutional government Aristotle
 sometimes gives the name of polity though
 he also uses this name for the mixed constitution
 which combines democratic with oligarchical
 criteria for citizenship and public office.
 The mixed constitution is not to be confused
 with the mixed regime for it is a mixture of
 different constitutional principles not of constitutionalism
 itself with absolute government. When the word
 polity signifies constitutional government generally
 it has the meaning which the Romans express
 by the word *res publica* and which the constitutionalists
 of the 18th century call free government.

The distinctive characteristics of such government—
 whether it is called political republicanism
 constitutional or free—lie in the fact
 that the citizens are both rulers and ruled that
 no man not even the chief magistrate is above
 the law that all political power or authority is
 derived from and limited by the constitution
 which being popular in origin cannot be
 changed except by the people as a whole.

sometimes be the product of custom growing and altering with change of custom. But however it is exercised, the constitutive power is held by them to reside in the constituents of the state, the sovereign people. This power may be exercised through force of custom to produce an unwritten constitution or through deliberative processes to draft a written one, but it can never be exercised by a government except with popular consent, since all the powers of a duly constituted government derive from its constitution. In the American if not the British practice, the amendment of the constitution also involves at least indirectly an appeal to the people.

Rousseau assigns the constitutive power to a mythical figure he calls the legislator or the law-giver, describing him as the man who sets up the Republic. Yet Rousseau says of this special office that it nowhere enters into the constitution. He thus reaffirms the essential point that a constitution cannot create the office of constitution making.

These remarks in the *Social Contract* have another significance. Rousseau tries to distinguish the formation of a government by the constitution (the political or fundamental law made by the legislator) from the formation of the state by the social contract entered into by the people in their original act of association. But is not the constitution also a formative contract or convention? If it is popular in origin, either through custom or enactment, is there more than a verbal difference between these two contracts—the one which establishes a political society and the one which establishes its government?

For Hobbes and seemingly also for Locke the compact by which men abandon the state of nature and establish a civil society results at the same time in the establishment of a government. It is Hobbes who writes: "as if every man should say to every man, 'I authorize and give my right of governing my self to this Man or to this Assembly of men on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.' According to Rousseau, there is only one contract in the State, and that is the [original] act of association. For him, the institution of government is not a contract."

The reality and significance of the difference between these three political philosophies would seem to depend on the precise historical meaning each gives to the hypothesis of men living in a state of nature prior to political association. If prior to the state men live in non-political societies, and if the state as opposed to the family or the despotically ruled community begins to exist only when it is constituted, then the formation of the state and the formation of its government would seem to be the product of a single convention.

THE PRINCIPLE OF constitutionality is also necessary in order to understand the familiar distinction between government by laws and government by men. Except for the divine sort of government which is above both law and lawlessness, Plato employs 'the distinction of ruling with law or without law' to divide the various forms of government into two groups.

The principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all. — the Cleitarch Stranger says in the *Statesman*.

In the ordinary meaning of law as an instrument of government, it is difficult to conceive government by laws without men to make and administer them, or government by men who do not issue general directives which have the character of law. Government always involves both laws and men. But not all government rests upon the supremacy of law, a supremacy which consists in the equality of all before the law and the predominance of regular law as opposed to arbitrary decision. Nor is all government based upon a law that regulates the officials of government as well as the citizens, and determines the legality of official acts, legislative, judicial or executive. That law is of course the constitution.

Locke makes a distinction between governing by absolute arbitrary power and governing by settled standing laws. It is his contention that whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions; for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in a state of Nature. All the power the government has being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to

anized into an objective constitution but only a feudal monarchy

It is not until the 18th century that the latest vestige of royal power comes to be regarded as inimical to law. For Rousseau every legitimate government is republican for that the only rightful Constitution is that of a pure Republic which in his view can only be constituted by a *representative system* of the people. The writers of *The Federalist* take the same stand. They interpret the aversion of the people to monarchy as signifying their espousal of purely constitutional or republican government. In the tradition of the great books, only Hegel speaks thereafter in a contrary vein. Constitutional monarchy represents for him the essence of constitutionalism and the only perfect expression of the idea of the state.

Because modern republics and even modern constitutional or limited monarchies have developed gradually or by revolution out of mixed regimes and because this development came as a reaction against the increasing absolutism or despotism of kings the principle of constitutionality has been made more effective in modern practice than it was in the ancient world. In addition to asserting limitations upon governments constitutions have also provided means of controlling them. They have been given the force as well as the authority of positive law. They have made office holders accountable for their acts and through such judicial processes as impeachment and such political devices as frequent elections and short terms of office they have brought the administration of government within the purview of the law.

Following Montesquieu, the Federalists recommend the separation of powers with checks and balances as the essential means of enforcing constitutional limitations of office and of preventing one department of government from usurping the power of another. The citizens are either protected from the misuse of power by constitutional declaration of their rights and immunities and constitutional government is itself safeguarded from revolutionary violence by such institutions as judicial review and by the availability of the amending power as a means of changing the constitution through due process of law.

In the history of political change it is necessary to distinguish *change from or to* constitutional government and within the sphere of constitutional government the *change of* constitutions.

Republics are set up and constitutions established by the overthrow of despots or with their abdication. Republics are destroyed and constitutions overthrown by dictators who usurp the powers of government. Violence or the threat of violence usually attends these changes.

The other sort of change may take place in two ways either when one constitution replaces another as frequently occurs in the revolutions of the Greek city-states or when an enduring constitution is modified by amendment as is customary in modern republics. Every constitutional change is in a sense revolutionary but if it can be accomplished by due process of law violence can be avoided.

All the changes in which constitutional government or constitutions are involved raise fundamental questions of justice. Is republican government always better than absolute monarchy and the mixed regime—better in the sense of being more just better because it gives men the liberty and equality they justly deserve? Is it better relative to the nature and condition of certain peoples but not all or of a people at a certain stage of their development but not always? In what respects does one constitution embody more justice than another? What sorts of amendment or reform can rectify the injustice of a constitution? Without answering such questions we cannot discriminate between progress and decline in the history of constitutionalism.

Divergent answers will of course be found in the great books. Among the political philosophers there are the defenders of absolutism and those who think that royal government is most like the divine the exponents of the supremacy of the mixed regime the republicans who insist that nothing less than constitutional government is fit for free men and equals. And there are those who argue that the justice of any form of government must be considered relative to the condition of the people so that republican government may be better only in some circumstances, not in all.

The issue arising from these conflicting views

It is perhaps only in the Middle Ages that we find the mixed regime in actual existence.

That rule is called politic and royal. Aquinas writes by which a man rules over free subjects who though subject to the government of the ruler have nevertheless something of their own by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. These words seem to present an accurate picture of the peculiarly mediaeval political formation which resulted from the adaptation of Roman law (itself partly republican and partly imperial) to feudal conditions under the influence of local customs and the Christian religion.

The mediaeval mixed regime is not to be confused with modern forms of constitutional monarchy any more than with the mixed constitution or polity of the Greeks. The so-called limited monarchy or kingship according to law Aristotle remarks is not a distinct form of government. The chapter on MONARCHY deals with the nature of constitutional monarchy and its difference from the mixed regime as well as its relation to purely republican government. The mediaeval king was not a constitutional monarch but a sovereign person in one sense above the law and in another limited by it.

To the extent that he had powers and prerogatives unlimited by law the mediaeval king was an absolute ruler. He was, as Aquinas says, quoting the phrase of the Roman jurists *legibus solutus*—exempt from the force of all man-made law. Aquinas also describes him as above the law insofar as when it is expedient he can change the law and rule without it according to time and place. Yet he was also bound by his coronation oath to perform the duties of his office, first among which was the maintenance of the laws of the realm—the immemorial customs of the people which define their rights and liberties. The king's subjects could be released from their oath of allegiance by his malfeasance or dereliction in office.

To this extent then the mediaeval king was a responsible ruler and the mixed regime was constitutional. Furthermore the king did not have jurisdiction over customary law yet where custom was silent the king was free to govern absolutely to decree what he willed and even to innovate laws.

MEDIAEVAL IN ORIGIN the institution of a government both royal and political or what Fortescue describing England in the 15th century called a political kingdom exerted great influence on modern constitutional developments. As late as the end of the 17th century Locke's conception of the relation of king and parliament, royal prerogative and legal limitations may emphasize the primacy of law but it does not entirely divest the king of personal sovereignty. Locke quotes with approval the speech from the throne in 1609 in which James I said that the king binds himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom tacitly as being a king and so bound to protect as well the people as the laws of his kingdom and expressly by his oath at his coronation. To this extent the British kingdom is as Fortescue had said political. But the king also retains the prerogative to dispense with law and to govern in particular matters by decree apart from law and to this extent the government still remains royal.

Locke recognizes the difficulty of combining the absolute power of the king in administration with the limitations on that power represented by Parliament's jurisdiction over the laws which bind the king. To the question: Who shall be judge of the right use of the royal prerogative? he replies that between an executive power in being with such prerogative and a legislature that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth. The people have no other remedy but to appeal to heaven.

Montesquieu as well as Locke can conceive monarchy as distinct from despotism in no other terms than those of the mixed regime. He separates despotism as lawless or arbitrary and absolute government from all forms of government by law and divides the latter into monarchies and republics. Montesquieu insists that the ancients had no notion of the kind of monarchy which while it is legal government is not purely constitutional in the sense of being republican. He calls this kind of monarchy Gothic government and as Hegel later points out it is clear that by monarchy he understands not the patriarchal or any ancient type nor on the other hand the type or

the theory of representation. That begins in medieval treatises which recognize the consultative or advisory function of those who represent the nobles and the commons at the king's court. But it is only in recent centuries—when legislation has become the exclusive function of representative assemblies—that the idea of representation and the theory of its practice assume a place of such importance that a political philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to identify representative with constitutional government.

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concerning constitutional and absolute government is treated in the chapters on *CITIZEN MONARCHY* and *TYRANNY*. But one other issue remains to be discussed here. It concerns the comparative justice of diverse constitutions. Constitutions can differ from one another in the way in which they plan the operations of government or in the qualifications they set for citizenship and public office. Usually only the second mode of difference seriously affects their justice.

In Greek political life the issue of justice as between the democratic and the oligarchical constitution is a conflict between those who think that all free men deserve the equality of citizenship and the opportunity to hold office and those who think it is unjust to treat the rich and the poor as equals. The latter insist that citizenship should be restricted to the wealthy and that the magistracies should be reserved for men of considerable means.

Finding justice and injustice on both sides Aristotle favors what he calls *the mixed constitution*. This unites the justice of treating free men alike so far as citizenship goes with the justice of discriminating between rich and poor with respect to public office. Such a mixture he writes "may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy" since it attempts "to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich." The mixed constitution especially if accompanied by a numerical predominance of the middle class seems to him to have greater stability as well as more justice than either of the pure types of constitution which oppressive to either poor or rich provoke revolution.

In modern political life the issue between oligarchy and democracy tends toward a different resolution. The last defenders of the oligarchical constitution were men like Burke, Hamilton and John Adams in the 18th century. Since then the great constitutional reforms have progressively extended the franchise almost to the point of universal suffrage. These matters are of course further treated in the chapters on *DEMOCRACY* and *OLIGARCHY*.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION with a system of periodic elections seems to be indispensable to constitutional government under modern con-

ditions. The territorial extent and population of the nation state as compared with the ancient city state makes impossible direct participation by the whole body of citizens in the major functions of government.

Considering the ancient republics of Sparta, Rome and Carthage the writers of *The Federalist* try to explain the sense in which the principle of representation differentiates the American republic from these ancient constitutional governments. The principle of representation they say "is as neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American government lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the former."

The Federalists then go on to say that the distinction thus qualified must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In their opinion representative government is not merely necessitated by the conditions of modern society but also has the political advantage of safeguarding constitutional government from the masses. As pointed out in the chapter on *ARISTOCRACY* where the theory of representation is discussed the officers of government chosen by the whole body of citizens are supposed—at least on one conception of representatives—to be more competent in the business of government than their constituents. It is in these terms that the Federalists advocate what they call *republican government* as opposed to *pure democracy*.

Like the idea of political offices the principle of representation seems to be inseparable from constitutionalism and constitutional government. Though the principle appears to certain extent in ancient republics—whether oligarchies or democracies—ancient political writing does not contain a formal discussion of

the theory of representation. That begins in medieval treatises which recognize the consultative or advisory function of those who represent the nobles and the common, at the king's court. But it is only in recent centuries—when legislation has become the exclusive function of representative assemblies—that the idea of representation and the theory of its practice assume a place of such importance that a political philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to identify representative with constitutional government.

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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 320a c / *Representative Government* 327b d 332d 350b 356b 401d-40 b 413c 414d 425b d
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

- I Works by authors represented in this collection
- II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

- MACHIAVELLI *The Discourses* BK I
 MILTON *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*
 HUME *Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*

II

- POLYBIUS *Histories* VOL I BK VI
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a specifically human strength. Courage does not consist only in conquering fear and in withstanding the body from flinching no matter what the risk of pain. It consists at least as much in steeling the will to reinforce its resolutions, and turning the mind relentlessly to seek or face the truth.

Can it be less than martial action requires courage? Wearied of empire, Marcus Aurelius summons courage each day for the performance of an endless round of duties. "In the morning, when thou risest unwilling," he reminds himself, let this thought be present—I am rising to the work of a human being. How he conceives the work of an emperor, he makes plain.

Let the deity which is in thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age and engaged in matters political, and a Roman, and a ruler who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man's testimony. The burdens are heavy, the task difficult but not impossible, for a man "can live well even in a palace."

Civil courage is as necessary for the citizen as for the ruler. This virtue, in Mill's opinion, is especially necessary for citizens of a free government. "A people may prefer a free government," he writes, but if, from indolence or carelessness, or cowardice or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it, if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked, if they can be deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it, if by momentary discouragement or temporary panic or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions, in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty, and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it.

The courage or pusillanimity of a people is sometimes regarded as the cause, and sometimes as the effect, of their political institutions. "The inhabitants of Europe," Hippocrates writes, are more courageous than those of Asia for a climate which is always the same induces indolence, but a changeable climate laborious exertions, both of body and mind, and from rest

and indolence cowardice is engendered and from laborious exertions and pains, courage. This, according to Hippocrates, partly explains why the Asiatics readily submit to despotism and why the Europeans fight for political liberty. But the character of the Europeans, he adds, is also the result of their institutions because they are not governed by kings. For where men are governed by kings, there they must be very cowardly, and they will not readily undergo dangers in order to promote the power of another, but those that are free undertake dangers on their own account, and thus their institutions contribute not a little to their courage.

For Hegel, on the contrary, civic courage consists in undertaking dangers, even to the point of sacrifice for the state. Moreover, for him true courage is entirely a civic virtue. "The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of the mind," he writes, "is to be found in the genuine absolute final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualize this final end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality." Though he admits that courage is multiform, he insists that "the mettle of an animal or a brigand, courage for the sake of honor, the courage of a knight, these are not true forms of courage. The true courage of civilized nations is readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state, so that the individual counts as only one amongst many."

THE WORK OF MAN is learning as well as action. Man has a duty to the truth as well as to the state. The ability to face without flinching the hard questions reality can put constitutes the temper of a courageous mind. "The huge world that girdles us about," William James writes, "puts all sorts of questions to us, and tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we meet by actions that are easy and some of the questions we answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and the dilemma of our heart-strings as we say 'yes, I will even have it so!' When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their hold on the situation altogether. But the heroic

Chapter 13 COURAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE heroes of history and poetry may be cruel violent self seeking ruthless intemperate and unjust but they are never cowards They do not falter or give way They do not despair in the face of almost hopeless odds They have the strength and stamina to achieve what ever they set their minds and wills to do They would not be heroes if they were not men of courage

This is the very meaning of heroism which gives the legendary heroes almost the stature of gods In the Homeric age they do in fact contend with gods as well as men The two Homeric epics especially the *Iliad* are peopled with men who cannot be dared or daunted In Tennyson's poem Ulysses now resident in Ithaca remembering the years at Troy and the long voyage home says to his companions

Some work of noble note may yet be done
Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods
and though

We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven that which we are we are
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate but strong in will
To strive to seek to find and not to yield

In the *Iliad* courage is the quality above all others which characterizes the great figures of Achilles and Hector Ajax Patroclus and Diomedes Agamemnon and Menelaus The only other quality which seems to be equally prized and made the subject of malice and boast is cunning—the craft of Odysseus that man of many devices and the cleverness in speech of Nestor Yet the best speech is only the prelude to action and except for the night expedition of Odysseus and Diomedes into the Trojan camp the great actions of the *Iliad* are unplanned deeds of prowess—stark not stealthy

The heroes have boundless passions and fear is among them When they are called fearless

it is not because nothing affrights them or turns their blood cold Fear seizes them a does answer with all its bodily force They are fearless only in the sense that they do not act afraid and still to act Their courage is always equal to the peril sensed or felt so that they can perform what must be done as if they had no fear of pain or death

Yet brave men often speak of courage as if it were fearlessness and mark the coward as one who is undone by fear An ambush Idomeneus says in the *Iliad* will show who is cowardly and who is brave the coward will change color at every touch and turn he is full of fear and keeps shifting his weight first on one leg and then on the other his heart beats fast as he thinks of death and one can hear the clashing of his teeth The brave man master of fear will appear to be fearless

This is the courage of men of action men in war found not only in the heroes of Troy's siege but in the stalwarts of all other battles—Leonidas at Thermopylae Aeneas and Turnus engaged in single combat the conquerors in Plutarch the warrior nobility in Shakespeare the civilized Prince Andrew and young Ross in *War and Peace* It is the sort of courage that goes with physical strength with feats of endurance and as signified by the root meaning of fortitude which is a synonym for courage it is a reservoir of moral or spiritual strength to sustain action even when flesh and blood can carry on no further Such courage is a virtue in the primary sense of the Latin word *virtus* manliness the spirit or strength of spirit required to be a man

There are other sorts of courage The courage of the tragic hero of Oedipus and Antigone goes with strength of mind not body This perhaps even more than being lion hearted is

whose duty it is to make real the idealism which is latent within itself, i.e. to sacrifice itself. But whereas for Hegel courage seems to be the foremost political virtue, Plato puts it last in the order of goods. Wisdom is chief, the Athenian Stranger says in the *Lysis*; next follows temperance, and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage.

In the context of a different psychological analysis, and a theory of the virtues which considers them primarily as habits, Aristotle's conception of courage differs from Plato's in a number of respects. It is most closely allied with temperance. These two virtues together belong to the irrational part of the soul—the passions or appetites—and are concerned with our attitude to joy and pleasure and pain. They discipline us, both in feeling and action, with regard to the pleasurable objects of desire and the painful objects of fear or aversion. Aristotle seems to think courage more praiseworthy than temperance, for it is harder to face what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant.

Just as the temperate man is one who habitually forgoes certain pleasures and seeks other pleasures moderately for the sake of achieving some greater good, so the courageous man is one who can at any time endure pain and hardship or overcome fear of danger and death in order to achieve a paramount end. Since death is the most terrible of all things, Aristotle declares that properly he will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble death and of all emergencies that involve death. But it must be for a noble end that the brave man endures pain and acts as courage dictates.

The paramount end, the greatest good which the moral raton of temperance and the endurance of courage serve is for Aristotle happiness. Yet through their relation to justice which concerns the good of others and the welfare of the state, temperance and courage help a man to perform his social duties, whether as ruler or citizen in peace or war. The man who acts lawfully will not only be just, but also courageous and temperate, for in Aristotle's view the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man, e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms, and those of a temperate man, e.g. not to commit adultery,

nor to gratify one's lust. Not only may the law-abiding man be called upon to be courageous in the respects which Aristotle indicates, but it may sometimes take great courage to uphold the law itself against many temptations to the contrary. After the death of Moses, the Lord spoke unto Joshua and said unto him:

Be thou strong and very courageous, that thou mayest observe to do according to all the law which Moses my servant commanded thee: turn not from it to the right hand or to the left.

The fourth virtue with which courage, temperance, and justice are associated in the conduct of private or public life is prudence, or practical wisdom. Though Aristotle classifies prudence as an intellectual virtue, consisting in the capacity for making a right judgment about things to be done, he also regards prudence as inseparable in origin and exercise from these other three virtues which he calls moral, rather than intellectual. Later writers call these four virtues taken together—courage, temperance, justice, and prudence—the cardinal virtues in order to signify, as Aquinas explains, that the whole of morality hinges upon them.

The theory of the cardinal virtues and of their connection with one another in such wise that none can be perfect in the absence of the others is treated in the chapter on VIRTUE. The chapters on JUSTICE, TEMPERANCE, and PRUDENCE discuss the doctrine that each of these virtues is only a part of virtue which must be integrated with the other parts. The special role which prudence plays in relation to virtues like courage and temperance—at least according to Aristotle's view that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue—must be reserved for the chapter dealing with that virtue. Nevertheless it is necessary to consider here how its dependence on prudence may qualify the meaning or nature of courage.

THE CONNECTION which some writers see between courage and prudence affects the definition of courage in two ways. The first involves the doctrine of the mean which enters into the consideration of all the moral virtues, but especially courage and temperance.

mind does differently. It can face them if necessary without for that losing its hold upon the rest of life. The world thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and mate. He can stand this Universe.

Not only in answering questions but in asking them courage is required. The story which St. Augustine tells in the *Confessions* of his persistent questioning of doctrines and dogmas, his refusal to rest in any creed which did not wholly satisfy his mind, is a story of speculative courage capped by the fortitude with which he bore the agony of irresolution and doubt.

Learning is never an easy enterprise nor truth an easy master. The great scientists and philosophers have shown the patience and perseverance of courage in surmounting the social hardships of opposition and distrust as well as the intellectual difficulties which might discourage men less resolved to seek and find the truth. The great religious martyrs as indomitable in their humility as soldiers are in daring have been as resolute—never yielding to a despair which would have dishonored their faith.

In all these types of fortitude different motivations are apparent as diverse as the forms which courage takes under the various demands of life. Not all the forms of courage may be equally admirable partly because they are unequal in degree but also partly because the courageous acts themselves or the purposes for which fortitude is needed are not of equal moral worth. Yet the essence of courage seems to be the same throughout. It sustains the honor of Don Quixote and in some sense even of Sir John Falstaff; it burnishes the fame of Alexander and Caesar; it fortifies Socrates and Galileo to withstand their trials. Whether in the discharge of duty or in the pursuit of happiness courage confirms a man in the hard choices he has been forced to make.

AS THE CHAPTER ON VIRTUE indicates the traditional theory of the moral qualities places courage or fortitude among the four principal virtues. The other three are temperance, justice and either wisdom or prudence according to the enumeration of different writers.

Plato names these virtues when in the *Republic* he compares the parts of the state with the parts of the soul. The same principles

which exist in the State exist also in the individual. Socrates says and they are three in number. There is one with which a man reason

the rational part of the soul, another with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire—the irrational or appetitive—the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions. The third part is passion or spirit which when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason.

Corresponding to these three parts of the soul there are or should be according to Plato three classes in the state: the guardians or rulers, the husbandmen and artisans, or the workers, and the auxiliaries or the soldiers.

The virtues which belong to the several parts of the soul also belong to the corresponding parts of the state. Wise is the man, Socrates declares, who has in him that little part which rules and which proclaims commands, the part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole. Courageous is he whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear.

Temperance, however, instead of being exclusively the perfection of one part pervades the whole and is found according to Socrates in the man who has these same elements in friendly harmony in which the one ruling principle of reason and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule. Justice—the only virtue which remains when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted—is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them and while remaining in them is also their preservative. It is this virtue which does not permit the several elements within a man to interfere with one another in any of them to do the work of others.

The political analogy finds justice in the well-ordered state where wisdom rules, courage defends the laws and peace and temperance advances the economy. Wisdom would belong properly to the guardians, courage to the auxiliaries while all three classes would need temperance. Hegel also associates courage with the military class—that universal class which is charged with the defence of the state.

and men of sanguine temperament extremely self-confident or at least free from fear would be as courageous as those who succeed in mastering their fears in order to do what is expected of them. But as Aristotle observes, drunken men often behave fearlessly and we do not praise them for their courage. Plato likewise presents a view of courage which requires forethought and a genuine concern for danger.

I do not call animals which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous says Nicomachus in the *Laches*. They are "only fearless and senseless. There is a difference to my way of thinking," he goes on, "between fearlessness and courage. I am of the opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought are very common qualities possessed by many men many women many children and many animals. According to this conception of courage 'courageous actions,' Nicomachus says, 'are wise actions.'

I LIVE WITH these considerations, the definition of courage would involve a reasonable a wise or prudent discrimination between what should be feared and what should be undertaken in spite of peril or pain. As the Larson declares, in his discourse on the Seven Deadly Sins in the *Cathary Tale* "the virtue is so mighty and so glorious that it dares to withstand sturdily and wisely to keep itself from dangers that are wicked and to wrestle against the assaults of the Devil. For it enhances and strengthens the soul. It can endure blows, will no the tools that are fitting."

To be able to make decisions of this sort in particular cases a man must have some view of the order of goods and the end of life. For a man to act habitually in a courageous manner he must be generally disposed to value certain things as more important than others, so that he is willing to take risks and endure hardships for their sake.

Freud seems to be skeptical of what he calls the rational explanation for heroism according to which a man is in the decision that the personal life is not be so precious as certain abstract general ideals. More frequent in his opinion, that must not be and impulse hero-

ism which knows no such motivation and flouts danger in the spirit of Anzenberger's Hans the Road Mender. "Nothing can happen to me." But Aquinas, who emphasizes rational motivation as much as Freud discounts it insists that courageous men face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will however great the danger be.

Courage as Aquinas conceives it though only a part of virtue in the sense of being one virtue among many nevertheless represents the whole moral life from one point of view. The quality of courage he points out "overflows into the rest of the virtues, as these in turn enter into courage. Whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, Aquinas writes, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing, to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death so as not to go too far which is much easier and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate.

"Again he continues, temperance is said to be brave because fortitude overflows into temperance. This is true in so far as he whose soul is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death which is a matter of very great difficulty is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures for as Cicero says, it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear and yet vanquished by cupidity or that he should be conquered by it after showing himself to be unconquered by it."

As the man who is temperate because he has rationally ordered his actions to a certain end can be expected to be courageous for the same reason so, according to Aquinas he will also be prudent since both his temperance and his courage result from a prudent or rational choice of means to the end he pursues.

Writing as a theologian Aquinas distinguishes what he calls the perfecting virtues of the religious life from "the social virtues of the political life—the virtues with which the moral philosopher is concerned. He holds courage to be inseparable from the other virtues on either plane—whether directed to a natural or supernatural end—because it is the sameness of the end in each case which binds the virtues together. "Thus prudent by contemplating the things of God," he explains, "counts as nothing all the things of this world and temperance so

Aristotle originates the analysis of virtue as a mean between two vices because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions. It requires prudence to decide what things should be feared when they should be feared and how much and so a prudent judgment is involved in fearing the right things at the right time and in the right manner—neither too much nor too little.

The coward, the rash man and the brave man Aristotle writes are concerned with the same objects but are differently disposed to them for the first two exceed and fall short, while the third holds the middle which is the right position and rash men are precipitate and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back when they are in them while brave men are keen in the moment of action but quiet beforehand.

Aristotle is not the only one to define courage as a middle-ground between contrary extremes. Most writers who devote any attention to the nature of courage come to somewhat the same conclusion. Epictetus for example in declaring that we should combine confidence with caution in everything we do seems also to make courage a mean. He points out that such a combination at first may appear a paradox since caution seems to be contrary to confidence and contraries are by no means compatible. But this he says is only due to confusion. There would be a paradox if we really called upon a man to use caution and confidence in regard to the same things as uniting qualities which cannot be united. But as Epictetus explains caution and confidence can be united because they concern different objects.

The difference in objects which he has in mind becomes clear in the light of the Stoic maxim. Be confident in all that lies beyond the will's control be cautious in all that is dependent on the will. Sharply distinguishing between what does and does not lie within our control Epictetus tells us to look with care and caution only to those things in which we can do evil by making an evil choice. In such matters of will it is right to use caution. But in other matters in things outside the will's control which do not depend on us we should use confidence.

By uniting caution and confidence we avoid the extremes of foolhardiness and cowardice and achieve the mean in which Aristotle says courage consists. Both are necessary. Cowardice is not the only vice opposed to courage. The man who acts without caution in the face of danger recklessly disregarding what may be reasonably feared is foolhardy rather than courageous even as the coward is held back by fear which his reason tells him should be overcome.

Because he agrees that courage consists in avoiding both extremes Spinoza writes that flight at the proper time just as well as fighting is to be reckoned as showing strength of mind. These two acts are allied since it is the same virtue of the mind that a man avoids danger and seeks to overcome.

To determine at a given moment whether to flee or to fight so as to avoid either foolhardiness or cowardice obviously involves a decision of reason. Such a decision according to Spinoza demands strength of mind by which he means the desire by which each person is determined from the dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being. Without rational direction or as Aristotle would say without prudence one may be fearless but not courageous.

Those who like Hobbes do not include reason or prudence as an essential element in the conception of courage treat courage as an emotion rather than a virtue and tend to identify it with fearlessness making its opposite the condition of being over fearful. Amongst the passions writes Hobbes courage (by which he means the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclines men to private revenge and sometimes to endeavor the unsettling of the public peace and timorousness many times exposes to the desertion of the public defence. As Hobbes describes courage it may be of doubtful value to the individual or to the state. Melville seems to have this meaning of courage in mind when he says that the most reliable and useful courage is that which arises from the fair estimation of the encountered peril—the lack of which makes an utterly fearless man a far more dangerous companion than a coward.

If apparent fearlessness were courage then certain animals might be called courageous.

Plutarch, in his life of Lucullus, shows how the army was a sort of camp. "The training and education of all was directed to military valor. Their very songs had a life and spirit in them that inflamed and possessed men's minds with an enthusiasm and ardour for a lion. The chorus always serious and moral, most usually it was in praise of such men as had died in defence of their country or in defence of those that had been towards the former they declared happy and glorified the life of the latter they denoted as most miserable and abject." The result was, according to Plutarch, that they were the only people in the world to whom war gave repose.

Both Plato and Aristotle criticize the commonness of Greek and Roman war for making war the end of the state and making courage which is only a part above the whole of virtue. Courage must be joined with the other virtues to make a man good, not only as a citizen but as a man. Justice, temperance and wisdom, says the Athenian Stranger in the *Lysis*, "when mixed with courage are better than courage only."

Furthermore, military courage is not even the whole of courage. While recognizing this, the good friend Plato thinks that a wise man would put it in its proper place if men are to be

trained to be good citizens, not merely good soldiers. Arguing that no would-be legislator would order peace for the sake of war and not war for the sake of peace, the Athenian Stranger suggests that a broad conception of courage than the Cretans and Spartans seem to have would correct its use, not only in external warfare but in the tasks of peace—in the struggle to lead a good life and build a good society. "What is this," he asks Megillus the Spartan and Cleinias the Cretan, "which makes your citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer and winning to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?"

Nevertheless, through the centuries the type of courage which the poets and historians celebrate has been the bravery of men who put their very lives in jeopardy for their fellow men—the courage of the citizen doing his duty or what is still more spectacular of the soldier confronting the enemy. This fact among others is one reason why many writers, from the Greeks to Herodotus, have found a moral stimulus in war. It is William James, however, who has hit for its moral equivalent. On this point they are answered no more by those who see only degradation in war but also by the many expressions of the ideal that peace can have its heroes too.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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5. The moral values of courage: friendship, honor, happiness, love, duty, religious faith 253
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far as nature allows neglects the needs of the body fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things and justice consists in the soul's giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed

WE ARE THUS brought to the second qualification upon courage which arises from its connection with prudence and through prudence with the other virtues Does it make any difference whether the end for which a man strives valiantly is itself something commendable rather than despicable? If not then the thief can have courage just as truly as the man who fears dishonor more than death the tyrant can be courageous no less and no differently than the law-abiding citizen

In his advice to the prince Machiavelli seems to consider only the utility of courage Referring to the end which he says every man has before him namely glory and riches he points out that men proceed in various ways one with caution another with haste one by force another by skill one by patience another by its opposite and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method Fortune he thinks plays a large part in their success and for that reason he holds no method certain Any method requires us to use fortune to the best advantage This demands courage and even audacity

It is better to be adventurous than cautious he writes because fortune is a woman and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill use her and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly She is therefore always woman like a lover of young men because they are less cautious more violent and with more audacity command her

It would appear that Machiavelli recommends courage or at least daring to those who wish to succeed in great undertakings whether the end in view is commendable or not In either case courage may improve the chances of success and it is success that counts According to their notions of courage as a virtue Plato Aristotle and Aquinas sharply disagree with this as we have already seen So do Kant and Hegel

It is the positive aspect the end and content Hegel writes which gives significance to the spiritedness of courageous actions. Robbers and murderers bent on crime as their end, adventurers pursuing ends planned to suit their own whims etc. these too have spirit even to risk their lives Because their ends are either malicious or unworthy the mettle of a brigand and even the courage of a knight do not seem to Hegel to be true forms of courage

According to Kant intelligence with judgment and other talents of the mind to even they be named or courage resolution perseverance as qualities of temperament are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them and which therefore constitutes what is called character is not good If a good will is necessary to make courageous virtuous then the behavior of a scoundrel may look courageous but it can only be a counterfeit Without the principles of a good will such things as the ability to face dangers or to bear hardships Kant thinks may become extremely bad The coolness of a villain he adds not only makes him far more dangerous but also makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it

It may still remain true that courage can take many forms according to the variety of objects which inspire fear or according to the types of action which men find burdensome or painful But if the truly courageous man must always be generally virtuous as well then many of the appearances of courage do not spring from genuine virtue The conception of virtue as a habit adds the criterion of a settled disposition even the habitual coward may perform a single courageous act Nor should courage be attributed to those who by freak of temperament are utterly fearless The merit of virtue—overcoming fear—cannot be claimed by them

IN THE GREAT political books especially those of antiquity the place of courage in the state and in the training of citizens receives particular attention The constitutions of Crete and Sparta seem to make courage the only essential virtue for the citizen

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65-83] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

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SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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LOSS REFERENCES

- * The general theory of virtue and the virtues, see VIRTUE AND VICE.
- The virtues most closely related to courage, see JUSTICE, PRECEDENCE, TEMPERANCE.
- The relation of these other virtues to courage, see PRECEDENCE 32-3b, 3. TEMPERANCE 12.
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- Matters relevant to the emotional aspects of courage, see EMOTION 4b(1). PLEASURE AND PAIN 6a. VIRTUE AND VICE 3a.
- The general sound reason of moral training, see EDUCATION 7-7d. VIRTUE AND VICE 7-7e(3).
- The general consideration of civic virtue, see CITIZEN 5. STATE 8b-8c. VIRTUE AND VICE -7d and for courage a military virtue, see WAR AND PEACE 10c.
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the ideas and topics in which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

1. Works by a those represented in this collection.
2. Works b those not represented in this collection.

For useful places and other facts concerning the publication of the work cited, consult the Bibliography. Additional Reading which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 14 CUSTOM AND CONVENTION

INTRODUCTION

THE contrast between the artificial and the natural is generally understood in terms of the contribution which man does or does not make to the origin or character of a thing. Works of art are man made. The artificial is somehow humanly caused or contrived. The contrast between the natural and the conventional or customary involves the same point of difference. Though customs are not in the strict sense made by man as are works of art, they do grow only as the result of the kind of acts which men perform voluntarily rather than instinctively. Similarly conventions like contracts are social arrangements or agreements into which men enter voluntarily.

The fundamental notions with which this chapter deals are thus seen to be closely related to ideas and distinctions treated in the chapters on ART and NATURE. For example, the distinction between human action and production or doing and making helps us to understand how the conventional and the artificial differ from one another as opposites of the natural. Art involves voluntary making. Customs result from voluntary doing. In both cases the distinction between the voluntary and the instinctive—the latter representing the natural—seems to be presupposed.

A third term—habit—is traditionally associated with the consideration of the voluntary and the instinctive. Like these others it seems to have a critical bearing on the discussion of custom and art. Aristotle for example conceives art as an intellectual virtue—that is, a habit of mind, an acquired skill. For Hume the customary and the habitual are almost the same. Whether they are to be identified or are only connected causally, the relation of habit to custom not only throws some light on the nature of custom but also calls our attention to the fact that the words custom

and convention cannot be treated simply as synonyms.

In the tradition of the great books the word convention has at least two meanings, in only one of which it is synonymous with custom. When convention is used in the sense of habitual social practices it is for the most part interchangeable with custom. In this sense the notion of convention like that of custom is an extension of the idea of habit. What habit is in the behavior of the individual, customary or conventional conduct is in the behavior of the social group.

The other meaning of "convention" does not connote the habitual in social behavior but stresses rather the voluntary as opposed to the instinctive origin of social institutions, arrangements or practices. For example, different ways of family organization are conventional in the sense that at different times or in different communities men have set up their domestic arrangements in different ways. In each case they tend to perpetuate the particular institution which they or their ancestors originated. What ever is conventional about social institutions might have been otherwise if men had seen fit to invent and adopt different schemes for the organization of their social life. This indicates the connection between the two senses of the word convention: for all customs are conventional in origin and all conventions become customary when perpetuated.

THE FACT that men can depart from as well as abide by their conventions—that they can transgress as well as conform to custom—seems to indicate that custom and convention belong to the sphere of human freedom. Yet there is also a sense in which custom is a constraining force which reduces the tendency of individuals to differ from one another and which

effect of moulding them alike and regulating their lives.

The repressive effect of custom can be seen and in Freud in the neurotic disorders in which men suffer when their instincts and impulses come into conflict with accepted custom.

Discussing the influence of custom upon developing individual he says that its influences frequently too stringent exact a great deal from him much self-restraint much renunciation of instinctual gratification. It becomes therefore one of the aims of psychoanalytic therapy to release the individual from bondage to custom or at least to make him conscious of the way in which certain desires have been submerged or distorted and his whole personality shaped by the constraints such as the mores and taboos of the tribe have imposed upon him.

Considered in relation to society custom also tends to exercise a conservative if not repressive effect. Established customs tend to resist change. They are sometimes thought to impede progress. But to the extent that they conserve the achievements of the past they may be indispensable to progress because they provide the substance of what we call tradition. As we see in Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* it illustrates these apparently contrary effects of custom.

Over-emphasis upon either antiquity or novelty seems to Bacon a disease of learning or an obstacle to its advancement. Antiquity on its own should be new additions, he writes and novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface. If custom tends to support antiquity against novelty it may also encourage innovations or discoveries which genuinely enhance the tradition without defacing it. Antiquity deserves that reverence. Bacon says, that men should make a stand thereupon and recover what is the best way but when the recovery is well taken then to make progression. As the preserve of antiquity custom thus appears to afford a basis for progress.

One other fact about customs which most commentators from Herodotus to Montaigne and Freud have observed is their variety and variability. Customs differ from time to time and from place to place. But this diversity and variation in custom does not necessarily mean

that no uniformity at all exists in the actions of men. Were there no uniformity in human actions Hume points out it would be impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind. At least enough uniformity is found in his opinion for it to be universally acknowledged that human nature remains still the same. To whatever extent human behavior is purely natural or instinctive it is common to all members of the species and does not like customary conduct vary remarkably from one part of the human race to another or from generation to generation.

The diversity and variation of customs seems therefore to be of their essence and to show that they are both man-made and voluntary in origin. If they were not devices of men Augustinus writes, they would not be different in different nations and could not be changed among particular nations. The distinction between nature and convention can be formulated therefore, partly in terms of the contrast between the constant and the variable and partly in terms of the difference between the instinctive and the voluntary.

The early Greeks had an apt way of expressing this. As Aristotle phrases their insight they referred to the natural as that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that—as, for example, "fire burns both here and in Persia." The conventional and those things which are not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same. The laws of Persia differ from the laws of Greece and in Greece or in Persia they change from time to time.

THE VARIABILITY of custom in contrast to the constancy or uniformity of nature puts the distinction between nature and convention at the service of the skeptic. One form of the skeptical attack upon natural law, universal moral standards, and the objectivity of truth or beauty consists in making custom the only measure of the acceptability of human actions or judgments. To say for example as Hume does that the connection which the mind seems to make between cause and effect is based on custom rather than reason has the skeptical effect which Hume intends. It substitutes the arbitrary for the rational. It dispossesses reason as a source of

either the validity or the intelligibility of our conclusions concerning cause and effect.

As the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION indicate, the skeptical argument takes other forms. The reduction of all human judgments to opinion makes the differences between men in either action or thought unresolvable by argument or debate. One opinion can predominate over another only by force or by the weight of numbers. When it predominates by weight of numbers, it prevails by custom or convention. It is the opinion which the majority have agreed upon at a given time or place. To settle every controversy about what men should think or do by counting heads is to hold that every thing is a matter of opinion and purely conventional.

Whether the skeptic reduces every thing to opinion or to convention, he achieves the same effect. What he means by calling every thing an

opinion or a convention is equally inimical to reason. In either case, the willful or arbitrary is enthroned in reason's place and only force can be finally decisive. The two ideas—opinion and convention—seem to be corollaries of one another. Both imply a kind of relativity. Opinion normally suggests relativity to the individual; custom or convention relativity to the social group. Either may be involved in the origin of the other. The individual may form his opinions under the pressure of prevailing customs of thought or action; the customary beliefs or practices of a society or culture may and usually do result from opinions which have come to prevail.

The Greek sophists we learn from the dialogues of Plato, appealed to the distinction between nature and convention and to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in exactly the same way. They used the notions of opinion and convention with equal force in their efforts to question absolute standards of conduct and the objectivity or universality of truth. The most familiar of all the sophistical sayings—the remark attributed to Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—is interpreted by both Plato and Aristotle to mean that what men wish to think or do determines for them what is true or right. Man's will governs his reason and convention or the agreement of individual wills decides what is acceptable to the group.

In the *Gorgias*, which is named after another of the leading sophists of the day, Plato puts into the mouth of Callicles the sophist's position that there is no law or standard of justice except the rule of the stronger. Insisting that convention and nature are generally at variance with one another, Callicles attempts to show that all of Socrates' efforts to discover an absolute standard of justice come to naught, because he cannot help but resort to the popular and vulgar notions of right which are not universal but conventional.

As they appear in Plato's dialogues, the sophists are obviously impressed by the kind of information which fills the *History of Herodotus*—information about the great diversity of human beliefs and practices which anyone could discover for himself if he traveled as Herodotus did, from people to people, observing their institutions and collecting their legends. Herodotus himself does not explicitly draw the skeptical conclusion, yet his own suspended judgment on many matters betokens a turn of mind made cautious by the impact of contrary opinions and conflicting customs.

In the Hellenistic period when the mainstream of Greek philosophy divides into a number of Roman schools of thought, the skeptical position receives what is perhaps its fullest and most explicit statement. But in the writings of Lucian and Pyrrho, to take two examples, it is not so much the conflict of customs as it is what Lucian calls the warfare of creeds which occasions universal doubt. Yet whatever the source of doubt, Pyrrhonism states the traditional denials of the skeptic in their most extreme form. The senses are entirely unworthy. Reason is both impotent and self-deceiving. Men possess no knowledge or science. No truth is self-evident; none can be demonstrated.

THE CRITICAL TEMPER of the Greek sophists and of an observer of men and manners like Herodotus reappears later in the questions of Montaigne—sharpened somewhat perhaps by his acquaintance with the Roman skeptic. In his case, perhaps more than any other, it is the implications of custom which everywhere expatiated on in his *Essays* give them the skeptical tone. Not himself a traveler in distant

is Montaigne traverses the world of time and space by reading. He becomes conversant with the strange customs of the aborigines and the Orient through the reports of returned travelers. He cull from the historians and geographers of antiquity every difference in custom which their books set forth as fact or fable. Montaigne's insatiable appetite for collecting and comparing customs is not an aimless fascination on his part with the spectacle of human variety. It steadfastly leads him to the conclusion which is for him the only one possible. Since every belief or practice can be paired with its opposite in the customs of some other time or place, no belief or practice can demand unqualified or universal assent. "There is nothing," he writes, "which custom does not or may not do and therefore with every good reason it is that Sardan calls for the ruler of the world."

To say as Montaigne does that the taste for good and evil depends in good part upon the opinion we have of them, and that everyone is well or ill at ease according as he so finds himself, amounts to saying that all moral judgments are matters of opinion, either individual or customary in origin. Beauty too is a matter of taste. We fancy its forms, Montaigne thinks, according to our own appetite and liking. As may be seen in the chapter on BEAUTY, Montaigne assembles a abundance of evidence to show that standards of beauty vary with different peoples. The tastes or preferences of one group are as unaccountable as they are frequently revolving to another.

Even in the field of speculative thought about the nature of things, Montaigne regards the thing men hold to be true as nothing more than prevailing opinion—the cultural conventions of a time or place. We have no other test of truth and reason, he declares, than the examined idea of the opinions and customs of the place which rein we live. There is always the perfect religion, there is the most perfect government, there the most exact and accomplished usage of all things.

Of all human deceptions or impostures, none is more than that which flows from a man's unwillingness to qualify every remark with the admission on that subject, *as it seems to me*. In Montaigne's view, there is no greater folly in the world than the failure to recognize that

we reduce truth and falsity to the measure of our capacity and the bound of our sufficiency. When new ideas or the strange beliefs of others at first seem incredible simply because they are not our own, we shall find that it is rather custom than knowledge that takes away their strangeness. For his own part, Montaigne makes his emblem the question, "What do I know?" This, he says, sums up his Pyrrhonian philosophy.

According to the modern social scientist who claims that custom is the ultimate standard of conduct and that it provides the only criterion of moral judgment, no questions can be raised about the goodness or evil of particular customs. The customs of one people cannot be judged by another, at least not objectively or impartially, for those who judge must do so on the basis of their own customs. Since there is no arbiter above conflicting customs to say which is right, a particular custom has validity only for the group in which it prevails. Within that social group the character or conduct of its individual members is measured by conformity to the prevailing customs.

The descriptive science of sociology or comparative ethnology thus tends to replace the normative science of ethics—or moral philosophy. The only scientifically answerable questions about human conduct take the form of "How do men behave?" or "How have they acted individually or in groups?" but not "How should they?" The study of morality, as in Sumner's *Folkways*, becomes a study of the mores—how the customs which measure conduct develop and dominate, or as in the writings of Freud it becomes a study of how the individual is psychologically formed or deformed by the mores of his tribe and culture, according to the way in which the growing child reacts to the pressures which the community imposes through parental discipline.

With these views, many philosophers and theologians, both ancient and modern, take issue. But their opposing doctrine seldom goes so far as to deny that morality has certain conventional aspects. In arguing that there are *some* innate practical principles, Locke, for example, like Montaigne, cites instances of contradictory customs to show that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named or rule of virtue

to be thought on which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others

But Locke does not leave this observation of the diversity of customs unqualified. He goes on to assert that though perhaps by the different temper education fashion maxims or interest of different sorts of men it fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another and so in different societies virtues and vices were changed yet as to the main they for the most part kept the same everywhere. For since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage and to blame and discountenance the contrary it is no wonder that esteem and discredit virtue and vice should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong which the law of God hath established. Even in the corruption of manners the true boundaries of the law of nature which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice were pretty well preferred.

For Locke then as for many others there appear to be underlying the variety of customs moral principles of universal validity that draw their truth from the nature of man which represents a constant and common factor throughout the diversity of cultures. Accordingly it would seem to follow that just as habits are modifications of instinct or developments of the individual's native capacities for action so customs are conventional elaborations of what is natural to man as a social animal. On this theory the conventional cannot be understood except by reference to the natural i.e. the nature of man or society.

THE VIEW THAT conventions have a natural basis is most readily exemplified by Aristotle's theory of natural and legal (or conventional) justice and by the teaching of Aquinas concerning natural and positive law. For the Greeks the legal and the conventional are almost identical so that it is a kind of justice rather than a kind of law which Aristotle calls natural. Roman philosophers like Cicero and Roman jurists like Gaius and Ulpian make what seems to be an

equivalent distinction in terms of law rather than justice. In his analysis Aquinas follows the Latin not the Greek vocabulary.

The Roman system of jurisprudence Gibbon tells us distinguished between those laws which are positive institutions and those which reason prescribes: the laws of nature and *ius gentium*. The former are man-made—the result of custom and prejudice. This holds true of both written and unwritten laws, although only the unwritten precepts are now usually called customary laws. These customary laws are positive in the sense that they are humanly instituted or enacted—posited by the will of the legislature rather than merely discovered by the reason of the philosopher. They are *conventional* in the sense that they represent some voluntary agreement on the part of the members of the community they govern whether that consists in obeying the edicts of the emperor or in giving consent to the enactments of the senate.

So far as it is conventional the law of one community differs from another and within the history of a single community the positive law changes from time to time. But such bodies of law however modified by accident or custom, the Roman jurists Gibbon says conceived as drawn from the rule of right. The fact that reason prescribes this rule was their explanation of certain common elements which all bodies of positive law seem to contain.

The principles underlying all codes of law whether discovered directly by reason or drawn inductively as Grotius later suggests from the comparative study of diverse legal systems comprise the precepts of what the Romans and later Aquinas call natural law. Thus these writers seem to reaffirm though in somewhat different language Aristotle's position that what is naturally just is the same for all men everywhere and always while the laws of Greece and Persia represent diverse conventional determinations of the universal principles of justice.

The theory of natural right and natural law as expressed in the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Kant as well as in the ancient and medieval tradition is of course more fully treated in the chapters on Justice and Law. But one example of the distinction between natural and conventional justice may be instructive here.

Aquinas conceives positive rules as deductions of rather than deductions from natural law. He treats such precepts as "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal" as conclusions that reason can draw deductively from the first principle of natural law, which is sometimes stated in the form of the command "do good, harm no one and render to each his own." Because these precepts are the prescriptions of reason rather than enactments of the state, they can be interpreted as declaring that murder and theft are always and everywhere unjust. But that sort of killing and taking of what is not one's own shall be defined as murder and theft, and how offenders shall be tried, judged and punished—these are matters which natural justice or the precepts of natural law leave open for determination by the positive laws of each community according to its own constitution and its local customs.

The theory thus exemplified of the relation between conventional and natural justice or between positive and natural law applies to moral rules and ethical standards generally. For the same reason that a positive law which violates natural justice cannot be called just, even though it is harmonious with the customs of the community, so no rule of conduct, however much it represents prevailing custom, can be approved as morally right if it violates the right reason sees in. The defenders of natural law, which is also sometimes called the law of reason, proclaim the existence of an absolute standard above the diversity and conflict of customs by which their soundness is measured.

Conflict in ethical doctrines raises many issues concerning what it is right for men to do or good for them to seek, but the moralists at least agree that morality based on reason or nature. For them the facts of human nature or the intuitions of reason will ultimately decide the point in issue. However far apart Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel, Kant and Mill may be in their conceptions or analyses of the right and the good, they stand together at least generally on the question of how their disputes can be resolved, not by appealing to the mores of this tribe or by looking to the conceptions of the community as a measure, but by testing the customs of the majority against the

The deepest of all moral issues therefore exists between those who think that morality somehow derives from nature or reason and those who like the ancient sophists or Montaigne or Freud find its source in custom and convention. According to the side a man takes on this issue, he does or does not believe it possible to discover standards independent of custom, thereby to judge whether customs are good, bad or indifferent. On one belief, public manners are conventional determinations of moral principles or they are sometimes violations of them, just as positive laws are either determinations or violations of natural law. On the other belief, the individual may be approved or condemned for conforming to or transgressing the manners or mores of his group, but those manners or mores, whether they are liked or disliked by the individual, are above any tenable, objective criticism.

The controversy in jurisprudence and morality between the naturalists or rationalists who appeal to man's nature or reason, and the positivists who hold that human customs cannot be appealed from, parallels a controversy in the theory of knowledge or science. The parallel issue considered at greater length in the chapters on Hypothesis and Principle, can be stated by the question whether the foundation of science—even of such sciences as logic and mathematics—consists of postulates or axioms.

Axioms, like the precepts of natural law, are supposed to have a universality derived from the nature of human reason. They are self-evident truths, compelling assent. Postulates, on the contrary, are like rules of positive law—voluntarily accepted assumptions which, when agreed upon by the experts in a certain science, become its conventional basis. In science as in law, the positivists recognize nothing beyond the agreement of men to determine what shall be taken for granted as true or just.

THE DIFFERENCE between nature and convention also enters into the traditional discussion of two of the most characteristic activities of man, speech and political association.

No one disputes whether the faculty of speech is natural to man. It is as natural for man to speak as for dogs to bark or birds to sing. But the question is whether any human language

having a certain vocabulary and syntax is natural or conventional. The answer seems to be dictated at once by the facts of the matter.

Human languages exist or have existed in great number and diversity and those which still endure have gradually developed and are undoubtedly subject to further change. Hence according to the traditional understanding of the natural and the conventional these various tongues must represent conventional languages—originally invented by this human group or that perpetuated by custom altered by the conventions of usage. In contrast the expressive sounds instinctively made by other animals show themselves to be natural by the fact that they are common to all members of a species and do not change as long as the species endures.

Nevertheless as the chapter on LANGUAGE indicates the writers of the great books consider the hypothesis of a natural human language. The Old Testament story of the Tower of Babel is sometimes interpreted as implying the existence of one language for all men before God confounded their speech and diversified their tongues. The story of Adam's giving names to the various species of plants and animals in the Garden of Eden is also cited by those who think there can be natural as well as conventional signs. In Plato's *Cratylus* the attempt is made to discover the natural names for things or at least to discern some natural basis for the words of a conventional language like Greek.

These who reject the hypothesis of a single human language from which all others have developed by diversification or who regard a purely natural language as impossible in the very nature of the case sometimes acknowledge the possibility of certain common elements—principles of syntax if not words—present in all human languages. The discovery of the common rules of speech was the object of the speculative grammarians in the Middle Ages and of those who like Arnauld and others later tried to formulate a universal grammar. On their view all languages even if they are conventional as written or spoken may have the same natural basis in the fact that they are all used to express what men can naturally perceive or think.

As in the case of language so in the case of so-

ciety the question is whether the family and the state are wholly natural wholly conventional or partly one and partly the other—these institutions being erected by choice and custom upon a natural basis. And as in the case of language here too the great books do not for the most part give either of the extreme answers. They do not say that the state is entirely natural that it is the expression of human instinct as the bee hive and the ant mound are instinctive formations. Nor do they say that the state is completely conventional that it comes into existence only as the result of voluntary association on the part of men contracting to live together in a political community.

While Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal and that the state is, therefore, a creation of nature he also distinguishes between the ways in which men and other animals are gregarious. Unlike the association of animals which he attributes to instinct the society of men rests on reason and speech. Man is the only animal, he writes, endowed with the gift of speech intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. Because of these things cities differ from one another as bee hives or ant mounds do not.

The diversity of states represents for Aristotle a deliberate inventiveness on the part of man and an exercise of free choice—certainly in far as states are politically constituted each on its own constitution. Aristotle's remark that while a social impulse is implanted in all men by nature yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors may look a little contradictory but its two parts can be read quite consistent with one another if the first is taken as signifying the natural basis of the state (in a social impulse) and the second as saying that a certain convention (a constitution) is required to shape that impulse before any state is actually established.

As Aristotle is sometimes interpreted to hold the theory that the state is entirely natural so Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are of great aid in maintaining the opposite extreme—that it is entirely conventional. The extreme interpretation is based on the sharpness with which each of them distinguishes between men living in a state of nature and in a state of civil society.

though they differ among themselves in their position of these two conditions of man they seem to agree that for men to pass from a state of nature whether hypothetical or historical in which men live in anarchy or at least in isolation it is necessary for them to enter into a contract or compact with one another. Since social contract is the original or originating convention by which the commonwealth or civil society is established it would seem to follow that on their view the state is purely a product of convention and in no way natural.

Yet Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau each in his own way add a qualification in favor of the naturalness of the state just as Aristotle qualifies his remark that the state is a creation of nature by praising the man who first founded the state. The exponents of the social contract theory of the state's origin find in the nature of man or in his reason an instinct, a need, or a law which impels or bids him to seek association with others for the sake of advantages which he cannot enjoy apart from civil society. This suffices to affirm the existence of a natural basis for the convention or contract which establishes the state.

These apparently opposed theories of what is natural and what conventional about the state thus appear to approach each other though one starts from an emphasis on the state's naturalness the other from its conventional origin. The whole problem is of course further treated in the chapters on FAMILY AND STATE but one point which the foregoing discussion suggests receives special consideration in still another chapter. The point concerns the relation between the idea of a constitution and the idea of a social contract. Both are conceived as the basic or primary convention which establishes the state. The question whether the two ideas are interchangeable or only analogous is examined in the chapter on CONSTITUTION.

CUSTOM IS BOTH a cause and an effect of habit. The habits of the individual certainly reflect the custom of the community in which he lives and in turn the habits of any social group get their vitality from the habits of its members. A custom which does not command general compliance is as dead as a language no

longer spoken or a law no longer observed. This general compliance consists in nothing more than a certain conformity among the habits of individuals.

The continuity between custom and statute as parts or phases of the positive law rests upon the relation of both to habit. Custom according to Aquinas, has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law precisely because it operates through the habits of the people. By repeated external actions such as produce a custom the inward movement of the will and the conceptions of the reason are most revealingly declared and according to Aquinas, all law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver. The law which a prince or a people enacts to become effective as social regulation must develop a particular habit of conduct in many individuals. Then and only then does a new enactment obtain the full force of law. To remain effective it must continue to have the support of the customs of the country.

Without that support it may be a law on the books but not in practice for the authority of a law cannot long prevail against a contrary custom except through a degree of coercion so oppressive as to produce rebellion. That is also why the customary or unwritten rule—usually the primitive form of positive law—is less flexible, less amenable to change or modification. Custom is a conservative factor. There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, writes Machiavelli, nothing more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. The innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.

Just as custom may either support the written law or render it ineffective, so custom works in opposite directions as a social force. It is both a factor of cohesion and of division among men—a cause of what is called social solidarity and a barrier separating peoples from one another. When the Athenians refuse to ally themselves with the Persians they chide the Spartans according to Herodotus for fearing that they "might make terms with the barbarian." For all the gold on earth they tell the Spartan

envoy; they could not take part with the Medes. To do so would betray our common brotherhood with the Greeks, our common language, the altars and sacrifices of which we all partake, and the common character which we bear.

The barbarians or the gentiles—to use the traditional names for aliens or foreigners—are excluded by a social, not a geographic boundary line, the line drawn between those who share a set of customs and all outsiders. When the stranger is assimilated, the group does not adopt him; he adopts the customs of the community. The very word *community* implies a multitude having much in common. More important than the land they occupy are the customs they share.

The Federalists, advocating the political union of the thirteen American states, could argue feasibility on the ground that a social union already existed. Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, by which

to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs.

Those who today advocate world federal union cannot similarly point to a world society already in existence. They can only hope that if the separate states were to unite politically, the social cohesion of the world's people might subsequently develop as a result of the force of universal customs by universal law.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The distinction between nature and convention: its application to the origin of the state and of language
- 2 The origin, development, and transmission of customs
- 3 The conflict of customs: their variation from place to place
- 4 The change of customs: their variation from time to time
- 5 Custom and convention in the moral order
 - 5a The conventional determination of moral judgments: the moral evaluation of conventions
 - 5b The effect of custom on the training and character of men
- 6 Custom in relation to law
 - 6a Constitutions, social contracts, positive laws, and manners as conventions
 - 6b The force of custom with respect to law
- 7 Custom in social life
 - 7a Custom as unifying a community
 - 7b Custom as a barrier between communities
 - 7c Custom as determining economic needs or standards
 - 7d The influence of custom on the liberty of the individual
- 8 Custom in relation to order and progress: the factors of tradition and invention
- 9 The bearing of custom on thought
 - 9a Custom as a source of opinion and belief: its influence on judgments of beauty
 - 9b The conventionality of truth: postulation, choice among hypotheses

(1 *The distinction between nature and convention its application to the origin of the state and of language*)

- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 402c 405d 406c 433c 434d esp 433d 434a 435a-436b 437c d
 43 MILL *Liberty* 294b 295b / *Representative Government* 327b d 332d
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363c 364a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b PART III par 168 60b c ADDITIONS 47 124a b 97 132c 133a 108 134b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 170d 171d PART II 260b
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 298a b 349d
 51 JAMES *Psychology* 733b 734b
 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 20c d / *General Introduction* 452c d 573c / *War and Death* 757d 759d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 776b 802a c esp 776b 777a 778a 780b 781d 783c 784b 787a c 788d 789b 791b 792a 799b 802a c / *New Introductory Lectures* 853a b

2 *The origin development and transmission of customs*

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 31a b 38a b BK II 58a b 59d 60a 62b c 66c d 69b d 87a b BK III 107b-c BK IV 125d 126a 129c 130a BK V 177a b 183d 184a BK VI 201b c
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395c d BK III 442c 443a
 7 PLATO *Laus* BK III 663d 666c esp 666a b
 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [4-83] 188a 189a BK VII [601-615] 252b 253a BK VIII [152-191] 263a 266b
 14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 1a 15a c passim / *Romulus* 15a 30a c passim / *Lycurgus* 36a 47c passim / *Numa Pompilius* 49a 61d passim / *Solon* 70c 74b / *Poplicola* 80d 84d 85a / *Camillus* 116a c / *Coriolanus* 175c d / *Marcellus* 254c 256b
 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK II 214d 215a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 24 25 648d 649d BK III CH 12 662c 663c
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 97 A 3 237b 238b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 278a 279a
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS DEP 27 EXPL 419a b
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 80a b
 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 309b 310a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 107a b BK XVI 116a 117c 118a 119c BK XVIII 132a b BK XX 146a b BK XXI 169a 170b BK XXIII 187b d 189d BK XXIV 205d 206a BK XXV 209a b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 416c 417a
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 154b 155a 583d 584b 704d [n 79]
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 227b 389b d
 43 MILL *Liberty* 308b [fn 1]

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 2c d 265c 266a PART IV 315d 316b 347b 351d 353a 367a b
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 228b 229b
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 317a-c 318b c
 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 800c / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b c

3 *The conflict of customs their variation from place to place*

- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK I [1 5] 183a BK VIII [4 255] 224c d BK IX [92 115] 230a b
 5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [33 35] 31d
 5 EURIPIDES *Andromache* [147 45] 316c 17b
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 22d 23a 31a 34a 35b c 39a 44b 45b 48a c BK II 56c 88a 80a c BK III 93d 94a 97d 98a 111b 115b BK IV 128c d 129c 130b 132a b 134a 13a 138c 142b 144b 154b 158d PART III 160b 161c BK VI 195d 196c BK VII 23a 253b d
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 306b d
 7 PLATO *Symposium* 154a 155c / *Laus* BK III 678c 679a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [99] 995 51 513c
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 7 [113] 1135 41 382c d
 10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* PART I 1a b par 14-18 15a 16c
 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [520-543] 117b-118a BK IV [590 620] 293a 311 BK VII [91-842] 3a 376b
 14 PLUTARCH *Themistocles* 99b c / *Themistocles* 254c 256b esp 256a b
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 23d 24a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 24 649b d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 97 A 2 ANS 231c 232b
 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK I 2 2 23 3b 4a BK II STANZA 6 7 22a b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 44a 47a 91d 99b esp 93b 94a 102a 103a 230b 231a 246b 25a passim 278a 279a 281a 284c 415a 5a 524b d
 26 SHAKESPEARE *Henry V* ACT V SC 1 [141] 562c 563b
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 46b c
 33 PASCAL *Pemises* 294 225b 226b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH 1 SECT II 12 105d 107d
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DEP 66 480b
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 76b 78b PART III 98b 99a 105a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 110a b BK XVI 116a 119c BK XIX 139c 140a BK XXI 153a c BK XXV 209a b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 416c 417a
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 89d 94b PART III 99c 260d 261a 409d-415a passim 670d 671a

(5) *Custom and consent: in the moral order*
 5a *The conventional determination of moral judgments: the moral evaluation of conventions*

- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 261a b
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 295b 303d
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xviii 132c
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 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 362a b / *Political Economy* 369a 370a / *Social Contract* bk iv 434b-435a
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 346c 347a
 42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 270d
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 43 MILL *Liberty* 269b 271d 286b 287a 293b
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 44 ROSWELL Johnson 197a b 198b d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 2b c PART II par 132 46c d par 138 48c d PART III par 150-152 56c 57b par 339 110b par 355 112d
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 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 305a 313b d 314c
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 50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427a
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 15d 16a bk
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 190a 191a 886b 887a
 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 625a / *War and Death* 757d 759a esp 759a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 792b c
- 5b *The effect of custom on the training and character of men*
 5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [886-1110] 499b 502b
 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 35c d
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk ii 314b c bk iv 344b
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 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk ii ch 3 [994^b 31-
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 10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Place* par ~3
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 11 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk iv SECT 18 264d
 14 PLUTARCH *Lysander* 361a d / *Cleomenes*
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 14-16 4c
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 92
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- Q 92 A 1 ANS 226c 227c A 3 228 228b 228c
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 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, xvi 143-144
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 185c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 22a-c 42b-43d 46b
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 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [1
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 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 82a
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 46b c 47
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 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 6 173a 9, 98 190b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk i ch 2
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 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII 11
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 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 303d
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk i 21d 25
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 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 347a b
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 337c 338
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 92c 94b 101b
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 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 389b-390b esp 389d
 42 KANT *Intro. Metaphysic of Morals* 387b
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 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 49 159d 160a viii
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 43 MILL *Liberty* 269b-c 293b 302c passim /
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 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 150-
 15 56c 57b par 164 59a d par 187b
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 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 313a 314b 317a d
 328c d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 221b d bk
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 733b 734b
 54 FREUD *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 113a
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- 6 Custom in relation to law
 6a *Constitutions social contracts positive laws and manners as conventions*
 7 PLATO *Symposium* 154a c / *Cratylus* 216d
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 8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* ch 12
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk v ch 7 [1134^b 15-
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14 PLUTARCH Lysurgus 33d 34b / Themistocles
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15 ALISTINE Co feta I BAH par 15 17a b/
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20 AQUINAS S mma Theologues P RT I O 95
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23 HORACE Latinha P AT 78b-c PART II
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25 M V TOLIE Essays 46b-48b 93b-94 102a
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27 S W SPE RE Aug Lear ACT I SC II [1 22]
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31 DE CA T S DISCITE II RT I 45b-d
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36 SWIFT G ST P T 22 23 28a b
38 M V TOLIE Spirit f La : BK 1c-d
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38 RUSSELL Social Co : CI BK I 387b d 394d
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40 G O Decline d Fall II 616d 637a
41 C O Decline d Fall, 71d 73a possum
75b-d 86d 89c esp 87a 87d
42 HANT Science of Right 419a-420b 435a 436c
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43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE { 311a b
43 WILL Liberty 269c d 2 0c 271b 305b-31 a
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44 B IV LL J h son 276a b
46 H EL PHIL to his f Right PA III PAR 211
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47 G RTI F A s P [372 19 9] 46b-a o
48 MELVILLE M by Dick 292a 297a esp 294a
50 MARIE LA CORRETT N Y f 40 42 b
51 T LITTON Harrod P CE BRILLIG E II 680b-
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6 HEODOTUS History KI 9 d 98a
7 P TO REPUBL 344b-d KXI 401 d
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14 PLUTARCH Lysurgus s 36b-37b 38b-d 46b-c
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15 TACITUS Annals BK III 57d 58b BK I
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18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK III PAR 1, 17a b
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20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 92
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23 HORACE Les ashen P RT I 78b-c ART I
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27 SHAKESPEARE Measure for Measure ACT II
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30 BACON New Atlantis 205d 206b
31 D SC RT I Discourse PART II 43b-d
33 PASCAL Pensées, 308 228b 312 279a 12, 326
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35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CI
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36 SWIFT Gulliver P RT I 22 23a
38 VOLTAIRE Quen Spirit of Laws BK I 3 d
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BK XXVIII 237a-d
38 ROUSSEAU Inequity LY 324d / SOCI CO IT CI
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40 G BODIN Decree and Fall 464c d
41 GEORGE Decline d Fall, 77c d 80
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42 HANT Science of Right 448d-449c
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [2 23] 1b
43 FEDERALIST NO 7 95c d 100b-101a
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43 WILL Liberty 270c 271b 308b [in 1] / Rep-
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44 BOSWELL J hno 204c 205b 276a E 277b
46 HCEL Philosophy f Right PART III PAR 2, 7
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6 H ROMANOS History BK I 287c-d
7 PLATO Laws K I 678c-679a K VII 716a b
13 ACLE Democritus K XII [2]-84 [375a 376b

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- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46b c / *Alexander* 562b 563c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 17a b / *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 515a c CH 17 522d 523a CH 24 528b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 25-26 649b 650a CH 39-40 654c 656a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 95 A 3 228c 229b Q 97 AA 2-3 236d 238b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VI [58-151] 61b 62c PARADISE XV [97]-XVI [154] 129b 132a *passim*
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 46b 47a 131b 132a
- 30 BACON *New Atlantis* 205d 206b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 45b d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XV 448c
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 294 225b 226b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XIV 137c d 138c 140c
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 1a 15d 16c
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 389c d
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 2 31c d NUMBER 27 9c d
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 424c 425b 428b c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 274 92a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 176b PART I 240d 241a PART II 260b-c 277c 280b 281b
- 50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 421a b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 254c 260a 263a 265d BK VII 288c 290b BK X 403a 405a BK XI 499c 500c BK XII 533a 534d 538d 539c 556c 557b EPILOGUE I 647b c
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or EPILOGUE 406a e
- 54 FREUD *War and Death* 756a d

7b Custom as a barrier between communities

- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK VII [27-36] 218b
- 5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliants Maidens* [8 5-965] 11d 13b
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 2a 31d 32a BK IV 137a 138c 143b 144b BK VIII 98c d
- 7 PLATO *Laws* BK IV 678c 679a
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [520-543] 117b 118a BK IX [590-620] 295a b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46b c / *Themistocles* 99b c / *Marcus Cato* 287d 288c / *Alexander* 562b 563c
- 15 TACITUS *Histories* BK V 295b 296a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 515a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 14 663c d
- 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [4038-4644] 238a
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Chapter 15 DEFINITION

INTRODUCTION

DEFINITION has been variously defined in the tradition of the great books. These diverse conceptions of what a definition is raise many issues.

At one extreme writers like Hobbes look upon definition as nothing more than an attempt to say what a word means—how it has been or is being used. At the other writers like Aquinas regard definition as that act of the mind by which it expresses the nature of a thing or formulates its essence.

In one technical view associated with the name of Aristotle to define is to state the genus and differentia by which the species of a thing is constituted. In another theory of definition advanced by Locke and others any combination of traits which distinguishes one class or kind of thing from another defines the character common to all members of that class. In still another view to be found in Spinoza definition consists in giving the cause or genesis of a thing in saying how the thing originated or was produced.

Sometimes definition through causes employs the final rather than the efficient or productive cause and characterizes the thing by the end it naturally serves. And sometimes as with William James definitions simply express the purposes or interests which we have in mind when we classify things to suit ourselves.

In the tradition of the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic these various conceptions of definition are connected with controversies concerning the power and activity of the human mind, the relation of language to thought, the structure of science or more generally the nature of knowledge and the constitution of reality with particular reference to the existence of universals and individuals and their relation to one another.

These connections appear in the thought of

Aristotle and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Aquinas and William James. Their views of the way in which definitions should be constructed or their conceptions of the function of definitions determine and reflect lines of agreement and opposition on many other matters. The use of definitions in the great works of mathematics and natural science—by Euclid, Descartes, Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier and Darwin—tends to exemplify now one now another theory of definition. Modern discussions of the nature of science and mathematics especially discussions influenced by the development of mathematical logic—from Whewell, Mill, and Poincaré to Whitehead, Russell and Dewey—focus critical attention on the nature and role of definitions.

MANY OTHER chapters provide an illuminating context for topics discussed in this one especially the chapters on LANGUAGE and LOGIC, IDEA, PRINCIPLE and REASONING, PHILOSOPHY and SCIENCE and TRUTH. Though the issues concerning definition cannot be resolved apart from this larger context of controversy about the mind, reality and knowledge we can nevertheless formulate these issues in isolation. But in doing so we ought to bear in mind that they can be more readily understood in proportion as they are seen in the light of other relevant considerations.

There is first of all the question about the object of definition. What is being defined when men make or defend definitions? This question broadens into the problem of nominal as opposed to real definitions. That is a complex problem which raises a number of further questions. Are all definitions arbitrary expressions of the conventions of our speech or the particular purpose we have in mind when we classify things? Or do some if not all definitions ex-

ness the real natures of the things defined? Do they classify things according to natural kinds which have reality apart from our mind and its interests?

These issues are in turn related to the issue concerning the limits of definition and its ultimate principles—whether all things, or only some, are definable and whether the indefinible terms without which definition is itself impossible can be arbitrarily chosen or must

ways be terms of a certain sort. The sense in which definitions may be true or false and the sense in which they cannot be either have a bearing on all these issues and through them it runs the divergent conceptions of how definitions can or should be constructed.

Let us try the course of argument one man discusses the opinion of another by saying: "That just a matter of definition." The usual implication is that the rejected opinion has no truth apart from the way in which the man who proposed it uses words. He may even be accused of begging the question, of framing definitions which implicitly contain the conclusion he subsequently draws from them.

The underlying supposition here seems to be expressed by Pascal when in his essay *On Geometrical Demonstration* he asserts that there is great freedom of definition and definitions are never subject to contradiction for nothing is more permissible than to give whatever name we please to a thing we have clearly pointed out. He calls true definitions those which are arbitrary, permissible and geometrical. The only restriction he would place upon our freedom to make definitions is that we must be careful not to take advantage of our freedom to impose names by giving the same name to two different things. And even this case he claims is permissible if we avoid confusion by not extending the consequences of one to the other.

If we are free to make whatever definitions we please, it would seem to follow that definitions cannot be matters of argument and differences of opinion which result from differences in definition would seem to be irreconcilable by any appeal to reason or to fact.

Such a conception of definition as verbal does not seem to prevent Hobbes from holding

that definitions are first principles or foundations of science. In *Geometry* (which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind) men begin. He writes at settling the signification of their words which settling of significations, they call *Definitions* and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. Thus shows, Hobbes thinks, how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors and either to correct them where they are negligently set down or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds.

For Hobbes, then, definition is verbal yet definitions can also be true or false and on the truth of definitions depends the distinction between knowledge and opinion. "In the right definition of names," he says, lies the first use of speech which is the acquisition of science. Only when discourse begins with the definitions of words can it reach conclusions that have the character of knowledge. If the first ground of such discourse be not definitions then the end or conclusion is opinion.

Hobbes accurately reports the nature of geometry when he says that in that science definitions serve as principles in reasoning or proof. The words he defines mark one of the steps in many Euclidean proofs. Descartes and Spinoza proceeding in the geometrical manner place definitions at the head of their works as ultimate principles to be used in validating their conclusions. But unlike Hobbes, these writers do not seem to regard their definitions as merely verbal. Euclid goes further as we shall presently see and offers what amounts to proofs of his definitions, or at least of their geometrical reality. Aristotle and Aquinas certainly take the position not only that definitions are principles, but also that definitions themselves are capable of being demonstrated. But they complicate the matter by insisting that definitions are neither true nor false since as Aristotle says they do not involve "the assertion of something concerning something."

At least two questions seem to be involved in this familiar dispute about the arguability of definitions and their role in argumentation. To avoid confusion, they should be kept distinct. One is the question of the truth and falsity of

definitions. It should be separated from even though it is related to the other question about whether all definitions are nominal *i.e.* concerned only with assigning meanings to the words by which we name things. To understand what is involved in this second question it may be helpful to consider the relation of words, thoughts and things in the process of definition.

A DICTIONARY is supposed to contain definitions. It does in part—insofar as the meaning of any word is expressed in a phrase containing other words which are not synonyms for the word in question. The combined meanings of these other words determine the meaning of the word being defined.

For example one definition of the word *brother* is a male relative the son of the same parents or parent. Another is a male member of a religious order. These two definitions give different meanings for the same word. The dictionary is here recording two ways in which—as a matter of historical fact—the word has been used. It has been and can be used in still other ways. No one of these definitions can be called right and the others wrong.

Dictionary definitions seem to be verbal and arbitrary in a number of ways. That the word *brother* should carry any of the meanings which the dictionary records is an accident of English usage. It is arbitrary that that particular sound or mark should be the name for a male relative who is the son of the same parents. It would be equally arbitrary to restrict the meaning of the word *brother* to any one of its definitions.

Nothing about a word limits the number of distinct meanings with which it can be used. As Locke says, every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has when they use the same words that he does. A word is thus a conventional sound or mark which can be given any meaning convention assigns to it. When that meaning is expressed in other words we have a verbal definition and such definitions are certainly nominal in this sense—that they state the meaning of a name.

But are they merely nominal? Are they entirely arbitrary? That this word should be used to name this thing is arbitrary, but that when it is so used a certain definition also applies may not be arbitrary. Among the several verbal definitions of a word the one which applies in any particular case will depend upon the character of the thing which the word is used to name.

For example if John and James are sons of the same parents the name *brother* applies, but not with the same definition which is required for the application of the name to Mark and Matthew who are unrelated by blood to members of the same monastic order. When the word *brother* is used of man may be arbitrary but when it is used now of John and James and now of Mark and Matthew it would be misapplied if it did not carry the appropriate definition. Which definition is appropriate in each case does not seem to be arbitrary since that appropriateness depends not on our will but on the objective facts of the case—the actual relation of the persons called brothers.

Precisely because the word is used to name a thing the definition of the word as so used does more than state the meaning of the word. It states something about the character of the thing named. Definitions remain merely verbal only so long as the words they define are not actually used to name or to signify things in some way. Whenever a thing is named or signified the definition which gives the meaning of the word must also signify something about the nature of the thing.

In the natural order of ideas writes Lavoisier the name of the class or genus is that which expresses a quality common to a great number of individuals the name of the species on the contrary expresses a quality peculiar to certain individuals only. These distinctions are not as some may imagine merely metaphorical but are established by Nature.

YET IT MAY BE said that the definition is still nominal for it depends entirely on the meanings of the words which express it. For example one definition of *brother* involves the meanings of such words as *male* and *relative*—son, parents and same. If we were to

put these words up in a dictionary the definitions we found would involve the meanings of still other words, and so on in an endlessly regular fashion. Furthermore we would find on account of certain words such as *relate* and *same* somewhat unsatisfactory as definitions because the meaning of the defining words would immediately involve the meaning of the word to be defined. To say that "same means not other or not different" *means the same* saying *same* means *same*. Yet we must know the meaning of *same* for otherwise we could not understand the meaning of "brother" the definition of which the word "same" appears.

That some words seem to have undefinable meanings suggests that not all meanings are merely verbal or nominal and that the meaning of every word cannot be found in the meanings of other words. In the Preface to his dictionary Dr Johnson observes that "as nothing can be proved but by supposing something intuitively known and evident without proof, so nothing can be defined but by the use of words on plain to admit of definition. The circularity of the dictionary is thus avoided. When we trace meanings from one word to another we finally come to words whose meanings we seem to understand immediately or at least without reference to the meanings of other words."

Just as the arbitrary character of verbal definitions seems to be removed by the consideration of the things which words name or signify so the purely nominal character of definitions seems to be removed by recourse to meanings which are understood without further verbal explanation—meanings which may in fact be incapable of such explanation.

NOT ALL WRITERS agree with Dr Johnson. All of them would admit that some words must be left undefined in order to define others, but which shall be used as indefinable and which shall be defined is in the opinion of some a matter of choice. It is not something which can be determined by the order intrinsic to our ideas or meanings. The issue between the mathematical logicians who think that we are free to choose our primitive or indefinable terms, and those who like Aquinas, think that certain terms, such as *being*, *same*, *one*, and *relate*

non impose themselves upon our minds as principles, leaving us no choice, parallels the issue between the view that the principles of a science consist of postulates voluntarily assumed and the view that they are axiomatic or unavoidable.

Far from regarding such basic indefinable terms as clearest and most indisputable in meaning Spinoza thinks that these terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused. For him the true definition of any one thing expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. But to arrive at the true definition it is necessary to discover the cause of the thing. For every existing thing he writes, there is some certain cause by reason of which it exists. This cause must either be contained in the nature itself and definition of the existing thing or it must exist outside the thing. In the latter case the definition of the thing always involves a statement of the external cause of its existence.

Accordingly Spinoza rejects the traditional type of Aristotelian definition as purely subjective—a matter of individual memory and imagination. Those who have more frequently looked with admiration upon the stature of men he writes, by the name *man* will understand an animal of erect stature while those who have been in the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else will form another common image of men describing man for instance as an animal capable of laughter, a biped without feathers, a rational animal and so on each person forming universal images of things according to the temperament of his or her body.

However the issue between Spinoza and Aristotle is resolved both seem to agree that more is involved in the process of definition than the statement of verbal equivalences. We have a definition Aristotle says not where we have a word and formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words could be definitions). The formula which is expressed in a phrase or combination of words must state the nature or essence of a thing not just the meaning of a word. The formula in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed thus, according to Aristotle is the formula of the essence of each thing and he

adds there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition

Even supposing the truth of these statements which Hobbes or Locke certainly would question the problem of real as opposed to nominal definition requires further examination To explore the matter further let us take two of the most famous definitions to be found in the great books Both are definitions of man — featherless biped and rational animal As we have seen these definitions must remain purely nominal—only stating the meaning of the word man—until that word is used to name some kind of thing If however we apply the word man to existing entities which combine the characteristics of having two legs and lacking feathers then featherless biped defines not the word man but a class of real that is existing things In addition to being nominal the definition is now also real in the sense that the class or kind which it determines has existing members

That animals exist may similarly be a fact of observation But animal is only one of the two terms in the other nominal definition of man In order to make rational animal more than a nominal definition it is necessary to verify the existence of animals which possess a certain characteristic *rationality* not possessed by all animals If rationality in some degree belonged to all animals then the word man (nominally defined by rational animal) would be synonymous with animal But unlike feathers the presence or absence of which seems readily observable the possession or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain

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the beings to which we also arbitrarily give the name man

THE PROCESS of verification by which a nominal is converted into a real definition can be regarded as the demonstration of a definition. Strictly speaking it is not the definition which is thereby proved It is rather a proposition in which the subject of the definition is affirmed to exist or in which a subject already known to exist is said to have a certain definition For example it is not the definition rational animal which is proved but the proposition there exists an animal which differs from other animals in being rational or the proposition the real being which we call man is both an animal and rational and he alone is rational

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That definitions are not as such either true or false is unaffected by the distinction between real and nominal definitions The point is simply that a definition which is always linguistically expressed by a phrase never a sentence neither affirms nor denies anything and so can not be either true or false Featherless biped or son of the same parents makes no assertion about reality or existence

Yet there is a special sense in which definitions can be true or false which does have bearing on the distinction between real and nominal definitions Pascal suggests three alternatives with regard to the truth or falsity of definitions If we find it impossible to write it passes for false if we demonstrate that it is true it passes for a truth and as long as it cannot be proved to be either possible or impossible it is considered a fable,

According to Aquinas there are two ways in which a definition can be false In one way when the intellect applies to one thing the definition proper to another as that of a cuckoo to a man In another way by composition a definition of parts which are mutually repugnant A definition such as a four footed rational animal would be of this kind for such a statement as some rational animals are four footed is false in itself

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which in Pascal's terms plainly represents an impossibility. Suppose someone offered sound more as the nominal definition of rectitude.

The phrase *sound square* expresses a self-contradiction and in consequence the definition is false. Its falsity is tantamount to the possibility of there being any such figure as a *square* which has the definition proposed. The truth of a definition—which is nothing more than its freedom from self-contradiction—is equivalent to the possibility, as opposed to the impossibility of the thing defined. To call the definition son of the same parents or featherless biped *true* is to say that the words defined—brother or man—signify possible existences. In short, only those nominal definitions which are true can ever become real and they become real only when the possibility they signify is actually known to be realized in existence.

THE DEFINITION OF Euclid's *Elements* illustrates self-regarding points. Euclid defines certain geometrical figures such as triangle, parallelogram, square. These definitions may appear to be free from contradiction but that does not tell us whether they are more than nominal. The defined figures are possible but the question is whether they exist in the space determined by Euclid's postulates.

To show that they do exist Euclid undertakes to construct them according to his postulates which permit him the use of a straight edge and a compass for purposes of construction. When in Proposition 1 Euclid proves that he can construct an equilateral triangle he establishes the geometrical reality of the figure defined in Definition 20. A geometrical construction is thus seen to be what is called an *existence proof*. It comes in as a nominal into a real definition. Figures which cannot be constructed must be postulated as for example the straight line and the circle. Postulates 1 and 3 ask us to assume that a straight line can be drawn between any two points and that a circle can be described with any center and radius. These postulates give Definitions 4 and 5 their geometrical reality.

Though the method of construction is peculiar to geometry the relation of definitions to proof or postulates of existence is the same for

all sciences. Until a definition ceases to be nominal and becomes real it cannot be used scientifically in the demonstration of other conclusions to use a merely nominal definition in the proof begs the question.

If the existence of the thing defined is either directly observable or self-evident no proof or postulation of existence is required. In theology for example there are those who think that the existence of God is immediately seen in the definition of God. Descartes and Spinoza seem to be of this opinion.

Descartes argues that eternal existence is necessarily included in the idea of God as a supremely perfect Being. This is so evident he declares that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a triangle or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley. Concerning substance or God Spinoza holds that since it pertains to its nature to exist its definition must involve necessary existence and consequently from its definition alone its existence must be concluded.

On the other hand there are those who think that the existence of God must be proved by inference from effect to cause. Supposing that a man understands the meaning of the word God Aquinas maintains that it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually but only that it exists mentally. Hence he declares it is necessary to prove the existence of God accepting as a middle term the meaning of the name but using an effect in place of the definition of the cause in proving the cause's existence.

The difference between these two positions might be summed up by saying that Descartes and Spinoza like Anselm before them think the definition of God is intrinsically real where as Aquinas thinks we must begin with a nominal definition of God which becomes real only with proof of God's existence. For some confirmed atheists, any definition of God is not only nominal but false—the definition of an impossible being incapable of existing.

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but feet it makes a difference according to Aristotle what terms are then used to differentiate footed animals into their proper sub-classes.

"It is necessary," he insists, "that the division be by the differentia of the differentia e.g. endowed with feet is a differentia of animal and the differentia of animal endowed with feet must be of it *qua* endowed with feet. Therefore we must not say if we are to speak wholly that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless (if we do this we do it through incapacity) we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not cloven for these are differentiae in the foot. Cloven footedness is a form of footedness. And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contains no difference. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae. If then this is so clearly the *last* differentia will be the essence of the thing and its definition.

As Aristotle quarrels with Plato's method of division so William James takes issue with Aristotle's theory that a real essence is defined when the right differentia is properly chosen within a certain genus of things. He tends to follow Locke's notion that definitions indicate no more than the nominal essences of things, but he gives this theory a special twist by adding the notion that all our definitions merely group things according to the interest or purpose, whether theoretical or practical which motivates our classification of them. This has come to be known as the pragmatic theory of definition.

"My thinking," writes James, "is first and last and always to the sake of my doing. After pointing out that Locke undermined the fallacy of supposing that we can define the real essences of things, he goes on to say that "none of his six errors, as far as I know, has been radically escaped, or even that the only meaning of science is teleological. And the classification of science is purely teleological as well as the method. The crux of this is that one of its properties which is so important for my interests is its comparison with the I may neglect the method. The properties which are important

vary from man to man and from hour to hour

In a footnote James adds "A substance like oil has as many different essences as it has uses to different individuals. The classification of natural as well as artificial objects should therefore proceed according to the advice Mephistopheles gives to the student in Goethe's *Faust* 'You will have more success,' he says 'if you will learn to reduce all and to classify each according to its use. But if this is so, then no one scheme of classification, more than any other represents the real structure or order of nature. Nature indifferently submits to any and all divisions which we wish to make among existing things. Some classifications may be more significant than others but only by reference to our interests, not because they represent reality more accurately or adequately. It does not matter therefore whether we define by genus and differentia by other characteristics in combination or by reference to organs or functions.

Darwin's scheme of classification provides evidence relevant to this whole issue. As indicated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLUTION Darwin thinks that his genealogical classification of plants and animals comes nearer to the natural system of living organisms than the classifications proposed by his predecessors. "The Natural System," he writes "is a genealogical arrangement with the acquired grades of difference marked by the terms species, genera, families, etc. and we have to discover the lines of descent by the most permanent characters whatever they may be and of however slight vital importance. Hence forth, following his method systematists will have only to decide whether any form be sufficiently constant and distinct from other forms, to be capable of definition and if definable whether the differences be sufficiently important to deserve a specific name.

But Darwin's statement re-opens rather than resolves the great traditional questions. Are the various groupings made in classification divisions which the classifier finds useful to impose on nature or do they represent lines of real distinction in the very nature of things? If the latter is the case either wholly or in part are we able to do more than approximate real distinction by whatever method of definition we employ? Can we discover real species, essen-

essences. It is also raised by Aristotle's discrimination between essential and accidental unities: i.e. the difference between the unity signified by the phrase "featherless biped" and by the phrase "black man." Both phrases look like definitions. Each designates a possible class of individuals and sets up the conditions for membership in that class or exclusion from it.

The distinction between them does not rest according to Aristotle on the criterion of existence. Both of the objects defined may exist, but whereas the first is truly a species, the second is only, in Aristotle's opinion, an accidental variety within the species *man*. *Man* being a species can have a real essence, and so its definition of man—whether "featherless biped" or "rational animal"—can be a real definition constituted by genus and differentia. But *negro* or *arjan*, not being a species but only a race or variety, has no essence as such. The definitions—black man and white man—indicate this in that they are constituted by two terms which are related as substance and accident, not as genus and differentia.

Though Aristotle distinguishes these two types of formulae as essential and accidental definitions rather than as real and nominal definitions, the one principle of distinction is closely related to the other: for only essential definitions can have real essences for their objects. Accidental definitions do little more than state the meanings of words, or express what Locke calls the nominal essences of things. He doubts that the definition of any thing except a mathematical object can ever grasp the real essence of a thing. For him all definitions are nominal, which is equivalent to saying that we never define by means of the true genus and differentia, but always by accidental and external signs, or by stating the component parts of a complex whole.

Speaking of a man or gold, Locke explains, or any other species of natural substance as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea

in the mind of the speaker, stand for neither what, and the extent of these species, with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow.

THIS ISSUE HAS MANY ramifications. In one direction it leads into Aristotle's quarrel with Plato over the method of definition by division or dichotomy. In the *Sophist* and the *Symposium*, the search for definitions proceeds by the division of a class of things into two sub-classes, one of which is then further subdivided, and so on, until a class is reached which has the characteristic of the object to be defined. The attempt to define a sophist, for example, starts with the notion that he is a man of art, and proceeds by dividing and subdividing the various kinds of art. At one point in the course of doing this, the Athenian Stranger summarizes the process to that point:

You and I, he says to Theaetetus, have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force; half of this was hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals; half of this was hunting water animals;—of this again, the under half was fishing; half of fishing was striking, a part of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again being the kind which strikes with a hook, and draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up. And now, following this pattern, he continues: let us endeavor to find out what a Sophist is.

The pattern as illustrated indicates that in the course of division, one of the two classes is discarded while the other is subject to further subdivision. Aristotle's criticism of this procedure turns partly on the fact that the division is always dichotomous, or into two sub-classes, and partly on the fact that the terms which Plato uses in a succession of subdivisions do not seem to have any systematic relation to one another. If the class of animals, for example, is divided into those with and those without

tially distinct from one another, and can our definitions formulate the essence of each?

THE SEARCH FOR definitions basically belongs to the activity of the human mind in all its scientific or dialectical efforts to clarify discourse to achieve precision of thought to focus issues and to resolve them.

Men have no other way of coming to terms with one another than by defining the words they use to express their concepts or meanings. They make terms out of words by endowing words with exactness or precision of meaning. Definition does this and makes possible the meeting of minds either in agreement or in dispute. Definition also makes it possible for any

mind to submit itself to the test of agreement with reality. Definition helps man to ask or experience the only sort of question to which answers can be found.

The search for definitions has perhaps its most dramatic exemplification in the dialogues of Plato. Socrates usually leads the conversation in quest of them though it is only in certain dialogues such as the *Sophist* and the *Symposium* that the making of definitions is practiced in detail. Two other books in this set are largely concerned with ways of reaching and defending definitions—Aristotle's *Topics* (which should be considered together with the opening chapter of his *Parts of Animals*) and Bacon's *Organum*.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The theory of definition
 - 1a The object of definition definitions as arbitrary and nominal or real and concerned with essence
 - 1b The purpose of definition the clarification of ideas
 - 1c The limits of definition the definable and the indefinable
 - 1d The unity of a definition in relation to the unity of the thing defined
 - 1e The truth and falsity of definitions
- 2 The various methods of definition or classification
 - 2a The use of division or dichotomy in definition
 - 2b Definition by genus and differentia properties
 - 2c Definition by accidental or extrinsic signs or by component parts
 - 2d The appeal to genesis origin cause or end in definition
 - 2e Definition by reference to purpose or interest
- 3 The grammatical or verbal aspects of definition
- 4 The search for definitions and the methods of defending them
- 5 Definition and demonstration definitions as principles and as conclusions
- 6 The character of definitions in diverse disciplines
 - 6a The formulation of definitions in physics mathematics and metaphysics
 - 6b The use of definition in speculative philosophy and empirical science
 - 6c The role of definitions in practical or moral philosophy and the social sciences

- 30 B CON *Novum Organum* bk I aph 59 112b-c
 31 D SCA TES *Rules* xii 23c 24
 31 S I OZA *Ethics* art I ax om 2 355d
 33 P CAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 431b-434b 442-443b
 35 LOC & HUM *Understand g* bk II ch II s ct 1 127d 128a ch IV sect 6 131a ch XV sect 1 176b-c k II ch IV sect 4 17 260b-263c ch vi 268b-283a passim esp act 7 1 270b-271b ch XI s ct 13 3 302d 306c
 35 H M HUM n *Understand ng* sect VI d v 49 471c-d
 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 29d 33d 53b 54b 179d 182b 215d 216c / *J dgement* 603a-604b
 43 FADIA L ST N BER 37 119b-120b
 44 BOSWELL *f h son* 82b
 49 D KINIA *Origin f Species* 242a / *D scent of* 34a 346d 347b
 51 TOLSTOY *Wa and P* ce z LOGUE II 694b-d
 53 J ME *Psych logy* 314a

d The un ty of a defin : on n relation to the u ty of the th g defined

- 7 PLATO *La her* 32a 33a / *Cr tyls* 85 114a c esp 85a 89a, 104b-114a c / *Men* 174 179b / *The ete* 1 514b-515d / *Soph* s 559a-c
 8 A ISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk II ch 6 [128-33] 126b ch 8 [93^b28-94^b7] 128b-c ch 13 [97^b6-35] 133 b / *Top ci* bk vi ch 4 [141 26-32] 194c d ch 5 [142^b30-143 2] 196b-c c 13 14 204c 206d bk vii ch 3 [53^b6-2] 208a b [154 3 11] 209b / *Physic* bk ch 3 [86^b14 30] 261 -d / *Metaphysic* 8 i ch 5 [986^b8-987^a1] 504c 505a bk v ch 6 [1 16 31 1] 536d 537a bk vi ch 4-6 552b-555a ii 10-7 558a 566a c bk i c 2 3 566d 568d ch 6 569d 570d bk x ch 1 [52^a3-37] 578d / *So l* bk ii c 3 [114^b20-4 5 14] 644d-645b
 30 BACO *Novum Organum* bk II aph 35 162 164
 35 LOCK *H ma U derst ding* bk II ch xvii act 4 201c d ch x ii s ct 1 2 204 k iii ch sect 4 264b ch vi act 1 273 d ct 28 3 276a 277b
 35 Bz KLEI *Hum An aledge* act 413a b
 53 J ME *Psych logy* 503a b

1e The truth and fal ty of defi : on s

- 7 PLATO *Corylus* 85a 114a c esp 85a 89a 104b-114a c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
 8 A ISTOTLE *Topik* k vi ii 192a 211 c passim, esp bk i 4 14 194c 206d / *Met phy* bk i ct 9 [102^a17 38] 546d 547a vi ch 4 [1 17 23] 550 bk ix ch 1 [51^b18 31] 577d 5 8a / *So l* bk i ct 6 [43 6-3] 1663b-c
 19 AOCI 1 *S mma Thral gr* bk III A p 2 10d 11d q 17 3 102d 103c q 53 530c 304c q 85 6458d-459c 231) 1 *Lettishan* a z 56b-d

- 28 G L LEO *Two Nev Sciences* THIRD DAY 200a III
 30 BACO *Novum Organum* I BK I aph 59 112b-c bk II aph 35 162 164a
 31 DES ARTES *Rules* xii 26b c
 31 S I Z *Ethics* p ky I PRO 8 SCHOL 2 357b-d PART II PRO 30 SCHOL 1 387b 388b
 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b 431b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understand ng* bk II ch xxxii 243 248b passim
 42 KANT *Pur e Reason* 179d 182b
 43 MILL *Utitarian sm* 469a b
 44 BO WE L Joh on 82a-c
 46 HEG L *Ph losophy of Right* INTRO par 2 9b-10a
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 669a 671a

2 The arrou methods of defin : on or classification

2a The use of di : sion or d choromy n defin : on

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 134 -c / *Sophist* 552b-561d 577 579d / *S a cman* 580a-608d / *Ph i bus* 610d 613a
 8 A ISTOTLE *Prio Analytics* bk I ch 31 64b-65a / *P tioro A alyt* i bk ii ch 5 125b-d ch 13 [96^b25-97^b6] 132 133a / *T pics* bk vi ch 6 [143^b11 144 4] 19 b-c / *Metaphysic* bk vii c 12 [1037^b28 1 38 35] 561c 562a
 9 A ISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* k i ch 2 4 165d 168c
 11 PLOTINUS *F st Ennead* tr iii ch 4 11a c / *S th Enn* d tr iii ch 8-1 285a 286d ch 16-18 289c 291d
 18 AUGUST V *Christ a D ctri e* bk ii ch 3 653b-c

2b Defin : on by genus and diff ce n propo : sies

- 7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 548c 549d
 8 A ISTOTLE *Categorie* c i 3 [1^b16-24] 5d ch 1 [3^b24] 6a 8a c i 13 [14^b32 15 8] 20c d / *Prio Analyt ci* bk i ch 27 [13^b25 44] 60c d / *Posterior A alytcs* k i ch 22 113b-115b k ii c 13 14 131b 134 / *T pics* bk i ch 4-9 144b-147b ch 28 [108 38-39] 152d [1 5^b19 32] 153a c bk iv ii 168b d 211a c / *Physic* k i ch 3 [186^b14 34] 261c 262a / *Met physic* k iii ch 1 [99^b27 31] 514b c 3 517a 518a bk v ch 3 [1 14^b3 13] 534d c 25 [1023^b 25] 545c ch 28 [1 24 37 39] 546b-c bk vii ch 4 [3 7 14] 552d ch 14 561b 563c bk vii ch 3 [43^b24 1 44] 568b d ch 6 569d 570d bk x ch 8-9 585b-586c bk x ch 1 [1059^b21 1 60] 587d 588a / *S ul* bk i ch 1 [4 2^b15 103^a2] 631d-632a
 9 A ISTOTLE *Il i ry f thm ls* k ch 1 [146 15 157^a] 7b-d / *Part of An m L* bk i

- (1) *The theory of definition* 1a *The object of definition* definitio is as arbitrary and nominal or real and concerned with essence
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A
7 REP 1 7a c Q 2 A 1 REI 2 10d 11d A 2
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 4
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 55b c 56b 59c d
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 518d 519a
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 142d
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- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 4 137d
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- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 26b c / *Objections*
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 8 SCHOL -
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- 33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 372b 373b 376b 377a /
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT
18 410a c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 179d 182b 215d 216c /
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- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART I
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- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 176c
184d 185a
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 77b 9a esp 29a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II
694b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 106a 185a b 668a 671a
882b-883a
- 1b *The purpose of definition* the clarification
of ideas
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120a b / *Meno* 174a 175d
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1
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- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT II 26b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1,
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 56b 58d 59a
PART IV 269b c
- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY
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- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60b c
61b c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 33
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- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 23c 24a XII 26c
- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b
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- 34 NEWTON *Principles* DEFINITIONS SCHOL III
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH IV
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b c / *Practical Reason*
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- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 377d
- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART II
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- 45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 361a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 2
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- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 207d 208a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 694b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 314a b 669a 671a 871a b
- 1c *The limits of definition* the definable and
the undefinable
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 384a 388a / *Theaetetus*
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [92¹
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- 17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 6 231b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A
7 REP 1 7a c Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 2
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- 49 D w1 *Orig. of Species* 27c 29a passim
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51] *Mrs Psychology* 184a 186a 314 b 668a
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- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 6b-d / *Cratylus* 85a 114a c
/ *Theaetetus* 544d 545b / *Laus* bk x 763c d
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- 8 A STOTLE *Categories* c1 15 b n 5 {
3 19] 7c d / *Prior Analytics* bk ii ch
13 {9-27 39] 133b-c ch 14 {98 13 23] 133d
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578d 579a bk xi c1 5 590 d / *Soul* k 1
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* bk ii q 1
3 41 402a-403d
- 23 HOBBES *Leviathan* p rt 56b-57c pa t
1 269b- 270a-c
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* xii 23c 24 xiii 26b-
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii n
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- 43 FEUERBAUGH *Ums* 37 119b-120b
- 44 BO WELLS *Johns* 82a-c
- 45 LA W *Element of Chemistry* p rt 4a
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- 45 F R *Researches* 1 EL 10a 361a
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- 51 JAMES *Psychology* 171b 172a

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- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 4 13d / *Laches* 31 37c /
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- 8 A STOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk i c 10
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esp 1 631 632d k1 n 1 {4 21-1-4
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- 9 A STOTLE *Part of First* bk i c 1 2 4
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- 12 A STOTLE *Part of First* bk i 2c 12 262 d

- 17 PLATO *First Enchiridion* bk iii ch 4 11a-c /
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part 1 q 10
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part 1 q 11 q 49
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 518d 519a

- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* third day
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- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 61b-c / *Novum Organum* bk i a 1 59 112b-c p 105
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- 31 DESARTES *Rules* xii 23c 24a

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* p rt ii prop 40 chol 2 2
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk iii ch xi
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* bk ii ch 1 470d
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- 38 ROLAND *Equality* 330 d

- 42 HUME *Pure Reason* 215d 216d / *Practical Reason* 293 294b

- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 119b-120b

- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 241d 242a

- 51 TOULSTOY *War and Peace* epilogue 11
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- 8 A STOTLE *Prior Analytics* bk i ch 13 64b-
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Part of Animal* k 1 ch 1
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- 17 PLATO *Sixth Enchiridion* bk iv ch 2 306 b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part 1 q 1
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- 23 HUME *Leviathan* part 3 56b-60c 65c d

- 31 DE CARTES *Object and Replie* 128c
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17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH I 281a b CH 8-10 285a 286d CH 16-18 289c 291d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 REP 1 16d 17c A 5 ANS 17c 18b Q 29 A 1 REP 3-4 162a 163b Q 50 A 2 REP 1 270a 272a A 4 REP 1 273b 274b Q 66 A 2 REP 2 345d 347b Q 75 A 3 REP 1 380c 381b Q 76 A 3 ANS and REP 3 391a 393a Q 77 A 1 REP 7 399c 401b Q 85 A 3 455b 457a Q 88 A 2 REP 4 471c 472c PART I II Q 1 A 3 611b 612a Q 18 AA 5-11 697a 703a passim esp A 7 698c 699c Q 23 723c 727a passim esp A 1 723c 724c Q 35 A 4 774d 775d A 8 ANS and REP 3 779c 780c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 AA 1-2 1b 4a Q 52 A 1 ANS and REP 2 15d 18a Q 53 A 2 REP 3 21a d Q 54 22d 25d passim Q 55 A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 28c 29d Q 60-61 49d 59d passim Q 71 A 6 110b 111b Q 72 111b 119b passim Q 85 A 4 ANS 229b 230c PART II II Q 4 A 1 402a 403d PART III Q 1 A 1 ANS 710a 711c

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II 137a 195d passim esp APH 20-52 150d 195d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 154a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III 234d 260a passim esp SECT 6-10 255c 257a CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 6 269d 270a SECT 30-32 276d 278b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 193a 200c 215d 216c

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 4a 5c PART I 21d 25c d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 176c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 98a b 104a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 12c 13a 25d 29a esp 28b 29a 30d 31d 207d 210b esp 207d 208a / *Descent of Man* 331b 332a 346d 347c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 344b 345b 669a 671a 869a 871a esp 870a 871a

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8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 6 [144 23 27] 197d [144^b 3-145^b 33] 198a 199c CH 13 [150 1]-CH 14 [151 32] 204c 206a / *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 12 [1038 8 30] 561d 562a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 4 [1290^b 5 36] 489d-490a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 29 A 1 REP 3 162a 163b Q 77 A 1 REP 7 399 401b PART I II Q 35 A 8 ANS and REP 3 779c 780c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL I 2 387b 388a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 3 201b c SECT 9 202c 203a (3) XXIII SECT 3 10 204c 206d SECT 14 d 208b 209a SECT 37 213d 214b BK III CH III SECT 10 256c 257a CH IV SECT 11 262b 263a CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 2-3 268c d SECT 29 276b d CH VI SECT 19 22 304b 305a SECT 25 305d 306c

35 HUMF *Human Understanding* SECT III VI 49 471c d

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* P II 1 21a 22c 25c 29d

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 95b 105b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 207a 210b e, 207a 208b 210b 212d 215a / *Descent of Man* 332b-c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 503a b 742a b

2d *The appeal to genesis origin cause and end in definition*

7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 544c 548d

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 5 [145^b 1] 196c CH 6 [145 19-27] 198d 199a [145^b 20] 199a b CH 8 [146^b 9-147 11] 200c 201a CH 12 [149^b 31-39] 204b c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 12 493d 494d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH [93^b 24 29] 501c BK V CH 28 [1024^b 1] 546b BK VIII CH 2 [1043 2 17] 567b CH 4 [1044^b 12-15] 569b BK XII CH 3 [1072 21 24] 599c / *Soul* BK I CH I [403^b 5] 632b c BK II CH 2 [413^b 19] 643a b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH I 2 415a 448b BK III CH 9 [1280 25-1281 2] 477d 478c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 41 A 1 REP 1 238b 239a PART I II Q 1 A 611b 612a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 1 A 4 28c 29d

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31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 8 SCHOL 356d 357d APPENDIX 369b-372d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH IV SECT 10 261b d SECT 16 263b c CH V SECT 23 274b c

42 KANT *Judgement* 574a b 579b c

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 742a b

2e *Definition by reference to purpose or interest*

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- 45 FOUR *Theory* 111 ff 184 187b
 45 FARADY *Remarks on Electricity* 361a-d
 45 HILL *Philosophy of Rest* 180, par 2
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 690b
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 51 JAMES *Psychology* 3b-4a 869a-871a esp 870a
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 54 FAUL *Nature* 400d-401 / *Instructions*
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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 170a-c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Enact* II CH 1 CH 11, CH 6
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 20 HOLTY *Summa Theologica* ART 1-11 Q 49
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 23 HO *Lexicon* PART 57d 58a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH XI
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 42 HANT *Fund. Prin. Met. hinc f Mor.* 171a
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 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 469a b
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par. 9b-
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 50 MAX *Comm.* I, 6c 11d *passim* 176d 179c
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* AK IX 365a b
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 887-888a

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- For the linguistic aspects of definition and the general theory of the meaning of words, see LANGUAGE 12 SIGN AND SYMBOL 4a.
- The logical aspects of definition see IDEA 4a.
- Other discussions of the object of definition and the problem of essences or universals, see BEING 6c NATURE 4a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c
- The notions of genus and differential, species and property see BEING 8d IDEA 4b(3) NATURE 12(1) RELATION 5a(4) UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5b
- Other considerations of indefinable terms, see METAPHYSICS 23(3) and for the indefiniteness of individuals, see UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c
- The use of definition as principles in reasoning or proof and for the problem of demonstrative definitions, see PRINCIPLE 3a(2) REASONING 5b()
- The discussion of matters related to the truth or falsity of definitions, see IDEA 6f TRUTH 3b(1)
- The role of definitions in dialectic and science and in the various sciences, see DIALECTIC 3a(2) 2b(1) MATHEMATICS 3a MATTER 4b METAPHYSICS b PHILOSOPHY 3b-3c PHYSICS 3a SCIENCE 4a

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- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* I 171a 172a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b 434b passim esp 430b 431b 432a 442a-443b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH IV SECT 15 16 288d 289c CH VI SECT 15-17 303b 304a BK IV CH III SECT 10 319b
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 131 508d 509a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 179d 182b 211c 218d esp 215d 216d / *Practical Reason* 293c 294b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 2 9b 10a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 690b
- 54 FREUD *Instinct* 412a b

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- 7 PLATO *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 4 [141-6-24] 194c 195a BK VII CH 3 [153 6-11] 208a b / *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192 25-26] 268c d BK II CH 2 270a 271a BK III CH 1-2 278a 279c CH 6 [206³³-207 14] 285b-c BK IV CH 1-5 287a 292c CH II 298c 300a / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 12 493d-494d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 525a 528b BK V CH 1-BK VI CH I 533a 548c BK IV CH 6 [1048 25-29] 573c 574a BK VI CH 5 590a d CH 7 592b 593a BK VIII CH 1 [1077³¹]-CH 3 [1078 32] 608d 609d / *Soul* BK I CH 1-BK II CH 3 631a 645b esp BK I CH 1 631a 632d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 2 4 165d 168c / *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1098²⁰-8] 343c 344a
- 11 EUCLID *Elements* BK I DEFINITIONS 1a 2a esp 1-2 4 10 1a 15 1b 23 2a BK II DEFINITIONS 30a BK III DEFINITIONS 41a b esp 2 3 41a BK IV DEFINITIONS 67a b BK V DEFINITIONS 81a 82a esp 3 7 81a b BK VI DEFINITIONS 99a BK VII DEFINITIONS 127a 128a esp 1-2 127b II 12 20 127b BK VIII DEFINITIONS 191a b esp I 3 191a DEFINITIONS II 229a DEFINITIONS III 264b BK IX DEFINITIONS 301a 302b esp 14 301b 18 21 302a
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- 11 ARIOTONIS *Comics* BK I FIRST DEFINITIONS 604a b esp I 604a SECOND DEFINITIONS 626a
- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 814b-c
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK V 986b 1004a passim
- 17 PLOTINUS *Steth Ennead* TR III CH I 281a b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 7 REP 17a c Q 2 1 2 REP 2 11d 17c Q 2 A 5 ANS 17c 18b Q 10 A 1 40d-41d Q A 1 162a 163b Q 75 A 4 ANS 381b 382a Q 85 A 1 REP 2 451c-453c A 8 REP 2 462c 461b

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 56b PART II 269b-c

- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 142d 143a THIRD DAY 197b-c 203a 203d

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43a d

- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 23c 24a VIII 26b-c / *Objections and Replies* 128c 129a

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 29b 372d PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1 387b 388b

- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* I 171a 172a / *Vacuum* 37b 373b 376b 377a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b-434b passim esp 430b-431b

- 34 NEWTON *Principles* DEFINITIONS 5a 13a / *Optics* BK I 379a 380b

- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 131 470d 471d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 17d 19a 68a 69c 215d 217a 245c 248d

6b The use of definition in speculative philosophy and empirical science

- 7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 544c 549d / *Statesman* 595b c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810b

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 14 131b 134a / *Soul* BK I 631a 641d esp CH I 631a 632d BK II CH 1-3 647a 645b

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 161a 168c passim / *Politics* BK II CH 4 [1290²⁵ 40] 489d-490a

- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK II 43c-44d

- 28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 200a 203d

- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 63 113d 114a BK II APH 10-20 140c 153a APH 43 179d 188b

- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 23c 24a VIII 26b-c

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1 387b 388b

- 33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 372b 373b 376b 377a

- 34 NEWTON *Principles* DEFINITIONS 5a 13a / *Optics* BK I 379a 380b

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII SECT 3-10 204c 206d SECT 14 187³⁰ 209a SECT 37 213d 214b BK III CH IV SECT 15-17 288d 290a CH VI SECT 10 302b SECT 19 25 304b-306c

- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 17 457b d [1a 1] SECT VII DIV 43 49 41d 471d SECT VIII DIV 74 484a c

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 215d 216d 243c 244c / *Practical Reason* 293c 294b / *Intro Metaphysic of Moral* 388a-c / *Judgment* 603b d

- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 17 119b 120b

- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART I 10a b 21a 22c 25c 29d

Chapter 16 DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

OF all the traditional names for forms of government "democracy" has the liveliest currency today. Yet like all the others, it has a long history in the literature of political thought and a career of shifting meanings. How radically the various conceptions of democracy differ may be judged from the fact that in one of its meanings democracy flourished in the Greek city-states as early as the fifth century B.C. while in another democracy only began to exist in recent times or perhaps does not yet exist anywhere in the world.

In our minds democracy is inseparably connected with constitutional government. We tend to think of despotism or dictatorship as its one opponent or enemy. That is how the major political issue of our day is understood. But as recently as the 17th century some of the American constitutionalists preferred a republican form of government to democracy, and at other times, both ancient and modern, ofarchy or anarchy rather than monarchy or despotism, is the major alternative. Democracy has even tended for the lawless rule of the mob—either as a kind of tyrannical or the immediate prerogative of the man.

Throughout all these shifts in meaning and use the word democracy preserves certain original political connotations. Democracy exists as a designation for a system wherein the body of the people is empowered to the supreme power. In one meaning the word indicates democracy—the rule of the people. While there may be said that often has been a difference of opinion with respect to the meaning of "the people" this notion has been traditionally associated with the doctrine of popular sovereignty which makes the political community as such the origin and basis of political authority. In the development of the democratic tradition popular sovereignty has been accom-

panied by the elaboration of safeguards for the rights of man to assure that government actually functions for the people and not merely for one group of them.

Although there are essential parts of democracy—neither popular sovereignty nor the safeguarding of natural rights provides the specific characteristic of democracy—since both are compatible with any other just form of government. The specifically democratic element is apparent from the fact that throughout the many shifts of meaning which democracy has undergone the common thread is the notion of political power in the hands of the many rather than the few or the one. Thus at the very beginning of democratic government we find Pericles calling Athens a democracy because "its administration favours the many instead of the few." Close to our own day Mill likewise holds that democracy is "the government of the whole people by the whole people in which the majority will outvote and prevail."

According as the many exercise legal power as citizens or merely actual power as a mob democracy is aligned with or against constitutional government. The quantitative meaning of man can vary from more than the few to all or something approaching all and with this variance the same constitution may be at one time regarded as oligarchical or aristocratic and at another as democratic. The way in which the many who are citizens exercise their power—either directly or through representatives—occasions the 18th century distinction between a democracy and a republic though this verbal ambiguity can be easily avoided by using the phrases "direct democracy" and "representative democracy" as was sometimes done by the writers of *The Federalist* and their American contemporaries.

These last two points—the extension of the

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

I

- AQUINAS *On Being and Essence* CH 2-3
 HOBBS *Concerning Body* PART I CH 2
 SINOZA *Correspondence* IX
 LOCKE *Conduct of the Understanding*
 HANT *Introduction to Logic* VIII
 HEGEL *Science of Logic* VOL I BK II SECT I CH I
 J. S. MILL *A System of Logic* BK I CH 7-8 BK 4
 CH 7-8

II

- QUINTILIAN *Institutio Oratoria* (*Institutes of Oratory*) BK VII CH 3
 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* BK II
 JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus Ars Logica* PART II QQ 6-12
 ARNAULD *Logic or the Art of Thinking* PART I
 CH 12-14 PART IV CH 4-5
 LEIBNITZ *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* BK III CH 3
 T. REID *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* I
 J. MILL *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* CH 8
 W. HAMILTON *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*
 VOL III (24)

WHEWELL *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*
 VOL I BK VIII

SICWART *Logic* PART I CH I SECT 44 PART III CH I
 SECT 74

JEVONS *The Principles of Science* CH 30

— *Studies in Deductive Logic* CH I

VENN *Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic*
 CH 11-13

POINCARÉ *Science and Method* BK II CH 2

WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL *Principia Mathematica*
 INTRO CH I esp pp 11-19 PART I SECT A pp
 pp 91-94

B. RUSSELL *Principles of Mathematics* PART I

— *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* CH
 13 16-17

WHITEHEAD *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
 Natural Knowledge* CH 8-13

— *The Concept of Nature* CH 4

W. E. JOHNSON *Logic* PART I CH I, 8

OGDEN and RICHARDS *The Meaning of Meaning*

DUBISLAV *Die Definition*

MARITAIN *The Degrees of Knowledge* CH 3

CARNAP *The Logical Syntax of Language* PART A
 SECT 8 PART II SECT 22 PART III SECT 29

DEWEY *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry* CH 13 14
 16-18 20

DEWEY and BENTLEY *Knowing and the Known*
 CH 7

Alexander Hamilton and others involved in the American constitutional debates, as for example James Wilson occasionally call this system a representative democracy but in *The Federalist* a republic is sharply differentiated from a democracy. The great points of difference however turn out to be only the delegation of the government (in a republic) to a small number of citizens elected by the rest and the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country in which a republic may extend. The difference as already noted is best expressed in the words representative and direct democracy.

In Mill's *Representative Government* we find democracy identified with the ideal state. The ideally best form of government he writes is that in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling power in the last resort is vested in the entire aggregate of the community every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty but being at least occasionally called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function local or general. Though Mill recognizes the infirmities of democracy and though he readily concedes that it may not be the best government for all peoples under all circumstances his argument for its superiority in all other forms of government remains substantially unqualified.

In Mill a construction of the democratic ideal as providing liberty and equality for all the essential function flows from previous conceptions of the meaning of the word *all*. The republicans of the 18th century in their doctrines of popular sovereignty and natural rights understood citizenship in terms of equality of status and conceived liberty in terms of a man's having a voice in his own government. The ancients seeing that men could be free and equal members of a political community only when they lived as citizens under the rule of law recognized that the democratic constitution alone bestowed such equality upon all men not born slaves. But generally neither the ancients nor the 18th century republicans understood liberty and equality for all men to require the abolition of slavery the emancipation of women from political subjection or the eradication of all con-

stitutional discriminations based on wealth race or previous condition of servitude.

With Mill *all* means every human person without regard to the accidents of birth or fortune. "There ought to be no pariahs in a full grown and civilized nation" he writes no persons disqualified except through their own default. Under the latter condition he would withhold the franchise from infants idiots or criminals (including the criminally indigent) but with these exceptions he would make suffrage universal. He sums up his argument by claiming that it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one unless for the prevention of greater evils the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people and whoever has no vote and no prospect of obtaining it will either be a permanent mal-content or will feel as one whom the general affairs of society do not concern. But it should be added that for Mill the franchise is not merely a privilege or even a right it is he says strictly a matter of duty. How the voter uses the ballot has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. He is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the suffrage.

The notion of universal suffrage raises at once the question of the economic conditions prerequisite to the perfection of political democracy. Can men exercise the political freedom of citizenship without freedom from economic dependence on the will of other men? It was commonly thought by 18th century republicans that they could not. A power over a man's subsistence Hamilton declares amounts to a power over his will. On that basis it was urged by many during the Philadelphia convention that a property qualification was necessary for suffrage.

Mill also argues that suffrage presupposes the independence or self-sufficiency of the individual citizen. Because apprentices servants minors women and the like do not maintain themselves each according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others he claims that they are mere subsidiaries of the Common wealth and not active independent members of

franchise and a system of representation—mark the chief differences between ancient and contemporary institutions of democracy. Today constitutional democracy tends to be representative and the grant of citizenship under a democratic constitution tends toward universal suffrage. That is why we no longer contrast democracy and republic. That is why even the most democratic Greek constitutions may seem undemocratic—oligarchical or aristocratic—to us.

To the extent that democracy ancient or modern is conceived as a lawful form of government, it has elements in common with other forms of lawful government which for one reason or another may not be democratic. The significance of these common elements—the principle of constitutionality and the status of citizenship—will be assumed here. They are discussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and CITIZEN. The general theory of the forms of government is treated in the chapter on GOVERNMENT and the two forms most closely related to democracy in the chapters on ARISTOCRACY and OLIGARCHY.

THE EVALUATIONS of democracy are even more various than its meanings. It has been denounced as an extreme perversion of government. It has been grouped with other good or other bad forms of government and accorded the faint praise of being called either the most tolerable of bad governments or the least efficient among acceptable forms. It has been held up as the political ideal, the only perfectly just state—that paragon of justice which has always been, whether recognized or not, the goal of political progress.

Sometimes the same writer will express divergent views. Plato for example in the *Statesman* claims that democracy has a twofold meaning according as it involves ruling with law or without law. Finding it in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil, he concludes that it is the worst of all lawful governments and the best of all lawless ones. The rule of the many is least efficient for either good or evil. But in the *Republic* he places democracy at only one remove from tyranny. On the ground that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction, tyranny is

said to arise naturally out of democracy and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty.

Similarly Aristotle in the *Politics* calls democracy the most tolerable of the three perverted forms of government in contrast to oligarchy which he thinks is only a little better than tyranny, the worst of governments. Yet he also notes that among existing governments there are generally thought to be two principal forms—democracy and oligarchy—and the rest are only variations of these. His own treatment conforms with this observation. He devotes the central portion of his *Politics* to the analysis of oligarchy and democracy. In his view they are equal and opposite in their injustices, and to him both seem capable of degenerating into despotism and tyranny.

Among the political philosophers of modern times a certain uniformity of treatment seems to prevail in the context of otherwise divergent theories. Writers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau or Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Kant differ in many and profound respects. But they classify the forms of government in much the same fashion. As Hobbes expresses it, when the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a monarchy; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy or popular commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an aristocracy. Though Hobbes favors monarchy and Montesquieu either aristocracy or democracy, these writers do not make the choice among the three traditional forms a significant expression of their own political theories. For them the more important choice is presented by other alternatives for Hobbes between absolute and limited government, for Montesquieu and Locke between government by law and despotism, for Rousseau and Kant between a republic and a monarchy.

The authors of *The Federalist* define and show their preference for popular government as opposed to monarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy. They usually refer to it as a republic, by which they mean a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period or during good behavior.

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THE ANCIENT ISSUE between the democratic and the oligarchical constitution turns primarily on a question of justice not on the relative competence of the many and the few to rule. Either form of government may take on a more or less aristocratic cast according as men of eminent virtue or ability assume public office but in neither case does the constitution itself guarantee their choice except possibly on the oligarchical assumption that the possession of wealth signifies superior intelligence and virtue.

The justice peculiar to the democratic constitution Aristotle thinks arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects because men are equally free they claim to be absolutely equal. It does not seem to him inconsistent with democratic justice that slaves women and resident aliens should be excluded from citizenship and public office.

In the extreme form of Greek democracy the qualifications for public office are no different from the qualifications for citizenship. Since they are equally eligible for almost every governmental post the citizens can be chosen by lot rather than elected by vote. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu's opinion of the Greek practice that election by lot is democratic in nature. He thinks it would have few disadvantages in a real democracy but he adds:

I have already said that a real democracy is only an ideal.

The justice peculiar to the oligarchical constitution is according to Aristotle based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal being unequal that is in property they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The oligarchical constitution consequently does not grant citizenship or open public office to all the free born but in varying degrees sets a substantial property qualification for both.

Though he admits that the opposite claims of the oligarch and the democrat have a kind of justice Aristotle also points out the injustice of each. The democratic constitution he thinks does injustice to the rich by treating them as equal with the poor simply because both are freeborn while the oligarchical constitution does injustice to the poor by failing to treat all free men regardless of wealth as

equals. Tried by an absolute standard Aristotle goes on to say they are faulty and therefore both parties whenever their share in the government does not accord with the preconceived ideas stir up a revolution.

Plato Thucydides and Plutarch as well as Aristotle observe that this unstable situation permits demagogue or dynast to encourage lawless rule by the mob or by a coterie of the rich. Either paves the way to tyranny.

To stabilize the state and to remove injustice Aristotle proposes a mixed constitution which by a number of different methods attempts to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich. In this way he hopes to satisfy the two requirements of good government. One is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws the other is the goodness of the laws which they obey. By participating in the making of laws all free men the poor included would be more inclined to obey them. But since the rich are also given a special function there is according to Aristotle the possibility of also getting good laws passed since birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.

To Aristotle the mixed constitution is perfectly just and with an aristocratic aspect added to the blend it approaches the ideal polity. Relative to certain circumstances it has a greater right than any other form of government except the true and ideal to the name of the government of the best.

Yet the true and the ideal or what he sometimes calls the divine form of government seems to be monarchy for Aristotle or rule by the one superior man and in his own sketch of the best constitution at the end of the *Politics* the best practicable if not the ideal—Aristotle clearly opposes admitting all the laboring classes to citizenship.

AS INDICATED in the chapter on CONSTITUTION Aristotle's mixed constitution should be distinguished from the medieval mixed regime which was a combination of constitutional with non constitutional or absolute government rather than a mixture of different constitutional principles. The mixed regime—or royal and political government—seems to have come into being not as an attempt to

conclusion, conflict, principles of justice but is the inevitable product of a decaying feudalism and a rising nationalism. Yet Aquinas claims that a mixed regime was established by the law for the people of Israel for it was partly kingdom since there is one at the head of all partly aristocracy in so far as a number of persons are set in authority partly democracy in so far as the government by the people in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people and the people have the right to choose their rulers. In such a system the monarchical principles are blended with aristocratic and democratic elements to whatever extent the nobles and the commons play a part in the government. But neither group functions politically as citizens so under purely constitutional government.

The question of constitutional justice can however be carried over from ancient to modern times. Modern democracy answers it differently granting equality to all men on the basis of their being born human. It recognizes no wealth or breeding as basis for special political preferment or privilege. By these standards the mixed constitution and even the most extreme form of Greek democracy must be regarded as oligarchical in character by a writer like Mill.

Yet Mill no less than Aristotle would agree with Montesquieu's theory that the rightness of any form of government must be considered with reference to the humors and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established. The constitution and laws Montesquieu writes should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it would be a great chance if those of one nation suit another.

Mill raises the same point somewhat differently when he says the ideally best form of government does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization. But although he is willing to consider the form of government in relation to the historic conditions of a people not satisfy by absolute standard. Mill differs sharply from Montesquieu and Aristotle in one very important respect. For him as we have seen representative democracy founded on universal suffrage is absolutely speaking the only truly just government—the only one perfectly suited

to the nature of man. Peoples whose accidental circumstances temporarily justify less just or even unjust forms of government such as oligarchy or despotism must not be forever condemned to subjection or disfranchisement but should rather be raised by education, experience and economic reforms to a condition in which the ideal polity becomes appropriate for them.

THE BASIC PROBLEMS of democratic government—seen from the point of view of those who either attack or defend it—remain constant despite the altered conception of democracy in various epochs.

At all times there is the question of leadership and the need for obtaining the political services of the best men without infringing on the political prerogatives of all men. The difference between the many and the few between the equality of men as free or human and their individual inequality in virtue or talent must always be given political recognition if not by superiority in status then by allocation of the technically difficult problems of statecraft to the expert or specially competent with only certain broad general policies left to the determination of a majority vote. Jefferson and Mill alike hope that popular government may abolish privileged classes without losing the benefits of leadership by peculiarly gifted individuals. The realization of that hope Jefferson writes Adams depends on leaving to the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo aristoi of the wheat from the chaff.

At all times there is the danger of tyranny by the majority and under the threat of revolution the rise of a demagogue who uses mob rule to establish a dictatorship. Hobbes phrases this peculiar susceptibility of democracy to the mischief of demagogues by saying of popular assemblies that they are as subjects to evil counsel and to be seduced by orators as a monarch by flatterers with the result that democracy tends to degenerate into government by the most powerful orator.

The democratic state has seldom been tempted to undertake the burdens of empire without suffering from a discordance between its domestic and its foreign policy. Again and again

Thucydides describes the efforts of the Athenians to reconcile their imperialism abroad with democracy at home

In his oration at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war Pericles praises the democracy of Athens and at the same time celebrates the might of her empire. It is only the Athenians, he says, who fearless of consequences confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency but in the confidence of liberality. But four years later after the revolt of Mitylene Cleon speaks in a different vein. Thucydides describes him as being at that time by far the most powerful with the commons. He tells his fellow citizens of democratic Athens that he has often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire but never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene. He urges them to return to their earlier decision to punish the Mitylenians for he says if they reverse that decision they will be giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire—pity, sentiment and indulgence.

Diodotus, who in this debate recommends a policy of leniency, does not do so in the confidence of liberality which Pericles had said was the attitude of a democratic state toward its dependencies. The question is not of justice, Diodotus declares, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens. We must not, he continues, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own prejudice but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in the future by the revenue-producing powers of our dependencies. It is far more useful for the preservation of our empire, he concludes, voluntarily to put up with injustice than to put to death however justly those whom it is our interest to keep alive.

Twelve years later Alcibiades, no democrat himself, urges the Athenians to undertake the Sicilian expedition by saying we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall top; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme

to extend it for if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. In the diplomatic skirmishes which precede the invasion of Sicily Hermocrates of Syracuse tries to unite the Sicilian cities so that they may escape disgraceful submission to an Athenian master. The Athenian ambassador Euphemus finds himself compelled to speak at first of our empire and of the good right we have to it but he soon finds himself frankly confessing that for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient.

The denouement of the Peloponnesian war and especially of the Sicilian expedition is the collapse of democracy, not through the loss of empire but as a result of the moral sacrifices involved in trying to maintain or increase it. Tacitus commenting on the decay of republican institutions with the extension of Rome's conquests underlines the same theme. It is still the same theme when the problems of British imperialism appear in Mill's discussion of how a democracy should govern its colonies or dependencies.

The incompatibility of empire with democracy is one side of the picture of the democratic state in external affairs. The other side is the tension between democratic institutions and military power or policy—in the form of standing armies and warlike maneuvers. The efficiency traditionally attributed to democracy under peaceful conditions does not from all the evidences of history seem to render democracy weak or pusillanimous in the face of aggression.

The deeper peril for democracy seems to lie in the effect of war upon its institutions and on the morality of its people. As Hamilton writes in *The Federalist*, "The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe they at length become will not to run the risk of being less free."

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk II [267-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk II [267-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. Old Testament *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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 43 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* 125c d 127b-c 211b-c
 46 HENRI SHARP *Science of Rights* 114b-d / *Science of Rights* 450d 452 / *Judgement* 586a 587a
 48 MILL *Liberty* 460a-c 467a b 474d-4 6a
 50 MILL *Liberty* 460a-c 467a b 474d-4 6a
 51 TOLSTOY *Letters* 104b-105a 150c 151a

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- 5 ARISTOTLE *Mediations* bk 1 sect 14 251b-c
 6 THUCYDIDES *Annals* bk x 132a-c
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk 1 408b-413d
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk ii ch 11 479b-481b bk iv ch 11 495b-497b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 1 m 62b-c
 23 HENRI LEE *Letters* 104b-105a 150c 151a
 38 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch xix 223 76c d 240-242 81b-d
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk 1 4c 5a bk 1 9b-10c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* bk 1 411 c bk 2 427d
 40 GORDON *Decline and Fall* 114b
 41 CARRO *Decline and Fall* 81d
 42 HENRY SHARP *Science of Rights* 114b-d / *Science of Rights* 450d 452 / *Judgement* 586a 587a

4a *Liberty and equality for all under law*
 4a(1) *Universal suffrage the abolition of privileged classes*

4b *The democratic realization of popular sovereignty the safeguarding of natural rights*

- 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION VI [87-93] 6b
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 9 [289-295] 14a ARTICLE VI [597-599] 16d
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 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125c 126b NUMBER 57 177a b NUMBER 84 252a
 43 MILL *Representative Government* 344d 346c 350a 369b 370a 380c 389b 394a 396d 403d
 50 MARY ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 416c d 425b c 428d 429c

- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [334-35] 261b c [399-462] 261d 262b
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c d BK IV 245b
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396b 397c
 7 PLATO *Laus* BK IV 681d 682c
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH I 471b d 472c CH I [1278^b 14] 475d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1365^b 22-31] 608a
 14 PLUTARCH *Tiberius Gracchus* 678b d
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 101a 10-d PART III 228b c PART IV 273a c
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 1 435b-436a

4a(2) *The problem of economic justice the choice between capitalism and socialism*

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IV SECT 21 35a CH VII SECT 87-CH VIII SECT 99 44a 47c CH IX SECT 127 CH X SECT 132 54a 55b CH XI 55b 58b CH XIII SECT 149 59b d CH XIX 73d 81d passim esp SECT 212 74a b SECT 243 81d

- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
 5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesina usae* 615a 628d
 7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 341c d BK V 363b 365d / *Laus* BK V 691b 697a
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130^b 30]-CH 4 [1132^b 20] 378b 380b / *Politics* BK II CH 5 458a 460a CH 6 [1265 27-37] 460c d CH 7 461d 463c BK V CH I 502a 503b BK VI CH 3 521c 522a CH 5 [13 0 17-31] 523d 524b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 105 A 1 ANS and REP 1-6 309d 316a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 156b 157a
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1 22f] 351a 353d
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V 30b 36a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laus* BK IV 16a 17b BK V 19d 21d BK VII 44d 45b BK XIII 96a 102a c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 375b d 377b d / *Social Contract* BK I 393d 394d BK II 405a d
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 28a d 61c d 109d 110d BK IV 201b d 239c 240a 287c d
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. AMENDMENTS V [645-648] 17b XIII 18c XVI 19b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50b 53a NUMBER 35 113a 114b NUMBER 60 184d 186b NUMBER 79 233c
 43 MILL *Liberty* 309a e / *Representative Government* 345b 346a 369b 370a / *Utilitarianism* 467a b 472d 473c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 304c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 356d
 50 MARY *Capital* 33b 37a 104b 105a 113c 115c 377c 378d
 50 MARY ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 419a 434d esp 428d 429c 432b c 433b 434c d
 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787d 788b

- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laus* BK II 4a 6b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323d 356b 359a / *Political Economy* 369b c / *Social Contract* BK I 387b d 392a BK II 395a 396a BK III 420a-424d
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14b 91a d
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 94d
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 429a c 434a 435a 458a c esp 436c 437c d 450a b 451c d
 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [1 25] b [11-47] 2a [109-121] 3a b
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. PREAMBLE 11a d AMENDMENTS I-V 1 a d VIII VI 18c 10b XIX 19d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a NUMBER 14 60c d NUMBER 23 84d 85a NUMBER 38 125a 128b NUMBER 40 131b NUMBER 41 144d 145a 146c d NUMBER 46 150b c NUMBER 51 164a 165a NUMBER 78 231a 237c NUMBER 83 246a b NUMBER 84 251b-254b
 43 MILL *Liberty* 267a 274a / *Representative Government* 344d 350a 382b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 93d 94d par 308 102c 103a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 175b c PART II 272a d

4c *The infirmities of democracy in practice and the reforms or remedies for these defects*

- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
 5 ARISTOPHANES *Acharnians* 455a-469a c / *Knights* 470a 487a c esp [1111 1150] 483d 484b / *Wasps* 507a 525d / *Peace* 526a 541d esp [601-62] 532d 534a / *Birds* 542a 563d / *Frogs* [686 705] 572a b / *Lysistrata* [486-5] 589a 590d / *Ecclesina usae* [169-185] 617a
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108a c BK IV 180c d

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- 6 THUCY 1 25 *Pol. necessities* HAT BK III
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- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycorgus* 34d 35c / *Lycorgus*
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- 23 H *Lernath* R II 148d 149b
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- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH X 1 ECT 5¹
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- 38 MONTESQ *Spirit of Laws* BK II 5a BK
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 418a-420a
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- 40 CH *Decline and Fall* 14b
41 G *Decline and Fall* 94d 95c 562c
563a esp 563d 564

- 43 FEDER LIST NUM I 1 49c 53a passim
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- H *Philosophy of Right* ART I par 3 1
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to all men under all circumstances: con-
ditions favorable to democracy progress
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- 6 HAZARD *History* K 193b-c BK IX
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- 7 PL to Republic K 425c-427b

- 9 ARISTOTEL *Politics* K II CH 2 [129⁸-22]
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- 38 MONTESQ *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3b-d
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Ineq. lvs* 324a b / *Social Co*
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- 41 G *Decline and F II* 562 565a esp
562 d, 563d 564a

4. K. *Pure Re* 10 114b-115a / *Science of*
R 436d-437 431 B

- 43 F I 14 60a-61b NUM K
19 125b NUM 5, 174c-d

- 43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 268c 272a / *Represent*
ative Government 328d 332d 338b-340d
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442d passim
45 H C 2 *Philosophy of History* INTRO 161 c
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5 Democracy and representation = government

5a The distinction between direct democracy and representation, or republican, go- ernment = the territorial limits of democ- racy

- 9 ARISTOTEL *Politics* BK VI CH 4 [131⁸-2] 1
522b

- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH X SECT 132
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- 38 MONTESQ *Spirit of Laws* K III 56c-d
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 410c-420a
423a

- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 451-452a

- 43 FEDER LIST NUM R 1 51c 53a NUM R
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- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 330a b
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- 46 HAZARD *Philosophy of History* INTRO 175b-c
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5b The theory of representation

- 7 PLATO *Leads* BK VI 697a 705c

- 9 ARISTOTEL *Politics* K I CH 14 498b-499c
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- 14 PLATON *Lycorgus* 34d 35d / *Solon* 70d
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- 20 AOT *as Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 90,
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- 23 H *as Lernath* RT 96c 98a,c RT
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- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II 5 CT 87-89
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143 58c-d CH XIII ECT 154 153 60c 62b
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- 38 MONTESQ *Spirit of Laws* K XI 71 c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 421c-423a

- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271d
40 G *Decline and F II* 522c 523a

- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 436c 450a b 451c
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- 43 DE LA RIVIERE *as* IV d 45c {3, 4}
1b-2 [109-121] 3a passim

- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I 11a
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- 43 FEDER LIST NUMBER I 49c 53a NUMBER
14 60a-61b NUM 22 82a 83 NUM
BER 23 97b-d NUMBER 35 113a 114b

(5) *Democracy and representative government*
 5b *The theory of representation*

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43 MILL *Liberty* 268b e / *Representative Government* 327a-442d passim esp 329d 330b 338a b 350a 355b 356b 370a 372b 389c 392b 401a-406a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 301-303 100b 102a par 308-311 102c 104a ADDITIONS 182 148c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 175b e

5b(1) Majority rule and minority or proportional representation

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 10 478d-479a CH 13 [1283 a1-b34] 481b d CH 15 [1286 2-b22] 484c 485a BK IV CH 8 [1294 12-15] 493d 494a BK V CH 9 [1310 25-35] 512c BK VI CH 2 [1317^{b2}-16] 520d CH 3 [1318 19-b5] 521c 522a CH 4 [1318^{b21}-26] 522b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 301-303 227b 878 345a b
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 95-99 46c 47c CH X SECT 132 55a b CH XI SECT 140 58a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4b 6d

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 391b BK IV 425d-427a esp 426d 427a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 91b

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION V [49-73] 5d 6a

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US AMENDMENTS XIV SECT. 18d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a NUMBER 22 82a 83a NUMBER 35 113a 114b NUMBER 37 120b c NUMBER 43 141d 142d NUMBER 51 164a 165a passim NUMBER 54 170a 172b NUMBER 58 181d 182a NUMBER 62 189b d

43 MILL *Liberty* 268d 271c 298b 302c 307b 312a / *Representative Government* 366a 380b 386a 387d 406d-407d 410b e

44 BOSWELL Johnson 261c e

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 311-313 103d 104b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172d 173a PART IV 365a

5b(2) Ultimate limitations on the franchise

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 697d 700b BK VIII 740d 741a

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 6 492b 493a BK VI CH 3 521c 522a CH 4 [1319^{b2}-32] 523a b BK VII CH 9 533a d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 4 554b ii CH 42 572b d

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 62b d

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 5c

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 427c-432b

42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US ARTICLE I SECT 2 [5 10] 11b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 52 165a-c NUMBER 170a 172b NUMBER 57 177a

43 MILL *Representative Government* 315a b 380 389b passim esp 382c 383c 393-396d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 103d 104a

5b(3) Methods of election and voting

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 697a 705c BK VII 786b-787b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 9 [1314^{b4}] 494c CH 14 [1298^{b13} 1 99 1] 499a-c CH 15 [1300^{g9}-b4] 500d 501b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 6a b / *Historiae* BK IV 267d 268c

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 154 158 60d 62b CH XIV SECT 216 74d

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 5b e

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324c 325b / *Social Contract* BK IV 426c-428a

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US ARTICLE I SECT 2 [5-10] 11b SECT 2 [17]-SECT 3 [8] 11b 12a SECT 4 [96 102] SECT 5 [107 109] 12b ARTICLE II SECT 1 [321 3/4] 14b-d AMENDMENTS XII 18a c XVII 19b-c XXII 20d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 5 -61 165a 188d passim NUMBER 62 189a b NUMBER 65 205b 207a

43 MILL *Representative Government* 3 III 406a 412a 414d

44 BOSWELL Johnson 176a b 251a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 309-311 103b 104a / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d

5b(4) The role of political parties factions

5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* [511-580] 590c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 434c-438b BK IV 458d-459c 463a-465c BK V 502d 504a BK VIII 564a 593a c esp 568d 569a 575c 576c 577b d 579c 583c 584b 585a 585d 586b 587a 590c

7 PLATO *Laws* BK V 695a e BK IX 744c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH II 420c 421a / *Politics* BK V CH 9 [1309^{b14} 1310^{b1}] 511d 512b / *Athenian Constitution* CH 5 554d 555a CH 8 par 5 556c

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 68d 75c d / *Pentecost* 126c d / *Pompey* 521d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b-c / *Historiae* BK II 224d 225a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IV 14c d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 121c d 148d 149b 150b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 9d 15 XIX 142b 143a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 396b d BK III 424b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271a BK V 420c-421a

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- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* II 652b-655c
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a TM
 43 141d 142d NUM ER 50 161d 162 passim
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 43 MILL *Liberty* 289c-d / *Representative Govern-*
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 44 BOSWELL *J. Knox* 261-d 374b-c
 46 H. EL *Philosophy of History* PART II 2 5b-d
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 50 M. EX E. GELS *Communist Manifesto* 423d
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- 4 The distribution of function and powers, checks and balances in representative democracy
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* K VI 697 700c
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* K II 4-16 498b-502a.c K VI, CH 8 515b-516d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 4-69 572b-581a passim
- 1 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d 3 d / *So on* 70d 71
- 23 H. *Leviathan* RT II 103d 104b 150b 1 1 1 2a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII 5 CT 10th 49b-d H XII XIII 53-62b
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 1 G. *Decline and Fall* 26d 27b
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 1 A. TICLES of Co. R. TWO EX 7a-9a
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- 13 F. RALIST NUMS R 47-45 153c 159a esp TM 45 1 7 NUM R 5 162d 163a TM 2A 52, 167 b NUM R 57 176d 179b TM R 5 180d NUM 2 60 184d-185b TM ER 6 189d 191c TM R 63 192 193c TM 66 200c 201d NUMS 69 207 210c passim TM 73 219b-221 TM ER -6, 226a 277b NUM R 3 230a 233a TM 2 8 237d 239c
- 43 MILL *Representative Government*, 355b-356b 36 b-366a 369b-370a 401d-402b 406a 409c 412b-c
- 46 H. EL *Philosophy of History* ART II PART 2 87d 90c OPTION 3 147d 148a / *Philosophy of History* VARIO. 192d 193a

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- 5 E. RUM S. *Politics* 199-26 1261d 262b
 6 THUCYD. *Polymachus* Har K II, 395d 392a

- 7 PL. TO LARY EXH 670c-6 6b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* K IV CH 9 1204^b 19-41 49-c K V CH 9 1310^a 35 1512b-c K VII CH 14 537b-538d K VIII CH 1 542a b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan*, P RT II 114d 115a 153a 155c
 3. MILTON *Areopagitica* 381a-412b esp 384b-389a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* K I 15c 18d
 38 ROES = *Political Economy* 375d 377b
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* K 340c 343d
 43 FEDERALIST TM ER 2 90c-d NUMBER 84 253d 254b
 43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 323a.c / *Representative Government*, 330a 339a 341c 349a-350a 3 1-c 381b-382b 386b-387d 401a-406a passim 418b-d 420b-d 424b-c
 50 MARX *Capital*, 237d 240d esp 238b-c
 50 M. EX E. GELS *Communist Manifesto* 427c 429b
- 7 The growth and vicissitudes of democracy
- 5 ARISTOTLE *Politics* 160-155 617a
 6 H. C. OODUS *History* K III 120b-c
 6 THUCYD. *Peloponnesian War* K III 434c-438b K III 579d 580a
 7 PL. TO REP HAR K I 408b-414b / *Lysis* K II 674d-676b
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- 11 PLUTARCH *Themistocles* 9a-d / *Themistocles* 96b-c / *Pericles* 121 141a.c / *Leviathan* 166a 174d / *Phocion* 604b-d-619d / *Tiberius Gracchus*, 675b-d 678b-d / *Cato Major*, 681b-d-689a esp 683b-c
- 15 THUCYD. *Politics* K I 2a
 23 MACMILLAN *Primer* CH 8a-c
 23 HO. S. *Leviathan* PART 114b-115a 150c 151a ART II 273a b
 26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* 562a 590a.c
 27 S. L. K. E. A. R. *Cori* 351a 392a.c
 38 M. T. S. Q. T. C. *Spirit of Laws* K III 9b-10c
 38 RO. SEAT *Social Contract* K III 418a 419b
- 41 G. S. *Decline and Fall*, 71d 73d passim 21 a b 218c 219a 427b-428b 562b-565a esp 562c-d 5 4b-582b esp 574b-577d 587b-588b
- 43 FED. RAL. NUM ER 29a 31a passim NUM ER 6 38d-41 passim TM ER 9- 47a 53a TM R. 2, 82d-83d NUM ER 43 141a 142d NUM R 44 150c-d NUMS 5 164 165a NUM R 58 179c 182a passim NUM R 63 192 194
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 3 6b-c
 46 H. EL. P. *Philosophy of History* ART II 271c 274 27 b-276a

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- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
 5 ARISTOPHANES *Knights* 470a 487a c esp
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5 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 108a c

5 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk iii
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 582a c

7 PLATO *Republic* bk viii 411d-414b / *Laus*
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9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk ii ch 12 [1273^b 36-
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14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 13a 14c / *Solon* 75c
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the Younger 628b d / *Cato Gracchus* 681b d
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15 TACITUS *Annals* bk i 1a 2a / *Histories* bk
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 105c 106d 127d
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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 23a 26a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch xix SECT 224-
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk viii
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38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* bk iii 419b

42 KANT *Science of Right* 439c 441d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 1 30b NUMBER 9
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43 MILL *Representative Government* 329b 330c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 300a
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5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* [572-586] 590c d

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk ii
 403b c bk iii 425a 429a

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Chapter 17 DESIRE

INTRODUCTION

Darwin, Mill, James, and Freud at the modern end of the great tradition, the word "desire" primarily signifies a cause of animal and human behavior. It is one of the basic terms in psychoanalytic analysis, concern that whole class of phenomena which are also referred to by such terms as *aversion*, *needing*, *craving*, *wishing*, *longing*, all of which are discussed in connection with theories of instinct and emotion, *hunger* and love, motivation and purpose.

If we turn to traditional beginnings, to the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Galen and Plotinus, we find that the psychological consideration of desire is part of a much larger context. The ancients are of course concerned with the cause of desire in causing animal or human behavior and with the causes of such desire, but they are also interested in creatures which seem to be present in plants as well as animals. Plato, or perhaps Aristotle, attributes to plants "feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them. The vegetative activities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction seem to spring from basic appetites—or in modern terminology, "biological needs"—inherent in all living matter.

Because hunger and thirst so readily symbolize the essence of desire (or certainly represent its most general manifestation in living things) the words "appetite" and "desire" are frequently used as synonyms in the earlier phase of the tradition. As Hobbes observes, however he promotes to use "appetite" and "desire" as synonyms, desire is the general name "and appetite is sometimes restrained to signify the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst." So, too, Spinoza says that "there is no difference between appetite and desire" yet he adds, "nor is in this particular that desire is general related to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore

be defined as appetite of which we are conscious.

Spinoza here seems to be reflecting the distinction made by earlier writers between natural appetite and conscious desire which we today would perhaps express in terms of "need" and "wish." The ancient conception of tendencies inherent in all things—inanimate as well as living—which seek a natural fulfillment broadens the meaning of appetite or desire. When Aristotle says that "each thing seeks its own perfection" and that "nature does nothing in vain," he is thinking of non-living as well as living bodies. Wherever in the physical world things seem to have a natural tendency to move in a certain direction or to change in a certain way, their appetite belonging to the very nature of the moving thing operates as a cause. Adopting this view, Dante declares that "neither Creator nor creature was ever without love, either natural or of the mind" and in his *Comedy* he shows how each thing has its specific love. The love, or desire of the elements is their innate affinity to their proper place; minerals desire "the place where their generation is ordained" with the result that "the magnet ever receives power from the direction of its generation."

According to this view it is possible to speak of the natural desire of raindrops to fall or of smoke to rise. Such a manner of speaking may at first seem metaphorical—an expression of poetic animism or anthropomorphism—but the ancients, observing different natural tendencies in heavy and light bodies, mean this literally.

The sense of such statements is no different from what is meant when it is said that the sunflower without consciousness, naturally tends to turn toward the sun, or that all men by nature desire to know.

FROM ITS NARROWEST meaning with reference to the behavior of animals and men desire gains a wider connotation when it is conceived as covering the appetites found in living organisms. But in its broadest significance it refers to the innate tendency inherent in matter itself. As we shall presently see, appetite, desire, or tendency is seated in matter according to that conception of matter which identifies it with potentiality or potential being. These considerations are more fully treated in the chapters on BEING, CHANGE, and MATTER, but their significance for the notion of desire can be briefly indicated here.

Plotinus suggests the basic insight when he describes matter as, in beggary, striving as it were by violence to acquire and always disappointed. Matter is that in natural things which is the reason for their motion and change. Considering natural change, Aristotle names what he thinks are its three principles. In addition to something divine, good and desirable, he writes, we hold that there are two other principles: the one contrary to it, the other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it. These are respectively form, privation, and matter. The relation between matter and form is expressed by Aristotle in terms of desire.

The form cannot desire itself, he says, for it is not defective, nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The truth is that what desires the form is matter as the female desires the male.

Conceived most generally as natural appetite or tendency, desire becomes a physical or metaphysical term. *Natural appetite*, says Aquinas, is that inclination which each thing has of its own nature. The significance of desire in this sense extends far beyond psychological phenomena to all things in motion under the impetus or inclination of their own natures rather than moved violently by forces impressed on them from without.

In ancient physics every natural tendency has an end or fulfillment in which the motion governed by that tendency comes to rest. *Eros* and *telos*—desire and end—are complementary concepts, each implying the other as principles of physics, i.e., as factors operating together throughout nature in the order of change. The *telos* of each thing is the perfection which satis-

fies the tendency of its nature. That nature does nothing in vain means simply that in natural desire—need or appetite—exists without the possibility of fulfillment.

CONSIDERING THE DESIGN of the universe and the relation of creatures to God, theologians, Augustine and Aquinas use the concept of desire in both its psychological and its metaphysical sense.

Considered metaphysically, desire can be present only in finite beings, for to be finite is to be in want of some perfection. Hence desire can in no way enter into the immutable, infinite, and perfect being of God. In desire, Aquinas points out, a certain imperfection is implied, namely, the lack of the good which we have not. Since God is perfect, desire cannot be attributed to Him, except metaphorically. Love, however, implies perfection rather than imperfection, since it flows from the act of the will to diffuse its own goodness among others. For that reason, although the infinite perfection of God precludes desire, it does not preclude love.

The theologian goes beyond the metaphysician or physicist when he carries the analysis of desire to the supernatural plane. As God is the supernatural efficient cause of all created things, so God is also the supernatural final cause—the end or ultimate good toward which all creatures tend. The metaphysical maxim that each thing seeks its own perfection is then transformed.

All things, Aquinas writes, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being. Of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their end by a higher intelligence.

The existence in the creature of a desire for God raises difficult questions concerning the manner in which this desire is fulfilled. A supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural means, i.e., without God's help. The vision of God in which the souls of the blessed come to rest is, according to the theologian, the ultimate

ate a fit of grace. Hence in man's case at least
becomes an essay to ask whether he can have
purely natural desire to see God if the goal
such desire cannot be achieved by purely
natural means.

The question is not whether men to whom
God has revealed the promise of ultimate glory
can consciously desire the beatific vision. Clear
that is possible though to sustain such desire
the theological virtue of hope inseparable from
faith and charity may be required. Rather the
question is whether the beatific vision which is
man's supernatural end can be the object of
natural desire. On this the theologians appear
to be less clearly decided.

Aquinas holds that "neither man nor any
nature can attain final happiness by his nat-
ural powers. Yet he also seems to maintain
that man has a natural desire for the perfect
appearance of eternal life. The object of the
will, i.e. of man's appetite he writes is the
eternal good just as the object of the intel-
lect is the universal truth. Man's natural de-
sire to know the truth—not just some truths
at the whole truth—the infinite truth—would
seem to require the vision of God for its fulfill-
ment. Aquinas argues similarly from the will's
natural desire for the infinite good. Naught
fulfills man's will he writes, save the uni-
versal good to be found not in any creature
but in God alone. Some writers find this con-
firmed in the fact that whatever good a man
desires but cannot obtain he pursues to infinity. No
amount of pleasure or power or wealth
seems to satisfy him. He always wants more.
But there is no end to wanting more of such
things. The infinity of such desires must result
in frustration. Only God says the theologian
only an infinite being can satisfy man's infinite
yearning for all the good there is.

Seeing man's restlessness no matter where he
turns to find rest Augustine declares "Thou
miserest us for Thyself and our heart is restless,
until it repose in Thee." Pascal teaches the
same conclusion when he considers the ennui
of men which results from the desperation of
their unending search. Their error he
writes does not lie in seeking excitement if
they seek it only as a diversion. The error is that
they seek it as if the possession of the objects of
the quest would make them really happy."

With regard to the frantic pursuit of diversions,
he claims that both the censurers and the cen-
sured do not understand man's true nature
and the misery of man without God. In such
restlessness and vain seeking the theologian sees
evidence of man's natural desire to be with God.

Admitting the same facts the skeptics inter-
pret the infinity of man's desire as a craving to
be God. If this is not every man's desire it is
certainly Satan's in *Paradise Lost*. Skeptic or
believer every man understands the question
which Goethe and Dante among the great
poets make their central theme. At what mo-
ment amid man's striving and restlessness will
the soul gladly cry "Ah longer on thou art so
fair? Confide that there can be no such
moment. Faust makes that the basis of his
wager with Mephistopheles.

The two poets appear to give opposite an-
swers to the question. Faust finds surcease in an
earthly vision of progressive ends or Heaven-
ly rest comes to the soul of Dante at the very
moment it relinquishes its quest winning peace
through surrender.

IN THE broadest or theological sense of the
word God alone does not desire. In the nar-
rowest or psychological sense only animals and
men do. The contrast of meanings is useful.
Natural appetite or tendency throws light on
the nature of conscious desire.

In order to determine the nature and seat of
desire, Socrates in the *Protagoras* considers such
things as hunger thirst and the like as in
the class of desires. He points out that when
we say a man thirsts, we mean to say that he
is empty. It is not drink he desires, but re-
plenishment by drink, which is a change of
state. Thus we, like Socrates generalizes by say-
ing that he who is empty desires the op-
posite of what he experiences for he is empty
and desires to be full. In the *Symposium* using
the words love and desire as if they were
interchangeable, Socrates declares that he who
desires something is in want of something and
love is of something which a man wants and
has not.

In the psychological sphere desire and love
are often identified—at least verbally. The one
word is frequently substituted for the other.
Here the fact already noted that God loves but

does not desire suggests the root of the distinction between desire and love. Desire always involves some lack or privation to be remedied by a change, whereas love certainly requited love implies the kind of satisfaction which abhors change. Love and desire are of course frequently mixed, but this does not affect their essential difference as tendencies. They are as different as giving and getting. Love aims at the well-being of the beloved, while desire seeks to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good.

Not all writers, however, contrast the generosity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire. Locke, for example, finds self-interest and self-seeking in both. The meaning of love, he observes, is known to anyone who reflects upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him.

For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them, or in spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him. The meaning of desire is, in Locke's opinion, closely related. It consists in the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it. We desire, in short, the things we love but do not possess.

The distinction between love and desire, the question whether they are distinct in animals as well as in men and their relation to one another when they are distinct, are matters more fully discussed in the chapter on Love. It is enough to observe here that when writers use the two words interchangeably, they use both words to signify wanting and seeking.

In the case of animals and men, the thing wanted is an object of conscious desire only if it is something known. In addition to being known as an object of science, it must also be deemed good or pleasant—in other words, worth having. For Locke, desire, as we have seen, is no more than an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good, which is measured in terms of pleasure and pain. What has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call *good*, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call *evil*. That which we consciously desire, that which we judge to be desirable, would thus be some-¹ regard as good for us while the ² would be that

which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious rather than beneficial to us.

There is no question that desire and aversion are psychologically connected with estimations of good and evil or pleasure and pain. This is the case no matter how we answer the moralist's question: Do we desire something because it is good, or do we call it good simply because we desire it? The ethical significance of the question, and of the opposite answers to it, is discussed in the chapter on Good and Evil.

THE METAPHYSICAL conception of natural desire provides terms for the psychological analysis of conscious desire and its object. Viewed as belonging to the very nature of a thing, appetite according to Aristotle consists in the tendency toward something we do not have and which we need. Both factors are essential—the privation and the capacity, or potentiality, for having what is lacked. Privation in the strict sense is always correlative to potentiality.

The writers who use these terms would not speak of the sunflower being deprived of wisdom, even as they would not call a stone blind. Blindness is the deprivation of sight in things which have by nature a capacity to see. So when it is said that man by nature desires to know, or that certain animals instinctively gregarious, naturally tend to associate with one another in herds or societies, the potentiality of knowledge or social life is indicated, and precisely because of these potentialities, ignorance and solitariness are considered privations.

We observe here two different conditions of appetite or desire. As the opposite of privation is possession—or of lacking, having—so the opposite states of appetite are the drive toward the unpossessed and satisfaction in possession. We do not strive for that which we have, and it be to retain our possession of it against loss, and we do not feel satisfied until we get that which we have been seeking.

If a man being strong desired to be strong, says Socrates in the *Symposium*, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. This would be a misconception which we must avoid. To an one who says, I desire to have simply what I

Socrates thinks we should reply: You my friend having wealth and health and strength want to have the continuance of them. When you say I desire that which I desire and nothing else is not your meaning: for you want to have in the future what you now have? This is equivalent to saying that a man desires something which is for him non-existent and which he has not got from which Socrates draws the conclusion that everyone desires that which he has not already which is future and not present and of which he is ignorant.

The object of desire—natural or conscious—thus seems to be an altered condition in the desirer: the result of union with the object desired. Man's natural desire to know impels him to learn. Every act of learning which satisfies his natural desire consists in a changed condition of his mind: a change which both Plato and Aristotle describe as a motion from ignorance to knowledge.

When we consciously desire food it is not the edible thing as such we seek: but rather the ending of it. Only the eating of it will quiet our desire with that change in our condition we call nourishment. That the edible thing is only incidentally the object of our desire may be seen in the fact that no way in which we can possess food *other than eating it* satisfies hunger.

A distinction between natural and conscious desire is complicated by other closely related distinctions which psychologists have made. Freud for example distinguishes between conscious and unconscious desire. Darwin separates instinctive from learned desires and James observes how a conscious desire may become habitual and operate almost automatically without our awareness of either its object or its action.

Part of the complication is verbal and can be removed by referring to natural desires as *non-conscious* rather than *unconscious*. The word *unconscious* literally means *without knowledge*. Creatures which lack the faculty of knowing cannot desire consciously. It does not follow however that sentient or conscious beings cannot have natural appetites. Man's natural desire to know is a case in point. That natural human tendency is not excluded by the fact

that many men also consciously seek knowledge knowing what knowledge is and considering it something worth having.

The instinctive desires of animals are not generally thought to operate apart from the perception of the object toward which the animal is emotionally impelled. The instinctive desire works consciously both on the side of perception and on the side of the emotionally felt impulse. If because it is innate rather than learned or acquired through experience we call the instinctive desire *natural* it is well to remember that we are not here using the word to signify lack of consciousness. Yet both instinctive and acquired desires may operate unconsciously.

What Freud means by a repressed desire illustrates this point. The repressed desire whether instinctual in origin or the result of some acquired fixation of the libido on object or ego would be a conscious tendency *if it were not repressed*. Freud compares the process of repression to the efforts of a man to get from one room to another past the guard of a door-keeper. The excitations in the unconscious to begin with, remain unconscious. When they have pressed forward to the threshold and been turned back by the door-keeper they are incapable of becoming conscious: we call them then repressed. Being repressed when applied to any single impulse means being unable to pass out of the unconscious system because of the door-keeper's refusal of admittance into the preconscious.

The repressed desire is made to operate unconsciously by being repressed which does not prevent it from influencing our conduct or thought but only from intruding its driving force and its goal upon our attention. In contrast the desire which works *habitually* and therefore to some extent unconsciously is not repressed but merely one which no longer demands our full attention.

DESIRE AND EMOTION are often identified in our description of the behavior of animals and men. Sometimes however desire along with aversion is treated as just one of the emotions and sometimes all the emotions are treated as manifestations of just one type of conscious appetite namely animal as opposed to rational desire.

does not desire suggests the root of the distinction between desire and love. Desire always involves some lack or privation to be remedied by a change, whereas love certainly requir'd love implies the kind of satisfaction which abhors change. Love and desire are of course frequently mixed, but this does not affect their essential difference as tendencies. They are as different as giving and getting. Love aims at the well-being of the beloved, while desire seeks to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good.

Not all writers, however, contrast the generosity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire. Locke, for example, finds self-interest and self-seeking in both. The meaning of love, he observes, is known to anyone who reflects upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him.

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The distinction between love and desire, the question whether they are distinct in animals as well as in men, and their relation to one another when they are distinct, are matters more fully discussed in the chapter on Love. It is enough to observe here that when writers use the two words interchangeably, they use both words to signify wanting and seeking.

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which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious rather than beneficial to us.

There is no question that desire and aversion are psychologically connected with estimation of good and evil or pleasure and pain. The case no matter how we answer the first question: Do we desire something because it is good, or do we call it good simply because we desire it? The ethical significance of the question, and of the opposite answers, is discussed in the chapter on Good and Evil.

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The writers who use these terms would not speak of the sunflower being deprived of wisdom, even as they would not call a stone blind. Blindness is the deprivation of sight in things which have by nature a capacity to see. So when it is said that man by nature desires to know, or that certain animals instinctively gregarious, naturally tend to associate with one another in herds or societies, the potential of knowledge or social life is indicated, and precisely because of these potentialities, isolation and solitariness are considered privations.

We observe here two different conditions of appetite or desire. As the opposite of privation is possession—or, if lacking, having—so the opposite states of appetite are the drive toward the unpossessed and satisfaction in possession. We do not strive for that which we have, and it is to retain our possession of it, a *mis*fortune, and we do not feel satisfied until we get that which we have been seeking.

If a man being strongly desired to be strong, says Socrates in the *Symposium*, or being so desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. This would be a misconception which we must avoid. To any one who says, I desire to have simply what I

ital terms of psychoanalysis—conflict, repression, rationalization, sublimation, to name a few—carry the connotation of moral as, even though they imply a purely psychological resolution of them.

Contrary to a popular misconception, Freud expressly declares that it is out of the question that part of the analytic treatment should consist of advice to live freely. The conflict between libidinal desires and sexual repression

explains as “not resolved by helping one to win a victory over the other. Although Freud thinks that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth, he also declares that “we must be wary of overestimating the importance of abstinence in effecting neurons.

What Freud calls emotional infantilism resembles to some degree what a moralist like Aristotle calls self-indulgence or incontinence, a give vent to all the promptings of desire without regard to the demands of society or reality is to revert to infancy—a state characterized, according to Freud, by the irreconcilability of its wishes with reality. Because children live at the beck and call of appetite and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest,” Aristotle thinks it fitting that we should speak of self-indulgence when it occurs in an adult as a childish fault.

Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at the same facts of human nature and seeing them in the same light. What Freud describes as the conflict between the “pleasure-principle” and the “reality principle” Aristotle—and with him Spinoza—treats as a conflict between the passions and the reason, and Kant conceives in terms of the opposition between desire and duty. What Freud says of the reality principle—that it “demands and enforces the postponement of satisfaction, the renunciation of manifold possibilities, and the temporary endurance of pain”—parallels traditional statements concerning the role of reason or of duty in the moral life. Where the moralists speak of the necessity for regulating or moderating emotional desires, Freud refers to the need of do-

minating them, as one would train a beast to serve the ends of human life.

The implication in Aristotle as in Spinoza as well as in Freud does not seem to be that man’s animal appetites are in themselves bad but that if they are undisciplined or uncontrolled they cause disorder in the individual life and in society. Some moralists, however, take an opposite view. For them desire is intrinsically evil, a factor of discontent and fraught with pain.

“What we crave is wanting,” Lucretius writes; it seems to transcend all the rest then when it has been gotten, we crave something else.” Yet as often as a man gains something new he discovers afresh that he is not better off. *Either our desires are unsatisfied and then we suffer the agony of frustration or they are satisfied and so are we—desperate with ennui.* Hence freedom from all desires, not just their moderation, seems to be recommended for peace of mind, as centuries later Schopenhauer recommended the negation of the will to live in order to avoid frustration or boredom.

Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, and later Kant similarly urge us not to yield to the persuasions of the body and never to be over-powered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites. But whereas the Stoics would restrain desire because it is animal and in order to avoid pain Kant argues that the renunciation of desire should be undertaken not merely in accordance with duty but from duty which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.

The opposition between these two views of desire in the moral life represents one of the major issues in ethical theory further discussed in the chapters on Duty and Virtue. The doctrine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is right, he is so by virtue of the truth that natural tendencies are everywhere the measure of good and evil. If, however, there is no truth in the doctrine of natural desire, then the impulses which spring from man’s animal passions can claim no authority in the court of reason.

several terms of psychoanalysis—conflict, repression, rationalization, sublimation, to name only some—carry the connotation of moral *evils*, even though they imply a purely psychological resolution of them.

Contrary to a popular misconception Freud explicitly declares that it is out of the question that part of the analytic treatment should consist of advice to live freely. The conflict between blind desires and sexual repression he explains is not resolved by helping one side to win a victory over the other. Although Freud thinks that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth, he also declares that we must beware of overestimating the importance of abstinence in effecting neurosis.

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The appetitive or driving aspect of emotions is indicated by William James in his analysis of instinctive behavior. The functioning of an instinct may be viewed according to James as a train of psychological events of general reflex type called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal's body or at a distance in his environment arousing emotional excitements which go with them. The emotional part of the instinctive behavior is at once an impulse to perform certain acts and the feeling which accompanies the acts performed. The sheep instinctively recognizing the wolf as dangerous fears and flees. It runs away because it is afraid and feels fear in the act of flight. When in his theory of the emotions James goes so far as to say that the feeling of fear results from running away he does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear involves the impulse to flee.

In its aspect as impulse—or tendency to act—an emotion is a desire consciously aroused by sense-perceptions and accompanied by conscious feelings. This conception of emotion has been variously expressed in the tradition of the great books. Aquinas for example, calls all the emotions or passions movements of the sensitive appetite. But he also uses the words desire and aversion along with love and hate, anger and fear to name specific emotions.

Hobbes recognizes the appetitive tendency which is common to all the emotions when he finds at their root what he calls endeavor—those small beginnings of motion within the body of man before they appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions. This endeavor he goes on to say when it is toward something which causes it is called appetite or desire. Spinoza makes the same point in somewhat different terms. Desire he writes is the essence itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature is conceived from its given constitution as determined towards any action. As his nature is constituted in this or that way so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from another just as the affects from which each desire arises differ. There are as many kinds of desire therefore as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc. and in consequence as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.

Those psychologists who find in man two distinct faculties of knowledge—the senses and the reason or intellect—also find in him two distinct faculties of appetite or desire. The distinction is perhaps most sharply made by Aristotle and Aquinas who claim that there must be one appetite tending towards the universal good which belongs to reason and another with a tendency towards the particular good which appetite belongs to sense. The traditional name for the intellectual appetite or the faculty of rational desire is will. In Spinoza's vocabulary, the effort of desire when it is related to the mind alone is called *will* but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body is called *appetite*.

Psychologists who attribute these diverse modes of desire as they attribute sensation and thought to a single faculty called mind or understanding nevertheless deal with the whole range of appetitive phenomena including both the animal passions and act of will. James for example treats the instinctive acts associated with the emotions as automatic and reflex movements and separates them from voluntary movements which being desired and intended beforehand are done with full prevision of what they are to be. In so doing he draws a line between emotional impulses and acts of will even though he does not distinguish two appetitive faculties.

With or without the distinction in faculties almost all observers of human experience and conduct seem to agree upon a distinction in types of conscious desire at least insofar as they recognize the ever present conflict between the passions and the will. These matters are more fully considered in the chapters on Emotion and Will.

THE ROLE OF DESIRE in human life—especially emotional desire—is so intimately connected with problems of good and evil, virtue and happiness that until quite recently the subject was discussed mainly in books on ethics, politics or rhetoric rather than psychology. Even Freud who tries to separate psychological description and explanation from moral principles or conclusions cannot avoid treating the effects of morality upon the dynamics of desire and the life of the passions. Many of the funda-

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2 The analysis of desire or appetite

2a The roots of desire in need privation or potency the instinctual sources of the libido

- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 24a-c / *Symposium* 162a 166b / *Republic* bk iv 352b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16 24] 268b c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vii ch i [581 21-22] 107a b / *Parts of Animals* bk iii ch 14 [675^b 25-30] 205b / *Ethics* bk iii ch ii [1118^b 8-18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 13 [1389^b 32-35] 637b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk iii ch 6 202d 203a ch 8 205a 207b ch 13 211d 212d
12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iv [8, 8 8, 6] 55b = bk v [156-173] 63a b
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr v ch i 100c 101c ch 10 105d 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 18 21 166d 168c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 1-6 1a 2c bk iii par 1 13b-c par 10 15b d bk iv par 15-19 23a 24b bk v par 1-2 27a c bk vii par 16-23 48c 50c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REI 3 25a d Q 19 A 1 REP 2 108d 109c Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 81 A 2 429c 430c PART I-II Q 27 A 3 ANS AND REP 3-4 738c 739c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xvii [91]-xviii [75] 79b 80c xx [124] xxi [75] 84c 85d passim PARADISE i [103-120] 107b-c
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a d
27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT II SC IV [263 274] 261c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a 350a 402a d
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 97d 98a 99d 102d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 2-7 425a-426b
33 PASCAL *Pemises* 100 191a 192b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xx SECT 6 177a II ch xvi SECT 30-33 185a 186d esp SECT 31 185c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b
43 MILL *Liberty* 295b-d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PAR 190 191 66a 67a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk viii 571b 578b esp 577d 5 8a bk viii 605b-d bk viii 630c 631c EPILOGUE i 665a d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 51a b 76^a

- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363 d / *Narcissism* 400c-402c / *Instincts* 412c-413a 414a d / *General Introduction* 574a 580a d 591d 592b 615b 616b 618d 619a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 654a-c 667d 657a / *Group Psychology* 673b-c / *Ego and Id* 710c 711b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* etc 791c esp 791a / *New Introductory Lectures* 846a 851d esp 846a 847b 849b 851c

2b The objects of desire the good and the pleasant

- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaedrus* 120a 122a / *Symposium* 161d 161b / *Meno* 177d 178b / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 275b 280d / *Republic* bk ii 310c d bk iv 351b 353 d bk iv 422c-425b esp 423b 424d / *Philebus* 614a / *Laws* bk = 682c-690c bk vi 712b bk viii 735c 736c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk ii ch 3 [110^b 38 110^c] 155d bk iii ch 1-4 162a 166b bk vi ch 8 [146 37-39] 200b-c [146^b 36-147 11] 200d 201a / *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16 24] 268b c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 2 [98^b 1 27] 100d 501a [98^b 14 21] 501b-c bk vii ch 7 [10, 2 23-24] 602b-d / *Soul* bk ii ch 3 [141 28^b] 614c bk iii ch 7 [431 1^b] 663c 664b ch 10 [433 13 10] 665d 666c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk viii ch i [589^b 3-10] 115b / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 17 [661^a 6-8] 188a / *Motion of Animals* bk 6 [700^a 23-30] 236a / *Ethics* bk i ch i [1094 1-3] 339a ch 2 [1094 17 2] 339b bk vi ch 2 387d 388b bk vii ch ii 14 403c 406a c bk x ch 2 426c-427b ch 3 [111^a 4 4-11] 478b ch 4 [117^b 10-22] 429c ch 3 [1175^b 4-33] 430b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6-7 602d 607d ch 10 [1369 1 4] 11 b ch 11 [1370^b 17 28] 613c
12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d
12 PRICETIVS *Discourses* bk i ch 4 108d 110a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr vi 21a 26a passim / *Third Ennead* tr v 100c 100b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 35 177d 178a / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 12 234a d / *Sixth Ennead* tr vii ch 30 336b-d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 9-18 10d 13a bk v par 29-33 78d 80b / *City of God* bk xii ch 6 345b 346c bk xix ch i 507a 509a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b-c ch 2-30 629b 633b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 Q 23b 30d passim Q 16 A 1 ANS 94b-95c A 4 97a c Q 19-20 108d 124a passim Q 26 A 2 ANS 150c 151a Q 48 A 1 ANS AND REP 4 259b 260c Q 59-60 306b 314c passim esp Q 60 AA 3-5 311d 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c Q 63 A 4 328b-329a Q 80-83 422a 440b passim Q 104 A 3 REP 1 537b-d Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a Q 106 A 2 ANS 546d 547c

- 7 RYAN *Q* 5 609a-613d *passim* Q 8 655a
 65 c Q 11 A 2, ANS 721c 722a A 3 REP 2
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 and REP 3 734a-d Q 27 737a 740a Q 30
 749a-752b *passim* Q 33 A 2 766a 767a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* RYAN *Q* 94
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 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII
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 22 HOBBS *Leviathan*, P RYAN 61a-63c 76c 77b
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 23 CECIL WILES *Don Quixote* PART II 381d
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 24 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 73a 74a
 31 D C 1 *Discourse* PART III 50b
 32 SEE ORA *Ethics*, PART III, PROP 4-13 398d
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 33 P CAL. *Principles* 81 186b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K 1 CH II,
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 42 HANT *Fund. Prin. Meta-phys. of Morals*,
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 200d 600d-606b [in 3]
 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 448a-450b 461 464d
 46 HIGGINS *Philosophy of Right*, PART II PAR 23
 124 44a-d / *Philosophy of History* PAR IV
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 47 GORTER *Form* ART 1 [19] 216] 29b-30a
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 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 308a b 316a 317
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* K XI 524c 527a
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 198b-211a 208b-814b esp
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 54 FAY *to LUTHER* 414 B 418d-420b esp
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 2c Desire as a cause of action: motivation or
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 7 PLATO *Cratylus*, 95a b / *Symposium* 163a
 196b / *Republic* BK V 302d 353b / *Timaeus*,
 4 4b-d / *Lysis* BK VI 712b BK IX 751b-d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH [10] 9-16]
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 9 A ISTOTLE *Metaphysics* of *Physics* CH 6 11
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 [12] 6^a 3-5] 62c-d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10
 611c 613a
 12 L. CRETILL *Nature of Things* BK II [25] 93]
 18b-d BK IV [577-906] 55d 56a
 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH III 10>d
 106b / *Fourth Ennead*, TR IV CH 18-21 166d
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 18 A GUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV PAR 2, 25c
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae*, PART I Q 14
 8 A 1 and REP 1 82c 83b Q 14 A 3 45 106b-
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 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan*, P RYAN 61a-63c 76c 77b
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 31 DE C. *rei Discourse* P RYAN 60b
 31 C. *rei Ethics*, P RYAN, THE AFFECTS DEF 1
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 33 PASCAL *Practical Letter* 24b-26b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II
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 38 ROUSSEAU *Emile* 338c-339b
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 43 MILL *Representative Government* 346c 348c /
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 46 HECKEL *Philosophy of Rights* RYAN, PAR II
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 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 308a-314c *passim*
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 53 J. M. S. *Psychology* 4 8a-9a 13a 15a
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 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dream* 363b-364d
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(1 *Desire and the order of change eros and telos*)

- 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 639a 663d esp 651d 654c 662c 663d / *Ego and Id* 708d 712a esp 711c 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790a 791d 799a 800a / *New Introductory Lectures* 849c 851d

■ The analysis of desire or appetite

2a The roots of desire in need privation or potency the instinctual sources of the libido

- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 24a-c / *Symposium* 162a 166b / *Republic* bk iv 352b-d / *Philebus* 621c 622b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk i ch 9 [102 16-24] 268b c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vii ch i [581 21 22] 107a b / *Parts of Animals* bk iii ch 14 [675^b 25-30] 205b / *Ethics* bk iii ch ii [1118^b 8-18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 13 [1389^b 32-35] 637b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk iii ch ii 202d 203a ch 8 205a 207b ch 13 211d 212d
12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iv [83b-876] 55b c bk v [156-173] 63a b
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr v ch i 100c 101c ch 10 105d 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 18-21 166d 168c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 1-6 1a 2c bk iii par 1 13b c par 10 25b d bk iv par 15-19 23a 24b bk v par 1-2 27a-c bk vii par 16-23 48c 50c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 3 25a d Q 19 A 1 REP 2 108d 109c Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 81 A 2 429c 430c PART I II Q 27 A 3 ANS and REP 3 4 738c 739c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xiii [91]-xviii [75] 79b 80c xv [124] xvi [75] 84c 85d *passim* PARADISE i [103 120] 107b c
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a d
27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT II SC IV [263-274] 261c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a 350a 402a d
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* vi 97d 98a 99d 102d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 2-7 425a 426b
33 LAZARUS *Pensees* 100 191a 192b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch vi sect 6 177a b ch vii sect 30 35 185a 186d esp sect 31 185c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b
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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PAR 190 195 66a 67a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk xiii 577a 578b esp 577d 578a bk xiv 605b d bk xv 630c 631c *PROLOGUE* i 665a d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 51a b 767a

- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363 d / *Narcissism* 400c-402c / *Instincts* 412c-413a 414a d / *General Introduction* 574a 580a d 591d 592b 615b 616b 618d 619a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 654a-c 657d-659a / *Group Psychology* 673b c / *Ego and Id* 708c 711b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790c esp 791a / *New Introductory Lectures* 846a 851d esp 846a 817b 849b 851c

2b The objects of desire the good and the pleasant

- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaedrus* 120a 122a / *Symposium* 161d 166b / *Meno* 177d 178b / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 275b 280d / *Republic* bk ii 310c d bk iv 351b 353 d bk ix 422c 425b esp 423b-424d / *Philebus* 614a / *Laws* bk v 689c 690c bk vi 717b bk viii 735c 736c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk ii ch 3 [1103^b 38 11] 155d bk iii ch i-4 162a 166b bk vi ch 8 [146 37-39] 200b = [146 36-147 11] 207d 201a / *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16-24] 268b c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 2 [982^b 12 27] 500d 501a [983 14 21] 501b-c bk iii ch 7 [1012^b 23-31] 602b d / *Soul* bk ii ch 3 [414^b 31] 644c bk iii ch 7 [431 1 12] 663 664b bk iii [433 13 19] 665d 666c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk viii ch i [589 3 10] 115b / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 17 [661^b 6-8] 188a / *Motion of Animals* bk ii ch 6 [700^b 23 30] 236a / *Ethics* bk i ch i [1094 1-3] 339a ch ii [1094 17 2] 339b bk vi ch 2 387d 388b bk vii ch 14 14 43a 406a c bk x ch 2 426c-427b ch 3 [1175^b 4-11] 428b ch 4 [1175 10-22] 429c ch 5 [1175^b 24-33] 430b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6 602d 607d ch 10 [1349 1 4] 612b ch ii [1370 17 28] 613c
12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-6] 15a d
12 FRICETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 4 109d 110a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr vi 21a 26a *passim* / *Third Ennead* tr v 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 35 177d 18a / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 12 234a d / *Sixth Ennead* tr vii ch 30 336b-d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 9-13 13a bk x par 29-33 78d 80b / *City of God* bk xii ch 6 345b 346c bk xiv ch 1 30 509a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b d ch 22-30 629b 633b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 3 25a d Q 19 A 1 REP 2 108d 109c Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 81 A 2 429c 430c PART I II Q 27 A 3 ANS and REP 3 4 738c 739c

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- 21 DA VINCE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY X VII
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- 23 HO 23 *Leviathan*, PART I, 61-62c 76c 77b
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- 29 CEA A. TES *Don Quixote* PART II 381d
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- 30 B CON *Agreement of Learning* 73a 4a
 31 D TES *Discourse* PART II 50b
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART III, PROP 4 13 398d
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- 33 P 41 *Primer* 8 185b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II
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- 42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphys. of Morals*,
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- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 418a-450b 461c-464d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II, pt. 3
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- 47 GOETHE *Faust*, P RT I [194 1216] 29b-30a
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- 49 D KANT *Desire of Man*, 308a II 316a 317a
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- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 524c 527a
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 198b-211a 208b-814b esp
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- 54 F EUD *Intercourse* 414a b 418d-420b esp
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- c Desire as a cause of action, motivation or
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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus*, 95a b / *Symposium* 163a
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 4 4b-d / *Lysis* X VI, 712b X X 751b-d
 8 A ISHUR *Metaphysics*, K CH [991 9-6]
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- [1049³ 12] 574c-d / *Soul* BK III CH 7
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Meteorology of A* PART CH 6-11
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- 12 LACRATILS *Nature of Things* BK II [251 93]
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- 17 PLATO 15 *Third Ennead* TR V CH 10 103d
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- 18 A CANT *Confessions* BK IV par 25 25c
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- 19 AOCINAS *Symposium Theologicum* P RT I Q 14
 8 ANS 80d REF 1 82c 83b Q 19 A 3 ANS 106b-
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- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY X III
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- 23 HO 223 *Leviathan*, PART I, 53a 61 c 61a-c
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- 31 D CART *Discourse* II RT 60b
- 31 S OR *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS DEF I
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- 33 PASC. 1 *Provincial Letter* 24b-26b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II
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- 38 ROLAND *Leq* -ry 338c 339b
- 42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphys. of Mo* b
 262a-c 271c-d 279b 282d 283d / *Practical
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- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 346c 348c /
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- 46 HE X. *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par II
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- 49 DANTE *Desire of Man*, 308a 314c *passim*
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- 53 J M P J *Psychology* 4 a 8a 9a II 15a
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- 54 F EUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363b-364d
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(2) *The analysis of desire or appetite*2d *The satisfaction of desire possession and enjoyment*

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 162b c / *Gorgias* 275b 276b / *Republic* BK IX 421a-425b / *Philebus* 620a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 8 [146^b13-19] 200c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 10-11 364b 365d BK X CH 4-5 428b-430d esp CH 4 [1175 10-22] 429c
- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d
- 13 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-4 9b-d BK IV par 15 23a b BK VI par 9-10 37c 38b par 26 42d 43a BK VIII par 6-8 54c 55a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3-4 625b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART I II Q 1 AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 2 A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b II 4 AA 1-2 629d 631a Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 11 666d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b 772b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II QQ 28-29 527b 533a PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 ANS 889c 890c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19 39] 80a b PARADISE III [34-90] 109d 110b XVIII [52-72] 155b c XXVIII [46-48] 156c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 32 406b c PROP 35 36406d 407c PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 10q 193b 194a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b
- 42 HANT *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 341c 342a / *Judgement* 470a 471b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 347b 348b / *Utilitarianism* 448d 449c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c d par 59 27a b PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 154 57c par 182 64a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165b-166a
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [2605-3216] 63b 79a PART II [9192 9573] 223b 232a
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308a 309d passim 312b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 725b-726a 812a 813b
- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d 377c d / *Instincts* 412d-413a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 663a / *Ego and Id* 711d 712a / *Catharsis and Its Discontents* 773b d

3 *The modes of desire or appetite*

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH III [432^b5-7] 665a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1370 17 27] 613c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 4-5 108c 109d

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 3-31 78d 80b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 78 A 1 REP 1 407b 409a Q 80 427a-428d PART II Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b 656a Q 26 A 1 734a d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91] XVIII [75] 79b 80c esp XVII [91-96] 79b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a 62a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 335b c PROP 56-57 414a-415b THE AFFECTS DEF I III 447a b PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b d
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a b / *Descent of Man* 287d 289a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 17b esp III 9a 13a 13a 47b 52b esp 49b 50a 51a 52a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d 593b / *War and Death* 757d 759d esp 753d 759a

3a *Natural appetite desires determined by nature or instinct*

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 165b c / *Republic* BK II 311b 317b / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b / *Lysis* BK VI 712b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192 16-21] 268b c BK VIII CH 4 [255 30-31] 340a c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^a22 28] 499a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 8 [542 17-24] 68d 69a BK VI CH 18 BK VII CH 2 97b 108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 97b 99c BK VII CH 1 106b d 108a BK VIII CH 1 [589 4-9] 115b / *Ethics* BK III CH II [1111 8-18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [135^a 18-25] 613c BK II CH 7 [1385 21 25] 631d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 6 202d 203a CH 8 205a 207b CH 13 211d 212d
- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK IV [823-876] 55b c [1037 1051] 57d
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK II 224d 225a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 28 157a b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b 58b Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c A 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 ANS 150 151a Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 60 310a 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c 384c Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b-409a Q 80 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 427b-428a Q 82 A 1 431d-432c PART II Q 5 A 8 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b 656a Q 10 A 2 663d 664d II 12 A 5 672a c Q 13 A 2 673c 674c Q 26 A 1 ANS and REP 3 734a d A 2 ANS 725c Q 27 A 2 REP 3 737d 738c Q 30 AA 3-4 750d 752b Q 34 A 1 REP 2 768c 769d Q 36 AA 1 2 780c 782b Q 40 A 3 794c 795a

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20 VERNAL SUMMER THEOLOGIES P. RT. II Q. 91
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21 DANTE DIVERSE COMEDY PURGATORY XVII
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22 CH. RICH. MASTERS / T. A. [L.] I 141/490a b

23 H. B. LUTHER, PART I 50a 61a-d 76c-d
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24 V. OUTAQUE EPIST. 22-d 225a 483b-d

25 HARTY ON AURAL CREATION, 34th 3-9a
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31 DESCARTES DISCOURSE PART V 60b / Med
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31 SPINOSA Ethics PART III, 395a-d PROP
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33 P. SCAL. PRINC. 81 185b / Generalized Des
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33 LOCKE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING BK. I. CH. II.
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33 BERKELEY HUMAN KNOWLEDGE P. INTRO. 107
 3 4th b-c

33 P. SCAL. PRINC. 81 185b / Generalized Des
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44 BOWELL PRINC. 132b

46 H. B. LUTHER, PART I 50a 61a-d 76c-d
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47 DAWSON ON THE CREATOR 119a / DEITY OF
 31a 297d-299a 304a 313a PASSIM. 304b d
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51 JAMES P. CHURCH 49b-50a 198b-199a 204b
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 20a-211a 712b-73a 20a b 87b-872a
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51 F. AND. O'NEILL AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRINC
 15d 18a / Introduction of Dreams
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 414b-417c PASSIM. 414c-415d /
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 troduction Letters 83rd b-d 84a-84d exp
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36 Desires determined by knowledge or judg
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"Plato Principles 59a-61d / Phaedrus 197b-c
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6 ARISTOTLE Topics BK. VI. CH. 5 [L.]-
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9 ARISTOTLE Ethics II. CH. 3 [L.]-3rd b 13
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17 Plotinus Four Enneads BK. III. CH. 2^a
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18 ARISTOTLE Confessions BK. X. par. 9-35

18 ARISTOTLE City of God BK. XII. CI. 6 380b-c

19 ARISTOTLE SUMMA THEOLOGICA P. RT. I Q. 9

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21 DANTE DIVERSE COMEDY PURGATORY X II

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23 HO B. LUTHER PART I. 61c-d

31 DE CARTE DISCOURSE PART III 50b / Med

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31 SPINOSA Ethics P. RT. II AXIOM 3 373d

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38 ROUSSEAU Emile 333. 339b

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49 D. SWIN. Discourse of Man 310c 313a PASSIM,

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53 JAMES PRINCIPLES 13a-15a 51a 51a 27b-

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54 FREUD General Introduction 5 1d 504b

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36(i) The distinction between sensitive and

rational desire emotional tendencies

and acts of the will

7 PLATO Phaedrus BK. II 421a-4 3b

8 ARISTOTLE 1st Principles BK. IX. CH. 5 5th 3a

c BK. XII. CH. 7 [L.]-[L.] 601b / Soul,

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10 [L.]-[L.] CH. 11 [L.]-[L.] 666c-66 a /

Memory and Remembrance CH. 2 [L.]-[L.] 311

69th b-d

9 ARISTOTLE Rhetoric BK. I. CH. 10 [L.]-[L.] 15th 9

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17 Plotinus First Ennead, BK. VI 21a 26a PASSIM

/ Third Ennead, BK. V CH. 1 100c 101c

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VI. CH. 4 343c 344d

19 ARISTOTLE SUMMA THEOLOGICA PART 2, Q. 19,

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6th 3c-6th c Q. 13, 682a-c Q. 15, A - 684d

685b Q. 1 A 68th d-688b Q. 2, A 3 72d

723b Q. 1 A - AN 727d-728c Q. 5 A 1

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20 ARISTOTLE SUMMA THEOLOGICA P. RT. III, Q. 19

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21 DANTE DIVERSE COMEDY PURGATORY XVII

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23 HOBBS LEBNIZ PART I. 63a 6-2 c PART

II. 1

31 DE CARTE DISCOURSE PART III 50b

(2) *The analysis of desire or appetite*

2d The satisfaction of desire possession and enjoyment

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 162b c / *Gorgias* 275b 276b / *Republic* bk ix 421a-425b / *Philebus* 620a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk vi ch 8 [146^b13 19] 200c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk iii ch 10-11 364b 365d bk x ch 4 5 428b 430d esp ch 4 [1175 10-22] 429c
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iii [1003-1010] 43a bk iv [1073-1120] 58a d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 2 4 9b d bk iv par 15 23a b bk vi par 9 10 37c 38b par 26 42d 43a bk viii par 6-8 54c 55a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3-4 625b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART I II Q 1 AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 2 A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 4 AA 1-2 629d 631a Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 11 666b d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b-772b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II QQ 28 29 527b 533a PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 ANS 889c 890c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xviii [19-39] 80a b PARADISE iii [34-90] 109d 110b xxviii [52-72] 155b c xxviii [46 48] 156c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 32 406b c PROP 35-36 406d 407c PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b 194a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b
- 42 HANT *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 341c 342a / *Judgement* 470a 471b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 347b 348b / *Utilitarianism* 448d-449c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c d par 27a b PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 154 57c par 182 64a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165b 166a
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [2605-3216] 63b 79a PART II [9192-9573] 223b 232a
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308a 309d passim 312b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 725b 726a 812a 813b
- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d 377c d / *Instincts* 412d-413a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 663a / *Ego and Id* 711d 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b d

3 The modes of desire or appetite

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* bk iii ch 9 [432^b5-7] 665a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* bk i ch ii [1370 17-27] 613c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI ch 4-5 108c 109d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk x par 9-33 78d 80b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 8 A 1 REP 3 407b 409a Q 80 427a-428d PART I II Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b-656a Q 26 A 1 734a d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xvii [91]-xviii [75] 79b 80c esp xvii [91-96] 19b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a 62a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 399b-c PROP 56-57 414a-415b THE AFFECTS DEF I 416b d PART IV PROP 59 442b d APPENDIX I 41b 447a b PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b d
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a b / *Descent of Man* 287d 289a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 17b esp 8a 9a 13a 15a 47b 52b esp 49b 50a 51a 52a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d 593b / *War and Death* 757d 759d esp 758d 759a

3a Natural appetite desires determined by nature or instinct

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 155b-c / *Republic* bk ii 311b-312b / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b / *Lysis* bk vi 712b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16-24] 268b c bk viii ch 4 [255 30-31] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch i [980 22 28] 499a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk v ch 8 [542 17-24] 68d 69a bk vi ch 18 bk vii ch 2 97b 108c passim esp bk vi ch 18 9b-99c bk vii ch i 106b d 108a bk viii ch i [589 4-9] 115b / *Ethics* bk iii ch ii [111^b 8 18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch ii [113^a 18-25] 613c bk ii ch 7 [1385 21 23] 631d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk iii ch 6 202d 203a ch 8 205a 207b ch 13 211d 212d
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d bk iv [858-876] 55b c [103 105] 57d
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* bk ii 224d 225a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR v 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* TR iii ch 28 157a b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b 58b Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c A 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 ANS 150c 151a Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 60 310a 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c 384c Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b-409a Q 80 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 427b-428a Q 82 A 1 431d-432c PART I II Q 5 A 8 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b-656a Q 10 A 2 663d 664d Q 12 A 5 672a-c Q 13 A 2 673c-674c Q 26 A 1 ANS and REP 3 734a d A 2 ANS 734d 735c Q 27 A 2 REP 3 737d 738c Q 30 AA 3-4 750d 752b Q 34 A 1 REP 2 768c-769d Q 36 AA 1 2 780c 782b Q 40 A 3 794c 795a

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theol* qua P RTI II Q 94
A 2 ANS and REP 2 221d 223a Q 109 A 3
340c 341b P RT III SUPPL Q 93 A 1 ANS
1037d 1039a

21 D'URTE *Dixne Comedy* PURGATORY XII
[9]-XVII [75] 79b 80c XX [-]-XXI [75]
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22 CH L'CEB *Manciple's Tale* [17] 104 144 490 b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* P RTI III 61a d 76c d
P RT IV 271d

24 MONTIGNE *Essays* 224d 225a 489b-d

25 HAY *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a
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31 DESCARTES *Discours* PART V 60b / *Metho-*
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a d Repl 3 124b 136a d

32 SPINOZA *Ethics* P RT III 395a d PROP 7
399 PART IV PRO 19 429d

33 P'CAL *Pent es* 8c 185b / *Geometrical Dem-*
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35 LOCKE *If man U deriv nd ng* BK I CH II
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36 B'KELLE *Human Knowledge* INTRO 3 CT
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38 ROUSSEAU *l'eq alité* 338c 339b 346b

44 BO W L L / *hmo* 130b

46 H'Z *Phlo ophy of Right* INTRO PAR II
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49 D'K'W'N *Origin of Sp ciet* 339a / *Descent of*
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53 J'W'Z *Psychol gy* 49b-50a 198b-199a 204b-
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700a 701a 712b 737 799 b 890b 892
esp 891b [in 1]

54 F'EL *Origin a d Development of Psycho-*
logy 15d 18a / *I terpretat on of Dre ms*
363c d / *Narciss* 400 -402c esp 401b d /
I stincts 414b-421 passim esp 414c-415d /
General introd ct on 369c 376d esp 374 d /
Beyond the Pleasure Principle 651d-654c
658b 659d / *W a and Dre sh* 758a 759
764d 765 / *Ch l mon a d l's Discontent*
787a 788d esp 787 c 789b-791d / *New I*
ntroductory Lectures 837b-d 846a-851d esp
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36 Desires d m mned by knowledge or judg-
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7 PLATO *Protagor* s 59a 62d / *Th drus* 120l c
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8 4 1 TOTL *Topic* K 3 C 3 8 [13] 6-
14 [11] 200d 201a / *Met physics* BK X

11 7 [107] 216-301 602b / *So l* BK I C 2
[113] 19-4] 643d C 1 3 [1 2] 23-16] 644c-d

12 1 3 [12 2 24] 660 CH 7 [13] 8-2] 663c 664b

13 4 TOTL *Eth* s b III CH 3 [1 3 3] 131
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17 PLATO *s I urth Enne d* TR IV CH 28
157 b TR I CH 20 168a b / *S xth E c d*
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21 D'URTE *Dixne Comedy* PURGATORY XII
[9]-XVII [75] 79b 80c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* P RTI III 61a 64a RT
1 162c

31 DESCARTES *Discours* PART III 50b / *Med-*
tho s III 82d-83a

18 AU L'ESTRE *Confessions* BK X PAR 29-33
78d 80b / *Coy of God* BK XIV CH 6 380b c

19 AQUINAS *S mma Theolog* PART I Q 8
A 1 REP 3 407b-409a Q 80-83 427a-440b

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793d 794c

21 D'URTE *Dixne Comedy* PURGATORY XII
[9]-XVII [75] 79b 80c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61c d

31 DESCARTES *Discours* PART III 50b / *Med-*
tho s III 82d-83a

31 SINOZA *Ethics* P RT III ATIO I 3 373d
P RT IV PROP 59 442b-d PROP 61-62 443a-d

A FENDE III 447b PART V PROP 4 SCI OL
453b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *l'eq alité* 338c 339b

42 HANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Mo al*
264d 265b esp 265b d [in i]

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 313a passim
esp 312a-c

53 J'W'Z *Psychology* 13a 15a 51a 52a 729b-
730

54 FIELD *General I troductio* 501d 504b
593a / *War and Death* 758a 759a

36(1) The distinction between sensitive and
rational desire emotional tendencies
and acts of the will

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 421a-425b

8 ARISTOTLE *Meta* 121c BK IV CH 5 3a
c BK XII CH 7 [107] 27 9] 602b / *Soul*

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9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [136] 28
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17 PLATO *First Ennead* TR VI 21a 26a passim
/ *Third Ennead* TR V CH 1 100c 101c

TR VI CH 4-5 108c 109d / *Fourth Ennead*
TR IV CH 28 1 2a 173b / *Sixth Ennead* TR

III CH 2 4 343c 344d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 19
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I I Q 1 2 REP 3 610b-611b Q 6 A 2 646a c

Q II A 2 667b-d Q 12 A 5 572a-c Q 13 A 2
673 674c Q 15 A 2 682 c Q 16 A 2 684d

685b Q 17 A 2 68 d 688b Q 22 A 3 722d
723b Q 24 A 2 AN 727d 728c Q 26 A 3

734a d Q 30 A 1 749a d A 3 750d 751c
Q 31 A 3 754a 755c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III Q 18
2 811d 812b

21 D'URTE *Dixne Comedy* PURGATORY XII
[9]-XVII [75] 79b 80c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* P RTI III 61a 64a RT
1 162c

31 DESCARTES *Discours* PART III 50b

(2) *The analysis of desire or appetite*

2d The satisfaction of desire possession and enjoyment

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 162b c / *Gorgias* 275b 276b / *Republic* bk ix 421a 425b / *Philebus* 620a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk vi ch 8 [146^b 13 19] 200c
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- 13 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 2 49b d bk iv par 15 23a b bk vi par 9 10 37c 38b par 26 42d 43a bk viii par 6-8 54c 55a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART II Q 1 AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 2 A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b ■ 4 AA 2 629d 631a Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 11 666b ■ 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b Q 31-34 752b 772b
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- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d 265b esp 265b d [ln 1] 271c d 279b 282d 283b 284d 285a / *Practical Reason* 301a c 303b 304b 314d 317c 330c 331a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c 386b / *Judgment* 483d 484b 605d 606b [ln 2]
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- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 314c 592d 593a
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 SCHOL 399c THE AFFECTS DEF I EXPL 416c d
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- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 463d 464d
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a b
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- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 20c d 23d 24d / *Phaedrus* 115a 129d esp 120b e 123b 124a / *Symposium* 164c 165b / *Laus* BK VIII 735c-736c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 2 [68 27-27] 89d 90a / *Topics* BK VI CH 7 [146 9 12] 199d BK VII CH 1 [152b-9] 207c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 11 [1115b 15] 365a b BK VIII CH 1-8 406b d-411d passim CH 13 14 414d 416d BK IV CH 1 416b d 417c passim CH 5 420a c CH 8 421d-423a
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- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR V CH 7 TR VI CH 9 20a 26a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confession* BK II PAR I BK III PAR I 9a 13c / *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 380c 381c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH III 661d 662a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 1 REP 2 108d 109c A 1 ANS 109 110b Q 20 A 1 ANS AND REP 2 120a 12 b A 1 REP 3 121b 122a Q 60 A 3 ANS 311d 312b PART I II Q 2 A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 21 A 1 724c 725c A 4 725a 727a Q 22 A 2 731b 732a A 3 ANS 732a 733a Q 26 733b 737a Q 27 A 4 3-4 738c 740b Q 28 A 1 ANS AND REP 1-2 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS AND REP 2 742a d A 4 742d 743c Q 30 A 2 749d 750d Q 32 A 3 REP 3 760d 761c A 8 ANS 764c 765b
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3b Desires determined by knowledge or judgment 3b(1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire emotional tendencies and acts of the will)

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 9a 13a 15a 767b 768a 790a 799b passim esp 794a 798b

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 377c 380d esp 377c 378b 379d 380b / *General Introduction* 501d 504b 590a 593b 607d 608c 615b 616c / *Ego and Id* 702c / *Ne I In rodutory Lectures* 837b 838d 843d 844b

3b(2) Conscious and unconscious desires habitual desire

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IX 416a c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I 348b d 349b CH I 351b c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confession* BK VIII par 10 II 55c 56b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 87 A 2 466c 467b PART II Q I A I REP 3 614a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a A 5 10b d Q 56 A 4 32b 33c A 6 34b 35a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 SCHOL 399c THE AFFECTS DEF I EXPL 416c d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a = / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c 386b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 463d 464d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a B

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK X 407c d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 8b 9a 90b 93a passim 788a 792a

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110b c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 357b 358c 363b 365c esp 364c 369a b 377b 387a c passim, esp 386d 387a / *Unconscious* 428a 443d esp 428a 429d-430b 432c 433d 436b 437c / *General Introduction*

452a = 453b 476a c esp 468a 469c 473c d 501d 503d esp 503b c 531d 532b 599d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643d 646a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 720a

3c Desire and love their distinction and connection

5 EURIPIDES *Iphigeneia at Aulis* [343-79] 429d 430a

7 PLATO *Lysis* 20c d 23d 24d / *Phaedrus* 115a 129d esp 120b c 123b 124a / *Symposium* 164c 165b / *Laus* BK VIII 735c 736c

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 22 [68-77] 89d 90a / *Topics* BK VI CH 7 [146 9-12] 199d BK VII CH I [123b-9] 20 c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH II [1118^b 13] 365a B BK VIII CH I-8 406b d 411d passim CH I 414 414d 416d BK IV CH I 416b d 417c passim CH 5 420a-c CH 8 421d-423a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [103, 1062] 57d 58a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 24 203c 210a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR V CH 7 TR VI CH 9 20a 26a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confession* BK II par I BK III par I 9a 13c / *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 380c 381c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 661d 662a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 1 REP 2 108d 109c A I ANS 109c 110b Q 20 A 1 ANS and REP - 120a 121b A REP 3 121b 122a Q 60 A 3 ANS 311d 312b IART II Q 2 A 1 REP 3 615d-616c Q 23 A 2 724c 725c A 4 726a 727a Q 25 A 2 731b-732a A 3 ANS 732a 733a Q 26 733d 737a Q 27 A 3 738c 740a Q 28 A 1 ANS and REP 1 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 2-3 742a d A 4 742d 743c Q 30 A 2 749d 750d Q 32 A 3 REP 3 760d 761c A 8 ANS 764c 765b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 62 A 3 ANS and REP 3 61c-62b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XVII [91] XVIII [73] 79b 80c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61c 63a

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Titus and Cressida* ACT I SC II [303 321] 107d 108a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 79d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS DEF 6 417b c PART IV APPENDIX I II 447a b XIX XX 449a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-61] 243a 245b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 4-6 176d 177b

38 RUSSEAU *Inequality* 345c 346b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b 209b passim

54 FREUD *Narcissism* 404d 406b 409b-411a c / *Instincts* 420a-421a / *General Introduction*

- 581b; 617c-618a / *Group Psychology* 673b-674 679a b 681c-683a 693a-694b / *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 783b-c / *New Introductory Lectures* 847d-848a
2. Desire and aversion as emotional opposites
- 7 PL. TO. REPUBLIC BK IV 323d 333a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul*, x iii ch - [431^b-3^a] 663c-664a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Elact* x 2, ch 2 [1130^a21 31] 38^d-333a BK X, CH 2 [113^a5 1] 427a b
- 10 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK XII, ch 6 330b-c
- 10 APOCAL 1 *Sermons Theologica* v t 1-11 11 2 724c 725c A 4 725a-727 Q 3, A 1 2 730b-732a 1 1 2 732a 733a Q 30 743a 752b Q 3; A 6 77b-778c
- 23 H 15 *Lectures* PART I, 61 d
- II SPINCE *Elact* PART III 390a-422a.c esp PROP 12 13 400b-d, PROP 1; 45 491 411a, PROP 51 411c-412a, THE AFFECTS, D F 3 4 5d-417a, DEF 6- 417b-d PART 1 D F 5 424b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* x ii ch xx, 1 CT 4- 176d 177
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- 53 JAM *Psychology* 08a 709a
- 54 FRIED *Intro* 418c-421a.c esp 418c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659b-d / *Group Psychology* 677 678c / *Ego and Id* 08d 710c esp 709d 710c / *Il or and Dr.* 766a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790a 791b
4. The economy of desire in human life
- 4a. The conflict of desire with one another
- APOCRYPH *Sermons* 2. 24-(D) OT Daniel 322 24
- NEW TESTAMENT *Mattew* 6:24 8:2 — 26 3- 4 / *Romans* 14: 5 / *Philippians*, 121 / *James*, 42
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus*, 128a-d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX, CH 2 [4^a 21 24] 573c / *Soul*, BK III, CH [433^b 5 3] 666b^r CH II [134^a10-13] 666d-667 / *Memory and Understanding* CH [433^a15 31] 695b-d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Elact*, xvii 395a-406a.c
- 12 LACRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk i [0^a 3 1 5] 58a-b
- 13 A. C. *Amor* iv [33- 350] 1 6a 177
- 18 A. C. *Confessions*, BK I, par 12 21d 22b BK X, par 14 81b-c par 41-63 81-87d
- 19 APOCAL 1 *Sermons Theologica* v t 1-11 Q 6, b- 649a-650d Q 9, 1P 3 658d 659c Q 3 664d-665c
- 20 A. C. *Sermons Theologica* 1-11 530b-531 11 Q 5 6 814d-815d 111 PPL Q 9 A 1-12 1063d 1065b
- 21 D. ST *Devotio Compendy* ARABIC, IV [11] 112d 111a
- 25 MONTAGNE *Essays* 29^b-d 350d 354b
- 31 C. C. *Elact* 1-4 395a-450d passim,
- esp PART III PROP 31 403d-405a, 11 ET 11 DEF 5 424b, PROP - COR 4 425b PRO 15 15 428a-429d, PROP 60-61 442d-443b
- 46 HEGEL *Phenomenology of Spirit* 11 17 16c- additions, 13 118c
- 47 GO THE *Faint* esp PART 1 [351-513] 11a 14b [614-615] 1 a 18a, [1110-111] 27b-28a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 394a 397a
- 49 D. ST *Devotio Compendy* 309c 313a 318d 319a
- 50 MARK *Central*, 293c 294a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53d 54b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 199b-204b 05a 706b 717a 718a 720b 734b-735a 791 98b passim, esp 794a-795a
- 54 FRIED *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 7a-8a / *Hysteria* 65c-66a 82c-83a 117a / *Interpretation of Dreams*, 370b / *Nature of the Unconscious*, 433d-436c esp 435b-c / *General Introduction* 467b-470a.c esp 469c-470c, 474d-475a 501d 504b 589c 593b esp 589c 591d 599d-600d 61^b-616c 624b-d 633d-635d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 6-60c-d / *Ego and Id* 699a-c 704d 12a 71 a.c passim / *Libidinal Theory, Symptom and Interpretation* 730a 733c passim, esp 723b-d, 734a 735a, 731c-d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783d 784a 789b-791d passim / *New Introductory Lectures* 843d-843a
- 4b The attachment of desire: fixations, projections, identifications, transferences
- 12 LACRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK I [105^b-107^a] 57d 58a
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II, CH 15 150c-156b
- 18 PLUTARCH *Solon* 66c-d
- 25 MONTAGNE *Essays* 10b-11b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT 1 SC II [1 3 19] 8^c-82a
- 31 SPINCE *Elact* PART III, PROP 13 400c 402a PROP 46 410c PART IV PROP 6 426a PROP 44 430d 437d-438a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 31 186b
- 46 H. GEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 196d 197c
- 47 GOETHE *Faint* PART 1 [3 1 1006] 38b-39a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 135a 135b, 156b-158b
- 53 J. M. *Psychology* 648b-650b 70^a 12b esp 07b-708a 734b-735b
- 54 F. *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis*, 15b-18a 19a-c / *Unconscious* 399a 411a.c esp 404d-406c, 409d-410d / *Interpretation*, 414b / *General Introduction*, 5 b-58d esp 58a b 509c 589c esp 5 4c-d, 582a 591c, 585b-585d, 587a-c 593d 597 599d-600d 616d-622b 623c-631b esp 628d-630d 634b-d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 644d-645d 648c / *Group Psychology* 678d-681a esp 678d 681a, 681b.d [in 4] / *Ego and Id*, 703c 706c esp 704d 705c 711b-c 712b-c / *New Intro-*

(4) *The economy of desire in human life* 4b *The attachment of desires fixations project ons, identifications transferences*

ductory, Lectures 837b 834b esp 832d 833b 847b 849b 855d 856d 862d 863c

4c *The focusing of desires emotional complexes*

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 10c 16b 17d / *Interpretation of Dreams* 246a 248c / *Instincts* 415d 418c / *General Introduction* 529d 531d, 557b 558d 569c 583a esp 574a 576d 580a 584c 593d 600d 607b 623c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 644d 646a / *Group Psychology* 680c d / *Ego and Id* 704d 706d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 724a 742a esp 724a 727c 733c 734d 739a 740b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774c d 792b 796c esp 794c 796c / *New Introductory Lectures* 833c 834a 847b 849b 855d 856c esp 856b 860a

4d *The discharge of desires catharsis and sublimation*

9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* CH 6 [1449^b 38] 684a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 190a c
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* 337a
42 KANT *Judgement* 509b d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 308b c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 718a 719a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 2b 6c esp 4c 5a 8d 9a 11c 17b 20a d / *Hysteria* 26c 31a esp 27a c 62c 64a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 189b 193b 356d 373a esp 363c d 364d 365c 369a 370a / *Harassment* 407c 408a / *General Introduction* 452c d 495a 499b esp 496a 497b 527c 539c esp 532d 535d 587d 588b 592c 593a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 641d 643c / *Group Psychology* 693b 694b / *Ego and Id* 704b c 710c 712a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 739a c 745a 751b d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773d 774c 781a e / *New Introductory Lectures* 847a h

5 *Desire as ruler*

5a *Desire ruling imagination daydreaming and fantasy*

7 PLATO *Republic* BK V 361a
8 ARISTOTLE *Dreams* CH 2 [460 33 27] 704b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 42 82a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 77 A 1 ANS 145a d
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a PART II 138d 139a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 37a b 405d-406a
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [123-195] 87c 88a / *Richard II* ACT V SC V [1 41] 349d 350a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 1b 2b, 18d 19b 50b 52d 134b 135d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [95 1 5] 177b 178a / *Samson Agonistes* [599-605] 352b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 22c 221a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [2, 1 7312] 178b 179a [10 039-066] 245a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 82a d 85 III 125b-c 146d 148c BK VI 254b-c 85 x 394d 443c 444a BK VI 497c-499c BK XII 542d 543a 544a II BK XII 601c 602d BK VI 615a 617a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 374a 375a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 18c d / *Hysteria* 115a 116a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 333c 336a esp 333c d 347d 349c / *General Introduction* 453b-c 486b 489c esp 486d-487a 487d-488a 591b 601b esp 599b 600b 600d 601b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774a c

5b *Desire ruling thought rationalization and wishful thinking*

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 11b d 21d 22a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 427d-428a BK IV 474a e BK V 508b 507a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1 877^b 38] 485c-486a
12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141 1191] 59a d
12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 18 161a 162b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 9 A 2 ANS and REP 2 658d 659c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 1 AA 5 10 131d 137c Q 77 A 1 ANS 145a d
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 168a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 210b 212a 273b 276a 490d 491d
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [1 3-195] 87c 88a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT V SC II [106-114] 136a
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 60d 61a
28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 306a-c 309d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 49 111a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* IV 89a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 215d 216a
31 SINOZA *Lihi* PART III PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 82-87 186b 189a 99-100 191a 192b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b 442a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 6, 7, 195b 196c BK II CH XX SECT 12 392c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 1 29b 30a NUMBER 31 103c 104a NUMBER 50 162a II

5c

- **MILL** *Liberty* 269d 270a
 44 **BO WELL** *Johns* 103b-c 106d
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 33 **J ME** *Psychology* 314b 381b-385b 643
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 4 **FR D** *I interpret n of Dream* 363d 364b
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 3c **Des** *re rule* *gact on the uncheck d expres*
s n of des res incont o nce
 6 **OLD TESTAMENT** *Gen* ii 4 6 23-29-34 34
 39 7 2 / *E od* s 16 3 / *Numbers* ii 4 35
 16 35-(D) *A mbers* ii 4 34 16 1 35 /
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 18 7 1 19 8-0 / *II S m el* 1 3-(D)
II lings 1 3
 1 **APOR** *vp* *Wid m of Sol mon* 2 6-9-(D)
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 3 5 9 / *I Timothy* 6 9 6 / *James* 4 1 4 /
 1 *John* 2 5 17
 5 **AL** *h ll* *Sevtn Ag inst Thetex* [633 719]
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 5 **SOPH** *CL* *Aj x* [47 090] 152a b / *Tro*
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 5 **EC** *D* *M de* [621-641] 217c
 5 **ARISTOTEL** *et Cl* d [852 1 03] 499b 502a
 6 **HEA** *DOCT* *H stori* bk ii 95d 98b bk
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 7 **PLATO** *Ph dru* 120 122a 128a 129c / *Re*
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 8 **A** *TOTLE* *S ul* p n n 9 [433] -CH i
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 9 **AR** *T TL* *II* / *75 f An mals* k i CH i
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 12 **F** *TL* *Dro* k bk i CH 18 161a
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 12 **A** *M data om* bk i CH i 257d
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 15 **TAC** *TL* *A* *als* bk iii 57b 58d
 18 **AL** *TIME* *Confessions* bk i par 23 25c
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 19 **AQUINA** *Summa Theologica* p rt i q 81
 43 REP i 2 430c-431d q 83 A i REP i 436d
 438a PART i ii q 6 7 650a d q 9 A 2
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 20 **AQUINA** *Summa Theologia* ca PART i ii q 75
 A 2 3 138c 139d q 77 144d 152a
 21 **D** *ITE* *Durme Corred* *HELL* v [i] iii [64]
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 22 **C** *LOCER* *Manicule* s Tale [i 104 144] 490a iii
 24 **RABELAIS** *Gargant a and Pan agruel* bk i
 65c-66b
 25 **MONTAIGNE** *Essays* 107a 112d 159a 167a
 237b 238d 350d 354b 413-416c 486b-
 49 a 527b 528a 538a 543a c
 26 **SH** *K* s *EAR* 3 d *Herry* I I ACT iii SC ii
 [123 195] 87c 88a ACT v SC vi [61-93] 103d
 104a / *Kichard III* 105 148a c / *Romeo a d*
 J I et ACT ii SC vi [i 15] 300c
 27 **SHAKESPE** *RE* *Hamlet* CT iii SC ii [61 9]
 49c d SC i [63-81] 55b-c / *Troilus and Cret*
nda CT i SC ii [101 124] 109b ACT ii SC
 ii 113 115d / *Othell* 205a 243a c esp ACT
 i SC i 229d 233a ACT v III ii [291 356]
 242b-243a / *King Lea* CT iv s [i 9-134]
 274c d / *Anto y a d Cleopat* a 311a 350d
 31 **SP** *ON* *Ethics* AT iv PROP i 18 424c
 429d PRO 41 437c-438a PROP 60-61 442d
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 32 **M** *LETON* *P ad se Lost* bk viii [521-794]
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 351 b
 35 **LOCK** *Huma U derstand* II bk i CH ii
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 36 **STEARNE** *Triste m Sh dy* 239b 243a
 37 **FIEL** *D* *m Jones* 109 122d 123a
 40 **G** *ON* *D cl n a d Fall* 34d 39d passim
 esp 35 b 38a b 60 c
 41 **C** *a ON* *D im and Fall* 174c 175 559a-c
 42 **K** *T* *f dgement* 586 587a
 44 **B** *SW* *LL* *Johns* 135c 136a 301c d
 46 **HE** *E* *Phil sophy of I story* INTRO 162b-c
 171 172b
 47 **GO** *TL* *F* *et PA* T i [2605 677] 63b 65a
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 51 **TO** *LSTOY* *II* *a d P* *ce* bk i 15b-16a bk
 201a-c A T 248b-250 251d 252d k
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 337d
 52 **DO** *OE* *SKY* *Brothers* *A* *ura* k i 4a d
 bk i 39b-40 bk i 164b d
 53 **JAM** s *Psychology* 718a 720a 799a 807a
 54 **I** *a* *ED* *Gro p Pj* *hol* g 690b-c / *Fg and*
Id 702c d / *New Introd ctory Lectures* 837b-
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6 Desire as subject to rule

6a The regulation of desire by reason the discipline of moral virtue or duty

OLD TESTAMENT Exodus 20 14 17 / Numbers 15 38-41 / Deuteronomy 5 15 21 / Psalms 37 1 13 esp 37 7-8—(D) Psalms 36 1 13 esp 36 7-8 / Proverbs 7 23 1-8 25 16 30 7-9

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NEW TESTAMENT Romans 8 1 13 / I Corinthians 13 4-8 / Galatians 5 16-4 / Colossian 3 5 15 / I Thessalonians 4 3-8 / I Timothy 6 3 12 / Titus 11-14 3 3-7 / James 4 1-7 / I Peter 2 11

5 Aeschylus Eumenides 490 565 86b 87a

5 Euripides Iphigenia at Aulis 543-589 429d 430a

5 Aristophanes Cloud 882 1104 499b 502a / Lysistrata 583a 599a e

7 Plato Phaedrus 128a d / Phaedo 225d 226c / Gorgias 275b 280d / Republic bk III 326c 327b bk II 346a 356a bk IV 416a c 425c 427b / Laws bk VI 712b bk VIII 735c 738c

8 Aristotle Topics bk V CH I [129 10-16] 179a / Soli bk III CH 9 [433 5-8] 665c CH II [434 10-15] 666d 667a

9 Aristotle Ethics bk I CH 13 [1102^b 13 1103 3] 348a c bk III CH 10-12 364b 366a c bk VI CH 2 387d 388b bk VII CH 1 10 395a 403c passion / Politics bk II CH 7 [1266^b 26-1267 17] 462b d

11 Nicomachus Arithmetic bk I 825d 827a

12 Aurelius Meditations 253a 310d esp bk II SECT 16 259a bk IV SECT 24 265c d bk VII SECT 55 283b c

13 Virgil Aeneid bk IV 167a 186b

14 Plutarch Coriolanus 174b d 175a / Cato Marius 353d 354a c

15 Tacitus Annals bk III 57b 58d

17 Plotinus Fifth Ennead TR IV CH 1-2 246c 247b

18 Augustine Confessions bk II par 4 9b d bk III par 1 13b c bk VI par 14 26 40d 43a bk VIII par 1 52c 53b par 10 11 55c 56b par 27 60a c bk X par 40-48 81c 89a / City of God bk IV CH 4-5 287a 289a bk VII CH 8-9 381c 385b bk VII CH 4 511d 512a / Christian Doctrine bk I CH 24 630c 631a CH 27 631d bk III CH 18 21 664d 666b

19 Aquinas Summa Theologica PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d Q 92 A 2 507c 508a Q 98 A 2 517d 519a PART I II Q 10 A 3 664d 665c Q 17 A 7 690d 692a Q 24 727a 730a Q 45 A 4 815 812b 813a

20 Aquinas Summa Theologica PART II Q 50 A 1 8b 9a Q 56 A 4 32b 33c A 5 REF I 33c 34b Q 59-60 45d 54d PART III Q 15 A 4 790d 791c

21 Dante Divine Comedy PURGATORY 53a 105d esp VI [40] VIII [5] 75d 80c

22 Chaucer Troilus and Creseida bk II STANZA 82 99a / Parson's Tale par 80 541b-542a

23 Horace Lertianan PART I 93d 96b

25 Montaigne Essays 89b 90c 159a 16 a 184a d 200d 205b 232b 238d 431c-432d 486b 495a 538a 543a c

26 Shakespeare Henry I ACT I SC I [24-69] 533b c

27 Shakespeare Hamlet ACT I SC III [1-7] 34b d ACT III SC II [61 9] 49c d / Troilus and Creseida ACT I SC III [101 1 4] 109b ACT II SC II 113c 115d / Othello ACT I SC III [3 337] 212b c

30 Bacon Advancement of Learning 26a c 18a d

31 Descartes Discourse PART III 49b d

31 Spinoza Ethica I PART III PROP 1 396a c PROP 9 SCHOL 399c PART IV PREF 421b d 424a PROP 14 15 428a-429d PROP 41 437c-447a APPENDIX I-III 447a b 447d 450c d PART V PREF 451a 452c PROP 1 15 452d 456c PROP 42 463b d

32 Milton Arcopagitica 390b 391a

33 Pascal Pensées 104 193a 502 260b 261a

35 Locke Human Understanding bk I CH II SECT 13 107d 108c bk II CH XVI SECT 46-51 189d 192c SECT 1 197b 198a SECT 3 198c 199c

42 Kant Fund Priv Metaphysic of Morals 25th 258b c 259a c 264d 265b / Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics 378b III / Judgment 586a 587a

43 Mill Liberty 295a d / Representations of Government 348a b / Utilitarianism 463d-464d

44 Boswell Johnson 135c 136a 176d

46 Hegel Philosophy of Right INTRO par 19 166 17a PART III par 149 56b par 157 65a c ADDITIONS 13 14 118c d / Philosophy of History INTRO 162a 172b PART III 312d 313a

49 Darwin Descent of Man 304a 305a 310c-319a esp 310c 312c 313d 314b 318d 319a 592b 593b

51 Tolstoy War and Peace bk VI 245b c 248b 250a PROLOGUE 655c 656b

53 James Psychology 80a 83b par III 201a 204b 797b 798a 807a 808a 816a 819a

54 Freud Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis 9a 16c / Hysteria 110b c / Interpretation of Dreams 386d 387a / Dreams 407b c / General Introduction 452c d 501d 501b esp 504b 590a 593b 624a 625b esp 625a b / Ego and Id 701d 702d 704a 707b esp 706d 707c 715a 716c esp 715c d / Civilization Symptoms and Anxiety 721d 722c 744a / War and Death 757c 759d / Civilization and Its Discontents 773b 774a esp 773c 780b 781d 783c 785a 785d 789a esp 787b c 792a 796c esp 797a b 793a b 793d 194b 800c 801b / New Introductory Lectures 837d 840a

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- 5 A I TOPH NES *Lysistrata* 583a 599 c
12 F I TETLS *Discourses* 105a 245 c esp bk i
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2 140c 141c ch 17 18 158d 162b bk iii ch
2 203 210a bk iv ch 4 225 228a
12 A NE US *Mediocris* bk ii sect 5 257b-c
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bk ix sect 7 292b
13 A I CL *Academ* bk v [393 449] 178a 179b
18 A L TIVE *City of God* bk ix c 4-5 287a
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19 A O I AS *Summa Theologiae* p rt ii q 10
3 664d 665c q 24 727a 730 esp a 2
727d 728c
20 A O I AS *Summa Theologiae* part ii q
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22 CH UC R I S *fe of Bath* Prologue [5587-5743]
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24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii
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25 M O Y IGNE *Essays* 89b-91b 99b-c 107
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30 B I COOT *Advancement of Learning* 71d 72b
31 D I C R T A S *Il courtois* p rt ii 49b-d
31 S I VOZ *Ethics* p rt i prop 9-18 426d
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32 M I LTON *Comus* [420-475] 42b-44 [716-, 65]
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33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 64b-65b
40 C I O *Decline and Fall* 191 193c 596c-d
42 KANT *Pure of Reason* 346a-d / *Practical
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44 B O WLE / *h* o 283a
46 H E L P *omph of History* part i 224a
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47 G O T F *Fa st* t i [544 1571] 37b 38a
51 T O STON *War and Peace* bk iii 122b-c bk
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605b-d bk x 630c 631a
52 D O O V *Brother Lawrence* bk i
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53 J M S *Psychology* 80b-83b esp 81 199b
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799a 800
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-
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742b-c 750 d / *Civilization and Its Discontents*
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tures* 834d-835b 812a 815b esp 842b-d
843d 844c

6c The results of repression dreaming sym- bolic or reactions neuroses

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk xiv ch 18-9
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32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk [28 128] 176a
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40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 598a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk 220b-c 233b
234a bk vi 238a-c 248b 250a bk vii
292b 296a bk viii 338b 339c esp 338d
53 J A S *Psychology* 753b 754b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-
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75a-d 82c 87a 90d 96a 97b 102a 111a
115a 116d 118a-c / *Interpretation of Dreams*
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passim 216b-219a 234d 235d 240d 249b esp
240d 241a 248c 249a 294d 295b 323b-c
328a-d 331d 332a 352d 387c esp 356d 365c
375c 376a 380d 382a 386b-387a / *Repres-
sion* 423b-427a-c esp 423b-424b 425c-426a /
/ *Unconscious* 434c-436b / *General Intro-
duction* 469c-470b 476a 544d esp 489c 491b
495a 504d 532d 539b 557b-631b esp 563a
569c 586b-590a 593b-600d 614b-615a
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and Id* 712c 715c esp 713c 714b 715a b /
/ *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* 718a
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733c 741d [in i] 745d 747b-748a and D
759 d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781c
d 793a 794a 796a-c 798c 799a 800d-801c
/ *New Introductory Lectures* 810d 813c esp
811b-812b 817a 818b 840 846a

7 Desire and infinity

7a The infinite tendency of desire

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67 / *Isaiah* 42-5-(D) 11 bacc 2 5
APOCALYPSE *Revelation* 49-(D) OT Ec-
cle astica 149
NEW TESTAMENT / *h* 4 13 14
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b-27 c / *Republic* 4
370a-c bk ix 416a-418c
12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iii [10 3
1 0] 43a [1 76-1 91] 44 c b vi [1 2] 80 c
11 EPICURUS *Diogenes* bk iii c 9 185d
bk v ch 9 237d 238a
14 PLUTARCH *Cato* 353d 354a
18 A U T I N *Confessions* bk i par 19 5d
19 A O I AS *Summa Theologiae* t i i q
1 4 612a 613a q 2 a 1 REP 3 615d 616c q
30 a 4 751c 752b
5 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 149b-d 297d 299c
429 b 489b-d 503b-d

7 Desire and infinity 7a The infinite tendency of desires

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC II [83-90] 121a / *Macbeth* ACT IV SC III [57-99] 304a c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 6-9 398d 399c
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b 194a 125-183 195b-204b
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 236b 238a
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d ADDITIONS 118 136a b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354 381] 11a 14a [602-784] 16b 20b [1671-1706] 40a 41a PART II [11 433-466] 278a 279a [11 559-586] 281b 282a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK VI 164b d

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Pyrrhus* 319b 321a / *Pompey* 525a b 533a-c / *Caesar* 599b d / *Cornelius* 706b-c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 13 33 c 388c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 3 327b-328b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 350d 354b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* 105a 148a c / *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [10 34] 574c-d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [242 270] 98b-99a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIX SECT 49 78a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b

7a(1) The pursuit of pleasure

- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 23 16-17—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 23 21-24
- NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 13-14
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Philebus* 628a d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 12 [1119^b6-12] 366c / *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257^b38-1258 14] 452a b
- 11 LUCRETIIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a [1076 1094] 44a c BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d BK V [1405-1435] 79b d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-4 9b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 30 A 4 751c 752b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25-45] 7b c
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 58-66 8b 9b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5953 5960] 262a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 429a b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT 2 SC I [1-55] 311b 312a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 42 45 188c 189d
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 283a b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
- 42 KANT *Judgements* 584d 585b 586d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3217 3250] 79a b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK III 53b 54b

7a(3) The accumulation of wealth

- OLD TESTAMENT *Ecclesiastes* 5 10 67—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5 9 67 / *Habakkuk* 2 5 11—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5 11
- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9 / *Baruch* 3 16-19—(D) OT *Baruch* 3 16 19
- NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 12 16 21
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [143 197] 630d 631b
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Republic* BK VIII 405c-408a 412a / *Laws* BK VIII 733b-d BK IX 751b d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257^b38-1258 14] 452a BK II CH 7 [1266^b27 1267^b] 462b-463b
- 12 LUCRETIIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-91] 30d 31b BK VI [1 42] 80a-c
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 19 5d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 30 A 4 ANS 7¹c 752b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 4 A 1 174b 175a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [52-66] 10a b
- 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 122a 124c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XXVIII XXX 450a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 237a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 71b d
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 510b
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c-463a
- 44 BOSWELL *John* or 125a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d par 195 66d 67a
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [5505-61, 2] 135a 151a [11 151 287] 271b 274b esp [11 151 162] 271b [11 239-254] 273b 274a
- 50 MARX *Capital* 60d 62d esp 62a b 71d 72c esp 72a-c 292c 295a esp 293c 294a

7a(2) The lust for power

- OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 14 12 14—(D) *Isaiah* 14 12 14 / *Habakkuk* 2 5—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 215c 216b
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 506b c
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b-277c
- 12 LUCRETIIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d 31b [995-1002] 42d 43a

CHAPTER 17 DESIRE

The restless search for the infinite the desire for the vision of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Ezra* 3:37-23 / *Psalms* 27 esp 27-4 27-9 42 43 63 73-75 28 84-(D) *Psalms*, 6 esp 26-4 68 41 42 62 122-28 83 / *Isaiah* 26-9-(D) *Isaiah* 63-9
NEW TESTAMENT *J* 14 4 3 14 6 35 / *Philippians* 3-2 / *1 J* 3:13
7 PLATO *Symposium* 163 167d

17 PLOTINUS *First Enn* ad tr 7 21a 26a passage / *Sixth Ennead*, tr ix 353d 360d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* 1a 125 c esp bk 1 par 1-6 1a 2c, bk 11 par 15 12b-c bk 11 par 1 13b-c, par 8 14d 15a, bk 1 par 15 9 23 24b bk v par 1 2 27a-c, bk 11 par 6-23 48c 50c bk viii par 1, 18 57d 58a, bk ix par 3 62a b bk x par 40 71-81c bk xi par 1 4 89b-90b bk xii par 1 101e, par 23 104b-c bk xii 110d 125a. / *Christus Doctrinae* k i ch 38 63c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 esp 28b-d Q 12 A 1 A 3 50c 51c A 8 bk 4 57b-58b Q 26 A 2 ans 150c 151a Q 54 2 A 28 d 286c Q 60 5 313b-314c Q 6 A 317d 318c P RT 1-11 Q 2 A 21 3 615d-616c Q 5 A 1 636d-637 Q 8 655a-657

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 109, A 3 340c 341b P RT II II Q 27 A 6 524c 525c Q 28 A 3 528d 529c PART III SUPPL. Q 69 A 4 889c-890c

21 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a x ii [91]-xviii [75] 79b-80c PARADISE IV [112]-V [12] 111d 112b xxii [5-] 140b xv i [1 8] 145d 146c xxviii 156b-157d esp [46-49] 156c

30 M CON *Advancement of Learning* 80b-81a

31 DE CARTES *Meditations* iii 88c d

31 S I OZ *Ethics* PART IV APPE DIX IV 447b-c P RT V PRO 36 461a-c

32 MILTON *Sonnets* xi 66a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* -2 183a b 125 183 195b-204b 463 255a 468 492 255b-259b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk III ch xxi 3 45 47 189b-190b

46 HECATE *Philosophy of History* PART I 224a 225a P RT III 304c 306a

47 GOETHE *Faust* esp P RT I [354 481] 11a 14a, [60 84] 16b-20b [1671 1706] 40a-41 PA T II [11-433 466] 278a 2 9a [11 559-586] 281b-282a

48 MELVILLE *Moby-Dick* 78a b
III TOLESTOY *War and Peace* bk xii 560a 561d bk xiv 608a b bk x 631a-c

52 DO TOE SKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk iii 53b-54b

CROSS REFERENCES

For matters relevant to the metaphysical conception of desire see BEING 70-7c(3) CHANGE 1 MATTER 1a 3b

Discussions bearing on the theory of natural appetite or desire see HABIT 3a HAPPINESS 1 NATURE 2a 2d, 3c(3)

Other discussions of the distinction between conscious and natural desire and of animal appetite in contrast to the human will see ANIMAL 1a(3) MAN 4b SENSE 3c WILL 1 2b(2)

The consideration of voluntary acts or movements, see ANIMAL 4b NATURE 3c(2) WILL 3a(1)-3a(2)

Other treatments of the objects of desire in general see BEING 3b GOOD AND EVIL 1a 3c HUMANITY 3 1 4-4b PLEASURE AND PAIN 6a-6b and for particular objects of desire see HONOR 2b LIFE AND DEATH 8b WEALTH 10a-10b 10c(3)

The concept of pleasure as the satisfaction of desire see PLEASURE AND PAIN 6d Another comparison of desire and love see LOVE 1c 2-2a(4)

Further psychological analysis of emotional desires and impulses see EMOTION 3-3c(4) LOVE 2 2a(3)-2a(4) MEDICINE 6c(2)

Other discussions of the influence of emotional desires on imagination and thought see EMOTION 3b MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8e OPINION 2a WILL 3b(1)

The psychological and ethical consideration of problems arising from the conflict between desire and reason of IV see DUTY 8 EMOTION 4-4b(2) LIBERTY 3a-3b MIND 1c(3) 9b NATURE 2 2c 5a WILL 2b(1) 9b

The discussion of man's relation to the infinite see INFINITY 6a MAN 10d and for the theological conception of man's ultimate rest in the vision of God see GOD 5b 6c(4) HAPPINESS 1-1c(1) LOVE 5a(2) WILL 2d

(7) *Desire and infinity 7a. The infinite tendency of desires*

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Truolus and Cressida* ACT III SC II [82-90] 121a / *Macbeth* ACT IV, SC III [57-99] 304a c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 6-9 398d 399c
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 109 193b 194a 125 183 195b 204b
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 236b 238a
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d ADDITIONS 118 136a b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354-481] 11a 14a [602-784] 16b 20b [1671-1706] 40a 41a PART II [11 433-466] 278a 279a [11 559-586] 281b 282a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK VI 164b d

7a(1) The pursuit of pleasure

- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 23 16-17--(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 23 21 24
- NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 13 14
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Philebus* 628a d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 12 [1119b-12] 366c / *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257b38-1258 14] 452a b
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a [1076 1094] 44a c BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d BK V [1405-1435] 79b d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2 4 9b d
- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 30 A 4 751c 752b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25 45] 7b c
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 58-66 8b 9b / *Wife of Bath* Prologue [5953-5960] 262a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 429a B
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT I SC I [1-55] 311b 312a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 42-46 188c 189d
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 283a B
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585b 586d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 18, 64b d
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3217-4250] 79a b
- 5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK III 53b 54b

7a(2) The lust for power

- OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 14 12 14--(D) *Isaiah* 14 12 14 / *Habakkuk* 2 5--(D) *Habacuc* 2 5
- B HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 215c 216b
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 506b c
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b-277c
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d 31b [995 1002] 42d-43a

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Pyrrhus* 319b 321a / *Pompey* 525a b 533a c / *Caesar* 599b d / *Cato* 706b-c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 13 38c 388c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 3 327b 328b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 330d 334b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* 105a 148a c / *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [10-34] 574c d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [242 270] 98b 99a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIV SECT 2 78a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b

7a(3) The accumulation of wealth

- OLD TESTAMENT *Ecclesiastes* 5 10 67--(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5 9 6 7 / *Habakkuk* 2 3 11--(D) *Habacuc* 2 5-11
- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9--(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9 / *Baruch* 3 16-19 (D) OT *Baruch* 3 16-19
- NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 12 16-21
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [143 197] 630d 631b
- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Republic* V VIII 405c-408a 412a / *Lysis* BK VIII 733b-d BK IX 751b d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257b38 1258 14] 452a b BK II CH 7 [1266b27 1267b 462b-463b]
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d 31b BK VI [1 42] 80a-c
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 19 5d
- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 30 A 4 ANS 751c 752b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 81 A 1 174b 175a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [52-67] 10a 1
- 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 122a 124c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XXVIII XIX 450a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 237a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 71b-d
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 510b
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c 463a
- 44 BOSWELL *John* on 125a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 18, 64b d par 195 66d 67a
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [550-61,2] 336a 151a [11 151-28,1] 271b 274b esp [11 151 161 271b [11 239 258] 273b 274a
- 50 MARY *Capital* 60d 62d esp 62a b 71d 72 esp 72a-c 292c 295a esp 293c 294a

Chapter 18 DIALECTIC

INTRODUCTION

THE words "dialectical" and "dialectician" are currently used more often in a derogatory than in a descriptive sense. The person who criticizes an argument by saying, "It's just a matter of definition," is also apt to say, "That may be true dialectically but . . ." or "You're just being dialectical." Implied in such remarks is dispraise of reasoning which, however excellent or shrewd, it may be, as reasoning stands condemned for being out of touch with fact or experience.

Still other complaints against dialectic are that it plays with words, begs the question, makes sport of contradictions. When the theologian Hippothadeus almost convinces Panurge that he "should rather choose to marry once than to burn still in fires of concupiscence," Rabelais has Panurge raise one last doubt against the proposal: "Shall I be a cuckold faith?" he asks, "yea or no?" Hippothadeus answers: "By no means . . . will you be a cuckold, if it please God." On receiving this reply Panurge cries out: "O the Lord help us now! whether are we driven to, good folks? To the conditionals, which according to the rules and precepts of the dialectical faculty admit of all contradiction and impossibilities. If my Traulpe mule had wings, my Traulpe mule would fly. If it please God I shall not be a cuckold but I shall be a cuckold if it please him."

As a term of disapproval "dialectical" has been used by scientists against philosophers, by philosophers against theologians and with equal effect by religious men against those who resort to argument concerning matters of faith.

The early Middle Ages witnessed a conflict between the mystical and the rational approaches to the truths of religion. Those for whom religious experience and revelation were

the only avenue to God condemned the dialecticians—the philosophers or theologians who tried to use reason discursively rather than proceed by intuition and vision. With the Reformation and with the Renaissance men like Martin Luther and Francis Bacon regarded dialectic as the bane of mediaeval learning. Because of its dialectical character Luther dismissed all theological speculation as sophistry. Bacon for the same reason stigmatized scholastic philosophy as consisting in "no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit."

On grounds which were common as well as opposite both mystics and experimentalists attacked dialectic as a futile if not vicious use of the mind—as hair-splitting and logic-chopping. Even when they admitted that it might have some virtue they approved of it as a method of argument or proof proper enough perhaps in forensic oratory or political debate but entirely out of place in the pursuit of truth or in approaching reality.

A certain conception of dialectic is implicit in all such criticisms. The dialectician is a man who argues rather than observes, who appeals to reason rather than experience, who draws implications from whatever is said or can be said, pushing a premise to its logical conclusion or reducing it to absurdity. This aspect of dialectic appears to be the object of Rabelais' satire in the famous dispute between Panurge and Thaumast which is carried on by sons only without speaking, for the matters are so abstruse, hard and arduous, that words proceed only from the mouth of man with a view to being sufficient for the unfolding of them.

In view of those who think that truth can be learned only by observation, by induction from particulars, or generalization from experience, the technique of dialectic, far from being a

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups.

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

I

- EPICETUS *The Manual*
 GOETHE *Sorrows of Young Werther*
 HEGEL *The Phenomenology of Mind* IV (3)
 FREUD *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*
 CH I

II

- FILICURUS *Letter to Menoeceus*
 BOCCACCIO *Decameron*
 VILLON *The Debate of the Heart and Body of Villon*
 LERRO *The Philosophy of Love* DIALOGUE I
 P. SIDNEY *Astrophel and Stella*
 MARLOWE *Tamburlaine the Great*
 SUÁREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* X (1) XLIII-XLIV XXX (16) XLII (14)
 JOHN OF SAINT THOmas *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus Philosophia Naturalis* PART IV Q 13
 MOLIÈRE *L'alcibiade (The Miser)*
 MALEBRANCHE *De la recherche de la vérité* BK IV
 RACINE *Phedre*
 — *Athalie*
 BOSSUET *Traité de la concupiscence*
 LEIBNITZ *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* BK II CH 21
 J. BUTLER *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature* I II
 HUTCHESON *A System of Moral Philosophy* BK I CH 2-3 BK II CH 2
 — *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*
 HELMSTEDT *Trilogie de l'esprit* III CH 9-11
 T. REID *Essay on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* III PART II CH 1-2
 J. G. FICHTE *The Vocation of Man*
 SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea*
 BROWN *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* VOL II PP 153-179

- D. STEWART *Outline of Moral Philosophy* PART II CH I (1-4)
 — *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Parts of Man* BK I CH 1-3
 J. MILL *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* CH I
 STENDHAL *The Red and the Black*
 BENTHAM *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* CH 10
 — *Deontology*
 PUSHKIN *The Queen of Spades*
 WHATELL *The Elements of Morality* BK I CH 2
 BALLAC *Cousin Bette*
 SIENGER *The Principles of Psychology* VOL I PART I CH 6 (50) PART II CH 8
 BAIN *The Emotions and the Will*
 E. HARTMANN *Philosophy of the Unconscious*
 H. SIDGWICK *The Methods of Ethics* BK I CH 4
 ZOLA *Nana*
 FRANCE *The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard*
 T. H. GREEN *Prolegomena to Ethics* BK II CH I
 L. STEINER *The Science of Ethics* CH 2
 IBSEN *The Master Builder*
 CHEKHOV *The Sea Gull*
 RIBOT *The Psychology of the Emotions*
 BRADLEY *Collected Essays* VOL I (14)
 MOORE *Principia Ethica* CH (39-4)
 SCHIHLER *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die moralische Weltanschauung*
 B. RUSSELL *The Analysis of Matter* LECT 3
 DEWEY *Human Nature and Conduct* PART III (9)
 FITZGERALD *The Great Gatsby*
 O'NEILL *Desire Under the Elms*
 A. ALEXANDER *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality*
 BEEBE CENTER *The Psychology of Pleasure and Unpleasantness*
 NICHOLS *Love and Eros*
 ROUGE MONT *Love in the Western World*
 MARITAIN *Scholasticism and Politics* CH VI
 D. ARCY *The Mind and Heart of Love*

- adds I am a man and the other has given
 - his assent to this also the first draws his con-
 - clusion Then you are not a man

According to Augustine this sort of en-
 snaring argument should not be called dia-
 lectical but sophistical It makes the same
 sort of observation about the abuse of rhetoric
 in speech which only a misapplied verbal orna-
 mentation more than is consistent with seriousness
 of purpose That too he thinks should be
 called sophistical in order to a void attaching
 the name of rhetoric to misapplications of the
 art

Dialectic for Augustine is the art which
 deals with inferences and definitions and
 divisions and is of the greatest assistance in the
 discovery of meaning Rhetoric on the other
 hand, is not to be used so much for a certain
 meaning as for setting forth the mean-
 ing when it is ascertained Dialectic in other
 words is divorced from the practical purpose of
 stating and winning an argument and given
 theoretical status as a method of inquiry

THIS CONCEPTION of dialectic originates in the
 dialogues of Plato Not himself a sophist either
 by profession or in aim Socrates found other
 uses for the analytical and argumentative device
 invented by the sophists The same skills of mind
 which were practically useful in the public as-
 sembly and in the law courts could be used or
 adapted for clarification and precision in specu-
 lative discussions They could also be used to
 find the truth implicit in the commonly ex-
 pressed conceptions of men and to lay bare
 errors caused by lack of definition in discourse
 or lack of rigor in reasoning

In the *Sophist* Plato separates the philosopher
 from the sophist not by any distinction in
 method but by the difference in the use each
 makes of the same technique And in the
Republic one of the reasons Socrates gives for
 postponing the study of dialectic until the age
 of thirty is that youngsters, when they first
 get their feet in their mouth argue for amuse-
 ment and like puppy dogs they rejoice in
 pulling and tearing tails to come near them
 As a result of being vainly disputatious they
 get into the way of not believing anything
 which they believed before and hear not
 only they but philosophy and all that relates

to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of
 the world But when a man begins to get
 older he will no longer be guilty of such in-
 sanity he will imitate the dialectician who is
 seeking for truth and not the sophist who is
 contradicting for the sake of amusement

In the hands of the philosopher dialectic is a
 instrument of science There is a cording to
 Socrates no other method of comprehending
 by any regular process all true existence or of
 ascertaining what each thing is in its own na-
 ture It passes beyond the arts at the lowest
 level which are concerned with the desires or
 opinions of men or are cultivated with a view
 to production and constructions It likewise
 transcends the mathematical sciences which
 while they have some apprehension of true
 being leave the hypotheses which they un-
 examined and are unable to give an account
 of them Using these as handmaids and
 helpers dialectic goes directly to the first
 principle and is the only science which does
 away with hypotheses in order to make her
 ground secure

The dialectic of Plato has an upward and a
 downward path which somewhat resemble the
 inductive process of the mind from facts to
 principles and the deductive process from
 principles to the conclusions they validate
 Dialectic says Socrates ascends by using hy-
 potheses as steps and points of departure into
 a world which is above hypotheses in order
 that she may soar beyond them to the first
 principle of the whole By successive steps
 she descends again without the aid of any sensu-
 ble object from ideas through ideas and in
 ideas she ends

As the disciplined search for truth dialectic
 includes all of logic It is concerned with every
 phase of thought with the establishment of
 definitions the examination of hypotheses in
 the light of their presuppositions or conse-
 quences the formulation of inferences and
 proofs the resolution of dilemmas arising from
 opposition in thought.

WHEREAS FOR PLATO dialectic is more than the
 whole of logic for Aristotle it is less Dialectic
 is more than the process by which the mind
 goes from myth and fantasy perception and
 opinion, to the highest truth For Plato it is the

method of inquiry seems to have virtue only for the purpose of disputation or criticism.

The human faculties writes Gibbon are fortified by the art and practice of dialectics. It is the keenest weapon of dispute he adds but more effectual for the detection of error than for the investigation of truth.

Mill describes the Socratic dialectics so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato as a contrivance for making the difficulties of the question present to the learner's consciousness. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life he continues directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing anyone who has merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion that he did not understand the subject. The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. In Mill's opinion as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the Socratic age but the modern mind he says owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other.

Disparaging comment on dialectic comes not only from those who contrast it unfavorably with the methods of experiment or empirical research. It is made also by writers who trust reason's power to grasp truths intuitively and to develop their consequences deductively. Sensitive to what may seem to be a paradox here Descartes writes in his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. It may perhaps strike some with surprise that here where we are discussing how to improve our power of deducing one truth from another we have omitted all the precepts of the dialecticians. The dialectician can proceed only after he has been given premises to work from. Since in Descartes' view dialectic provides no method for establishing premises or for discovering first principles it can contribute nothing at all to the discovery of the truth. Its only possible use is to serve to explain at times more easily to others the truths we have already ascertained hence it should be transferred from Philosophy to Rhetoric.

THE CONNECTION of dialectic with disputation and rhetoric has some foundation in the historical fact that many of the techniques of dialectic originated with the Greek sophists who had primarily a rhetorical or forensic aim. Comparable to the Roman rhetoricians and to the law teachers of a later age the sophists taught young men how to plead a case how to defend themselves against attack how to persuade an audience. Skill in argument had for them a practical not a theoretical purpose not truth or knowledge but success in litigation or in political controversy. The familiar charge that the method they taught enabled men to make the worse appear the better reason probably exaggerates but none the less reflects the difference between the standards of probability in disputation and the standards of truth in scientific inquiry. This has some bearing on the disrepute of sophistry and the derogatory light cast on the *dialectical* when it is identified with the *sophistical*.

But there is another historical fact which places dialectic in a different light. In the tradition of the liberal arts especially in their Roman and mediaeval development dialectic and logic are interchangeable names for the discipline which together with grammar and rhetoric comprises the three liberal arts known as the trivium. In his treatise *On Christian Doctrine* Augustine uses the word dialectic in this way. Whatever else it means, the identification of dialectic with logic implies its distinction from rhetoric and certainly from sophistry.

Yet Augustine does not fail to observe the misuse of dialectic which debases it to the level of sophistry. In the use of it he declares, we must guard against the love of wrangling and the childish vanity of entrapping an adversary. For there are many of what are called *sophisms* he continues inferences in reasoning that are false and yet so close an imitation of the true as to deceive not only dull people but clever men too when they are not on their guard. He gives as an example the case of one man saying to another What I am you are not. The other man may assent to this thinking as Augustine points out that the proposition is in part true the one man being cunning the other simple. But when the first speaker

an illusion of the universal and universalized essence of the understanding

When it is thus misused the essence of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic Kant writes, "must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion and this critique we shall term Transcendental Dialectic—not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling) but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use."

Kant goes further than Aristotle in separating dialectic from science. With regard to the sensible or phenomenal world of experience science is possible with regard to the mind's own structure the supreme sort of science is possible. But when reason tries to use its ideas for other objects, and then regards them as conceptions of actual things, their mode of application is *transcendent* and delusive. Kant explains that "an idea is employed transcendently when it is applied to an object falsely believed to correspond to it immanently when it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the sphere of experience and he maintains that when ideas are used transcendently they do not give rise to science but "assume a fallacious and dialectical character."

A conclusion of dialectical reasoning according to Kant is either opposed by a conclusion equally acceptable to reason—a perfectly natural antithesis—as in the antinomies of pure reason or as in the paradoxes, the reasoning has specious cogency which can be shown to conclude falsely while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this balance of reason against itself lies the illusory character of the transcendental dialectic.

Where Aristotle recognizes that reason can be employed on both sides of a question because it is of competing probabilities, Kant in calling dialectic "a logic of appearance" explains that this does not signify a doctrine of probability. He further distinguishes what he calls "transcendental illusion" appearance from empirical illusion appearance and ordinary logical illusion. "The latter two can be corrected and totally removed

But transcendental illusion, on the contrary," he writes, "does not cease to exist even after it has been exposed and its nothingness has been clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism."

The reason for this, Kant explains, is that here we have to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective.

There is, therefore, he continues, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. Such arises because the mind seeks to answer questions well nigh impossible to answer such as how objects exist as things in themselves or how the nature of things is to be subordinated to principles. In its effort to transcend experience—in disregard of all the warnings of criticism—the mind cannot escape the frustration the dialectical illusion, which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason. It is not Kant repeatedly insists, that the ideas of pure reason are in their own nature dialectical it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise.

Like Hegel as for Plato dialectic moves in the realm of truth and ideas, not probabilities and illusions. But for Hegel dialectic is always the process of mind or of the Idea in interminable motion toward absolute truth—never resting in the intuition of that truth. The Idea, he writes, "as self-determined it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends and by this very process of transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative and in fact a richer and more concrete shape."

The dialectical process is a motion in which contrary and defective truths are harmonized. The synthesis of *thesis* and *antithesis* results in a more complete truth. To illustrate his meaning Hegel uses the example of building a house. For such a purpose we must have in the first instance a subjective aim and design and as means, the several substances required for the work—iron, wood, stones. In rendering these materials suitable for our purpose we make use of the elements: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set the wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood etc."

Let the house that we build is, according to

ultimate fruit of intellectual labor—knowledge itself and in its supreme form as a vision of being and unity. That is why Socrates makes it the ultimate study in the curriculum proposed for training the guardians to become philosophers. Dialectic, he says, is the coping stone of the sciences and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can go no further.

For Aristotle dialectic far from being at the summit of science and philosophy lies at their base and must be carefully distinguished from sophistry which it resembles in method. Dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher. Aristotle writes: "For sophistic is wisdom which exists only in semblance and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic and being is common to all things but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy. Sophistic and dialectic he continues turn on the same class of things as philosophy but philosophy differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not."

According to Aristotle dialectic is neither itself a science nor the method of science. It is that part of logic or method which he treats in the *Topics* and it differs from the scientific method expounded in the *Posterior Analytics* as argument in the sphere of opinion and probabilities differs from scientific demonstration. Unlike the conclusions of science the conclusions of dialectical reasoning are only probable because they are based on assumptions rather than self-evident truths. Since other and opposite assumptions cannot be excluded one dialectical conclusion is usually opposed by another in an issue of competing probabilities.

Intermediate between science and rhetoric dialectic can serve both. In addition to its practical employment in forensics it is useful in the philosophical sciences because it develops skill in making and criticizing definitions and in asking or answering questions. The ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject Aristotle says will make us detect

more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise.

Though it is primarily a method of arguing from assumptions and of dealing with disputes arising from contrary assumptions dialectic is also concerned with the starting points of argument. The *Topics* considers how assumptions are chosen what makes them acceptable what determines their probability. Here again Aristotle shows how the philosopher can make use of dialectic—as that process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.

There are four major expositions of dialectic in the tradition of the great books. It is as pivotal a conception in the thought of Kant and Hegel as it is in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. With differences which may be more important than the similarities the Kantian treatment resembles the Aristotelian the Hegelian the Platonic.

Like the division between the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* in Aristotle's *Organon*, the transcendental logic of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* falls into two parts—the analytic and the dialectic. The distinction between his transcendental logic and what Kant calls general logic is discussed in the chapter on Logic but here it must be observed that for Kant general logic considered as an organon must always be a logic of illusion that is, he dialectical. He thinks that the ancients used the word dialectic in this sense to signify a sophistical art for giving ignorance nay even intentional sophistries the coloring of truth in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated. For his own purposes however he wishes dialectic to be understood in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion.

When he comes to his own transcendental logic therefore he divides it into two parts. The first part deals with the elements of pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object at all can be thought. This is the Transcendental Analytic and at the same time a logic of truth—a logic of science. Since in his view it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as

It is ONLY in the writings of Hegel or his followers that the meaning of dialectic is not limited to the activity of human thought. Hegel expressly warns that the latter dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally but is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically. It is the development of the Idea which is the proper activity of its rationality. If the whole world in its existence and development is the thought and thinking of an Absolute Mind or the Idea then the events of nature and of history are moments in a dialectical process of cosmic proportions. The principles of dialectic become the principles of change and change itself is conceived as a process or evolution from lower to higher from part to whole, from the indeterminate to the determinate.

The dialectical pattern of history conceived by Hegel as the progressive objectification of spirit is reconstructed by Karl Marx in terms of the conflict of material forces. Marx himself explicitly contrasts his dialectic with that of Hegel. "My dialectic method," he writes, "is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite. Hegel," he claims, "thinks that the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the Idea whereas his own view is that 'the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought'.

Nevertheless, with respect to dialectic, Marx praises Hegel for being "the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. The only trouble is that with Hegel dialectic is standing on its head. It must therefore 'be turned right side up again'—a revolution which Marx thinks he accomplishes in his dialectical materialism.

Placing put dialectic on its proper basis, Marx constructs the whole of history in terms of a conflict of material forces, or of social classes in economic strife according to a dialectical pattern which provides "recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also the recognition of the negation of that state of things, its inevitable breaking up." History is thus viewed dialectically—as in fluid move-

ment"—yet it is also conceived as working towards a definite end—the revolution which has as its result the peace of the classless society. Bourgeois industry by bringing about the concentration and association of the proletariat produces its own gravediggers: its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

In Marx's vocabulary the phrases "historical materialism" and "dialectical materialism" are strictly synonymous. But Marx's protest to the contrary notwithstanding a comparison of Marx and Hegel seems to show that a dialectic of history is equally capable of being conceived in terms of spirit or of matter.

The question whether there is a dialectic of nature as well as a dialectic of history remains a point of controversy in Marxist thought despite the bearing which Hegel's *Science of Logic* and *Phenomenology of Mind* might have upon the question. Engels tries in his *Dialectics of Nature* to give a fuller rendering of the Hegelian dialectic in strictly materialistic terms. Its universal scope—including all of nature as well as all of history—is also reflected in certain post-Darwinian doctrines of cosmic evolution.

CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT to the Hegelian or Marxist dialectic will be found in the chapters on HISTORY and PROGRESS. Without judging the issues which Hegel and Marx have raised in the thought of the last century, it may be permissible to report the almost violent intellectual eruptions they have produced in certain quarters. Freud for example is as unsympathetic in his criticism of Marx and as uncompromising in his rejection of dialectical materialism, as James before him is extreme in the expression of his distaste for Hegel. Mocking the Hegelians who think that "the glory and beauty of the psychic life is that in it all contradictions find their reconciliation," James declares "With this intellectual temper I confess I cannot contend.

The Hegelian dialectic and what James calls the pantomime-state of mind are, in his opinion, emotionally considered one and the same thing. In the pantomime all common things are represented to happen in impossible ways, people jump down each other's throats, houses turn inside out, old women become young men.

Hegel an opposite or antithesis of these elements. The wind which has helped to build the house is shut out by the house so also are the violence of rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire so far as the house is made fire proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity—press downward—and so high walls are carried up. The result is that

the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature and yet to cooperate for a product by which their operation is limited. The initial opposition between the idea of a house and the elements is reconciled in the higher synthesis which is the house itself.

While it shows the opposing theses and the resulting synthesis this example does not fully exhibit the dynamic character of the Hegelian dialectic. If the resulting synthesis is not the whole truth it too must be defective and require supplementation by a contrary which is defective in an opposite way. These two together then become the material for a higher synthesis another step in that continuing dialectical process which is the life of mind—both the subjective dialectic of the human mind and the objective dialectic of the Absolute Mind or the Idea.

THE THREAD OF common meaning which runs through these four conceptions of dialectic is to be found in the principle of opposition. In each of them dialectic either begins or ends with some sort of intellectual conflict or develops and then resolves such oppositions.

For Kant dialectical opposition takes the extreme form of irreducible contradictions from which the mind cannot escape. It is a melancholy reflection he declares that reason in its highest exercise falls into an antithetic. This comes about because all statements enunciated by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding which are applicable only to experience and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses.

For Hegel the opposition takes the milder form of contrary theses and antitheses. They can be dialectically overcome by a synthesis which remedies the incompleteness of each half truth. It is one of the most important discoveries of logic. Hegel says that a specific moment which by standing in opposition has the position of an extreme ceases to be such and in a moment in an organic whole by being at the same time a mean. The Hegelian opposition is thus also a mediation.

Dialectical opposition for Aristotle originates in the disagreements which occur in ordinary human discourse. But just as disagreement is reasonable only if there are two sides to the question in dispute so reason can operate dialectically only with regard to genuinely arguable matters. The familiar topics concerning which men disagree represent the commonplace issues of dialectic since for the most part they are formed from debatable propositions or questions. Nobody in his senses Aristotle believes would make a proposition of what no one holds nor would he make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people. Each of the conflicting opinions will therefore have some claim to probability. Here the dialectical process ends neither in a synthesis of incomplete opposites nor in a rejection of both as illusory but having an eye to general opinion it seeks to ascertain the more reasonable view—the more tenable or probable of the two.

In the Platonic theory of dialectic the element of opposition appears in the tension between being and becoming the one and many or the intelligible and the sensible which is found present in every stage of the mind's dialectical ascent to the contemplation of ideas. So fundamental is this tension that Socrates uses it to define the dialectician as one who is able to see a One and Many in Nature—by comprehending scattered particulars in one idea and dividing it into species according to their natural formation. Here as in the Hegelian theory the oppositions—apparent contradictions in discourse—can be resolved by dialectic and through their resolution the mind then rises to a higher level.

REFERENCES

To find the passage cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOUTER *Ilad* BK II [65 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTION. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR. Divided into one or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, book, section) at some times included in the reference. The numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases. *g. Ilad* BK II [265 53] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. The references are to books, chapters and verses. When the King James and Douay versions differ in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay version is cited in brackets. *e.g.* OLD TESTAMENT *Jeremiah* 43-(D) II *Ezra* 1-45.

SUBJECTS. The abbreviation "esp." calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in its use. *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1. Definitions of dualistic

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 88d-89a / *Phaedrus* 139d 140a / *Republic* BK VI 387e-d BK VII 396d 398c / *Parmenides* 491a-c / *Sophist* 257a-b 271-c / *Philebus* 611d-612b 634b-c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810c

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [1 2 13] 39a-c *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I [1 2 3] 106b *Topics* BK I CH I [100a 5 31] 143a-c CH I [1 13] 411a / *Sophistical Refutations* BK I CH I [63 3] 422a CH I [1 3-8] 236a-b [1 10 4] 111a-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK CH I [3 6 14] 411-d *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [100a 5 1] 523d 2 1131a-b 3 1599c-d *Soul* BK CH I [429-4] 432c-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK CH I [133 1-5] 593a [355 1] 594b BK I [133 6 3] 595d 596a

10 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 3-6 11 12b

11 AGUSTINE *Summa Theologiae* P I-II Q 5 6a 140a-41

31 DESCARTES *Rules* x, 16d 17

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36d 37d 59c-d 108a 111 esp 108a-d 227 235a esp 229b-c, 231c 232a / *Practical Reason*, 337-c / *Judgement* 562a 564c esp 562d

43 MILL *Liberty* 287d 288a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* I TRG, par 31 19c 20a / *Phenomenology of Spirit* I TRG, 179b-c 181d

2. Diverse theories of dialectic

2a Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of being

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 57a-c *Parmenides* 139b-140b / *Phaedrus* 242b-c / *Republic* BK I 383d 388a BK II 396d 398c / *Parmenides* 491-d / *Sophist* 56c 557b 571a-c / *Symposium* 585c / *Philebus* 611d 612b 634b-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b esp CH 4-6 11 12b

4. KANT *Pure Reason* I *Reason* 337a 338 / *Judgement* 5 1a-552

43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c

2a(1) The ascent from appearance to reality
o from opinion to knowledge: the upward and downward paths of dialectic

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 382b-388a BK I 391b-401d / *Sophist* 551a 579d esp 552b-c 561d 579d / *Symposium* 580a-608d esp 585d, 586c 589c-d 591-c, 594d 596a 599a-c 608d / *Seventh Letter* 810a-d

every thing passes into its opposite with inconceivable celerity and skill. And so in the Hegelian logic James continues... relations elsewhere recognized under the insipid name of distinctions (such as that between lower and object many and one) must first be translated into impossibilities and contradictions, then transcended and identified by miracle and proper temper is induced for thoroughly enjoying the spectacle they show

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69 488d-491e
4a K wt Pure Reactor 109a d

3c The opposed conclusions of dialectical reasoning: the antinomies and paralogisms of a transcendental dialectic

9 4R STOTLE *Ricinus* BK 1 CH 1 (1355⁴ S 40)
50-c-d

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197d 200c-200d 210a 220b 229b-c / Fu-d

Pr - Mc Ltr of Merz. 260d 261b 283d
284d / Partial Return 291a 292 302a-d

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f R₂² -0 405b / J₂ 340a 346d

57513c 544c 562a 578a es, 562d 564c, 575b-
578a 587c-d

46 HEGEL *Par. 1041 f. Rgt. v. 27 u. 135*
47b-d

3d Thesis and antithesis : as moments in the advance toward dialectical synthesis :

4 East Port Kew 7a-8b 43d-44a 133c
45 Hz EL. Physiology of Kv⁺ 1440a par 1

16c par 6 18b-c par 31 33 19c 20d par 1
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par 30 101a-c par 333 360 112b-114a,c /

Ph. entry of History 153a 369a,c en 1470,
153a 190b 203a 206a,c, 1471 208b-d,
225a 226- 228b 21 Feb 2000 2000

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15 316a b 311d 32 c-3 6d 327a, 333d-334d

53 JAMES P. OF NY 1176 239b (La)

4 Dialectic in relation to philosophy and science

7 Pl. to Rm 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839,

571 c / Flucht : 610d-613a 633a-635a evn

634b-635a / Search Letter 809c-810d
8 1/2 story Pro 14-1/2 ft x 12 ft x 12 ft

64 18 2) 10°C [5° 8-9] 103a b CH 1

■ см 5 [01]11 : 1 12 б / Торжак : см 1
1 143а 144а, см 10-11 147б, 148, см 1

215c-d / *Synthesical Refutations* c19- 1234b

Generation of Corr 797 x 2 CH 2 [316

54] 411-4 / 412, 413 BK I C I 1 (960
01-22 00 00 1 [993] S 1 499a 512a esp 00
00 3 [993] 501c-4. 00 = 505b-4. 00

CH 10 [993^b11]-BK П CH 1 [993^b15] 511c 512a
BK M 513b,d 522a,c стр CH 1 [99-^a 3^b

513b d x 2 ch 2 [1004^b1₂] 523d x
x5 ch 3 [106^a9^b12] 589c d xk xiii ch

110-3-3-31 610b-c / Cont. # 1 CH 1 (40
25 119) 612b-d

(2a) *Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of being* 2a(1) *The ascent from appearance to reality or from opinion to knowledge the upward and downward paths of dialectic*

- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 611a 12b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115c 173b 174a / *Judgement* 551a 552c
43 MILL *Liberty* 288a

2a(2) *Definition division hypothesis and myth in the service of dialectic*

- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 4a 13d esp 4b 5a b 6d
7c 10a / *Laches* 31c 37d / *Protagoras* 43d
45a 49a / *Phaedrus* 124b 129d 134a c 139d
140b / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 175d 179d 180b
183b c / *Euthyphro* 192c 199a c esp 193a
193d 195b / *Phaedo* 242b 243c / *Republic*
BK I II 297b 316b BK IV 346a 356a BK
VI VII 386d 398c / *Timaeus* 462b c / *Parmenides*
486a 511d esp 491a d / *Sophist* 551a 579d
esp 552b c 553d 554a 561b 570c 571d / *Statesman*
580a 608d esp 580d 582d 583c
586c 589c 591a d 594d 596a / *Philebus*
609a 639a c esp 610d 613a 615c 617d / *Seventh Letter*
809c-810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I
CH 2 [316^a 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH
6 [987^a 29-37] 505b c [987^b 30 33] 506a BK
XIII CH 4 [1078^b 18-32] 610b c / *Soul* BK I
CH I [403^a 29^b] 632c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 2-3
165d 167d
12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 7 112b 113d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 11a c

2b Dialectic as the method of inquiry argument and criticism in the sphere of opinion

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24^a
21^b 15] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH
II [77^a 25-35] 106b CH IV [81^b 17 22] 111c d / *Topics*
143a 223a c / *Sophistical Refutations* 227a 253d
esp CH I 1-2 227a 228a CH 9 II 234b 237c
CH 34 252c 253d / *Generation and Corruption*
BK I CH 2 [316^a 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics*
BK IV CH 2 [1004^b 15-27] 523d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH I 2 593a 598b
CH 4 [1359^a 30^b] 599c d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57
A 6 REP 3 40a 41a PART III Q 9 A 3 REP 2
765b 766b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60a c 65a c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2c 3a IV 5b c V
16d 17a XIII 25b
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 299b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36d 37d 109b c / *Judgement*
600d 603d
43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 31
19c 20a = RT II par 140 53a b / *Philosophy of History*
PART IV 360c d

2b(1) *Divisions of dialectic: the theory of the predicables*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I VII 143a 211a c esp
BK I CH 2 143d 144a CH 4-6 144b 146a CH
12 148d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH II [11^a
3-8] 236a = [172^b 4] 237b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [133^b 36-
135^b 33] 596a 598b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 5
A 6 REP 3 40a 41a

2b(2) *The technique of question and answer*

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50d 51b / *Euthydemus*
78a d / *Cratylus* 88d 89a / *Republic* BK VI,
375b c / *Sophist* 551d
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24^a
21^b 15] 39a = / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH
II [77^a 25-35] 106b BK II CH 5 [91^b 11^a]
125b / *Topics* BK VIII 211a 223a = / *Sophistical Refutations*
CH 10 [171^a 27]-CH 11 [11^a 16]
235d 236a CH 11 [17^a 15 21] 237a
12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 2 1 & d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 65a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140,
53a b

2c Dialectic as the logic of semblance and as the critique of the illusory employment of reason beyond experience

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c esp 1a b 7a 8b
15c 16c 20a 36d 37b 53b 54b 59c d 93c
99a 101b 107b 108a 209d esp 108a 112d,
120c 121c 129c 130b 133d 157d 173b 174a,
175c d 185b c 190a 209d 217d 218a 219a
223d 227a 235a esp 229b c 231c 232a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261c
283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a
296a d 309b 310d 311d 313b-314d 316c
321b 335c 337a c / *Judgement* 461a c 540a
542a 543c 544c 551a 552c 562a 564c 570b
572b 606d 607c

2c(1) *The division of logic into analytic and dialectic the distinction between general and transcendental dialectic*

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 37d esp 36a 37d
108a 111c

2c(2) *The natural dialectic of human reason*

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 3b 7a 8b 20a 120c
121c 133d 192c 193b 217d 218a 227a 235a
esp 229b c / *Practical Reason* 335c 337d
352b c / *Judgement* 570b 572b

2d Dialectic as the evolution of spirit or matter

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 32 33
20a d PART III par 342 344 110c 111a par
353 360 112b 114a = / *Philosophy of History*
INTRO 153a 206a c esp 178a 179c 182d 183a,
203a 206a = PART I 208b d 236a c 257a c
PART II 278a c PART IV 315a

(2a) *Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of being* 2a(1) *The ascent from appearance to reality or from opinion to knowledge the upward and downward paths of dialectic*

- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 611a 12b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115c 173b 174a / *Judgement* 551a 552c
43 MILL *Liberty* 288a

2a(2) *Definition division hypothesis and myth in the service of dialectic*

- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 4a 13d esp 4b 5a b 6d 7c 10a / *Laches* 31c 37d / *Protagoras* 43d 45a 49a / *Phaedrus* 124b 129d 134a = 139d 140b / *Meno* 174a 190a esp 175d 179d 180b 183b c / *Euthyphro* 192c 199a c esp 193a 193d 195b / *Phaedo* 242b 243c / *Republic* BK I II 297b 316b BK IV 346a 356a BK VI VII 386d 398c / *Timaeus* 462b c / *Parmentides* 486a 511d esp 491a d / *Sophist* 551a 579d esp 552b c 553d 554a 561b 570c 571d / *Statesman* 580a 608d esp 580d 582d 583c 586c 589c 591a d 594d 596a / *Philebus* 609a 639a c esp 610d 613a 615c 617d / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 317] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [98, 29 30] 505b = [987^b30 33] 506a BK XIII CH 4 [1078^b18 32] 610b c / *Soul* BK I CH I [403 29-30] 632c d

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 2 3 165d 167d

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 7 112b 113d

- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 11a c

2b Dialectic as the method of inquiry argument and criticism in the sphere of opinion

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21-25] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77-25 35] 106b CH 19 [81^b17 2] 111c d / *Topics* 143a 223a = / *Sophistical Refutations* 227a 253d esp CH 1-2 227a 228a CH 9 II 254b 237c CH 34 252c 253d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 317] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1004^b15 -7] 523d

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1-2 593a 598b BK 4 [1359 30 319] 599c d

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 57

- A 6 REP 3 40a 41a PART III Q 9 A 3 REP 2 765b 766b

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60a c 65a c

- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2c 3a IV 5b c V 16d 17a XIII 25b

- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 299b

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36d 37d 109b c / *Judgement* 600d 603d

- 43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 31

- 19c 20a PART II par 140 53a = / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 360c d

2b(1) *Divisions of dialectic: the theory of the predicable*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I VII 143a 211a c esp BK I CH 2 143d 144a CH 4-6 144b 146a CH 12 148d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH II [11 13 3-8] 236a b [172 2 4] 237b c

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1336 36-1358 33] 596a 598b

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 57 A 6 REP 3 40a-41a

2b(2) *The technique of question and answer*

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50d 51b / *Euthydemus* 78a d / *Cratylus* 88d 89a / *Republic* BK VI 375b c / *Sophist* 551d

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21-25] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77-25-35] 106b BK II CH 5 [91^b11 1] 125b / *Topics* BK VIII 211a 223a = / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 10 [171 27]-CH 11 [171^b27] 235d 236a CH 11 [172 15 21] 237a

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 2 178a-d

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 65a

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a =

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140 53a b

2c Dialectic as the logic of semblance and as the critique of the illusory employment of reason beyond experience

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c esp 1a b 7a 8b 15c 16c 20a 36d 37b 53b 54b 59c d 63c 99a 101b 107b 108a 209d esp 108a 112d 120c 121c 129c 130b 133d 157d 173b 174a 175c d 185b = 190a 209d 217d 218a 219a 223d 227a 235a esp 229b c 231c 232a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261c 283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 296a = 309b 310d 311d 313b-314d 330c 321b 335c 337a c / *Judgement* 461a = 540a 542a 543c 544c 551a 552c 562a 564c 570b-572b 606d 607c

2c(1) *The division of logic into analytic and dialectic: the distinction between general and transcendental dialectic*

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 37d esp 36a 37d 108a 111c

2c(2) *The natural dialectic of human reason*

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 3b 7a 8b 20a 120c 121c 133d 192c 193b 217d 218a 227a 235a esp 229b c / *Practical Reason* 335c 337d 352b c / *Judgement* 570b 572b

2d Dialectic as the evolution of spirit or matter

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 32 33 20a d PART III par 342 344 110c 111a par 353 360 112b 114a c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 206a c esp 178a 179c 182d 183a 203a 206a c PART I 208b d 236a = 257a c PART II 278a = PART IV 315a

(1) to 4

10 M₁ x Ca / 10 11d esp 11b-d
 54 F EU New Introductory Lectures 882c

(1) The dialectic on between subjects and objective dialectic: the realization of the moral will

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 6
 18b-c par 31 19c-20a par 105 114
 40-42b par 109 41a b par 120 49b 54a
 ad 110 67 72 126d 127c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 360c 361a

(2) The dialectic of nature and of history: the actualization of freedom

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* I TWO par 12d
 13a par 11 par 194 66c par 340-344
 110b-111 par 353 360 112b 114a c / *Philosophy of History* 133a 369 c esp 1 100 156c
 190b 203d 206a c par 1 368d 369 c

3 Types of dialectical opposition

3 The opposition between being and becoming: the one and the many, the same and the other

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126a c 134b c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* BK II 333b d a v 370d 373c BK I 383d 398c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Sophist* 564d 574c / *Statesman* 594d 595 / *Philebus* 610d 613 615c 617d 633a-635a esp 634b 635 / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 AISTHETIC *Aesthetic* BK I c 6 505b-506b a ii c 1 [995^b 25] 514 b BK I c 2 522b-524b esp 504 15 26] 523d

11 HIC M HUS *Truthfulness* BK II 839d 840b

17 PLOTINUS *Enneads* I E ad TA III II 4 11 c / *Socratic* d TA IV c 5 51b d / *Theodoret* d TA I c 1 93b c TA I 119b 129a TA III 136a 138a / *Filio* En c d TA II c 139 140c / *Filio* En c d TA I c 4 7 209d 212 TA II 214c 215c TA VI 235b 237d / *Socratic* d TA I c 1 3 310d 312b 15 c 1 2 353d 355a

53] *Psychology* 107a b

3b The opposed premises of dialectic argument: dialectic of problems and dialectic of probabilities

8 ARIOTTE *Principles of Arithmetic* BK I c 1 [24 2 5] 39a-c / *Principles of Arithmetic* BK I c 1 [27^a 25 35] 106b / *Topics* BK II 148a c BK VI 2 [157 34^b 33] 213d 214b / *Sophistical Refutations* c 1 2 [165 3 4] 228a / *Metaphysics* c 1 2 [9 4 2] 370d 12 F₁ T II *Disquisitiones* BK II c 1 150d 151a 10 A₁ *Symmetria Theologia* BK I Q 83 436d 438a

30 B *Adamentia* f Le ra g 47d-48d

31 D₁ *Dico* BK I 43d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH I 9 369b-c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* d g sect x div 86-91 483d-491c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 108a d

3c The opposed conclusions of dialectical reasoning: the antinomies and paralogisms of a transcendental dialectic

9 ARIOTTE *Rhetoric* BK I c 1 [355 28 4] 594c d

42 K₁ *Pure Reason* I 4a c 7a 8b 120c 173a esp 129c 130b 133c 174b 177b 187a 192d 200c 209d 219a 220b 229b-c / *First Metaphysics of Metaphysics* 260d 261b 283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 302a d 331c 337 c 340a 342d 348d 349a / *Science of Right* 407a 408b / *Juridical* 540a 546d esp 543c 544c 562a 578a esp 567d 564c 575b 578a 581c d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 135 47b-d

3d Thesis and antithesis as moments in the advance toward a dialectical synthesis

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7a 8b 43d-44a 133c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 17 16c par 26 18b c par 31 33 19c 20d PART I par 1 39b d par 105 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41a b PART III par 35b 79d 80a par 302 101 c par 353 360 112b 114a c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369 c esp 1 100 153 190b 203a 206a c PART I 208b d 235d 236c 238b 245b d, 257a-c PART II 279c d par 100 286c 287a 303c 311d par 1 316a b 321d 322c 326d 337a 333d 334d 53] *Mas Psychology* 117b 238b [in 2]

4 Dialectic in relation to philosophy and science

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 383d 398c esp BK VI 386d 388a BK VII 396d 398c / *Parmenides* 490d 491a / *Sophist* 570a 574c esp 571a c / *Philebus* 610d 613a 633a-635a c / 634b 635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

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17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 57
A 6 REP 3 40a 41a PART III Q Q A 3 REP 2
765b 766b
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2c 3a II 5b c v
15d 17a VIII 25b 26a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 37a b / *Fund Prin Meta*
physic of Morals 261c d / *Judgement* 551a 552c
43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c
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5 *The spheres of dialectic and rhetoric: proof and persuasion*

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 39d 42c / *Euthydemus*
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25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 446d 450a 453c 455a
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- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d esp [889-
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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a b 36d 37d 109b c
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Chapter 19 DUTY

INTRODUCTION

LOCKE discussing in the course of his essay *On Human Understanding* why a man must keep his word notes that we meet with three different answers to this question. If a Christian be asked he will give as reason. Because God who has the power of eternal life and death requires it of us. But if a Hobbiſt be asked why? he will answer. Because the public requires it and the Leviathan will puniſh you if you do not. And if one of the old philoſophers had been asked he would have answered. Because it was diſhoneſt below the dignity of a man and oppoſite to virtue the higheſt perfection of human nature to do otherwiſe.

With theſe three answers Locke introduces us to ſome of the alternative views on what is perhaps the central problem concerning duty. All three acknowledge the exiſtence of duty and the force of obligation. By accepting the queſtion they affirm the propoſition that a man *muſt* or *ought* to keep his word. But why? What creates the *ought* or obligation?

Two of the answers Locke cites—that of the Chriſtian and that of the Hobbiſt—ſeem to derive duty from the commands of law—the law of God or of the ſtate—in either caſe a law to be enforced by the ſanctions of a ſuperior power. Accordingly the citizen has duties to the ſtate the religious man to God. Yet it does not ſeem to be entirely the caſe that ſuch duties reſt excluſively on the *ſuperior power* of God or the ſtate. Men who obey either divine or civil law from fear of puniſhment alone are ſaid to act not from duty but from expediency—in terms of a calculation of riſks and conſequences.

Obedience to law would appear to be acknowledged as a duty only by thoſe who recognize the authority of the law or the right of the law-maker to command. They would be willing to obey the law even if no external ſanction could be enforced againſt them by a ſuperior

power. Thoſe whom the law binds in conſcience rather than by its coercive force obey the law becauſe it is morally right to do ſo. The ſenſe of the law's moral authority is for them the ſenſe of duty from which the dictates of conſcience flow.

Locke's third answer—that of the ancient philoſophers—ſhows that duty is ſometimes underſtood without reference to law divine or human. We ſhare this underſtanding whenever having made a promiſe or contracted a debt we feel an obligation to diſcharge it even if no ſuperior commands the act. Here furthermore the obligation ſeems to be to another individual—to a perſon who may be our equal—rather than to the ſtate or God.

As indicated by Locke's ſtatement of this ancient view it is the honeſt or juſt man who acknowledges ſuch obligations apart from the law or his relation to any ſuperior. Virtue may of courſe alſo direct a man to act for the common welfare and to obey the laws of the ſtate or the commandments of God. But the immediate ſource of the obligation to act in a certain way toward one's fellow men is placed by the ancients according to Locke in virtue the higheſt perfection of human nature. On this view virtue alone provides the motivation. Without it men would act lawfully only becauſe of the law's coercive force. Without it men would recognize no obligations to their fellow men or to the ſtate.

THESE two conceptions of duty—for the moment grouping the Chriſtian and Hobbiſt answers together againſt the ancient view—may ſeem at firſt to be only verbally different. It ſeems certain that dutiful conduct would frequently be the ſame on either view. Yet they do conflict with one another and each if examined further preſents difficulties.

The theory that duty arises from a man's own virtue receives its classic expression as Locke intimates in the ancient philosophers particularly Plato and Aristotle. It appears in the *Republic* for example when Socrates has to meet Glaucon's argument that men abide by moral rules not simply because they ought to but in order to avoid the pain of censure and punishment. Glaucon claims that given the possession of Gyges' ring which can render a man invisible to others no man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked. He could in all respects be like a God among men.

Against this Socrates sets his conception of the just man who does what he ought to do because it is just and because justice is essential to the very life and health of the soul. According to Socrates' way of thinking it is ridiculous to ask which is the more profitable to be just and act justly and practise virtue whether seen or unseen of gods and men or to be unjust. We know that when the bodily constitution is gone life is no longer endurable though pampered with all kinds of meat and drinks and having all wealth and all power and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted life is still worth having to a man if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the only exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue or to escape from injustice and vice?

On this view it seems to be the virtue of justice which lies at the root of duty or obligation. But for Plato justice though only one of the virtues is inseparable from the other three—temperance, courage and wisdom. It is almost indifferent therefore whether one attributes moral obligation to the particular virtue of justice or to virtue in general. As the chapters on Justice and Virtue indicate Aristotle differs from Plato both with respect to the virtues in general and to justice in particular. For Aristotle it is justice alone not virtue in general or any other particular virtue which is essential to duty or obligation.

Justice differs from the other virtues according to Aristotle in that it alone of the virtues is thought to consist in another's good because it concerns the relation of a man to his neighbor. The other virtues such as temperance

and courage do not give rise to obligations unless they are somehow annexed to or united with justice. Whenever Aristotle speaks of duties he does so with reference to the obligations that follow from justice—the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens.

Whereas for Aristotle justice always refers to the good of another or to the common good of all such virtues as temperance and courage when they are isolated from justice concern the well-being of the individual himself. That is why only justice entails duties which are obligations to act in a certain way for the welfare of others. If the good of no other individual is involved it seems that a man has no duty to be temperate or courageous even when he possesses these virtues.

Precisely because of the essentially social character of justice Aristotle raises the question whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not. He is willing to admit that a man can do justice or injustice to himself only in a metaphorical sense. What he calls metaphorical justice is not a relation between a man and himself but a relation between one part of himself and another.

Aquinas seems to follow Aristotle in connecting duty with justice and with no other virtue. Justice alone of all the virtues he writes implies the notion of duty. If he also intimates that duty may somehow enter into the acts of other virtues—as when he says that it is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice—his position still remains fundamentally Aristotelian. Referring to that kind of metaphorical justice to which Aristotle appeals in stating the sense in which a man can treat himself unjustly Aquinas explains how all the other virtues can be said to involve the duty of the lower powers to reason. Apart from this metaphorical duty of the passions to obey reason duty in the strict sense comes in the opinion of Aquinas only from the precepts of justice which concern the relation of one person to another.

On this theory duty is not co-extensive with morality: the sense of duty is not identical with the moral sense and specific duties obligate a

man to other men even when no general law exists to be obeyed. Difficulty is found with this theory by those critics who think that the whole of morality not simply one part of it involves duties. Does not the sense of duty operate *they ask* in matters which do not affect any other individual or even the common good? Does a man for example have a duty to tell the truth only to others but not to seek it for himself? Kant as we shall see holds that there are private as well as public duties or in his language internal duties in the realm of ethics as well as external duties in the realm of jurisprudence.

The Hobbist theory of duty seems to face similar difficulties. The specific duties which are determined by the precepts of justice may as we have seen not always be the same as the specific duties imposed by civil law though they will be identical whenever the law of the state is itself an expression or determination of justice. But when law rather than justice is the principle duty seems to consist primarily in obedience to the law or rather to the lawgiver who has superior power and authority. Only secondarily or in consequence does it involve obligations to other men who are one's equals.

With Hobbes for example justice and obligation as well begin only with the establishment of a constituted authority with the power of making laws. Where there is no Commonwealth he writes there is nothing unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them. Duty and justice are both said to be laws of nature but Hobbes adds they are not properly laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience until a Commonwealth is once settled and then they become the commands of the Commonwealth. In other words it is the Sovereign power that obliges men to obey them and obedience which is said to be part also of the law of nature its proper expression.

So far the two conceptions conflict or at least diverge. But if the legal theory of duty goes no further than the enactments of the state the same question arises here as before. Does a man have no duties apart from his relation to the

state? Can duty be co extensive with morality if the only rules of conduct to be obeyed are laws imposed from without—regulations which have authority simply because they come from one who has the right to command? Again as we shall see Kant would say No.

WE HAVE NOW stated the questions about duty which raise difficulties for Aristotle and Hobbes. Though they differ in their theories of law and justice as well as in their conceptions of duty they seem to concur in thinking that doing one's duty does not exhaustively solve all moral problems.

The same questions do not however seem to present difficulties to other moralists—to Kant and to the Stoics of antiquity such as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. On the contrary their moral philosophy by making the sphere of duty co extensive with the whole of the moral life seems to prevent such questions from being raised.

As we turn to examine their conception of duty we must observe that in two respects it alters Locke's threefold division of the answers to the question *Why must a man keep his word?* In the first place Locke's statement of the answer given by the ancient philosophers seems to have only Plato and Aristotle in mind certainly not the Stoics. In the second place Locke's statement of the Christian position seems to associate it with the Hobbist answer against that of Plato and Aristotle. That association may be justified on the ground that duty to God like duty to the state involves obligation to a superior. But Aquinas as we have seen seems to agree with Aristotle about justice as a source of duty and as we shall see he also seems to agree with Kant and the Stoics about the pervasiveness of duty in the realm of morals. Locke's statement of the Christian position which selects one aspect of it only may therefore be inadequate.

The point which unites Kant the Stoics and Aquinas is their agreement concerning the existence of a law which is neither enacted by the state nor proclaimed by God in his revealed commandments. This law the Stoics speak of as the law of reason. Aquinas calls the natural law and Kant conceives to be the moral law within. The common conception thus van

ously expressed is more fully treated in the chapters on Law but that ampler discussion is not needed to perceive that the law of reason or of nature is a moral law in that its general principles and detailed precepts govern the entire range of moral acts.

Morality according to Kant consists in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. By this he means that the will is never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal law. This law is also moral in the sense that it exercises only moral authority and should prevail even without the support of the external sanctions which accompany the positive commands of a superior. The idea of duty Kant declares, "would alone be sufficient as a spring [of action] even if the spring were absent which is connected by force with legislation—namely external compulsion."

Making the natural or moral law the principle of duty introduces the element of obligation into every moral act. Whatever is right to do we are obliged to do in conformity to the law of nature or in obedience to the commands of the moral law. We need no external promulgation of this law—i.e., no express formulation in words by a law-giver—for this law is inherent in reason itself. Its various maxims or precepts can be deduced from what Aquinas calls the *first principle* of the practical reason and Kant the categorical imperative. Or as the Stoics say, the reason is the ruling principle in man; man's duty consists in holding fast to it and going straight on so that it has what is its own.

On this theory we are obliged in conscience to do whatever reason declares as right whether or not others are directly involved. The distinction between public and private morality—between the spheres of justice and the other virtues—is irrelevant to conscience. Conscience accedes to Kant's functions equally in the spheres of internal and external duty. In both the realm of ethics and the realm of jurisprudence conscience applies the moral law dictating our duty in the particular case. We stand in no different relation to ourselves and others since the moral law is universally and equally binding on all persons. The obligation is in

every case to obey the law. It is not a duty to persons except as the moral law commands us to respect the dignity of the human person ourselves and others alike.

The element of a superior command in an inferior seems to be present in this conception of duty through the relation of reason to the will and appetites of man. Acting dutifully consists in the submission of the will to reason and in overcoming all contrary inclinations or desires. But though Kant sometimes speaks in these terms he also conceives duty as carrying with it an obligation to God. The subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God he says is contained though it be only obscurely in every moral self-consciousness.

Nevertheless, Kant insists that the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological. It rests, in his opinion on the autonomy of pure practical reason since it does not make the knowledge of God and his will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the *summum bonum* on the condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the conception of duty as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.

It is through the *summum bonum* as its object and final end of pure practical reason that in Kant's view of Christian morality we pass from moral philosophy to religion that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands. A Christian theologian like Aquinas, however seems to go further than Kant in equating conformity to the moral law—or the natural law of reason—with religious obedience to God. Nor does he explain this equivalence by reference to the fact that God has made man's attainment of the *summum bonum*—or eternal happiness—depend on his free compliance with the moral law. Rather for Aquinas the natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" of God—the imprint on us of the divine light. As God is the author of man's nature and reason, so is He the ultimate authority behind the commands of the natural law which He implanted in man's reason at creation.

For a Christian theologian like Aquinas duty to God involves obedience to the moral law which reason can discover by itself no less than obedience to those positive commandments which God has revealed to man. Aquinas seems to think that violation of the natural law is as much a sin as violation of the divine law. Both involve a rupture of that order laid down by God: the one in relation to the rule of reason in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason; the other in relation to the rule of the divine law. Thus in all moral matters it would appear that duty is in Wordsworth's phrase "stern daughter of the voice of God." If the natural law commands us to use our faculties to the ends for which they were created, then the possession of a mind impores upon us what Socrates in the *Apology* calls man's duty to inquire. If we fail to seek the truth we sin against God by sinning against our nature even though "Thou shalt seek the truth" is nowhere explicitly prescribed in Holy Writ.

ETHICAL DOCTRINES can be classified according to the role which they assign to duty as a moral principle. There is perhaps no more fundamental issue in moral philosophy than that between the ethics of duty and the ethics of pleasure or happiness. This issue obviously belongs to the chapters on HAPPINESS and PLEASURE as well as the present one. All three must be read together—and perhaps also the chapters on DESIRE, LAW, and VIRTUE—to complete the picture.

According to the morality of duty every act is to be judged for its obedience or disobedience to law, and the basic moral distinction is between right and wrong. But where pleasure or happiness are central the basic distinction is between good and evil, and desire rather than law sets the standard of appraisal. An analysis of means and ends and a theory of the virtues are usually found in the ethics of happiness, as a theory of conscience and sanctions is usually prominent in the ethics of duty.

At one extreme there is the position which totally excludes the concept of duty. This fact more than any other characterizes the Epicureanism of Lucretius. The good life for him is one where nature craves for herself no more than

this: that pain hold aloof from the body and she in mind enjoy a feeling of pleasure even, and free from care and fear. The life he describes—so disciplined and moderated that all but the simplest pleasures are relinquished in the effort to avoid pain—seems to leave no place for obligation or social responsibility.

In the much more elaborate moral philosophy of Aristotle virtue entails moderation in the avoidance of pain as well as in the pursuit of pleasure. Though he admits that most pleasures might perhaps be bad without qualification, Aristotle claims that the chief good which is happiness would involve some pleasure. But even as a good pleasure is not the only good for there are other objects of desire.

The happy man according to Aristotle is one who somehow succeeds in satisfying all his desires by seeking the various kinds of goods in some order and relation to one another. Happiness itself is something that we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else. Although we may also choose other things in some sense for themselves such as honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue, still they are chosen for the sake of happiness, since we judge them as the means by which we shall be happy.

In Aristotle's ethics of happiness duty is not entirely excluded, but neither is it given any independent significance. As we have seen it is merely an aspect of the virtue of justice and amounts to no more than the just man's acknowledgment of the debt he owes to others or his recognition that he is under some obligation to avoid injuring other men and to serve the common good.

At the other extreme there is the position which identifies the sense of duty with the moral sense. In the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus to live well is to do one's duty and to set aside all contrary desires. It is thy duty, the Emperor writes, to order thy life well in every single act, and if every act does its duty as far as is possible, be content and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty. Man is not destined to be happy; his happiness consists rather in doing what is required of him at his post of duty in the order of the universe. The only good is a good will.

a dutiful will a will which conforms itself to the law of nature.

Kant's much more elaborate moral philosophy presents the same fundamental teachings. This is indicated by the fact that he associates what he calls *eudemonism* (i.e. the ethics of happiness) with *hedonism* (i.e. the ethics of pleasure). Happiness, he writes, is a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence" and its basis is "the principle of self-love." Therefore according to Kant both *eudemonism* and *hedonism* commit the same error. Both "undermine morality and destroy its sublimity since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class, and only teach us to make a better calculation." Both admit desire as a moral criterion of good and evil. Both are utilitarian in that they are concerned with consequences, with means and ends. Both measure the moral act by reference to the end it serves.

For Kant, an action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it but from the maxim by which it is determined and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place without any regard to any object of desire. Duty," he goes on to say "is the necessity of acting from respect for the law." From this he argues that duty and consequently all moral action, must be done because it is right because the law commands it, and for no other reason. The recommendation of any action solely on the ground that it will contribute to happiness is satisfying, the inclination of the person and achieving the object of the will is completely ruled out. That would be a judgment of pure expediency. Worse than not moral it is, in the opinion of Kant, immoral.

An action done from duty," Kant writes, must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for the practical law and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations. The pre-eminent good which we call

moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself which certainly is only possible in a rational being in so far as this conception and not the expected effect determines the will.

This law which is the source of duty and of all moral action is Kant's famous categorical imperative"—or in other words reason's unconditional command. According to its decree Kant declares "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." By obeying the categorical imperative we can know and do our duty and rest assured that our will is morally good. I do not therefore need any far reaching penetration to discern what I have to do," Kant writes in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not then it must be rejected and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation.

To say that a man ought to do this or refrain from doing that in order to achieve happiness is, for Kant at best a conditional obligation ultimately a specious one since he is not unconditionally obliged to be happy. Kant does not totally exclude happiness or the *summum bonum*. In fact he says that there is no need to maintain an opposition between them and morality. But he claims that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness. Just as Aristotle treats duty only in terms of justice so Kant considers happiness to have a moral quality only insofar as it is worth of it is an end set by the moral law.

TWO OTHER VOICES join in this great argument concerning duty and happiness. One is that of John Stuart Mill whose *Utilitarianism* recognizes Kant as the chief opponent of an ethics of happiness. Though Mill differs from Aristotle on many points, particularly in regard to the virtues as means to happiness Mill's answer to Kant can be read as a defense of Aristotle as well as of his own theory.

From Kant's point of view they are both

utilitarians. They both argue in terms of means and ends. They both make purely pragmatic not moral judgments—judgments of expediency instead of judgments of right and wrong.

From Mill's point of view, Aristotle like himself needs no other principle of morality than happiness—an ultimate end which justifies every means that tends towards its realization. The ultimate sanction of all morality, external motives apart, Mill writes, is a subjective feeling in our own minds. He asserts that when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, it will appeal to a powerful natural sentiment. Man's nature as a social being, he holds, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.

This conviction in persons who have it does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without. This conviction, rather than an internal sense of obligation or fear of external sanctions imposed by a superior power, is for Mill the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality—which aims at the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Where Mill answers Kant by excluding duty—even from considerations of justice—Aquinas seems to develop an analysis in which every moral act can be regarded as obeying or disobeying the natural law and yet at the same time be judged as a means which serves or fails to serve the ultimate end of man's natural desire. The order of the precepts of the natural law is, in the words of Aquinas, according to the order of natural inclinations. The dilemma set up by the opposition between duty and happiness seems to be denied or at least avoided by a theory which finds a perfect parallelism between the precepts of natural law and the objects of natural desire, a parallelism resulting from their common source in the creation of human nature by God.

THE TENSION between duty and desire—between obedience to rules of conduct and unrestrained indulgence—is one of the burdens which no other animal except man must bear. It

is a constant theme in the great poems. It is pivotal to the plot of most of the great tragedies. It is a theme of tragedy for in which ever direction the tension is resolved—whether in the line of duty (as by Aeneas forsaking Dido) or in disobedience to law (as by Adam yielding to Eve in *Paradise Lost*)—run results.

The tragedy of being both rational and animal seems to consist in having to choose between duty and desire rather than in making any particular choice. It may be significant, however, that the tragic heroes of poetry more frequently abandon duty than desire or love though seldom without mortal punishment preceded by a deep sense of their transgression. Sometimes, however, they are self-deceived and cloak desire in the guise of duty.

There is another source of tragic conflict in the sphere of duty. Men are torn by competing loyalties, obligations which pull them in opposite directions. In the basic relationships of the family, the duty a man owes to his parents often cannot be discharged without violating or neglecting obligations to his wife. When the moral law and the law of the state command contrary actions, duty is weighed against duty in an ordeal of conscience. Sometimes, however, one obligation seems to take clear precedence over another as in the mind of Sophocles' Antiope for whom the king's edict loses its authority when it runs counter to the law of God. Creon, the king, not Antigone his subject, may be the play's more tragic personage. He sacrifices a dearly beloved son to uphold the authority he considers it his duty as a ruler to maintain.

If man is not a rational animal or if whatever his nature, reason is not its ruling principle, then the sense of duty would appear to be an imposture that draws its driving force from the emotional energies with which certain man-made rules of conduct are invested. Rather than acting as a counterweight to desire, duty is itself the shape which certain desires take to combat others.

Conscience or the *super ego*, according to Freud, is born of the struggle between the ego and the *id*. Translated into popular language, Freud tells us, the ego stands for reason and circumspection while the *id* stands for the untamed passions. What may originally have had a necessary function to perform in the psychic

economy can grow to play too dominant a part. For the psychoanalyst not tragedy but neurosis results from an overdeveloped sense of duty. When "the ego [] forced to acknowledge its weakness, Freud explains, it "breaks out into anxiety, reality anxiety in face of the external world, normal anxiety in face of the super-ego, and neurotic anxiety in face of the strength of the passions in the id.

THE RELATION of ruler and ruled in the domes-
tic or the political community may seem at first
to impose duties or obligations only on the
ruled. The ruler commands. His subjects are
obliged to obey. Does the ruler in turn have no
duties, no obligations to those whom he governs?
If he has none then neither have the persons he
rules rights which he must respect. Such absolute
rule—defined by a correlative absence of
duties in the ruler and rights in the ruled—has
been one conception of the relation between
master and slave.

In the state rulers who are merely office-
holders are obligated by the duties of their

office as well as vested with its authority and
power. The office-holder duty bound by the
constitution, is not an absolute ruler. He is, in
fact, a servant of the state, not its master. The
medieval king who pledged himself in his coro-
nation oath to discharge the duties of his office
may not have been bound by human law, but
so long as his conscience kept him loyal to his
pledge, he recognized the supremacy of the
natural law or of the law of God. The self-
governing citizen of a republic is similarly duty-
bound only when he recognizes the supremacy
of the common good.

According to the theory of constitutional
government, rights and duties are correlative.
The acknowledgment of duties signifies that the
holder of rights recognizes their limited or con-
ditional character. To consider oneself entirely
exempt from duties or obligations is to regard
one's rights as absolute. Can anyone have abso-
lute rights except on condition of being with-
out a superior of any sort? One implied answer
to this question is that neither despot nor state
but only God, is autonomous or without duty.

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are in book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Ezra* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention in one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The concept of duty or obligation its moral significance

- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 269d 270c
- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 5 143d 144a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 1 259b d SECT 2 261a c BK IV SECT 4 264a BK V SECT 6 269b d BK VI SECT 22-3 276a b SECT 26 276b d BK VII SECT 5 280a b BK VIII SECT 26 287c SECT 32 287d 288a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4 287d BK XIX CH 14 16 520c 522a CH 19 523b d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 30 629b 633b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 99 A 5 249a 250a PART II II Q 4 A 7 REP 3 407d 409a QQ 183 189 625a 700d passim esp Q 183 A 1 REP 3 625a 626a A 3 627a d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 86c 87c PART II 115a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 7a d 24c 25c 233a b 319b 383c 385a 467b 470a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 74b 76a
- 38 ROLAND *Social Contract* BK I 388d 389a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114d 115a 149d 150a 190c d 236d 237a / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 253d 254d 256a 279d esp 276b-

- 277a 282d 283d / *Practical Reason* 305d 307d 325a d 327d 329a / *Pref. Metaphysic Elements of Ethics* 366d 367a 368a d 373b d / *Intro. Metaphysic of Morals* 383a 390a c esp 383a 384d 389a 390a c 391a c 392b 393a / *Science of Right* 397c 398a 416b 417b / *Judgement* 571c 572a 594c 596c esp 595a d 605d 606b [in a]
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 304c 306b passim / *Utilitarianism* 453c 454a 468b 469b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 133 135 47a d PART III par 148 150 56a 57a ADDITIONS 84 129b 95 132b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 170d 171c PART I 214a PART IV 362c d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 304a 310d 314c esp 313d 314a 592b-c

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- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 11 150a 151b CH 19 162c 164b BK III CH 24 203c 210a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 11 11 258a c BK VIII SECT 10 286b SECT 28 287c SECT 39 288c BK IX SECT 1 291a c SECT 7 292b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4-5 287a 289a BK XIV CH 8-9 381c 383b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* ART 1-11 Q 24, 2 727d 725.
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* 2 1 65c-66b
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69d 76a
 31 F. CAL. *Practical Lessons*, 62b-68b
 32 SUMMA THEOLOGY OF AQUINAS BK V 336c-d
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 43 MILL *Literary* 296a-297b / *Utilitarianism* 440a-4 64c esp 5 c-451c, 464d-476c
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 30 B. CAL. *Advancement of Learning* 74b-c
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 41 G. O. *Decline and Fall*, 89d 91a, 96a-b
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 22 ON THEE *Angels Tale* [359-1004] 1 4a 1 6b
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- OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs*, 29 1 / *Ecclesiastes*, 2 2-(D) *Ecclesiastes*, 7-23
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 12 ARISTOTLES *Meditations*, BK II, SECT 5 III b-c BK I, SECT 4 260b-261 BK IV SECT 15 254d BK VII, CT 32 287d 288a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK II par 9, 10d K IV par 14 21d 23a
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 79, A 1 3 420c-427a PART I II, Q 9, A 5-6 702d 708a
 70 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P. ART II Q 96, A 4 233a-d
 21 D. VTE *D-the Comedy PURGATO* T XXVII [24 4-] 90d-96a

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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 65d 66a PART II 149b c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16a d 46b d 174d 176a 306d 307a 381a 395b esp 384d 385a 467d 468b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT II SC II [1-66] 78d 79c / *Merchant of Venice* ACT II SC II [1-33] 412a b / *2nd Henry IV* ACT I SC V 501b 502c
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC III [78-81] 35a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 74b c 96a-c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS DEF 27 EXPL 419a b
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 57c 58a 360d 361a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330a 331c 343d 345c
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 306d 307d 321b 329a esp 326b 327d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 374c 379d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 389a b / *Judgement* 593a d
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 295b-d / *Utilitarianism* 458b 461c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 219a b
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- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 304a 305c 310c 318c 321b 323a 592b 593b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 160b 163c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 190a 191a 661b 886b 688a
- 54 FREUD *Ego and Id* 707b 708b / *War and Death* 757c 759d esp 758c d 759b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 792b d / *New Introductory Lectures* 876b d

4b *The emotional development of conscience its morbid manifestations*

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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Electra* [121-633] 157b 161a
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK III [1014-1023] 43a b BK V [1143-1160] 76a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 174d 176a
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT I SC IV [1-75] 114d 115b ACT V SC III [119-206] 144d 145d
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* 29a 72a c esp ACT II SC II [617-633] 46c d ACT III SC I [56-90] 47c d SC III [36-7] 53d 54a SC IV 54b 56d ACT IV SC IV [32-66] 59a-c / *King Lear* ACT III SC IV [23-36] 264c / *Macbeth* ACT III SC II 297c 299b ACT V SC I 306b 307a SC III 307c 308b

- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [790-605] 352b
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 54d 55a
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 306d 307d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 389a b / *Judgement* 593a d
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 458b c
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [37,6-3834] 92a 93b [4403-4612] 110a 114b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312d 314b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 373b-374d BK V 406c-410c 416c 417b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 160b 163c BK VI 319b-c BK VII 367c 368a
- 54 FREUD *Narcissism* 407b-409a / *General Introduction* 622c d / *Group Psychology* 689d 691c / *Ego and Id* 703c 708c esp 706b-70 d 712b 717a c esp 715d 716c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 792a 799a esp 792b 794a 791c 799a / *New Introductory Lectures* 830a 84a esp 838d 839b 851d 852d

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- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 22 1 19 esp 23 18 / *Leviticus* 19 esp 19 2 19 36-37 / *Deuteronomy* 5 22-33 esp 5 32-33 6 1, 18 4 5 11 26-9 12 28-32 esp 12 32 / *Psalms* 1, 3 4 8 11 119 esp 119 4-6 119 33 40 119 57-61-(D) *Psalms* 16 3-4 77 1 11 118 esp 118 4-6 118 33 40 118 57-61 / *Ecclesiastes* 12 13 14 / *Jonah*-(D) *Jonah*
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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [863-910] 107b c / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* [1316-1345] 154b-c
- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* 258a 269a c esp [1-4] 258a b / *Phoenician Maidens* [1625 1, 66] 392b 393d
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- 12 EPICUREUS *Discourses* BK II CH 16 157c 158d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditatio* II BK III SECT II 262a b BK IV SECT I 263a SECT 4 264a SECT 39 267a BK V SECT 8 269d 270b BK VII SECT 55 283b-c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 14 16 520c 522a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 30 629b 633b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 64 A 1 ANS 325c 326c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 96 A 4 233a d Q 99 A 5 249a 250a PART II Q 4 A 7 REP 3 407d 409a
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- For Other discussions of the issue between the ethics of duty and the ethics of happiness or pleasure see HAPPINESS 3 PLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6a 8b
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Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

- I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

- EPICURETUS *The Manual*
- HOBBS *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* CH 13
- HUME *A Treatise of Human Nature* BK III PART II
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- FIELDING *Amelia*
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— *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*
- DOSTOEVSKY *Crime and Punishment*

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- CICERO *De Finibus* (On the Supreme Good)
— *De Officiis* (On Duties)

- SENECA *Moral Essays*
- MAIMONIDES *Eight Chapters on Ethics*
- BOCCACCIO *Patience Griselda*
- BEAUMONT and FLETCHER *The Maid's Tragedy*
- SANDERSON *De Obligatione Conscientiae* (On the Obligations of Conscience)
- CORNEILLE *Le Cid*
- *Horace*
- *Polyeucte*
- J TAYLOR *Of Holy Living*
- *Ductor Dubitantium*
- RACINE *Andromaque*
- BAXTER *Chapters from 1 Christian Directory*
- PUFENDORF *De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta Legem Naturalem* (Of the Duties of Man and of the Citizen According to Natural Law)

- BUTLER. *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature* III
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 G Fichte. *The Vocation of Man* PART III
 WORDSWORTH. *Ode to Duty*
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 — *Ethics* CH 4-5
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 SECT 4-6
 H. R. *Conscience and its Problems*
 ROSS. *The Right and the Good* I I 71
 B. RUSSELL. *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* CH I
 MILLER. *Rule and End in Morals*

Chapter 20 EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

THE great books assembled in this set are offered as means to a liberal or general education. The authors of these books were educated men more than that they typified the ideal of education in their various epochs. As their writings reveal their minds were largely formed or at least deeply impressed by reading the works of their predecessors. Many of them were related as teacher and student sometimes through personal contact sometimes only through the written word. Many of them were related as divergent disciples of the same master yet they often differed with him as well as with one another. There is scarcely one among them—except Homer—who was not acquainted with the minds of the others who came before him and more often than not profoundly conversant with their thought.

Yet not one of the writings in this set is specifically a treatise on education except Montaigne's essay *Of the Education of Children*. Some of these authors speak more or less fully of their own education as does Marcus Aurelius in the opening book of his *Meditations*. Augustine in his *Confessions*. Descartes in his *Discourse* and Boswell. Others refer to their educational experience in fictional guise as does Aristophanes in the argument in the *Clouds* between the Just and Unjust Discourses or Rabelais when he tells of Gargantua's schooling in Gargantua's letter to Pantagruel. Sometimes they report the way in which other men were trained to greatness as does Plutarch or like Gibbon, Hegel and Mill they describe and comment on the historic systems of education.

In still other instances the great books contain sections or chapters devoted to the ends and means of education, the order of studies, the nature of learning and teaching, the training of statesmen and citizens as for example

Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Augustine's *Christian Doctrine*, Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and the psychological writings of James and Freud. But in no case is education the principal theme of these books, as it is for most of the works cited in the list of Additional Readings among which will be found treatises on education by authors in this set.

EDUCATION is not itself so much an idea or a subject matter as it is a theme to which the great ideas and the basic subject matters are relevant. It is one of the perennial practical problems which men cannot discuss without engaging in the deepest speculative considerations. It is a problem which carries discussion into and across a great many subject matters—the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic, psychology, medicine, metaphysics and theology, ethics, politics and economics. It is a problem which draws into focus many of the great ideas—virtue and truth, knowledge and opinion, art and science, desire, will, sense, memory, mind, habit, change and progress, family and state, man, nature and God.

This can be verified by noting the diverse contexts in which education is discussed in the great books. In each connection we shall find some of the special questions which together make up the complex problem of education. For example, the nature of teaching and learning is examined in the wider context of psychological considerations concerning man's abilities, the way in which knowledge is acquired and how it is communicated by means of language or other symbols. Different conceptions of the nature of man and of the relation of his several capacities surround the question of the ends of education. In this context

questions also arise concerning the parts of education—the training of man's body the formation of his character the cultivation of his mind—and how these are related to one another.

The whole theory of the virtues and of habit formation is involved in the question whether virtue can be taught or must be acquired in some other way and in related questions about the influence of the family and the state on the growth of character. These questions are also asked in terms of general political theory. Different views of the state are involved in questions about the division of responsibility for education among various agencies. Questions about the purpose of education and what sort of education shall be given to the diverse classes in the state are differently raised and differently answered in the context of discussions of different forms of government.

Though they are far from exhaustive these examples should nevertheless suffice to make the point that there can be no philosophy of education apart from philosophy as a whole. It may therefore not be a disadvantage to find the discussion of education in the great books almost always imbedded in the context of some more general theory or problem.

ONE OPINION FROM WHICH THERE IS HARDLY A dissenting voice in the great books is that education should aim to make men good as men and as citizens. If you ask what is the good of education, Plato writes the answer is easy—that education makes good men and that good men act nobly and conquer their enemies in battle because they are good. Men should enter upon learning, Bacon declares in order to give true account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men while William James stresses the need for a perfectly rounded development. Thus it would seem to be a common opinion in all ages that education should seek to develop the characteristic excellences of which men are capable and that its ultimate ends are human happiness and the welfare of society.

Within this area of general agreement there are of course differences which result from the different views that are taken of man's relation to the state or to God. If the good of the state

takes precedence over individual happiness, then education must be directed to training men for the role they play as parts of a larger organism. Education then serves the purpose of preserving the state. Of all things Aristotle says that which contributes most to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government. The best laws, he continues, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution.

Rousseau seems to take a similar view when he calls for a system of public education run by the state. Its object is to assure that the citizens are early accustomed to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of the state and to be aware so to speak of their own existence merely as a part of that of the state. Taught in this way the citizens Rousseau claims might at length come to identify themselves in some degree with the greater whole to feel themselves members of their country and to love it with that exquisite feeling which no isolated person has save for himself.

If happiness cannot be fully achieved on earth then whatever temporal ends education serves must themselves be ordered to eternal salvation and the whole process of human development must be a direction of the soul to God. What did it profit me Augustine asks in his *Confessions* that all the books I could procure of the so-called liberal arts I the vile slave of vile affections read by myself and understood? For I had my back to the light and my face to the things enlightened whence my face with which I discerned the things enlightened was not itself enlightened. Whatever was written either on rhetoric or logic geometry music and arithmetic by myself without much difficulty or any instructor I understood. Thou knowest O Lord my God because both quickness of understanding and acuteness in discerning is Thy gift yet did I not thence sacrifice to Thee. Wherefore Augustine concludes concerning this stage of his learning it served not to my use but to my perdition. But Augustine does not therefore conclude that under no circumstances can liberal education be put to good use. In his

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IN THE CLASSIFICATION of the kinds of education, the word *liberal* is frequently used in a more restricted sense to signify not all education designed for free men, but only the improvement of the mind through the acquisition of knowledge and skill. In this sense liberal education is set apart from physical education which concerns bodily health and proficiency and moral education which concerns excellence in action rather than in thought.

These divisions are clearly made perhaps for the first time in Plato's *Republic*. The education described there begins in the early years with music and gymnastic. Gymnastic "prepares for the growth and decay of the body." Music which includes literature as well as the arts of harmony and rhythm is said to educate its students "by the influence of habit by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical and its function is to develop moral as well as aesthetic sensibilities.

The second part of Plato's curriculum "which leads naturally to reflection" and draws the soul towards being consists in the mathematical arts and sciences of arithmetic geometry music and astronomy. The program is capped by the study of dialectic to which all the rest is but a prelude" for when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only and without any assistance of sense and persists until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world."

Up to this point the program can be taken as liberal education in the narrow sense of learning how and what to think. The fifteen years of experience in civic affairs and the tasks of government which Plato interposes at the age of thirty five seem to function as another phase of moral training. This period provides an opportunity of trying whether when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation they will stand firm or flinch.

To the extent that physical training aims, beyond health at the acquirement of skill in a coordinated use of one's body it can be answered liberal rather than moral education. Plato notes for example that gymnastic should not be too sharply distinguished from music as the training of the body from the train-

ing of the soul. Gymnastic as well as music he claims, has in view chiefly the improvement of the soul and he considers the two as balancing and tempering one another.

Whether they produce competence in gymnastic or athletic feats or like the manual arts proficiency in productive work all bodily skills, even the simplest involve the senses and the mind as well as bones and muscles. They are arts no less than music or logic. Apart from their utility they represent a certain type of human excellence which will be denied only by those who can see no difference between the quality of a racehorse and the skill of his rider. Whether these skills as well as other useful arts are part of liberal education in the broader sense depends, as we have seen on the end for which they are taught or learned. Even the arts which are traditionally called liberal, such as rhetoric or logic can be degraded to servility if the sole motive for becoming skilled in them is wealth won by success in the law courts.

IN THE two traditional distinctions so far discussed "liberal education" seems to have a somewhat different meaning when it signifies the opposite of servile training and when it signifies the opposite of moral cultivation. In the first case the distinction is based upon the purpose of the education in the second it refers to the faculties or functions being cultivated. When the second is stated in terms of the distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues liberal (i.e. intellectual) education is concerned as aiming at good habits of thinking and knowing and moral education is thought of as aiming at good habits of will desire or emotion along with their consequences in action.

Although he does not use these terms Moraine seems to make the contrast between moral and intellectual training in mind when he criticizes the education of his day for aiming at nothing but to furnish our heads with knowledge but not a word of judgment as virtue. It is, to him a "pedantic education which not only fails to achieve the highest educational purpose but also results in a great evil in that all knowledge is harmful to him who has not the secret of goodness.

A too sharp separation of the intellect

treatise *On Christian Doctrine* he considers in detail how the liberal arts which serve so well in the study of Sacred Scripture may also serve to bring the soul to God

SUCH DIFFERENCES DO NOT however annul one consequence of the general agreement namely the conception that education is concerned with the vocation of man and prepares him in thought and action for his purpose and station in life In these terms Adam Smith argues for a minimum general education He claims that a man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man is if possible more contemptible than even a coward and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature He explicitly points out that this is the condition of the great body of the people who by the division of labor are confined in their employment to a few very simple operations in which the worker has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur The result according to Smith is that the torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation but of conceiving any generous noble or tender sentiment and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life

When the vocation of man is thus understood a general or liberal education is vocational in that it prepares each man for the common conditions and callings of human life In this sense specialized training which by implication at least seems to be the object of Smith's criticism is not vocational It fits a man only for some specialized function according to which he or his social class is differentiated from some other man or class

In our day the word vocational is used in the opposite sense to mean specialized training whether it is preparation for the least skilled of trades or for the most learned of professions Since all men are not called to the practice of law or medicine—any more than all are called to productive work in the various arts and crafts or the tasks of commerce and

industry—the training they may need to perform these functions does not fully develop their common humanity It is not adequate to make them good as men as citizens or as children of God

The traditional meaning of the word liberal as applied to education entails a distinction between free men and slaves Slaves like domesticated animals are trained to perform special functions They are not treated as ends but as means and so they are not educated for their own good but for the use to which they are put This is true not only of slaves in the strict sense of household chattel it is also true of all the servile classes in any society which divides its human beings into those who work in order to live and those who live off the work of others and who therefore have the leisure in which to strive to live well

In accordance with these distinctions Aristotle divides education into liberal and illiberal Certain subjects are illiberal by nature namely any occupation art or science which makes the body or soul of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue In this category Aristotle includes those arts which tend to deform the body and likewise all paid employments for they absorb and degrade the mind

It is not only the nature of the subject but also the end which education serves that determines whether its character is liberal or illiberal Even a liberal art becomes illiberal in Aristotle's opinion if it is menial and servile if done for the sake of others A man's education will not appear illiberal only so long as he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends or with a view to excellence In other words to be liberal education must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of excellence It must treat man as an end not as a means to be used by other men or by the state

It follows that any society which abolishes the distinction of social classes and which calls all men to freedom should concern education as essentially liberal and for all men It should furthermore direct education in all its parts and phases to the end of each man's living well rather than to the end of his earning a living for himself or others

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These divisions are clearly made perhaps for the first time in Plato's *Republic*. The education described there begins in the early years with music and gymnastic. Gymnastic pre-empted by the growth and decay of the body. Music which includes literature as well as the arts of harmony and rhythm is said to educate its students by the influence of habit by harmony making them harmonious by rhythm rhythmical and its function is to develop moral as well as aesthetic sensibilities.

The second part of Plato's curriculum which leads naturally to reflection and draws the soul towards being consists in the mathematical arts and sciences of arithmetic geometry music and astronomy. The program is capped by the study of dialectic to which all the rest is but a prelude for when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only and without any assistance of sense and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world.

Up to this point the program can be taken as liberal education in the narrow sense of learning how and what to think. The fifteen years of experience in civic affairs and the trials of government which Plato interposes at the age of thirty-five seem to function as another phase of moral training. This period provides an opportunity of trying whether when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation they will stand firm or flinch.

To the extent that physical training aims beyond health at the acquirement of skill in a coordinated use of one's body it can be answered liberal rather than moral education. Plato notes for example that gymnastic should not be too sharply distinguished from music as the training of the body from the train-

ing of the soul. Gymnastic as well as music he claims has in view chiefly the improvement of the soul and he considers the two as balancing and tempering one another.

Whether they produce competence in gymnastic or athletic feats or like the manual arts proficiency in productive work all bodily skills, even the simplest involve the senses and the mind as well as bones and muscles. They are arts no less than music or logic. Apart from their utility they represent a certain type of human excellence which will be denied only by those who can see no difference between the quality of a racehorse and the skill of his rider. Whether these skills as well as other useful arts are part of liberal education in the broader sense depends, as we have seen, on the end for which they are taught or learned. In the arts which are traditionally called liberal such as rhetoric or logic can be degraded to servility if the sole motive for becoming skilled in them is wealth won by success in the law courts.

IN THE TWO traditional distinctions so far discussed liberal education seems to have a somewhat different meaning when it signifies the opposite of servile training and when it signifies the opposite of moral cultivation. In the first case the distinction is based upon the purpose of the education in the second it refers to the faculties or functions being cultivated. When the second is stated in terms of the distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues liberal (i.e. intellectual) education is conceived as aiming at good habits of thinking and knowing and moral education is thought of as aiming at good habits of will desire or emotion along with their consequences in action.

Although he does not use these terms, Montaigne seems to have the contrast between moral and intellectual training in mind when he criticizes the education of his day for aiming at nothing but to furnish our heads with knowledge but not a word of judgment and virtue. It is, to him a "pedantic education" which not only fails to achieve the highest educational purpose but also results in a great evil in that all knowledge is hurtful to him who has not the science of goodness.

A too sharp separation of the intellectual

treatise *On Christian Doctrine* he considers in detail how the liberal arts which serve so well in the study of Sacred Scripture may also serve to bring the soul to God

SUCH DIFFERENCES DO NOT however annul one consequence of the general agreement namely the conception that education is concerned with the vocation of man and prepares him in thought and action for his purpose and station in life In these terms Adam Smith argues for a minimum general education He claims that a man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man is if possible more contemptible than even a coward and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature He explicitly points out that this is the condition of the great body of the people who by the division of labor are confined in their employment to a few very simple operations in which the worker has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur The result according to Smith is that the torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation but of conceiving any generous noble or tender sentiment and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life

When the vocation of man is thus understood a general or liberal education is vocational in that it prepares each man for the common conditions and callings of human life In this sense specialized training which by implication at least seems to be the object of Smith's criticism is not vocational It fits a man only for some specialized function according to which he or his social class is differentiated from some other man or class

In our day the word vocational is used in the opposite sense to mean specialized training whether it is preparation for the least skilled of trades or for the most learned of professions Since all men are not called to the practice of law or medicine—any more than all are called to productive work in the various arts and crafts or the tasks of commerce and

industry—the training they may need to perform these functions does not fully develop their common humanity It is not adequate to make them good as men as citizens or as children of God

The traditional meaning of the word liberal as applied to education entails a distinction between free men and slaves Slaves like domesticated animals are trained to perform special functions They are not treated as ends but as means and so they are not educated for their own good but for the use to which they are put This is true not only of slaves in the strict sense of household chattel it is also true of all the servile classes in any society which divides its human beings into those who work in order to live and those who live off the work of others and who therefore have the leisure in which to strive to live well

In accordance with these distinctions Aristotle divides education into liberal and illiberal Certain subjects are illiberal by nature namely any occupation art or science which makes the body or soul of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue In this category Aristotle includes those arts which tend to deform the body and likewise all paid employments for they absorb and degrade the mind

It is not only the nature of the subject but also the end which education serves that determines whether its character is liberal or illiberal Even a liberal art becomes in Aristotle's opinion menial and servile if done for the sake of others A man's education will not appear illiberal only so long as he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends or with a view to excellence In other words to be liberal education must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of excellence It must treat man as an end not as a means to be used by other men or by the state

It follows that any society which abolishes the distinction of social classes and which calls all men to freedom should conceive education as essentially liberal and for all men It should furthermore direct education in all its parts and phases to the end of each man's living well rather than to the end of his earning a living for himself or others

toms. All of these related problems of moral education have a political aspect which appears in the issue concerning the state's right to censor or regulate the arts for morality's sake, in the question of the primacy of the family or the state in the moral guidance of the young, in the distinction between the good man and the good citizen or ruler and the possible difference between the training appropriate for the one and for the other.

THE MAIN PROBLEM of intellectual education seems to be the curriculum or course of study. The traditional attempts to construct an ideal curriculum turn on such questions as what studies shall be included, what shall be their order and how shall they be taught or learned. A variety of answers results from a variety of views of man's faculties or capacities, the nature of knowledge itself, the classification and order of the arts and sciences. Especially important are the various conceptions of the nature and function of the liberal arts. Subordinate questions concern the place of the fine and useful arts in liberal education and the role of experience and experiment—both in contrast to and in cooperation with the role of books and teachers.

In addition to the problem of the curriculum and its materials, the theory of intellectual education necessarily considers methods of teaching and learning. Here the various proposals derive from different views of the learning process—of the causes or factors at work in any acquisition of skill or knowledge.

The contribution of the teacher cannot be understood apart from a psychological analysis of learning, for the teacher is obviously only one among its many causes. It makes the great difference to the whole enterprise of learning whether the teacher is regarded as the principal cause of understanding on the part of the student or whether the teacher is as Socrates describes himself, merely a midwife assisting the labor of the mind in bringing knowledge and wisdom to birth and thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth.

This Socratic insight is later reformulated in the comparison which Aquinas makes, in his

tract *Concerning the Teacher* between the art of teaching and the art of healing. Both are cooperative arts, arts which succeed only as ministers of nature which is the principal actor and not by acting like the art of the cobbler or sculptor to produce a result by shaping plastic but dead materials.

The comparison which Hippocrates makes of instruction in medicine with "the culture of the productions of the earth" exhibits the same conception of teaching. Our natural disposition, he writes, is as it were the soil, the tenets of our teacher are as it were the seed, instruction in youth is like the planting of the seed in the ground at the proper season, the place where the instruction is communicated is like the food imparted to vegetables by the atmosphere, diligent study is like the cultivation of the fields, and it is time which imparts strength to all things and brings them to maturity.

This conception of teaching as a cooperative art analogous to medicine or to agriculture underlies the principles of pedagogy in the *Great Didactic* of Comenius. It gives significance to the distinction that Aquinas makes between learning by discovery or from experience and learning by instruction or from a teacher—even as a person is healed in one way by the operation of nature alone and in another by nature with the administration of medicine.

In addition to the technical considerations raised by the nature of the learning process, the discussion of teaching deals with the moral or emotional aspect of the relation between teacher and student. Without interest, learning seldom takes place or if it does it cannot rise above the level of rote memory. It is one thing to lay down a course of study, another to motivate the student. Though he does not hesitate to prescribe what is to be learned by the student, Plato adds the caution that there must be no notion of forcing our system of education.

More than interest is required. Teaching, Augustine declares, is the greatest act of charity. Learning is facilitated by love. The courtesies between Dante and Virgil in the *Divine Comedy* present an eloquent picture of love between student and teacher, master and dis-

and the moral may be questioned or at least qualified by those who like Socrates tend to identify knowledge and virtue. Yet they seldom go to the opposite extreme of supposing that no distinction can be made between the task of imparting knowledge to the mind and that of forming character. Socrates for example in the *Meno* recognizes that a man cannot be made temperate, courageous or just in the same way that he can be taught geometry.

From another point of view the notion of moral training is questioned by those who like Freud think that the patterns of human desire or emotion can be beneficially changed apart from moral discipline. It is the object of psychoanalysis he writes "to strengthen the ego to make it more independent of the super ego to widen its field of vision and so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions of the id." To do this is radically to alter the individual's behavior pattern. It is reclamation work. Freud says "like the draining of the Zuyder Zee. Emotional education so conceived is therapeutic—more like preventive and remedial medicine than moral training.

Religious education is usually regarded as both intellectual and moral even as the science of theology is said to be both speculative and practical. Citing the admonition of St. James

Be ye doers of the word and not hearers only. Aquinas holds that religious education is concerned with the knowledge not only of divine things but also of the human acts by which man comes to God. Since man is infinitely removed from God he needs for this purpose the grace of God which according to Aquinas is nothing short of a partaking of the divine nature.

Both on the side of man's knowledge of God and on the side of his love and worship of God religious education involves the operation of supernatural factors—revelation, grace, sacraments. Hence God is Himself the primary source of religious education. But as the dispenser of the sacraments whereby grace is instrumentally caused the church according to Aquinas functions instrumentally in the service of the divine teacher.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE MEANS and ends of moral education will differ with different ethi-

cal theories of the good man and the good life and according to differing enumerations and definitions of the virtues. It will differ even more fundamentally according to whether the primary emphasis is placed on pleasure and happiness or duty. The parties to this basic issue in moral philosophy which is discussed in the chapters on *DUTY and HAPPINESS* inevitably propose different ways of forming good character—by strengthening the will in obedience to law or by habituating the appetites to be moderate or reasonable in their inclinations.

On either theory the basic problem of moral education is whether morality can be taught and how. The Greeks formulated this question in terms of virtue by asking whether such things as courage and temperance are at all teachable as geometry and horsemanship plainly are. The problem remains essentially the same if the question is how the will can be trained. Can it be trained by the same methods as those which work in the improvement of the understanding?

The answer to the question whichever way it is formulated depends on the view that is taken of the relation between moral knowledge and moral conduct. Do those who understand the principles of ethics or who know the moral law necessarily act in accordance with their knowledge? Can a man know what is good or right to do in a particular case and yet do the opposite? St. Paul seems to suggest this when he says "For the good that I would I do not but the evil which I would not that I do." If something more than knowledge or straight thinking is needed for good conduct how is it acquired and how can one man help another to acquire it? Certainly not by learning and teaching in the ordinary sense which applies to the arts and sciences. Then how—by practice by guidance or advice by example by rewards and punishments or if by none of these then by a gift of nature or by the grace of God?

These questions are necessarily prior to any discussion of the role of the family, the state and the church in the process of moral training. They also provide the general background for the consideration of particular influences on character formation in men and children such things as poetry and music or laws and cus-

tion. All of these related problems of moral education have a practical aspect which appears in the issue concerning the state's right to censor or regulate the arts for morality's sake in the question of the primacy of the family or the state in the moral guidance of the young in the distinction between the good man and the good citizen or ruler and the possible difference between the training appropriate for the one and for the other.

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ciple Not only love but docility is required on the part of the student and respect for the student's mind on the part of the teacher In intellectual education may not be directly concerned with the formation of character yet the moral virtues seem to be factors in the pursuit of truth and in the discipline of the learning process

WE HAVE ALREADY noted some of the political problems of education Of these probably the chief question is whether the organization and institution of education shall be private or public Any answer which assigns the control of education largely or wholly to the state must lead to a number of other determinations

Who shall be educated all or only some? Should the education of leaders be different from the education of others? If educational opportunity is to be equal for all must the same kind as well as the same quantity of education be offered to all? And in every case to what end shall the state direct the education of its members—to its own welfare and security or to the happiness of men and the greater glory of God? Should education always serve the status quo by preserving extant customs and perpetuating existing forms of government or can and should it aim at a better society and a higher culture?

These are some of the questions with which statesmen and political philosophers have dealt answering them differently according to the institutions of their time and in accordance with one or another theory of the state and its government There are still other questions Is freedom of expression in teaching and discussion indispensable to the pursuit of truth and the dissemination of knowledge? To what extent shall the state control the content and methods of education or leave such determination to the teaching profession? How shall public education be supported? Should it be carried beyond childhood and youth to all the ages of adult life and if so how should such education be organized outside of schools?

Mill for example holds it to be almost a self-evident axiom that the State should require and compel the education up to a certain standard of every human being who is born

its citizen Yet he deprecates the idea of a general state education as a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another

Discussing the pros and cons of this issue Mill touches upon most if not all of the questions just raised He believes that the difficulties could be avoided if the government would leave it to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them Schools completely established and controlled by the state he maintains should only exist if they exist at all as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence

So far as the problem of adult education concerns citizenship Mill's answer like Montesquieu's and Plato's before him is that nothing can take the place of active participation in political life Men become citizens by living and acting as citizens, under the tutelage of good laws and in an atmosphere of civic virtue So far as the problem of adult education concerns the continued growth of the mind throughout the life of mature men and women the answer is not to be found in the great books in the words of their authors Yet the great books as a whole may constitute a solution to that problem

The authors of these books from Homer to Freud are the great original teachers in the tradition of our culture They taught one another They wrote for adults not children and in the main they wrote for the mass of men not for scholars in this or that specialized field of learning

The books exhibit these teachers at work in the process of teaching They contain moreover expositions or exemplifications of the liberal arts as the arts of teaching and learning in every field of subject matter To make these books and their authors work for us by working with them is it seems to the editors and publishers of this set of books a feasible and desirable program of adult education

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk II [63-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART bk CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7:45—(D) II *Esdra*s 7:46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

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- 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk IX [430-441] 61c
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Cloud* 482a 506d esp [366-1114] 499a 502b
- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45d 46d / *Apology* 201b c / *Republic* bk III 320c 339a passim esp bk III 333b c 338a 339a 341b c bk VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Laus* bk I 648b 649d bk II 653a c 656b c bk VII 713c 731d passim bk VII 796b 799a e
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk I CH 2 143d 144a / *Metaphysics* bk I CH 3 499a 501c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Paras of Animals* bk I CH I [639-1-15] 161a b / *Ethics* bk I CH 2 339b d CH 13 [1102-2-25] 347b c / *Politics* bk II CH 5 [1263-36-1264-1] 459a bk VII CH 13 bk VIII CH 7 536b 548a e
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* bk II [1-1] 15a d bk III [1053-1075] 43c bk IV [1-54] 61a d bk VI [1-4] 80a d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk I CH 22 127c 128c bk III CH 15 190a 191a CH 17 193d 195a CH 24 203c 210a esp 208d 210a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk IV SECT 3 263b 264a SECT 16 264d bk V SECT 15 12 298b d
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk VIII [508-519] 272b 273a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk I par 14 4c d par 16 5a bk par 19 5d par 24 7a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I 1 3b 4a Q 94 1 3 ANS 504a 505a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 153a 156b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk II 81a 83b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 55d 62a esp 60c 61c 64c 66b 69d 72a
- 26 SHAKSPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* ACT I SC I [1-10] 202c 03a
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 145d
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 28d c p 9c d 16d 17a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a 2a III 3c d *Discourse* PART I 42d 43a 44a b
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II Axiom 1 IN IV 447b c IX 448a
- 32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 385b 390b 391a 394b 395b 397a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* II CH XXVIII SECT 8 249c d
- 36 SIFF *Culture* PART II 165a 167a
- 36 SIERNE *Tristram Shandy* 417b-419b

- III MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk 13bd
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33 ROCKE *Reasons for the Improvement of the Poor* 346d 31 a
37 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk 1 340b-343d
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43 MILL *Liberality* 303b-d / *Representative Government* 344b-c 424b-c
45 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* retro. par. 17a
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50 MARX *Capital* 238b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk 47b-c bk 7
244d 245d
J JONES *Psychology* 274b-275a 11b 712b
III FRANKLIN *Autobiography* 868d-871a
esp 870a 871a

1a. The ideal of the educated man

- PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Laches* 37c-d / *Republic* bk II 319c-370c bk III 338a-339a
bk I 388a-401d esp 390b-391b / *Timaeus*
434a / *Lysis* bk 649b-d bk II 653a-654a
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8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk I ch 3 344a b / *Metaphysics* bk I ch 1 499a 501 esp II 2
1054b 20 500b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* f 490a bk I ch 1
1639a 15 161a b / *Politics* bk II ch 13 k
VII ch 7 536b-548a c passim / *Rhetoric* k
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12 ACRILIUS *Meditations* bk I 233a 256d k
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7 PLATO Laches 29d 30b 37c-d / Grgias 253a / Republic BK II 333b-d 337b d BK V 566a-c BK VI 577a 579c BK VII 401a / Theatet 535d

8 ARISTOTEL Pro Analytics BK I CH 30 63d 64b / Posterior Analytics BK CH 97a d BK II CH 19 136 137a / Physic BK I C 259a b / Gener tio nd Corrupt n BK I C 2 316 5 14 411c d / Md taphy x s BK I N 1 108 22-981 3 499 -c BK IX CH 8 102 0 20-5 5 5d / So / BK CH 130 1 403 2 631d-632a x III N 8 1432 3-9 664c

9 ARISTOTEL Ethics BK I CH 3 99 8 109 3 340 CH 4 1 95 30 13 340 d BK C I 1 3 4 7 348b BK VI CH 8 1 42 12 191 391b CH II 1 43 25 13 392d 393a x x CH 9 1 18 13 3 435b-c 1 81 18 46 436a / P huc x i CH 6 128 7 32 33 485d BK VI CH 6 546b 547b

10 I PROCRATE Articula s par 10 94d 95a / The Law par 3-4 144c-d

11 LUCIUS V IOR f Th g BK V 92 145 73b 11a-c passim 1 448 1457 79d 80 c

13 V I L Aeneid BK III 508-5 9 722b-273a

14 PLINY C I Demosthenes 691b d-692b 692d 695d

18 AUGUSTINE Confess s BK I par 13 4b-c / Christian Doctrin BK IV CH 3 676a d

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 84 A 6 447c-449a Q 8 7 A 1 451c-453c Q 8 A 1 3 465a-468a passim Q 94 A 3 REP 3 504 505a Q 117 A 1 A 3 and RE 4 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART III Q 9 A 3 RE 1 766b 767b Q 12 A 1 R P I 776c 777b A 2 777b 778b A 3 REP 2 778b-779a

21 DANTE Divine Comedy HELL XXVI 149-14 38c 39c

23 HOR ES Lethaen INTRO 47b d PART I 60a 61a 66c 68b

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28 GILBERT Loadstone PREF 1a b

28 HARVEY Motion f the Heart 268c / On Anim l Generation 331b-332a 333b-d 411c d

30 BACON Advancement of Le ru g 16a 16c 30d 31a 82c d / Novum Org num BK I AP I 97-98 126c 127b

31 DESCARTES Rules 2d 3b xii 22c 23a / Discourse PART I 43a 44a-c P RT I 1 50b-51a PART I 61d-62c / Geometry BK I 297a b BK III 341b

31 S OZA Ethics PART II PROP 4 SCHOL 1 2 387b-388b

33 IASCAL Finitio 617a / Vacuum 355a 358b

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH I xii 121a 148d passim CH XXIII SECT 3 204c-d C III CH III SECT 7-8 255d 256a BK IV CH XII SECT 9-13 360d 362d

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge CT 30 31 418d-c

35 H W Human Understanding g SECT VI DIV 6 479d-480

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 12d 99d 100 142 d 274 296b d 297c

38 MONTE QUIRU Spirit of Laws BK IV 15c

38 ROUSS AU Inequality 334c

39 SMITH Wealth of Nations x v 337c d

42 HAZ Pure Reason 14a 15c 146a 149d esp 148b-c

43 MILL Liberty 287b-c 288a b 294c 295a / Repres n e Government 341d 343a passim 418b-d / Dr aratum 426 -d

44 BOSWELL John on 257c 378b-c

45 LA O ER Elements of Chemistry PR 1d 2b P RT III 8 b

46 H PH l ophy of Right P R I I par 197 67 b / Philosophy f History PA T 230c 231b

47 GORTIE F st A T I 352 -601 15 16b

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5d *The order of learning the organization of the curriculum*

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46b c / *Meno* 179b 183a / *Gorgias* 272b 273b / *Republic* bk II 320c 321a bk III 333b 334b bk VI 380d 381a bk VI-VII 383d 401d / *Timaeus* 465d 466a / *Sophist* 552b III / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Laus* bk II 653a 654a bk V 696b III bk VII 728b-730c bk XII 798a 799a c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk I CH I 259a b CH 7 [189^b30-33] 265b-c / *Metaphysics* bk II CH 3 [99^a 12 14] 513c bk IV CH 3 [107^b2-5] 524c CH 4 [100b 5-12] 525a b bk V CH I [101^b1-3] 533a bk VII CH 3 [1029 35-312] 552a bk IX CH II 8 [1049^b7-1050 3] 575c III / *Soul* bk I CH I [402^b15-403 2] 631d 632a bk II CH 2 [413 11-13] 643a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk I CH I [639^a 1^a 1] 161b d / *Ethics* bk I CH 3 [109^b28 1095 3] 340a bk VI CH 3 [1139^a25-29] 388c / *Politics* bk VII CH 15 [1334^b20-8] 539c d bk VIII CH 3 542d 543d
- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* bk I 812b 813d
- 12 EPICUREUS *Discourses* bk I CH 26 131b-132b bk II CH 25 174b c
- 16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* bk I 5a 6b passim
- 16 KPILER *Epitome* bk IV 847b 848a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1-4 10a 11c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk I par 13 31 4b-9a bk IV par 30 26b c / *Christian Doctrine* bk II CH 8 42 639d 656d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE Ia b PART I Q I A 9 8d 9c Q 2 AA I 2 10d 12c Q 10 A I ANS and REP I 40d 41d A 2 REP I 41d-42c A 6 ANS 45c-46d Q II A 2 REP 4 47d-48d Q 14 A 6 REP 2 80a 81c Q 18 A 2 ANS 105c 106b Q 84 A 3 REP 3 443d 444d A 6 447c-449a Q 85 A I 451c 453c A 3 455b-457a A 8 460b 461b Q 117 A I ANS 595d 597c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART-II Q 100 A 6 ANS and REP 2 257c 258c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 56b 59b c 71c d 72a d PART IV 268c 269b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk I 18b 19d 25a 30c bk II 75c 77a 78b 80d 82c 83b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d 80b passim esp 69d 70c
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 336a esp 334c d 335c 336a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 4c 5b 14c 15a 30b c 31a d 44c 56b-66a 68c 69c 79c 80a 85a-c / *Notum Organum* PREF 105a 106d BK I APH 19-36 108b 109b APH 90 124d 125a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV-VI 5a 10a VIII x 12a 17a XIII 25b 27d / *Discourse* PART I 42b

- 44a PART II 47a b PART VI 61d 62c / *Geometry* bk I 297a b 298b bk III 341b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk I CH I SECT 15 98d 99a SECT 20 100c d SECT 3 101b 102a CH III SECT 13 116a b BK II CH I SECT 6-8 122b 123a SECT 22 127a CH XI SECT 8-9 145b c BK III CH II SECT 7 254a b CH III SECT 7-9 255d 256c CH V SECT 15 267c d CH IX SECT 9 286d 287b BK IV CH VII SECT 9 338d 339b SECT 11 340a 342d passim esp 340d 341a CH XII SECT 3 358d 359c
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 78b
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 421b-422b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk V 334c 337b 338c d 342b
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 294a b / *Judgements* 551a 552c 572a b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 11b d 15a-c 23d 24b 121d 128c 135b-c 273a b 309c d 448a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 213c
- 47 COETHE *Faust* PART I [1868 2045] 44b 48a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk V 291d 292b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 317b 319a 323a b 360a 406a b 453a 457a esp 453b 456b-457a 503b 524b 525a 711b 712b
- 54 FREUD *Castle aton and Its Discontents* 768b b
- 5e *The emotional aspect of learning: pleasure desire interest*
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk VI 374a 375a bk VII 388a 389c 399b 401a esp 399 bk IX 421a 422b / *Laus* bk II 660b / *Seventh Letter* 808b 809a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk I CH I [980^a2 27] 499a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* bk I CH 5 [644^b 22-645^b37] 168c 169b / *Ethics* bk VII CH 12 [1153^a22 24] 404c bk V CH I [117 16 21] 426a / *Politics* bk VIII CH 5 [1339^a25 31] 544d [1339^b10-20] 545a CH 6 [1340^a25-30] 546b / *Rhetoric* bk I CH II [1371 30-33] 614d bk III CH 10 [1410^b9-12] 662c / *Poetics* CH 4 [1418^a4-19] 682c d
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *The Law* par ~ 144b
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk III CH 10 207d
- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* bk I [41-51] 1c d BK II [1023 1047] 28a b bk III [1 3c] 30a b BK IV [1- 5] 44a b
- 12 EPICUREUS *Discourses* bk IV CH 4 225a 228a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH I 3 10a 11a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk I par 14 16 4c 5b par 19 27 5d 7d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A I ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b 58b PART I II Q 3 A 8 ANS 628d 629c Q 30 A I REP I 749d Q 37 A I 783d 784c
- 21 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy* INFERNO xxvi [112 142] 39b-c PURGATORY xx [124]-xxi [5] 84c 85d PARADISE IV [115 142] 111d 112a
- 22 CHAUCER *Prologue* [285-308] 164a b

- 21 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53b PA I 154
- 24 RA LAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk I 190 191a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70d 74a 244d 246a
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Tam of the Shrew* ACT I SC I 1 202c 203a
- 28 HALEY *On A mal C neratio* 331c 332a
- 30 BACO *Ad a cement of Le n g* 79b-c
- 31 DESCARTES *Geometry* bk I 297a-b
- 31 SIOGAARD *Ethics* PART III PRO 55 SCHOL 413b-d THE AFFECTS DRP 27 419 li
- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstr on* 440b 442
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understandi* bk II c I xxxiii s CT 15 250c
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jo* 7b-c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Equality* 326c-d 338c 339
- 42 LA TUDENCEMENT 551d
- 44 BOWELL *John o* 7d 8a 11b-d 14b 15a-c 130b 135b-136a 151d 199d 200b 273a 309c-d 360d 423c 448a-b
- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements f Chem stry* P 27 1d 2a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 175 61c-d par 197 67a-b
- 47 GUTHRIE *F* PART I 321 736 11a 19b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk I 47b-48d BK VIII 306b
- 53 MILL *Psychology* 271b-275a esp 274b 275a 290 291a 433a-434a 448b-449b 524 525a 711b-712b
- 57 LEARN apart from teachers and books the role of experience
- A OCKTYPH *Ec le iasticus* 3-6-(D) OT Eccl i iacu 5-5-8
- 4 HORACE *Ody sey* 183 322d
- 5 A CURIUS *Ag mem* [160-25,] 53d 54d
- 7 PLATO *Laches* 29d 30b 37c-d / *Gorgias* 253a / *Republic* bk I 333b-d 337b-d BK V 366-c BK VI 377a 379c K VII 401a / *The etius* 535d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior A nalytic* bk I CH 30 63d 64b / *Posterior Analytics* bk I CH 1 97a-d 1 119 136a 137 c / *Physics* K I CH I 259a II / *Generation d Corruption* BK I CH 2 [3 65 14] 411 d / *Metaphysics* BK I II 1 [950 2-981 13] 499a-c K IX c 18 [050 0-15] 575d / *Soul* BK I CH I [90 11 403 1] 631d-632a K I CH 8 [432 3-9] 664c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1093 28 109 3] 340 H 4 [095 30-3] 340d-c K I CH I [11 3 14 7] 348b BK VI CH 8 [1142 2 9] 391b K II [1143 2 3] 392d 393a K K CH 9 [1 80 13 23] 435b-c [118 18-36] 436a / *Ethics* BK CH 16 [287 32 33] 485d BK VII n 6 546b 547b
- 10 HENRY CRAT *Articul tions* par I 94d 95 / *The Law* par I 4 144c-d
- 12 LUCIUS NAETIUS *Th g* BK V [925 457] 73b 80 c passim esp [1418 457] 79d 80 c
- 13 VIRIL *A nced* BK III [508-519] 272b-273
- 14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes* 691b-d 692b 692d 695d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Co fessions* bk I par 13 4b c / *Christ a Doctrine* BK II CH 3 676a-d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 6 447c-449a Q 83 A 1 451c-453c Q 87 AA 1 3 465a-468a passim Q 93 A 3 REP 3 504a 505a Q 117 A 1 ANS and K 4 595d 597
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 9 A 4 REP 1 766b-767b Q 12 A 1 REP 1 776c 777b A 2 777b 778b A 3 REP 2 778b 779a
- 21 DENTZ *Duties C medy* HELL 144vi [39-144] 38c 39c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47b-d PART I 60a 61a 66c-68b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 29d 30c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 24a-c 66b-69d 74d 75a 395b-398c 520d 522d
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Love s Labour s Lost* ACT II SC III [296-365] 271c 272a / *Henry I* CT I SC I [22-66] 333b-c / *Is You Lik li* ACT IV SC I [1 26] 617a-b
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* PREF 1a-b
- 28 HUME *Mot n f the Hea s* 268c / *Of A mal General* 331b-332a 333b-d 411c-d
- 30 BOWEN *Advancement of Learning* 16a 16c 30d 31 82 d / *Notum Org num* BK I APH 97-98 126c 127b
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules II* 2d 3b XII 22c 23a / *Disco rse* PART I 43a 44a-c PART III 50b-51a PART VI 61d-62c / *Geometry* BK I 297a li BK III 341b
- 31 SIOGAARD *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL I 387b-388b
- 33 PASCAL *Pens es* 6173a / *Vacuum* 355 358b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understandi ng* BK II CH I XII 121a 148d passim CH XIII SECT 3 204c-d BK III CH III SECT 7-8 255d 256 BK IV CH XII SE T 9-13 360d 362d
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30 31 418c-d
- 35 HUME *Human Understand g* SECT VII DIV 65 4 9d-480a
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 12d 99d 100a 142c-d 274c 296b-d 297
- 38 MONTAIGNE *Qui u Sport f Laus* BK IV 15c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Unq lity* 334c
- 39 SIOGAARD *Wealth f Nations* BK V 337c-d
- 4 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 15a 146a 149d esp 148b-c
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 287b-c 288a-b 294c 295 / *Represent c Government* 341d 343a passim 418b-d / *Utilitaria sm* 456a-d
- 44 BOWEN *Johnso* 257c 378b-c
- 45 LAVOISIER *Elem ts f Chemistry* PREF 1d 2b PART II 87b-c
- 46 HUME *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 197 67a-b / *Philosophy of History* PART I 230c 231b
- 47 GUTHRIE *F* PART I 321 2-60 15a 16b

- (5) *The improvement of the mind by teaching and learning* 5f *Learning apart from teachers and books the role of experience*)

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 82a 243a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk v 424a b bk viii 584c 585b

52 JAMES *Psychology* 362b 364a passim 453b 454a 767b 768a 852b 862a esp 852b 853a 856b 857a 859b 860a

- 6 The acquisition of techniques preparation for the vocations arts and professions

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d esp [401-509] 494b d [7-3-812] 497b 498c

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 136a b / *Gorgias* 258d 262a esp 260a d / *Republic* bk ii 319a c bk iii 337b 338a bk v 366a c bk vi 377d 378c / *Philebus* 633a d / *Laos* bk i 649b c bk iv 684d 685a

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk i ch 3 144a b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 13 [1102 17-22] 347c bk ii ch i 348b d 349b ch i 4 350d 351b bk v ch 9 [1180^b 13 1181^b 13] 435b 436a c passim / *Politics* bk iv ch i [1288^b 10-20] 487a b bk viii ch 6 546b 547b / *Athens an Constitution* ch 42 par 3 572c

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* pr i 4 1a 2c par 9 3b d / *Epidemics* bk iii sect iii par 16 59b c / *Articulations* par 10 94d / *The Lau* par 2-5 144b d

11 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk v [1091-1104] 75b c [i 41 1408] 77b 79b

12 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk viii [512-517] 272b

14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes* 692c 695d

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* bk iv ch 3 676a d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 1 A 7 REP 2 385c 387a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 27d 30c bk ii 76b 71a 85c 87c esp 87a bk iv 232a 233b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 82b 83c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 30b-c 53d 54b 82c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 66c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b 31a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 42d-43c 51c 58b esp 51c 53b 54c 55a bk v 301a 305c 339b c 342d 343c

40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 5a c 245b d 411d-412c

41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 75d 78b passim 298a 300a esp 299c 300a 311d 312a 355a c 508d 509d

42 HANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 415a 417c passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 197 67a b par 25 78d 79a par 96 99a ■ ADDITIONS 126 137a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1868 2050] 44b 48b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278c ■

50 MARY *Capital* 81d 165c 166a 170c 171c 237d 241a esp 240c d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 774a

54 FREUD *Wild Psycho Analysis* 130b-c / *General Introduction* 449a-452a passim

7 Religious education

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 12 4 27 18 10-0 24 12 / *Deuteronomy* 4 9 10 14 5 31 6 16-9 11 18 -1 31 9-13 / *Joshua* 8 30 35-(D) *Joshua* 8 30-35 / *I Kings* 23 1- -(D) *I Kings* 23 1-2 / *II Chronicles* 34 29 30-(D) *II Paralipomenon* 34-29 30 / *Deheniah* 8-(D) *II Esdras* 8 / *Psalms* 78 1 4-(D) *Psalms* 77 1-4

NEW TESTAMENT *Ephesians* 6 4

7 PLATO *Laos* bk x 757d 771b bk vii 797b 798b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk iii ch 2 195a 201a

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* 621a 698a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 107 A 4 ANS 318b 321a Q III A 1 ANS 351d 352d A 4 354c 355d PART II II Q 2 A 6 ANS 395b 396a Q 16 A 2 ANS and REP 2 455c 456d Q 188 A 5 679d 681a A 6 ANS 681b 682c PART III SUPPL. Q 9C A 7 1061b 1062a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 123a b 153a 156b passim esp 154d 155a PART III 208d 209a 211b c 241c 242a PART IV 269a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 24c d 27a bk ii 82c 83b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 183 194 205a 209b 52 224a

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3c-4a 7a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laos* bk xvii 202b c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk v 343b d 356d passim 357c

40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 82d 601b c

42 HANT *Practical Reason* 325a 327d esp 326b-327a

43 MILL *Liberty* 285b 290a 292a passim / *Representative Government* 437d-438b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 151b d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or bk vi 150d 153d

7a God as teacher divine revelation and inspiration

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* ■ i 17 / *Exodus* 4 10-17 0 1-20 / *Deuteronomy* 4 1 5 10 13 5 1 20 esp 5-4-11 / *I Kings* 8 35 36-(D) *II Kings* 8 35-36 / *Job* 33 14 17 34 31 3 38-41 / *Psalms* 25 4-5 8-9 12 32 8-9 94 10-13 143-(D) *Psalms* 24 4-5 8-9 12 31 8-9 93 10-13 142 / *Proverbs* 6 23 / *Isaiah* 5 7 13-(D) *Isaiah* 28 9-13 / *Daniel* 2 19 23 APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 17 6-14-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 17 5 12

39 S m II lh f\ t s x v 343b d 348a

(7) *Religious education* 7b *The teaching function of the church of priests and prophets*

- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 194d 302d 304a passim esp 303d 307d 308a 355b d 601b c
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 230c 231d 522d 523a
 43 MILL *Liberty* 285b / *Representative Government* 341a-c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 313d 316d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 308b c
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk vi 245a li
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk vi 152a 153a 164a 165a
 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 793c

8 *Education and the state*

8a *The educational responsibility of the family and the state*

- 7 PLATO *Crito* 217a b / *Laos* bk vii 721d 722c bk viii 723c d bk vi 778d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk v ch 9 [1179^b31 1180^b 13] 434c-435b / *Politics* bk i ch 13 [1260^b 9 19] 455c bk viii ch i 542a b
 12 AURILIUS *Meditations* bk i sect 4 253a
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a 45b esp 40c 41a / *Licurgus Numae* 63d 64a c
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 1 ANS 226c 227c Q 107 A 4 ANS AND REP 5 318b 321a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 155b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 344a c
 30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207c d
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 58-59 37b d
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b 31a PART IV 166b
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 376b 377a
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk v 338c 339a 340c 343d
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 86b c 92c
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 420b-421c
 43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b passim
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 174 61b par 239 76d ADDITIONS 111-112 134d 135a 147 140c
 50 MARX *Capital* 176d 178a 195b 196d 237d 241d 245a d
 50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427b c
 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 17d 18a

8b *The economic support of educational institutions*

- 7 PLATO *Apology* 209b d
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 30c 31a
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b-31a PART III 106a b
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 56b 58b bk v 331b d 356d
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 669d 670d
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 298c

43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b passim / *Representative Government* 382c-383b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 300a e

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 325d

8c *The political regulation and censorship of education*

- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Acharnians* [366-384] 459c d [497-508] 460d-461a
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk ii iii 320c 339a bk iv 344b d bk v 365d 366c bk v 427c-434c esp 432d 434c / *Statesman* 601c 602c / *Laws* bk ii 654c 655b bk iii 675c 676b bk vii 713c 731d bk viii 732c d bk vi 782d 783b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk i ch 13 (i 60^a 9 19) 455c bk v ch ii [1313 38^b 5] 516a bk vii ch 17 [1336 30-32] 541b d bk viii ch i [1337¹⁰ 19] 542a
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CROSS REFERENCES

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the
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II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
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Chapter 21 ELEMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE words atom and element express basic notions in the analysis of matter. To some extent their meaning seems to be the same. Atoms or elements are usually understood to be ultimate units, the parts out of which other things are formed by combination. But as soon as further questions are asked—about the divisibility or indivisibility of these units or about their number and variety—we are confronted with differing conceptions of the atom and with a theory of the elements which is opposed to the atomic analysis of matter.

Even when the two notions are not opposed to one another they are not interchangeable.

Atom has a much narrower meaning. It usually designates a small particle of matter whereas element signifies the least part into which anything at all can be divided. It is this broader meaning of element which permits Euclid to call his collection of the theorems in terms of which all geometric problems can be solved the elements of geometry. According to Aristotle this is true not only of geometrical proofs but also in general of the elements of demonstration for the primary demonstrations each of which is implied in many demonstrations he says are called elements of demonstration. From this it follows that elements will be found in any subject matter or science in which analysis occurs and not only in physics.

An element writes Nicomachus in his *Introduction to Arithmetic* is the smallest thing which enters into the composition of an object and the least thing into which it can be analyzed. Letters for example are called the elements of literate speech for out of them all articulate speech is composed and into them finally it is resolved. Sounds are the elements of all melody for they are the beginning of its

composition and into them it is resolved. The so called four elements of the universe in general are simple bodies fire water air and earth for out of them in the first instance we account for the constitution of the universe and into them finally we conceive of it as being resolved.

This explains why books in so many different fields have the word element in their titles. There are the elements of grammar or logic the elements of language or music the elements of psychology or economics. Elements in one subject matter or science are analogous to elements in another because in each sphere they stand to everything else as the simple to the complex the pure to the mixed the parts to the whole. Thus the factors of price may be said to function in economic analysis as do the parts of speech in grammatical analysis.

Another illustration comes from the theory of the four bodily humors in ancient physiology. In the traditional enumeration which goes back to Hippocrates they are blood phlegm yellow bile and black bile and they function analytically as do fire water air and earth in ancient physics. They make up the nature of the body of man according to a Hippocratic treatise on the nature of man and through them he feels pain or enjoys health. Perfect health is enjoyed by a man when these elements are duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding power and bulk and when they are perfectly mingled. Galen in an analysis of temperaments explains all varieties of temperament and all complexions of physique in terms of these humors either by their mixture or by the predominance of one or another. Thus the sanguine phlegmatic choleric or melancholic temperament is accounted for by the excess of one and a deficiency of the other humors.

Still another physiological application of the notion of element is to be found in the ancient division of matter into flesh and bone or in the more elaborate modern analysis of the types of cells which compose all living matter.

THESE ILLUSTRATIONS indicate that the undividedness of elements is something simpler than themselves does not necessarily mean that they are absolutely indivisible. Cells can be further divided into nucleus, protoplasm, and membrane without ceasing to be the elements of tissue. The parts of speech—nouns, verbs, adjectives—can be further divided into syllables and letters without ceasing to be the elements of significant utterance. Letters, treated as the elements of language, can be physically divided. The fact that terms are sometimes regarded as the logical elements out of which propositions and inferences are formed does not prevent a distinction from being made between simple and complex terms. Nicomachus calls the triangle an elementary among all plane figures, for everything else is resolved into it but it into nothing else; yet the triangle is divided into the lines which compose it and these lines in turn are divisible into points.

When Nicomachus says that the triangle is the element of all other figures "and has itself no element" he does not mean that the triangle is absolutely indivisible, but only relatively so. Relative to the analysis of plane figures there is no simpler figure out of which the triangle can be formed. Similarly relative to the analysis of significant speech there is no simpler part than the word. Relative to the analysis of melody there is no simpler part than the tone. Musical tones may be physically but they are not musically complex.

THE DEFINITION of element can also be approached by comparing its meaning with that of principle and cause. All three terms are brought together by Aristotle in the beginning of his *Physics* when he declares that we attain scientific knowledge through acquaintance with the principles, causes, and elements of things.

The word principle occurs almost as frequently as element in the titles of books which claim to be basic expositions or analyses.

The two words are often used as synonyms. La Mettrie for example says that we can use "the terms *causes*, or, *principles* of bodies to express our idea of the last point which analysis is capable of reaching."

To detect any difference in the meaning of "element" and "principle" it is necessary to specify their correlatives precisely. Out of elements, compounds or mixtures are formed. From principles, consequences are derived. In logic for example we say that terms are the elements of propositions (the proposition "Socrates is a man" comprises the terms "Socrates" and "man") but we say that axioms are the principles from which conclusions are derived. This does not prevent the same thing from being viewed in different connections as both element and principle—as an element because it is the simple part out of which a more complex whole is composed and as a principle because it is the source from which something else is derived. The parts of speech in grammar are the elementary components of phrases and sentences; they are also the principles from which the rules of syntax are derived.

The third notion which belongs with element and principle is cause. Its correlative is effect. Now it can be said that that which is an element in one connection and a principle in another can be regarded as a cause from still a third point of view. In Aristotle's physical treatises for example matter is regarded in all three ways: it is an element of all bodies, for they are substances composed of matter and form; it is a principle of change since from matter form and privation change is derived; it is a cause (i.e., the material cause) of certain results.

But it must also be observed that everything which is any one of these three is not necessarily both of the others also. Since an element is a component in a thing, anything that is an extrinsic principle or cause cannot be an element. Thus the action of one body upon another is a cause and a principle but not an element. Referring to these distinctions, Aquinas declares that *prime*, i.e., is a wider term than *cause* just as *cause* is more common than *element*. The chapters on CAUSE and PRINCIPLE tend to substantiate this observation about the scope of these ideas in the tradition of western thought.

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tive indivisibility. The atom is the least quantity of matter. It cannot be broken into quantitative parts. The elementary body is not atomic. It is always capable of division into smaller units, but all of these units must be of the same kind as the elementary body undergoing division.

The element is indivisible only in the sense that it cannot be decomposed into other kind of matter as a mixed body can be decomposed into its diverse elements. The atom can not be divided in any way. Only compound bodies can be divided into their constituent atoms, all of which are alike in kind, differing only quantitatively—in size, shape, or weight. Different kinds of matter occur only on the level of compounds and as the result of diverse combinations of atoms.

This last point indicates another contrast between atoms and elements in ancient physical theory. The elements are defined, as we have seen, by their qualitative differences from one another, or more strictly according to combinations of elementary sensible qualities—hot and cold, moist and dry. By virtue of the qualities peculiar to them, the four elements stand in a certain order to one another. Water and air, according to Plato, are in the mean between fire and earth, and have the same proportion so far as possible as fire is to air, so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth. The quality which two of the elements have in common produces the mean. Thus fire and air are joined by the common quality of hot, and air and water by moist, and water and earth by cold.

When their analysis reached its greatest refinement, the ancients recognized that the earth, air, fire, and water of common experience do not actually have the purity requisite for element. They are not simple but blended. Aristotle writes, and while the elements are indeed similar in nature to them, [they] are not identical with them. The element corresponding to fire is such as fire, not fire, that which corresponds to air is such as air, and so on with the rest of them. Thus the four elements are only analogous to, for they are purer than ordinary earth, air, fire, and water, yet their names continued to be used as symbols for the true elements, a connotation which is

still retained when we speak of men struggling against or battling with the elements.

IT WILL NO DOUBT be a matter of surprise Lavoisier writes in the Preface to his *Elements of Chemistry*, that in a treatise upon the elements of chemistry there should be no chapter on the constituent and elementary parts of matter, but I shall take occasion in this place to remark that the fondness for reducing all the bodies in nature to three or four elements proceeds from a prejudice which has descended to us from the Greek philosophers. The notion of four elements, which by the variety of their proportions compose all the known substances in nature, is a mere hypothesis, assumed long before the first principles of experimental philosophy or of chemistry had any existence.

This does not mean that Lavoisier entirely rejects the notion of elements in chemical analysis. On the contrary, he says that we must admit as elements all the substances into which we are capable by any means to reduce bodies by decomposition. His quarrel with the ancients chiefly concerns two points. The first is on the number of the elements, which he thinks experiment has shown to be much greater than the four of classical theory. The second is on the simplicity of the experimentally discovered elements. They can be called atoms or simple bodies only if we do not thereby imply that we know them to be absolutely indivisible—either qualitatively or quantitatively. We are not entitled to affirm that these substances we consider as simple may not be compounded of two or even of a greater number of principles, merely because we have not yet discovered the means of separating them.

In modern physics and chemistry, the distinction between element and atom seems to be abolished. The same unit of matter is at once both an atom and an element. The table of atomic weights is also a chart of the elements. The classification of atoms is both quantitative and qualitative—qualitative in the sense that the atoms of different elementary kinds of matter differ in their active properties.

According to the ancient meaning of the terms, the molecule would seem to be both a mixture and a compound—mixed in that it can

THE BASIC ISSUES concerning elements occur in the analysis of matter. Before Plato and Aristotle the early Greek physicists had asked such questions as: From what do all things come? Of what are all things made? A number of answers were given ranging from one kind of ultimate such as earth or fire through a small set of ultimate kinds to an infinite variety. The classical theory of the four elements is the middle answer avoiding the extremes of unity and infinity.

According to Galen it was Hippocrates who first took in hand to demonstrate that there are in all four mutually interacting qualities and who provided at least the beginnings of the proofs to which Aristotle later set his hand in developing the theory of the four elements. Galen also indicates that it was a subject of controversy among the ancients whether the substances as well as the qualities of the four elements undergo this intimate mingling from which results the genesis and destruction of all things that come into and pass out of being.

Aristotle in his treatise *On Generation and Corruption* enumerates the various senses in which the physicist considers elements. We have to recognize three originative sources (or elements): he writes firstly that which is potentially perceptible body; secondly the contraries (e.g. heat and cold) and thirdly Fire, Water and the like. The potentially perceptible body is identified with prime matter and since this has no separate existence but is always bound up with a contrary, it can be ruled out from the usual notion of element. The elementary qualities the contraries named secondly are the hot and cold and dry and moist. The so-called elements Fire, Air, Water and Earth are left to the last and are mentioned only thirdly. Aristotle says because they change into one another whereas the contraries do not change.

The elementary qualities attach themselves by couples to the apparently simple bodies. In consequence Aristotle writes: Fire is hot and dry whereas Air is hot and moist and Water is cold and moist while Earth is cold and dry. Each of them however is characterized *par excellence* by a single quality.

In terms of these simple bodies and the elementary qualities all other material things can be explained.

In contrast to the elements stand the mixed or compound bodies in the constitution of which two or more elements combine. There may be many kinds of mixed bodies but none is irreducible in kind as are the four elements: any mixed body can be divided into the different kinds of elementary bodies which compose it whereas the elementary bodies cannot be divided into parts which are different in kind from themselves. A living body for example may contain parts of earth and water but the parts of earth are earth the parts of water water.

It is precisely the mode of divisibility that Aristotle declares is the fundamental question. In answering this question he opposes the theory of the four elements to another Greek account of the constitution of matter—the atomic theory developed by Leucippus and Democritus and expounded for us in Lucretius' poem *On the Nature of Things*.

According to the Greek atomists matter is not infinitely divisible. If nature had set no limit to the breaking of things Lucretius writes by this time the bodies of matter could have been so far reduced that nothing could within a fixed time be conceived out of them and reach its utmost growth of being. There must then be a fixed limit to their breaking—a limit in physical division which ultimately reaches units of matter that are absolutely indivisible. Lucretius calls them first beginnings of solid singleness not compounded out of a union of parts but rather strong in everlasting singleness—the seed of things or atoms. The Greek word from which atom comes literally means *uncuttable*.

From this it is evident that Aristotle can deny the existence of atoms while at the same time he affirms the existence of elementary bodies. The elements unlike the atoms are not conceived as indivisible in quantity but only as incapable of division into diverse kinds of matter.

In the Greek conception of atom and element the difference between them lies in this distinction between quantitative and qualitative

stances of nature and the indestructibility of matter depend on the absolute solidity and impenetrability of matter's ultimate parts. The negative arguments of Aristotle and Descartes proceed from the divisibility of whatever is continuous to the conclusion that any unit of matter must have parts.

The philosophical doctrine of atomism in the form in which Lucretius adopts it from Epicurus insists upon void as the other basic principle of the universe. Nature, he writes, is founded on two things: there are bodies and there is void in which these bodies are placed and through which they move about. Compound bodies are divisible because the atoms of which they are composed are not absolutely continuous with one another but are separated by void or empty space. That is why they are not solid or impenetrable as are the atomic particles which are composed of matter entirely without void. In Newton's language hardness must be reckoned the property of all un-compounded matter for if compound bodies are so extremely hard as we find some of them to be and yet are very porous, how much harder must be simple particles which are void of pores.

The opponents of atomism tend to deny the existence not only of atoms but of the void as well. Descartes for example denies that there can be any atoms or parts of matter which are indivisible of their own nature. For how ever small the parts are supposed to be yet because they are necessarily extended they are always able in thought to divide any one of them into two or more parts. For the same reason he maintains there cannot be a space in which there is no substance because the extension of space or internal place is not different from that of body. The physical world of this view is conceived as what the ancients called a plenum continuously filled with matter. This controversy over void and plenum is labored in the chapter on SPACE.

Although he uses the language of the atomists, Faraday seems to agree with Descartes rather than with Newton. He pictures matter as continuous throughout with no distinction between its atoms and any intervening space. Atoms, he thinks, instead of being absolutely hard are highly elastic and they are

all mutually penetrable. He compares the combination and separation of two atoms with the conjunction of two sea waves of different velocities into one their perfect union for a time and final separation into the constituent waves. Such a view of the constitution of matter Faraday writes, leads to the conclusion that matter fills all space or at least all space to which gravitation extends.

The very continuity—the voidlessness or lack of pores—which the opponents of atomism insist is the source of matter's infinite divisibility the atomists seem to give as the reason why the ultimate particles are without parts hence simple solid and indivisible.

ON STILL OTHER POINTS there is disagreement among the atomists themselves. Not all of them go to the extreme of denying existence or reality to anything immaterial nor do all insist that whatever exists is either an atom or made up of atoms and void. In the tradition of the great books the extreme doctrine is found in Lucretius alone. Though it is shared by Hobbes and is reflected in the *Leviathan* it is not expounded there. It is developed in his treatise *Concerning Body*.

For Lucretius the atoms are eternal as well as indestructible. The first beginnings of all other things are themselves without beginning. In time gone by Lucretius writes they moved in the same way in which now they move and will ever hereafter be borne along in like manner through an endless succession of worlds: each of which comes to be through a concourse of atoms each in turn perishing, as with decay that concourse is dissolved. Newton writes in what seems to be a contrary vein. It seems probable to me he says that God in the beginning formed matter in solid massy hard impenetrable movable particles. All material things, he continues, seem to have been composed of the hard and solid particles above mentioned variously associated in the first Creation by the counsel of an intelligent Agent.

Nor does Newton appeal to the properties and motions of the ultimate particles except to explain the characteristics and laws of the physical world. Unlike Lucretius and Hobbes he does not—and there seems to be some evidence

be broken up into other *kinds* of matter *compound* in that it can be divided into *smaller* units of matter. But in modern theory the meanings of compound and mixture have also changed, the molecule being classified as a compound rather than a mixture. The combination of the elements to form molecular compounds is determined by the proportion of their weights or valences rather than by a fusion of their qualities.

The most radical change in theory is not this, however, nor is it the increase in the number of the elements from four to more than ninety-four, nor the ordering of the elements by reference to their atomic weights rather than by the contrariety of their qualities. It results from the discovery that an atom is not uncuttable and that new elements can be produced by atomic fission. Faraday's experimental work in ionization and in electrochemical decomposition lies at the beginning of the physical researches which have penetrated the interior structure of the atom and isolated smaller units of matter. Even before atoms were experimentally exploded, analysis had pictured them as constituted by positive and negative charges.

As the result of his researches Faraday, for example, conceives of atoms as mere centres of forces or powers, not particles of matter in which the powers themselves reside. The atom thus ceases to be a little unchangeable impenetrable piece of matter and consists of the powers it exercises. What was ordinarily referred to under the term *shape* becomes the disposition and relative intensity of the forces that are observed.

With Faraday it is evident that the meaning of atom has departed far from the sense in which Lucretius speaks of units of solid singleness or Newton of solid massy hard impenetrable movable particles, incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear or break in pieces, no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation. With the conception of the elements as different kinds of atoms, then, with the discovery of radio-active elements undergoing slow disintegration, finally with the production of isotopes and new elements through

atomic change, the meaning of 'element' has moved equally far from its original sense.

Do these altered meanings change the basic issues in the philosophy of nature? Are these issues resolved or rendered meaningless by experimental science?

The central point in the theory of elements is an irreducible qualitative diversity in kinds of matter. The elements of modern chemistry may no longer be *elementary* types of matter in the strict sense of the word, but the kind of difference which would be strictly elemental may be found in the distinction of the positive, the negative, and the neutral with respect to the electrical charge of sub-atomic particles.

Similarly, the central point in atomism as a philosophy of nature is the existence of absolutely indivisible units or quanta of matter. In other words, the denial that matter is infinitely divisible, that any particle, no matter how small, is capable of being broken into smaller parts. The strict conception of the atom is therefore not invalidated by the experimental discovery that the particles called atoms are not *atomic*, that they are themselves complex structures of moving particles and that they can be physically divided.

It makes no difference to the philosophical atomist whether the particles which constitute molecules or the particles—the electrons and protons, the neutrons and mesons—which constitute atoms—are *atomic*. Even if further experimental work should succeed in dividing these sub-atomic particles, the question could still be asked: Is matter infinitely divisible regardless of our actual power to continue making divisions *ad infinitum*? Since the question when thus formulated cannot be put to experimental test, the issue concerning atoms would remain.

That issue would not refer to any particle of matter defined at a certain stage of physical analysis or experimental discovery. It would consist in the opposition of two views of the nature of matter and the constitution of the material universe: the affirmation on the one hand that truly atomic particles must exist, and the denial on the other that no particle of matter can be atomic. The affirmative arguments of Lucretius and Newton make the con-

stances of nature and the indestructibility of matter depend on the absolute solidity and impenetrability of matter's ultimate parts. The negative arguments of Aristotle and Descartes proceed from the divisibility of whatever is continuous to the conclusion that any unit of matter must have parts.

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Nor does Newton appeal to the properties and motions of the ultimate particles except to explain the characteristics and laws of the physical world. Unlike Lucretius and Hobbes, he does not—and there seems to be some evidence

in the *Optics* that he would not—reduce the soul of man to a flow of extremely mobile atoms or attempt to account for all psychological phenomena (thought as well as sensation and memory) in terms of atom buffeting atom

The atomic theory of the cause of sensation is not limited to the materialists. Writers like Locke who conceive man as having a spiritual nature as well as a body adopt an atomistic view of the material world. The different motions and figures bulk and number of such particles, he writes, affecting the several organs of our senses produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and

smells of bodies. Furthermore the distinction which is here implicit—between primary and secondary sense qualities—is not peculiar to atomism. It can also be found in a critic of atomism like Descartes.

The atomistic account of sensation is nevertheless of critical significance in the controversy concerning this type of materialism. Critics of atomism have contended that the truth of atomism as a materialistic philosophy can be no greater than the measure of its success in explaining sensation—the source upon which the atomist himself relies for his knowledge of nature—in terms of the properties and motions of particles themselves imperceptible.

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Il ad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SETTING. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53] *IES Psychol gy* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BOOK, CHAPTER, SECTION) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Il ad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. These refer to a book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. *Old Testament* *Lehemah* 7-45-(D) *II End* as 7-46.

SOURCE. The abbreviation on the left of the reference signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk I ch I [181^b 10]-ch 2 [184^b 4] 259a-c ch 4-9 262a 268d / *Heavens* bk III 1 389b d 405a e / *Generation and Corruption* 409a-441a esp bk II ch I 3 428b d 431a / *Meteorology* 445a-494d
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3c The mutability of the elements their transmutation

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

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Chapter 22. EMOTION

INTRODUCTION

THE emotions claim our attention in two ways. We experience them sometimes in a manner which overwhelms us and we analyze them by defining and classifying the several passions and by studying their role in human life and society. We seldom do both at once for analysis requires emotional detachment and moments of passion do not permit study or reflection.

With regard to the emotions the great books are similarly divided into two sorts—those which are theoretical discussions and those which concretely describe the passions of particular men exhibit their vigor and induce in us a vicarious experience. Books of the first sort are scientific, philosophical or theological treatises. Books of the second sort are the great epic and dramatic poems, the novels and plays, the literature of biography and history.

We customarily think of the emotions as belonging to the subject matter of psychology—proper to the science of animal and human behavior. It is worth noting therefore that this is largely a recent development which appears in the works of Darwin, James and Freud. In earlier centuries, the analysis of the passions occurs in other contexts: in treatments of rhetoric as in certain dialogues of Plato and in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; in the Greek discussions of virtue and vice; in the moral theology of Aquinas and in Spinoza's *Ethics*; and in books of political theory such as Machiavelli's *Prince* and Hobbes' *Leviathan*.

Descartes' treatise on *The Passions of the Soul* is probably one of the first discourses on the subject to be separated from the practical considerations of oratory, morals, and politics. Only subsequently do the emotions become an object of purely theoretical interest in psychology. But even then the interest of the psychiatrist or

psychoanalyst—to the extent that it is medical or therapeutic—has a strong practical bent.

In the great works of poetry and history no similar shift takes place as one goes from Homer and Virgil to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, from Greek to Shakespearean tragedy, from Plutarch and Tacitus to Gibbon. What Wordsworth said of the lyric poem—that it is emotion recollected in tranquillity—may not apply to the narratives in an identical sense. Yet they too re-enact the passions in all their vitality. Their pages are filled with the emotions of men in conflict with one another or suffering conflict within themselves.

This is no less true of historical narrative than of fiction. The memorable actions of men on the stage of history did not occur in calm and quiet. We would certainly not remember them as well if the historian failed to re-create for us the turbulence of crisis and catastrophe or the biographer the storm and stress which accompany the upward resolution of heroic lives.

It is impossible of course to cite all the relevant passages of poetry and history. In many instances, nothing less than a whole book would suffice. The particular references given in this chapter which are far from exhaustive have been selected for their peculiar exemplary significance in relation to a particular topic, but for the whole range of topics connected with emotion the reader should certainly seek further in the realms of history and poetry for the raw materials which the scientists and philosophers have tried to analyze and understand.

To the student of the emotions Bacon recommends the poets and writers of histories as "the best doctors of this knowledge" where we may find painted forth with "great life" how affections are kindled and ignited and how pacified and restrained and how again contained from act and further degree, how they

disclose themselves how they work how they vary how they gather and fortify how they are enwrapped one within another and how they do fight and encounter one with another and other like particularities

FOUR WORDS—passion affection or affect and emotion—have been traditionally used to designate the same psychological fact. Of these, affection and affect have ceased to be generally current although we do find them in Freud and passion is now usually restricted to mean one of the emotions or the more violent aspect of any emotional experience. But if we are to connect discussions collected from widely separated centuries we must be able to use all these words interchangeably.

The psychological fact to which they all refer is one every human being has experienced in moments of great excitement especially during intense seizure by rage or fear. In his treatise *On the Circulation of the Blood* Harvey calls attention to the fact that in almost every affection appetite hope or fear our body suffers the countenance changes and the blood appears to course hither and thither. In anger the eyes are fiery and the pupils contracted in modesty the cheeks are suffused with blushes in fear and under a sense of infamy and of shame the face is pale and in lust how quickly is the member distended with blood and erected!

Emotional experience seems to involve an awareness of widespread bodily commotion which includes changes in the tension of the blood vessels and the muscles changes in heart beat and breathing changes in the condition of the skin and other tissues. Though some degree of bodily disturbance would seem to be an essential ingredient in all emotional experience the intensity and extent of the physiological reverberation or bodily commotion is not the same or equal in all the emotions. Some emotions are much more violent than others. This leads William James to distinguish what he calls the coarser emotions in which every one recognizes a strong organic reverberation from the subtler emotions in which the organic reverberation is less obvious and strong.

This fact is sometimes used to draw the line between what are truly emotions and what are

only mild feelings of pleasure and pain or even during sentiments. Nevertheless sentiments may be emotional residues—stable attitudes which pervade a life even during moments of emotional detachment and calm—and pleasure and pain may color all the emotions. Pleasure and pain Locke suggests are the hinges on which our passions turn. Even though they may not be passions in the strict sense they are obviously closely connected with them.

THAT THE EMOTIONS are organic disturbances upsetting the normal course of the body's functioning is sometimes thought to be a modern discovery connected with the James Lange theory that the emotional experience is nothing but the feeling of the bodily changes which follow directly the perception of the exciting fact. On this view the explanation of emotion seems to be the very opposite of common sense which says we meet a bear are frightened and run. According to James this order of sequence is incorrect and the more rational statement is that we feel afraid because we tremble. In other words we do not run away because we are afraid but are afraid because we run away.

This fact about the emotions was known to antiquity and the Middle Ages. Aristotle for example holds that mere awareness of an object does not induce flight unless the heart is moved and Aquinas declares that passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. He describes at some length the bodily changes which take place in anger and fear. Only very recently however have apparatus and techniques been devised for recording and in some cases measuring the physiological changes accompanying experimentally produced emotions—in both animals and men.

Modern theory also tries to throw some light on these organic changes by pointing out their adaptive utility in the struggle for existence. This type of explanation is advanced by Darwin in *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* and is adopted by other evolutionists. The snarl or sneer the one-sided uncovering of the upper teeth James writes is accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the time when our ancestors had large canines and unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for attack.

The distention of the nostrils in anger is interpreted by Spencer as an echo of the way in which our ancestors had to breathe when in combat their mouth was filled up by a part of the antagonist's body that had been seized.

The reddening of the face and neck is called by Wundt a compensatory arrangement for relieving the brain of the blood pressure which the simultaneous excitement of the heart brings with it. The effusion of tears is explained both by this author and by Darwin to be a blood-withdrawing agency of a similar sort.

Reviewing statements of this sort James is willing to concede that some movements of expression can be accounted for as *weakened repetitions of movements which formerly (when they were stronger) were of utility to the subject* but though we may thus see the reason for a few emotional reactions he thinks

others remain for which no plausible reason can even be conceived. The latter James suggests, may be reactions which are purely mechanical results of the way in which our nervous centres are framed: reactions which although permanent in us now may be called *accidental* as far as their origin goes.

Whether or not *all* the bodily changes which occur in such emotions as anger or fear serve the purpose of increasing the animal's efficiency in combat or flight—as for example the increase of sugar in the blood and the greater supply of blood to arms and legs seem to do—the basic emotions are generally thought to be connected with the instinctively determined pattern of behavior by which animals struggle to survive. The actions we call *instinctive* James writes are expressions or manifestations of the emotions or as other writers suggest an emotion whether in outward expression or in inner experience is the central phase of an instinct in operation.

The observation of the close relation between instinct and emotion does not belong exclusively to modern or post-Darwinian thought. The ancients also recognized it though in different terms. Following Aristotle's analysis of the inferior senses Aquinas for example speaks of the estimative power by which animals seem to be innately prepared to react to things useful or harmful.

If an animal were moved by pleasing and

disagreeable things only as affecting the sense—that is the exterior senses—there would be no need to suppose. Aquinas writes that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive and in which the animal takes pleasure or from which it shrinks with horror. But animals need to seek or avoid certain things on account of their advantages or disadvantages and such emotional reactions of approach or avoidance require in his opinion a sense of the useful and the dangerous which is innate rather than learned. The estimative power thus seems to play a role which later writers assign to instinct. The relation of instinct to the emotions and to fundamental biological needs is further considered from other points of view in the chapters on *Desire* and *Habit*.

Like *desire* emotion is neither knowledge nor action but something intermediate between the one and the other. The various passions are usually aroused by objects perceived, imagined or remembered and once aroused they in turn originate impulses to act in certain ways. For example fear arises with the perception of a threatening danger or with the imagination of some fancied peril. The thing feared is somehow recognized as capable of inflicting injury with consequent pain. The thing feared is also something from which one naturally tends to flee in order to avoid harm. Once the danger is known and until it is avoided by flight or in some other way the characteristic feeling of fear pervades the whole experience. It is partly a result of what is known and what is done and partly the cause of how things seem and how one behaves.

Analytically isolated from its causes and effects the emotion itself seems to be the feeling rather than the knowing or the doing. But it is not simply an awareness of a certain bodily condition. It also involves the felt impulse to do something about the object of the passion.

Those writers who like Aquinas identify emotion with the impulse by which the soul is drawn to a thing define the several passions as specifically different acts of appetite or desire—specific tendencies to action. Aquinas for instance adopts the definition given by Damascene: *Passion is a movement of the sensi-*

tive appetite when we imagine good or evil

Other writers who like Spinoza find that the order of the actions and passions of our body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind stress the cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of emotion. They accordingly define the passions in terms of the characteristic feelings pleasant and unpleasant which flow from the estimation of certain objects as beneficial or harmful. Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he says that "an affect or passion of the mind is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before."

There seems to be no serious issue here for writers of both sorts acknowledge though with different emphasis the two sides of an emotion—the cognitive and the impulsive—that which faces toward the object and that which leads into action. On either view the human passions are regarded as part of man's animal nature. It is generally admitted that disembodied spirits if such exist cannot have emotions. The angels Augustine writes "feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger." When we do ascribe emotions to spirits it is Augustine claims because "though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us."

In connection with the objects which arouse them the emotions necessarily depend upon the senses and the imagination and their perturbations and impulses require bodily organs for expression. That is why as indicated in the chapter on DESIRE some writers separate the passions from acts of the will as belonging to the sensitive or animal appetite rather than to the rational or specifically human appetite. Even those writers who do not place so high an estimate on the role of reason refer the emotions to the animal aspect of human behavior or to what is sometimes called man's lower nature. When this phrase is used it usually signifies the passions as opposed to the reason, not the purely vegetative functions which man shares with plants as well as animals.

There seems to be no doubt that emotions

are common to men and animals and that they are more closely related to instinct than to reason or intelligence. Darwin presents many instances which he claims prove that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc. of which man boasts may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well developed condition in the lower animals. Where Darwin remarks upon the fewness and the comparative simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals in contrast with those of the lower animals, James takes the position that man is the animal richest in instinctive impulses. However that issue is decided, the emotions seem to be more elaborately developed in the higher animals and man's emotional life would seem to be the most complex and varied of all.

The question then arises whether particular passions are identical—or are only analogous—when they occur in men and animals. For example, is human anger, no matter how closely it resembles brute rage in its physiology and impulses nevertheless peculiarly human? Do men alone experience righteous indignation because of some admixture in them of reason and passion? When similar questions are asked about the sexual passions of men and animals, the answers will determine the view one takes of the characteristically human aspects of love and hate. It may even be asked whether hate as men suffer it is ever experienced by brutes or whether certain passions such as hope and despair are known to brutes at all?

IN THE TRADITIONAL theory of the emotions the chief problem after the definition of emotion is the classification or grouping of the passions and the ordering of particular passions. The vocabulary of common speech in all ages and cultures includes a large number of words for naming emotions and it has been the task of analysts to decide which of these words designate distinct affects or affections. The precise character of the object and the direction of the impulse have been for the most part the criteria of definition. As previously noted it is but recently that the experimental observation of bodily changes has contributed to the differentiation of emotions from one another.

Spinoza offers the longest listing of the passions. For him the emotions, which are all "compounded of the three primary affects, desire joy and sorrow" develop into the following forms: astonishment, contempt, love, hatred, inclination, aversion, devotion, derision, hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness, remorse, commiseration, favor, indignation, over-estimation, envy, compassion, self-satisfaction, humility, repentance, pride, despondency, self-exaltation, shame, regret, emulation, gratitude, benevolence, anger, vengeance, ferocity, audacity, consternation, courtship, ambition, luxuriosity, drunkenness, aversion, lust.

Many of the foregoing are for Hobbes, derived from what he calls "the simple passions," which include appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. There are more emotions in Spinoza's list than either Aristotle or Locke or James mentions, but none which they include is omitted. Some of the items in Spinoza's enumeration are treated by other writers as virtues and vices rather than as passions.

The passions have been classified by reference to various criteria. As we have seen, James distinguishes emotions as "coarse or subtle" in terms of the violence or mildness of the accompanying physiological changes, and Spinoza distinguishes them according as the mind passes to a greater perfection or to a less perfection. Spinoza's division would also seem to imply a distinction between the beneficial and the harmful in the objects causing these two types of emotion, or at least to involve the opposite components of pleasure and pain. For in his view the emotions which correspond to a greater or less power of existence than before are attended in the one case by "pleasurable excitement" and in the other by pain.

Hobbes uses another principle of division. The passions differ basically according to the direction of their impulses—according as each is a motion or endeavor "to or from the object moving." Aquinas adds still another criterion—the difficulty or struggle in acquiring certain goods or in avoiding certain evils, which in contrast to those we can easily acquire or avoid makes them, therefore, "of an arduous or difficult nature." In these terms, he divides all the passions into the "concupiscible" which regard "good or evil

simply (i.e. love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sorrow) and the "irascible" which regard good or evil as arduous through being difficult to obtain or avoid (i.e. fear, daring, hope, despair, anger).

Within each of these groups, Aquinas pairs particular passions as opposites, such as joy and sorrow or hope and despair either according to the contrariety of object (i.e., of good and evil) or according to approach and withdrawal. Anger seems to be the only passion for which no opposite can be given other than that cessation from its movement which Aristotle calls "calmness" and which Aquinas says is an opposite not by way of contrariety but of negation or privation.

Using these distinctions Aquinas also describes the order in which one passion leads to or generates another, beginning with love and hate passing through hope, desire, and fear with their opposites, and after anger ending in joy or despair. On one point all observers and theorists from Plato to Freud seem to agree, namely, that love and hate lie at the root of all the other passions and generate hope or despair, fear and anger according as the aspirations of love prosper or fail. Nor is this the only point that even hate derives from love peculiarly modern, though Freud's theory of what he calls the "ambivalence of love and hate toward the same object" seems to be part of his own special contribution to our understanding of the passions.

THE ROLE OF THE emotions or passions in human behavior has always raised two questions, one concerning the effect of conflict between diverse emotions, the other concerning the conflict between the passions and the reason or will. It is the latter question which has been of the greatest interest to moralists and statesmen.

Even though human emotions may have instinctive origin and be innately determined, man's emotional responses seem to be subject to voluntary control, so that men are able to form or change their emotional habits. If this were not so, there could be no moral problem of the regulation of the passions nor for that matter could there be a medical problem of therapy for emotional disorders. The psychoanalytic treatment of neuroses seems, more-

tive appetite when we imagine good or evil

Other writers who like Spinoza find that the order of the actions and passions of our body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind stress the cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of emotion. They accordingly define the passions in terms of the characteristic feelings pleasant and unpleasant which flow from the estimation of certain objects as beneficial or harmful. Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he says that an affect or passion of the mind is a *confused idea by which the mind affirms of it body or any part of it a greater or less power of existence than before*.

There seems to be no serious issue here for writers of both sorts acknowledge though with different emphasis the two sides of an emotion—the cognitive and the impulsive—that which faces toward the object and that which leads into action. On either view the human passions are regarded as part of man's animal nature. It is generally admitted that disembodied spirits if such exist cannot have emotions. The angels Augustine writes feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment no fellow feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable no fear while they aid those who are in danger. When we do ascribe emotions to spirits it is Augustine claims because though they have none of our weakness their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us.

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for express Δ emotional drives in action the ego supported by the super-ego represses the emotional or instinctual impulses, that is prevents them from expressing themselves overtly

Freud's great insight is that emotions repressed do not atrophy and disappear. On the contrary their dammed up energies accumulate and like a core they fester inwardly. Together with related ideas, memories and wishes the repressed emotions form what Freud calls a complex, which is not only the active nucleus of emotional disorder but also the cause of neurotic symptoms and behavior—phobias and anxieties, obsessions or compulsions and the various physical manifestations of hysteria such as a blindness or a paralysis that has no organic basis.

The line between the neurotic and the normal is shadowy for repressed emotional complexes are according to Freud also responsible for the hidden or latent psychological significance of slips of speech, forgetting the content of dreams, occupational or marital choices and a wide variety of other phenomena usually regarded as accidental or as rationally determined. In fact Freud sometimes goes to the extreme of insisting that all apparently rational processes—both of thought and decision—are themselves emotionally determined and that most or all reasoning is nothing but the rationalization of emotionally fixed prejudices or beliefs. The ego, he writes, is after all only a part of the id, a part purposely modified by its proximity to the dangers of reality.

The ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion seems to be in essential agreement with the insight that emotions can control the course of thinking. But at the same time it denies that all thinking is necessarily dominated by the passions. The sort of thinking which is free from emotional bias or domination may result in knowledge if reason itself is not defective in its processes. But the sort of thinking which is directed and determined by the passions must result in opinion. The former is reasoning, the latter what Freud calls rationalization or sometimes wishful thinking.

BUT CAN THEY be ordered when they get out of order? The emotions raise problems for both medicine and morals. Whether or not

there is a fundamental opposition between the medical and the moral approaches to the problem whether psychotherapy is needed only when morality has failed, whether morality is itself partly responsible for the disorders which psychotherapy must cure, the difference between the medical and the moral approaches is clear. Medically emotional disorders call for diagnosis and therapy. Morally they call for criticism and correction.

Human bondage according to Spinoza consists in the impotence of man to govern or restrain the affects. For a man who is under their control is not his own master. A free man he describes as one who lives according to the dictates of reason alone and he tries to show how much reason itself can control the affects to achieve what he calls freedom of mind or blessedness. While moralists tend to agree on this point they do not all offer the same prescription for establishing the right relation between man's higher and lower natures.

The issue which arises here is also discussed in the chapters on *Desire* and *Duty*. It exists between those who think that the passions are intrinsically evil, the natural enemies of a good will, and those who think that the passions represent a natural desire for certain goods which belong to the happy life or a natural aversion for certain evils.

Those who like the Stoics and Kant tend to adopt the former view recommend a policy of attention toward the passions. Their force must be attenuated in order to emancipate reason from their influence and to protect the will from their seductions. Nothing is lost according to this theory if the passions atrophy and die. But if according to the opposite doctrine the passions have a natural place in the moral life then the aim should be not to dispossess them entirely but to keep them in their place. Aristotle therefore recommends a policy of moderation. The passions can be made to serve reason's purposes by restraining them from excesses and by directing their energies to ends which reason approves.

As Aristotle conceives them, certain of the virtues—especially temperance and courage—are stable emotional attitudes, or *habits* of emotional response which conform to reason and

over to assume the possibility of a voluntary or even a rational resolution of emotional conflicts—not perhaps without the aid of therapeutic efforts to uncover the sources of conflict and to remove the barriers between repressed emotion and rational decision.

The relation of the passions to the will especially their antagonism is relevant to the question whether the actions of men always conform to their judgments of good and evil or right and wrong. As Socrates discusses the problem of knowledge and virtue it would seem to be his view that a man who knows what is good for him will act accordingly. Men may desire things which they imagine to be good he says—but which in reality are evil. Hence their misconduct will be due to a mistaken judgment not to a discrepancy between action and thought. Eliminating the case of erroneous judgment Socrates gets Meno to admit that no man wills or chooses anything evil.

Aristotle criticizes the Socratic position which he summarizes in the statement that no one

when he judges acts against what he judges best—people act badly only by reason of ignorance. According to Aristotle this view plainly contradicts the observed facts. Yet he admits that whatever a man does must at least seem good to him at the moment and to that extent the judgment that something is good or bad would seem to determine action accordingly. In his analysis of incontinence Aristotle tries to explain how a man may act against what is his better judgment and yet at the moment of action seek what he holds to be good.

Action may be caused either by a rational judgment concerning what is good or by an emotional estimate of the desirable. If these two factors are independent of one another—more than that if they can tend in opposite directions—then a man may act under emotional persuasion at one moment in a manner contrary to his rational predilection at another. That a man may act either emotionally or rationally Aristotle thinks explains how under strong emotional influences a man can do the very opposite of what his reason would tell him is right or good. The point is that while the emotions dominate his mind and action he does not listen to reason.

These matters are further discussed in the chapter on TEMPERANCE. But it should be noted here that the passions and the reason or the lower and the higher natures of man, are not always in conflict. Sometimes emotions or emotional attitudes serve reason by supporting voluntary decisions. They reinforce and make effective moral resolutions which might otherwise be too difficult to execute.

THE ANCIENTS DID NOT underestimate the force of the passions nor were they too confident of the strength of reason in its struggle to control them or to be free of them. They were acquainted with the violence of emotional excess which they called madness or frenzy. So too were the theologians of the Middle Ages and modern philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes. But not until Freud—and perhaps also William James though to a lesser extent—do we find in the tradition of the great books insight into the pathology of the passions, the origin of emotional disorders and the general theory of the neuroses and neurotic character as the consequence of emotional repression.

For Freud the primary fact is not the conflict between reason and emotion or in his language between the *ego* and the *id*. It is rather the repression which results from such conflict. On the one side is the *ego* which stands for reason and circumspection and has the task of representing the external world or expressing what Freud calls the reality principle. Associated with the *ego* is the super-*ego*—the vehicle of the *ego* ideal by which the *ego* measures itself towards which it strives and whose demands for ever increasing perfection it is always striving to fulfill. On the other side is the *id* which stands for the untamed passions and is the source of instinctual life.

The *ego* according to Freud is constantly attempting to mediate between the *id* and reality and to measure up to the ideal set by the super-*ego* so as to dethrone the pleasure-principle which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the *id* and substitute for it the reality principle which promises greater security and greater success. But sometimes it fails in this task. Sometimes when no socially acceptable channels of behavior are available

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The nature and causes of the emotions or passions
 - 1a Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain
 - 1b Bodily changes during emotional excitement
 - 1c Instinctive emotional reactions in animals and men
- 2 The classification and enumeration of the emotions
 - 2a Definitions of particular passions
 - 2b The order and connection of the passions
 - 2c The opposition of particular emotions to one another
- 3 The disorder or pathology of the passions
 - 3a Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess: excessively emotional or emotionally over-determined behavior
 - 3b Rationalization or the emotional determination of thought
 - 3c Particular emotional disorders: psychoneuroses due to repression
 - (1) Hysterias
 - (2) Obsessions and compulsions
 - (3) Phobias and anxieties
 - (4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses
 - 3d The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders
- 4 The moral consideration of the passions
 - 4a The conflict between reason and emotion
 - (1) The force of the passions
 - (2) The strength of reason or will
 - 4b The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason
 - (1) Moderation of the passions by reason: virtue, continence, abstinence of sin
 - (2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason
 - 4c The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition
- 5 The political consideration of the passions
 - 5a The causes of political association: fear or need
 - 5b The acquisition and retention of power: love or fear
 - 5c The coercive force of law: fear of punishment
 - 5d The devices of orators: emotional persuasion
 - 5e The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions

carry out its rule. The moral virtues require more than a momentary control or moderation of the passions: they require a discipline of them which has become habitual. What Aristotle calls continence as opposed to virtue consists in reason's effort to check emotions which are still unruly because they have not yet become habituated to reason's rule.

The fact of individual differences in temperament is of the utmost importance to the moralist who is willing to recognize that universal moral rules apply to individuals differently according to their temperaments. Both psychologists and moralists have classified men into temperamental types by reference to the dominance or deficiency of certain emotional predispositions in their inherited makeup. These temperamental differences also have a medical or physiological aspect insofar as certain elements in human physique—the four bodily humors of the ancients or the hormones of modern endocrinology—seem to be correlated with types of personality.

ONE OF THE GREAT ISSUES in political theory concerns the role of the passions in human association. Have men banded together to form states because they feared the insecurity and the hazards of natural anarchy and universal war, or because they sought the benefits which only political life could provide? In the political community once it is formed, do love and friendship or distrust and fear determine the relation of fellow citizens or of rulers and ruled? Should the prince or any other man who wishes to get and hold political power try to inspire love or to instill fear in those whom he seeks to dominate? Or are each of these emotions useful for different political purposes and in the handling of different kinds of men?

Considering whether for the success of the prince it is better to be loved than feared or feared than loved, Machiavelli says that one should wish to be both, but because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when of the two either must be dispensed with. Nevertheless, he continues, a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred, because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated.

According to Hobbes, when men enter into a

commonwealth so that they can live peacefully with one another, they are moved partly by reason and partly by their passions. The passions that incline men to peace, he writes, are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. But once a commonwealth is formed, the one passion which seems to be the mainspring of all political activity is a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death, for a man cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he has present, without the acquisition of more.

Not all political thinkers agree with the answers which Machiavelli and Hobbes give on such matters, nor do all make such questions the pivots of their political theory. But there is general agreement that the passions are a force to be reckoned with in the government of men, that the ruler, whether he is despotic prince or constitutional officeholder, must move men through their emotions as well as by appeals to reason.

The two political instruments through which an influence over the emotions is exercised are oratory (now sometimes called propaganda) and law. Both may work persuasively. Laws like other discourses, according to Plato, may have preludes or preambles intended by the legislator to create good will in the persons whom he addresses in order that, by reason of this good will, they will more intelligently receive his command. But the law also carries with it the threat of coercive force. The threat of punishment for disobedience addresses itself entirely to fear, whereas the devices of the orator—or even of the legislator in his preamble—are not so restricted. The orator can play upon the whole scale of the emotions to obtain the actions or decisions at which he aims.

Finally, there is the problem of whether the statesman should exercise political control over other influences which affect the emotional life of a people, especially the arts and public spectacles. The earliest and perhaps the classic statement of this problem is to be found in Plato's *Republic* and in his *Laws*. Considerations relevant to the question he raises, and the implications of diverse solutions of the problem, are discussed in the chapters on ART, LIBERTY, and POETRY.

CHAPTER 27 EMOTION

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14 Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c / *Phaedrus* 220b-
 221 / *Republic* bk iv 352d / *Timaeus* 463d
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8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk iv ch 3 [25th 31]
 1 3a ch 6 [46-3a] 17th b / *Soph.* k i ch
 2 [413th 24] 643d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk ii ch 3 [1st 9-
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12 LEC STICS *Nature of Things* k i [0th
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14 PLAT *Rep* *Coriander* 184 c

17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* 2, tr i ch 15-0
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18 A CUTH *Confession* k iii, par 4 13c
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23 HIL *Levithan* ART I, 61-62c

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35 LOCK *Human Understanding* k ii, ch ix
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53 JAM *Practical Logic* 197 b 391b-392a 39b-
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54 F *Interpretation of Dreams* 378b-d / *In-*
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7 PL *Tr* 143a b *Symposium*, 155c 157 /
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8 A *Topica* *Causae* ch 8 [0th 9-31] 14c
 15a *Soul* k i, h i [4th 3th] 632a-c ch 4

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9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk iv ch i
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10 HIPPOCRATES *Sacred Disease* 158a 159d
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12 LECRITUS *Nature of Things* bk iv [103
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14 PLAT *Ch Democritus* 7-0d 41a

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr i ch 3 108a b /
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL.
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21 R BELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, bk i
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25 MO TAI *De Essent* 3-5b-c 40 b-d

28 HART *Motion of the Heart* 271a-b 283b
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30 B O *Advancement of Learning* 49b-c

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36 STELL *Tristram Shandy* 234 H

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49 D WIL *Descent* f *Max* 274 5-6b

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 198a 327b-328a 694a
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54 F *On Hygiene* 59c / *Interpretation of*
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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Lehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The nature and causes of the emotions or passions

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d BK IV 416b c 421a B / *Timaeus* 466b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b 627c 628a 628d 630c / *Laos* BK IV 748a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK I CH I [403 2-3] 632a-c CH I 4 [408 34 31] 638b d BK III CH I 3 [427 21-24] 660a CH I 9 [432 26-433 2] 665c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH I [692 2-27] 224b B / *Ethics* BK II CH I 5 [1105 19-1106 6] 351b c / *Politics* BK VII CH I 7 [1327 40-1328 18] 532a B / *Rhetoric* BK II CH I [1378 20] CH II [1388 30] 623b 636a
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [136-160] 31d 32a [231-322] 33a 34b
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [724 734] 230b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH I a b CH I 2d 3c CH I 11 4c 5c / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH I 3 4 108a 109b / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH I 8 166d 167b CH 20-21 167d 168c CH 28 172a 173b / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH I 9 22 262a 264c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH I 5 287a 289a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 AA 2 3 4 9c 431d PART II QQ 22-48 720b d 826a c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 82 A 1 ANS 968a 970c Q 86 A 3 ANS and RFP 3 4 994d 996a c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47c-d PART I 61a 65b esp 61a B 68b B 77b-c PART II 152c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 55b B
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 82d 83a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 3 373d PART III 395a 422a c esp 395a d DEF 1 3 395d 396a PROP 1 396a c PROP 3 398b-c PROP 56 414a d THE AFFECTS 416b 422a c PART IV DEF 7 424b PROP 1 4 424c 415d PROP Q-13 426d 428a APPENDIX I B 447a b F R T V AXIOM 2 452c PROP 34 460c d
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX 176b 178a esp SECT 3 176d CH XXXIII SECT 5 15 248d 250c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c d
- 42 KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378b c / *Intro Metaphysics of Morals* 385a d 386b d / *Judgement* 483d 484b 508d [in i]
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 17 69c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b 50a 87b 209a b 327b 328a 738a 766a esp 738a b 742a 746a 758a 759a 761a 765b
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 4d 5a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d / *Repression* 424d 425b Uncon

- 30 SYR *Tristram Shandy* 453a-456a 502a b
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 198d 199 237b-c
 38 WILKINSON *Equality* 345c 346d
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 49 DILLY *Descent of Man* 308d 309a 312b d
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* x. xii 561b
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 717a 736b *passim* esp
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 54 FLETCHER *General Introduction* 558d 607d-609c 612c-614b 623b-c /
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- 7 PLATO *Phileas* 628d-630c
 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk ii c1 7 [1 333^b3]
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 18 ALBERTUS *Confessions* bk i: par 2 4 13c
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* p. xi: q. 82: a
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* t. i 61a-65b esp 61a
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- 24 HOBBS *Leviathan* t. i 61a-65b esp 61a
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- 31 SPINOSA *Ethica* p. ii 395a-422a c p
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- 34 PASCAL *Pensées* 61 221a

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* g. bk ii ch. xx,
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 237b-c

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- 54 FLETCHER *General Introduction* 415d-421 c esp 420c-
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- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 153b-157 / *Phaedrus*
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* 7 [131^b16]
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* bk ii ch. i [13 8^a2]-ch
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- 12 LUTHER *On the Nature of Things* bk [073
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- 18 ALBERTUS *Confessions* bk i: par 7 ii
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 23
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* p. xi: 61b-d 62b-c
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- 31 SPINOSA *Ethica* p. ii: prop. 17 401d-402a
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* g. bk ii ch. vi
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 127b-c

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- 49 DILLY *Descent of Man* 312b d [in 27]
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- 54 FLETCHER *General Introduction* 415d-421a c *passim* esp
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- 3a Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess
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- 4 HESIOD *Works and Days* 1142 [3 7c 2b 1c [189-
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- 5 ARISTOTLE *Chorophore* [1050-1063] 80a-c

- 5 SORANUS *On the Diseases of Women* 143a 155a c esp [182 332]
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- 5 E. REP. DEF. 11 d 212a 224a-c / *Electra* 327a
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- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 95d-98a 103b-d
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- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 2b-c / *Lysis* 14b-15d /
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *De Anima* ii 2 [160^a32 161^b3] 704b-c

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethica* bk vi c1 3 [1147^a14 17]
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- 12 LUTHER *Nature of Things* g. bk iii [31-93]
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- 13 LUTHER *Aeneid* bk iv [16-303] 175a
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- 15 TITUS *Historiae* bk i 206b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 10
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- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 111d 112c esp 112c BK VII 236c
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b esp 158a 159a 165b 166b / *Republic* BK II 320b c / *Laus* BK VI 712b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 27 [70^b6-39] 92c 93a c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH I [524^b17-19] 50c BK V CH 8 [542 17-^b4] 68d 69a CH 18 [550^a29-31] 77b BK VI CH 18-BK VII CH 2 97b 108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 97b 99c BK VII CH I 106b d 108a BK IX CH I [608 21-^b20] 133b d 134a CH 37 [621^b28-622 10] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [679^a3-32] 209a e CH II [69 22 27] 224b c / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 2 [753 6-17] 294a b / *Ethics* BK III CH 8 [1116^b24 1117^a3] 363a b BK VII CH 6 [1149^b24 1150 8] 400b c
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 12 173a e
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH -3 128c d BK III CH 7 183c d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 9 292b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 78 A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 82 AA 2-3 429c-431c Q 96 A 1 REP 2 510b 511b PART I II Q 17 A 2 REP 3 687d 688b Q 40 AA 2-3 793d 795a Q 41 A 1 REP 3 798b d Q 46 A 4 REP 2 815b d A 5 REP 1 815d 816d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [10 75] 80a e
- 24 CHAUCER *Nuns Priest's Tale* [15 282-287] 457b / *Manciple's Tale* [17 104 144] 490a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 184a e
- 28 HARRIS *On Animal Generation* 346a 347d 349a 350a 361b 362a 381b e 402a d 405c 406a 476c 477a
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99d 100a 102b 103a / *Objections and Replies* 156a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 57 SCHOL 415b
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 80 486c d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 343d 346d
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 469c d
- 44 BOSWELL *John* on 124b 174b 347a c 386a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 144a b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 287d 291a esp 289a 291a 304b 313a esp 305c 309a 312b d [fn 27] 371c 372c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 499c 500c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b 51a 198a 199a 204b 211a passim esp 206a 208a 209b 700a 738b esp 717a 731b 734b 735a 738a b
- 54 FELD *General Introduction* 591d 592c 607d 609b esp 608d 609b 613a 615b 616c 623b c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety*

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- 7 PLATO *Philebus* 628d 630c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 5 351b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [13/8 20-30] 623b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 2 429c 430c PART I II Q 33 723c 727a q 24 A 4 729c 730a R 30 A 2 ANS and REP I 749d 750d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 62c-64a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS 416b 422a c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT I-3 176b d SECT 18 178a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 127b 656a 742a 743a 745b 746a 766a

2a *Definitions of particular passions*

- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 103b-d / *Phaedrus* 120a-c / *Symposium* 149a 173a e esp 161d 168a / *Euthyphro* 193d 194b / *Apology* 202a / *Philebus* 628d 630c / *Laus* BK I 650a 651a-c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113 33] 33 158d 159a BK IV CH 5 [125^b28 34] 175a c BK 6 [127^b26-32] 177b CH 13 [151 14 19] 205d 206a BK VIII CH I [156 26-31] 212b c / *Soul* BK I CH I [403 23-33] 632b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 11 [692 23-27] 224b-c / *Ethics* BK III CH 6 [1115 7 14] 361a b CH 8 [1116^b24 1117 3] 363a b BK IV CH 9 [1128^b10-14] 375d 376a BK VIII CH 6 [1158 10-14] 409d 410a BK IX CH 10 [1171 11 13] 424d CH 12 [1171^b29-33] 425d / *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1312^b34 33] 515b / *Rhetoric* BK II CH I [1378 20]-CH II [1388^b30] 623b 646a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 28 172a 173b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 13 11d 12a BK III par 2 13c d BK IV par 7 14 20d 23a esp par 11 21d 22a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 26-48 733d 826a c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a 65b esp 61a 62c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5a 6c 25c 26d 344a 347c 409d 434d passim esp 424d-425a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT III SC III [16 192] 223d 224a [322 357] 25c 226a SC IV [155 162] 229a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP II-59 399d 416b THE AFFECTS 416b-422a c PART IV APPENDIX XXI XXI 449a-c
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 3 18 176d 178a

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3c(1) Hysterias

- 10 *ELPHINSTONE* *Repression in Freud's Dream Appendix*, pp. 35-43d
53 *JAMES* *Psychology* 131b-137b esp 135a, 13 a 2-8a 252a 74 b [in 3], 68b-70a esp 70b [in 3], 79b-79b [in 1] 802b-803a
54 *Freud* *Origins and Development of Psychoanalysis* 1a 5d esp 4c 5d / *Hysteria* 25a-62b esp 3 b-c, 3 d 33d, 53b-c 72d 73b 6c-d 81d-83c 9 b-99c 111b-113a.c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 200a-d / *Regression*, 425b-c / *Unconscious* 434c-435a esp 432d-435a / *General Introduction* 572a b 585d 58 b 610d-612b passim / *Ego and Id*, 713d 714a / *Libidinal Symptoms and Anxiety* 718-719c 728b-729a 41c 42a 747c 748a 750b

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- 12 *LORENTS* *Nature of Things* bk ii [39-93] 30d 31b [10-3] or 43c-d
27 *SHREVE* *Master's* ACT V SC 1 306b-30 a SC 1 [3] 46] 308a
29 *C* *Wife Don Quixote* PART 1 2b
31 *SE* *Vol. Eight* PART IV P OF 44 SCHOOL 437d-438a
33 *P* *Cal. Project* 39 196b-197a + 143 197b-200a
44 *BOYD* *J. J.* 138c 137a
45 *MEL* *the Moby Dick* esp 135a 136b
51 *TOLSTOY* *War and Peace* bk ii 513d 15a
53 *J* *W Psychology* 733b [in 1] 801a-805b
54 *Freud* *Hysteria* 83d 86a 90a-b 99c 102a / *Regression* 4 6d-41 c / *Unconscious* 43 b / *General Introduction* 540d 557b esp 5 12b-55 c 561 562c 568a 569a 577b-c 587b-c 600d 612a b / *Ego and Id* 712, 715c passim / *Libidinal Symptoms and Anxiety* 18b-719b passim 721 723-d 729a 733c 735c-d 47 d 750b-d / *New Introductory Lectures* 841b-c

3c(3) Phobias and anxieties

- 12 *LI* *the Nature of Things* bk [15] 2b 3a + [5-9] 30d 31b
19 *ADAM* *Summa Theologiae* PA 13-14 Q 30 8 a 179c 80c

23 *HOBBS* *Leviathan* PART 1 6-335 *LOCKE* *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXIII SECT 10 249d51 *TOLSTOY* *War and Peace* bk \ 210b-211a c xv 618a52 *DOSTOEVSKY* *Brother Karamazov* bk ix 260d 262a bk xi 318a 3-8d bk xii 3 6b-d53 *JAMES* *Psychology* 722a 725a passim, esp 723a, 724b 733b [in 1]54 *Freud* *Hysteria* 83d-86a passim, esp 84d 85a 87a 97b / *Interpretation of Dreams* 205a-c 235b-d 276c 3 0b-373a / *Regression* 422d-427b / *Unconscious* 432c-435d / *General Introduction* 607b-615b esp 610d-612d 623b-c / *Ego and Id*, 715d 717a.c / *Libidinal Symptoms and Anxiety* 720a 54a esp 24a 728b, 733c-742a, 744b-74 11 / *New Introductory Lectures* 8-0a 8-6a

3c(4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses

54 *Freud* *Origins and Development of Psychoanalysis* 1-11 3a-3a esp 4b-c 14d 15a / *Hysteria* 25a 30a esp 25a-c, 27c-d / *General Introduction* 558a-d 603a b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 642a-d 648d-650c / *Libidinal Symptoms and Anxiety* 730d 736c 41a b 744b-745d 49b-c 7 1b-7 2b / *New Introductory Lectures* 817c 818b 845b-846a

3d The alienation and cure of emotional disorders

- 12 *LORENTS* *Nature of Things* bk iii [31-93] 30b-31b esp [3-9] 31b + vi [1 42] 80a-c
19 *ADAM* *Summa Theologiae* PART 1-11 Q 33 785d 789d
25 *MO* *Tucker* *Essays* 3 39a 401b-406a
27 *SHREVE* *Master's* ACT V SC 1 306b-307a SC in [3 46] 308a
35 *LOCKE* *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXIII SECT 13 250a 11
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48 *MEL* *the Moby Dick* 357b-358b
51 *TOLSTOY* *War and Peace* bk 271b-c bk xii 551c or k x 614a-d 616a-618b esp 61 a b
52 *DOSTOEVSKY* *Brother Karamazov* bk 1 22d 23c
53 *JAMES* *Psychology* 132b 135a b
54 *Freud* *Origins and Development of Psychoanalysis* 1-11 1a-4d 6c 7 10c 13d 14d 15a 18a 20d / *Hysteria* 25a-81c passim, esp 30d 31a, 59d-60a, 60c 71d, 75d 81c 106c 111b / *Psychoanalytic Theory* 123a-12 ac / *New Psychoanalytic Lectures* 128a 132d / *General Introduction* 546b-c 550a-c 560b-561b 603b-60-c 623c 638a.c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643d 644d 651c-d / *Ego and Id* 712 713a / *Libidinal Symptoms and Anxiety* 48b-d / *New Introductory Lectures* 8-0a 851d-8 2d 864a 873d esp 871a-873d

(3) *The disorder or pathology of the passions* 3a
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determined behavior)

- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* 1a 155a esp
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 63b 68b 71a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5a 6c 10b 11b 25c
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- 26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II
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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* 29a 72a c esp ACT
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- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 83a c
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- 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 7d 8c / *Human Under*
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 231c 232b 234a b
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 216a c 509d 510c
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- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 481d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV
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- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3374 3413] 82b 83a
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- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 135a 136b 148b
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- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 51d BK III
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- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 4a d
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b 653a b 716b 718a
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- 54 FREUD *Hysteria* 27a-c / *Interpretation of*
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 nation of thought

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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 118d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287^a 20^b]
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- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a 58a
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- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III
 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 168a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 210b 212a 273b 276a
 447c-448c 490d 491d
- 28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 306a-c
 309d
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38d 39a
 66c d / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 49 111a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 39 SCHOL
 408b d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 8 -87 186b 189a 97-100
 191a 192b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b
 442a
- 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 2d 3a / *Civil Government*
 CH II SECT 13 28a b / *Human Understanding*
 BK II CH XXVIII SECT 1-9 248b 249d BK IV
 CH XX SECT 12 392c
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 6
 453c
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER I 29c 30b NUMBER 31
 103c 104a NUMBER 50 162a b
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 270a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 82d 83a BK
 III 134a c BK IV 170d 171c BK V 233b 234a
 BK VI 238a b BK X 426b BK XI 497c-499c
 505a 511b esp 509c 510d BK XIII 585b
 EPILOGUE II 686c 687a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 371b 374a 377a passim
 esp 376b 377a 439a 643a 646a 652a 657b
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho*
Analysis 13d 14a / *Interpretation of Dreams*
 210c d 379a 380d / *General Introduction*
 486b 488b esp 487d-488a / *Group Psychology*
 682b m / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *New*
Introductory Lectures 874a 879b esp 874a d
 878b 879b

3c Particular emotional disorders psycho-
 neuroses due to repression

- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 347c d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 244b 253b esp 248a 645b-
 646a 746b 748a 749a 750b 753b 754b
 759b 760a 799b 807a 838a 839b
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho*
Analysis 1a 20d esp 4d 5a 7a 9a 14b 19a /

4 The moral consideration of the passions

- 7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275d 277c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d BK V 433d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I BK III CH I 348b d 357b *passim* BK III CH 6-BK IV CH 9 361a 376a BK V CH 8 [1135^b17-1136 9] 383c 384a BK VII 395a 406a BK X CH 8 [1178 21] 432d / *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334^b8-28] 539b d / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 12 14 636a 638a
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [88-322] 33d 34b
- 12 FRICETUS *Discourses* 105a 245a *passim* esp BK I CH 3-5 108b 110c CH 22 127c 128c CH 25 129d 130a BK II CH 5 142c 143b CH 13 152c 153d CH 17 18 158d 162b BK III CH 15 190c d BK IV CH 4-6 225a 232c CH 9 237d 238d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* 253a 310d *passim*
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4-6 287a 289b BK XIV CH 3-9 378a 385b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 24 727a 730a Q 34 768c 772b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 56 A 4 32b 33c Q 58 A 2 ANS 42a 43a A 3 REP 2 43b 44a Q 59 45d 49d Q 60 A 1 50d 51b AA 4-5 52b 54d Q 62 A 2 REP 1 3 60d 61b Q 63 A 4 ANS 65d 66c Q 64 A 1 66d 67c Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 2 77c 78b Q 67 A 1 81c 82c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61d 62a 79a 80a 85d 95d 96b PART II 138d 139a PART IV 272c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 26a 27c 78a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX I III 447a b XXXII 450c d PART V PROP 1-4 452d 453d esp PROP 4 SCHOL 453b d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 203 211a 262 221a 412 413 242a 423 243b 502 260b 261a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331a 343b 346d 362a d / *Political Economy* 375d 376b
- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253a 279d esp 256a c 259b c 264d 65b 266d 267d 268d 271d 284d 285a / *Practical Reason* 297a 307d esp 298a 300a 304a 307d 321b 329a esp 321b 324b 341c 342a 356a 360d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c 386d 389a b
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 295b 297b / *Utilitarianism* 457c 461c 464d 465c 469b 471b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PR 150 56c 57a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 251b PART IV 321b d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 319a esp 311a d 313d 314b 318d 319a 592b 593b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 81b 83a 802a 203a 798b 803a esp 807a 808a 816a 818a
- 54 FREUD *In erpretation of Dreams* 386c 387a / *General Introduction* 501d 504b esp 503d 504b 624d 625b / *War and Death* 757d 761c

4a The conflict between reason and emotion

- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [633-663] 120b-c
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 355a BK IX 416a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH II 239a d / *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102^b13 1103 10] 348a d BK III CH I [1111 35-4] 357b BK VII 395a 406a / *Politics* BK III CH 15 [1286 17] of 484b [1286 33-37] 484d
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [307 322] 34a b
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b-c SECT 10 257d 258a SECT 16-17 259a d BK III SECT 4 260b 261a SECT 1 262b c BK V SECT 8-9 269d 270c BK VII SECT 55 283b-c SECT 68-69 284c d BK VIII SECT 39 288c
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV 167a 186b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 ANS and REP 2 430c 431d Q 95 A 2 ANS and REP 1 507c 508a Q III 1 ANS 569 570b PART I II Q 9 A 2 esp REP 3 658d 659c Q 10 A 3 ANS and REP 2 664d 665c Q 11 A 7 690d 692a Q 33 A 3 767a d Q 34 A 1 REP 1 768c 769d Q 48 A 3 824c 825b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 61 A 3 ANS 56b 57a Q 77 144d 152a esp 1 2 145d 147c A 4 148b 149a A 7 150d 151c Q 80 A 2 160d 161c Q 91 A 6 212c 213c Q 93 A 6 219d 220d Q 94 A 6 ANS 225d 226b PART II II Q 186 A 4 ANS 655c 656b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a 58a d PART II 105d 106a 141a b 151b e
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 20d 22a 159a 167a esp 161a c 165c 166a 184b d 200d 205b 273b 276a 486b-495a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Travels and Cresida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d ACT III SC II [74-81] 121a / *Othello* ACT I SC III [306-337] 212b-c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 55b d 66c d 67a b 78a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 1 18 424c 429d PROP 59 73 442b 447a APPENDIX I III 447a b XXXII 450c d PART V PROP 1 0 452d-458a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-644] 243a 246a BK XII [80-110] 321a b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 104 193a 412-413 242a 4 243b
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 13 28a b / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 54 192b c BK IV CH XX SECT 12 392c
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 3 451d
- 42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Moral* 385c 386b / *Judgement* 586a 587a
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65b c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 312d 313a
- 47 COEHR *Faust* PART I [321 33 3] 79a 82a esp [321 3 50] 79a b
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 411a 412a

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- 12 *Medias* s BK II 3 CT 5 257b-c
BK IV SECT 4 265c d BK II, SECT 5
283b-c X V 1 SECT 39 288c BK I SECT 7
292b
- 14 *PLUTARCH De* 98b-d
- 18 *AL I T C Co fessions* BK II par 2 49b d
BK II pa 1 13b-c BK I par 25 25c BK VI
par 18 26 40d 43 BK I par 1 2 52c 53b
pa 10-11 55c 56b par 2 7 60a-c / *Cary of*
6 d BK IV CH 3 190a c X IV CH 5-6 288b
289b BK XIV CH 6-9 380b 385b BK XIV CH
15 521a-c / *Ch in an Doctrine* BK I CH 24
630c 631a
- 19 *AQUAS Summa Theol* gca v RT I Q 97
A 2 3 507c 309b Q 98 A 2 esp R P 3 517d
519 P RT I II Q 20 A 4 ANS 714c 715b
Q 24 727a 730a
- 20 *AQUAS Summa Theologic* PART I Q 56
A 4 32b-33c Q 59 45d-49d Q 6 A 4-Q 6 A 5
52b-59d Q 64 A 4 2 66d 68b Q 65 A 1
70b-72 RT III Q 15 A 4-9 790d 795b
- 21 *DI VT Du ne Comedy* PLAC YO T VIII
[19-3] 80a-c
- 22 *LI CHA Tale of M libens* par 4 7 401b-
402b / *Parson's T le* par 12 503b-504a
- 23 *HOBBS Leviatha* v RT I 93d-94 95d
96b
- 24 *RABELAIS Gargantua d Pantagruel* BK IV
234 240a
- 25 *MONTIGNE Essays* 20d 22 89b 91b
159a 167a 184 d 200d 205b 232b-238d
251a-c 346b-347c 353c 354b 402c-404b
431c-432d 486b 495a
- 26 *SHAKESPEARE Romeo and Juliet* ACT III C
1 [1 15] 300c / *Henry I* ACT I SC I [34-69]
533b
- 27 *SCALES E H miles* CT I 30 III [5-51]
34c d CT I 1 11 [68 9] 49 d
- 30 *BACON Advancement of Learning* 27b-c
67 b 71d 72b 78a d
- 31 *S OY Ethius* v RT IV ROP 8 424c
429d esp O 8 106 429a d 8a Q 3
442b-447a v 40c 447 450d ART I
4 1a-463d esp P 1 20 452d-458a ROP
45-42 461d-463d
- 32 *ALI = Pa dse Lost* BK V II [500-6]
243a 245b R 2 [334 369] 306b 307 [2-
55] 310b 311 / *Samson Ago* [4 7 6]
351b-392 / 4 cop gica 390 391
- 33 *PAUL P 1 1 1 193a* 203 211a 4 3
242a 4 3 243b 502-5 3 260b 261
- 35 *LACKE Hum n Understand* g a s CH XXI
1 46-54 189d 192 esp SECT 54 192b-c
2 69 196d 197a
- 40 *LI CHA Decline and Fall* II 32 b
- 4 *LI CHA F nd Prim Metaphysic f M* 15
256b / *Pr f Metaphysic Elements of Ethic*
368d 369 Judgement 586d 587
- 44 *LI CHA* 1 h 107 9 b c
- 46 *LI CHA Phisophy f Right* ADDITION 1 105
133d 134 / *Ph' ph' f Hist ry* v RT III
312d 313 RT I 365d 366a
- 49 *D RWIN Descent f Man* 310c 319a esp
313d 314b 318d 319a 322c d 592b c 593a b
- 51 *TOLSTOY W r a d Peace* BK III 122b-c
BK V 201a-c BK VI 245b-c 247d 250a RT
106u 1 655c 656b
- 52 *DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov* BK VI
164a 167a
- 53 *J MES Psychology* 807a 808a 816a-819 esp
817a 818a
- 54 *FREUD Origin and Development of Psycho*
An hys 9a 20a-c / *Hysteria* 110c / *La cas*
sum 407b-408a / *Ego and Id* 02c 106d
707d 715a 716a / *War and Death* 757d
759c / *Carl ation and its Discontents* 773b-c /
New Introductory Lectures 838c 839b 844b-c
- 46(2) *Attenuation and atrophy of the passions*
the liberation of reason
- 7 *PLATO Phaedo* 233c 234c / *Republic* BK I
293d 296c
- 9 *ARISTOTLE Rhetoric* BK II CH 13 [139^o 12-
139^o 24] 637a-c
- 12 *LUCILIUS Nature of Th gr* BK V [1-54]
61 d
- 12 *EPICETUS Diogenes* BK I CH 1 105a 106c
CH 4 108d 110a BK II CH 2 140c 141c CH
17 18 158d 162b BK III CH 8 184b-c CH 22
19a 201a K IV CH 4 225a 228a CH III
242d 244a
- 12 *AURELIUS Meditations* BK II SECT 2 257a
s CT 5 257b-c SECT 10 257d 258a SECT 16-
17 259a-d K II SECT 4 260b 261a SECT 6
261a-c SECT 1 262b-c BK IV SECT 39
26 a BK V SECT 8 269d 270b SECT 26 272c
BK VI 3 CT 40-46 277d 278d K VII SECT
55 283b SECT 68-69 284c d BK IX SECT 7
29 b
- 17 *PLINIVS Thud Enne d* TR VI CH 4 108a
109d esp CH 5 109 d
- 18 *AL I CHA City of God* BK IX CH 4-9 287
89 K XIV d 8 10 381c 385d / *Christ an*
Doctrine BK I CH 24 630c 631a
- 19 *AQUAS Summa Theol g ca* ART I II Q 24
A 2 727b-728c
- 24 *RABELAIS Gargantua d Pantagruel* BK III
152 d 188d 191c
- 25 *MONTIGNE Essays* 89b-91b 99b 100a
107a 112d 165d 167a 200d 205b 232b 238d
esp 235 36 251 c 402c-404b 432b-d
486b-495 esp 491d-495a
- 30 *B CON Adv cerver of Learning* 26b c 71d
72b
- 32 *M LTON Com s* [114 175] 42b 44a [706-
755] 49a 50a / *A cop gca* 390 391a
- 33 *P SC I Pensé* 413 242a
- 38 *MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws* BK I 19a
- 38 *ROLAND v I q luy* 344d 345c
- 40 *G ROK Decl e and Fall* II
- 42 *LA T Furd Prim Metaphysic of Mor I*
256b / *Practical Reason* 346b d [in 1] / *Prf*
Metaphy d Elements of Ethic 378d 379 /
Judgement 586a 587a

(4a) *The conflict between reason and emotion.*

4a(1) *The force of the passions*

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* bk I 4a d 8v ii 39b-40a bk iii 50c 62a bk vii 177c bk xii 397c 398d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 799a b
- 54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *General Introduction* 502a 504b esp 503d 504a / *Group Psychology* 690a c / *Ego and Id* 701d 702d 715d 716a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 745d 747b / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b 839b esp 838c 839b

4a(2) *The strength of reason or will*

- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* bk iv [265-295] 201d 202a bk ix [82-104] 230a bk xix [203-19] 291b
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 168a 173a c / *Apology* 205d 206d / *Crito* 214d 215d / *Phaedo* 220b 221a 225b 226c 232b 234c 250b 251d / *Laus* bk i 649d 650b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk ix ch 8 [1168^b28 1169^b11] 422b d / *Politics* bk i ch 5 [1254 18-8] 447d 448a
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iii [307-322] 34a b
- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 3 108b c bk ii ch 23 170a 172d
- 12 AURELIUS *Mediations* bk vii sect 55 283b c bk viii sect 39 288c bk ix sect 7 292b bk xi sect 18 304b 305b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 139a 140d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk vi par ii 13 38b 39c par 16 40a c bk viii par 10-11 55c 56b par 19-27 58b 60c / *City of God* bk ix ch 4-5 287a 289a bk xii ch 8-9 381c 383b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d II III A 2 ANS 569c 570b PART I II Q 10 A 3 664d 665c Q 17 A 7 690d 692a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 141a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 20d 22a 36c 41a esp 39b 40a 159a 167a 184a d 200d 205b 273b 276a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT I sc iii [322 337] 212b c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 27a c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 15-17 428a d PROP 59 73 442b 447a APPENDIX I III 447a b XXVIII 450c d PART V 451a 463d
- 32 MILTON *Comus* [114 475] 4th 44a / *Paradise Lost* bk viii [500-617] 243a 245b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 350 234a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 54 191b c
- 38 ROLISSEAU *Inequality* 344d 345c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 164a 165c 235c d / *Fund Prin Metaphys of Morals* 259a c 264d 265b 271c d 279b 282d 283d 284d 285a / *Practical Reason* 303b 304b 314a d

315b c 346b d [fn 1] / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 365b-366a / *Intro Metaphys of Morals* 386b d / *Judgement* 483d 484b 586a 587a 605d 606b [fn 2]

- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 332c d / *Utilitarianism* 463d 464c
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312a e 313d 314a 318d 319a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 798b 800a 807a 808a
- 54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 384c 385c 386d 387a / *Unconscious* 433b c / *Group Psychology* 690a c / *Ego and Id* 702c ii 715c 716c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 721d 722c 744a / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 800d 801a / *New Introductory Lectures* 837d 839b 845b 880a

4b *The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason*

4b(1) *Moderation of the passions by reason*
virtue continence avoidance of sin

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 14 17 23 4 5 / *Leviticus* 19 17 18 / *Numbers* 15 37 41 / *Deuteronomy* 5 18 21 / *Psalms* 32 8 10 37 1-8- (D) *Psalms* 31 8 10 36 1-8 / *Proverbs* 7 15 1 23 30 7-9 / *Ecclesiastes* 7 8-9- (D) *Ecclesiastes* 7 9 10

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 18 30 33 31 35 16-23- (D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18 30-33 31 38 16-24

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:21 26 43 48 / *1 Corinthians* 13 4-8 / *Ephesians* 4 31 32 / *Colossians* 3 5 15 / *1 Thessalonians* 4 3-8 / *1 Timothy* 6 3-1 / *Titus* 2 11 14 3 1 7 / *James* 4 1 7 / *Peter* 2 11 12

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [866 1114] 499a 502b

7 PLATO *Charmides* 5a b / *Laches* 31d 37a / *Protagoras* 59b 64a / *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 153b 157a 168a 173a c / *Phaedo* 225b 226c 233c 234c / *Republic* bk iii 325b 326b bk iv 346a 356a bk ix 416a c bk x 431b 434a / *Timaeus* 466a 467a / *Laus* bk i 649d 650b bk vii 713c 716a esp 715d 716a bk viii 735c 738c

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk iv ch 5 [125^b20-28] 174d 175a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 11 347b 348d bk ii ch i bk iii ch i 348b ii 357b bk iii ch 6-bk iv ch 9 361a 376a c bk vii 395a 406a c bk ix ch 8 [1168^b28 1169 11] 422b d / *Politics* bk i ch 5 [1254 18 8] 447d 448a / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 14 637d 638a

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* bk i 826d 827a

12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d bk iii [307 322] 34a b [1053 1094] 43c 44a c bk v [1-54] 61a d [1117 1135] 75d bk vi [1-42] 80a d

12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk i ch i 105a 106c ch 3 108b c bk ii ch 2 140c 141c ch ii 151a b ch 18 161a 162b

- 43 Feb. 2, 1917 NUMBER 1 29a 31 passim NUM
BER 5-63 41c passim, esp NUM ER 6 40a b
NUMBER 10 49c 53a esp 50a-d NUM ER 15,
65b-d NUMBER 1 69a 70d NUMBER 27
95c-d NUM ER 31 103d 104 UM ER 34
110c-d NUMBER 46 150b-152a NUMBER 49,
150b-161a NUM ER 50 162 b NUMBER 55
173a b NUM ER 63 192c 193a NUM ER 70
211d 212a NUM a 6 225d 226a
- 43 V. L. Representative Government 329b-c
336c 337a 346c 348c
- 46 H. GEL. Philosophy of History INTRO, 166b-
16 P RT I 241d 242a P RT III 300c-d
P T I 323b-c
- 53 J. WES. Psychol gy 201a
- 54 F. L. D. Carleton a d its Discourses 780b-
802a, esp 780c-d 781c, 783c 784b 785d
787c, 792 b, 800c-802a c
- 54 The causes of political association: fear
or need
- 6 HERODOTUS History BK III 95d 96b 103d
104a 107c-d
- 6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War BK I 368b-d
BK II 402a-404a BK III 425d-426d BK V:
519a 520d 523c 524c BK VIII 580b-c
- 7 PL. TO REP. Hic BK III 311c 312b / Law BK
III 671a-c 674c-d BK IV 682b / Scrutiny Let
ter 806d-807a
- 9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK I CH 2 [1302 16]-
CH 3 [130 34] 503b-504b CH 8 [1305 25, 34]
510b-c CH 10 512d 515d CH 11 [1313 34
1315, 11] 516a 518c
- 12 EPICURE Discourses BK I CH 4 225a
26c CH 9 237d 238d
- 14 PLUTARCH Corollary, 180d 181b / Pyrrhus
314b-d 332d esp 319b-321a / Lysander 362b-
366a / Sulla 384a-c / Crassus 438b-d-455a c /
Cicero 462a-c 466d-467a / Agrippinus 482d
484a / Pompey 517d 518a 533a-c / Caesar
577d 583a / Cleomeles 6 9d-660a / Cato
717a b / Demetrius 737b-d / Dion 784d
85a / Antiochus 856b-c
- 15 T. CILICUS Histories BK II 224d 225
- 23 MACHIAVELLI Prince CH I 9b-d CH VII
11b-c 12b-d CH X II 23d 24d CH XIV 26a
30a c XX 31b-c
- 23 HOBBS Leviathan INTRO, 47b-d PART I
76d PART II 100d 109b-c 156c
- 24 R. ARJUS Gargantua and Pantagruel BK III
132a-d
- 25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 51a 55d passim
- 26 SHAKESPEARE Richard III ACT II SC III
[32 2-30] 146b-c / L. Henry VI ACT III SC II
[30-34] 453b-d
- 27 SHAKESPEARE Macbeth ACT IV SC III [37
124] 303d 304c
- 29 C. TES D. Quixote PART I 40d
- 30 BACON Advancement of Learning 78a-d
- 38 M. TESQUEL Spira f La BK III 12b-
13c BK IV 15 c KY 26d 7d BK VI 43c-d
BK VII 93d 94a 94c-95a
- 38 ROUSSEAU Equality 364a II / Social Co-
tract BK III 412d-413a
- 39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK I 348a 349c
- 40 GEORGE Decline and Fall, 263a II 436a b
- 41 GEORGE Decline and Fall 549a
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 6 39a b NUMBER 15
65b-d NUMBER 17 69a-d NUMBER 72
217a-c
- 43 V. L. Representative Government 344b-355b /
L. ARJUS 462d
- 46 H. GEL. Philosophy of History P RT III
287a-d PART IV 365d 366b
- 54 F. L. D. Gro Psychol gy 669a-c 686c 689b
esp 687 b

- (4b) *The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason* 4b(2) *Attenuation and atrophy of the passions, the liberation of reason*)

- 51 **TOLSTOY** *War and Peace* BK XIII 577a 578b
BK XIV 605b d BK XV 630c 631a
53 **JAMES** *Psychology* 751a 752a 753b 754b
760a b
54 **FREUD** *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 20b c / *Hysteria* 110c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 745d 746c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 839d 840a

4c *The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition*

- 7 **PLATO** *Charmides* 3b d / *Republic* BK I 296b ■ BK II 319c 320c BK III 338a 339a / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Statesman* 607a 608d
8 **ARISTOTLE** *Categories* CH 8 {9^b34-10^a6} 15a
9 **ARISTOTLE** *Ethics* BK IV CH 9 {1128^b10-20} 375d 376a BK VI CH 13 {1143^b17} 394b BK VII CH 4 {1148 18-23} 398c CH 5 399a d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 {1369 5 20} 612b c BK II CH 1a 14 636a 638a
12 **LUCRETIUS** *Nature of Things* BK III {288-32} 33d 34b
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

- I Works by a author presented in this collection.
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Course*.

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Chapter 23 ETERNITY

INTRODUCTION

THE notion of eternity like that of infinity has two meanings. One meaning may refer to something positive yet both seem to be formulated by the human mind in a negative way. We grasp one meaning of eternity by saying that there is no beginning, or end to time's process. The other sense of eternity we conceive by denying time itself and with it change or mutability.

Considering eternity as infinite duration Locke says that we form this notion by the same means and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time. First, having got the idea of succession and duration we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another as often as we please and apply them so added to durations past or to come. And thus we can continue to do, without bounds or limits, and proceed *in infinitum*.

The unimaginability of the infinite is no different in the sphere of time than in that of space or number. The difficulty Locke points out is the same in all three cases. "The idea of infinity is positive and clear. The idea of greater is also clear. But these do not yet give us the idea of the infinite. That only comes with the idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended and this is plainly negative not positive. What lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity Locke continues, "lies in obscurity and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would in being too large for a finite and narrow capacity."

In insisting that we can have no positive idea of infinity—whether of space, time, or number—Locke's point seems to be that it is beyond our finite capacity to form an image of an infinite object. But though our imaginations may be limited in this way we do seem able to construct—in a negative manner—conceptions

that go beyond experience and have some meaning even if they lack imaginative content. Locke indicates this other aspect of the matter when he criticizes those who assert dogmatically that the world is neither eternal nor infinite. It seems to him that the world's eternity or the world's infinity is at least as conceivable as the contrary.

It may not be inconsistent therefore to say that infinite time while unimaginable remains quite conceivable for to say that eternity is conceivable is simply to say that endless time is neither more nor less possible than time with a beginning and an end. The first conception is as meaningful as the second. It is in fact formed from the second by negation—by substituting the word "without" for "with" with respect to a beginning and an end. But unlike our conceptions, our images cannot be formed by negation. When we imagine, as when we perceive, the object before us is positive and definite. We cannot imagine as we cannot experience a duration or a span of time without a beginning and an end.

With regard to the other traditional meaning of eternity Locke takes a different position. It too might be defended as a negative conception so far as human comprehension is concerned since it involves the denial of time itself, i.e., of a duration comprising a succession of moments. But here Locke says that there is "nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession." If our weak apprehensions, he continues, cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of an infinite succession of moments of duration wherein anything does exist.

Nevertheless, Locke affirms that we can easily conceive in God infinite duration and

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Chapter 23 ETERNITY

INTRODUCTION

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Considering eternity as infinite duration, Locke says that we form this notion by the same means and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time — having got the idea of succession and duration — we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another as often as we please and apply them so added to durations past or to come. And thus we can continue to do with out bounds or limits and proceed *in infinitum*.

The unimaginability of the infinite is no different in the sphere of time than in that of space or number. The difficulty Locke points out is the same in all three cases. The idea of so much is positive and clear. The idea of greater is also clear. But these do not yet give us the idea of the infinite. That only comes with

the idea of so much greater as can not be comprehended and this is plainly negative not positive. What lies beyond our positive idea of infinity, Locke continues, lies in obscurity and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea. Herein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity.

I maintain that we can have no positive idea of infinity — whether of space, time or number — Locke points out seems to be that it is beyond our finite capacity to form an image of an infinite object. But though our imaginations may be limited in this way, we do seem able to construct — in a negative manner — conceptions

that go beyond experience and have some meaning even if they lack imaginative content. Locke indicates this other aspect of the matter when he criticizes those who assert dogmatically that the world is neither eternal nor infinite. It seems to him that the world's eternity or the world's infinity — at least as conceivable as the contrary.

It may not be inconsistent therefore to say that infinite time while unimaginable remains quite conceivable for to say that eternity is conceivable is simply to say that endless time is neither more nor less possible than time with a beginning and an end. The first conception is as meaningful as the second. It is in fact formed from the second by negation — by subtracting the word without for with with respect to a beginning and an end. But unlike our conceptions, our images cannot be formed by negation. When I imagine as when we perceive the object before us is positive and definite. We cannot imagine as we cannot experience a duration or a span of time without a beginning and an end.

With regard to the other traditional meaning of eternity, Locke takes a different position. It too might be defended as a negative conception so far as human comprehension is concerned since it involves the denial of time itself — of a duration comprising a succession of moments. But here Locke says that there is nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. If our weak apprehensions, he continues, cannot separate successions from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of an infinite succession of moments of duration wherein anything does exist.

Nevertheless, Locke affirms that we can easily conceive in God infinite duration and

we cannot avoid doing so. Whether he means by this that God's eternity involves temporal succession must be determined by an interpretation of the passage in which he maintains that God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power he sees all things past and to come and they are no more distant from his knowledge no farther removed from his sight than the present they all lie under the same view.

If this passage means that time stands still for God in a single moment in which all things are co-present then Locke may not be as resolute as Hobbes in rejecting the theologian's conception of God's eternity. Criticizing the Scholastics Hobbes says that for the meaning of *Eternity* they will not have it be an endless succession of time. Instead they will teach us that eternity is the standing still of the present time a *Nunc-stans* (as the Schools call it). Thus Hobbes thinks neither they nor anyone else understands no more than they would a *Hic-stans* for an infinite greatness of place.

A theologian like Aquinas tries to avoid the difficulty which Hobbes finds in this conception by distinguishing between the *non* of eternity and the *now* of time. The *now* of time is the same he writes as regards its subject in the whole course of time but it differs in aspect. Furthermore the flow of the *non* as altering in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect and hence eternity is not the same as the *non* of time.

The notion of the eternal as the timeless and the immutable does not belong exclusively to Christian theology. In the tradition of the great books it is found for example in Plato and Plotinus. Eternity according to Plotinus is a life changelessly motionless and ever holding the Universal content in actual presence not this now and now that other but always all not existing now in one mode and now in another but a consummation without part or interval. All its content is in immediate concentration as at one point nothing in it ever knows development all remains identical within itself knowing nothing of change for ever in a Now since nothing of it has passed away or will come into being but what it is now that it is ever.

Eternity so conceived is perhaps even more unimaginable than the eternity which is in finite time. We may feel that we have some sense of an infinite duration when we talk as Ivan does in the *Brothers Karamazov* of about a billion years or a quadrillion of a quadrillion raised to the quadrillionth power. Infinite time is like that only longer. But because all our experience is temporal through and through it is more difficult to get any sense of that which is both absolutely timeless and endlessly enduring.

Poets and sometimes philosophers turned poets have struggled to give this concept imaginative content by contrasting the white radiance of eternity with a many-colored gliss or by speaking of time itself as the moving image of eternity. When Dostoevsky in *War and Peace* tells Natasha that it is hard for us to imagine eternity she replies that it does not seem hard to her—that eternity is now today and it will be tomorrow and always and was there yesterday and the day before.

These and similar attempts may not succeed as much as the insight that if we could hold the present moment still or fix the fleeting instant we could draw an experience of the eternal from the heart of time. The *non* that stands still Aquinas writes is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. For just as the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the *non* so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the *now* standing still.

TO UNDERSTAND the opposed views that constitute the major issues with regard to eternity it is necessary to hold quite separate the two meanings of the word which have run side by side in the tradition of western thought. The first of these two senses signifying interminable time is the meaning of eternity which has greatest currency in popular speech. This is the meaning which appears in the chapters of INFINITY and TIME. It is also the sense in which philosophers and theologians debate the problem of the eternity of the world—whether the world ever began or will ever end.

Since that which exists interminably is imperishable the word eternal is also applied to substances which are thought to be ever

lasting. Thus Ptolemy and the ancients generally think of the heavenly bodies as beings which are sensible and both moving and moved but eternal and impassible. Aristotle calls the heavenly bodies eternal and incorruptible. For Lucretius and the atomists the atoms and the atoms alone are eternal. They are, he says, everlasting though all things else are dissolved. Unless they were eternal all things before this would have utterly returned to nothing. If the atomic particles were to wear away or break in pieces Newton argues the nature of things depending on them would be changed. And therefore that nature may be lasting the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only in the various separations and new associations and motions of these permanent particles.

The heavenly bodies and the atom may be thought everlasting but they are not immutable in all respects for local motion is of their very essence. Impassible in existence they are also endlessly in motion. In Aristotle's view local motion can be perpetual or eternal only if it is circular. Circular motion alone has neither beginning nor end.

The eternal circular motion of the heavens, according to Aristotle in turn communicates an eternal cyclical movement to the rest of reality. Since the sun revolves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle.

And now they come-to-be cyclically so in their turn to the things whose coming-to-be the seasons in nature. Such an eternal return it would seem, is also applied by Aristotle to human things for he writes that probably each a thing and each season has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished.

SINCE THE HEAVENS and the atoms are in motion even though the motion is everlasting or eternal, they cannot be eternal in the second meaning of eternity which is the very opposite of the first not a duration or extension of it. In this meaning the eternal is an existence absolutely immutable—a being which neither comes to be nor passes away nor changes nor moves in any respect whatsoever. Aquinas uses the word in this sense when he says that the nature of eternity consists in the uniformity of what is absolutely outside of movement.

He also includes in this meaning of eternity the notion of interminability for he writes as whatever wholly immutable can have no succession so it has no beginning and no end. Yet Aquinas preserves the sharp distinction between the two meanings when he differentiates the sense in which the world might be called eternal and the sense in which he would attribute eternity to God alone.

Even supposing that the world always was it would not be equal to God in eternity. He writes for the divine being is all being simultaneously without succession but with the world it is otherwise.

The conception of eternity as absolutely immutable existence is found in the ancient pagan writers. Plotinus as we have already seen makes immutability the mark of eternity. The unmoved prime mover of Aristotle and the Platonic Ideas or Forms also possess this characteristic. But it is the Jewish and Christian theologians who make eternity in this sense one of the prime attributes of God.

Augustine for example invokes God as that everfixed Eternity in whom nothing passeth but the whole is present. Since time is for him unconceivable apart from change or motion that which exists immutably does not exist in time. Referring to God's eternity he says: Compare it with the times which are not fixed and see that it cannot be compared. Thy years neither come nor go whereas ours both come and go that they all may come. Thy years are one day and Thy day is not daily but To-day. Thy To-day is Eternity.

Time and eternity are here conceived as two distinct orders of reality. The temporal order is the order of things in change or motion the eternal the realm of the fixed or permanent the immobile and immutable. As eternity is the proper measure of being Aquinas writes so time is the proper measure of movement.

The eternal and the temporal are similarly distinguished by Plato in terms of the realms of being and becoming—the world of immutable being and the world of generation. In the one we find the parts of time and the past and the future which do not apply to the other. We unconsciously but wrongly transfer them. Plato declares to the eternal essence

but the truth is that *is alone is properly* attributed to it and *was and will be* are only to be spoken of becoming in time for they are motions but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time nor is it subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things of which generation is the cause

For Spinoza the distinction consists in two ways of viewing the order of nature. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways he writes either in so far as we conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Only in the second way do we conceive things under the form of eternity. We can view things under the aspect of eternity only insofar as we know God and through knowing God are able to know all things according as their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.

The separation of time and eternity into distinct spheres of reality or even into distinct ways of conceiving the whole of being is challenged by thinkers who find the eternal within the process of time. For both Jew and Christian the eternal God intervenes directly in the temporal order. The most radical form which this fusion takes is perhaps exemplified in the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ when the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.

Whitehead challenges the sharpness of the separation from another point of view. He not only makes eternal objects ingredients in actual occasions or temporal events but since the events which constitute the process of change are themselves unchangeable they are for him eternal—even though they have their being within the sphere of change.

A similar point seems to be made in Aristotle's theory of change. When change is conceived as consisting in a transformation of matter it is the thing composed of matter and form which changes and neither the matter nor the form. Matter *as* matter Aristotle writes does not cease to be in its own nature but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. The remark would seem to hold true as well of the form *as* form.

As indicated in the chapter on *CHANGE* the Aristotelian analysis of motion finds in matter or the substratum of change and in the contrary forms *from which and to which* a motion takes place the elements of permanence underlying change. When a green leaf turns red for instance green has not changed into red the leaf has changed from one color to another. The changing leaf is not eternal but red and green are since they are incapable of change. This is the sense of eternity in which the unchanging instant is eternal or the past is eternal even though both are somehow elements or aspects of time and the process of change.

The past may be eternal but it no longer exists. The passing moment may be eternal but it has no duration. Lack of existence and lack of duration together distinguish that meaning of eternal in which it merely signifies the unchanging from the meaning in which it signifies that which exists or endures forever without changing. It is only in the second of these two meanings that the eternal can be conceived as that which exists entirely outside the realm of time.

AS WE HAVE ALREADY observed the basic philosophical and theological issues concerning eternity cannot be intelligibly stated unless these meanings of eternity and the eternal are kept distinct.

The traditional problem of the eternity of the world asks for example not whether the order of nature is free from change or succession but whether the changing physical universe ever had a beginning or ever will end. As indicated in the chapters on *CHANGE, TIME* and *WORLD* it is a question of the infinity of time or in another formulation a question of the interminability of change or motion.

Aristotle appears to answer these questions affirmatively especially in the last book of his *Physics* where he claims to demonstrate the impossibility of there having been a beginning to motion. Aquinas on the other hand does not think that the eternity of the world can be demonstrated and of Aristotle's arguments he says that they are not absolutely demonstrative but only relatively so—*scilicet* as against the arguments of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to be in some actually

impossible ways." In support of this contention, he cites a remark made by an old man in the *Torres* that among dialectical problems which we cannot solve demonstratively "one is 'whether the world is eternal'."

For *hant* the problem is typically dialectical. It occurs as part of the first antinomy in the *Transcendental Dialectic* the thesis of which asserts that "the world has a beginning in time" and the antithesis that "the world has no beginning, for it is infinite in respect both to time and space." The fact that *antirealist* cogent arguments can be marshalled for both of these contradictory propositions shows, in *hant*'s opinion, that the reasoning on either side is not demonstrative, but only dialectical and as he says, "illusory."

The Jewish and Christian doctrine of the world's creation by God might seem to require the denial of the world's eternity. But in fact the theologians find either alternative compatible with divine creation, which they conceive as the cause of the world's being, not necessarily of its beginning. Augustine for example, examines the sense in which the world is held by some to be co-eternal with God even though made or created by God. "It is as if a foot, he interprets them to say 'had been always from eternity in the dust there would always have been a print underneath it and yet no one would doubt that this print was made by the pressure of the foot nor that, though the one was made by the other neither was prior to the other.' So, it goes on, it might also be said that the world has always existed and yet is always, throughout eternity, created, *it ceased to exist* by God."

Commenting on this passage Aquinas adds the observation that if an action is instantaneous and not successive it is not necessary for the maker to be prior in duration to the thing made. Hence it does not follow necessarily, he writes, that if God is the actual cause of the world He must be prior to the world in duration because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change—"but an instantaneous act."

Writing both as a philosopher and as a theologian, Maimonides—many centuries before he stated his antinomy—thinks he is able to show that the question of infinity in time and

endless motion cannot be decided by proof, neither in the affirmative nor in the negative. Just as for Augustine and Aquinas, so for him it is indifferent—from a philosophical point of view—whether the created world and its Creator are co-eternal or whether as Genesis says, "in the beginning God created heaven and earth."

But both alternatives are not equally acceptable to the theologian. Since there is no proof on either side "sufficient to convince us," Maimonides writes, "we take the text of the Bible literally and say that it teaches us a truth which we cannot prove"—namely that the world had a beginning in time. Aquinas comes to the same conclusion. "That the world did not always exist," he writes, "we hold by faith alone. It is not 'an object of demonstration or science.'" For Christian and Jew alike the religious dogma that the world is not only created by God in the sense of depending for its existence upon God as cause but was also initiated by God or caused to begin to exist and move is based on the revealed word of God in Holy Writ.

Those who, on philosophical grounds, deny creation *ex nihilo* also deny the world's beginning. Pursuant to his theory of the world as a necessary and perpetual emanation from the One, Plotinus, for example, declares that "the *hovers* has had no beginning and thus is warrant for its continued existence. Why should there be in the future a change that has not yet occurred?" For Spinoza likewise "all things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must for ever exist and to this extent at least the world is eternal and uncreated."

The man of faith, however, believes in a God who is free to create or not to create, not one *from whom* the world emanates as a necessary effect from its source. When, therefore, he affirms that God freely chose to produce the world out of nothing, he seems to meet the question, "What was God doing before He made heaven and earth?" To the questioner Augustine does not wish to give "the yesting answer"—and to have been given by one who sought to evade the force of the question—"He was getting Himself ready for people who pry too deep."

Instead he points out that the question itself

is illicit for it assumes a time before time began. If before heaven and earth were made he writes there was no time then what is meant by the question What were You doing then? If there was not any time there was not any then. In the phrase before creation the word before has no temporal significance. It signifies a different kind of priority—the sense in which eternity precedes time the sense in which Augustine says of God that it is not in time that You are before all time. You are before all the past by the eminence of Your ever present eternity.

TURNING FROM eternity in the sense of infinite time to the eternal in the sense of the timeless and unchanging the great question is whether anything eternal exists. The atoms of Lucretius are not eternal in this sense nor are the supposedly imperishable heavenly bodies. Nor is it sufficient to point out that change itself involves aspects or elements of permanence for the question strictly interpreted asks whether anything exists in and of itself which having no beginning or end also has no past present or future—no temporal phases in its continued endurance. Only such a thing would be utterly non temporal or changeless.

Since nothing made of matter is exempt from motion it is generally supposed that no material thing is eternal in this sense. Not even God is eternal unless God is absolutely immutable as well as spiritual. The angels are spiritual beings yet according to Christian theology they cannot be called eternal because in the first place they are creatures and had an origin and in the second place they are subject to spiritual change even if they are not involved in the sorts of motion to which bodies are susceptible. The theologians therefore use the word *aeviternal* to signify the mode of angelic existence in that it is a mean between eternity and time. *Aeviternity* Aquinas explains has a beginning but no end while eternity has neither beginning nor end and time both beginning and end.

THE QUESTION ABOUT the eternal as timeless and immutable existence has two parts. Does an immutable God exist? Does anything else exist which is immutable?

To the first question it does not suffice to reply by affirming the existence of God. Some modern theologians deny God's absolute immutability and so deny the eternity of His being in the precise sense under consideration.

With regard to the second question we must observe that in the tradition of the great books eternity has been claimed for two things other than God namely for truth and ideas. What ever is produced by reasoning aright Hobbes says is general eternal and immutable truth. On somewhat different grounds James declares there is no denying the fact that the mind is filled with necessary and eternal relations which it finds between certain of its ideal conceptions and which form a determinate system independent of the order of frequency in which experience may have associated the conceptions originals in time and space. He quotes Locke to the effect that truths belonging to the essences of things are eternal and are to be found out only by the contemplation of those essences.

The common phrase—the eternal verities—which James uses testifies to the prevalence of the notion that truth itself cannot change and that when men speak of a new truth or the growth of truth the change they refer to is only a change of mind with respect to what men think is true or false not a change in the truth itself. Whatever is true now always was true and always will be. Time and change make no difference to the truth of *two plus two equals four*.

But even so it can still be asked how the truth exists for the attribution of eternity to anything also requires us to consider its mode of being. If for example the truth exists only in the mind then it exists unchangingly only in the mind of an absolutely infallible knower a mind which neither learns nor forgets nor changes in any respect with regard to what it knows. If God is such a knower eternal truth can have existence in God's mind.

The theologians sometimes go further and identify absolute truth as they identify absolute goodness with God. Aquinas writes for example that if we speak of truth as it is in things then all things are true by one primary truth to which each one is assimilated according to its entity and thus although the es

sences or forms of things are many yet the truth of the divine intellect is one in conformity to which all things are said to be true. On this view it would appear that there are not two eternal beings but only one.

William James finds immutability not only in the truth but also in the concepts of the human mind. Each conception, he writes, *eternally remains what it is and never can become another*. The mind may change its states and its meanings at different times may drop one conception and take up another but the dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be said to *change into* its successor. Thus amid the flux of opinions and of physical things the world of conceptions or things intended to be thought about stands stiff and immutable like Plato's Realm of Ideas.

In the case of ideas however the problem is complicated by the question whether ideas exist in and by themselves outside the mind of God or man. If according to a doctrine attributed to Plato and the Platonists the Ideas or Forms exist separately then they constitute a realm of eternal beings for their immutability is unquestionable. If from an opposite point of view the realm of unchanging ideas is identical with the divine intellect then no eternal being or beings exist apart from God.

THE PROPOSITION that God is the only eternal being, the only uncreated and immutable existence is inextricably connected with the proposition that God is the only actually infinite being, the *ens calissimum* having all perfection. Eternity is the very essence of God. Spinoza writes, in so far as that essence involves necessary existence. In saying this he appeals to his definition of eternity by which we are to understand existence itself so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the *divinitus* alone of the eternal thing. For Spinoza as well as for Aquinas the same fact which makes God eternal—namely the identity of his essence and existence—also constitutes his infinity and uniqueness. It is impossible, Spinoza argues, for there to be two infinite beings. For the same reason there cannot be two eternal beings.

And stated in the chapter on Infinity when the word *finite* is applied to God the

theologians give it a positive rather than a negative significance. They mean by it the actual infinity of perfect being and absolute power in sharp distinction from the potential infinity by which the mathematicians signify the lack of a limit in addition or division.

These two meanings of infinity seem to parallel the two meanings of eternity which we have dealt with throughout this chapter—one the negative sense in which it means the lack of a beginning or an end to time the other the positive sense in which God's eternity consists in that fullness of being which can exist apart from time and change. Because our intellects are finite we may apprehend eternal being in a negative manner by calling it timeless or by conceiving it as infinite duration but Spinoza cautions us against supposing that it can be explained by duration or time even if the duration be conceived without beginning or end.

One other theological discussion raises issues which involve in a unique way the two meanings of eternity. It deals with the revealed doctrine of perdition and salvation as eternal death and eternal life. Is the eternality of Hell and Heaven equivalent to a period of endless duration or does it mean—more fundamentally—the *unchanging state of souls after the Last Judgment*?

According to Augustine and Aquinas the eternity of Heaven and Hell means the moral immutability of the immortal soul as well as the interminability of the beatitude it enjoys or the punishment it suffers. Only in Purgatory does a change of moral state occur but the process of purification which takes place there is always limited in period. Purgatory is therefore not eternal in either sense.

As Kant sees it however the after life must not only be interminable or of infinite duration but it must also permit a progressive moral development without end. Man is justified according to Kant in hoping for an endless duration of his existence only on the ground that the holiness which the Christian law requires leaves the creature nothing but a progress *in finitum*. From still another point of view Dr Johnson questions the traditional Christian dogma that the souls of the blessed are secure in a perpetual state of rectitude—in this respect

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like the good angels who are confirmed in their goodness from the first instant of creation

Boswell had ventured to ask him whether, although the words of some texts of Scripture seemed strong in support of the dreadful doctrine of an eternity of punishment we might not hope that the denunciation was figurative and would not be literally executed. To this Dr Johnson replied: Sir you are to consider the intention of punishment in a future state. We have no reason to be sure that we shall then be no longer able to offend against God. We do not know that even the angels are quite in a state of security. It may therefore perhaps be necessary in order to preserve both men and angels in a state of rectitude that they should have continually before them the punishment of those who have deviated from it.

On Dr Johnson's theory the moral condition of the damned seems to be immutable. It is irremediable even by the punishments which according to him may exercise some deterrent effect upon the blessed who he seems to think are not as unalterably set in the path of righteousness as the wicked are in their iniquity.

On any of these conceptions of Heaven and Hell and of the state of the soul in the after-life the meaning of eternity is somewhat altered for eternal life or eternal death is conceived as having a beginning if not an end for the individual soul. As in the case of all fundamental religious dogmas the truth asserted remains obscure and mysterious. It is not only beyond imagination but also beyond any adequate rational conception, analysis or demonstration.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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| 3 | The eternity of God | 447 |
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| 4a | The imperishability of angels: spiritual substances: souls | |
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| 5 | The knowledge and imagery of eternity | |

REFERENCES

To find the passage cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [365 253] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as VERTY BK CII & CIII) are sometimes included in the reference. Line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [36, 283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7-15—(D) II *Ezra* 7-16.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. pass m signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Eternity is timelessness and immutability or as endless and non-temporal distance between eternity and time

AVOC V HA Eccle asticus 18 10—(D) OT Ec l 1 c 18 8

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450b-451d

8 ARIOTTE *Interpretation* 1 13 [23 13-26]

35b-c / *Physics* BK I CH I [22 19]-CH 3

[2 2 9] 301 302c BK VI H 2 [33 13 6]

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32 MONTAIGNE *On Time* 12a b / *Paradise Lost* BK

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- (1) *Eternity as timelessness and immutability or as endless and infinite time the distinction between eternity and time*

CH XII 167d 174a passim esp SECT 5 168d 169a SECT 10 170b-c SECT 16 172a b CH XXIX SECT 15 237a

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 26d 130b 133c 135a 137a c 152c 160b 161d 185a b

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 206c

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII 295b-c EPILOGUE II 681a

1a The priority of eternity to time

- 7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-451a

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050^b 2-28] 576b d

- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH I 119b c CH 6 122c d CH II 126a CH 13 128c / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 15-16 165c 166b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 21 49d 50a BK XI par 12-16 92b 93a BK XII par 40 109b 110a / *City of God* BK XI CH 4-6 324a 325d BK XII CH 12 349b 350a CH 15-17 351b 354a

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 22 A 1 REP - 127d 128d Q 46 250a 255d Q 61 A 2 315c 316a

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [10-45] 150b c

- 31 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [577-599] 187b 188a BK VII [70-108] 218b 219b

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 135a 137a c 160b 161d esp 161d

1b Aeviternity as intermediate between eternity and time

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 9 101b c par 12-15 101d 102c par 18-22 103b 104a / *City of God* BK VII CH 15 351b-352d

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 2 REP I-2 41d-42c A 3 ANS 42c-43b A 4 5-6 44b 46d

2 The issue concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or of motion

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1:2 / *Nehemiah* 9:6

—(D) II *Ezra* 9:6 / *Job* 38:1-13 / *Psalms* 90:2 93:4-5 102:25-26 104:5-6 119:90-91 136:5-9 148:1-6—(D) *Psalms* 89: 91:4-5 101:26-7 103:5-6 118:90-91 135:5-9 148:1-6 / *Proverbs* 3:19 8:22-29 / *Isaiah* 45:12 18:48 13:65 17:25—(D) *Isaiah* 45:12 18:48 13:65 17-25 / *Jeremiah* 51:15—(D) *Jeremiah* 51:15

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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 13:24-30 36-43 49:50 24:3-35 / *Mark* 13:3-33 / *Luke* 21:7-33 /

John 1:1-3 / *Colossians* 1:16-17 / *Hebrews* 1:10-11 / II *Peter* 3:3 13 / *Revelation* 10:7-6—(D) *Apocalypse* 10:5-6

- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b-c / *Tirotus* 447b-c 450b-451a

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH II [104^b 13 15] 148a b / *Physics* BK IV CH 13 [2 2 9-28] 302b BK VII CH I - 334a 337b CH 6 344b-346b CH 8 348b 352a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [69^b 2-10] 360c d CH 3 [270^b 1-26] 361c 362a CH 9 [79 1-] CH 12 [283^b 22] 370b-375d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10-11 437d-441a = / *Meteorology* BK I CH 14 [33 16-35] 27] 458b 459a c BK II CH 3 [350^a 357^a 4] 462b = / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050^b 20-28] 576c d BK XI CH 6 [1063 13 16] 591b CH 10 [1067^a 33-38] 596a BK XII CH 6-8 601b 605a esp CH 7 [107- 19-21] 602b-d [1073 5-11] 603b

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 4 [699^b 14 700^a 6] 234d 235a CH 6 [700^b 9-701^a 7] 236a b

- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK I [146- 64] 2d-4b [483-634] 7a 8d [951-1051] 12d 14a BK II [89-141] 16a d [294-307] 18d 19a [569-580] 22b [1048-1063] 28b-c [1105 1174] 29a 30a c BK V [1-431] 61a 66d esp [53 70] 61d 62a [235 246] 64a b [331-379] 65c 66a BK VI [335-607] 87c 88b

- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 13 271b BK VI SECT 15 275a b BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a

- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 847b 848b

- 17 PLATINUS *Second Ennead* TR I 35a 39d esp CH I 5 35a 37c

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI 89b 99b esp par 12-17 92b 93b par 40 98d 99a / *City of God* BK XI CH 4-6 324a 325d BK XII CH 10-20 348b 357a

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 46 250a 255d esp 1 250a 252d Q 61 A 2 315c 316a Q 66 A 4 348d 349d Q 75 A 1 REP I 378b 379c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 2 1017c 1020c

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 50a PART II 162b

- 30 BACON *Voxum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d

- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 27b-c / *Objections and Replies* 228a b

- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [6-10] 93b BK II [80-100] 129b 133a esp [89-96] 130b 132a BK V [577-599] 187b 188a BK VII [10-108] 218b 219b

- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a

- 34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 540a 541b

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XII SECT 26 160c d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 20a 26d 130b 133c esp 130b 131c 132d 133a 135a 137a c 152a d 160b 161d 239b = / *Practical Reason* 334b-335c esp 335a b

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693c 694a passim

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16 ARISTOTLE Harmonics of the World 1071b

17 PLATO 2 Third Erastus 28 viii ch 5 221c

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18 ARISTOTLE 2 Confessions 28 vii ch 1 43b-

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21 DAVID 2 Divine Comedy 28 vii ch 1 [41-7]

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(4 *The things which partake of eternity 4a. The imperishability of angels, spiritual substances, souls*)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b esp 124d 126c 203d 204c / *Practical Reason* 348d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk vi 216d 218b bk vii 295b c bk xiv 608a b

4b *The imperishable in the physical order matter atoms celestial bodies*

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-451a 457a b

■ ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk ii ch i [193 9-8] 269b-c / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 360d 362a bk i ch 9 [279 1-] bk ii ch i [846] 370b 376a bk ii ch 6 379c 380c bk iii ch 6 396a c / *Generation and Corruption* bk ii ch 10 ii 437d-441a esp ch 10 [336^b 25-34] 438d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 3 [983^b 7-9^a 17] 501d 502b bk iii ch 2 [997^a 34-^b 1-] 516a b ch 4 [999^b 1-16] 518b ■ [1000 5 1001 3] 518d 519d bk iv ch 8 [1050^b 16-28] 576c d bk vi ch 2 [1060 3-36] 588a c ch 6 [1063 10-16] 591b bk vii ch 3 599a d ch 6-8 601b 605a / *Soul* bk ii ch 4 [415 23-^b 8] 645c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* ch 4 [699^b 14-700 6] 234d 235a

12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk i [146 264] 2d-4b [483-634] 7a 8d bk ii [294-307] 18d 19a bk i [110-143] 62c 63a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk iii ch 13 188d 189a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk ii sect 3 257a b bk iv sect 46 267c bk vi sect 15 275a b bk vii sect 18 281a sect 23 281b sect 25 281c sect 50 283a bk v sect 7 297b c

16 PROPERTIUS *Almagest* bk i 5a 6a bk viii 429a b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk iv 888b 889b 929b 930b

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr i 35a 39d / *Fourth Ennead* tr ii ch 7-8 161d 162d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk vii par 8-9 101a-c par 14 16 102b 103a par 22 104a b par 28 105c par 40 109b 110a / *City of God* bk xiii ch 17 367d 368b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 2 REP 41d 42c A 3 ANS 42c 43b A 4 ANS 43b 44b A 5 ANS 44b 45c Q 46 A 1 REP 2 250a 252d Q 58 A 3 ANS 301d 302d Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c M 6 A 1 REP 1 339b 340b M 66 A 2 345d 347b Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c 384c ■ 84 A 1 REP 3 440d-442a Q 104 A 1 REP 1 534c 536c Q 113 A 1 ANS 576a d Q 115 A 3 ANS 588c 589c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. Q 77 A 2 ANS and REP 1 945a 946b Q 91 1016a 1025b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [64-81] 106d 107a

28 HARRIS *On Annual Generation* 390b d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 4^a 186b d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 15 SCHOL 360b 361d

33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a

34 NEWTON *Optics* bk iii 541b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch i sect 2 to 19 351b 354c passim

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 346d

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 226b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 18d 19a 14b-6c

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7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Meno* 184d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b / *Timaeus* 447b d 457b 458b

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk i ch 8 104a b / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 6 [987^a 9-15] 505b d bk ii ch 1 [993^b 19 11] 512a b bk iii ch 2 [997^a 34 12a] 516a b bk iv ch 10 [1051^b 33 1052^a 12] 578a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 6 [109b 9^a] 341c d bk vi ch 3 [1139^b 19 3] 388b c

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* bk i 811a 812a 813d 814a

17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* tr ix ch 5-8 2 8a 250a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 9 3a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 8 10 626c 627b bk ii ch 38 39 654b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 3 REP 3 42c-43b Q 14 A 13 ANS and REP 3 86d 88c A 15 89b 90b Q 16 A 1 7 89a 100d Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 22 A 1 REP 2 12 d 128d Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 84 A 2 REP 3 440d-442a A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b-443c A 2 446c 447c Q 86 A 3 463b d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 91 A 2 208b d Q 93 215b d 220d Q 94 A 4 ANS 223d 224d AA 5-6 224d 226b PART II Q 1 A 1 CONTRARI 380b 381a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part II 267b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 276b 285c passim esp 279b 282a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* bk i aph 56 112a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 216d 217c 228a b 229c-d

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- 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologiae part 1 q 1
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- 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologiae part 1 q 67
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- 35 LOCKE Treatise of Substances 15d 16a / Human
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sect 62 194c d
- 41 CROMWELL Obedience and Faith 233d 234d
42 HALT Practical Reason 346b 347c
44 BOSWELL John 3 363 b
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- Another consideration of infinite time see INFINITY 3c
- The controversy concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or motion see ASTRONOMY 8c(1) 8d CHANGE 13 TIME 2b WORLD 4a and for the relation of creation to eternity and time see GOD 7a TIME 2c WORLD 4c(2)
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- The discussion of imperishable or incorruptible bodies see ASTRONOMY 8a BEING 1b(3) CHANGE 10c ELEMENT 5a
- The consideration of the eternality of truth and of ideas see CHANGE 15a FORM 2b IDEAS 1c IMMORTALITY 6c TRUTH 5
- The conception of the eternity of Heaven and Hell or of eternal salvation and damnation see HAPPINESS 7c IMMORTALITY 5c-5f PUNISHMENT 5c(1) SIN 6d
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 — *De Aeternitate Mundi*
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- PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* (F)
 BOETHIUS *The Consolation of Philosophy* BK V PROSA 6
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Chapter 24. EVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

THIS chapter belongs to Darwin. Not that his writings which are cited under almost all headings, stand alone in the various places they appear. The point is rather that many of the topics are dictated by and draw their meaning from his thought and that he figures in all the major issues connected with the origin of species, the theory of evolution and the place of man in the order of nature. With respect to the matters under consideration in this chapter the other writers in the tradition of the great books cannot escape from being classified as coming before or after Darwin, or as being with or against him.

Darwin's influence on later writers may be variously estimated but it is plainly marked by the reuse of his language and their reference to his fundamental notions. James' *Principles of Psychology*, especially in its chapters on instinct and emotion, reveals the behavior of men and animals and the phenomena of intelligence or mind in a evolutionary term. The writings of Freud are similarly dominated by the genetic approach and by an appeal to man's animal ancestry in order to explain the inherited constitution of his psyche in conformity with the doctrine of evolution.

Outsiders psychology the concept of evolution is reflected in theories of progress or of a dialectical development is just as, for example, in the dialectical or historical materialism of Marx and Engels which is set forth in the latter *Dialectic of Nature*. An even more general re-orientation of philosophy which stems from an evolutionary way of thinking is to be found in the writings of Bergson and Deleuze such as *Creative Evolution* and *The Philosophy of Darwin on Philosophy*. These along with many of the specifically biological works cited in the list of Additional Readings give some measure of the influence of Darwin not

only on philosophical thought but also on the direction of research in all the biological sciences.

With regard to Darwin's predecessors the question is not so much one of their influence upon him as of their anticipation in one way or another of his discoveries, his conceptions, and his theory.

The observation made in antiquity concerning a hillside deposit of marine fossils is sometimes taken as implying an early recognition of the evolution of terrestrial life. More apposite perhaps is the statement by Lucretius that the new earth first put forth grass and bushes, and next gave birth to the races of mortal creatures springing up many in number in many ways after diverse fashions." Lucretius also speaks of strange monsters which nature did not permit to survive. "Nature set a ban on their increase and they could not reach the coveted flower of age nor find food nor be united in marriage. And many races of living things must then have died out and been unable to beget and continue their breed. Those which survived he adds, had qualities which "protected and preserved each particular race."

Apparently susceptible to similar interpretation are Aristotle's statements that nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life, that there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent toward the animal and that throughout the entire animal scale there is a graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion. Augustine's commentary on the first chapter of Genesis seems even more explicitly to contemplate the successive appearance of the various forms of life. Plants and animals did not actually exist when the world began. Though their causes were created by God and existed from the beginning, the actual production of plants

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cerned. He is concerned with establishing the fact that new species do originate in the course of time against those who suppose the species of living things to be fixed in number and immutable in type throughout the ages. He is concerned with describing the circumstances under which new species arise and other forms cease to have the status of species or become extinct. He is concerned with formulating the various factors in the differentiation of species, and with showing against those who think a new species requires a special act of creation that the origin of species, like their extinction, is entirely a natural process which requires no factors other than those at work every day in the life, death and breeding of plants and animals. Only as a consequence of these primary considerations does he engage in speculations about the moving panorama of life on earth from its beginnings to its present and its future.

Darwin looks upon the term "species" as arbitrarily given, and for that reason does not attempt any strict definition of it. He uses it moreover like his predecessors in systematic biological classification to signify a set of individuals closely resembling each other—a class of plants or animals having certain common characteristics. Darwin would probably agree with Locke's criticism of those who suppose that our definitions of species grasp the real essences or relate to the substantial forms inherent in things. As indicated in the chapter on DEFINITION, Locke insists that our notion of a species expresses only what he calls the nominal essence—a set of characteristics we attach to the name we give things of a sort when we group them and separate them in our classifications. The boundaries of species, whereby man sorts [things] are made by men, he writes; the essences of the species, distinguished by different names are of man's making.

Species is not the only term of classification. A genus, for example, is a more inclusive group than a species. Groups which differ specifically belong to the same genus if their difference is accompanied by the possession of common traits. As species differ from one another within a generic group, so genera are in turn subclasses of more inclusive groupings, such as

phyla, families, and orders. But there are also smaller groupings within a species. There are races or varieties and sub-varieties, the members of which share the characteristics of the species but differ from one another in other respects. Ultimately, of course, within the smallest class the systematist bothers to define each individual differs from every other in the same group with whom at the same time it shares certain characteristics of the race, the species, the genus and all the larger classes to which they belong.

This general plan of botanical or zoological classification does not seem to give species peculiar status in the hierarchy of classes or groupings or to distinguish it from other classes except as these are more or less inclusive than itself. Why then should attention be focused on the origin of species rather than of varieties or of genera?

One part of the answer comes from the facts of generation or reproduction. Offspring tend to differ from their parents as well as from each other but they also tend to resemble one another. "A given germ," Aristotle writes, "does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one, but each germ springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny." This is an early formulation of the insight that in the process of reproduction the law of like generating like always holds for those characteristics which identify the species of ancestors and progeny.

In other words, a species always breeds true; its members always generate organisms which can be classified as belonging to the same species, however much they vary among themselves as individuals within the group. Furthermore, the sub-groups—the races or varieties—of a species are able to breed with one another but diverse species cannot interbreed. Organisms different in species either cannot mate productively at all or if crossbred like the horse and the ass, they produce a sterile hybrid like the mule.

In the hierarchy of classes, then, species would seem to be distinguished from all smaller groupings by their stability from generation to generation. If species are thus self-perpetuating they in turn give stability to all the larger

and animals in their various kinds is as Aquinas tells us while summarizing Augustine's view the work of propagation—not of creation

Like Aristotle both Aquinas and Locke represent the world of living organisms as a graduated scale ascending from less to more perfect forms of life. But where Aquinas tends to conceive that graduated scale as a hierarchy involving essential differences, Locke sees an almost perfect continuity involving only differences in degree. In all the visible world, he writes,

we see no chasms or gaps. To illustrate this he points out that there are fishes that have wings and are not strangers to the airy region and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water whose blood is cold as fishes.

There are animals so near of kin to both birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both. Amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together, and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined that if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganic parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees.

But for the theory of evolution the observation of a hierarchy in nature or even of a continuity in which the species differ by almost insensible degrees constitutes only background. What the theory of evolution brings to the fore is the notion of a developmental or genetic relation among the various forms of life. Because it seems to contain this insight, the anticipation of Darwin to be found in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* is perhaps the most remarkable, even though in a closely related passage in which Kant discusses epigenesis he uses the word *evolution* in a sense quite contrary to Darwin's conception.

It is praiseworthy, Kant writes to employ a comparative anatomy and go through the vast creation of organized beings in order to see if there is not discoverable in it some trace of a system and indeed of a system following a genetic principle. When we consider the agreement of so many genera of animal in a certain common schema which apparently underlies not only the structure of their bones

but also the disposition of their remaining part and when we find here the wonderful simplicity of the original plan which has been able to produce such an immense variety of species by the shortening of one member and the lengthening of another by the involution of this part and the evolution of that, there gleams upon the mind a ray of hope, however faint, that the principle of the mechanism of nature apart from which there can be no natural science at all may yet enable us to arrive at some explanation in the case of organic life. This analogy of forms which in all their differences seem to be produced in accordance with a common type strengthens the suspicion that they have an actual kinship due to descent from a common parent. This we might trace in the gradual approximation of one animal species to another from that in which the principle of ends seems best authenticated, namely from man back to the polyp and from this back even to moles and lichens and finally to the lowest perceptible stage of nature.

FINDING ANTICIPATIONS of Darwin involves judgments much more subject to controversy than tracing his influences. It is questionable, for example, whether the suggestive passages in Lucretius and Locke bear more than a superficial resemblance to Darwin's thought. The matter is further complicated by Darwin's own sense of his divergence from and disagreement with his predecessors—both immediate precursors like Buffon and Linnaeus and earlier philosophers and theologians.

Darwin tells us himself of his quarrel with the theologians. His followers elaborate on the opposition between his conception of species and that of Aristotle, an opposition which Darwin intimates by the great stress he lays on the difference between a static taxonomy and dynamic or genealogical classification of living things.

We must therefore try to locate the central points of Darwin's theory in order to judge comparable views for their agreement or disagreement.

As the title of his major work indicates, it is not evolution as a grand scheme of biological or cosmic history, but the origin of species with which Darwin seems to be principally con-

common language will come into accordance. In short we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience. Our classifications will come to be as far as they can be so made genealogies.

The origin of species thus seems to be identical with the extinction of intermediate varieties combined with the survival of one or more of the extreme varieties. These seem to be simply two ways of looking at the same thing. Still another way of seeing the point may be achieved by supposing contrary to fact the survival of all the varieties ever produced through the breeding of organisms.

If my theory be true Darwin writes numberless intermediate varieties, linking closely together all the species of the same group must assuredly have existed but the very process of natural selection constantly tends as has been so often remarked to exterminate the parent forms and the intermediate links. If one were to suppose the simultaneous co-existence of all intermediate varieties in the present day the groups now called species would be continuously connected by slight differences among their members and would not therefore be divided into distinct species as they now are because certain links are missing.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states the principle of continuity in the following manner. "This principle," he writes, "indicates that all differences of species limit each other and do not admit of transition from one to another by a *saltus*, but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In one word there are no species or sub-species which are the nearest possible to each other intermediate species or sub-species being always possible the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these. But Kant adds that it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience partly because "the species in nature are really divided and if the gradual progression through their affinity were continuous the intermediate members lying be-

tween two given species must be infinite in number which is impossible.

The Russian geneticist Theodore Dobzhansky gives an interpretation of continuity in nature which differs from Kant's in that it follows and applies Darwin's conception of species and their origin. According to him if we suppose the extreme case of all possible genetic variations being alive on earth together the result could be not an infinite number of species but no species and genera at all. The array of plants and animals would approach a perfectly continuous series in which there would only be individual differences. There would be no specific or generic groupings of the sort now made in our classification of the forms of life.

ON DARWIN'S conception of the origin of species its causes divide in a two sets of factors first those which determine the extinction or survival of organisms and with their survival their opportunities for mating and reproduction second those which determine the transmission of characteristics from one generation to another and the variation of offspring from their ancestors and from each other. Without genetic variation there would be no range of differences within a group on which the factors of selection could operate. Without the inheritance of ancestral traits there could be no perpetuation of group characteristics in the organisms which manage to survive and reproduce.

For Darwin the operation of the first set of factors constitutes the process of natural selection. This may take place in many ways through geological catastrophes which make certain areas of the earth's surface uninhabitable for all organisms or for those types which cannot adapt themselves to the radically changed environment through the competition among organisms for the limited food supply available in their habitat through the struggle for existence in which organisms not only compete for food but also prey upon one another through the sexual selection which operates within a group when some organisms are prevented by others from mating and reproducing and through all the obstacles which isolate groups from interbreeding in

groupings—the genera phyla families—which remain as fixed from generation to generation as the species which constitute them. Hence the question of origin applies peculiarly to species rather than to varieties or to genera.

On the supposition stated, no origin of species would seem to be possible except by a special act of creation. Either all the existing species of organisms have always existed from the beginning of life on earth, or if in the course of ages new species have arisen, their appearance cannot be accounted for by natural generation. By the law of natural generation offspring will always be of the same species as the parent organisms.

Spontaneous generation of course remains a possibility. A new species of organism might come to be without being generated by other living organisms. But apart from the question of fact (*i.e.* whether spontaneous generation ever does occur) such origin of a form of life seems to lie outside the operation of natural causes and to imply the intervention of super-natural power.

The possibility of spontaneous generation was entertained in antiquity and the Middle Ages and was even thought to be supported by observation, such as that of maggots emerging from putrefying matter. But modern science tends to affirm the biogenetic law, that living organisms are generated only by living organisms. To Kant the notion that life could have sprung up from the nature of what is void of life seems not only contrary to fact but absurd or unreasonable. Yet while affirming the principle that like produces like by insisting upon the generation of something organic from something else that is also organic, Kant does not carry that principle to the point where it would make the generation of a *new* species impossible. Within the class of organic beings, he writes, it is possible for one organism to generate another, differing specifically from it.

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these various suppositions, Darwin is moved to a new insight by the conjunction of certain types of fact: the results of breeding under domestication which exhibit the great range of variation within a species and the tendency of *inbred*

varieties to breed true; his own observations of the geographical distribution of species of flora and fauna, especially those separated from one another by impassable barriers; the facts of comparative anatomy and embryology which reveal affinities in organic structure and development between organisms distinct in species; and the geological record which indicates the great antiquity of life upon the earth, which gives evidence of the cataclysmic changes in the earth's surface (with consequences for the survival of life) and which above all contains the fossil remains of forms of life now extinct but not dissimilar from species alive in the present age.

Briefly stated, Darwin's insight is that new species arise when, among the varieties of an existing species, certain intermediate forms become extinct and the other circumstances are such that the surviving varieties now become more sharply separated from one another in type, are able to reproduce their kind and in the course of many generations of inbreeding also tend to breed true. They thus perpetuate their type until each in turn ceases to be a species and becomes a genus when its own extreme varieties, separated by the extinction of intermediates, become new species as they themselves did at an earlier stage of history. For the very same reason that Darwin says, a well-marked variety may be called an incipient species, a species may be called an incipient genus.

The point is misunderstood if it is supposed that when new species originate from old, both the new and the old continue to survive as species. On the contrary, when in the course of thousands of generations some of the varieties of a species achieve the status of species, the species from which they originated by variation ceases to be a species and becomes a genus.

The only distinction between species and well-marked varieties, Darwin writes, is that the latter are known or believed to be connected at the present day with intermediate gradations, whereas species were formerly thus connected. It is quite possible that forms now generally acknowledged to be merely varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of specific names and in this case scientific and

CHAPTER 24 EVOLUTION

pothesis of the origin of species by the extinction of intermediate varieties

In comparing Darwin with certain of his predecessors notably Aristotle and Aquinas it seems necessary to apply another kind of test. Here the problem is not so much one of discovering affinities or disagreements as one of determining whether they are talking about the same thing and therefore when they appear to disagree whether the issue between them is genuine. They do not seem to conceive a species in the same way. Certainly they use the word differently. This affects the way in which the whole problem of origin is understood. The controversies concerning the fixity or mutability of species, concerning evolution and creation and concerning the origin of man involve genuine issues only if those who seem to disagree do not use the word species in widely different senses.

It is possible that certain forms of life do not originate by descent from a common ancestor and do not derive their status as quite distinct types from the mere absence of intermediate varieties—varieties which once must have existed but are now extinct. If such forms were to be called species the word would have a different meaning from the meaning it has when applied to types of pigeons, beetles, or rats.

The first of these two meanings may express the philosophical conception of a living species as a class of organisms having the same essential nature according to which conception there would have been intermediate varieties. The second meaning may be that of the scientific biologist in botany or zoology who constructs a system of classification genealogical or otherwise. On this meaning one million and a half would be a conservative estimate of the number of plant and animal types classified by the systematic biologist as species. In contrast the number of species in the philosophical sense of distinct essences would be extremely small.

Darwin for example says "I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom. I believe that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser

number. Analogy would lead me one step farther namely to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide." It is immaterial to the theory of evolution whether this inference is chiefly grounded on analogy or be accepted.

The issue between Darwin and the theologians may or may not be genuine according to the interpretation of this passage and according to the possibility of a double use of the word species—for both the small number of progenitors from which all the extant types of plants and animals have evolved and for a very large number of those extant types. If the theologians use the word species in the first sense and Darwin in the second they need not be in disagreement. The view of life which Darwin attributes to certain eminent authorities he himself does not flatly reject namely that life with its several powers [has] been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one.

Is there common ground here in the admitted possibility that life may have been originally created in a small number of distinct forms and that these are to be regarded as species in one conception though not in another? If so the affirmation of a certain fixity to species would apply only to a few primordial forms. Concerning forms which have appeared with the passage of time two questions would have to be answered. First are they species in the philosopher's sense of distinct and unmutable essences or species in the scheme of systematic biological classification? Second is their first appearance at an historical moment due to a special act of creation to spontaneous generation or to evolution from already existing organic forms by descent with modification?

To join issue with Darwin it would seem to be necessary for the person answering the questions to use the word species in the biologist's sense and at the same time to account for the historical origin of the new species by special creation or spontaneous generation. But in the tradition of the great books, the theologians like Augustine and Aquinas do not attribute to God any special acts of creation after the original production of the world.

cluding geographical and physiological in accessibility

The struggle for existence is not only a struggle to survive but also a struggle to reproduce. Natural selection operates with respect to reproduction as well as survival. Whether the survival is of the fittest alone or whether the multiplication of inferior organisms also gives evolution another direction has been disputed since Darwin's day but according to his theory natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being: all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection. Thus from the war of nature from famine and death the production of the higher animals directly follows.

With respect to the factors of heredity and variation tremendous advances since Darwin in the experimental science of genetics require revisions in this part of his theory of evolution. This is particularly true of the researches of Mendel, Bateson and Morgan concerning the ways in which genetic factors operate. But on one major point in the theory of heredity Darwin holds a view which later investigations have tended to confirm. Antedating Weismann, he nevertheless opposes Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. As William James expresses it where Lamarck supposes that environmental influences cause changes in the structure or functioning of the organism which then become hereditary, Darwin regards the environment merely as a selective agency acting upon variations produced entirely by causes operating in the breeding process. James thinks the evidence for Mr. Darwin's view [was] quite convincing even before it received the support of Weismann's theory according to which it is *a priori* impossible that any peculiarity acquired during the lifetime of the parent should be transmitted to the germ.

The situation is not the same with regard to Darwin's views on the mechanism of heredity. Writing before Mendel's classic experiments in hybridization, Darwin seems to suppose a blending of hereditary factors whereas according to Mendel inheritance is particulate. Distinct genetic factors combine to produce a certain somatic result without losing their

separate identities. They can therefore be reassorted and enter into new genetic combinations in the next generation. Most important of all, Darwin thinks that new forms of life are gradually as the result of a continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations. The opposite view is now taken. The discovery of abrupt mutations in a single generation discounts countenances Darwin's maxim *natura non facit saltum*—nature does nothing by jumps.

These advances in genetics since Darwin's day do not alter the main outlines of his theory. The mechanisms of heredity may be much more complicated than Darwin knew and involve much of which he was ignorant such as mutation rates or the various types, causes, and effects of hybridization. But that merely leads to a more elaborate or different explanation of genetic variation in offspring and the transmission of ancestral traits. No matter how these are explained, their occurrence is all that is needed to permit new species to originate through natural processes of heredity and selection. If Darwin were alive today, Julian Huxley writes, the title of his book would have to be not the origin but the Origins of Species. For perhaps the most salient single fact that has emerged from recent studies is that species may arise in a number of quite distinct ways.

THE READER MUST judge for himself to what extent Darwin's theory of evolution was anticipated by those who like Augustine affirm the appearance of new species of life on earth at various stages in its history or even by a unit like Kant who seems to possess the germ of this insight.

The critical test in every case is whether those who affirm the occurrence of new species by natural processes rather than by special creation think of them as simply added to the organic forms already in existence without any change in the status of species of the pre-existing forms. Those who think in this way do not have Darwin's idea of the origin of species so in concerning an increase in the number of species as merely a matter of addition; they necessarily attribute stability to each species, new as well as old. By this test, not even Kant seems to be near the center of Darwin's hy-

conform to the doctrine of man's creation by God, or even on the hypothesis of emergent evolution, there need not be—strictly speaking—there cannot be—a missing link between ape and man for the emergent species is a whole step upward in the scale of life. Man is thus not one of several organic types which have become species through the extinction of intermediate varieties, and hence he differs from other animals not in an accidental but rather in an essential manner—that is, his difference is in kind rather than degree.

This issue concerning human nature is discussed from other points of view in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN. Here the issue stated in terms of man's origin seems so unlike the three possibilities—special creation, evolution by descent from a common ancestor, and emergent evolution. But these three possibilities apply not only to man, but to the origin of every species which did not exist at the first moment of life on earth.

The hypothesis of special creation does not seem to be held by the theologians, at least not in the tradition of the great books. The hypothesis of emergent evolution raises questions concerning the factors—natural or supernatural—which must be operative to cause the emergence of higher from lower forms of organic matter. Whether or not Aristotle and Aquinas can supply an answer to these questions in terms of their theory of matters

potential is for a variety of forms. Darwin's theory of descent with modification seems to be definitely opposed to the hypothesis of emergent evolution. Speaking as a Darwinian, James says that the point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. "No new *natures*, no factors not present at the beginning are introduced at any later stage."

In this dispute between two theories of evolution does not the solution depend in every case upon a prior question concerning the relation of the species under consideration—whether or not it is possible for them to be or to have been developmentally connected by intermediate varieties? If for example the evidence were to prove that man and ape as they now exist in the world are essentially distinct—different in kind—then no intermediate varieties could ever have existed to account for their descent from a common ancestor. If on the other hand the evidence were to prove that they differ only in degree then no difficulty stands in the way of the Darwinian hypothesis. The ultimate issue concerning the origin of species would thus seem to reduce to the problem of which meaning of "species" applies to the organic types in question.

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3 The process of heredity

3a The inheritance of acquired characteristics: the use and disuse of parts

except to explain the origin of individual human souls

Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God. Aquinas writes, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some existed not only in matter but also in their causes as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species also that are new, if any, such appear existed beforehand in various active powers so that animals and perhaps even new species of animals are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare but even these existed previously in their causes in the work of the six days.

WHETHER OR NOT the theologian's conception of an historical development of the forms of life conforms to the evolutionist's hypothesis even though it does not offer the same type of explanation is a matter which the reader of the texts must decide. But one issue which still remains to be discussed can leave little doubt of a basic controversy between Darwin and some of his predecessors especially the theologians.

It concerns the origin and nature of man. It can be stated in terms of two views of human nature. One is that man is a species in the philosophical sense, essentially and abruptly distinct from brute animals, the other that man is a species in the biologist's sense and differs from other animals only by continuous variation.

On the first view either man would have to be created in body as well as soul or if the human species has an origin which in part or whole involves the operation of natural causes it must be conceived as *emerging* from a lower form of life. The rational soul Aquinas maintains can not come to be except by creation. But it is not only man's soul which according to Aquinas cannot be produced save immediately by God. He also insists that the first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power but was im-

mediately from God. He does not reject the suggestion of Augustine that the human body may have preexisted in other creatures as a *effect preexists in its causes*. But he adds the qualification that it preexists in its causes only in the manner of a passive potentiality, that it can be produced out of pre-existent matter only by God. A Christian theologian like Aquinas might entertain the hypothesis of emergent evolution as applied to the human organism but only with the qualification that natural causes by themselves do not suffice for the production of man.

On the second view which is Darwin's man and the anthropoid apes have descended from a common ancestral form which is now extinct, as are also many of the intermediate varieties in the chain of development—unless as it is sometimes thought certain fossil remains supply some of the missing links. The great break in the organic chain between man and his nearest allies which cannot be bridged over by any extinct or living species has often been advanced. Darwin admits as a grave objection to the belief that man is descended from some lower form but this objection, he continues,

will not appear of much weight to those who from general reasons believe in the general principle of evolution. Breaks often occur in all parts of the series some being wide sharp and defined others less so in various degrees as between the orang and its nearest allies—between the Tarsius and the other Lemnidae—between the elephant and in a more striking manner between the Ornithorhynchus or Echidna and all other mammals. Furthermore Darwin insists no one who has read Lyell's *Antiquity of Man* will lay much stress

on the absence of fossil remains for Lyell has shown that in all the vertebrate classes the discovery of fossil remains has been a very slow and fortuitous process. Nor should it be forgotten that those regions which are the most likely to afford remains connecting man with some extinct ape-like creature have not as yet been searched by geologists.

On either of these two conflicting views the organic affinities between man and the most highly developed mammals would be equally intelligible though they would be differently interpreted by Aquinas and Darwin. But at

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To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 *FLOWER* *Shad* AK II (265-283) 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTION. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 *JAMES* *Psychology* 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 *PLATO* *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR & DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part or section) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, in German in certain cases, e.g. *Shad* AK II [65-283] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. The references to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows, e.g. *OLD TESTAMENT* *Lehemiah* 7:45-(D) *II Esdras* 7:46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant passages of a whole reference; a "passum" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Index*; consult the Preface.

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30 B. C. *Natural History* BK II APH 9 159b-c

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

- I Works by authors represented in this collection
- II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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Chapter 25 EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

EXPERIENCE is regarded as a source of knowledge. It is also spoken of as containing what is known.

Sometimes it is identified with sense perception; sometimes it involves more—memory and the activity of the imagination. Sometimes it includes thoughts, feelings, and desires as well as all the contents of consciousness, every phase of mental or psychic life. The temporal flow of experience is then identified with the stream of consciousness.

Experience may connote something which is private or public, subjective or objective—something which no man can share with another or something which is common to all men who live in the same world and who are acquainted with the same objects.

There are still other divisions of experience: intuitive or aesthetic experience, religious experience, and mystical experience.

Experience is said to be that which makes a man expert in an art or in a sphere of practical activity. A man is better able to do or make *that which he has much experience in doing or making*. He is also better able to judge what should be undertaken or what has been accomplished by others as well as by himself. In this connection experience is called practical both because it is the result of practice and because it is a means to be used in directing action. But it is also praised for the opposite reason—as something to be enjoyed for its own sake, serving no end beyond itself unless it be the enrichment of life by the widest variety of experiences.

THESE ARE SOME OF the myriad meanings of experience—not all but those which occur with major emphasis in the tradition of the great books. No author uses the word in all these senses. Some of these senses are contra-

dictory. According to the context of the discussion or the subject matter under consideration the same author will shift from one meaning to another.

For example, in his account of the origin of science Aristotle says that out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience. For a number of memories constitute a single experience. The further product of experience—the universal stabilized in its entirety within the soul—is obtained by abstraction and the related art of induction or generalization. Art or science arises, Aristotle writes, when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced. Hence it can be said he thinks that from experience originate the skill of the craftsman, the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being.

In the study of nature experience according to Aristotle is essential for taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts which can come only from dwelling in intimate association with nature and its phenomena. In the context of ethical or political problems he treats experience as the basis for a prudent judgment which is not concerned with universals only but must also recognize the particulars. This fact Aristotle writes explains why some who do not know but who have experience are more practical than others who know. In the field of poetry, as in moral matters it is the man of experience according to Aristotle who can best judge what is good or bad, he can judge rightly the works produced and understand by what means or how they are achieved and what harmonizes with what, whereas the inexperienced must

content if they do not fail to see whether the work has been well or ill made

Hobbes and William James also use the word for the possession of expertness or sound judgment in practical affairs as well as in connection with the origin or nature of knowledge. Hobbes like Aristotle says that much memory or memory of many things is called *Experience*. He connects it with prudence. It is that knowledge he writes which is not attained by reasoning but found as well in brute beasts as in man and is but a memory of successions of events in times past wherein the omission of every little circumstance alters the effect.

It frustrates the expectation of the most prudent.

For James however experience is usually identified with the stream of consciousness. Experience moulds us every hour he writes and makes of our minds a mirror of the time-and-space-connections between the things in the world. He distinguishes it from conception, reasoning or thought and associates it with sensation and feeling. The way of experience proper is the front door he writes the door of the five senses.

For the most part experience is a term in psychological analysis with implications for the development of theoretic knowledge or practical wisdom. That is the way it is chiefly used by Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Hume as well as the authors already mentioned. It is still a term in the domain of psychology when it is used by Plotinus and by the theologians to discuss the mystical union of the soul with God.

But with Hume experience also is reality or in his phrase the realm of matters of fact and existence as opposed to relations of ideas. He tends to identify the order of nature with the succession of events in experience though he also seems to conceive a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas. Nature he goes on to say has implanted in us an instinct which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among eternal objects.

Hume's difficulty or indecision with regard to the objectivity of experience does not appear in Kant for whom experience ceases to be psychological in any subjective sense if that word

The order of nature—the object of the theoretic sciences—is the order of experience. In Kant's technical sense of *mögliche Erfahrung* nature is the realm of all possible experience. His distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience differentiates what for other writers is subjective sense-experience from knowledge of reality or of objects shared by many minds.

Experience is the domain of such public objects precisely because its sense-materials are formed and ordered by the structure of the mind itself—by the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding in a synthesis which Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception. Without this synthesis experience would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions never fitting together into any connected text according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible) consciousness and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.

Though it may not seem possible William James goes further than Kant in the conception of experience as a realm of being. Kant does not think that *all possible experience* circumscribes reality. That which is not phenomenon he writes cannot be an object of experience it can never overstep the limits of sensibility within which alone objects are presented to us. In contrast to this phenomenal reality with which he identifies experience Kant posits a noumenal world—a world of intelligible or supra-sensible beings. To this realm Kant writes belong those possible things which are not objects of our senses but are cogitated by the understanding alone. Since the things Kant calls *dinge-an-sich* are unconditioned that is not subject as they are in themselves to the forms of intuition or the categories of the understanding they cannot have an empirical or sensible reality but only an intelligible existence.

William James goes further in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* when he takes experience as equivalent to the whole of reality including the actual and the possible or imaginary, the concrete and the abstract, the objective and the subjective. All differentiations must be made within experience and experience itself is neutral with respect to all distinctions—re-

ceptive of all. There can be no meaningful distinction between experience and some other realm of existence. It is in this all-inclusive sense that experience is said to be the central term in the philosophy of John Dewey when it functions as *mind* does for Hegel, *substance* for Spinoza, or *being* for Aquinas and Aristotle.

WE HAVE GONE from one extreme to another in passing from a purely psychological to some thing like a metaphysical conception of experience. These are opposite in a way which suggests the contrast between the practical and the aesthetic values of experience—the actively useful and the intrinsically enjoyable. At least the metaphysical identification of experience with all existence seems analogous to the aesthetic ideal of a life which embraces every variety of experience.

There is some intimation of this ideal in the lust for adventure which motivates Odysseus and his men. Dante in fact finds the secret of his character in the ardor of Odysseus to become experienced of the world and of the vices of men and of their virtue which leads him to pursue virtue and knowledge even to the point of his mad flight.

There is some suggestion of this ideal of experience in the unbounded vitality of Gargantua and Pantagruel and in the enterprise of the Wife of Bath in Chaucer's tale. But the great poetic expression of this ideal is written in *Faust*—in the worlds of experience Mephistopheles opens to the man who has wagered his soul for one ultimately satisfying moment.

Whatever to all mankind is assured
I in my inmost being will enjoy and know
Seize with my soul the highest and most deep
Mean's weal and woe upon my bosom heap
And thus this self of mine to all their selves
expanded
Like them I too at last be stranded

THE BASIC ISSUE concerning the role of experience in the origin of knowledge especially the organized knowledge of the arts and sciences turns on whether it is the source or only a source. It is rarely if ever supposed that nothing can be learned from experience or that everything worth learning can come to be known entirely apart from experience. During the early centuries of Christianity devoutly religious men

preached that God has revealed to man all he needs to know in order to live well and be saved. But this extreme position rejects the constructions of reason as well as the materials of experience.

Among philosophers and scientists concerned with what man can learn by the exercise of his own powers the controversy over experience usually involves a distinction between the senses and the reason or intellect. As indicated in the chapters on IDEA, MIND and SENSE whether this distinction can be validly made is itself a major issue in the tradition of the great books. Those who make it however tend to regard experience as something which results from the activity of the senses. For them the problem is whether our ideas—the general notions or concepts that enter into our scientific judgments and reasoning—come from sense-experience which either is or originates from the perception of particulars. The contrast between the particular and the universal between perceptible sense impression or concrete image on the one hand and concept or abstract idea on the other lies at the heart of the problem.

One possibility is that the mind by processes of abstraction or induction somehow draws all its concepts and generalizations from experience. Aquinas is representative of this view. He adopts Aristotle's notion that the intellect is like a tablet on which nothing is written. This *tabula rasa* depends upon the senses and the imagination for the material out of which concepts are formed. For the intellect to understand actually Aquinas writes not only when it acquires new knowledge but also when it uses knowledge already acquired there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers.

Without experience the mind would remain empty but experience itself does not fill the intellect with ideas. The activity of the sensitive faculty is not by itself the cause of knowledge. The perceptions and images furnished by sense experience Aquinas writes need to be made actually intelligible and this requires the activity of the intellect not merely its passivity in receiving impressions from experience. For this reason he concludes it cannot be said that sensitive knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge but

rather that it is in a way the material cause. Although experience is the indispensable source of the materials on which the intellect actively works, knowledge worthy of the name of science or of art does not come from experience alone.

Thus we see that those who like Aquinas affirm that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses do not mean to imply that the materials of sense-experience reach the intellect untransformed. On the contrary, the primary contribution of the intellect is the translation of experienced particulars into universal notions. Nor do those who like Bacon affirm that the principles of knowledge are obtained by induction from experience necessarily imply that all knowledge is directly drawn from experience. To the extent that deductive reasoning is a way of learning new truths, the truths thus learned derive from experience only indirectly. Their direct source is truths already known which must in turn have come from experience by induction.

Harvey criticizes those who misconceive the part which reason should play in relation to the senses. In the field of his own inquiries, some weak and inexperienced persons, he writes, vainly seek by dialectics and far-fetched arguments either to upset or establish things that are only to be founded on anatomical demonstration and believed on the evidence of the senses.

How difficult it is, he continues, to teach those who have no experience the things of which they have not any knowledge by their senses!

As a geometry is in all the sciences according to Harvey, it is the business of reason from things sensible to make rational demonstration of things which are not sensible, so that it is credible or certain things absurd and beyond sense from the wise man's estimation better known. Science depends upon both reason and sense, but sense not reason is the ultimate arbiter of what can be accepted as true. To test whether anything has been well or ill advised, need to ascertain whether some falsehood does not lurk under a proposition, it is imperative on us. Harvey declares to bring it to the proof of sense and to admit or reject it on the decision of sense.

THE FOREGOING views are not a necessary consequence of the distinction between the faculties of sense and reason. The theory of innate ideas presents another possibility. As expressed by Descartes for example, this theory holds that there are purely intellectual [ideas] which our understanding apprehends by means of a certain inborn light. Hence it would seem that experience can be dispensed with except for its value in dealing with particulars. But for most of the writers who take this view, experience in addition to providing a acquaintance with particulars, acts as the stimulus or the occasion for the development of the seeds of knowledge implanted in the mind at birth. Although he rests his metaphysics on the innate ideas of self and God, Descartes also appeals to experimental knowledge in the sphere of natural science. To answer such a question as what is the nature of the magnet, the inquirer must first collect all the observations with which experience can supply him about this stone and from these he will next try to deduce its character.

The extreme position which denies any role to experience can be taken only by those who think that the growth of actual knowledge from innate ideas requires no outside impetus and perhaps also by those who make ideas the objects of the mind's intuitive apprehension. It is questionable whether anyone goes to this extreme without the qualification that for particulars at least sense-experience is knowledge.

The other extreme—that experience is the only source of knowledge—is approached by those who deny the distinction in faculties and substitute for the duality of sense and reason each with its characteristic contribution to human knowledge, a distinction between the function of perceiving and that of reworking the received materials. Though in different ways, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all appear to take this position.

They represent according to James the empirical school in psychology. He tries to summarize their view by saying that if all the connections among ideas in the mind could be interpreted as so many combinations of sense and motion, then experience in the common and legitimate sense of the word would be the sole fashioner of the mind. If

ceptive of all. There can be no meaningful distinction between experience and some other realm of existence. It is in this all-inclusive sense that experience is said to be the central term in the philosophy of John Dewey when it functions as *mind* does for Hegel, *substance* for Spinoza, or *being* for Aquinas and Aristotle.

WE HAVE GONE from one extreme to another in passing from a purely psychological to something like a metaphysical conception of experience. These are opposite in a way which suggests the contrast between the practical and the aesthetic values of experience—the actively useful and the intrinsically enjoyable. At least the metaphysical identification of experience with all existence seems analogous to the aesthetic ideal of a life which embraces every variety of experience.

There is some intimation of this ideal in the lust for adventure which motivates Odysseus and his men. Dante in fact finds the secret of his character in the ardor of Odysseus—to become experienced of the world and of the vices of men and of their virtue—which leads him to pursue virtue and knowledge even to the point of his mad flight.

There is some suggestion of this ideal of experience in the unbounded vitality of Gargantua and Pantagruel and in the enterprise of the Wife of Bath in Chaucer's tale. But the great poetic expression of this ideal is written in *Faust*—in the worlds of experience Mephistopheles opens to the man who has wagered his soul for one ultimately satisfying moment.

Whatever to all mankind is assured
I in my inmost being will enjoy and know.
Seize with my soul the highest and most deep
Men's weal and woe upon my bosom heap
And thus this self of mine to all their selves
expanded
Like them I too at last be stranded

THE BASIC ISSUE concerning the role of experience in the origin of knowledge, especially the organized knowledge of the arts and sciences, turns on whether it is the source or only a source. It is rarely if ever supposed that nothing can be learned from experience or that everything worth learning can come to be known entirely apart from experience. During the early centuries of Christianity devoutly religious men

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even more emphatic than Aristotle or Aquinas in his insistence on the empirical origin of knowledge goes as far as they do in affirming man's knowledge of God and the soul.

Hume in contrast holds that knowledge may go beyond experience only if it is knowledge of the relation of our ideas, as exemplified in the science of mathematics. Precisely because mathematics is not knowledge of matters of fact or real existence its propositions are accessible to Hume discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. But with regard to matters of fact Hume thinks that "experience is our only guide."

Any science which claims to be knowledge of reality or existence rather than of the relations between ideas, is thus limited to the realm of experienceable objects. According as the objects of a science fall within experience so also must its conclusions be verified by reference to experience. Experience is the ultimate test of what truth there is in the propositions of natural science. Only the propositions of mathematics can have a validity which does not require empirical verification.

By these criteria Hume challenges the validity of metaphysics or natural theology. Such disciplines claim to be knowledge of real existences, but their objects are not experienceable and their conclusions cannot be empirically verified. The existence of God and the immortality of the soul may be objects of faith but they are not verifiable conclusions of science nor for that matter can metaphysics give us authentic knowledge of the ultimate constitution of the physical world if that involves knowledge of substances and causes which lie behind the phenomena and outside of experience. "All the philosophy in the world," Hume writes, "and all the religion will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience."

Kant like Hume limits theoretical knowledge to mathematics and the study of nature. A metaphysics which pretends to know objects outside the phenomenal order cannot be defended. "The understanding has no power to decide," he writes, "whether other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience [exist], and consequently

whether some other sphere of matter exists. What transcends all possible experience in other words cannot be known at least not in the manner of the speculative sciences; only the moral sciences, proceeding in a different fashion have access to the realm of the supra-sensible."

Kant's position seems to resemble Hume's. But it involves a quite different conception of mathematics and natural science especially the latter which Kant divides into pure and empirical physics. Kant identifies pure physics with the metaphysics of nature in distinction from the metaphysics of morals; the one a theoretic, the other a practical science. For Kant the principles of both mathematics and pure physics are *a priori* rather than *a posteriori*; the objects of both are objects of actual or possible experience.

In the classification of sciences the natural sciences are usually set apart from mathematics, as well as from metaphysics, by being called *empirical* or *experimental*. These names signify not merely the inductive method by which the knowledge is obtained from experience; they also imply that hypotheses however formulated and conclusions, however reached must be verified by the facts of experience. Newton states it as a rule of reasoning in experimental philosophy [that] we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses "we may be imagined till such time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions." In similar tenor La Fontaine says that "we ought in every instance to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation."

The two words "empirical" and "experimental" should not however be used interchangeably. No science can be experimental without being empirical but as the chapter on Astronomy indicates the converse does not appear to be true.

There seem to be three different types of experience from which knowledge can be derived: (1) the ordinary everyday experiences which men accumulate without reflection...

in other words all that is done with the sensations impressions or ideas—whatever term is used for the original data of experience—consists in their reproduction by memory and imagination and their comparison combination and connection in various ways to produce complex ideas judgments and trains of reasoning then the entire content of human knowledge can be reduced to elements derived exclusively from experience

Whether this position is taken *with* or *without* qualification depends on the disposition that is made of the problem of universals or abstractions which is more fully discussed in the chapters on IDEAS SETS and UNIVERSAL. Locke's treatment of abstract ideas and the special consideration given by Hume to the concepts of mathematics suggest that there are kinds or aspects of knowledge which cannot be accounted for by reduction to experience. Both men introduce a certain qualification upon their empiricism. However slight that may be it does not appear in Hobbes and Berkeley for they completely deny the existence of abstract or universal notions in the mind. If abstract universal or general applies to names alone then the mind or understanding adds nothing to and does not radically transform the materials of experience.

THE CONTROVERSY concerning experience and knowledge can also be stated in terms of the opposition between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. These terms are sometimes used to signify what is possessed before and what comes after or from experience and sometimes they are used to indicate without reference to the time order what is independent of and what is dependent upon experience.

The distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is not made in the same way with respect to propositions or judgments and with respect to reasoning or inference. The distinction and its significance for science and philosophy are discussed in the chapters on JUDGMENT and REASONING. It is sufficient here to point out that an *a priori* judgment is not determined by experience nor does it need empirical verification.

It might at first be supposed that those who agree in thinking that experience is just one—

not the only—source of knowledge would also agree that some judgments especially the basic propositions of science are *a priori*. But this does not appear to be the case. Bacon for example like Aristotle holds that the principles of the various sciences are derived by induction from experience. There are and can exist he writes but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms and from them as principles and then supposed indisputable truth derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars by ascending continually and gradually till it finally arrives at the most general axioms. All axioms on this view are *a posteriori* propositions.

Descartes and Kant while differing in the terms of their analysis think as we have seen that the mind itself provides the ground for certain judgments which are therefore *a priori*. It does not even seem to be the case that those who make experience the only source of knowledge regard all propositions as *a posteriori*. Hume's treatment of mathematical propositions and James' treatment of axioms or necessary truths seem to be the exceptions here.

There is still another way in which the issue can be stated. The question is whether human knowledge extends to objects beyond experience to things or beings which are not sensible and which transcend all possible experience.

Again it might be supposed that those who take an *a posteriori* view of the origin of knowledge would also limit apprehension to things experienceable. But Aristotle and Aquinas seem to say that the origin of knowledge from experience does not restrict the knowable to things capable of being experienced. Aquinas cites Aristotle's work on the heavens to show that we may have a scientific knowledge of things we cannot experience by way of negation and by their relation to material things. He would hold what is true of astronomy to be even more the case in metaphysics and theology. Even though all our concepts are abstracted from experience we can by means of them reach beyond the sensible world to purely intelligible realities—to immaterial and non-sensible beings or aspects of being. Locke who may be thought

of discovery rather than of induction or verification. Hypotheses may result from such explorations, but in the first instance the experimentation may be undertaken without the guidance of hypotheses. This employment of experimental technique is illustrated by Faraday's remark that "the science of electricity is in that state in which every part of it requires experimental investigation not merely for the discovery of new effects, but what is just now of far more importance the development of the means by which the old effects are produced."

Experimental exploration apart from the direction of hypotheses seems to be a procedure of trial and error. Experimentation in this sense reflects what Hippocrates had in mind when he spoke of the experiment periclitus. In the work of Hippocrates at the very beginning of empirical science recourse to experiment far from being the most prized technique signified a lack of scientific knowledge. Only the physician who could not cure the patient by art based on science took the risk of experimenting—of proceeding by trial and error.

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special effort to investigate explore or test (2) the special data of experience which men collect by undertaking methodical research and making systematic observations with or without apparatus and (3) experiences artificially produced by men who exercise control over the phenomena and with respect to which the observer himself determines the conditions of his experience. Those experiences which are used to prove a scientific truth James writes are for the most part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after the truth itself has been conjectured.

Of these three only the last is an experimental experience. The first type of experience may be employed by the scientist but it is seldom sufficient or reliable enough for his purposes. The distinction between the empirical sciences which are and those which are not experimental turns on the difference between the second and third types.

It is not always possible for the scientist to perform experiments as for example in astronomy where the phenomena can be methodically observed and exactly recorded but cannot be manipulated or controlled. Among the great books of natural science the biological writings of Hippocrates Aristotle Galen and Darwin the astronomical works of Ptolemy Copernicus Kepler and Newton and the clinical studies of Freud are examples of scientific works which are more or less empirical but not experimental. In contrast Galileo's *Two New Sciences* Newton's *Optics* Harvey's *Motion of the Heart and Blood* Lavoisier's *Elements of Chemistry* and Faraday's *Experimental Researches in Electricity* represent empirical science which has recourse to experimentation at crucial points.

ON THE SIDE OF their production experiments are like inventions. They do not happen by chance or without the intervention of art. They are usually performed under carefully controlled conditions and by means of apparatus artfully contrived. This explains the interplay between technology and experimental science. Progress in each occasions progress in the other.

On the side of their utility experiments seem to serve three different though related purposes in scientific work. In those branches of physics

which are both mathematical and experimental, the experiment enables the scientist to make exact measurements of the phenomena and so to determine whether one or another mathematical formulation fits the observable facts of nature. Investigating accelerated motion Galileo seeks not only to demonstrate its definition and its properties but also to show that experimental results agree with and exactly correspond with those properties which have been one after another demonstrated by us.

The experiment of the inclined plane yields measurements which exemplify those ratios between space and time that are determined by one rather than by another mathematical definition of the acceleration of a freely falling body. The experiment is thus used to decide between two competing mathematical theories choosing that one best fitting natural phenomena. In those sciences Galileo writes in which mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural phenomena the principles once established by well chosen experiments become the foundation of the entire super structure.

Concerned with the phenomena of heat Fourier makes the same point concerning the relation of mathematics and experiments.

Mathematical analysis he says can deduce from general and simple phenomena the expression of the laws of nature but the special application of these laws to very complex effects demands a long series of exact observations for which experiments are needed.

In addition to testing hypotheses and providing measurements whereby mathematical formulations can be applied to nature experiments function as the source of inductions. A crucial experiment constitutes a single clear case from which a generalization can be drawn that is applicable to all cases. Newton's optical experiments are of this sort. He calls this use of experiments the method of analysis. It consists in making experiments and observations and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction. And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of.

A third use for experiments is in the exploration of new fields of phenomena for purposes

of discovery rather than of induction or verification. Hypotheses may result from such explorations but in the first instance the experimentation may be undertaken without the guidance of hypotheses. This employment of experimental technique is illustrated by Faraday's remark that the science of electricity is in that state in which every part of it requires experimental investigation not merely for the discovery of new effects but what is just now of far more importance the development of the means by which the old effects are produced.

Experimental exploration apart from the direction of hypotheses, seems to be a procedure of trial and error. Experimentation in this sense reflects what Hippocrates had in mind when he spoke of the experiment *periculosus*. In the work of Hippocrates at the very beginning of empirical science recourse to experiment far from being the most prized technique signified a lack of scientific knowledge. Only the physician who could not cure the patient by art based on science took the risk of experimenting — of proceeding by trial and error.

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk II { 65-83} 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of p₁₂c 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 117. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk II {65-83} 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7:45—(D) *II Esdras* 7:46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

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868a, 851b [in 3], 899a
- b The empirical source of induction, b-
tracution, generalization
- 8 A. TOTT *Principles of Philosophy* BK I CH 3 146
5 91 64 BK II CH 23 155 5 291 90b-c /
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5 111b-c CH 3 120a-c BK II CH 2 190b-24 301
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10-4 112 d / *Physics* BK I, CH I 259a-b
BK VI CH I 319b-321 335d 336b / *Hermes*

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [263, 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference. Line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases, e.g. *Iliad* BK II [63-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows, e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Various conceptions of experience

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH I [16 3-8] 25a / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [99^a 34 100^a 9] 136b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^a 25-981^b 9] 499b d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 301d 30^ad Q 64 A 1 REP 5 334a 335c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP 1 5 359c 360c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 50d PART II 128c PART IV 267b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 516b 524a
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 334a 335a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22c / *Discourse* PART I 44a c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 5 373d
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121b 123a esp SECT 2 121b c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30 418c
- 35 HOME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20 SECT VIII DIV 74 458^a 484c *passim* esp SECT IV DIV 28 SECT V DIV 38 460d 466c SECT VII DIV 58-61 476a 478a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 15c 45d 46a 47d 48a 53b-54b 56d 57b 58c 59b 65d 66d 72c 73a 176d 177a 225c 226b / *Practical Reason* 308a b

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 185b 187b 232b 238b esp 235a 236a 260a 261a 317b 318a 852b 858b

2 Experience in relation to the acts of the mind

- 7 PLATO *Meno* 179d 183a / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228a 230c / *Republic* BK VII 392c 393c / *Theaetetus* 534d 536b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I 499a 500b
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [379 521] 49a 51a esp [469 521] 50b 51a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X PAR 12 36 74b 80d esp PAR 14 74d 75a PAR 26 78a b PAR 31 79c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 5 288a d B 58 A 3 REP 3 301d 302d Q 64 A 1 REP 5 334a 335c Q 84 A 1 5-8 440c 451b PART I II Q 40 A 5 795d 796c A 6 ANS and REP 3 796c 797a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP 1 5 359c 360c
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 334c d
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22c 23a / *Discourse* PART III 50b d / *Mediations* 75a 77c esp 75d 76c / *Objections and Replies* 220d 230d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PR P 40 4 387a 388c

- 5 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I
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12 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a 14 c 22a c
23 24 34a-c 39a c 42a 45d-46a 47e-48a
53b-54b 58a 59b 61a-64a 66a-d 72 85d
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- 11 JAMES *Psychology* 2b-3 149b-152b esp
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- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 228a 230c / *Theaetetus* 523d
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19
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- 18 AUSTIN *Confessions* BK X PO 1 3674b-
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- 23 HUME *Enquiry* PART I 50d PA 7 II
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- 28 HAYE *On the Generation* 332 335c
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- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 59a b
- 31 S. I. OZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK CH I
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- 35 BECKLE *Human Knowledge* s CT 1 413a b
- 38 R. S. I. *Inequality* 14 341d 342a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 41c-42b 54b-56c 58a b
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 1b-3b 282a 291 esp 285b
32 329 331b-336a 383a b 413 b 433a
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- 54 F. I. *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c 364b

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straction, generalization

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK CH 30 [46
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [109-30-38]
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[395-25-3] 641a
- 18 AUSTIN *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 27
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 1
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 9
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- 28 HAYE *On the Generation* 332a-335c
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- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44c
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- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a VII 10c 11c
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- 31 S. I. OZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 107
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b-342b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a b 45b-46a / *Judge-
ment* 56 d 563b
- 45 FARADAY *Researches on Electricity* 659a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* 147a d, 18 d
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 303a 329a 331b 674a
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- 54 F. I. *Interpretation* 412a

2c The transcendental or innate structure of
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* II 108a c esp 14 15c
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 232b-238b esp 232b 233b
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(2) Experience in relation to the acts of the mind)

2d The *a priori* and *a posteriori* in judgment and reasoning

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* bk I ch 3 [72^b25-33] 99c bk II ch 19 136a 137a c / *Physics* bk I ch I 259a b / *Metaphysics* bk I ch I 499a 500b bk VI ch 3 [1029 33-112] 552a

10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 2 11d 12c Q 3 A 5 ANS 17c 18b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP I 5 359c 360c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a / *Meditations* III 81d 89a esp 88c d / *Objections and Replies* PROP I II 132b c 215b c 224b d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP II 1 358b 359b PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk I ch I SECT 15-16 98d 99c SECT 23 101b 109a bk IV ch IX SECT 1 349a ch XI SECT 13-14 357d 358c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20-SECT V DIV 38 458a 466c esp SECT IV DIV 30 462a SECT X DIV 89 490b-c SECT VI 497b 503c passim SECT VII DIV 131-132 508d 509d passim

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d 33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a 48d 57d 59b 64b 66d 108b d 110a 113b 115d 120c 123d 124b 134c d 141d 142c [antithesis] 146a 170d 171a 172c 173a 174a 177d 179c 182b 190c 191a 192a b 199a 209b d 211c 218d 2 4a 227a 228b d 230c 231c 236d 237a 244d 245a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Moral* 253a 254d esp 253b 254c d 268b d 283b / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d 329d 330c / *Science of Right* 405b d / *Judgement* 461a 475d esp 465c 467d 474b 475d 570b 572b 600d 603d esp 603a b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445d 447a passim 475b d [in 1]

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 182d 183c

51 JAMES *Psychology* 801a 890a esp 851a b 859a 861b 889a 890a

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7 PLATO *Gorgias* 253a

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* bk I ch 30 [46 18 28] 64a / *Posterior Analytics* bk II ch 19 136a 137a c / *Heavens* bk III ch 7 [306 6-18] 397b-c / *Generation and Corruption* bk I ch 2 [316 5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* bk I ch I 499a 500b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk X ch 9 [1180^b13 1181^b 12] 435b-436a c

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1-8 1a 3b / *Aphorisms* SECT I par I 131a

21 DANTE *Dante Comedy* PARADISE II [6 103] 108b d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60c 61a PART II 128d 129b

28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 322d 323d 324c d / *On Animal Generation* 331b 335c esp 334c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a / *Novum Organum* bk I APH 98 126d 127b

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a / *Discourse* PART I 44a c PART VI 61b d / *Meditations* I 75a 77c esp 75d 76c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 396 240b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk II ch I SECT 1-8 121a 123a esp SECT 2 121b-c ch I SECT 15 146d 147a

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35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20 SECT V DIV 38 458a-466c passim esp SECT V DIV 36 465a d [in I] 465c SECT VII DIV 60 477a c SECT VIII DIV 65 479b-480a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 15c / 2c 83d esp 72c 74b 82a b / *Judgement* 562d 563b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 281b

47 GOETHE *Faust* II RT I [522 601] 15a 15b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 449 451b

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7 PLATO *Charmides* 6d 7b / *Phaedrus* 136b c / *Gorgias* 253a 261a 262a 280d 282b 287d 288b / *Republic* bk I 303a 304a / *Theaetetus* 516a / *Philebus* 633a = / *Laws* bk IV 684c 685a bk IX 745a b

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* bk I ch 30 [46 18-28] 64a / *Posterior Analytics* bk II ch 19 [100 3-9] 136c / *Metaphysics* bk I ch I [1080^b25-932 1] 499b 500b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk I ch 13 [1102 15 26] 347c bk II ch I 348b d 349b passim bk III ch 8 [1116^b3 15] 362d 363a bk VI ch I [1138^b25 34] 387b bk X ch 9 [1180^b13 1181^b12] 435b 436a = / *Politics* bk III ch 11 [1281^b40 1281^b46] 479d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1-8 1a 3b par 20 7b d / *Epidemics* bk III SECT III par 16 59b = / *Surgery* par I 70b / *Articulations* par 10 94d / *The Law* 144a

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk II ch 9 195c 196a

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* bk IV ch 3 676a d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60c d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 66a b 368a 377d passim c.p 377a d 450d-451a 523c 524a

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8 AR OTL *Prs Analysis* = CH 3 [16
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10 H POCHIA S *Ancient Medicine* par 1-81a 3b
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20 AQ S *mma Theologic* P T III Q 9
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23 HO S *Les alh* A 60 d PART II
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25 V Essay 260c 261c 285 288a
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28 G NE *Loadstone* 2 1a b BK I 6 ?
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28 C LECO *T o New Science* T D 131a
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30 B *Adi cement f Le* g 5b-c 16a
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31 D *Rule* II 2d 3 VI 10c 12a
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31 S OZ *Eth* c P I PRO 4 S OL I 2
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34 NEWTO *Principles* BK III RULE III IV 270b-
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34 HUTGE S *Light* CH I 553a

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43 M LL *Litlu rian sm* 445b-447a passim
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45 LAVOI R *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1c
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45 F RA Y *Rese ches in Elect* icty 774d

46 HE L *Phlos phy of Right* INTRO P r 3
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54 FA LO *Narcissum* 400d-401 / *Inst nets*
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4a The knowability of that which is out d
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7 PLATO *Cratyl* s 94a 113b-114 c / *Rep bl c*
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8 ARISTOTLE *H a ens* κ CH I [298^b 2 4]
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9 ARISTOTL *Paris f A mals* κ CH I [644^b
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12 LEC *Nature f Th g* BK I [6 3 8]
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18 A STIVE *City of G d* K XI CH 2 4 323a
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- (4) *Experience as measuring the scope of human knowledge* 4a *The knowability of that which is outside experience the supra-sensible the noumenal or transcendent*
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q. 1 1-10d 12c QQ 12-13 50b 75b ■ 32 175d 180d Q 77 A 1 REI 7 399c 401b Q 84 A 5 446c 447c A 6 REP 3 447c 449a QQ 87-88 464d 473a Q 89 A 2 475a d Q 91 A 1 2 501d 504a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 359c 360c PART III SUPPL Q 75 A 3 REP-938a 939c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54b c 78d 79a PART II 163a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 291b 294b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 39d 40a 41b d 96d 97b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 53b 54b / *Objections and Replies* 215b c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [52 58] 331a 332a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 2-10 121b 173d SECT 19 24 126a 127c CH XII SECT 1 2 147b d CH XVIII SECT 2 3 204b d SECT 6-7 205b 206a SECT 29 211d 212a SECT 3-37 212c 214b BK III CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 9 II 270d 771d BI IV CH III SECT 14 315b d SECT 16 317a c SECT 25-29 321a 323a passim CH VII SECT 9-1 360d 362c passim CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a
- 35 BURNLEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 27 418a b SECT 135 14 440a-441c
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b 457b SECT IV DIV 20 SECT V DIV 38 458a 466c passim SECT VIII DIV 81 487a SECT XI 497b 503c passim SECT XII DIV 119 505a b DIV 127 507b c
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 308c d
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I CH 3 [10^b 13] 361c d BK III CH 7 [306^b 18] 397b c / *Soul* BK I CH I [402^b 15-403 2] 631d 632a
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- Other discussions of the role of experimentation in scientific inquiry *see* INDUCTION 5 LOGIC 4b MECHANICS 2a PHYSICS 4-4d SCIENCE 5a
- Experience as a factor in education *see* EDUCATION 5f
- The treatment of religious or mystical experience or of related matters *see* GOD 6c(3) PROPHECY 1b RELIGION 1b(2)-1b(3) SIGN AND SYMBOL 5b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

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Chapter 26 FAMILY

INTRODUCTION

THE human family according to Rousseau is the most ancient of all societies and the only one that is natural. On the naturalness of the family there seems to be general agreement in the great books although not all would claim like Rousseau that it is the *only* natural society. The state is sometimes also regarded as a natural community but its naturalness is not as obvious and has often been disputed.

The word natural applied to a community or association of men can mean either that men *instinctively* associate with one another as do bees and buffaloes or that the association in question while voluntary and to that extent conventional is also *necessary* for human welfare. It is in this sense of necessity or need that Rousseau speaks of family ties as natural. The children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation he writes. As soon as this need ceases the natural bond is dissolved. If after that they remain united they continue so no longer naturally but voluntarily and the family itself is then maintained only by convention.

Locke appears to attribute the existence of the human family to the same sort of instinctive determination which establishes familial ties among other animals though he recognizes that the protracted infancy of human offspring make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man than the other species of animals. Since with other animals as well as in the human species the end of conjunction between male and female [is] not barely procreation but the continuation of the species it ought to last in Locke's opinion even after procreation so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones who are to be sustained by those who got them till they are able to shift and support for themselves. This rule he adds which the infinite

wise Maker hath set to the works of His hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey.

Yet Locke does not reduce the association of father mother and children entirely to a divinely implanted instinct for the perpetuation of the species. Conjugal society he writes is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman and though it consists chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end procreation yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance and a communion of interests too.

If the human family were *entirely* an instinctively formed society we should expect to find the pattern or structure of the domestic community the same at all times and everywhere. But since the time of Herodotus historians and later anthropologists have observed the great diversity in the institutions of the family in different tribes or cultures or even at different times in the same culture. From his own travels among different peoples Herodotus reports a wide variety of customs with respect to marriage and the family. From the travels of other men Montaigne culls a similar collection of stories about the diversity of the mores with respect to sex especially in relation to the rules or customs which hedge the community of man and wife.

Such facts raise the question whether the pattern of monogamy pictured by Locke represents anything more than one type of human family—the type which predominates in western civilization or even more narrowly in Christendom. Marx for instance holds that the structure of the family depends on the character of its economical foundation and insists that it is of course just as absurd to hold the Teutonic Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman the ancient

Greek or the Eastern forms which moreover taken together form a series in historic development

Though the observation of the various forms which the human family takes has led some writers to deny the naturalness of the family—at least so far as its naturalness would mean a purely instinctive formation—it has seldom been disputed that the family fulfills a natural human need. Conventional in structure the family remains natural as a means indispensable to an end which all men *naturally* desire. There must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other. Aristotle writes, namely of male and female, that the race may continue and he goes on to say that this union is formed not of deliberate purpose but because in common with other animals and with plants mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves.

The human infant, as Locke observes, requires years of care in order to survive. If the family did not exist as a relatively stable organization to serve this purpose, some other social agency would have to provide sustained care for children. But wherever we find any other social units, such as tribes or cities, there we also find some form of the family in existence, not only performing the function of rearing children but also being the primitive social group out of which all larger groupings seem to grow or to be formed. Aristotle, for example, describes the village or tribe as growing out of an association of families just as later the city or state comes from a union of villages.

We have seen that the naturalness of the family—as answering a natural need—is not incompatible with its also being a product of custom or convention. The facts reported by Herodotus, Montaigne and Darwin, which show the variability of families in size and membership in form and government, do not exclude but on the contrary emphasize the further fact that wherever men live together at all they also live in families.

Whether or not the political community is also a natural society, and if so whether it is natural in the same way as the family, are questions reserved for the chapter on STATE. But it should be noted here that for some writers, for Aristotle particularly and to a lesser extent

for Locke, the naturalness of the family not only points to a natural development of the state but also helps to explain how in the transition from the family to the state paternal government gives rise to royal rule or absolute monarchy. Even Rousseau who thinks that the family is the *only* natural society finds in the correspondence between a political ruler and a father reason for saying that the family may be called the first model of political societies.

IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION a family normally consists of a husband and wife and their offspring. If the procreation and rearing of offspring is the function or even a function which the family naturally exists to perform, then a childless family cannot be considered normal. Herel suggests another reason for offspring. He sees in children the bond of union which makes the family a community.

The relation of love between husband and wife, he writes, is in itself not objective because even if their feeling is their substantial unity, still this unity has no objectivity. Such an objectivity parents first acquire in their children, in whom they can see objectified the entirety of their union. In the child a mother loves its father and he its mother. Both have their love objectified for them in the child. While in their goods their unity is embodied only in an external thing, in their children it is embodied in a spiritual one in which the parents are loved and which they love.

Until recent times when it has been affected by urban industrial conditions, the family tended to be a much larger unit, not only with regard to the number of children but also with respect to other members and relationships. The household included servants, if not slaves; it included blood relatives in various degrees of consanguinity; its range extended over three or even four generations. Sancho Panza's wife, for instance, pictures the ideal marriage for her daughter as one in which we shall have her all days under our eyes and be all one family: parents and children, grandchildren and sons in law, and the peace and blessing of God will dwell among us. Even though they belong to the nineteenth century, the families in *War and Peace* indicate how different is the domestic

Chapter 26 FAMILY

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establishment under agrarian and semi feudal conditions

But even when it comprised a larger and more varied membership the family differed from other social units such as tribe or state in both size and function. Its membership determined by consanguinity was usually more restricted than that of other groups although blood relationships often more remote may also operate to limit the membership of the tribe or the state. Its function according to Aristotle at least in origin was to supply men's everyday wants, whereas the state went beyond this in aiming at other conditions of a good life.

In an agricultural society of the sort we find among the ancients the household rather than the city occupied with the problems of wealth. In addition to the breeding and rearing of children and probably because of this in part the family as a unit seems to have been concerned with the means of subsistence on the side of both production and consumption. Its members shared in a division of labor and in a division of the fruits thereof.

Apart from those industries manned solely by slave labor in the service of the state the production of goods largely depended on the industry of the family. In modern times this system of production came to be called the domestic as opposed to the factory system. It seems to persist even after the industrial revolution. But according to Marx this modern so called domestic industry has nothing except the name in common with the old fashioned domestic industry, the existence of which presupposes independent urban handicrafts, independent peasant farming and above all a dwelling house for the laborer and his family.

In effect the industrial revolution produced an economy in which not only agriculture but the family ceased to be central. The problem shifts from the wealth of families to the wealth of nations even as production shifts from the family to the factory. Modern industry according to Marx by assigning an important part in the process of production outside the domestic sphere to women to young persons and to children of both sexes creates a new economical foundation.

The family was for centuries what the factory and the storehouse have only recently become in an era of industrialism. For the ancients the problems of wealth—its acquisition, accumulation and use—were domestic not political. The so called art of getting wealth Aristotle writes is according to some identical with household management according to others a principal part of it. In his own judgment property is a part of the household and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household—but a part only because the household includes human beings as well as property and is concerned with the government of persons as well as the management of things.

The foregoing throws light on the extraordinary shift in the meaning of the word economics from ancient to modern times. In the significance of their Greek roots the word *polity* signifies a state the word *economy* a family and as *politics* referred to the art of governing the political community *economics* referred to the art of governing the domestic community. Only in part was it concerned with the art of getting wealth. As the chapter on WEALTH indicates Rousseau tries to preserve the broader meaning when he uses the phrase *political economy* for the general problems of government but for the most part in modern usage economics refers to a science or art concerned with wealth and it is political in the sense that the management of wealth and of men with respect to wealth has become the problem of the state rather than the family. Not only has the industrial economy become more and more a political affair but the character of the family as a social institution has also changed with its altered economic status and function.

THE chief question about the family in relation to the state has been in ancient as well as in modern times whether the family has natural rights which the state cannot justly invade or transgress.

The proposal in Plato's *Republic*—that the wives of our guardians are to be common and their children are to be common and no parent is to know his own child nor any child his parent—was as radical in the fifth century

its counterpart would be today. When Socrates proposes this, Glaucon suggests that the possibility as well as the utility of such a law may be subject to a good many doubts. But Socrates does not think that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of law in wives and children in common: the possibility, he adds, is quite another matter and will be very much disputed.

Aristotle questions both the desirability and possibility. The premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, he says, is the greater the unity of the state the better. He denies this premise. Is it not obvious, he asks, that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a state is to be a plurality and in tending to a greater unity from being a state it becomes a family and from being a family an individual. Hence we ought not to attain if it is greatest unity even if we could for it would be the destruction of the state. In defusion the scheme taken literally is unpracticable.

It is significant that Aristotle's main argument against Plato's communism (which includes the community of property as well as the community of women and children) is based upon the nature of the state rather than on the rights of the family. It seems to have been a prevalent view in antiquity at least among philosophers that the children should be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their parents. Antigone's example shows however that this view was by no means without exception. Her defiance of Creon based on the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven, is also undertaken for the majesty of kindred blood. In this sense it constitutes an affirmation of the rights and duties of the family.

In the Christian tradition the rights of the family as against the state are also defended by reference to divine law. The point is not that the state is less a natural community than the family in the eyes of a theologian like Aquinas but in addition to having a certain priority in the order of nature the family more directly than the state is of divine origin. Not only is it founded on the sacrament of matrimony but the express commandments of God declare the

duties of care and obedience which bind its members together. For the state to interfere in those relationships between parents and children or between husband and wife which fall under the regulation of divine law would be to exceed its authority and hence to act without right and in violation of rights founded upon a higher authority.

In the Christian tradition philosophers like Hobbes and Kant state the rights of the family in terms of natural law or defend them as natural rights. Because the first instruction of children, writes Hobbes, depends on the care of their parents it is necessary that they should be obedient to them while they are under their tuition. Originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord with power over him of life and death. When the fathers of families relinquished such absolute power in order to form a commonwealth or state they did not lose nor did they have to give up according to Hobbes, all control of their children. Nor would there be any reason, he goes on, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men. And thus he says accords with the Fifth Commandment.

In the section of his *Science of Man* devoted to the rights of the family as a domestic society Kant argues that from the fact of procreation there follows the duty of preserving and rearing children. From this duty he derives the rights of parents to the management and training of the child so long as it is itself incapable of making proper use of its body as an organism and of its mind as an understanding. This includes its nourishment and the care of its education. It also includes in general the function of forming and developing it practically, that is, may be able in the future to maintain and advance itself and also its moral culture and development the guilt of neglecting it falling upon the parents.

As is evident from Hobbes and Kant the rights of the family can be vindicated without denying that the family like the individual owes obedience to the state. In modern terms, at least the problem is partly stated by the question: To what extent can parents justly claim exemption from political interference in

the control of their own children? But this is only part of the problem. It must also be asked whether in addition to regulating the family for the general welfare of the whole community the state is also entitled to interfere in the affairs of the household in order to protect children from parental mismanagement or neglect. Both questions call for a consideration of the form and principles of domestic government.

THE KINDS OF RULE and the relation between ruler and ruled in the domestic community have a profound bearing on the theory of government in the larger community of the state. Many of the chapters on the forms of government—especially CONSTITUTION, MONARCHY and TYRANNY—indicate that the great books of political theory from Plato and Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau derive critical points from the comparison of domestic and political government.

We shall pass over the master-slave relationship both because that is considered in the chapter on SLAVERY and because not all households include human chattel. Omitting these two fundamental relationships which domestic government involves remain to be examined the relation of husband and wife and of parents and children.

With regard to the first there are questions of equality and administrative supremacy. Even when the wife is regarded as the complete equal of her husband the administrative question remains for there must either be a division of authority or unanimity must prevail or one—either the husband or the wife—must have the last word when disagreement must be overcome to get any practical matter decided. So far as husband and wife are concerned should the family be an absolute monarchy or a kind of constitutional government?

Both an ancient and a modern writer appear to answer this question in the same way. A husband and father Aristotle says rules over wife and children both free but the rule differs the rule over his children being a royal over his wife a constitutional rule. Yet the relation between husband and wife in Aristotle's view is not perfectly constitutional. In the state the citizens rule and are ruled in turn

on the supposition that their natures are equal and do not differ at all. In the family however Aristotle thinks that although there may be exceptions to the order of nature the male is by nature fitter for command than the female.

According to Locke the husband and wife though they have but one common concern yet having different understandings will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It therefore being necessary that the last determination (i.e. the rule) should be placed somewhere it naturally falls to the man's share as the abler and the stronger. But thus Locke thinks leaves the wife in the full and true possession of what by contract is her peculiar right and at least gives the husband no more power over her than she has over his life the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him where natural right or their contract allows it.

In the so-called Marriage Group of the *Canterbury Tales* Chaucer gives voice to all of the possible positions that have ever been taken concerning the relation of husband and wife. The Wife of Bath for example argues for the rule of the wife. She claims that nothing will satisfy women until they have the sovereignty as well upon their husband as their love and to have mastery their man above. The Clerk of Oxford in his tale of patient Griselda presents the wife who freely admits to her husband

When first I came to you just so left I my will
and all my liberty. The Franklin in his tale allows the mastery to neither wife nor husband save that the name and show of sovereignty would belong to the latter. He dares to say

That friends each one the other must obey
If they d be friends and long keep company
Love will not be constrained by mastery
Women by nature love their liberty
And not to be constrained like my thrall
And so do men if say the truth I shall
Thus did she take her servant and her lord
Servant in love and lord in their marriage
So was he both in lordship and bondage

WHILE THERE MAY be disagreement regarding the relation between husband and wife there is none regarding the inequality between parents and children during the offspring's imma-

in his liberty. Every man may enjoy "equal liberty to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other men." Children, according to Locke, are not born in this full state of equality though they are born to it.

Paternal power even absolute rule, over children arises from this fact. So long as the child "is in an estate wherein he has no understanding of his own to direct his will," Locke thinks he "is not to have any will of his own to follow. If that understands for him must will for him too. He must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions." But Locke adds the important qualification that when the son "comes to the estate which makes his father a free man, the son is a free man too."

Because children are truly inferior in competence there would seem to be no injustice in their being ruled by their parents or in the rule being absolute in the sense that children are precluded from exercising a decisive voice in the conduct of their own or their family's affairs. Those who think that kings cannot claim the absolute authority of parental rule frequently use the word *despotic* to signify unjustified paternalism—a transference to the state of a type of dominion which can be justified only in the family.

The nature of despotism as absolute rule is discussed in the chapters on Monarchy and Tyranny but its relevance here makes it worth repeating that the Greek word from which *despotic* comes, like its Latin equivalent *potestas*, signifies the rule of a household and carries the connotation of absolute rule—the complete mastery of the father over the children and the servants, if not over the wife. A condition like this would seem to be nothing unusual in referring to domestic government as *despotic*, at least not to the extent that in the case of the children, absolute rule is justified by their immaturity. The problem arises only with respect to despotism in the state when our man rules another mature man as absolutely as a parent rules a child.

The great defender of the doctrine that the sovereign must be absolute "to ease there is no inconsistency at all" sees no difference between the rights of the ruler of a state—the sovereign by institution—and those of a father as the

natural master of his family. The rights and consequences of both paternal and despotic dominion, Hobbes maintains, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution. On the other hand Rousseau an equally trenchant opponent of absolute rule, uses the word despotism only in an invective sense for what he regards as illegitimate government—absolute monarchy. Even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between the State and the family he writes, "it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper for one of these societies would be also proper for the other."

Rousseau even goes so far as to deny that paternal rule is despotic in his sense of that term. With regard to paternal authority from which some writers have derived absolute government he remarks that "nothing can be further from the furious spirit of despotism than the mildness of that authority which looks more to the advantage of him who obeys than to that of him who commands. He agrees with Locke in the observation that unlike the political despot, the father is the child's master no longer than his help is necessary." When both are equal, the son is perfectly independent of the father and owes him "only respect and not obedience."

Misrule in the family then would seem to occur when these conditions or limits are violated. Parents may try to continue their absolute control past the point at which the children have become mature and are competent to take care of their own affairs. A parent who does not relinquish his absolutism at this point can be called "despotic" in the derogatory sense of that word.

Applying a distinction made by some political writers, the parent is tyrannical rather than despotic when he uses the children for his own good treats them as property to exploit even at a time when his absolute direction of their affairs would be justified if it were for the child's welfare. The existence of parental tyranny raises in its sharpest form the question of the state's right to intervene in the family for the good of its members.

THE CENTRAL ELEMENT in the domestic establishment is, of course, the institution of mar-

nage The discussion of marriage in the great books deals with most of the moral and psychological if not all of the sociological and economic aspects of the institution The most profound question perhaps is whether marriage is merely a human institution to be regulated solely by custom and civil law or a contract under the sanctions of natural law or a religious sacrament signifying and imparting God's grace The last two of these alternatives may not exclude one another but those who insist upon the first usually reject the other two

Some like the Parson in the *Canterbury Tales* consider marriage not only a natural but also a divine institution—a sacrament ordained by God Himself in Paradise and confirmed by Jesus Christ as witness St Matthew in the gospel: For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife and they twain shall be one flesh; which be tokens the knitting together of Christ and of Holy Church

Others like Kant seem to stress the character of marriage as an institution sanctioned by natural law The natural union of the sexes he writes proceeds either according to the mere animal nature (*vera libido venusvulvaga fornicatio*) or according to law The latter is marriage (*matrimonium*) which is the union of two persons of different sex for life long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties Kant considers offspring as a natural end of marriage but not the exclusive end for then the marriage would be dissolved of itself when the production of children ceased Even assuming he declares that enjoyment in the reciprocal use of the sexual endowments is an end of marriage yet the contract of marriage is not on that account a matter of arbitrary will but is a contract necessary in its nature by the Law of Humanity In other words if a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual natures they must necessarily marry each other

Still others see marriage primarily as a civil contract Freud for example considers the view that sexual relations are permitted only on the basis of a final indissoluble bond between a man and woman as purely a convention of present day civilization Marriage as a set of taboos restricting the sexual life varies from

culture to culture but in Freud's opinion the high water mark in this type of development has been reached in our Western European civilization

The conception of marriage—whether it is merely a civil or a natural and even a divine institution—obviously affects the position to be taken on monogamy on divorce on chastity and adultery and on the comparative merits of the married and the celibate condition The pagans for the most part regard celibacy as a misfortune especially for women as witness the tragedy of the unwedded Electra Christianity on the other hand celebrates the heroism of virginity and encourages the formation of monastic communities for celibates Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition there are striking differences Not only were the patriarchs of the Old Testament polygamous but orthodox Judaism and orthodox Christianity also differ on divorce

Augustine explains how a Christian should interpret those passages in the Old Testament which describe the polygamous practices of the patriarchs The saints of ancient times he writes were under the form of an earthly kingdom foreshadowing and foretelling the kingdom of heaven And on account of the necessity for a numerous offspring the custom of one man having several wives was at that time blameless and for the same reason it was not proper for one woman to have several husbands because a woman does not in that way become more fruitful In regard to matters of this sort he concludes whatever the holy men of those times did without lust Scripture passes over without blame although they did things which could not be done at the present time except through lust

On similar grounds Aquinas holds that it was allowable to give a bill of divorce under the law of the Old Testament but it is not allowable under the Christian dispensation because divorce is contrary to the nature of a sacrament The greatest familiarity between man and wife requires the staunchest fidelity which is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered Within the Christian tradition Locke takes an opposite view of divorce He can see good reason why the society of man and wife should be more lasting than that of

mal and female amongst other creatures, but he does not see why this compact where protection and education are secured and when tance taken care for may not be made determinable either by consent or at a certain time or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compact there being no necessity in the nature of the thing that it should always be for life. Against Locke Dr. Johnson would argue that to the contract of marriage besides the man and wife there is a third party—Society and if it be considered as a vow—God and therefore it cannot be dissolved by their consent alone.

Laws and customs, however, represent only the external or social aspect of marriage. The discussion of these externals cannot give any impression of the inwardness and depth of the problem which marriage is for the individual person. Only the great poems, the great novels and plays, the great books of history and biography can adequately present the psychological and emotional aspects of marriage in the life of individuals. Heightened in narration they give more eloquent testimony than the case histories of Freud support the proposition that marriage is at all times—in every culture and under the widest variety of circumstances—one of the supreme tests of human character.

The relation between men and women in and out of marriage, the relation of husband and wife before and after marriage, the relation of parents and children—these create crises and tensions, conflicts between love and duty, between reason and the passions from which no individual can entirely escape. Marriage is not only a typically human problem but it is the one problem which both psychologically and morally touches every man, woman, and child. Sometimes the resolution is tragic; sometimes the outcome seems to be happy, almost blessed, but whether a human life is built on this foundation or broken against these rocks it is forever shaken in the process and forever shaped.

To some degree each reader of the great books has, in imagination if not in action, participated in the trials of Odysseus, Penelope, and Telemachus in the affections of Hector and Andromache, Alcestis and Admetus, Tom Jones and Sophia, Natasha and Pierre Bezukhov, in the jealousy of Othello, the anguish of Lear

in the decision of Aeneas or the indecision of Hamlet, and certainly in the reasoning of Panurion about whether to marry or not. In each of these cases everyone finds some aspect of love in relation to marriage, some phase of parenthood or childhood which has colored his own life or that of his family, and he can find somewhere in his own experience the grounds for sympathetic understanding of the extraordinary relation between Electra and her mother Clytemnestra, between Augustine and Monica his mother, between Oedipus and Jocasta, Prince Hamlet and Queen Gertrude, Pierre Bezukhov and his wife, or what is perhaps the most extraordinary case of all—Adam and Eve in *Paradise Lost*.

On one point the universality of the problem of marriage and family life seems to require qualification. The conflict between conjugal and illicit love exists in all ages. The entanglement of the blood between man and wife with the ties—of both love and blood—which unite parents and children is equally universal. But the difficulties which arise in marriage as a result of the ideals or the illusions of romantic love seem to constitute a peculiarly modern problem. The ancients distinguished between sexual love and the love of friendship and they understood the necessity for both in the conjugal relationship if marriage is to prosper. But not until the later Middle Ages did men think of matrimony as a way to perpetuate throughout all the years the ardor of that moment in a romantic attachment when the lovers find each other without flaw and beyond reproach.

Matters relevant to this modern problem are discussed in the chapter on Love. As is there indicated, romantic love though it seems to be of Christian origin may also be a distortion—even an heretical perversion—of the kind of Christian love which is pledged in the reciprocal vows of holy matrimony.

WE HAVE ALREADY considered some of the problems of the family which relate to children and youth—the immature members of the human race—such as whether the child belongs to the family or the state and whether the family is solely responsible for the care and training of children, or a share of this responsibility falls to the state or the church.

There are other problems. Why do men and women want offspring and what satisfactions do they get from rearing children? For the most part in Christendom and certainly in antiquity the lot of the childless is looked upon as a grievous frustration. To be childless is not merely contrary to nature but for pagan as well as Christian it constitutes the deprivation of a blessing which should grace the declining years of married life. The opposite view so rarely taken is voiced by the chorus of women in the *Medea* of Euripides:

Those who are wholly without experience and have never had children far surpass in happiness those who are parents. The women chime in response to *Medea's* tragic leave taking from her own babes. The childless because they have never proved whether children grow up will be a blessing or a curse to men are removed from all share in many troubles whilst those who have a sweet race of children growing up in their houses do wear away their whole life through first with the thought how they may train them up in virtue next how they shall leave their sons the means to live and after all this is far from clear whether on good or bad children they bestow their toil.

Still other questions arise concerning children quite apart from the attitude of parents toward having and rearing them. What is the economic position of the child both with respect to ownership of property and with respect to a part in the division of labor? How has the economic status of children been affected by industrialism? What are the mental and moral characteristics of the immature which exclude them from participation in political life and which require adult regulation of their affairs? What are the criteria—emotional and mental as well as chronological—which determine the classification of individuals as children or adults and how is the transition from childhood to manhood effected economically, politically and above all emotionally?

The authors of the great books discuss most of these questions but among them only Freud sees in the relation of children to their parents the basic emotional determination of human life. The fundamental triangle of love and hate, devotion and rivalry consists of father, mother and child. For Freud all the intricacies and per-

versions of love—the qualitative distinctions of romantic, conjugal and illicit love—the factors which determine the choice of a mate and success or failure in marriage and the conditions which determine the emergence from emotional infantilism—all these can be understood only by reference to the emotional life of the child in the vortex of the family.

The child's great task according to Freud is that of freeing himself from the parents for only after this detachment is accomplished can he cease to be a child and so become a member of the social community. These tasks are laid down for every man but Freud writes it is noteworthy how seldom they are carried through ideally that is how seldom they are solved in a manner psychologically as well as socially satisfactory. In neurotics however he adds this detachment from the parents is not accomplished at all.

In one sense it is never fully accomplished by anyone. What Freud calls the ego-ideal—which represents our higher nature and which in the name of the reality principle resists instinctual compliance with the pleasure principle—is said to have its origin in the identification with the father which takes place in the prehistory of every person. Even after an individual has achieved detachment from the family this ego-ideal acts as a substitute for the longing for a father and in the form of conscience it continues to exercise the censorship of morals.

ONE OTHER GROUP of questions which involve the family—at least as background—concerns the position or role of women. We have already considered their relation to their husbands in the government of the family itself. The way in which that relation is conceived affects the status and activity of women in the larger community of the state in relation to citizenship and the opportunities for education to the possession of property and the production of wealth (for example the role of female labor in an industrial economy).

Again it is Euripides who gives voice to the plight of women in a man's world in two of his great tragedies the *Trojan Women* and *Medea*. In the one they cry out under the brunt of the suffering which men leave them to bear in the

backwash of war. In the other Medea passionately berates the ignominy and bondage which women must accept in being wives. Of all things that have life and sense she says we women are the most hapless creatures: first must we buy a husband at great price and then over ourselves a tyrant set which is an evil worse than the first.

The ancient world contains another feminist who goes further than Euripides in speaking for the right of women to be educated like men to share in property with them and to enjoy the privileges as well as to discharge the tasks of citizenship. In the tradition of the great books the striking fact is that after Plato the next great declaration of the rights of women should be written by one who is as far removed from him in time and temper as John Stuart Mill.

In Plato's *Republic* Socrates argues that if the difference between men and women consists only in women bearing and men begetting children this does not amount to proof that a woman differs from a man in respect to the sort of education she should receive. For the same reason he says: the guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits. Since he thinks that the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both, Socrates insists that there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman or which a man has by virtue of his sex. All the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also. Yet he adds that in all of them a woman is inferior to a man. Therefore when he proposes to let women share in the toils of war and the defence of their country Socrates suggests that in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women who are the weaker natures.

Mill's tract on *The Subjection of Women* is his fullest statement of the case for social economic and political equality between the sexes. In *Representative Government* his defense of women's rights deals primarily with the question of extending the franchise to them. Difference of sex he contends is as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color of the hair. All human beings have the same interest in good government. Mankind have long since abandoned the only premises which will support the conclusion that women ought not to have votes. No one now holds that women should be in personal servitude that they should have no thought wish or occupation but to be the domestic drudges of husbands fathers or brothers. It is allowed to unmarried and wants but little of being conceded to married women to hold property and have pecuniary and business interests in the same manner as men. It is considered suitable and proper that women should think and write and be teachers. As soon as these things are admitted Mill concludes the political disqualification has no principle to rest on.

Though no other of the great books speaks so directly for the emancipation of women from domestic and political subjection many of them do consider the differences between men and women in relation to war and love pleasure and pain virtue and vice duty and honor. Some are concerned explicitly with the pivotal question—whether men and women are more alike than different whether they are essentially equal in their humanity or unequal. Since these are matters pertinent to human nature itself as it is affected by gender the relevant passages are collected in the chapter on Man.

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2 The family and the state

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2b Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government

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Find the passage cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passage referred to. For example in 4 *Howe's Last* xii [65 253] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page numbers When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 *James' First* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 6 and ends in the lower half of page 9. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 *Plato's Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 6 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

Actions D 1 0 5 O or more of the main divisions of a work (such as Part, Book, Chapter, etc.) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Last* x 1 [26, 33] 12d.

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Symbols The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of the style of the references in the use of *The Great Library* consult the Preface.

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36 SA F *Gulliver* a x t 1 29b-31a s t n
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38 R l s v *Inequ lun* 327c-d / P l u / *Econ*
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15 T C I T L A *Annal* bk i 3 b d

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20 A Q v S m r *Theologica* x t s i s 12
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35 LOCKE *Civil Government* c i v i sect 2 73
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36 SYER z *Trietram Shards* 376b 379a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spir of Laus* bk iii 50a s
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38 R l s v i l e j l u y 350a b / *P cal Econ*
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39 SMITH II *slh of A o s* i v t r o 1b-c bk iii
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40 GIB ON *Decl card f* II 16c 17d 66d 67b
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41 GIBSON *Declure a d Fall* 83a 86d 89d

43 MELL *Liberty* 319b-d

44 BOSWELL *J h son* 14 c 148b { 7 3 } 74b-
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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* p r t i i i par
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50 M ax *Cap l* 34c-d 171d 172

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36 The effects of polit cal economy: the fam ly a the industr l system

38 ROE z v *Polica Eco my* 367a 368c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Natio s* bk i 27b-37b esp
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43 MELL *Liberty* 319b-d

44 BOSWELL *J h son* 197d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* p r t i i par 2, 3
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50 MARX *Cap l* 117c 144 passim 192c 196d
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 50 M ax E C U L S *Comm u i s t M a f e u* 420d
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I Peter 3

7 PLATO *Republ* k v 361b 365d / *S i s*
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9 AR TOTLE *Pol c s* bk i ch 2 { 25 } 69
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12 E S C Y T U S D v t a i i ch 7 183b-d
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(2) *The family and the state 2a Comparison of the domestic and political community in origin structure and function*)

- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [679 702] 229a b [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66 80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a B
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH I 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 99b c 111a b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI VII 36a 46c CH XV 64c 65d
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 13b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 359b a / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b PART III par 157 57d par 181 63c d par 203 68a c par 255 256 79d 80a par 303 101c 102a par 349 111d 112a ADDITIONS 47 124b b 115 116 135c d 157 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d 180c 182c PART I 211a 212c 216d 247a PART III 288c 289d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b d 310a c 579b 581c esp 581a b
- 54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 664b d 685b 687d esp 686c 687d 692a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781d 783d esp 781d 782d 796b c

2b Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 22 20-22—(D) *Isaiah* 22 20-2

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d
- 7 PLATO *Statesman* 581a b / *Laws* BK I 641a 642b BK III 664a 666c esp 666b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 6 [1134^b 17] 382b c CH II [1138^b 5-14] 387a c BK VI CH 5 [1140^b 7 10] 389b c CH III [1141^b 28 112d 11] 390d 391a BK VIII CH 10-11 412c 413d BK X CH 9 [1180^b 3 7] 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 1-2 445a 446d CH 5 447d 448c CH 7 [1255^b 15 20] 449b CH 12 453d 454a CH 13 [1259^b 30-1260 33] 454b 455a BK III CH 6 [1278^b 30-1279 2] 476a b CH 14 [1285^b 29-33] 484a
- 11 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66-80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 12 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A 1 REP 2 488d 489d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c Q 105 A 4 REP 5 318b 321a

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 67d 68a 86a PART II 109b 111b 121a 155b PART III 228b c
- 30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1010-1060] 361b 362b
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH I SECT 1 2 25a c CH VI VII 36a 46c esp CH VI SECT 66-75 39b 42a CH VIII SECT 105 112 48c 51b CH XIV SECT 162 63a CH XV 64c 65d
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 21a 22d 130c 131a c
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3b BK IV 13b BK V 28b 29a BK XVI 118b c BK XVII 140a e
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 357a B / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a BK III 411c d 414c
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 412c-413b
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 82b 83c
- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 421c-422d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 47 124a B CH 134d 135a 15, 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d PART I 211a 213a
- 54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 687a d 688d 689a

2c The place and rights of the family in the state the control and education of children

- OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 20 5, 24 5
- 5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* 27a 39a c esp [1011 1034] 38b 39a c
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d
- 5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a 439d esp [1255 1275] 436c [1368 1401] 431c d
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [11 650] 622a c
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 139a b BK VII 223c d
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 398c d
- 7 PLATO *Crito* 216d 217d / *Republic* BK V 360d 363d / *Statesman* 605d 608d / *Laws* BK III 665d 666c BK VI 707b 708a BK VII 721d 723d BK X 775d 780c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1177^b 31] 1180^b 131] 434c 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 13 [11 100^b 19] 455c BK II CH 2 3 455d 457a CH 6 [1265 38 117] 460d 461a CH 9 [1269^b 13] 1270^b 6] 465d 466c BK III CH 9 [1280^b 10-1281 2] 478c BK I CH 15 [13 10 4 8] 500d BK VI CH 8 [1322^b 3 8] 1323 6] 526d BK VII CH 16 [1334^b 28] BK VIII CH [133, 14] 539d 542b
- 11 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 21a 26b / *Lycurgus* 36a 45c / *Numa Pompilius* 58d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Letter to the Younger* 629a B
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 32b d BK III 51a 51d 52a BK XV 162b c / *Historiae* BK III 248c d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 16 521d 522a

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38 Mo TESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXVI 217c
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38 POUSS U S et l C nt act K IV 439b d
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40 C ss Decl ne and Fall 193 II

41 GIB a Decl ea d Fall 83d 85c 177d 178b

44 PO WELL Joh sa 301a b

46 H GEL Pl lo phy of H s ry P RT III 288c
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51 TOLSTOY War and Pace BK I 50c BK XI
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7 PLATO Laws K IV 685 c

12 E ICTATLS Discourses K I CH 2 198c
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14 P UTARCI N ma Pompis s 54c 55a

14 TACITUS Annals BK II 44c BK III 51

18 AL UST C sein ns BK II p 3 9b c
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20 AQU s Summa Th ologie P RT II I Q
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22 CHAUC R Wife of B th s Prologue [633
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23 II ss Let ahan PA T IV 272d 273
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24 R ELA Gargantua and P tagr I BK I
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27 S KE z e Hamlet CT III C I [120-157]
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32 M to Pa adise Lost BK IV [736-749] 168b

36 STER R Trist m Sh d 522 523b

38 N QLI U Spirit of Laws BK XXXIII 189d
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40 GI BOV Decl ne a d Fall 82 193a c 533c d

41 GI ON Decl n a d Fall 86 177d 178a
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41 M LL Liberty 308c

46 H e Philosophy f H tory RT IV 333
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49 D RWIN D scent f M n 315 d 327d

49 MARX Cap i I 303b [In 2]

54 FR U G p Psychol gy 695a b

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5 8 21 7 4 21 0-14 22 13 3 4 5 5
7 20- 3 / Ruth 3 4 / H S m I 11 3
16 20- 3-(D) H L s g 13 6 0- 3 / Ezr
-(D) I Esdr s I / Esther 2 14 / J b
24 5 5 / Proverbs 5 6 0-7 27 / Jerem ah
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4 HO IER Odysey BK II 183a 192d BK XI
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5 SO HOCLES Oed pus the A I 99a 113a c /
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5 EL IPIDES Med a 212a 224a c / Andromache
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[1008 1123] 336b-337b / Phoenixian Ma dens
[1-87] 378a 379a / Cycl ps [175 187] 441d-442a

5 A ISTO HANE Clouds [1 60-1104] 501c 502a
/ Ecclesi usa 615a 628d

6 ILE DOUTS H s ry BK I 2d 3d 32a 34a b
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BK IV 144b BK V 160d 161a

7 PLATO Crato 217a / Rep b c BK V 360d
365d BK VIII 403b d / Timaeus 442d-443a
/ Statem n 605d-608d esp 608 c / La s
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712b 713c BK VII 735b-738c BK XI 777b-
778a 780 c

9 A STOTLE Politics BK II CH I 4 455b d
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12 465d-466c BK V CH 4 [1303] 40-
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12 EPICTETUS Dico net BK I CH 18 124b c
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18 PLU CH Rom I s 21a 22a 26a b / Lycin
gus 39 40a / Lycin g s huma 62d 63d /
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18 TACITUS An ali BK III 51a 52 d BK XI
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18 A CLUSTINE Ciry f God BK XV CH 16 410b
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19 AQU s S mma Theol gica P RT I Q 92
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20 AQUINAS S mra Theolog ca PART I II 72
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223a Q 105 A 4 ANS d re 6-9 318b 321a
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20 D VTE D ne Com dy HELL XXX [37 45]
44d-45 PU c ORY XXV [109 139] 92 d

22 C UCE M ller s Prol gue [3150-3 66] 212
/ M ller s T I 212b 223b esp [3 I 3 32]
213 / Re te s Tale [4136-4291] 228b 231b /
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[1 667-824] 361b 365a / P so s Tal p r
75-653b 540a

(4) *The institution of marriage its nature and purpose*

- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV [1-172] 167a 171b BK VII [81-106] 238a 239a [48 434] 942b 248a BK XI [336-375] 337a 338a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a 40c / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Solon* 71d 72a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3 9b c BK IV par 2 19d BK VI par 2 25 41d 42d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 21-26 392b 396c BK XV CH 16 410b 411d / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 12 663a BK CH 18 20 664d 665d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 AA 1-2 488d 490c [94 516d 519a
- 22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5583 6410] 256a 269b / *Merchant's Tale* [9121-9362] 319a 326a / *Franklin's Tale* 351b 366a esp [11041 117] 351b 352b / *Parson's Tale* par 77-80 540b 542a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 410d 413a
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *As You Like It* ACT V SC IV [114-156] 625a b
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 261c 262a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX 44 449a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [357-451] 240a 242a BK IX [952-999] 268a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 77-83 42b-43c
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirits of Laws* BK XVI 187d 188a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364d 365b
- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 418c 420b 433d 434a
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 316d 317c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 194a 89d 290a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b / ART III par 161-169 58b 60c ADDITIONS 47 124a [101 108 133c 134c
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 579b 581c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 14b 15a 55c 59d BK III 111a 128d BK VI 245d 274a c BK VII 301b 302d EPILOGUE I 659d 662a
- 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 784c / *New Introductory Lectures* 862d 863b

4a Monogamy and polygamy

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 16 29 30 4 / *Deuteronomy* 17 16 17 21 15-17 / *I Samuel* 25 39 44-(D) / *I Kings* 25 39 44 / *II Samuel* 3 15 11-12-(D) / *III Kings* 3 15 11-12 / *I Kings* 11 13-(D) / *III Kings* 11 13
- NEW TESTAMENT *I Timothy* 3 2 12
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Trichiniae* [307 489] 172d 174b
- 5 EURIPIDES *Andromache* 315a-326a c esp [147-244] 316c 317b / *Electra* [1030 140] 336c
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 32a 48 BK I 155c 156a BK V 160d
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39d 40c / *Demetrius* 731a b / *An only Demetrius* 780d

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 1-663a c CH 18 2 664d 666c
- 22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5583 561] 256a 251a
- 30 BACON *New Atlantis* 209b d
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 162b 166b esp 162b 166a b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirits of Laws* BK I 28d BK XV 112a b BK XVI 116a 120a BK XVII 188d BK XVIII 218d
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 86a 245b 246c
- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 419c-420a
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 311a 312a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 118 60b c ADDITIONS 105 133d 134a / *Philosophy of History* PART III 294c d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 579b 583a esp 581b c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 660d 661b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 733a b
- 54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 74b c

4b The religious view of marriage the sacrament of matrimony

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 3 24 / *Proverbs* 18 22
- APOCRYPHA *Tobit* passim esp [10-17 8 17 9 6 10 1 10-11-(D) OT *Tobit* passim esp 6 10 2 8 1 19 9 12 10 1 13
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 19 3 12 / *Mark* 10 1 12 / *John* 2 1-12 / *I Corinthians* 7 / *Ephesians* 5 22 33 / *I Timothy* 4 1-5 / *Hebrews* 13-4
- 5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [210 224] 83b
- 5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VII [81 106] 2 a 439a [244 444] 242b 248a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3 9b c BK IV par 2 19d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 2 392d 393b / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 18-22 664d 666c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 AA 2-3 489d 491b Q 98 516d 519a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 102 A 5 REP 3 283c 292c Q 103 A 4 ANS and REP 6-9 318b 321a PART III Q 65 A 1 1 5 and REP [879c 881d A 2 1 5 and REP I 881d 882c A 3 1 5 and REP I 4 882d 883d A 4 1 5 and REP 3 883d 884a c PART III SUPPL Q 95 1042c 1049d passim
- 22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5583 561] 256a 258b / *Merchant's Tale* [9121 9210] 320a b / *Parson's Tale* par 75 536a par 11-10 540b 542a
- 23 HUGHES *Lexington* PART II 250c 272d 2 3a 270a [219b 222b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 219b 222b
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 124b c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [3 9-560] 240b 244a

5 The position of women

5a. The role of women in the family: the relation of husband and wife in domestic government

Old Testament Gen. 2:15-3:16 / Num. 30 / Deutero 21:15-17

2:15-17 / Ex. 21:15-17 / Prov. 31:10-31

Apoc. 19:1-2 / 1 Cor. 11:3-16 / (D) OT T. 1:1-3

1:1-3 / E. 1:1-3 / 6:40-19-3-1

(D) OT Eccl. 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

New Testament 1 Cor. 11:3-16 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

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1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

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1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

1:1-3 / 1:1-3 / 1:1-3

Ta 296a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale
351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a
/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2
cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

318a 318a esp [1073-1088] 31 a 318a /
Methu's Tale 319a 338a / F 1:1-3 / Tale

351b-366a esp [1104-1114] 351b-352b / 31
rta 3 T 383b-390b esp [1104-1114] 356a

/ Tale f Methu's Tale 31 16 405a-40 b /
/ s Press's Tale [1526] 457a / 1/2

cops's Tale [1 088-1093] 490a / P. 1073's Tale
par 70-80 541a 542a

(4) *The institution of marriage its nature and purpose* 4d *The laws and customs regulating marriage adultery incest*

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 155b c
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 5c 6b bk iii 140c 141c 144d 146a 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 169d 173d 200d bk iv 248d 250a
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 44c-46b passim 47a c 89d 90c 185d 186c 409d 434d passim
 26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT V SC V 31b 32a c / *2nd Henry VI* ACT I SC I [1-74] 33b d 34c / *Comedy of Errors* ACT II SC II [11 148] 154c d ACT III SC II [1-70] 157c 158b / *Taming of the Shrew* ACT I SC I [48 101] 203a = ACT II SC I [37-413] 208c 212c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC II [14 -158] 295d 296a SC III [55-94] 297a b SC VI 300c d ACT III SC IV-V 306d 309d / *Much Ado About Nothing* 503a 531a c esp ACT IV SC I [1- 56] 520b 523a / *As You Like It* ACT III SC III 613d 614d ACT IV SC I [127 180] 618b c
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC II [139 159] 33a SC V [42-91] 37b d ACT III SC IV [39-170] 55a 56b / *Merry Wives of Windsor* 73a 102d / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II [173-206] 115b c / *Othello* ACT I SC III [52 209] 209c 211a ACT IV SC III [60-108] 236c 237a / *King Lear* ACT IV SC VI [109 135] 274c d / *Pericles* 421a 448a c esp ACT I PROLOGUE SC II 421b 425a / *Cymbeline* 449a 488d esp ACT II SC IV-V 461b 463c ACT III SC IV 466d 468d / *Winter's Tale* ACT I SC II [186 228] 492a c ACT III SC II [1-117] 501b 502c
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 124a c PART II 270c 271a
 30 BACON *New Atlantis* 209a d
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk xi [708 21] 314b 315a / *Samson Agonistes* [30 1060] 340a 362b esp [292-325] 346a [1010-1060] 361b 362b
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 81-83 43a =
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98b 99a 127b PART IV 166a b
 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 210b 213a 258b 261a 374b 376a
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 297d 298a 375b d 388c d
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk vii 48a 50a bk x 67a b bk xiv 108a [bk xv-xvi 115c 122a c bk xviii 132b c bk xix 241c 142a bk xxiii 187d 189d 193a 197c bk xxvi 215b c 217c 218d 219b 221c 223a c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* bk iv 439b d [fn -]
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c d 579a b 650c d 742b [n 93] 750d [n 52]
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83d 86a 93c 94a 174b 177d 178b 245b 246a 319b d 759b [n 30]

- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 419a-420b
 43 MILL *Liberty* 311b-312a 316d 317c 319b d
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 160a [304a b 411d, 429d-430b
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 163 164 58d 59d par 163 60b c ADDITIONS 103 134b c 113 135a b / *Philosophy of History* PART III 288c 289a 294c-d
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 289a 292a
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 276c 313c-d 315c d 565a b 578b 580c passim 581d 582c 584d 585d
 50 MARK ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427d 428a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk iii 119a 128d bk iv 177a 179a bk vi 250a 251c bk vii 291a 292b bk vi 476c-479d bk xii 540d 541a 545d
 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 531c d 555a b 583c d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 784a d

4e *Divorce*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 24 1 4 / *Mala-chi* 2 11-17—(D) *Malachias* 2 11 17
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 NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 31 3 19 3-9 / *Mark* 10 2 1 / *Luke* 16 18 / *Romans* 7 1 3 / *I Corinthians* 7 10-16 39
 5 CORINTHIANS *Vedea* 711c 63] 213b 214b
 7 PLATO *Lysis* bk vi 712c 713c bk vi 780a c
 14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 26a b / *Lycus* bk vii 62d 63c / *Alcibiades* 158b d / *Aemilius Paulus* 215a b / *Pompey* 502d 503a / *Cato* bk Younger 629a c
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 102 A 5 REP 3 283c 292c Q 105 A 4 ANSWER 2 REP 8 318b 321a
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 299c
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 261c 262a
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 84b
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk ix [95 -9] 268a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 81-83 43a [43a =
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 127b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xvi 120b 122a c bk xxvi 215c 217c 218d
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 84c 85c 759d [n 30]
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 419c 420a 421c d
 43 MILL *Liberty* 316d 317c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 220d 221a 304a [411c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* = RT III par 1, 135a b / *Philosophy of History* PART III 288c 289a
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 584d 585c
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk iv 177a 179a bk v 203a d bk vi 476c 479d

(5) *The position of women 5a The role of women in the family the relation of husband and wife in domestic government*)

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk iii 46a-48b bk v 112a 113b

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 692b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783d 784a

5b *The status of women in the state the right to citizenship property education*

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4 HOMER *Odyssey* bk xi [385-461] 247a c

5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [181-202] 29a b

5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [410-445] 215d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Thesmophoria usae* 600a 614d / *Ecclesiazusae* 615a 628d

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 39b-c bk ii 56c bk iv 128c d 143b 144b 154b

7 PLATO *Republic* bk v 356b 365d bk vii 401b-c / *Timaeus* 442d / *Laus* bk vi 710d 711d bk vii 716b 717a 721d 722c

8 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk ii ch i-4 455b d 458a ch 9 [1269^b 13-1270 33] 465d-466c bk iv ch 15 [1300 4-8] 500d bk v ch ii [1313^b 33-42] 516c bk vi ch 4 [1319^b 26-33] 523b ch 8 [1322^b 38-1323^b 6] 526d bk vii ch 16 539d 541a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 5 [1361^b 6-12] 601c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk v [604-699] 202b 205b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a 41a / *Numa Pompilius* 54a 55a / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 63c / *Solon* 72c / *Pericles* 133a d / *Coriolanus* 189d 191c / *Agis* 650d 651b / *Marcus Brutus* 811c d

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk ii 44b-c bk iii 53a d bk xii 117d / *Historiae* bk iv 285d 286a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 105 A 2 REP 2 309d 316a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 109c 110b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 60c 66b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 59d 60a 399c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT V SC III 387a 389b

32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [871-902] 358b 359a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IV SECT 82 43b CH XVI SECT 183 67d 68b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98b 99a PART IV 166b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 210b 213a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 7b c 283b-c

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk vii 47c 50d bk xii 90c d bk xiv 107d 108c bk xvi 116a 122a c bk xiv 137a 137c 138c 145c bk xvi 215b 216a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 327c d

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk iii 165b 166a bk v 340b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 61b-c 121c 123b esp 122c 533b 535d esp 533b 534a 557c-d 649c 652a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14d 16a 84a b 87d 88c passim 89c 164a b 170b-171c 171b c 182a 183b

42 HANT *Science of Right* 419c-420a 436d-43 c

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US AMENDMENTS XIX 19d

43 MILL *Liberty* 317c d / *Representative Government* 387d 389b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 257d 259d 260a 24d 277d 289c 312a 391c 392a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 166 59d 60a ADDITIONS 107 134a b

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 423a 427c-428a

5c *Women in relation to war*

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4 HOMER *Iliad* bk ii [155 16] 21c bk iii [146 160] 20c bk xii [405 515] 159c 160d bk xiv [707-804] 178d 179d / *Odyssey* bk ii 188a 192d

5 AESCHYLUS *Persians* [1-139] 15a 16d / *Seven Against Thebes* [79-63] 28a 30a / *Agamemnon* [399-455] 56b 57a [853-922] 61b d

5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [247 268] 214b / *Trojan Women* 270a 281a b / *Helen* 298a 314a c / *Andromache* [91-116] 316a b / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a-439d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 2a bk iii 121c d 123c bk iv 143b 144b 153a b bk vii 232b

7 PLATO *Republic* bk v 356b 368c / *Charmides* 479c-480a / *Laus* bk vi 713b-c bk vii 721d 722c 726a-c bk viii 734a 735a

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk ii ch 9 [1269^b 13 1270 14] 465d 466b

10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 1, 16a b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk i [490-493] 116b bk ii [567-613] 140a 141b bk v [605-699] 202b-205b bk vi [486-915] 341b 353a

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 10b 11c / *Romulus* 21a 24d / *Coriolanus* 189d 191c / *Pyrrhus* 328c 330a / *Antony* 756c 779c esp 760c d 767c 774a / *Marcus Brutus* 811c d

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk i 12b d 20b-c bk ii 26b c bk iii 53a d bk xiv 150a b / *Historiae* bk iv 271c d

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [859-1004] 173a 176b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 140c 141c 144b c

26 SHAKESPEARE *King John* ACT III SC I [205-338] 389b c / *1st Henry VI* ACT II SC III [177-120] 444a b / *2nd Henry VI* ACT II SC IV 477d-478c

The care and government of children the rights and duties of the child parental despotism and tyranny

- OL T STANLEY *Genesis* 9:21-26 / *Exodus* 2:6-7 0 2 1 5 17 / *Leviticus* 19:3 / *Deuteronomy* 5:6 6:6-7 21:15 23 / *Proverbs* 1:8-9 3 2 6:20-23 13:12 15 5 19 18 22 22:6 13 23 13 24 28:24 9 15 17 30 17 / *Zachariah* 13:3-(D) *Zacharias* 3:3
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 5 A E HY *s Eumenides* 81a 91d
 5 SO OCELS *Oedipus the King* [1458-530] 112c 113a / *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a c / *Antigone* [6-6] 136c 137d / *Electra* 156 169a c / *Trojan Women* [1:57 1:8] 180 181
 5 ELAM *s Alcestis* [80-3 5] 239c 240a [61 33] 242c 243 / *Heracles* M d [56-584] 369d 370a [6-636] 370c / *Phaenomena* *Metamorphoses* 378a 393d esp [48 1 66] 391a 393d / *Orestes* 394-410d
 5 ARISTOTEL *Clouds* [91-858] 498b-499b [3:1 451] 504c 506b / *Birds* [1337 37] 558d 559b [1640-675] 562b-c
 6 HERODOTUS *Histories* K II 76a K IV 155c 156 K 160d 161a K 1 281c
 7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 17 / *Laches* 26a 27d / *Protagoras* 42d-43d 45d-47 / *Symposium* 165c 166b / *Menos* 186 187b / *Euthyphro* 192 / *Cratylus* 214c 216d 217d / *Republic* K II 321b-c K 360d 365d / *Timaeus* 442d-443a / *Laos* K I 672d 673d 683b-c K V 686d 688b esp 687d-688a K 713c 716c 723 d K IX 750d 751b 755 757c K XI 779b-781 / *Seventh Letter* 804
 9 A TOTL *History of Animals* K CH I [8 1 22] 107b / *Ethics* K III CH I2 [9 33 8] 366a K H6 [34 8 7] 382b-c K H [60 3 3] 413a K IX CH 2 417-418b K C H 9 [80 4 4] 434d 435c / *Physics* K I CH 2 3 453d-455 c passim K II CH 6 [2 8 30-7 79a] 476 b K I c I [29 4 4] 495d K VI CH 3 [314 8-25] 539b-d CH 17 541a 542 K CH 3 [318 30-8] 543 d
 12 EUTYCRATES *Discourses* K I CH II 116d 118d CH 23 128c d K 23 22 198c 199c
 12 A LIL M d I K I 253 256d
 13 VIL *Eclipses* IV [60-61] 15b / *Ateneid* K I 8-5 9 [272b-273a K IX [24 313] 285 287
 18 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 40c-41 / *Fabius* 152b-d / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175 189d 191d / *Marcus Cato* 286c 287b

- 18 AL LSTYNE *Confessions* BK I par 18 5c d BK II par 3 5 9b 10d / *City of God* BK XIX CH I4 520a d
 20 AQINAS *Summa Theologiae* RT II Q 91 A2 Q 221d 223a Q 92 A1 A. 226c 227c Q 102 A4 A 318b-321a RT II Q 26 A 9-11 517a 519a
 22 C LACER *Physician's Tale* [12 006-039] 367b-368a
 23 HES *Leviathan* P RT II 109c 110b 121a 137d 155b
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 14 18b BK II 74b-75c 81a 83b BK III 219b-222b
 25 M TIGVE *Essays* 43a-c 63d 79c passim esp 63d 64b 66c 67a 83a c 183 192d esp 183d 18 d 344a-c 534 d
 26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT II SC II [1-55] 78d 79b / *Titus Andronicus* CT V III [35-64] 196d 197a / *Romeo and Juliet* 283a 319a c esp CT III SC V [127 15] 308c 309c / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT I SC I [1 121] 352 353c / *1st Henry IV* ACT III SC II 452d 454d
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT I SC III [1 5 189] 210d 211a / *King Lear* 244a 283a c esp ACT I 244 254c / *Cymbeline* ACT I SC I [12 153] 451a-c
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 218c 220c 251b 261c 262a
 30 B C Y *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
 31 S I OZA *Ethics* P RT V A END X CT 449a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI 5 CT 52-CH VI 5 CT 81 36-43 CH XV 5 CT I 64d 65 5 CT 73 174 65c d / *1st Essay* L *derstanding* BK I CH II 5 CT 9 106a b SECT 12 107b-d BK II CH XV II SECT 7 10 249b-d
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* B T I 29b PART IV 166a 167a
 36 S BRYAN *Trust am Shandy* 191b 192 250b-251a 400-402a 410-411 423b-424b
 37 FLETCHER *Tom Jones* 35a-49a c 65b-c 108c 110c 120c 121a c 124a 126c 136a c 217d 219c 283c d 310b-313b 321b-324b 338d 345d 359b-364d
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 22d 23a K XXII 187d 188a 189b-d K XXVI 216a 217b 220 b
 38 RUSSELL *Quintessence* 326c d 357 b 365a b / *Political Economy* 367a 368c 377a / *Social Contract* K I 387d 388a 389c
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* K I 29d 30d K V 338c d
 41 GIBBO *Decline and Fall* 45b-c 82b-83c
 42 HART *Science of Rights* 404d 420b-422d
 43 MILLS *Liberty* 316d 319d passim esp 317d
 44 BOWEN *J. H.* 199d 200d 247c d 301d 302 424d-425a
 46 HES *PhiloSophy of Rights* P RT II par 159 58a par 73 561a d ADDITIONS III 134d 135a / *PhiloSophy of History* PA T I 211d 212c P RT II 288c 289b

(6 Parents and children fatherhood motherhood 6a The desire for offspring)

- 39 S ITH *Wealth of Nations* bk i 29d 30d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 293d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 161 58b
54 FREUD *Instincts* 415a b / *New Introductory Lectures* 860d 861a 863a b

6b Eugenic control of breeding birth control

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iv 143b c
7 PLATO *Republic* bk v 361c 363b bk viii 403a d / *Timaeus* 443a / *Statesman* 605d 608d esp 608a c / *Laus* bk v 693a c bk vi 707b 709a 712b 713c
■ ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vii ch 3 [583 14-25] 108d / *Politics* bk ii ch 6 [1 65 38-618] 460d 461a ch 9 [1270 39-6] 466c ch 10 [12, 2 23-24] 468c bk vii ch 16 539d 541a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a-40c / *Solon* 71d 72a / *Cato the Younger* 629a c
15 TACITUS *Annals* bk iii 51a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I q 99 a. rep 2 520a d
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 35 520b
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166a b 168a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 193b 194b 271b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xiii 187d 190a b 191c d 192a b 192d 199b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b 364d 365a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 175c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83c
43 MILL *Liberty* 319b d / *Representative Government* 426d 427a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 267b c 275d 277c esp 276d 277a 323b 328a 391d-394a,c 578a 579a 581c d 583a 596b d

6c The condition of immaturity

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- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 17c / *Protagoras* 46b d / *Euthydemus* 67a / *Republic* bk ii 320c 321d bk iv 353b d bk v 366a e bk vii 309c 401a / *Philebus* 611c d / *Laus* bk ii 653a c bk vii 723c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk vii ch 3 [24, 13 248 6] 330c d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk viii ch 1 [588-5-5] 114b d / *Parts of Animals* bk iv ch 10 [686-5-30] 218a-c / *Ethics* bk i ch 3 [1094-7 1095 11] 340a ch 9 [1099-32 1100 9] 345b c bk iii ch i [1119 35-19] 366a c bk iv ch 9 [11-8-15 20] 376a bk v ch 6 [1134-8 17] 382b e bk vi ch 8 [1142 12 19] 391b bk vii ch 13 [1153 27 35] 404c d bk viii ch 3 [1156 -2 5] 407d 408a bk x ch 3 [1174 1 4] 428b / *Politics* bk i ch i. 453d 454a bk iii ch 5 [12, 8 3 6] 475a b bk vii ch 9 [1329-2 1,] 533b c ch 14 [1332-36 41]

- 537c d ch 15 [1334-8 3] 539b d ch 17 541a 542a m / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 12 636a-d
12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* bk i [234] 64a
12 LIGETIUS *Discourses* bk iii ch 6 182b
12 AURILLIUS *Meditations* bk i sect 17 255d 256d
14 PLUTARCH *Alexander* 540b d 549c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 7 312c 9a bk ii par 3-9 9b 11a / *City of God* bk xii ch 16 573b 574a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I q 100-101 520d 523d PART I II q 34 a 1 rep - 768c 769d q 40 a 6 796c 797a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II q 91 a 1 rep to CONTRARY 221a d q 93 a 1 276c 277c
21 DANTE *Dive Comedy* PURGATORY xii [8] 96] 77d
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60b 78b PART II 132b m
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54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 15a 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Child* ch 19a 122a c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 191b 113a 238c 239a 241b 243c / *Narcissus* 400a / *General Introduction* 495a-496b passim 526d 532a esp 526d 527c 530d 532a 572d 576d 579b 584d mp 579b 580d 591a d 592c 594d 599b 612d 614b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 641d 643c 644d 645a 651b c / *Group Psychology* 685b d 693a-c, *Inhibition of Symptoms and Anxiety* 724a 727c 737d 740b 743a d 746c 747a 751d 753c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 855b 861c passim 868d 878c

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- 52 DO THE SAY *Brothers Karamz* BK I 4a
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- 54 F C A *Narcissism* 404d-406b / *Group Py*
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 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 2c 3a 22b
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6c The initiation of children into adult life

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 26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT
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 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VI 197a c BK II
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 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 64b c BK VI 107b
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- 25 No T c *Essays* 37c-40 84a III 89d 90c
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- 27 S K PE *Il mlet* CT I S II [137 159]
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- 31 S VOL *Echus* P T P VOLX XIX XX
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- 32 MILTON *Pa d se Lost* BK IV [1/2 340] 156a
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- 38 ROSSIE s *I equalis* 364d 365b
- 40 Gt vo *Decl n and Fall* 92c 93a 649c
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- 44 BOSW LL *Joh son* 22a 57a 64a 107a 160b
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- 47 GOETH *Fe st P RT I* [4243 4250] 104a
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- 52 DOYER SAY *Bothers Karamazov* BK I 4
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- 4 Hov *Odj sey* BK XI [458-540] 247c 248b
- 5 HESCHYL s *Sec n Ag mti Thebes* 27 39 c
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- 5 S C ORLE *O d par the K s g* 99a 113a /
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- 5 EUR IDES *Elex* 327a 339a c / *P oenician*
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- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 13b c bk iii 96c d bk iv 146a b 149b c bk v 167b 168a
- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 3c d / *Lysis* bk iv 683b-c bk ix 752d 753a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk vii ch 6 [1149^b 4-13] 400a bk viii ch ii [1161 15 21] 413b c / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 5 [1360^b 19-38] 601a b
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk i 253a 256d
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk ii [671-804] 143a 146b bk v [42-103] 188a 190a bk vi [6, 9 702] 229a [756-901] 231a 235a bk viii [609-731] 275a 278b bk x [276 .86] 309b 310a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Aratus* 826a c
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* bk ii 227b c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 6 10a b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xi [46-72] 69b c PARADISE xi-xvi 128b 132a
- 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Wife of Bath* [6691-6788] 274b 276a / *Parson's Tale* par 27 514b
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- 28 PASCAL *Pensées* 626 286b
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 15c 17d 106b c 125b 275a 362c 364d
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xix 140a bk xviii 188b c 189b
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 242a b 412c 413a passim 497a-498a
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- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 274b 278a 280c 281a 282a b 289c d 293d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 173 61a b par 180 62c 63c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 197c d PART I 211d 212c PART IV 320c
- III TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk x 399d 401d
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 41a b

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- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4 1-16 9 18-29 22 1-19 24 25 21-34 27 29-1-30 32-34 37 42 45 50 15 23 / *Exodus* 2 1-8 / *Judges* 11 30-40 / *Ruth* 1 3 18 / *I Samuel* 18 1-4 20 -(D) *I Kings* 18 1-4 20 / *II Samuel* 13 14 18 33-(D) *II Kings* 13-14 18 33 / *Poetis* 10 1 15, 20 / *Micah* 7 5-6-(D) *Micah* 7 5 6

- APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 4 1 4-(D) OT *Tobit* 4 1-5 / *Ecclesiasticus* 25 1 40 3 24-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 25 1 2 40-3 24
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- 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk xxii [1-98] 155a 156a [405 515] 159c 160d bk xxiv [159-804] 172d 179d / *Odyssey* bk ii 188a 192d bk xi [458-540] 247c 248b bk xiv-xv 260a 271d bk xvi [167- 25] 273d 274b bk xvii [31-60] 277b c bk xxiii [1-245] 312a 314d bk xxiv [90-361] 320a d
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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 136a c esp [324-460] 117a 118b [1150-1446] 124d 127b / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* [1290-1311] 154a b / *Electra* 156a 169a c / *Trachiniae* 170a 181a e
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- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 7a b 8a 10a 32a c bk ii 73b 74d 76b d bk iii 89d 95d 96c 100b 101b 114d 115a 116a bk iv 143b 144b bk vi 194d 195b 212c 213a bk ix 311b 312d
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 398c d
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk i 296d 297a bk v 369d 365d / *Lysis* bk iv 683b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* bk iii ch 2 [753 7 15] 294a b / *Ethics* bk vii ch 4 [1138 6 4] 398d bk viii ch i [1155^b 16-21] 406b d ch 7 [1158^b 12 24] 410c d ch 8 [1159 24 37] 411b c ch 9 [1159^b 25 1160^b] 411d-412b ch 10 [1160^b 23] ch 11 [1161 9] 413a c bk 12 413d 414d ch 14 [1163^b 13 2] 416c d bk 12 ch 2 417c 418b ch 3 [1166 1-9] 419a b ch 7 [1168^b 21-27] 422d / *Poetics* bk i ch 12-13 433d-455a bk ii ch 3 4 456c 458a
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- 13 VIRGIL *Ergotus* iv [60-64] 15b / *Aeneid* bk iii [692 715] 166a b bk v [42 103] 188a 190a bk vi [679 702] 229a b bk viii [554-584] 273b 274b bk ix [280 302] 286b 287a bk x [822-828] 324b 325a bk xi [29-71] 328b

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Chapter 27 FATE

INTRODUCTION

FATE—sometimes personified sometimes abstractly conceived—is the antagonist of freedom in the drama of human life and history. So at least it seems to the poets of antiquity. In many of the Greek tragedies, fate sets the stage. Some curse must be fulfilled. A doom unworded and inexorable. But the actors on the stage are far from puppets. Within the framework of the inevitable the tragic hero works out his own destiny making the choices from which his personal catastrophe ensues. Oedipus, doomed to kill his father and marry his mother, is not fated to inquire into his past and to discover the sins which when he sees, he wishes to see no more. The curse on the house of Atreus does not require Agamemnon to bring Cassandra back from Troy or to step on the purple carpet. The furies which pursue Orestes have themselves awakened by murdering his mother. Clytemnestra's deed not fated but freely undertaken to avenge his father's death.

The ancients did not doubt that men could choose and through choice exercise some control over the disposition of their lives. Tacitus for example while admitting that "most men

cannot part with the belief that each person's future is fixed from his very birth," claims that the wisest of the ancients "have us the capacity of choosing our life. At the same time he recognizes an order of events beyond man's power to control, although he finds no agreement regarding its cause—whether it depends "on wandering stars" or "primary elements, and on a combination of natural causes." For his own part Tacitus declares, "I suspend my judgment on the question 'whether it is fate and unchangeable necessity or chance which governs the revolutions of human affairs.' In so doing he grants the possibility that not everything which lies beyond man's control is fated. Some of the things which happen with-

out man's willing, them may happen by chance or fortune.

It is sometimes supposed that fate and "fortune" are synonyms, or that one has a tragic and the other a happy connotation. It is as if fortune were always good and fate always malignant. But either may be good or evil from the point of view of man's desires. Although fate and fortune are hardly the same there is some reason for associating them. Each imposes a limitation on man's freedom. A man cannot compel fortune to smile upon him any more than he can avoid his fate. Though alike in this respect fate and fortune are also opposed to one another. Fate represents the inexorable march of events. There is no room for fortune unless some things are exempt from necessity. Only that which can happen by chance is in the lap of fortune.

It would seem that fate stands to fortune as the necessary to the contingent. If everything were necessitated fate alone would reign. Contingency would be excluded from nature. Chance or the fortuitous in the order of nature and freedom in human life would be reduced to illusions men cherish only through ignorance of the inevitable.

In a sense fortune is the ally of freedom in the struggle against fate. Good fortune seems to aid and abet human desires. But even misfortune sometimes is the element of chance which is more congenial than fate if no more amenable to man's concept that he can freely plan his life.

THE TERMS *necessity* and *contingency* cannot be substituted for *fate* and *fortune* without loss of significance. As the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY indicates they are terms in the philosophical analysis of the order of nature and causality. They may have but they need not have theological implications. Necessity

and contingency can be explained without any reference to the supernatural as is evident from the discussion of these matters in the chapter on CHANCE. But fate and fortune in their origin at least are theological terms.

In ancient poetry and mythology, both in inevitability and chance were personified as deities or supernatural forces. There were the goddess of Fortune and the three Fates, as well as these three evil sisters or counterparts, the Furies. The Latin word from which fate comes means an oracle and so signifies what is divinely ordained. What happens by fate is *fata*—something destined and decreed in the councils of the gods on Olympus or it may be the decision of Zeus to whose rule all the other divinities are subject or as we shall see presently, it may be a supernatural destiny which even Zeus cannot set aside.

In any case, the notion of fate implies a supernatural will, even as destiny implies predestination by an intelligence able not only to plan the future but also to carry out that plan. The inevitability of fate and destiny is thus distinguished from that of merely natural necessity which determines the future only insofar as it may be the inevitable consequence of causes working naturally.

But the ancients do not seem to be fatalists in the extreme sense of the term. To the extent that men can propitiate the gods or provoke divine jealousy and anger, the attitude and deeds of men seem to be a determining factor in the actions of the gods. To the extent that the gods align themselves on opposite sides of a human conflict (as in the *Iliad*) or oppose each other (as in the *Odyssey*), it may be thought that what happens on earth merely reflects the shifting balance of power among the gods.

But human planning and willing do not seem to be excluded by the divine will and plan which are forged out of the quarrels of the gods. On the contrary, polytheism seems to make fortune itself contingent on the outcome of the Olympian conflict and so permits men a certain latitude of self-determination. Men can struggle against the gods precisely because the gods may be with them as well as against them.

The ultimate power of Zeus to decide the issue may, however, place the accent on fate

rather than on freedom. This is certainly so if Zeus is not the master of even his own fate: much less the omnipotent ruler among the gods or the arbiter of human destiny. In *Prometheus Bound*, the Chorus asks: Who is the pilot of Necessity? Prometheus answers:

The Fates inform and the unforgetting Furies. The Chorus then asks: Is Zeus of lesser might than these? To which Prometheus replies: He shall not shun the lot apportioned. When they ask what this doom is, Prometheus tells them to inquire no more for they verge on mysteries. Later Zeus himself sends Hermes to wrest from Prometheus the secret of what has been ordained for him by all consummating Fate or Fate's relentless law. Prometheus refuses saying that none shall bend my will or force me to disclose by whom I am fated he shall fall from power.

The question Aeschylus leaves unanswered is whether Zeus would be able to escape his doom if he could foresee what Fate holds in store for him. The suggestion seems to be that without omniscience the omnipotence of Zeus cannot break the chains of Fate.

IN THE TRADITION of Judaeo-Christian theology the problem of fate is in part verbal and in part real. The verbal aspect of the problem concerns the meaning of the word fate in relation to the divine will, providence and predestination. With the verbal matters settled, there remains the real problem of God's will and human freedom. The strictly monotheistic conception of an omnipotent and omniscient God deepens the mystery and makes it more difficult than the problem of fate and freedom in pagan thought.

If anyone calls the will or the power of God itself by the name of fate, Augustine says, let him keep his opinion but correct his language. For when men hear that word according to the ordinary use of language they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular position of the stars which may exist at the time when anyone is born or conceived which some separate altogether from the will of God whilst others affirm that this also is dependent on that will. But those who are of the opinion that apart from the will of God the stars determine what we shall do or what

good things we shall possess or what evils we shall suffer must be referred a hearing by all not only by those who hold the true religion but by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever — in false gods. For what does it is opinion really amount to but this that no god whatsoever is to be worshipped or prayed to?

Since the word fate has been used for those things which are determined apart from the will of God or man Augustine thinks it would be better for Christians not to use it but to substitute providence or predestination when they wish to refer to what God will. Aquinas however retains the word fate but restricts its meaning to the ordering of mediate causes by which God wills the production of certain effects.

According to the definition given by Boethius which Aquinas quote Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things by which providence connects each one with its proper order. Thus fate is not identified with providence but made subordinate to it. The distinction Aquinas explains depends on the way we consider the ordering of effects by God. As being in God Himself the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But as being in the mediate causes ordered by God it is called fate. While admitting that the divine power or will can be called fate as being the cause of fate he declares that essentially fate is the very disposition or series or order of second cause.

The point on Lucretius takes seems to be exactly opposite to that of Augustine and Aquinas. Lucretius condemns the fatalism of those who believe that the gods control the order of nature and who therefore ascribe whatever befalls them to divine ordination. For human nature free at once and rid of her law by itself is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods. He tries to teach men that everything happens according to the laws of nature other than which there is no fate. The decrees of fate lie in the laws by which all motion is ever linked together and a new motion ever springs from another in a fixed order. If man by his power of free choice can make some commencement of motion to break through the decrees

of fate in order that cause follow not cause from cause eternally — it is because in the atoms of his makeup there is another cause of motions caused by a minute serving of first beginnings at no fixed part of space and no fixed time.

Nevertheless according to Augustine Lucretius is a fatalist who disbelieves in providence other than which there is no fate. Each of them uses the word fate the one to deny the other to affirm the power of God.

But even if a Christian avoids the superstitions of astrology or some similar belief in a natural necessity which does not depend on God he may still commit the sin of fatalism which follows from the denial of man's free will. Understanding fate as identical with providence the Christian is a fatalist if in the belief that every human act is foreordained by God he resigns himself to his fate making no moral effort and taking no moral responsibility for his soul's welfare. To do that is to argue like Chaucer's Troilus:

I am heerd but do care for so to say
For all that comes comes by necessity
That is to be done for is my destiny
I must believe and cannot ther choose
That I so dence in its digne for sight
Hit is known that Gressada I once must lose
Soce God is everithing from heven's height
And plans things as he thinks both best and right
As was arranged for by predestination

Troilus sees no way of avoiding the conclusion that free choice is an idle dream.

THE THEOLOGICIANS recognize the difficulty of reconciling providence and free will. The truth must lie somewhere between two heresies. If it is heresy to deny God's omnipotence and omniscience then nothing remains outside the all encompassing scope of divine providence nothing happens contrary to the divine will no future contingency is or can be unforeseen by God. If on the other hand to deny that man acts freely means that God must be responsible for the evil that man does then it is a heresy to deny free will, for that imputes evil to God.

This is the problem with which Milton deals in *Paradise Lost* announcing that he will try to justify the ways of God to man. In a conversation in heaven the Father tells the

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This is the problem with which Milton deals in *Paradise Lost* announcing that he will try to justify the ways of God to man. In a conversation in heaven the Father tells the

Son that though He knows Adam will disobey his rule Adam remains quite free to sin or not to sin and the fault is his own just as the rebellious angels acted on their own free will The angels God says

So were created nor can justly accuse
Thir maker or thir making or thir Fate
As if Predestination over rul'd
Thir will dispos'd by absolute Decree
Or high foreknowledge they themselves decreed
Thir own revolt not I if I foreknew
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault
Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown
So without least impulse or shadow of Fate
Or ought by me immutable foreseen
They trespass Authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge and what they choose for so
I formed them free and free they must remain
Till they enthrall themselves I else must change
Thir nature and revoke the high Decree
Unchangeable Eternal which ordain'd
Thir freedom they themselves ordain'd their fall

A solution of the problem is sometimes developed from the distinction between God's foreknowledge and God's foreordination God foreordained the freedom of man but only foreknew his fall man ordained that himself Strictly speaking however the word foreknowledge would seem to carry a false connotation since nothing is future to God Every thing that has ever happened or ever will is simultaneously together in the eternal present of the divine vision

During his ascent through Paradise Dante wishing to learn about his immediate future asks his ancestor Cacciaguida to foretell his fortune for he gazing upon the Point to which all times are present can see contingent things ere in themselves they are Cacciaguida prefaces his prediction of Dante's exile from Florence by telling him that the contingency of material things is all depicted in the Eternal Vision yet thence it does not take necessity more than does a ship which is going down the stream from the eye in which it is mirrored The difference between time and eternity is conceived as permitting the temporal future to be contingent even though God knows its content with certitude

But it may still be asked does not God's knowledge imply the absolute predestination of future events by providence since what God knows with certitude cannot happen otherwise

than as He knows it? In a discussion of divine grace and man's free will Dr Johnson remarks,

I can judge with great probability how a man will act in any case without his being restrained by my judging God may have this probability increased to certainty To which Boswell replies that when it is increased to certainty freedom ceases because that cannot be certainly foreknown which is not certain at the time but if it be certain at the time it is a contradiction to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent upon the exercise of will or anything else

Against such difficulties Aquinas insists that divine providence is compatible not only with natural necessity but also with contingency in nature and free will in human acts Providence he writes has prepared for some things necessary causes so that they happen of necessity for others contingent causes that they may happen by contingency Human liberty does not imply that the will's acts are not caused by God who being the first cause moves causes both natural and voluntary Just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary God causes man to choose freely and freely to execute his choice

THE UNCOMPROMISING conception of fate is that which leaves no place for chance or free dom anywhere in the universe neither in the acts of God nor in the order of nature nor in the course of history The doctrine of absolute determinism whether in theology science or history is thus fatalism unqualified

The ancient historians are not fatalists in this sense Herodotus for example finds much that can be explained by the contingencies of fortune or by the choices of men The crucial decision for example in the defense of Athens is presented as an act of man's choice Upon receiving the prophecy that safe shall the wooden wall continue for thee and thy children the Athenians exercise their freedom by disagreeing about its meaning Certain of the old men Herodotus writes were of the opinion that the god meant to tell them the citadel would escape for this was anciently defended by a palisade Others maintained

that the fate was what the god pointed at and their advice was that nothing should be thought of except the ships. The eloquence of Themistocles earned the latter view. To stress its importance the historian observes that the savins of Greece live in the decision that led Athens to "become a maritime power."

In preserving a comparable decision by the Persians, Herodotus seems to be contrasting their fatalism with the freedom of the Greeks. At first Xerxes accepts the counsel of Artabanus not to go to war against the Greeks. But after a series of visions, which appear to both the king and his councillor that decision is reversed for according to the dream the war "is fated to happen."

The conception of fate and freedom in the *Aeneid* seems closer to the Greek than to the Persian view. Even though the reconstruction of his origin which will come with the founding of the Roman empire is projected as a divinely appointed destiny, the hero who braves that great effort to pass it as if he were free to accept or evade his responsibilities.

The Christian understanding of historical destiny in terms of providence permits—more than that requires—men to exercise free choice at every turn. The cause of the greatness of the Roman empire, writes Augustine, is neither fortuitous nor fatal according to the judgment or opinion of those who call those things *fortuna*, which either have no causes or such causes as do not proceed from some intelligible order, and those things *fata* which happen independently of the will of God and man by the necessity of a certain order. Human kingdoms are established by divine providence. The fatalism which Augustine here condemns involves independence not only of the will of God but of man's will also.

It is only in modern times, with Hegel and Marx, that necessity reigns supreme in the philosophy of history. Hegel spurns the notion that history is a superficial play of casual so-called merely human traits and passions. He also condemns those who speak of Providence and the plan of Providence in a way that is empty of ideas since for them the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible. For Hegel history is the necessary development out of the concept of the

man's freedom alone. But this development and this freedom are entirely matters of necessity as far as individuals and their works are concerned. They are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them.

For Marx history seems likewise to have the same necessity. He deals with individuals, he writes in the preface to *Capital*, only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests. His standpoint, he says, is one from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history and within which the individual cannot be responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them. Here it is a question only of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results.

According to the historical determinism of Hegel and Marx which is further considered in the chapter on HISTORY, men play a part which is already written for them in the scroll of history. Human liberty apparently depends on man's knowledge of and acquiescence in the unfolding necessities.

HISTORICAL DETERMINISM is merely a part of the doctrine of a causal necessity which governs all things. Causality seems to be understood by moderns like Spinoza, Hume, and Freud as excluding the possibility of chance or free will. Among the ancients, Plotinus alone seems to go as far as Spinoza in affirming the universal reign of natural necessity. What Spinoza says of God or Nature, Plotinus says of the All One, namely that for the first principle which is the cause of everything else, freedom consists in being *causa sui* or cause of itself—*self-determined* rather than determined by external causes.

God does not act from freedom of the will. Spinoza writes, "Yet God alone is a free cause for God alone exists and acts from the necessity of his own nature. As for everything else in the universe, Spinoza maintains that there is nothing continuous but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine

nature to exist and act in a certain manner. This applies to man who according to Spinoza, does everything by the will of God alone.

From quite different premises Hume seems to reach much the same conclusion concerning chance and liberty. Chance, he writes, when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But he also thinks that liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance.

Hume embraces the consequences of such a position. If voluntary action be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter there is a continued chain of necessary causes pre-ordained and pre-determined reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe no difference no liberty.

When confronted with the objection that it then becomes impossible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude Hume replies that these are mysteries which natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle. To defend absolute decrees and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy.

Unlike Spinoza and Hume Freud does not deal with the theological implications or pre-suppositions of determinism. For him determinism is an essential postulate of science and even to some extent a scientifically discreditable fact. The deeply rooted belief in psychic free-

dom and choice, he writes, is quite unscientific and it must give ground before the claims of a determinism which governs even mental life. He thinks it can be shown on the basis of clinical experience that every psychic association will be strictly determined by important inner attitudes of mind which are unknown to us at the moment when they operate just as much unknown as are the disturbing tendencies which cause errors and those tendencies which bring about so called chance actions.

The fatalism of what is often called scientific determinism is that of blind necessity. It not only eliminates liberty and chance but also purpose and the operation of final causes. Every future event in nature history or human behavior is completely predetermined by efficient causes—predetermined but not predestined for there is no guiding intelligence at work no purpose to be fulfilled. The system of fatalism of which Spinoza is the accredited author Kant writes is one which eliminates all trace of design and leaves the original ground of the things of nature divested of all intelligence.

Whether such complete fatalism is the only doctrine compatible with the principles and findings of natural science has been questioned by philosophers like William James. It is certainly not the only doctrine compatible with the view that nothing happens without a cause. As the chapters on CHANCE and WILL show ancient and mediaeval thinkers who affirm contingency in nature or freedom in human acts do so without denying the universal reign of causation.

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 Hektor *Iliad* BK II [265, 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P or Section. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164 the passage begins in the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR. Dictionaries. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH or CV) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d.

BOOK REFERENCE. The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay version indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of whole reference possibly signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 28 FORM

INTRODUCTION

THE great philosophical issues concerning form and matter have never been resolved. But the terms in which these issues were stated from their first formulation in antiquity to the 17th or 18th centuries have disappeared or at least do not have general currency in contemporary discourse. Kant is perhaps the last great philosopher to include these terms in his basic vocabulary. The conceptions of matter and form he writes lie at the foundation of all other reflection so inseparably are they connected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general the second its determination.

The word *form* is no longer a pivotal term in the analysis of change or motion nor in the distinction between being and becoming nor in the consideration of the modes of being and the conditions of knowledge. The word *matter* is now used without reference to form where earlier in the tradition all of its principal meanings involved form as a correlative or an opposite. Other words such as participation and imitation have also fallen into disuse or lost the meanings which derived from their relation to form and matter.

The problems which these words were used to state and discuss remain active in contemporary thought. There is for instance the problem of the universal and the particular the problem of the immutable and the mutable the problem of the one and the many or of sameness and diversity. These problems appear in the writings of William James and Bergson Dewey and Santayana Whitehead and Russell. Sometimes there is even a verbal approximation to the traditional formulation as in Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects or in Santayana's consideration of the realm of essence and the realm of matter. Whatever expressions they use these thinkers find themselves

opposed on issues which represent part if not the whole of the great traditional controversy between Plato and Aristotle concerning form.

THERE IS A TENDENCY AMONG the historians of thought to use the names of Plato and Aristotle to symbolize a basic opposition in philosophical perspectives and methods or even in what William James calls intellectual temperaments. Later writers are called Platonists or Aristotelians and doctrines or theories are classified as Platonic or Aristotelian. It almost seems to be assumed at times that these names exhaust the typical possibilities that minds or theories must be one or the other or some sort of mixture or confusion of the two.

If this tendency is ever justified it seems to be warranted with regard to the problems of form. Here if anywhere there may be poetic truth in Whitehead's remark that the history of western thought can be read as a series of footnotes to Plato though perhaps the observation should be added that Aristotle the first to comment on Plato wrote many of the principal footnotes. In Plotinus the two strains seem to be intermingled. The issue between Plato and Aristotle concerning form dominates the great metaphysical and theological controversies of the later Middle Ages and with some alterations in language and thought it appears in the writings of Hobbes Bacon Descartes Spinoza and Locke where it is partly a continuation of and partly a reaction against the mediaeval versions of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine.

The most extreme reaction is of course to be found in those who completely reject the term *form* or its equivalents as being without significance for the problems of motion existence or knowledge. Bacon retains the term but radically changes its meaning. None should

suppose from the great part assigned by us to forms, Bacon writes, "that we mean such forms as the meditations and thoughts of men have hitherto been accustomed to. He does not mean either the concrete forms or any abstract forms of ideas but rather the laws and regulations of simple action. The form of heat or form of light therefore means no more than the law of heat or the law of light. But Hobbes and Locke tend to reject the term itself—especially when it occurs in the notion of substantial form—as meaningless or misleading.

"We are told," says Hobbes, "there be in the world certain essences, separated from bodies which they call *abstract essences* and *substantial forms*. Being once fallen into this error of *separated essences* [men] are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them *some place* which they cannot succeed in doing according to Hobbes, because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity and all men know that place is dimension and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal.

With regard to *substantial form* Locke declares, "I confess I have no idea at all but only of the sound form. Those who have been taught that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into the true species and genera were led yet further out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after substantial forms—a subject which Locke regard as wholly unintelligible. The general skepticism about this notion (or the distrust of its hollowness) in the 17th and 18th centuries is reflected in a bantering remark by Tristram Shandy's father. In a discussion of infant prodigies, he refers to some boy wonders who "left off their substantial forms at nine years old or sooner and went on reasoning without them."

Since form and matter are supposed to be correlative the denial to form of meaning or reality lead to materialism as in the case of Hobbes—the affirmation of matter alone as a principle or cause. Materialists of one sort or another are the opponents of both Platonists and Aristotle and of Platonists and Aristotelians. That part of the controversy is discussed in the

chapter on MATTER. Here we are concerned with the issues arising from different views of form and its relation to matter.

THE POPULAR MEANING of form affords an approach to the subtleties of the subject. As ordinarily used form connotes figure or shape. That connotation expresses one aspect of the technical significance of form. A great variety of things, differing materially and in other respects can have the *same* figure or shape. The same form can be embodied in an indefinite number of otherwise different individuals. But figures or shapes are sensible forms—forms perceptible to vision and touch. To identify form with figure or shape would put an improper limitation on the meaning of form. This is popularly recognized in the consideration of the form of a work of art—the structure of an epic poem or a symphony—which seem to be more a matter of understanding than of direct sense-perception.

Bertrand Russell's definition of the form of a proposition effectively illustrates the point involved. The form of a proposition, he says, is that which remains the same in a statement when everything else is changed. For example these two statements have the same grammatical and logical form: (1) *John followed James* and (2) *Paul accompanied Peter*. What might be called the matter or subject matter of the two statements is completely different but both have the same form, as may an indefinite number of other statements.

This illustration helps us to grasp the meaning of form and the distinction between form and matter or the formal and the material aspects of anything. It is thus that we understand the phrase *formal logic* to signify a study of the forms of thought or discourse separated from the subject matter being thought about or discussed. Similarly abstractionism or surrealism is a kind of formalism in painting which tries to separate visible patterns or structures from their representative significance or their reference to familiar objects.

Kant's doctrine of space and time as transcendental forms of intuition exemplifies the meaning of form as pure order or structure divorced from sensuous content. "That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation

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The problems which these words were used to state and discuss remain active in contemporary thought. There is for instance the problem of the universal and the particular, the problem of the immutable and the mutable, the problem of the one and the many, or of sameness and diversity. These problems appear in the writings of William James and Bergson, Dewey and Santayana, Whitehead and Russell. Sometimes there is even a verbal approximation to the traditional formulation, as in Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects, or in Santayana's consideration of the realm of essence and the realm of matter. Whatever expressions they use, these thinkers find themselves

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The most extreme reaction is of course to be found in those who completely reject the term *form* or its equivalents as being without significance for the problems of motion, existence, or knowledge. Bacon retains the term, but radically changes its meaning. None should

we regard the idea we have (that is, our understanding of the thing) as an approximation of the idea. The Ideas are outside the human mind even as the Forms are separate from their sensible material imitations. When we apprehend things by reason we know the Forms they imitate; when we apprehend them by our senses we know them as imitations or as images of the Ideas.

THE PLATONIC THEORY changes the ordinary meaning of the word imitation. We ordinarily think of imitation as involving a relation of resemblance between two sensible things both of which we are able to perceive. For example we say that a child imitates his father's manner or that a portrait resembles the person who posed for it. The painter, according to Socrates in the *Republic*, is not the only creator of appearances.¹ He compares the painter who pictures a bed with the carpenter who makes one.

Like the bed in the painting, the bed made by the carpenter is not the real bed. It is not, says Socrates, the Idea "which according to our view is the essence of the bed." The carpenter cannot make true existence but only some semblance of existence. As the bed in the picture is an imitation of the particular bed made by the carpenter, so the latter is an imitation of the Idea—the essential *bedness* which is the model or archetype of all particular beds.

Shifting to another example, we can say that a statue which resembles a particular man, is the imitation of an imitation for the primary imitation lies in the resemblance between the particular man portrayed and the Form or Idea Man. Just as the statue derives its distinctive character from the particular man it imitates, so that particular man, or any other, derives his manhood or humanity from Man. Just as the particular man imitates Man, so our idea of Man is also an imitation of that Idea. Knowledge, according to Plato, consists in the imitation of Ideas, even as sensible material things have whatever being they have by imitation of the Ideas, the Forms.

Another name for the primary type of imitation is participation. To participate in is to partake of. In the dialogue in which Plato has the young Socrates inquire into the relation

between sensible particulars and the Ideas or Forms, Parmenides tells him that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake and from which they derive their names: that similars, for example, become similar because they partake of similarity, and great things become great because they partake of greatness, and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful because they partake of justice and beauty. The Forms or Ideas are Parmenides suggests, patterns fixed in nature and other things are like them and resemblances of them—what is meant by the participation of other things in the Ideas, is really assimilation to them.

The fact of particularity and multiplicity seems to be inseparable from the fact of participation. That in which the many particulars participate must on the other hand have universality and unity. The Forms or Ideas are universals in the sense that each is a one which is somehow capable of being in a many—by resemblance or participation. Parmenides asks Socrates whether he thinks that the whole idea is one and yet being one is in each one of the many. When Socrates unhesitatingly says Yes, Parmenides points out to him that we then confront the difficulty that one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals and that the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them. Nor can we say, Socrates is made to realize that, the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one.²

THIS DIFFICULTY concerning the relation of particulars to the Ideas they participate in, is discussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. It is not the only difficulty which Plato himself finds in the theory of Ideas. Another concerns the individuality of each of the indefinite number of particulars which copy a single model or archetype. What makes the various copies of the same model different from one another?

Plato meets this problem by adding a third principle. To the intelligible patterns or archetypes and their sensible imitations, he adds, in the *Theaetetus*, the principle which is variously

I term its *matter* he writes, that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations. I call its *form*. Sometimes the consideration of form emphasizes not its separation from but its union with matter. The form dwells in the thing constituting its nature. The sensible or intelligible characteristics of a thing result from the various ways in which its matter has been formed.

It is impossible to say more about the meaning of *form* without facing at once the great controversy between Plato and Aristotle and the difficulties which their theories confront.

PLATO DOES NOT deny that things—the sensible material changing things of experience—have something like form. Nor does he deny that the ideas by which we understand the natures of things are like forms. Rather he asks us to consider that which they are like.

In the *Phaedo*—only one of the many dialogues in which the doctrine of forms is discussed—Socrates argues that there is such a thing as equality not of one piece of wood or stone with another but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality. Socrates gets Simmias to admit that we know the nature of this absolute essence and then asks: Whence did we obtain our knowledge? It could not have been obtained from the pieces of wood or stone. Socrates tries to show because they appear at one time equal and at another time unequal whereas the idea of equality is never the same as that of inequality. Hence he thinks

we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals. Before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses. The equality which supplies the standard by which material equals are measured is the Form or Idea of equality.

What is true in this one case Socrates thinks is true in every other. Whether we consider the essence of equality, beauty or anything else, Socrates holds the Ideas or essences which in the dialectical process we define as true existences are each of them always

what they are having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms not admitting of variation at all or in any way or at any time. Apart from the perishable things of the sensible world and apart from the ideas which are involved in our process of learning and thinking there exist the Forms or the Ideas themselves—the immutable objects of our highest knowledge.

Because the same English words are employed in these quite distinct senses it is useful to follow the convention of translators who capitalize the initial letter when Form or Idea refers to that which is separate from the characteristics of material things and from the ideas in our mind. The words Form and Idea are interchangeable but the words Idea and idea are not. The latter refers to a notion in the human mind by which it knows whereas Idea—as Plato uses the word—signifies the object of knowledge, i.e. that which is known. These differences are further discussed in the chapter on IDEA.

By imitating the Forms sensible things according to Plato have the characteristics we apprehend in them. The ideas we have when we apprehend the resemblance between sensible things and their Forms (which sensible things exhibit) would seem to be indirect apprehensions of the Forms themselves. When in the *Republic* Socrates discusses knowledge and opinion he distinguishes them from one another according to a division of their objects—the realm of intelligible being on the one hand and the realm of sensible becoming on the other. The latter stands to the former as image or copy to reality and Socrates finds this relationship repeating itself when he further divides each of the two parts. The realm of becoming divides into images or shadows and into that of which this is only the resemblance, namely the animals which we see and every thing that grows or is made. The realm of intelligible being is also subdivided into two parts of which the first is as an image or reflection of the second, namely the hypotheses we form in our minds and the Ideas or Forms themselves.

From this it appears that just as we should regard the form of the thing as an imitation of or participation in the separate Form so should

only physical things—formless sensible substances, such as the stone or the man—are not in his conception imitations of or participations in universal models which exist apart from these things. He leaves it an open question whether there are eternal forms or ideas—that is, purely intellectual substances—which do not function as the models for sensible things to imitate.

As we proceed the first of his theories comes to two affirmations. The first is that the characteristics of things are determined by "indwelling forms" which have their being, no matter from but in the things themselves. To Aristotle's meaning he turns to the realm of art. When we make a bronze sphere he writes, "we know the form," which is a sphere "in the particular matter" the bronze and "the matter is a bronze sphere." There is no "sphere" apart from the individual spheres," and no bronze apart from the particular lumps of metal that are bronze. The form means the such, and is not a thing—a definite thing, such as the individual bronze sphere.

Aristotle analyzes natural things in the same manner. It is from "the indwelling form and the matter" he says that "the concrete substance is derived." Men such as Callias or Socrates for example consist of "such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones," and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different) but the same in form. The flesh and bones of Callias are not the flesh and bones of Socrates but though different as material men, they are the same as men because they have the same form.

The second point is that our understanding of things does the forms of things, but does somehow in the intellect rather than in the things themselves. In order to know things, Aristotle says, we must have within us "either the things themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible. It is not the form which is present in the soul," he says, "but its form."

The form of the thing is as individual as the thing itself. But in the mind as the result of the intellect's power to abstract the form from its matter the form becomes a universal. It is then called by Aristotle an "idea," "a conception," or "concept." Forms are universal in the mind

alone. If there were a form existing apart from both matter and mind it would be neither an individual form nor an abstract universal.

The indwelling forms, according to Aristotle, are not universal. Except for the possibility of Forms which dwell apart and bear no resemblance at all to sensible things, all forms are either in matter or abstracted from matter in the human mind. These are of an called "material forms" because they are the forms which matter takes on, can take, and which the mind abstracts from matter. Their being consists in informing or determining matter just as the being of matter consists in the capacity to receive these forms and to be determined by them.

The foregoing helps to explain Aristotle's use of the word "composite" as a synonym for "substance" when he is considering particular sensible things. The individual external individual physical things which Aristotle calls "substances" are all composites of form and matter. He sometimes also calls form and matter "being known," but when he uses the word "substance" strictly and in its primary sense he applies it only to the concrete individual. Form and matter are only principles or constituents of the concrete thing—the concrete substance.

The union of form and matter to constitute physical substances also explains the Aristotelian identification of form with a reality and of matter with potentiality, and the relation of form and matter to a third term in the analysis of change—namely, motion. Is a physical thing changing its matter or is it up one form to take on another? Its matter thus represents its capacity or potentiality for form. Matter is the formless aspect of changing things. What things are actually at any moment is due to the forms they possess. But they may have the potentiality for acquiring other forms, with respect to which they are in process.

"The actuality of sensible things," Aristotle writes, "is simply their capacity for all the forms into which material things can be changed." Change occurs in a transformation of matter which is another way of saying that it consists in the actualization of a thing's potentialities. The Aristotelian theory of form and matter is a theory of becoming as well as of

named sometimes the receptacle : sometimes space sometimes matter. However named it is the absolutely formless for that which is to receive all Forms should have no form.

The mother and receptacle of all visible and in any way sensible things is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible and is most incomprehensible.

It is this material or receiving principle which somehow accounts for the numerical plurality and the particularization of the many copies of the one absolute model. When a number of replicas of the same pattern are produced by impressing a die on a sheet of plastic material at different places it is the difference in the material at the several places which accounts for the plurality and particularity of the replicas. Yet the one die is responsible for the character common to them all.

The sensible things of any one sort are not only particular because the Form they imitate is somehow received in matter: they are also perishable because of that fact. The receptacle is the principle of generation or of change. It is Timaeus says the natural recipient of all impressions which is stirred and informed by them and appears different from time to time by reason of them: but the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner.

Matter as Plato here suggests is the mother of changing things: things which between coming to be and passing away are what they are because of the unchanging Forms. The Form which is received in matter for a time makes the changing thing an *imitation*: as the matter in which the Form is received makes the changing thing a *participation*.

The admittedly mysterious partialing of the Forms by the formless receptacle constitutes the realm of becoming in which being and non-being are mixed. But the Forms or Ideas themselves existing apart from their sensible imitations are uncreated and indestructible: never receiving anything from without nor going out to any other: but invisible and imperceptible by any sense. They constitute the realm of pure being. They are the intelligible reality.

THE CRITICISM OF the Forms or Ideas which we find in the writings of Aristotle is primarily directed against their separate existence. Plato was not far wrong. Aristotle says when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object but he immediately adds the qualification if there are Forms distinct from the things of this earth. It is precisely that supposition which Aristotle challenges.

Aristotle's criticism of Plato stems from his own notion of substance and especially from his conception of sensible substances as composed of matter and form. He uses the word substance to signify that which exists in and of itself or in other words that which exists separately from other things. Hence when he says that in addition to sensible substances

Plato posited two kinds of substances—the Forms and the objects of mathematics—he is translating the affirmation that the Forms have being separately from the sensible world of changing things into an assertion that they are substances.

Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart. Aristotle writes but referring to the Platonists he says they however gave them separate existence and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas. What proof is there he repeatedly asks for the separate existence of the Forms or universals or the objects of mathematics? Of the various ways in which it is proved that the Forms exist he declares none is convincing. Furthermore he objects to the statement that all other things come from the Forms for to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. There is the additional difficulty he thinks that there will be several patterns of the same thing and therefore several Forms e.g. animal and two footed and also man himself will be Forms of man.

Aristotle's denial of separate existence or substantiality to the Ideas or universals stand side by side with his affirmation of the place of forms in the being of substances and the role of universals in the order of knowledge. Furthermore he limits his denial of the substantiality of Ideas to those Forms which seem to be the archetypes or models of sensible things. Par-

its own d. emanat. Idea which is always one and the same he will have nothing on which his mind can rest and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning."

The Aristotelian theory has difficulties of its own with respect to the ultimate character of matter apart from all forms. Completely formless matter would be pure potentiality and would therefore have no actual being. It would be completely non-eligible since form is the principle of anything's eligibility. Nevertheless, something like formless matter seems to be involved in substantial change—in contrast to the substantially formed matter which is the substratum of accidental change.

The problem of prime matter is related in important ways to the problem of the number and order of the various forms which matter can take. The question is whether matter must have a substantial form before it can have any accidental form and whether it can have a second substantial form in addition to a first, or is limited to having a single substantial form, all subsequent forms necessarily being accidental.

Aquinas plainly argues in favor of the unity of substantial form. "Nothing is absolutely one" he maintains, "except by one form, by which a thing has being, because a thing has both being and unity from the same source and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one as, for instance, a white man. If therefore" Aquinas continues, "man were known by one form, the vegetative soul, and animal by another form, the sensitive soul, and man by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. We must therefore conclude," he says, "that the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul are in man essentially one, and the same soul." In other words, "of one thing, there is but one substantial form. It is not only impossible that there be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul," but there is also no need of a second because "the intellectual soul constitutes virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants."

The Aristotelian theory also has difficulties which pertain to substantial forms as objects of

knowledge and definition. The definition which the mind formulates attempts to state the essence of the thing defined. The formable essence of a thing would seem to be identical with its form. But Aristotle raises the question and his followers debate at length whether the essence of a composite substance is identical with its substantial form or includes it. Matter as well.

Aquinas's followers Aquinas maintains that in defining the essence or species of a composite substance the genus is used to signify the matter and the differentia the form. "Some held," he writes, "that the form alone belongs in the species, while the matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. This cannot be true for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies, and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species not indeed, signify matter which is the principle of individuation but common matter." He explains in another place that "matter is twofold common and signifies individual common, such as flesh and bone individual, such as this flesh and these bones." In formulating the universal concepts man for example the intellect abstracts the notion of the species "from this flesh and these bones" which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual. But the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones.

As will be seen in the chapters on ONE and MANY and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR the Platonic and the Aristotelian theories of form are equally involved in the great problem of the universal and the individual. Even though they seem to be diametrically opposed on the existence of universals—whether apart from or only in minds—both Plato and Aristotle face the necessity of explaining individuality. What makes the particular that individuates a universal form the unique individual it is? What makes the individuating form of a composite substance an individual form, as unique as the individual substance of which it is the form?

We have already noted that both Platonists and Aristotelians appeal to matter as somehow responsible for individuation or individuality but that only raises further questions. The

analysis of the being of changing things. Illustrative applications of this theory will be found in the chapters on ART, CAUSE and CHANGE.

Some forms are sensible. Some are shapes, some are qualities, some are quantities. But not all forms are perceptible by the senses, as for example the form which matter takes when a plant or animal is generated and which gives the generated thing its specific nature. This type of form came to be called a substantial form, because it determines the kind of substance which the thing is. In contrast, the forms which determine the properties or attributes of a thing are called its accidents or accidental forms. For example, size and shape, color and weight are accidental forms of a man, whereas that by virtue of which this thing (*having* a certain size, shape, and color) is a *man* is its substantial form.

Aristotle's distinction between substantial and accidental form affects his analysis of change and his conception of matter. Generation and corruption are for him substantial change, change in which matter undergoes transformation with respect to its substantial form. The various types of motion—alteration, increase or decrease, and local motion—are changes which take place in enduring substances and with respect to their accidental forms.

The substratum of accidental change is not formless matter, but matter having a certain substantial form, whereas in the coming to be or passing away of substances, the substratum would seem to be a primary sort of matter devoid of all form. As indicated in the chapter on MATTER, this according to Aristotle is the primary substratum of each thing from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result. He tries to help us grasp prime matter by using an analogy. As the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, he writes, so is the underlying nature to substance—matter absolutely formless to substantial form.

Aristotle sometimes speaks of the substantial form as a first act or actuality, and of accidental forms as second actualities. Accordingly he also distinguishes between a primary and secondary kind of matter—the one absolutely potential and underlying substantial change, the other

partly actualized and partly potential and involved in accidental change. Primary matter, Aquinas explains, has substantial being through its form. But when once it exists under one form, it is in potentiality to others.

Perhaps one more distinction should be mentioned because of its significance for later discussions of form. Regarding living and non-living things as essentially distinct, Aristotle differentiates between the forms constituting these two kinds of substances. As appears in the chapter on SOUL, he uses the word soul to name the substantial form of plants, animals, and men.

BOTH THE PLATONIC theory of the separate Forms and the Aristotelian theory of the composition of form and matter raise difficulties which their authors consider and which become the subject of intense controversy among Platonists and Aristotelians in the Hellenistic and medieval periods.

The Platonic theory faces a question which arises from supposing the existence of an eternal and immutable Form for every appearance in the sensible world of becoming. If the Idea and the individual are alike, then some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light. Parmenides says to Socrates, and if that be like anything else, then another and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it. Because of this difficulty with the doctrine of participation, Parmenides suggests that it may be necessary to conclude that the Idea cannot be like the individual or the individual like the Idea. In addition, the relationships of the Forms to one another presents a difficulty. Is the relation of one Form to another? Parmenides asks, determined by the essence of each Form, or by the relationships among the sensible particulars that imitate the Forms in question? Either solution seems to be unsatisfactory because of the further difficulties which both raise.

Yet after propounding questions of this sort and multiplying difficulties, Parmenides concludes by telling Socrates why the theory of Ideas cannot be given up. If a man fixing his attention on these and like difficulties, he says, does away with the Forms of things and will not admit that every individual thing has

its own determinate Idea which is always one and the same. He will have nothing on which his mind can rest and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning.

The Aristotelian theory has difficulties of its own with respect to the ultimate character of matter apart from all forms. Completely formless matter would be pure potentiality and would therefore have no actual being. It could be completely unintelligible since form is the principle of anything's intelligibility. Nevertheless something like formless matter seems to be involved in substantial change. In contrast to the substantially formed matter which is the substratum of accidental change.

The problem of prime matter is related in lat speculations to the problem of the number and order of the various forms which matter can take. The question is whether matter must have a substantial form before it can have any accidental form and whether it can have a second substantial form in addition to a first or is limited to having a single substantial form all subsequent forms necessarily being accidental.

Aquinas plainly argues in favor of the unity of substantial form. Nothing is absolutely one, he maintains, except by one form by which a thing has being because a thing has both being and unity from the same source and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one as for instance a white man. If therefore Aquinas continues: man were *living* by one form, the vegetative soul and *animal* by another form, the sensitive soul and *man* by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. We must therefore conclude, he says, that the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul are in man numerically one and the same soul. In other words, of one thing, there is but one substantial form. It is not only impossible that there be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul, but there is also no need of any other because the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants.

The Aristotelian theory also has difficulties with respect to substantial forms as objects of

knowledge and definition. The definition which the mind formulates attempts to state the essence of the thing defined. The formula for the essence of a thing would seem to be identical with its form. But Aristotle raises the question and his followers debate at length whether the essence of a composite substance is identical with its substantial form or includes its matter as well.

Among his followers Aquinas maintains that in defining the essence or species of a composite substance the genus is used to signify the matter and the differentia the form. Some hold, he writes, that the form alone belongs to the species, while the matter is part of the individual and not of the species. This cannot be true for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species not indeed *signate* matter which is the principle of individuation but common matter. He explains in another place that matter is twofold: common and *signate* or individual common such as flesh and bone, individual such as *this* flesh and these bones. In forming the universal concept *man* for example the intellect abstracts the notion of the species from *this* flesh and *these* bones which do not belong to the species as such but to the individual. But the species of *man* cannot be abstracted by the intellect from *flesh and bones*.

As will be seen in the chapters on ONE AND MANY and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR the Platonic and the Aristotelian theories of form are equally involved in the great problem of the universal and the individual. Even though they seem to be diametrically opposed on the existence of universals—whether apart from or only in minds—both Plato and Aristotle face the necessity of explaining, individually. What makes the particular that imitates a universal Form the unique individual it is? What makes the individual form of a composite substance an individual form, as unique as the individual substance of which it is the form?

We have already noted that both Platonists and Aristotelians appeal to matter as somehow responsible for individuation or individuality but that only raises further questions. The

analysis of the being of changing things Illustrative applications of this theory will be found in the chapters on ART, CAUSE and CHANGE.

Some forms are sensible. Some are shapes some are qualities some are quantities. But not all forms are perceptible by the senses as for example the form which matter takes when a plant or animal is generated and which gives the generated thing its specific nature. This type of form came to be called a substantial form because it determines the kind of substance which the thing is. In contrast the forms which determine the properties or attributes of a thing are called its accidents or accidental forms. For example size and shape color and weight are accidental forms of a man whereas that by virtue of which this thing (*having* a certain size shape and color) is a man is its substantial form.

Aristotle's distinction between substantial and accidental form affects his analysis of change and his conception of matter. Generation and corruption are for him substantial change—change in which matter undergoes transformation with respect to its substantial form. The various types of motion—alteration increase or decrease and local motion—are changes which take place in enduring substances and with respect to their accidental forms.

The substratum of accidental change is not formless matter but matter having a certain substantial form whereas in the coming to be or passing away of substances the substratum would seem to be a primary sort of matter devoid of all form. As indicated in the chapter on MATTER this according to Aristotle is the primary substratum of each thing from which it comes to be without qualification and which persists in the result. He tries to help us grasp prime matter by using an analogy. As the bronze is to the statue the wood to the bed he writes so is the underlying nature to substance—matter absolutely formless to substantial form.

Aristotle sometimes speaks of the substantial form as a first act or actuality and of accidental forms as second actualities. Accordingly he also distinguishes between a primary and secondary kind of matter—the one absolutely potential and underlying substantial change the other

partly actualized and partly potential and involved in accidental change. Primary matter Aquinas explains, has substantial being through its form. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others.

Perhaps one more distinction should be mentioned because of its significance for later discussions of form. Regarding living and non-living things as essentially distinct Aristotle differentiates between the forms constituting these two kinds of substances. As appears in the chapter on SOUL, he uses the word soul to name the substantial form of plants animals and men.

BOTH THE PLATONIC theory of the separate Forms and the Aristotelian theory of the composition of form and matter raise difficulties which their authors consider and which become the subject of intense controversy among Platonists and Aristotelians in the Hellenistic and medieval periods.

The Platonic theory faces a question which arises from supposing the existence of an eternal and immutable Form for every appearance in the sensible world of becoming. If the Idea and the individual are alike then some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light. Parmenides says to Socrates and if that be like anything else then another and new ideas will be always rising if the idea resembles that which partakes of it. Because of this difficulty with the doctrine of participation Parmenides suggests that it may be necessary to conclude that the Idea cannot be like the individual or the individual like the Idea. In addition the relationships of the Forms to one another presents a difficulty. Is the relation of one Form to another Parmenides asks determined by the essence of each Form or by the relationships among the sensible particulars that imitate the Forms in question? Either solution seems to be unsatisfactory because of the further difficulties which both raise.

Yet after propounding questions of this sort and multiplying difficulties Parmenides concludes by telling Socrates why the theory of Ideas cannot be given up. If a man fixing his attention on these and like difficulties he says does away with the Forms of things and will not admit that every individual thing has

which God in the beginning created was unformed and void. Aquinas argues that if formless matter preceded in duration it already existed for this is implied by duration. To say then, that matter preceded but without form, is to say that being existed actually yet without actuality which is a contradiction in terms. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless. But neither according to Aquinas can the form of any material thing be created apart from its matter. Forms and other non-subsisting things, which are said to co-exist rather than to exist, he declares ought to be called *concreated* rather than *created* things.

Aristotle's theory of physical substances as composite of form and matter raises certain special difficulties for Christian theology. Those

who like Aquinas adopt his theory must also adapt it to supernatural conditions when they deal with the problems of substance involved in the mystery of the Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity and the mystery of transubstantiation in the Eucharist.

Furthermore Aristotle's identification of soul with the substantial form of a living thing makes it difficult to conceive the separate existence of the individual human soul. Again an adaptation is required. As indicated in the chapters on IMMORTALITY and SOUL, the Christian doctrine of personal survival is given an Aristotelian rendering by regarding the human soul as a form which is not completely material. Hence it is conceived as capable of self-subsistence when with death and the dissolution of the composite nature it is separated from the body.

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Platonists conceive matter as the receptacle of all Forms and so in itself absolutely formless. How then can it cause the particularizations which must be accounted for? Since prime matter like the receptacle is formless the Aristotelians resort to what they call signate matter or individual matter to explain the individuality of forms and substances but it has been argued that this only begs the question rather than solves it.

THE CORRELATIVE terms *form* and *matter* seem to occur in modern thought under the guise of certain equivalents as for example the distinct substances which Descartes calls thought and extension—*res cogitans* and *res extensa*—or the infinite attributes of substance which Spinoza calls mind and body. They appear more explicitly in Kant's analysis of knowledge related as the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of experience. But it is in the great theological speculations of the Middle Ages that the most explicit and extended use of these terms is made often with new interpretations placed on ancient theories.

The doctrine of spiritual substances for example has a bearing on the theory of self-subsistent Forms. The angels are sometimes called *separate forms* by the theologians. They are conceived as immaterial substances and hence as simple rather than composite. But though Plotinus identifies the order of purely intelligible beings with the pure intelligences the Christian theologian does not identify the Platonic Ideas with the angels. He regards the angels as intelligences. They exist as *pure forms* and therefore are intelligible as well as intellectual substances. But they are in no sense the archetypes or models which sensible things resemble.

Nevertheless Christian theology does include that aspect of the Platonic theory which looks upon the Ideas as the eternal models or patterns. But as Aquinas points out the separately existing Forms are replaced by what Augustine calls the exemplars existing in the divine mind.

Aquinas remarks on the fact that whenever Augustine—who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists—found in their teaching anything consistent with faith he adopted it and

those things which he found contrary to faith he amended. He then goes on to say that Augustine could not adopt but had to amend the teaching of the Platonists that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter. He did this not by denying the ideas, according to which all things are formed but by denying that they could exist outside the divine mind. The divine ideas are the eternal exemplars and the eternal types—*types* Aquinas explains insofar as they are the likenesses of things and so the principles of God's knowledge; *exemplars* insofar as they are the principles of the making of things in God's act of creation.

The profound mystery of the creative act which projects the divine ideas into substantial or material being replicates the older problem of how physical things derive their natures by participation in the Forms. According to the Aristotelian theory both natural generation and artistic production involve the transformation of a pre-existent matter. According to the Platonic myth of the world's origin only changing things are created neither the receptacle nor the Ideas. But the Christian dogma of creation excludes everything from eternity except God.

Ideas are eternal only as inseparable from the divine mind. Being spiritual creatures the angel or self-subsistent forms are not eternal. And in the world of corporeal creatures matter as well as its forms must begin to be with the creation of things. Since matter and its forms cannot exist in separation from one another the theologians hold that God cannot create them separately. God cannot be supposed Augustine says first to have made formless matter and after an interval of time formed what He had first made formless but he goes on as intelligible sounds are made by a speaker wherein the sound issues not formless at first and afterwards receives a form but is uttered already formed so must God be understood to have made the world of formless matter but contemporaneously to have created the world. God concreates form and matter. Augustine holds giving form to matter's formlessness without any interval of time.

Defending Augustine's interpretation of the passage in Genesis which says that the earth

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk ii (263, 283) 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk ii (263-283) 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are in book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of book or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Lehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Form in relation to becoming or change

1a Forms as immutable models or archetypes the exemplar ideas

- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 88a 89a 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Phaedo* 231b 732b 247c 248c / *Republic* bk iii 333b 334b bk v 368c 369c bk vi 382a c bk vii 386c 389 bk ix 426d-429b / *Timaeus* 447a-458b *passim* esp 447b 448b / *Parmenides* 487c 491a / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Sexton's Letter* 809c 810b

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk ii ch 7 [113 24 33] 158d bk vi ch 8 [147 5 11] 201a / *Genetics* 10a and *Corruption* bk ii ch 9 [335^b 24] 437a b / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 6 [987 29 13] 505b c ch 7 [988 34 3] 506c ch 9 [991 19 32] 509c bk vii ch 8 [1033^b 19-1034 7] 556d 557b bk xiii ch 4-5 610a 611d

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch 6 [1096^b 3] 1097^a 14] 342b c

- 11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* bk i 811a d

- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk v [181 193] 63b c

- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr iii ch ii 46b c tr iii ch 17 tr iv ch 5 49b 51d tr ii ch 15 56c 57a / *Third Ennead* tr ix ch i 136a d / *Fourth Ennead* tr ii ch i 139c 140c tr ix 205a 201a c / *Fifth Ennead* tr ii ch i 214c

- 215a tr i ch 4 tr ix ch 14 230b 251d / *Sixth Ennead* tr ii ch 10 22 278d 280d tr vii ch 4 17 323c 331a

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 9 3a bk xii par 38 108d 109a / *City of God* bk viii ch 3 266a b ch 6 269b = bk ix ch 22 296d 297a bk xi ch 7 3^a 6a = ch 10 328c d ch 20 339a b / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 9-10 627a b bk ii ch 38 654b c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 15 91b 94a *passim* Q 18 A 4 REP = 107d 108c Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256a 257b Q 50 A 1 ANS 272a 273b Q 63 A 4 ANS 342b 343c Q 108 A 1 ANS and REP 2 352c 553c

- 30 BACON *A Lancelot of Learning* 43d 44c

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk iii ch iii SECT 17 258d 259b SECT 19 259c 260a

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a 173b 174a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c

1b Forms as indwelling causes or principles

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk i 259a 268d bk ii ch i [193 30 19] 269c 270a ch [194 12 15] 270c 271a bk iii ch 2 [202 9-11] 279c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 8 [7^a 12 27] 368b c bk iv ch 4 [312 3-22] 403c d / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 3 [318^a 13-8] 415b c / *Meta*

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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 52
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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Symposium*
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 11 NICO IACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a d
 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH I-2 26a d
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I PAR 9 3a BK
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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113a 114a ■ / *Phaedrus*
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 33 35]
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 11 NICO IACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 841a d
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I PAR 9 3a BK
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14
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- 8 *Aristotle's Physics* 11c 11 [193] 194
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 17 *Plato's First Ennead* 11c 11 30d
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- 11 40L 3 S *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 2
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 A 1 244d 245c Q 54 A 1 3 285a 287b Q
 66 A 1 REP 3 343d 345c Q 6 A 3 351b-352a
 Q 6 A 4 393a 394c A 6 396a d Q 7 A 1
 399c-401b A 6 404c-405c PART II Q
 A 4 REP 3 654b 655a
 20 40L 3 S *Summa Theol* gica R RT I 11 Q 49
 A 2 A 1 264a A 4 A 5 and REP 1 5a 6a
 Q 5 2 7c 6a Q 52 A 1 A 1 15d 18a Q 5
 A 1 REP 4 178b-179b R RT III Q 2 A 1 1
 710a 711c A 2 A 5 711d 712d R RT III
 REP 1 710a A 4 A 5 693d 695d Q 79 A 1
 REP 4 931b-933b
 31 DE CARTE *De* 11c 11 PART I 41d
 35 LOCKE *11 man's* 11c 11 *de* 11c 11 CH XII
 SECT 3-6 147d 148c C I XXIII REP 1 204c d
 CH XXII SECT 6-13 240d 243b CH XXIII
 SECT 24 247c d BK III C I III SECT 15 19
 258b-260a CH III 262b-283a passim CH SECT
 1 10 368b 271b SECT 21 2 3c SECT 24 274c
 CH IX 1 CT III 13 267d 288d C I 2 SECT 20
 296d 297a
 4 A 1 T *Pure Reason* 131c d / 1 *degen.* 580c d
 2 (3) The unity of substantial forms preme-
 dia in relation to substantial form
 8 A 11c 11 *Physics* 11c 11 BK I CH 9 [19] 3 33
 268a-c / *General o and Corrupt* 11c 11 BK I CH 3
 [19] 33 416b-c / *Metaphysics* BK IV C 1
 11 [38] 322 390-7] 493d-494a / *Metaphysics* 11c 11
 11 11 [19] 322-33 509c BK II 11 [19] 322
 1-6] 512b BK I C 14 [115] 11] 535b BK I
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 556c BK 13 [10] 542 3] 562d 563a CH 16
 [10] 543 16] 564c [11] 5] 565 BK VI CH 4
 [11] 543 15 32] 568d 569a BK IX CH 7 [10] 543
 24 1] 575 BK XI CH 3 [10] 543 35 1070
 4] 599a b [10] 543-11] 599b BK XIII CH 5
 [10] 543 34] 611c
 17 40L 3 S *Second Ennead* 11c 11 CH 11-12 52a
 53b 11c 11 57d-60c / *Third Ennead* 11c 11 C I
 7 9 110d 119a / *Fourth Ennead* 11c 11 205a
 207a,c

(2c Form in the composite being of the individual thing 2c(3) The unity of substantial form prime matter in relation to substantial form)

- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 8 REP 3 19d 20c Q 5 A 3 REP 3 25a d Q 7 A 2 ANS and R.P 3 31d 32c Q 8 A 4 REP 1 37c 38c Q 14 A 2 REP 3 76d 77d Q 15 A 3 REP 3 93b 94a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b Q 66 A 1 2-2 343d 347b Q 76 A 3-4 391a 394c Q 77 A 1 REP 2 399c 401b A 2 REP 3 401b II Q 84 A 3 REP 2 443d 444d Q 115 A 1 REP 1-2 4 585d 587c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 79 A 1 REP 4 951b 953b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT II 415a b

2d Angels and human souls as self subsistent forms the substantiality of thought or mind in separation from extension or body

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 27c d / *Fourth Ennead* TR I CH 1 139b TR III CH 9-12 146d 149b CH 18 151b c TR IV 205a 207a c / *Sixth Ennead* TR IV CH 5 356d 357a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XXII CH I 586b d 587b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 ANS and REP 2 31d 32c Q 8 A 2 REP 2-3 35c 36b Q 50 269a 275a esp A 2 270a 272a Q 75 378a 385c esp A 5 382a 383b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [121-148] 116b = XXIV [13 36] 150b c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 80a b PART III 174b 176d PART IV 250c 251c 258b 261a 270c 271b

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a PART V 60b c / *Meditations* II 77d 81d VI 96b 103d / *Objections and Replies* DEP X 130d PROI IV 133c 152b d 156a 224d 225b 275d 226a 231a 232d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 10 358a b PROP 14 COROL 2 360a PART II PROP 1-2 373d 374a PROP 7 375a c PROP 13 377d 378c PART III PROP 2 396c 398b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [423-431] 102b BK V [385-443] 183b 185a [469-502] 185b 186a BK VI [3 0-351] 203a 204a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 15-37 208c 214b passim

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2 413b SECT 26-27 418a b SECT 89 430b c SECT 135 442 440a 441c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 186b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 136b

44 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b 201b = 203d 204c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 25/c 258a PART II 360c d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 221a 226a

3 Form in relation to knowledge

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a c / *Republic* BK V 368c 373c BK VI 385c 388a / *Timaeus* 457b-458a

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77^b-91] 105d 106a CH 22 [83 23 35] 113c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 9 [99a 33-99b 18] 508c 509c BK VIII CH 4 [101^b 30] CH 5 [107^b 24] 610a 611c / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [129 13 28] 661b =

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VI CH 7 316a c CH 9 339a =

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A REP 2 31d 32c II 13 A 1 REP 2 62c 63 Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 2 76d 77d Q 15 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 91b 92a Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c Q 34 A 1 REP 3 185b 18 b Q 86 A 3 463b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXIV [49 60] 80b c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 6-13 240d 243b BK III CH VI 268b 283a passim CH IX SECT 12 287d 288a BK II CH IV SECT 5-8 324d 325c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 108a c 173b / *Fu d Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b c / *Practic Reason* 308a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 7a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693d 694c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 859a 860b

3a Sensible forms intelligible forms the forms of sensation and understanding

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 228a 23 b / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK V 310d 373c BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 447a d 455c-458a / *Theaetetus* 534c 536a

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 13 [79 6 10] 108c / *Topics* BK II CH [113 1 31] 158d / *Soul* BK III CH 2 [425^b 17 6] 657d 658a CH 4 661b 662c CH 8 664b d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH I [450 26-451 19] 691a 692b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X PAR IV 76a b BK XII PAR 5 100a b / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b = BK XI CH 27 337d 338a BK VII CH 37 346c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 31d 32c Q 13 A 1 ANS 71b 72c Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 8 ANS 82 83b 217 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 91b 92a Q 1 A 1 ANS 102d 103c Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c I 1 A 1 ANS 108d 109 Q 34 A 1 R 135b 18 b 250 A 2 REP 2 270a 272a II 440b 451b Q 85 A 1 2 451c 455b A 5 451d 158d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 62 A 3 REP 1 61c 62b P III CH I CH Q 92 A 1 ANS 1025c 1032b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 40d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 9 10 270d 271b

- 42 *h. vt. Part Re* 11 14 108a c esp 14a 15c
23a 33d 41c 42b 48d 55 56d 59b 61 64
65d 66d, 68a 9 c 94d 96d 100d 101b 112d
113a 115d 135a 13 = 153c 155a 173b
20 c d 213d 215a / *F d Pri Metaphysic*
of Mor 18 282b-c 283b / *Practical Re son*
30a b 319d 31 c 336a 350b-c / *Judge*
ment 461 c 471b-e 517b-e 542c d 552b-c
562a b 603d 604c 61 c d
53] *met Psychol gy* 420a E 628b 631a
- 36 The problem of the universal knowledge
of the individual
- 7 *Plato Cratyl* 1 113c 114 c / *Phaed* 228a
237b / *Rep* 41c bk v 370d 373c / *Forme ide*
48 c 491 / *Ph letu* 610d 613a
- 8 *Aristotle Categories* cii 5 [26b-37] 6c 7a /
Prior An lytic bk i cii 1 [77^s-9] 105d
106a cii 24 [85^s-31 2a2] 116c 117a / *Top* c i bk
ii cii 7 [113^s-23] 158d / *S phical hsf* i
nom ii 22 [1^s 37 179^s-10] 246c / *Physic* bk
vii cii 3 [247^s 7] 330b / *Metaphysic* bk i
c ii 6 305b-306b cii 9 308c 311c bk iii cii 3
[99^s 6-14] 517d c i 4 [99^s 24 241] 518a-c bk
vii c ii 8 [33^s 19-31 8] 556d 557b i 10
[35^s 23-32] 559b c i ii [037^s 5-9] 560c cii
13 15 562a 564c bk xiii cii 4-5 610 611d
c ii 10 618a 619a-c / *Soul* bk iii c i 4 [429 18-
9] 661c
- 9 *Aristotle Ethics* bk i c i 6341b-347c
- 19 *AQUINAS Summa Theologiae* p rti q 3 a 2
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22b-23b q 11 a 3 *Ans* 49 c q 13 a 9 *Ans*
and *rep* 71b-72 q 14 a 11 84c-85c q 16 a
7 *rep* 99 d q 39 a 3 *Ans* 204c 205c q 5
2 s 270 272a 4 a s 273b-274b q
5^s a 2 293d 297 q 6 a 2 *Ans* 388c 391a q
85 a 7 *rep* 3 459c-460b q 86 a 2 461 -462
3 463b-d
- 20 *AQUINAS Summa Theologiae* p rti q 2
a s 711d 712d
- 28 *HANSEN On A mal Gener ion* 332a 333b
esp 333a b
- 35 *LOCKE Human Understanding* bk iii cii ii
s ct 6- o 255c 260a cii v vi 263d 283a pas-
sum esp cii v s ct 9 266a b cii vi s ct 32
277 278b sect 36-37 279 b bk iv cii iv
s ct 5-8 324d 325c c i 2cr 4 331d 332b
nvii 2cr 9 338d 339b
- 35 *BECKLEY Human Knowledge* 1 tr 8 s ct
6-19 405d-410 esp 12 15 16 409a d
- 38 *ROUSSEAU Equality* 341b-342b
- 42 *h. vt. Part Re son* 211c 218d / *Judgement*
573a-c
- 46 *HIC Phil ophy of History* 158b-c
pa 1 360c 361a
- 51 *ANNA Psychol gy* 308a 312
- 3 *Form and definition* the formal ess-
sence the problem of motivation
to define on
- 7 *Plato Phil dous* 134b-e / *Meno* 174b-179b /
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- 8 *ARISTOTLE Posterior Analytics* bk ii cii 3 10
123c 1 8d c i 13 131b 133c / *Physic* bk ii
c ii 1 [191 30-219] 269c 270a / *Gener i a d*
Corrupt bk i c i 2 [11^s-17 2] 413b /
Metemol gy bk iv cii 12 493d 494d / *Meta*
phys c bk i c i 6 505b 506b cii 7 [85 34
5] 506c bk ii cii 2 [99^s 16-27] 513a b
bk v c ii 2 [1013 2, 28] 533b bk vi cii 1
[1 25^s 23 1026^s 6] 547d 548a bk vii cii 4 6
552b-555a cii 10-15 558a 564c bk xiii
c ii 3 566a 568d c i 6 567d 570d bk xii
c i 9 [1074^s 37 1075^s 2] 605c bk xiii cii 4 5
610 611d / *Soul* bk i cii 1 631a 632d
bk ii cii 1 3 642a 645b passum bk iii cii
4 [42 10-23] 661d 662a cii 6 [43 26-31]
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- 9 *ARISTOTLE Parts of Animals* bk i cii 1 [641
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166a 167d
- 19 *AQUINAS Summa Theologiae* p rti q 3
1 s 16a d a 5 *Ans* 17c 18b q 13 a *rep*
2 74c 75b q 17 a 3 *Ans* 102d 103c q 19
a 4 *rep* 3 107d 108c q 20 a 1 *rep* 4 162a
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- 20 *AQUINAS Summa Theologiae* p rti q 1
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- 31 *SPINOZA Ethics* part i def 4 355b prop 8
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- 33 *LOCKE Human Understanding* bk iii cii xxxiii
204a 214b cii xxxi sect 6-13 240d 243b c i
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- 35 *BERKELEY Human Knowledge* 1
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- 38 *ROUSSEAU Inequality* 342a
- 46 *HANSEN Philosophy of History* intro 176c
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- 4 The denial of form as principle of being
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- 7 *Plato Cratyl* 1 113c 114a c / *Soph* 2 567a
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- 8 *ARISTOTLE Metaphysics* k iv c i 4 [100^s 20-
218] 526c 527 cii 5 528c 530c passum bk xi
c i 6 590d 592b
- 23 *HOBES Leviathan* part i 49d part i
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- 30 *Bacon Novum Organum* bk apn 51 212c
bk ii apn i 2 137a-c ii 17 149b d
- 35 *LOCKE Human Understanding* 1 tr 8 s ct
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296d 297
- 36 *SPINOZA Tractatus* Sh dy 422a b

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- Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things see CAUSE 1a CHANGE 2a MATTER 1a and for the consideration of form and matter as co principles of composite substances see BEING 7b(2)
- Discussions of matter or the receptacle in relation to form see CHANGE 2-2b MATTER 1-1b SPACE 1a WORLD 4b and for the consideration of matter apart from form see MATTER 2 3a
- The controversy over the separate existence of the Forms the objects of mathematics and universals see BEING 7d(2)-7d(3) MATHEMATICS 4b SAME AND OTHER 2a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c and for the problem of the cause of individuality see MATTER 1c UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 3
- The existence of forms in the mind as concepts abstracted from matter see IDEA 2g MATTER 4d MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(1) SENSE 5a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c
- Other considerations of the *a priori* or transcendental forms of intuition see SENSE 1c SPACE 4a TIME 6c
- Comparisons of creation generation and production as each relates to form and matter see ART 2b-2c MATTER 3d WORLD 4c(1)
- Other terms related to the distinction of form and matter or to the kinds of form see BEING 7b 7c(1)-7c(3) NATURE 1a(2) UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 6a
- The theological doctrine of the angels as self subsistent forms or simple substances see ANGEL 2 3b-3c BEING 7b(2) for the theological doctrine of the forms as eternal exemplars or types in the mind of God see GOD 5f IDEA 1c and for the theory of the soul as the substantial form of a living thing see LIFE AND DEATH 1 MAN 3a SOUL 1b
- Form and matter in relation to definition see BEING 8c DEFINITION 6a MATTER 4b NATURE 1a(2)

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

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I

- AQUINAS *On Being and Essence*
 ——— *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*
 ——— *On Spiritual Creatures*
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Chapter 29 GOD

INTRODUCTION

WITH the exception of certain mathematicians and physicists all the authors of the great books are represented in this chapter. In sheer quantity of references, as well as in variety it is the largest chapter. The reason is obvious. More consequences for thought and action follow from the affirmation or denial of God than from answering any other basic question. They follow for those who regard the question as answerable only by faith or only by reason and even for those who insist upon suspending judgment entirely.

In addition to the primary question of God's existence there are all the problems of the divine nature and of the relation of the world and man to the gods or God. The solutions of these problems cannot help influencing man's conception of the world in which he lives, the position that he occupies in it, and the life to which he is called.

The whole tenor of human life is certainly affected by whether men regard themselves as the supreme being in the universe or acknowledge a superior—a superhuman being whom they conceive as an object of fear or love, a force to be defied or a Lord to be obeyed. Among those who acknowledge a divinity matters greatly whether the divine is represented merely by the concept of God—the object of philosophical speculation—or by the living God whom men worship in all the acts of piety which comprise the rituals of religion.

The most radical differences in man's conception of his own nature follow from the exclusion of divinity as its source or model on the one hand and from the various ways in which man uses his partipating divinity on the other. Many fundamental themes and issues are therefore common to this chapter and to the chapter on MAN.

SOME OF THE TOPICS in this chapter are primarily philosophical. They belong to the subject matter of rational speculation or poetic imagination in all the great epochs of our culture regardless of differences in religious belief. Other topics however are peculiarly restricted to matters of faith or religion. With respect to such matters, dogmatic differences or differences in articles of faith must be explicitly recognized.

The materials here assembled must therefore in some instances be divided according to their origin from pagan or from Jewish and Christian sources. Though no great books from the Mohammedan tradition are included in this set, the fact that Gibbon discusses the Moslem faith and compares its teachings with those of Judaism and Christianity explains the inclusion of Mohammedanism in one group of topics. That is the group which deals with the doctrines common to these three religions as distinguished from the tenets on which Judaism and Christianity differ dogmatically. The existence of certain common beliefs in the western tradition enables us to begin, as it seems advisable to do, with the conception of God that is shared by the living religions of western culture today.

In our civilization what is denied by an atheist who says there is no God? Not idols or images which men may seek to placate. Not philosophical constructions or mythological figures. Certainly not the universe itself either as an infinite and everlasting whole or as finite and temporal but equally mysterious in its ultimate incomprehensibility to the human mind. In our civilization the atheist denies the existence of a supernatural being, the object of religious belief and worship among Jews, Christians and Mohammedans. He denies the single personal God Who created the world out of

CROSS REFERENCES

- For Other discussions of the Forms or Ideas as immutable models or archetypes see CHANGE 12a ETERNITY 4c IDEA 1a 6b
- Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things see CAUSE 12 CHANGE 2a MATTER 1a and for the consideration of form and matter as co principles of composite substances see BEING 7b(2)
- Discussions of matter or the receptacle in relation to form see CHANGE 2-a b MATTER 1-1b SPACE 1a WORLD 4b and for the consideration of matter apart from form see MATTER 2 3a
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 FOREST *La structure métaphysique du concret*
 A E TAYLOR *Philosophical Studies* CH 3
 KONING *Le problème de l'indéterminisme*
 BLANSHARD *The Nature of Thought*

of divine and human mating. These deities exercise superhuman powers but none is completely omnipotent or omniscient; not even Kronos or Zeus who cannot escape the decrees of Fate. Moreover, with the exception perhaps of that of Zeus, the power of one divinity is often challenged and thwarted by another. This aspect of polytheism and its bearing on the intervention of the gods in the affairs of men are discussed in the chapter on Fate.

The extent to which we think of the pagans as idolatrous because they made graven images of their gods in human form or regard the pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomorphic depends on our interpretation of religious symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of the poets' descriptions of the gods and their activities should be dismissed as unworthy precisely because they debase the gods to the human level.

According to Gibbon, a Greek or Roman philosopher who considered the system of polytheism as a composition of human fraud and error could disguise a smile of contempt under the mask of devotion without apprehending that either the mockery or the complaisance would expose him to the resentment of any invisible or as he conceived them imaginary powers. But the early Christians held them out as the many gods of antiquity as a much more odious and formidable light and held them to be the authors the patrons and the objects of idolatry.

Those who take symbols as flat literalism might also attack Christianity as anthropomorphic and idolatrous in fact. They have. The defense of Christianity against this charge does not avail in the case of Roman emperor worship which consisted not in the humanization of the divine for the sake of symbolic representation but in the dedication of the merely human to political purposes.

Although there are radical differences there are also certain fundamental agreements between paganism and Jewish-Christianity regarding the nature of the divine. As we have already noted the deity is conceived personally not in terms of impersonal brute forces. Conceived as beings with intelligence and will the gods concern themselves with earthly society; they aid or oppose human plans

and efforts; they reward men for fidelity and virtue or punish them for impiety and sin.

Despite all other differences between paganism and Christianity these agreements are substantial enough to provide many common threads of theological speculation throughout our tradition especially with regard to the abiding practical problems of how man shall live himself and his destiny in relation to the divine or the supernatural. We have therefore attempted to place passages from the great books of pagan antiquity under every heading except those which are specifically restricted to the dogmas of Judaism and Christianity—even under headings which are worded monotheistically since even here there is continuity of thought and expression from Homer and Virgil to Dante and Milton from Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus to Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant from Lucretius to Newton and Darwin.

The doctrines known as deism and pantheism like unqualified atheism are as much opposed to the religious beliefs of polytheism as to the faith of Judaism and Christianity.

Of these two pantheism is much nearer atheism for it denies the existence of a transcendent supernatural being or beings. God is nature. God is immanent in the world and in the extreme form of pantheism not transcendent in any way. Certain historic doctrines which are often regarded as forms or kinds of pantheism seem to be less extreme than this for they do not conceive the physical universe as exhaustive, the infinite being of God. The world for all its vastness and variety may only represent an aspect of the divine nature.

According to Spinoza the attributes of extension and thought in terms of which we understand the world or nature as being of the divine substance are merely those aspects of God which are known to us for the divine substance consists of infinite attributes each one of which expresses eternal and necessary essence. In the conception of Spinoza the whole world represents only a partial manifestation of the divine substance. Yet it is like Plotinus and Spinoza so concerned with the whole of the world that God that—something that is not pantheism—the religious doctrine of the union provides and

nothing Who transcends this created universe and sustains it by His immanent power Who has made laws for the government of all things and cares for each particular by His providence and Who created man in His own image revealed Himself and His will to men and metes out eternal rewards and punishments to the children of Adam whom He also helps by His grace

In this religious conception of God one term must be saved from misinterpretation. The word *personal* should not be read with an anthropomorphic imagery though its meaning does entitle man as well as God to be called a person rather than a thing. Although the term *person* is not found applied to God in Scripture either in the Old or New Testament Aquinas writes nevertheless what the term signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture as that He is the supreme self subsisting being and the most perfectly intelligent being

Boethius had defined a person as an individual substance of a rational nature or as Locke later said a thinking intelligent being. In applying the term *person* to God in the meaning which Boethius had given it Aquinas comments on the difference in its meaning when it is applied to men. God can be said to have a rational nature he writes only if reason be taken to mean not discursive thought but in a general sense an intelligent nature. God cannot be called an *individual* in the sense in which physical things are but only in the sense of uniqueness. *Substance* can be applied to God [only] in the sense of signifying self subsistence. Aquinas does not conclude from this that person is said improperly of God but rather that when God is called personal the meaning is applied in a more excellent way for God does not possess. God is an intelligence

We shall use this idea of a personal God the reality of which the contemporary atheist denies in order to distinguish divergent conceptions in other doctrines. Then we shall examine more closely what is involved in this idea itself.

IN THE WESTERN tradition the various pagan religions—reflected especially in the poems and

histories of Greek and Roman antiquity—were all polytheistic. The number of their gods Montaigne estimates amounts to six and thirty thousand. Augustine offers one explanation of why there were so many. The ancients he writes being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department—to one the body to another the soul and in the body itself to one the head to another the neck and each of the other members to one of the gods and in like manner in the soul to one god the natural capacity was assigned to another education to another anger to another lust and so the various affairs of life were assigned—cattle to one corn to another wine to another oil to another the woods to another money to another navigation to another wars and victories to another marriages to another births and fecundity to another and other things to other gods.

That polytheism no less than monotheism conceives the divine as personal appears in Plato's *Apology*. When Socrates is accused of atheism he asks whether the indictment means that he does not acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges but some other divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. Meletus answers that he thinks Socrates is a complete atheist who recognizes no gods at all. To this Socrates replies by suggesting that his enemies must be confusing him with Anaxagoras who had blasphemed against Apollo by calling the sun a red hot stone. As for himself he offers evidence to show that he believes in divine or spiritual agencies new or old no matter and if I believe in divine beings he asks how can I help believing in spirits or demigods?

Like the one God of Judaism and Christianity the many gods of pagan antiquity have immortal life but they are not without origin. Zeus is the son of Kronos and he has many offspring both gods and demigods who perform different functions and are not of equal station in the Olympian hierarchy. The realm of the divine includes such figures as the Titans and the Cyclops who are neither gods nor men and demigods like Heracles who are offspring

of divine and human mating. These deities exercise superhuman powers but none is completely omnipotent or omniscient, not even Kronos or Zeus who cannot escape the decrees of Fate. Moreover with the exception perhaps of that of Zeus, the power of one divinity is often challenged and thwarted by another. This aspect of polytheism and its bearing on the intervention of the gods in the affairs of men are discussed in the chapter on FATE.

The extent to which we think of the pagans as idolatrous because they made graven images of their gods in human form or regard the pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomorphic depends on our interpretation of religious symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of the poets' descriptions of the gods and their activities should be dismissed as unworthy precisely because they debase the gods to the human level.

According to Gibbon a Greek or Roman philosopher who considered the system of polytheism as a composition of human fraud and error could disguise a smile of contempt under the mask of devotion without apprehending that either the mockery or the complicity would expose him to the resentment of any visible or invisible deity. But the early Christians he points out saw the many gods of antiquity in a much more odious and formidable light and held them to be the authors, the patrons and the objects of idolatry.

Those who take symbols with flat literalism might also attack Christianity as anthropomorphic and idolatrous in fact they have. The defense of Christianity against this charge does not avail in the case of Roman emperor worship which consisted not in the humanization of the divine for the sake of symbolic representation but in the dedication of the merely human for political purposes.

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The extent to which we think of the pagans as idolatrous because they made graven images of their gods in human form or regard the pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomorphic, depends on our interpretation of religious symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of the poets' descriptions of the gods and their activities should be dismissed as unworthy precisely because they debase the gods to the human level.

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salvation are either rejected or profoundly altered

In the ancient world the teaching of the Stoic philosophers expresses a kind of pantheism. There is one universe made up of all things. Marcus Aurelius writes, and one God who pervades all things and one substance and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals and one truth. He speaks of the common nature which is apparently divine and of which every particular nature is a part as the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant. But although he stresses the oneness and divinity of all things, Aurelius also at times uses language which seems to refer to a god who dwells apart from as well as in the world as for example when he debates whether the gods have any concern with human affairs.

Another type of ancient pantheism appears in the thought of Plotinus for whom all things have being only insofar as they participate in even as they emanate from the power of The One or Primal Source. God is sovereignly present through all, he writes: We cannot think of something of God here and something else there nor of all of God gathered at some one spot: there is an instantaneous presence everywhere, nothing containing and nothing left void, everything therefore fully held by the divine. The relation between The One and every other thing is compared to the number series. Just as there is primarily or secondarily some form or idea from the monad in each of the successive numbers—the latter still participating though unequally in the unit—so the series of beings following upon The First bear each some form or idea derived from that source. In Number the participation establishes Quantity in the realm of Being: the trace of The One establishes reality, existence is a trace of The One.

But although The One is in all things and all things depend upon it for their very existence, The One itself has no need of them. It is in this sense that Plotinus says that The One is all things and no one of them. Holding all—though itself nowhere held—it is omnipresent for where its presence failed something would elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense that it is nowhere held, it is not present: thus

it is both present and not present, not present as not being circumscribed by anything, yet as being utterly unattached, not inhibited from presence at any point. Thus all things partake of The One in absolute dependence. But The One considered in itself is absolutely transcendent. Plotinus even denies it the name of God or Good or Being, saying it is beyond these.

Whether or not Spinoza is a pantheist has long been debated by his commentators. An explicit even an extreme form of pantheism would seem to be expressed in the proposition that whatever is is in God and nothing can be or be conceived without God. But while the one and only substance which exists is at once nature and God, Spinoza identifies God only with the nature he calls *natura naturans*. God is not reduced to the nature that falls within man's limited experience or understanding—the nature he calls *natura naturata*.

By *natura naturans* he explains we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence: that is to say, God in so far as He is considered as a free cause. But by *natura naturata* I understand everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God or of any one of God's attributes: that is to say, all the modes of God's attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived.

God is the infinite and eternal substance of all finite existences, an absolute and unchanging one underlying the finite modes in which it variably manifests itself. Though God for Spinoza is transcendent in the sense of vastly exceeding the world known to man, in no sense does God exist apart from the whole of nature. Spinoza's view thus sharply departs from that of an orthodox Jewish or Christian theologian. When the latter says that God is transcendent, he means that God exists apart, infinitely removed from the whole created universe. When the latter speaks of God as being immanent in that universe, he carefully specifies that it is not by His substance, but by the power of His action and knowledge. But Spinoza calls God the immanent and not the transitive cause of

all things," for the reason that "on such God there can be no subsistence that is to say, out of Him nothing can exist which is in itself."

These divergent conceptions of God's immanence and transcendence—so relevant to the question of who is or is not a pantheist—are further discussed in the chapters on NATURE and WORLD.

LUCRETIUS, however, affirms gods or a God, personal intelligences existing apart from this world but as in the teaching of Lucretius, deism sometimes goes to the extreme of believing in absentee gods who neither intervene in the order of nature nor concern themselves with human affairs.

"The nature of the gods," Lucretius writes, "must ever in itself necessarily enjoy untroubled together with supreme repose far removed and withdrawn from our concerns since exempt from every pain exempt from all distress, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither grieved by favors nor moved by anger."

Such gods neither create the world nor govern it; above all they do not reward or punish man, and so they do not have to be feared or propitiated. "To say that for the sake of men they have willed to set in order the glorious nature of the world and therefore it is meet to praise the work of the gods immortal, and that it is an unholiness ever to shake by a lawless force from its fixed seats that which by the foundation of the gods in ancient days has been established on everlasting foundations for mankind, or to assault it by speech and utterly to ruin it from top to bottom and to incense and add other sorrow of the kind—it is all sheer folly. For what advantage can our gratitude bestow on immortal and blessed beings that for our sakes they should take on hand to disturb or assuage?"

Deism seems to have moral significance to Lucretius only insofar as the gods exemplify the happy life and religion is irrational because its sweet illusions for earthly desire motives and meddles make men servile and miserable.

When the deism of Lucretius is contrasted with the more familiar modern forms of that doctrine the influence of Christianity is seen. The modern deist affirms the supremacy of one

God the infinite and eternal Creator of this world. Whose laws are the laws of nature which are laid down from the beginning, and which govern all created things. Rousseau speaks of this as the religion of man and even identifies it with Christianity—"not the Christianity of today but that of the Gospel which is quite different. He describes this religion as that which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality."

Not all deists, certainly not those of the 17th and early 18th centuries, go to the Lucretian extreme of picturing an uninterested and motionless neutral God. Many of them believe in an afterlife. But modern deism did tend toward this extreme. By Kant's time it had endeavored to look upon God as a personal intelligence. Kant therefore takes great pains to distinguish deism from theism.

The deist according to Kant "admits that we can conceive by pure reason alone the existence of a supreme being; but at the same time maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possesses all reality without being able to define it more closely." The theist on the other hand "asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from the analogy with nature with a more definite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will."

Kant even maintains that we might in strict logic deny to the deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being, or thing—the infinite cause of all other things. In any case deism seems to be an essentially un-Jewish and un-Christian or anti-Jewish and anti-Christian doctrine so it denies God's supernatural revelation of Himself; it denies miracles and every other manifestation of supernatural activity in the course of nature or the life of man; it denies the efficacy of prayer and sacrament. In short it rejects the supernatural and practices, as well as the faith and hope of an religion which claims supernatural foundation and supernatural warrant for its dogmas and rituals. Deism, which consists simply in the worship

of a God considered as great powerful and eternal is in Pascal's opinion almost as far removed from the Christian religion as atheism which is its exact opposite

What Pascal and Kant call deism and Rousseau the religion of man others like Hume call natural religion His *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* provide a classic statement of rationalism which is the same as naturalism in religion though as the chapter on RELIGION indicates it may be questioned whether the word religion can be meaningfully used for a doctrine which claims no knowledge beyond that of the philosopher and no guidance for human life beyond the precepts of the moralist

THE SYSTEMATIC exposition of man's knowledge of God is the science of theology In addition to considering all things—the whole world and human life—in relation to God theology treats especially of God's existence essence and attributes Throughout the range of its subject matter and problems theology may be of two sorts it may be either natural knowledge obtained by ordinary processes of observation and reasoning or knowledge which is supernatural in the sense of being based on divine revelation This is the traditional distinction between natural and sacred or as it is sometimes called dogmatic theology The one belongs to the domain of reason it is the work of the philosopher The other belongs to the domain of faith and is the work of the theologian who seeks to understand his faith

These distinctions are discussed in the chapters on THEOLOGY METAPHYSICS and WISDOM Here we are concerned with different attitudes toward the problem of man's knowledge of God The deist as we have seen rejects supernatural revelation and faith theology like religion is held to be entirely natural a work of reason The agnostic makes the opposite denial He denies that anything supernatural can be known by reason It cannot be proved or for that matter disproved The evidences of nature and the light of reason do not permit valid inferences or arguments concerning God or creation providence or immortality

It is usually with respect to God's existence that the agnostic most emphatically declares

reason's incompetence to demonstrate He often accompanies the declaration with elaborate criticisms of the arguments which may be offered by others This is not always the case however For example the great Jewish theologian Moses Maimonides thinks that God's existence can be proved by reason entirely apart from faith but with regard to the essence or attributes of God his position seems to be one which might be called agnostic

When men ascribe essential attributes to God Maimonides declares these so-called essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of other things just as there is no similarity between the essence of God and that of other beings Since the meaning of such positive attributes as good or wise is derived from our knowledge of things they do not provide us with any knowledge of God's essence for no comparison obtains between things and God Hence Maimonides asserts that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes They tell us not what God is but what God is not

Even though Maimonides holds that existence and essence are perfectly identical in God he also insists that we comprehend only the fact that He exists not His essence All we understand he goes on to say in addition to the fact that He exists is the fact that

He is a Being to whom none of his creatures is similar This fact is confirmed in all the negative attributes such as eternal (meaning non-temporal) infinite or incorporeal even as it is falsified by all the positive attributes expressed by such names as good or living or knowing insofar as they imply a comparison between God and creatures When they cannot be interpreted negatively they can be tolerated as metaphors but they must not be taken as expressing an understanding of the true essence of God concerning which Maimonides maintains there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge

Aquinas takes issue with such agnosticism about the divine nature in his discussion of the names of God Although he says that we cannot know what God is but rather what He is not Aquinas disagrees with Maimonides that all names which express some knowledge of God's essence must be interpreted negatively

or treated as metaphors. He does say that when we say God is, we mean merely that God is no like an inanimate thing, as was said by Rabbis Moses." On the contrary he holds that "these names signify the divine substance although they fall short of representing Him.

For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him." Therefore Aquinas concludes, "when we say God is good, the meaning is not God in the cause of goodness, or God is good *in* but the meaning is, whatever good we attribute to creatures proceeds in God, and in a higher way."

If Manichaeans were right that the names which are said positively of both God and creatures are "applied in a purely equivocal sense" (e.g. taking literal meaning when said of creatures but being only metaphorical when said of God) then according to Aquinas, it would follow that from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God. Those who say on the other hand that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal (*i.e.*, are said in exactly the same sense) claim to comprehend more than man can know of the divine essence. When the term *is* is applied to God," Aquinas writes, "it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term *is* is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures" but rather all positive names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense."

A further discussion of the names of God will be found in the chapter on *Sacra et Sacra Scriptura*, and the correct notion of the analogical, the univocal, and the equivocal will also be found there as well as in the chapter on *Sacra et Sacra Scriptura*. We have dealt with these matters here only for the sake of describing that degree of skepticism according to which Montaigne, by contrast with Aquinas, is an agnostic. But agnosticism itself goes further and denies that man can have any natural knowledge of God—either of His existence or of His essence.

So understood a positivism need not be incompatible with religion unless a given religion holds, as an article of faith itself, that the existence of God can be proved by reason. In fact the agnostic may be a religious man who accepts divine revelation and regard faith as divinely inspired.

Montaigne's *Apology for Raymond de Sebonde* illustrates this position. Sebonde had written a treatise on natural theology which to Montaigne seems hardly and bold for he undertakes, by human and natural reasons to establish and make good against the atheists all the articles of the Christian religion." Though Montaigne says of his work "I do not think it possible to do better upon that subject and though he entertains the conjecture that it may have been "drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas, for in truth that mind full of infinite learning and admirable subtlety was alone capable of such imaginations" nevertheless, Montaigne does "not believe that means purely human science in any sort capable of doing it."

According to Montaigne it is faith alone that vividly and certainly comprehends the deep mysteries of our religion. In his view reason by itself is incapable of proving anything much less anything about God. Our human reason," he writes, "is but sterile and undigested matter: the grace of God is its form: it is that which gives it fashion and value. The light and value in Sebonde's arguments come from the fact that faith supervenes to tint and illustrate them, and renders them firm and solid."

Such arguments, Montaigne says, may serve as "direction and first guide to a learner and may even "render him capable of the grace of God" but for himself, skeptical of all arguments, the way of faith alone can provide "a certain constancy of opinion. Thus have I by the grace of God preserved myself entire without anxiety or trouble of conscience in the ancient belief of our religion amidst so many sects and divisions as our age has produced."

Far from being religious as Montaigne was, the agnostic may be a skeptic about faith as well as reason. He may look upon faith either as a persuasion or as the exercise of the will to believe with regard to the unknowable and the

unintelligible—almost wishful thinking. He may even go so far as to treat religion as if it were pathological.

Freud for example regards religion as an illusion to be explained in terms of man's need to create gods in his own image—to find a surrogate for the father on whom his infantile dependence can be projected. Freud finds confirmation for this in the fact that in the religions of the west God is openly called Father. In psychoanalysis he goes on to conclude that he really is the father clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child.

Though the grown man has long ago realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute, Freud thinks that he nevertheless looks back to the memory image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a deity and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory image and the lasting nature of his need for protection—for as Freud explains, in relation to the external world he is still a child—are the two supports of his belief in God.

At the other extreme from agnosticism is the name implies gnosticism. Like deism it dispenses with faith, but it exceeds traditional deism in the claims it makes for reason's power to penetrate the divine mysteries. Between exclusive reliance on faith and an exaltation of reason to the point where there is no need for God to reveal anything, a middle ground is held by those who acknowledge the contributions of both faith and reason. Those who try to harmonize the two usually distinguish between the spheres proper to each and formulate some principle according to which they are related to each other in an orderly fashion.

Whatever is purely a matter of faith, Aquinas says, is assented to solely because it is revealed by God. The articles of Christian faith are typified by the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God, the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and the like. With regard to such matters which Aquinas thinks belong primarily to faith, some auxiliary use can be made of reason, not in order to prove faith, he explains, but to make clear the things that follow from it. Certain

matters such as God's existence and attributes, he classifies as belonging to the preambles to faith, because they fall in his view within reason's power to demonstrate, unaided by faith. Yet even here he does not assign the affirmation of the truth to reason alone.

Just as it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation, so even with regard to those truths about God which human reason can investigate, Aquinas thinks it was also necessary that man be taught by a divine revelation. For the truth about God such as reason can know it would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Because human reason is very deficient in things concerning God—a sign of which is that philosophers have fallen into many errors and have disagreed among themselves—men would have no knowledge of God, free from doubt and uncertainty, unless all divine truths were delivered to them by the way of faith, being told to them as it were by God Himself. Who can not lie.

In different ways faith supports reason and reason helps faith. On matters which belong to both reason and faith, faith provides a greater certitude. On matters strictly of faith, reason provides some understanding, however remote and inadequate of the mysteries of religion.

The use of human reason in religion, Bacon writes, is of two sorts: the former in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us, and doth grift his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspiration to open our understanding as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed an use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and ac

according to the analogy of them for our better direction."

In addition to all discursive knowledge of God, whether it be by faith or by reason there is the totally incommunicable and intimate acquaintance with the supernatural which the mystic claims for his vision in moments of religious ecstasy or which is promised to the blessed as their heavenly beatitude. When at the culmination of *Paradise* Dante sees God say to him he declares, was greater than our speech.

Knowing that his speech will fall more short than that of an infant who still bathes his tongue at the breast he tries nevertheless to communicate in words one single spark of Thy glory for the folk to come. In the presence of God he writes, his mind wholly rapt was gazing fixed not onless, and intent and ever with gazing grown enkindled. In that light one becomes such that it is impossible he should ever consent to turn himself from it for other sight because the Good which is the object of the will is all collected in it and outside of it that is defective which is perfect there.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR the existence of the gods or of one God constitute one of the greatest attempts of the human mind to go beyond the sensible or phenomenal world of experience. The attempt has been made in every age and by minds of quite different persuasions in religious belief or philosophical outlook. It is possible nevertheless, to classify the arguments into two or three main types.

Within the domain of pure or speculative reason there seem to be two ways of approach in the problem of God's existence.

One is in terms of the conception of God as an infinite perfect and necessary being whose non-existence is therefore inconceivable. According to Anselm God cannot be conceived in any other way than as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. But since the fool hath said in his heart there is no God how shall he be made to know that the God which exists in his understanding, at the moment when he denies His real existence, also really exists outside his understanding? For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding and another to understand that the

object exists. Hence Anselm considers the consequence of supposing that God exists in the understanding alone.

If that than which nothing greater can be conceived he argues, exists in the understanding alone the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived—for to exist in reality as well as in the understanding is to have more being. But this leads to an irreconcilable contradiction since if that than which nothing greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Therefore Anselm concludes that a being than which nothing greater can be conceived must exist both in the understanding and reality.

Anselm summarizes his argument by saying that no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist. Since the non-existence of God is inconceivable God must exist. Descartes gives the same argument a slightly different statement in terms of the inseparability of God's essence from God's existence.

Being accustomed he writes, in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a rectilinear triangle or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being, supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say to whom a certain perfection is lacking) than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley.

Spinoza defines a "cause of itself" as that whose essence involves existence or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. Since in his conception of substance substance is necessarily infinite it is also cause of itself. Hence he concludes that God or substance necessarily exists for if this be denied conceive if it be possible that God does not

unintelligible—almost wishful thinking. He may even go so far as to treat religion as if it were pathological.

Freud for example regards religion as an illusion to be explained in terms of man's need to create gods in his own image—to find a surrogate for the father on whom his infantile dependence can be projected. Freud finds confirmation for this in the fact that in the religions of the west God is openly called Father. Psychoanalysis he goes on concludes that he really is the father clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child.

Though the grown man has long ago realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute, Freud thinks that he nevertheless looks back to the memory image of the overrated father of his childhood exalts it into a Deity and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory image and the lasting nature of his need for protection—for as Freud explains in relation to the external world he is still a child—are the two supports of his belief in God.

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Without labelling it a proof of God's existence Augustine in his *Confessions* presents a similar argument—from the visible creation. Behold, he says, the heavens and the earth are they proclaim that they were created for they change and vary. They proclaim also that they made not themselves—therefore we are because we have been made—we were not therefore before we were so as to make ourselves. Thou therefore Lord madest them.

This second approach to the existence of God by reasoning from the facts of experience or the evidences of nature is called the *a posteriori* proof. In the tradition of the great books it has been formulated in many different ways. What is common to all of them is the principle of causality in terms of which the known existence of certain effects is made the basis for inferring the existence of a unique cause—a first cause, a highest cause, an uncaused cause.

Aristotle for example in the last book of his *Physics* argues from the fact of motion or change to the existence of an unmoved mover. He sums up his elaborate reasoning on this point in the following statement. We established the fact that everything that is in motion is moved by something and that the motion is either unmoved or in motion and that if it is in motion it is moved either by itself or by something else and so on through out the series and so we proceeded to the position that the first principle that directly causes things that are in motion to be moved is that which moves itself and the first principle of the whole series is the unmoved.

Aristotle's argument unlike that of Augustine or Locke does not presuppose the creation of the world at least not in the sense of the world's having a beginning. On the contrary he holds the world and its motions to be as eternal as their unmoved mover. It is impossible he writes in the *Metaphysics* that movement should either have come into being or cease to be. Precisely because he thinks the world's motions are eternal Aristotle holds that the prime mover in addition to being eternal must be immutable. This for him means a principle whose very essence is actuality. Only substance without any potentiality only one which is purely actual can be an absolutely immutable eternal being.

Whatever has any potentiality in its nature is capable of not existing. If every thing were of this sort nothing that now is need be for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist. Hence in still another way Aristotle seems to reach the conclusion that a purely actual being must exist and furthermore he seems to identify this being with a living and thinking God. Life also belongs to God he writes for the actuality of thought is life and God is that actuality and God's self dependent actuality is life most good and eternal.

Where Aristotle argues from motion and potentiality to a prime mover and a pure actuality Newton gives the *a posteriori* proof another statement by arguing from the design of the universe to God as its designer or architect. The most wise and excellent contrivances of things and final causes seem to him the best way of knowing God. Blind metaphysical necessity which is certainly the same all ways and every where could produce no variety in things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing.

In similar fashion Berkeley maintains that if we attentively consider the constant regularity order and concatenation of natural things the surprising magnificence beauty and perfection of the larger and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole but above all the never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure and the instincts or natural inclinations appetites and passions of animals. I say if we consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes one eternal infinitely wise good and perfect we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the Spirit who works all in all and by whom all things consist. This seems to him so certain that he adds we may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men.

But according to Berkeley all the visible things of nature exist only as ideas in our minds and as such unlike our own memories or imaginations do not of themselves produce. Every

exist. Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence. But this is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

This mode of argument which takes still other forms is traditionally called the ontological argument or the *a priori* proof of God's existence. Its critics sometimes deny that it is an argument or proof in any sense at all. Aquinas for example interprets Anselm not as proving God's existence but rather as asserting that God's existence is self-evident. Those who say that the proposition "God does not exist" is self-contradictory are saying that the opposite proposition "God exists" must be self-evident.

Aquinas does not deny that the proposition "God exists" is intrinsically self-evident. On this point he goes further than Anselm. Descartes and Spinoza. Where they say God's essence involves His existence, Aquinas asserts that in God essence and existence are identical. When Moses asks God, "If they should say to me, 'What is His name?' what shall I say to them?" the Lord says unto Moses, "I AM THAT I AM" and adds, "Say to the children of Israel, 'HE WHO IS' hath sent me to you." This name—"HE WHO IS"—Aquinas holds to be the most proper name of God because it signifies that the being of God is His very essence.

For this reason he thinks that the proposition "God exists" is self-evident in itself. Its subject and predicate are immediately related. Nevertheless Aquinas holds that the proposition is not self-evident to us because we do not know the essence of God. Even supposing he writes that everyone understands this name "God" as signifying something than which nothing greater can be thought nevertheless it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

The visitor of the First Set of Objections to Descartes' *Meditations* maintains that the criticism advanced by Aquinas applies to Descartes as well as to Anselm. Whether stated in

terms of the conception of an absolutely perfect being or in terms of essence and existence the argument is invalid he thinks which asserts that God actually exists because His non-existence is inconceivable. Kant's later criticism of the ontological argument takes a similar course. A proposition may be logically necessary without being true in fact.

The conception of an absolutely necessary being he writes is a mere idea the object of reality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. The unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. From the fact that existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception we cannot conclude that the existence of the thing is therefore absolutely necessary—merely. Kant says because its existence has been cogitated in the conception. What ever be the content of our conception of an object it is necessary to go beyond it if we wish to predicate existence of the object. The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a supreme being is therefore insufficient.

THE SECOND MAIN approach to the problem of God's existence lies in the sort of proof which Locke thinks our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts. He refrains from criticizing the argument from the idea of a most perfect being but he does insist that we should not take some men's having that idea of God in their minds for the only proof of a Deity. He for one prefers to follow the counsel of St. Paul that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world being understood by the things that are made even his eternal power and Godhead.

We have according to Locke an intuitive knowledge of our own existence. We know he says that nonentity cannot produce any real being and so from the consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our constitution our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth—That there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being.

ent Aquinas himself says that in speculative matters the medium of demonstration which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly is only one whereas probable means of proof are many. Since he considers the argument for God's existence to be a certain not a probable proof it would seem to follow that in strict logic only one principle can be involved in that proof.

As already suggested the principle—common to all the various ways in which such a *posteriori* reasoning is expressed—seems to be the principal of causality. This appears in the argument from the existence of contingent beings, which cannot cause their own being to the existence of a being which needs no cause of its being because its very essence is to exist. This may be the one argument for God's existence or if one among many it may be the core of all the others. It has the distinction at least of conceiving God as if a cause of being rather than of motion or of hierarchy and order in the world.

According to the statement of Aquinas that being is the proper effect of God it establishes God as the *unique* and *direct* cause of the being possessed by every finite thing. This formulation of the proof is more fully examined in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY and its relation to the question of whether the world had a beginning or is eternal and if eternal whether it is created or uncreated will be seen in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY and WORLD.

THE VALIDITY of the *a posteriori* argument for God's existence—in one form or another—is questioned by those who think that the causal principle cannot be applied beyond experience or who think that our knowledge of cause and effect is not sufficient to warrant such inferences.

The existence of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect. Hume writes "and these arguments are founded entirely on experience." It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bound of cause and effect and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. But Hume doubts whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its

effect or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. If experience and observation and analogy be indeed the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature as Hume thinks is the case then it follows that both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know.

I leave it to your own reflection," he adds to pursue the consequences of this principle. One seems obvious enough namely that God—a unique and unparalleled cause—cannot be proved by reasoning from our experience of effects and their causes. Hume himself draws this conclusion when he declares that theology insofar as it is concerned with the existence of a Deity has its best and most solid foundation not in reason or experience but in *faith* and *divine revelation*.

Like Hume Kant thinks that our notions of cause and effect cannot be applied outside experience or to anything beyond the realm of sensible nature. But he offers an additional reason for denying validity to all *a posteriori* reasoning concerning God's existence. It imposes upon us, he says, an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure reason and the other with those of empiricism while in fact it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice.

The principle of the argument from the contingency of the world or its parts Kant states as follows. If something exists an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. One premise in the argument namely that contingent things exist has its foundation in experience and therefore Kant admits that the reasoning is not completely *a priori* or ontological. But in order to complete the proof he thinks it must be shown that an *ens realissimum* or most perfect being is the same as an absolutely necessary being in order for the obtained conclusion (*a necessary being exists*) to be translated into the conclusion desired (*God exists*).

That an *ens realissimum* must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity—or in other words that a perfect being is identical

thing we see hear feel or anywise perceive by sense he writes must have some other cause than our own will and is therefore a sign or effect of the power of God To the unthinking herd who claim that they cannot see God Berkeley replies that God is intimately present to our minds producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us

The existence of any idea in us is for Berkeley ground for asserting God's existence and power as its cause But for Descartes one idea alone becomes the basis of such an inference He supplements his *a priori* or ontological argument with what he calls an *a posteriori* demonstration of God's existence from the mere fact that the idea of God exists in us

That he is himself imperfect Descartes knows from the fact that he doubts Even when doubting leads to knowledge his knowledge is imperfect an infallible token of which he says is the fact that my knowledge increases little by little But the idea which he has of God he declares is that of an absolutely perfect being in whom there is nothing merely potential but in whom all is present really and actually On the principle that there cannot be more reality or perfection in the effect than in the cause Descartes concludes that his own imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of a perfect being The idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I he writes must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect

The radical imperfection of man and indeed of all creation offers Augustine still another proof for God's existence which he attributes to the Platonists They have seen he writes that whatever is changeable is not the most high God and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme They have seen also that in every changeable thing the form which makes it that which it is whatever be its mode or *esse* can only be through Him who truly is because He is unchangeable And therefore whether we consider the whole body of the world its figure qualities and orderly movement and also all the bodies which are in it or whether we consider all life either that

which nourishes and maintains as the life of trees or that which besides this has also sensation as the life of beasts or that which adds to all these intelligence as the life of man or that which does not need the support of nutriment but only maintains feels understands, as the life of angels—all can only be through Him who absolutely is For to Him it is not one thing to be and another to live as though He could be not living nor is it to Him one thing to live and another to understand as though He could live not understand *no*, nor is it to Him one thing to understand another to be blessed as though He could understand and not be blessed But to Him to live to understand to be blessed are to be They have understood from this unchangeableness and this simplicity that all things must have been made by Him and that He could Himself have been made by none

The variety of arguments we have so far examined seems to fit the five ways in which according to Aquinas the existence of God can be proved *a posteriori* The first and most manifest way is the argument from motion which Aquinas attributes to Aristotle The second way is from the nature of an efficient cause Berkeley's argument or Locke's would seem in some respects to offer a version of this mode of reasoning The third way is taken from possibility and necessity and seems to develop the argument from potentiality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and to contain the inference from mutability and contingency which is implicit in the argument attributed to the Platonists by Augustine The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things Proceeding from the existence of the imperfect to absolute perfection it resembles in principle the reasoning of Descartes concerning the perfection in the cause relative to the perfection in the effect The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world—from the fact that everything acts for an end—and so is like the argument which Newton offers from final causes and the existence of order in the universe

These five ways may or may not be regarded as an exhaustive list of the *a posteriori* proofs It may even be questioned whether the five ways are logically distinct and independ

cause of all nature distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this connexion itself of the exact harmony of happiness with morality. That is why Kant explains, "it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."

IN THE TRADITION of the great books, the common ground shared by reason and faith is marked by the convergence of the contributions made by pagan Jew and Christian—and by poets, philosophers and theologians—to the problem of God's existence and the understanding of the divine nature, the essence of God and His attributes.

Certain attributes of God such as simplicity, immateriality, eternity, infinity, perfection, and glory are usually regarded as so many different ways in which the human understanding apprehends the divine nature in itself. Other attributes, such as the divine causality omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, love, justice, and mercy, are usually taken as ways of considering God's nature in relation to the world or to creatures. But to divide the attributes in this way—as is done in the Outline of Topics, is **■** make a division which cannot be fully justified except in terms of convenience for our understanding. God's will, for example, no less than God's intellect, can be considered in relation to Himself. God's intellect, no less than God's will, can have the world for its object. So, too, the divine goodness can be considered with reference to things, even as God's love can be considered with reference to Himself.

The difficulties we meet in classifying or ordering the attributes of God confirm the opinion of almost all theologians, that our understanding is inadequate to comprehend the essence of God. The fact that we employ a multiplicity of attributes to represent to ourselves what in itself is an absolute unity is another indication of the same point. The one attribute of simplicity would seem to deny us the right to name others, unless we take the plurality of attributes to signify something about man's understanding of God rather than a real complexity in the divine nature.

He that will attribute to God," Hobbes writes, nothing, but what is warranted by

natural reason must either use such negative attributes, as *from eternal incomprehensible* or superlatives, as *most most great* and the like or indefinite as *good just holy creator* and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy) but how much we admire Him and how ready we would be to obey Him which is a sign of humility and of a will to honor Him as much as we can for there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is, I AM and but one name of His relation to us, and that is GOD in which is contained Father King and Lord."

Even when they are discussed by the philosophers and reflected on by the poets, certain matters belong especially to theology because they constitute the dogmas of religion—articles of religious faith based solely on divine revelation not discovered by human inquiry or speculation. That God created the world out of nothing and of His free will that the world had a beginning, and will have an end are for example dogmas of traditional Judaism and Christianity. Philosophers may argue about the freedom or necessity of the creative act or about the possibility of a beginning or an end to time and the world but Jewish and Christian theologians find in Sacred Scripture the warrant for believing that which may not be thoroughly intelligible to reason, much less demonstrable by it. What is true of creation applies generally to the religious belief in divine providence and the positive commandments of God to the gift of grace which God bestows upon men and to the performance of miracles.

Judaism and Christianity share certain dogmas, though the degree to which Jewish and Christian theologians commonly understand what is apparently the same dogma varies from great similarity of interpretation (as in the case of creation and providence) to differences so great (as, for example with regard to grace) that there may be some doubt whether the dogma in question is really the same. The line of demarcation between these faiths would seem to be more easily determined than their common ground yet even here such matters as the resurrection of the body—even when we take differences of interpretation into account—may be regarded as a dogma shared by both.

with one which necessarily exists—1 according to Kant exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument. Hence he maintains that the argument from contingency is invalid because it cannot avoid including what 11 for Kant the invalid premise of the ontological argument as the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning

THE CONTROVERSY concerning the proof of God's existence raises issues in logic in metaphysics and physics and in the theory of knowledge. Philosophers are opposed on the question whether a valid demonstration is possible. Those who think it possible differ from one another on the way in which the proof should be constructed. Those who think it impossible do not always go to the opposite extreme of making the affirmation of God's existence a matter of faith or of denying with the skeptic that we can have any light on the question at all. Pascal and Kant for example reject the theoretic arguments as inconclusive or untenable but they do not think the problem is totally insoluble. They offer instead *practical* grounds or reasons for accepting God's existence.

The metaphysical proofs of God are so remote from the reasoning of men. Pascal asserts and so complicated that they make little impression. He will not undertake he tells us in his *Pensées* to prove by natural reasons the existence of God. In his view there are only three kinds of persons: those who serve God having found Him; others who are occupied in seeking Him; not having found Him while the remainder live without seeking Him and without having found Him. Since he regards the first as reasonable and happy the last as foolish and unhappy he addresses himself to the middle group whom he regards as unhappy and reasonable.

He asks them to consider whether God is or 1 not. Reason can decide nothing here he says. If a choice 11 to be made by reason it must be in the form of a wager. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose the true and the good and two things to stake your reason and your will your knowledge and your happiness and your

nature has two things to shun error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than another since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain you gain all; if you lose you lose nothing. Wager then without hesitation that He is.

We are incapable of knowing either that God 11 or what God is according to Pascal because if there is a God He is infinitely incomprehensible and has no affinity to us. Nevertheless proceeding on the practical level of the wager reason may lead to Christian faith yet not in such a way as to give adequate reasons for that belief since Christians profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason.

Kant also makes the affirmation of God a matter of faith but for him it is a purely rational faith since pure reason is the sole source from which it springs. He defines a *matter of faith* as any object which cannot be known through the speculative use of reason but which must be thought *a priori* either as consequences or as grounds if pure practical reason is to be used as duty commands. Such is the *summum bonum* he says which has to be realized in the world through freedom. This effect which is commanded together with the only conditions on which its possibility is conceivable by us namely the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are *matters of faith* and are of all objects the only ones that can be so called.

For Kant then the existence of God is a postulate of pure practical reason as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. The moral law commands us to seek the highest good with perfect happiness as its concomitant but Kant thinks that there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as a part of it. Since man is a part of the world or nature and dependent on it he cannot by his will be a cause of this nature nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize as far as his happiness is concerned with his practical principles. The only possible solution lies in the existence of a

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The basic differences between Jewish and Christian theology center of course on the issue between a unitarian and a trinitarian conception of the Godhead with immediate consequences for disbelief or belief in Christ as the incarnate second person of the Trinity—the Word become flesh. This in turn has consequences for doctrines of salvation and of the nature and mission of the church, its rituals and its sacraments. Even within Christianity, however, there have been and still are serious doctrinal differences on all these matters. The most fundamental heresies and schisms of early Christianity concerned the understanding of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The great modern schism which divided Christendom arose from issues about the sacraments, the organization and practices of the church and the conditions of salvation.

It would seem to be just as easy to say what beliefs are common to religious Jews and Christians as to articulate the faith common to all sects of Christianity. If all varieties of Protestant doctrine are included, little remains in common except belief in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—creator and provider, governor and judge, dispenser of rewards and punishments.

ONE BOOK STANDS OUT from all the rest because in our tradition it is—as the use of Bible for its proper name implies—the book about God and man. For those who have faith, Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture is the revealed Word of God. Its division into Old and New Testaments represents the historic relation of the Jewish and Christian religions.

Without prejudice to the issue between belief and unbelief or between Jewish and Chris-

tian faith, we have attempted to organize the references to specifically religious doctrines concerning God and His creatures according to their origin and foundation in either the Old or in the New Testament or in both. On certain points as we have already seen, the line of distinction can be clearly drawn. For example, the doctrines of God's covenant with Israel, of the Chosen People, of the Temple and the Torah are indisputably drawn from the Old Testament and from the New Testament come such dogmas as those concerning Christ's divinity and humanity, the Virgin Birth, the Church as the mystical body of Christ, and the seven sacraments.

Under all these topics we have assembled passages from the Bible, interpretations of them by the theologians, and materials from the great books of poetry and history, philosophy and science. Since the criterion of relevance here is the reflection of sacred or religious doctrine in secular literature, the writings of pagan antiquity are necessarily excluded though they are included in the more philosophical topics of theology such as the existence and nature of one God.

Despite its length, this chapter by no means exhausts the discussion of God in the great books. The long list of Cross References which follows the seventy-three topics comprising the Reference section of this chapter indicates the various ways in which the idea of God occurs in the topics of other chapters. The reader will find that list useful not only as an indication of the topics in other chapters which elaborate on or extend the discussion of matters treated here, but also as a guide to other Introductions in which he is likely to find the conception of God a relevant part of the examination of some other great idea.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The polytheistic conception of the supernatural order
- 1a The nature and existence of the gods
- 1b The hierarchy of the gods, their relation to one another
- 1c The intervention of the gods in the affairs of men, their judgment of the deserts of men

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- 6c Supernatural knowledge
 - (1) God as teacher inspiration and revelation
 - (2) The light of faith
 - (3) Mystical experience
 - (4) The beatific vision
- 7 Doctrines common to the Jewish Mohammedan and Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world and man
 - 7a Creation
 - 7b Providence
 - 7c Divine government and law
 - 7d Grace
 - 7e Miracles
 - 7f The Book of Life
 - 7g The resurrection of the body
 - 7h The Last Judgment and the end of the world
- 8 Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning God and His people
 - 8a The Chosen People Jew and gentile
 - 8b God's Covenant with Israel circumcision as sign of the Covenant
 - 8c The Law its observance as a condition of righteousness and blessedness
 - 8d The Temple the Ark of the Torah
 - 8e The messianic hope
- 9 Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny
 - 9a The Trinity
 - 9b The Incarnation the God man
 - (1) The divinity of Christ
 - (2) The humanity of Christ
 - (3) Mary the Mother of God
 - 9c Christ the Saviour and Redeemer the doctrines of original sin and salvation
 - 9d The Church the mystical body of Christ the Apostolate
 - 9e The sacraments
 - 9f The second coming of Christ
- 10 The denial of God or the gods or of a supernatural order the position of the atheist
- 11 The denial of God as completely transcending the world or nature the position of the pantheist
- 12 The denial of a revealed and providential God the position of the deist
- 13 God as a conception invented by man its emotional basis
- 14 The worship of false gods deification and idolatry

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To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 *Howards Road* xii [65 83] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P or SECTION. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53] *mis Psychol* gy 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 *Plato Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins on the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the divisions of a work (such as a preface, chapters, etc.) are sometimes included in the reference. Letters in brackets, or brackets, are given in certain cases. *g Road* bk 1 [65 83] 12d.

BOOK REFERENCE. The references to book chapters and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay version cited by a (D) follows. *e.g.* *Old Testament* *Isaiah* 47:4—(D) *II Esdr* 1:46.

SUBJECT. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Bible*; consult the Preface.

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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* bk II CH 17
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk vii par 16 48c
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 4
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk I [11 10 3b-c
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI 49 b
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI 49b
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 143a 145c 152a
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- 19 AQL s *Summa Theologiae* p RTI Q 3 A 1
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- 20 AQL s *Summa Theologiae* p RTI II Q 63
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- 42 HANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 278b-
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- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 458a b
- 47 GORTHE *Fa d p RT I* [11, 8-118] 29b
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 318b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War a d Peace* BK XV 631 c
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III
 53a b BK V 127b 137c passim BK VI 164d
 16 a BK XI 313c 314d

3d Obedience to God or the gods

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 15 17 3 22 1 15 esp
 22 13 26.4-5 / *Erodus* 3-4 17 24 1-8 /
Deutero omy 4 II passim 27 3 passim /
Joshua 22 24 1 28-(D) / *Ju* 22 24 1 28 /
I Samuel 12 14 15 15 esp 15.22 23-(D)
I Kings 12 14 15 15 esp 15.22 23 / *I le* gr
 8 54-6 -(D) III *Kings* 8 54-62 / *I Chro icles*
 8 9-(D) *I Pa al pomen* 28 9 / *Eere* 7.23
 -(D) *I Esdras* 7.23 / *I b / Ecclesiast* 1 5 1
 III 13-(D) *Ecclesiast* 4 17 12 13 / *Ia sh* 1
 1 19-20-(D) *Ia sh* 1 19-2 / *Ieremiah* passim
 esp 3 7 11 35 42 44-(D) *Ieremiah* passim
 esp 3 7 11 35 42 44 / *Ia sh* 1 7.27 / *Micah*
 6 8-(D) *Micah* 6 8
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matheu* 6 10 7.21 12.46-50
 26 36-39 / *Ma k* 14 32 36 / *Luke* III 40-45 /
Joh 5 30 18 10-11 / *Acts* 5.29-32 21.8-15 /
R mans 5 19 / *II Corinthe* 1 10 5-6 / *Ph p*
 1.21 2 18 esp 2.7-8 / *II Th saloma* 1
 1.7-9 / *Hebreu* 5.8-9 11.8
- 4 HOM *Iad* BK I [83-222] 5a b
- 5 ARSCHYL *S ppliant Ma dens* [410-434] 6a b
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- 5 So noc es *Oed p* *I the* *Ar g* [863-910] 107b-c
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- 5 EURIPIDE *S ppl* 1 [513-563] 262d 263b /
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- 6 H R DOTUS *History* K 1 39c d BK II 55a
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- 6 TH VOIDES *Peloponn sia* *Ilar* BK I 355b-c
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- 7 PL to *Apology* 206b-d / *Laus* BK IV 681b-
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- 12 E CT TL *Discourses* BK II CH 16-17 158a
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- 12 ACURELL *Med iat ons* K III s 13 262
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- 13 V GIL *Aeneid* K II [84 12] 149b-150b BK
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- 15 TACITUS *Historie* BK V 292 294a

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20 22 23 28- (D) *Ezekiel* 2 3 5 5-8
12 15 17 20 22-23 28 / *Hosea*—(D) *Osee*
/ *Jonah*—(D) *Jonas*

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 5 7 20-8 27—(D) OT
Judith 5 7 11-8 27 / *Wisdom of Solomon*
12 12—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 12

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 27 46 / *Mark* 15 34
/ *Acts* 9 1-6 11 17 / *Romans* 8 7 9 19-21 /
James 4 4

4 HOMER *Iliad* bk 1 [1-120] 3a 4b [428-487]
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Tauri* [570-575] 416a

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6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 400d
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7 PLATO *Lysis* bk iv 757a

12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 6 110c 112b
ch 12 118d 120b ch 27 137c 133a bk iii ch
22 195c d 198a b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk 1 [1 11] 103a bk vii [500-
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14 PLUTARCH *Agamemnon* 483a b / *Dion* 801b c

15 TACITUS *Histories* bk iv 292c 294a

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22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [1303 1333] 191b
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27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC 1 [30-3]
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32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [667, 69] 354a
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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 30a 34a 123a b
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5* DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk v
121d 127b *passim*

3c *The love of God or the gods*

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 5 6 / *Deuteronomy*
6 4-9 7 9 11 10 12 11 11 3 25 13 13
19 9 30 6 15 20 / *Joshua* 22 5 3 11—(D)
Josue 22 5 23 11 / *Psalms* 5 11 12 19 12
31 23 42 1-2 63 97 10 116 1 119 13
122 6 145 20—(D) *Psalms* 5 12 13 17-3
30-24 41-2-3 62 96 10 114 1 118 132
121 6 144 20 / *Isaiah* 26 8-9 56 6-7—(D)
Isaia 26 8-9 56 6 7 / *Jeremiah* 21 3—
(D) *Jeremias* 2 1-3

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13 12-18—(D) OT *Tobit*
13 14 23 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 15 16 13 14 25 11
12—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 18 19 13 18
5 14 16

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 10 31 38 22 30 33
/ *Mark* 12 28 33 / *Luke* 7 37 47 10 23
11 4- / *John* 5 40-4 8 32 14 15 21 16 6-8
27 17 23 26 21 15 17 / *Acts* 20 2 21 21 7
15 / *Romans* 5 5 8 28 39 / *I Corinthians* 2 9
8 1-3 13 1-14 1 16 14 22 / *II Corinthians*
5 14-15 / *Ephesians* 1 3-6 3 14 21 6-24 / *II
Thessalonians* 3 5 / *I Timothy* 1 5 / *II Timothy*
1 13 14 3 1 5 / *James* 1 12 2 5 / *I Peter* 1 7-8
/ *I John* 2 5 13 17 3 17 4 7-5 3 / *II John* 6 /
Jude 20-21

4 HO ICK *Odyssey* bk viii [217 351] 257b
258c

12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk ii ch 16 158b d
ch 22 168d bk ii ch 1 219a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk ii SECT 13 1 6c

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres* bk i 510a b

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1050b
1080a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 5-6 2b c
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17a b bk iv par 15 19 23a 24b bk v par 1
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par 8-40 73b 81c bk xi par 1 4 89b 90b bk
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- A L s *Summa Theol g ca* P XYI Q3 A1
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 31 D c *Yes M du i* s 88d 89 / *Oby c*
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 31 S *oz Eih ct p* P R P4 6 456b-c
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 P 36-37 461 c
 32 M 170 P *dise Lo t* BK [561-566] 331b
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 35 Lo k II m *Understa d g* BK II II VII
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42 Kant *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 278b-
 279d / *Practical Reason* 321b-329a esp 326b-
 327a

43 Mill *Utilitaria sm* 458a b

47 Goethe *Faust part 1* [1178 1183] 29b

48 Mel ille *Moby Dick* 318b

51 Tolstoy *War and Pe ce* BK XV 631a-c

52 Dostoevsky *Bro hers Ka ama oi* BK III

54 II BK 127b-137c *passim* BK VI 164d
 165a BK XI 313c 314d

3d Obedience to God or the gods

O D TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 15 17 3 22 1 18 esp
 22 18 26-4-5 / *Exodus* 3-4 4 17 24 1-8 /
Deutero omy 4 11 *passim* 27 30 *passim* /
Josh a 22 24 1 28-(D) *Josue* 22 24 1 28 /
I Samuel 12 14 5 15 esp 15 22 23-(D)
I Ki g 12 14 15 15 esp 15 22 23 / *I A s*
 8 54-62-(D) *III Kings* 8 54-62 / *I Chro icles*
 28 9-(D) *I Pa alupomen n* 28 9 / *Ezra* 7-23
 -(D) *I Esd as* 7-23 / *Job* / *Ecclesiastes* 5 1
 12 13-(D) *Ecclesiastes* 4 17 12 13 / *Isaiah*
 1 19- -(D) *Isaiah* 1 19-20 / *Jeremiah* *pa sum*
 esp 3 7 11 33 42 44-(D) *Jeremias* *pass m*
 esp 3 7 11 33 42 44 / *Da uel* 7-27 / *M cah*
 6 8-(D) *Micheas* 6 8

N W T ST NT *M tihew* 6 10 7-21 12-46-50
 26 36-39 / *M k* 14 32 36 / *Luke* 22 40-45 /
Joh 5 3 18 10-11 / *Acts* 5 29-32 21 8 15 /
R mans 5 19 / *II Corinrh a* 10 5-6 / *Philp*
pans 2 18 esp 2 7-8 / *II Thersaloma s*
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1 A 3 235b-239a Q 5 A REF 3 270a
272a Q 51 1 A 282a-d A 3 R 8 86c
277b Q 5, S 2 2 352a 353b P RT I, CH
Q 3 A 6 8a-d
- 23 AOTIN *Summa Theologiae* P RT III, Q 3
A 1 3 724 c

- 31 DE C. RTES *Mediations* III 81d-83a 1 93a
06a / *Overviews* c. d *Repar* 110a 112a 112d
114c 126b-127c *Postul* L TE 131b-c *AXIOM*
1 131d *AXIOM* X 132b *PROP* 1 132b-c 158b-
162a 217d 218a
- 31 *Ser* CH *Elber* PART I DEF 1 3 5a DEF 6-8
35 b-c *PROP* 6-8 356b-35 d *PROP* II 358b-
3 9b *PROP* 20 363d 364 *PROP* 24 365a
PROP 33 369a
- 33 P *sc. L. Prout* 469 256a
- 42 HAT *Pure Reason*, 143a 145c 153a 177b-
192d exp 177b-179c, III a-c, 192 -d *not* b
239a-c / *Practical Reason*, 344c 355d exp 353a
354d / *university* 570b-571c 606d 609b exp
608b-609a
- 46 H *EL. Philosophy of Right* P RT III par 57
92a / *Philosophy of History* P RT III 305c
306c
- 46 The unity and simplicity of the d vine nature
- 8 4 *STOLE PHANT* BK III CH 10 353b-355d
/ *university* BK XII CH 10 3rd 11 603a b
CH 8 [10th], 39] 604d CH 9 [10th], 11]
603c-d
- 9 4 *not* *Elber* BK VII CH 14 [1154th-31]
406c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Ser 4 Ennead* TR 721b 353d 360d
- 18 4 CUSTINE *Co currens* BK I par 10 3b-c
par 1 4a BK IV par 24 25b-c par 9 25b BK
VII par 43c-44 par 16 48c-49a par 1 49d
50a BK XII, par 4 111c par 19 115c-d / *Cry*
of God, BK VI CH 6 268d 269c CH II 2 2c
BK XI CH 10 327d 328d / *Christus Dixit*
K I CH 5 62d-6 6a CH 3 633c-d
- 19 AOTIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 3
II 20c Q 4 A 1, REF 1 2 21b-22b A 3 22b-
23b Q 6, A 3 29c 30b Q 7 A 3 31d 32c Q 9
A 1, REF 2 33c 36b A 4 3 c 38c Q 21 46d
50b Q 13 A 1 REF 2 3 61c-63c A 4, REF 3
65c-66b Q 14 A 1 RE - 5d 5c 4 8b-
79a Q 6 A 1 REF 1 150b-c A 1 REF 2
123b-134b Q 3 A 1, REF 1 158d 160a Q 30,
A 1 REF 3 4 16 a 168a A 3 169b-1 0c Q 40
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239a Q 47 A 5 256a 257b Q 50 A 1, REF 3
270a 272a A 3 REF 2 2 2a 273b Q 54 A 1
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443c Q 85 A 1 R 4 471c-472c PART I II
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- 20 AOTIN *Summa Theologiae* PART I-II Q 49,
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REF 3 119c 120c PART III Q 1 A AN and
REF 1 711d 712d Q 3 A 1, REF 3 724 c
A 3 724c 727 II Q 6, A 5 RE 2 744a-d
- 21 DIXIT *Dine Comedy* P RADI K, XIII [52
66] 126a XXIV [1, 154] 143d 144b XXIX
[11-14] 151c-d XXXII [6-14], 15 a-d
- 23 H *EL. Philosophy of Right* PART II 151d
- 31 D *C. RTES Discourse* P RT IV 52a-d /
Mediations I 86a-88b exp 83b / *Overviews*
c. d *Repar* 122b-c 237b

(4) *The divine nature in itself the divine attributes* 4b *The unity and simplicity of the divine nature*

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 2-8 355d 357d PROP 12-14 359b 360a PART II PROP 4 374c PROP 7 SCHOL 375b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 15 116c d BK II CH XVIII SECT 35 213b c
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307b c
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 229c 230b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 176b-c 192c d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 224a b 227d 228a PART III 306a PART IV 322a c

4c *The immateriality of God*

- ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 6 [1071^b 2-23] 601b ■ CH 8 [1074 31 39] 604d
- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK V [146-155] 63a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 53b c
- 15 TACITUS *Histories* BK V 296a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Enn ad tr* I CH 26 266a CH 27 266c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV PAR 29 26b PAR 31 26c 27a BK V PAR 19 20 32b 33a BK VI PAR 4 36a b BK VII PAR 1-4 43b 44a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 5-6 267d 269c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 2 15c 16a A 3 ANS 16a d A 8 ANS and REP 3 19d 20c Q 7 A 1 ANS and REP 2 31a d Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 1 84c 85c Q 10 A 1 REP 1 213b 214b Q 50 A 1 REI 1 269b 270a A 2 REP 3 270a 272a Q 54 A 1 ANS 285a d A 3 REP 2 286c 287b Q 75 A 5 REP 1 382a 383b Q 84 A 2 ANS 442b-443c A 4 REP 1 444d 446b Q 86 A 2 REP 1 462a 463a Q 91 A - ANS 485b 486b Q 105 A 3 ANS 540c 541b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 1 710a 711c A 2 ANS 711d 712d Q 25 A 3 REP 1 841c 842d PART III SUPPL. ■ Q 2 A 1 REP 1 1025c 1032b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 172d 173a
- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK I 105a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 122b c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 12 15 359b 361d PART II DEF 1 373a PROP 1-2 373d 374a PROP 5 7 374c 375c
- 34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 529a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 17 117a c BK II CH XVIII SECT 28 11b d BK III CH VI SECT 11 271b c BK IV CH V SECT 8 17351a 353c
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 334b 335b

4d *The eternity and immutability of God*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15 18 / *Deuteronomy* 32 39 40 / *1 Chronicles* 16 34 36- (D) / *1 Paralipomenon* 16 34-36 / *Psalms* 9 6-7 20 16 29 10 11 33 10-11 45 C 48 esp 48 8 48 14 66 7 90 esp 90 1-4 93 1 2 102c P 102 1 12

- 102 26-27 103 13 18 136 145 10 13 146 10- (D) *Psalms* 9 7-8 9 16 29 10 3 10-11 44 7 47 esp 47 9 47 15 6 7 89 esp 89 1 4 92 1-2 101 esp 101 1 13 101.27 8 10 13 18 135 144 10-13 145 10 / *Isaiah* 40 4 43 10 13 57 15- (D) *Isaiah* 40 8 8 43 10 13 57 15 / *Jeremiah* 10 10- (D) *Jeremiah* 10 10 / *Lamentations* 5 19 / *Daniel* 6 36 / *Micah* 5 2- (D) *Micah* 5 2 / *Malachi* 1 36 - (D) *Malachi* 3 6
- APOCRYPHA *Ecclasiasticus* 36 17 39 20 4 21- (D) *OT Ecclesiasticus* 36 19 30 23 42.21 2
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24 35 / *Roman* 1 20 25 / *Colossians* 1 16-17 / *1 Timothy* 1 1 6 15 16 / *Hebrews* 1 8-12 7-3 5 13 7-8 / *James* 1 17 / *Revelation* 1 17 18 10 b 11 15 17- (D) *Apocalypse* 1 17 18 10 6 11 15 17
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 322d 323c 324a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 6 [258^b 10-259^b 31] 344b 345d / *Heavens* BK I CH 9 [279 23 31] 370c d BK II CH 3 [286 8 13] 377c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [337 15-23] 439a b / *Metaphysics* BK VII CH I [1069 30-31] 598b ■ CH 6-7 601b-603b CH 9 605a d esp [1075 5 11] 605c d / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [415 22 28] 645c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 14 [1154^b 20-31] 406c
- 15 TACITUS *Histories* BK V 296a
- 16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1071b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH 2-6 119a 122d esp CH 5 121c 122a / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 11 348b-c CH 18 1 351d 353d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I PAR 10 3b c BK IV PAR 26 25c d PAR 29 26b BK VII PAR 1 7 43b 45d PAR 16 18 48c-49b PAR 21 49d 50a PAR 23 50b ■ PAR 26 51c BK XI PAR 12 16 92b 93a BK XII PAR 11 101d PAR 18 103a b PAR 40 109b 110a BK XIII PAR 44 122d / *City of God* BK VI CH 30 261b d BK VIII CH 1 272c BK XI CH 10 327d 328d CH 21 22 333a 334c esp CH 22 334c BK XII CH 1 3 342b d 344b CH 14 17 350d 354a esp CH 14 350d 351b CH 17 353a 354a / *Christian Doctrine* ■ 1 CH 5-6 625d 626b CH 8 626c 627a CH 1 627b CH 2 3 629b 630c CH 32 633c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 4 14b 15b Q 9 10 38c 46d Q 14 A 5 ANS 83b d A 13 ANS and REP 3 86d 88c A 1 89b 90b Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 114d 115d Q A 1 REP 2 127d 128d Q 26 A 1 REP 2 150b c Q 42 A 2 225d 227a Q 43 A 1 230d 231c Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a 278c Q 61 A 2 ANS 315c 316a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 71 A 1 208b d PART III Q 1 A 1 REP 3 701d 703a A 5 REP 3 707a 708c Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [64 72] 115d VIII [52-66] 126a XXIV [130 141] 144a XXIV [13 36] 150b c XXVIII 156b 157d

- 23 Ho 15 *Levithan* PART I 9d 80a P RTIII
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- 25 Mo T *Essays* 293d 234a
- 28 HAK ET *On A Small Generation* 428
- 31 DES R ES *Discourse* RTIV 52b-c / *Med*
tato c III 84 b III v 94d 95a
- 31 Sm or *Eth s* PART I DEF 6 355b D P 8
55c P II 6 356b c PROP II 13 358b 359d
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P TV PROT 17 456c d
- 3 M LYO *Paradise Lost* BK III [I 12] 135b
[372 38] 1143b
- 33 P SC L *Penitēs* 469 256a
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I GENERAL SCHOL,
3 0a 371a
- 35 Lo KE *Hum n Understa d g* BK II CH XV
I CT 3 4 162d 163b CH XVII SECT 16-17
172a c SECT 20 172d 173c H XXI I T 21
209c BK I CH X 349 354c esp SECT 3-4
349d 350b s c 8 II 351a 352a
- 35 B R LB *Hum Knowled e* SECT 117 436a
- 42 HA T *Pur Re* n 176b-c 190c 192 -d /
Practi l Re 10 334b 335b 344b-c 352a b
/ / dgement 592 -c
- 46 H AL *Philo phy of History* INTRO 156d
157b I T I 306a
- 51 T LATON *War d Peace* BK XIV 608a b
EP LOG II 684 d
- 4f The suuy of God the freedom of an
isobm being
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphyn s* BK X I CH 7 [1073
3 io] 603a b
- 18 ACROSTIV *Co f no* K V par 19- 32b-
33 K VII par 7 45 -d par 20-21 49d 50
BK XIII pa 12 113b-d
- 19 AQU I *Summa Th l gr* ART I Q A 3
EP I 12c 14 Q 731 34c II 4 A 1 ANS 75d
76c A 3 77d 78b Q 5 s and REP 1
144c 145b Q 54 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 75 A
5 RE 1 4 382 383b Q 79 A ANS 414d
416a Q 86 R I 462a-463a P T I
Q I A 4 REP 1 612a 613a
- 20 AQUIN *Summa The l g a* PART I II Q 64
4 P 3 69b-70a Q 87 A 4 RE 2 128b d
T II II Q 20 A REP 2 475d-476c Q 24
A 8 495b-496a PART I Q I A 2 REP 2
703a 704d Q 2 vs 710a 711c Q 3 A 1
REP 723b-724 A L Q 92 A I
6 12 1025c 1032b
- 23 II s *Levithan* PAR II 162b-c
- 31 D CA s *M d lat* s 86a 88d / *Ob*
ject s a d Replie 112a d 123c d II III
132d 133
- 31 S I O *Leti s P R* D P 2 455 D P 6-7
355b II 8 14 356d 360 O 15 C O
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I R 4 373d 74c
- 32 M YO P *ad se Lost* K II I 1212a

- 33 PASCAL *Penitēs* 231 231 213b 216a 469 256a
- 34 NEWTON *Principi s* BK III GENERAL SCHOL,
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- 35 LOCKE *Humna Understa d ng* BK II CH XV
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SECT 1 167d 168a SECT 16 17 172a-c SECT 20
172d 173c C I XXIII SECT 33 36 212d 213d
BK III CH VI SECT II 271b-d
- 35 B RELEY *Human Kno ledre* SECT 117 436a
- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 188c 192c d 201b II
05a b / *Pract ca! Reason* 325d 326a 344b-c
/ Judgement 590b d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 237d
238a 246b-c

4f The perfect on or goodness of God

- NEW TESTAMENT *Mattheu* 5-18 / *Luke* 18 19
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus*
447d 448a / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphyns* BK XII CH 7 602a
603b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 12 347a b
- 12 EPI TETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 147c
- 16 KEPLER *Harmo ies of the Wo ld* 1009a
- 18 AL STIV *Co f mon s* BK I par 12 4a BK
III par 12 16b BK IV par 24 25b-c BK V par
19-2 32b-33a BK VII par 1-7 43b-45d esp
par 4 44b-45d par 16-23 48c 50c BK V
par 38 81 BK XI par 6 90c d BK XII par
15 103b BK XIII par 1-5 110d 111d par 53
124d 125a-c / *City of God* BK VI CH 10
327d 328d K VII CH I 3 342b d 344b I
8-9 346d 348b / *Chrsian D ctine* BK I
CH 3 7 625d 626c II 3 3 633b d
- 19 AQUIN s *Summa Theol g ca* PART I Q 2
A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 A 4 and RE I 12c
14a Q 3 A I ANS 14b-15b A 2 A 5 15c 16a
7 REP 2 19a-c Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q
3 A 2 s 63 64d A II REP 2 73c 74b Q
18 A 3 108b-107 Q 19 A I RE I 3 108d
209c Q 2 A I REP 4 124b-125b Q 51 A I
RE 3 275b 276b Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d II
62 A 8 NS and REP I 2 323c 324a Q 66 A I
CONTR RV 343d 345c Q 84 A A 5 d REP
3 442b-443c Q 91 A I A 484a-485b Q 100
A vs 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b PART II
Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q
105 4 ANS 541 542 A 5 ANS 542a-543b
P T II Q I A 4 EP I 612 613a Q 2 4
RE I 618a d Q 9 A 6 662 -d P I 3 A I ANS
694a d Q 19 A 4 705b-c Q 22 A REP I 721c
722c Q 24 A 3 REP 2 728c 729c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologia* PART I Q 61
A 5 s 58b-59d Q 64 A 4 N and R P 3
69b 70 RTII II Q 9 A 4 R P 425d-426c
Q 23 A I R 444b-445a Q 17 A I ANS
45 -d Q 3 A 4 ANS 485d-486b Q 31 A I
AV 559a-c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q
184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d P A T II Q I A I
AN 701d 703 Q 23 A I AN 833a d RTIII
SUPPL Q 91 A REP 4 1017 1020c Q 99
A 2 RE 3 1081a d

(4) *The divine nature in itself the divine attributes of The perfection or goodness of God*)

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXVIII [91-93] 97a PARADISE VII [64-66] 115d XIX [40-90] 135c 136a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* 76d 77c III-IV 86a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 142c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a PART V PROP 17 DEMONSTR 456c
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 580 276b
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a 371a passim
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT II-12 271b 272b
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 78 81 485c 487a SECT XI DIV 106-107 499b-500b passim DIV III 502a b
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b / *Practical Reason* 307a d 325d 326a 342c 345a c 351b-352c / *Judgement* 592a c

4g The intellect of God

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [107^a b 14-29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X LN 8 [1178^b 23] 433b
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c BK II CH 8 146a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH I 65d 66d / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d esp TR V-11 228b 237d TR IX 246c 251d
- 11 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XI CH 21 333a d BK XII CH 17 353a 354a BK XXII CH 29 614b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 2-3 14b 15b Q 14 AA 1-4 75d 79a Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c A REP 4 109c 110b A 3 REP 6 110b 111c A 4 ANS and REP 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 150c 151a Q 7 A 3 REP 3 155c 156a Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 50 A 1 ANS 269b 270a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 55 A 1 ANS and REP 3 289a d A 3 ANS 291a d Q 57 A 1 ANS 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 79 A 1 ANS 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 4 ANS 417a 418c A 10 REP 2 423d 424d Q 84 A 2 ANS 442b-443c Q 85 A 5 ANS 457d 458d Q 87 A 1 ANS 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b 468a Q 89 A 1 ANS 473b-475a Q 105 A 1 REP 2 538d 539c A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 116 A 1 ANS 592d 593d PART II Q I A 4 REP 1 612a 613a Q 19 A 4 ANS and REP 3 705b c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 51

A 1 REP 2 12b 13c Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b-59d Q 93 A 1 215b d 216c PART III Q 6 A 2 A 1 741c 742a

- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228a c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362 363c PROP 21 364a c PROP 32 COROL 2 367b PROP 33 SCHOL 2 368b PART II PROP 1 373d 374a PROP 3-6 374a 375a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I, SECT 10 123b CH X SECT 9 143a c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 303b 304a 344b c 350c 351b / *Judgement* 590b d 592a 600d 601c 610b-613a c

4h The happiness and glory of God

- OLD TESTAMENT Exodus 15 1-21 33 13 23 / I Chronicles 16.23 27 29 11 13-(D) I Paralipomenon 16.23 27 29 11 13 / Psalms 8 19 24 57 5-11 96 3-6 104 1 113 138 5 145 11-12-(D) Psalms 8 18 23 56 5 11 95 3-6 103 1 112-4 13 5 141 11 12 / Isaiah 6 1-4 4-8-(D) Isaiah 6 1 4 42 8
- APOCRYPHA Judah 16 13-(D) OT Judah 16 16 / Rest of Esther 13 12-14-(D) OT Esther 13 12-14 / Song of Three Children 28 31-(D) OT Daniel 3 51 53
- NEW TESTAMENT Mark 8 38 / John 5 44 5 54 / Hebrews 2 10 / I Peter 4 7 11 / II Peter 1 16-18 / Revelation 5 9-14 7 9-12 21-(D) Apocalypse 5 9-14 7 9-12 21
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [107^a b 13-29] 602d 603a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 14 [1154^b 20-21] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178^b 23] 433b c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XIII PAR 4 111c / *City of God* BK V CH 14 20a d BK VIII CH 11 268d 269c BK XII CH 17 353a-354a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 150a 152a c 62 A 3 REP 3 319c 320b A 4 ANS 320b 321b 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b 341b Q 70 A 2 ANS 364b 365a Q 73 A 2 REP 3 371b d PART II Q 2 A 2 REP 2 616d 617b A 3 ANS and REP 1 617b 618a Q 3 A 1 REP 1 622c 623a A 2 REP 1 623a 624b A 8 REP 628d 629c Q 5 A 3 REP 638b 639a A 7 ANS 642a d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 ANS 759b d Q 16 A 4 REP 2 799b 800b Q 8 A 1 REP 845b 846a PART III SUPPL Q 71 A 8 REP 1 909d 910d Q 92 A 1 REP 5 1025c 1032b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-9] 106a XXXIII [46-145] 156c 157d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 17 456c d PROP 35-36 460d-461c
- 32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56-115] 136b 144b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 233 216a

4 **HA T** *Practical Reason* 347d 348b / *Judge*
ment 594d [in 1]

5 **The di** ne n ture in relat ou to the world or
creatures

7 **PLATO** *Republic* bk ii 321d 322d / *Timaeus*
447b-455b 465d-466a

8 **ARISTOTLE** *Physics* bk vii ch i 326a-327b
bk vii ch 2-6 334a 346b

9 **A** *ist tle* *Ethics* bk vii ch 14 [1154^o 0-31]
406c bk x ch 8 [1173^o 27] 433b c

12 **FRICHTATUS** *Discourses* bk i ch 22 195 b
bk i ch ii 240d 241a

12 **ALABRIUS** *Meditations* bk ii s ct 4 257b
k v sct 11 269d 270b bk vi sct 40-46

277d 2 8d

11 **HAPLER** *Harm nes of the World* 1017b
1018a 1071b

17 **PLATO** *us* *Fourth En cad* bk iii ch 13
149b d

18 **ALCUSTINE** *Co fessio s* bk i par 4 2a par
i 3b c bk i pa 25 25c bk iv par 31 bk v

par i 29c 27b k vii par 1-3 43b-45d par
16-21 48c 50c bk x par 35 81a bk xi par 6

90c d bk x i par 19 113c d / *City of G d*
s vii ch 29-3 261a 262a bk vii ch i 10

264b d 271d bk x c i r 2 293b d 300a bk
xi ch 24 335c 336a / *Christian Doctr e* bk i

ch 9 627a b

19 **A** *o s* i *S mma Theol ge* p r t i 00 14
25 75 150a 084 a 2 445 442b 443c

i *D cte* *D e Com dy* p k i r i [i 3]
106a [97 142] 107b-d [i 112 145] 109 b x

[i 27] 120b c [i 152-87] 136a b x i [40-90]
135c 136a x i [i 0-120] 148b c x vii

148d 150b k vii [75- 45] 157a d

28 **I** *l* *z* *On A m i Genes* 428c d

30 **B** *n* *Ad a ement f Learn g* 38a

31 **D** *s* *ca* *e* *D course* p k i 52a d / *Ob*
ject d *Repl c* 123 d 214a d 229c d

32 **AL** *u* *Parad* *Lois* bk x ii [4 2 436]
241 b

34 **NEWTON** *Pr n ciples* bk iii c xer l sc n 1,
369b 371 / *Opt c* k iii 542a 543a

35 **LOCKE** *Humu l derst d ng* bk ii c vii
e 167d 168a bk i ch v sct i 12

271b 272b

38 **B** *l* *r* *Hum* *Ans ludge* sct 57 423d
424a

39 **H** *m* *Il man U derstand g* sct vi div
649b-c 3502a d

37 **T** *u* *T m f n s* 186c-d 187d 188a

38 **R** *i* *e* *u* *S cial Contract* bk iv 439a

40 **C** *u* *u* *Il c lne d Fall* 81b-c 183 307b-c
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42 **K** *Pr ctical Rea n* 303b-304a 321b c
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- 21 DANTE *Dilire Comedy* PURGATORY XXVIII [91-93] 97a PARADISE VII [64-66] 115d XIX [40-90] 135c 136a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* 1 76d 77c III-IV 86a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 142c
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- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 580 276b
- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a 371a passim
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- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b ■
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysc of Morals* 263a b / *Practical Reason* 307a d 325d 326a 342c 345a c 351b-352c / *Judgement* 592a c

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 7 [1072^b 14-29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 8 [1178^b 23] 433b c
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c BK II CH 8 146a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH I 65d 66d / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d esp TR V VI 228b 237d TR IX 246c 251d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK VI CH 21 333a d BK VII CH 17 353a 354a BK VIII CH 29 614b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d
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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 303b 304a 344b-c 350c 351b / *Judgement* 590b d 592a ■ 600d 601c 610b-613a c

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35 H. M. *Human Understanding* SECT IX DIV 101
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40 G. BROWN *Decline and Fall*, 190c 191a 379a-c
42 H. T. *Pure Reason*, 242a 243a / *Practical*
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44 BOWWELL *Johnson 375a b*

45 H. G. *Philosophy of History* PART III 30^b-
30^b P 2 IV 34 b-30a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [O II 1] 246b-
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51 TOULSTOY *War & Peace* BK V 196a 198b
2 & 611 c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brother Karamazov* BK I, 21a b
BK II, 26b-27d BK III 64c 6 BK V 12 b-
137 *passim* BK VII, 177b-180a c 23, 23a b

6c(3) Mystical experience

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis 13, 15 227-45 26 2-*
6a 25 10-2 3171 3 3-23 12 45 1-4
1 Exodus 3 1-4 - 9-10 -1 / Numbers 1-
21 35 24 12 4 / 1 242 3-8 5-23-45-
(D) 1 242 3-8 73 16 / Judges 6-11 6 13
1 / Samuel 3- (D) 1 242 3 / 1 242 3 35 15
9-19 19- (D) 111 Kings 3-45, 97-9 19 /
1 Chronicle 1- 15- (D) 1 242 3-8 5-23-45-
3-45 / 1 242 33 14 1 5 1-4-5 /
Isaiah 6- (D) 1242 6 / Jeremiah (D)
Jeremiah 1 / Ezekiel esp 1-4 8-12 40-45- (D)
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1-10 7-8 / Zechariah, 6- (D) 242 3-8
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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew 120- 3 326-*
1-18 5 / Luke 13 35 22-25-35 35
925 35 4 / Acts 13 11 7 9 120 esp
7-20 5 15 9-11 21 1 23-11
4 3 5 / 11 Corinthians 1 3-9 / 11 Peter
2- 5 / Revelation- (D) 1-10c 4-10

18 APOSTOLIC CONFESSIONS 1 BK VII par 16 48-
49a x VIII, par 25 35 60a-61 x IX, par
21 5 63a-c BK X, par 67 8^d d-8a / *Cry f*
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425c-42^a

19 APOSTOLIC *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 1-
1 2 259d-60d Q 84 a 5446c-44 c

20 APOSTOLIC *Summa Theologiae*, a -11 Q 9^b
3 a 2 241c 242b ART 1-II Q 9a, a 3,
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I (1-51)
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141b-142a XXX [31-99] 152a-d XXXII (139)-
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23 HO BEE *Letters* PART I 52a b 68d-69b
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162d 166a 1 4b-1 6d 183d 150c c c c c
NON 281d 282

33 PASCAL *Præf. 2- 255 222b-224b*

40 G. BROWN *Decline and Fall - 81a*

41 CIBBON *Decline and Fall 4 6b-477a*

42 HAST *Practical Reason 320d 321b*

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brother Karamazov* BK VII
189a 191a c

6c(4) The beatific vision

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis 28-10- 3 24 35 /*
Exodus 4 esp 4-9-11 33 11 23 34 5-11
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APOSTOLIC *Ecclesiasticus 43 30-31- (D) OT*
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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew 55 / 1 3 /*
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thians 5-6 1 1-4 / 1 Timothy 6 13 16 /
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18 APOSTOLIC *Confession* BK IX, par 25 68- /
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19 APOSTOLIC *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 12
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20 APOSTOLIC *Summa Theologiae* PART II, Q 6^a
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* BK III 1 (1 12)
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22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 10 499b-500a
par 3 519b-520a

23 HO *Letters*, PART I, 65a b

31 DESCARTES *McLennan's* III 83d-89a

32 MASON *Of Time* [9-] 12a b / *Paradise*
Lost x xii [25-65] 242a

(6c Supernatural knowledge 6c(1) God as teacher inspiration and revelation)

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* passim esp 4 23
7 28-29 10 1-20 11 25-27 13 1-3 17 5
28 18-20 / *Mark* passim esp 1 1-11 4 1-2 /
Luke passim esp 2 41-50 3 21-42 8 4-15
9 34-35 10 21-22 / *John* passim esp 3 2
5 31-47 10 26-27 1 23-30 15 15 16 25 29
17 6-8 / *Acts* 22 6-14 / *Romans* 1 16-20 10 17
/ *I Corinthians* 2 12 1-8 / *Galatians* 1 11-12 /
Ephesians 1 9 17 3 1-5 / *II Timothy* 3 15-16 /
Hebrews 1 1-3 2 3-4 / *I Peter* 1 10-12 22 25 /
II Peter 1 19-21 / *I John* 2 20-27

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk II par 7 10b c
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 3a
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298a Q 68 A 1 ANS 354a 355c Q 89 A 1 REP 3
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595d 597c A 2 REP 2 597c 598c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 63
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385c 387a Q 2 A 10 ANS 399b 400b Q 4 A 4
REP 3 405a 406a Q 6 A 1 ANS 413d-414c
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775d 776b Q 12 A 3 ANS and REP 1-2 778b
779a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXX-
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22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Tale* [15 787-816]
467a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 83a b PART II
137b 138b 160b PART III 165a 167b 176d
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25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 212a 238c 239c 267c
268a 273a b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 19b c 38a
54b-c 95d 101d esp 95d 96c / *New Atlantis*
203a c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 43c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk V [308] bk VIII

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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 185 205a 585 588 277a b
642-692 290b 301a 881 345b / *Vacuum*
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk III CH IV
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35 HUMÉ *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV
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38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333d 366c d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 201a 307d 308a
346b-c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 227d 228a 231a d

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 455a e

44 BOSWELL Johnson 394a e 481d-482a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 157c-d
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51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk I 50b e

52 DOSTOEVSKI *Brothers Karama* ol bk V 12/b
137c bk VI 150d 153d

6c(2) The light of faith

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 44-50 esp 44 20 41 4
46 15 49 10 50 28 29—(D) OT *Ecclesiasti-*
cus 44-50 esp 44 21 45 4 46 17 18 49 12
50 30-31

NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 8 4-17 / *John* 6 28-
40 10 37-38 12 44 46 14 17-11 16—, 31
20 24—9 / *Romans* 3 21-5 2 10 14 17 /
II Corinthians 4 3-6 / *I Thessalonians* 2 13 /
Hebrews 4— 11 / *I Peter* 1 7-9 1 23 / *I John*
2 20-29 5 4-10

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk I par 1 la b bk
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563d 564d bk XXII ch 4 5 588b 590a ch 7
591c d / *Christian Doctrine* bk I ch 15 628b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 62
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [34 45]
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22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Tale* 463b-471b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 66a c PART II
137b d 149c II 160b PART III 165b c 172d
173a 209b 209d 241a 242a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 98b 99a 209a d 212a d
238c 239c 267c 268a 294a b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 19b c 95d
96c / *Novum Organum* bk I APH 65 114b-c

Doctrines common to the Jewish Moham-
medan and Christian conceptions of God
and His relation to the world and man

Creation

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-2 51-2 / *Exodus*

20 11 / *I Samuel* 2 8—(D) / *I Kings* 2 8 /
Nehemiah 9 6—(D) / *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 9 1-
13 10 8-13 1-7-10 26 7-14 8 24-27
27 14-38 41 esp 38 4-11 / *Psalms* 8 esp 8 5
19 1-6 4 1-2 33 74 16-17 89 11-12 90 2
95 1-7 96 5 10-25-28 104 119 73 90
1-1 2 136 5-9 139 14-16 146 5-6 148—
(D) / *Psalms* 8 esp 8 6-7 18 1-7 3 1-2 32
73 16-17 88 1-13 89 2 94 1-7 97 5 101 26-
29 103 118 73 90 1-2 135 2-9 138 14-16
145 5-6 148 / *Proverbs* 3 19-20 8 22-31 /
Ecclesiastes 3 11 / *Isaiah* 40-6 8 4 5-8
44-24-28 45 5-13 48 12-16 51 12-16 64 8
65 17—(D) / *Isaiah* 40-26-28 4 5-8 44-24-
28 45 5-13 48 12-16 51 1-16 64 8 65 17
/ *Jeremiah* 10 11-13 27 5 31 35 51 15-16—
(D) / *Jeremiah* 10 11-13 27 5 31 35 51 15 16
/ *Amos* 4 13 5 8 / *Jonah* 1 9—(D) / *Jonas*
1 9 / *Zachariah* 1-1—(D) / *Zachariah* 1 1

Apocrypha *Judith* 16 14—(D) OT *Ester*
16 17 / *Rest of Ester* 1 10—(D) OT *Ester*
13 10 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 14 23 6 7
9 1 9 11 17 24—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom*
1 14 23 6 8 9 1 9 11 18 25 / *Eccle-*
siasticus 17 1-9 18 1-5 3 19-20 24 8-9
33 9-13 39 16-35 42 15-43 33—(D) OT
Ecclesiasticus 17 1-8 18 1-5 23 27-9
24 12-14 33 10-14 39 21-41 42 15-43 37 /
Song of Three Children 34-60—(D) OT
Daniel 3 56-82 / *Bel and Dragon* 5—(D)
OT *Daniel* 14 4 / *II Maccabees* 7 23 28—
(D) OT *II Maccabees* 7 23 28

New Testament *John* 1 10 / *Acts* 14 14-15
17 23-7 / *Romans* 1 19-20 / *Colossians* 1 12-
17 / *Hebrews* 1 20 3 4 11 3 / *II Peter* 3 7 /
Revelation 4 11 10 6 14 7—(D) *Apocalyptic*
4 11 10 6 14 7

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 7 45a d
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7
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20 Aq *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 4
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742a 743a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* d FORGATORY XII [58-
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 162b PART III
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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b d /
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31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 54d 56a /
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Replies PROP III 132d 133a 137d 138a
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31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 36c
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32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [6-10] 93b [65-
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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 48-258a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 56-57
36d 37b / *Human Understanding* BK II
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35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 46
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35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DV
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a b

41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 228a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 81d-82a / *Judgement* 59-d
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46 H. GEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 245d
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47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243-2 0] 7a b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c 243d

54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 875d 8 11

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23 10 23 35 9-15 3 70 esp 45 7-8 / *Exodus*
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 (D) Jeremias 7 2—8 18—19 31 42 / Da nel
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 3 91 100 6 1 28 / Jonah esp 1 4—(D) Jo as
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- 29 CERVANTES Don Quixote P RT II 408c
- 30 BACON Advancement of Learning p 19d 38a /
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- 32 MILTON Sonnets XVI 66b—67a / Paradise Lost
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- 33 PA CAL Pensées 619—641 284b—290a
- 35 BERKELEY Human knoi led e INTRO SECT 3
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- 37 FIELD c Tom s nes 75 d 371c 378a
- 38 ROE SE c I eq aluz 331c d / Social Con
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- 40 GR OY Decline and Fall 292d 294a
- 41 GR NOV Decline a d Fall 542a li
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 95c d
- 46 HAZEL Johnson s History INTRO 158c
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- 48 M LVILLE Moby Dick 83a 237a 3 6b
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- 51 TOLSTOY War and Peace κκκ 1 2 2a b κκκ
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- 52 DO O VSKY Brothers Karam ov κκκ 127b—
 137c pass m κκκ xi 343b—c
- 54 FR Cu lusion and I s Duncan ends 771a b
- 7c DI ne go ernment and law
- OLD T ST MENT Genesis 9 1 7 / Exodus 12 1
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 passum / Numbers pass m esp 5 10 15 18 19
 27 30 35 36 / Deuteronomiu pass m esp 5—6—2
 / I Ch o icles 29 1 —(D) I Paralipomeno
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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 9 10d par 14 12a b bk iii par 13-17 16c 18a / *City of God* bk v ch ii 216c d bk vi ch iii 261b d bk ix ch 22 296d 297a bk x ch 13-15 307b 308b ch 17 309c 310b bk xi ch 18 331d 332a ch 22 333d 334c bk xii ch 5 345a bk xiv ch 12 15 517b 521c ch 21 524a 525a ch 23-25 525c 528d ch 27 529a d bk xvii ch 1-3 586b d 588b ch 24 609a 612a passim

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 2 A 3 ANS 12c 14a Q 21 A 1 ANS 124b 125b A 2 ANS 125c d Q 26 A 4 ANS 151c 152a c Q 47 A 3 REP 238c 239a Q 63 A 7 ANS 331c 332b Q 65 A 3 REP 1 341c 342b Q 83 A 1 REP 3 436d 438a QQ 103-119 528a 608d PART I-II Q 10 A 4 ANS 665d 666a c Q 17 A 8 REP 2 692a 2 699 A 4 705b c A 6 ANS and REP 707a 708a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 71 A 2 REP 4 106d 107c A 6 110b 111b Q 72 A ANS 112b 113a A 4 ANS 114a 115a Q 74 A 8 REP 1 134b 136a Q 91 A 1-2 208b 209d AA 4-5 210c 212c Q 93 215b d 220d Q 97 A 3 ANS and REP 1 237b 238b A 4 REP 3 238b 239b QQ 98 108 239b 337d PART II II Q 23 A 6 ANS 487a d Q 187 A 5 REP 3 671d 673b PART III Q 60 A 4 REP 2 849c 850b PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 1 ANS 883c 886c Q 7- A 2 ANS 919a 920c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *HELL* vii [70-6] 10b vi 15a 16b *PURGATORY* xvi [52-105] 77b d *PARADISE* i [94-142] 107b d ii [112 148] 109a b iii [34-90] 109d 110b [xi 27] 120b c xviii [100]-xxviii [139] 148b 150b xxxiii [37-84] 155a c

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [1663-1672] 187b / *Monk's Tale* [14 221 228] 438a b / *Canon's Yeoman's Tale* [16 935-949] 487a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 95d 96b PART II 136d 138b 159d 164a c PART III 167b c 171a 172a 177c 180a 199b 204a 216b 219d 240a 241a 245c 246a c PART IV 247a 249b 272b c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 491d 492a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71a b 94b c 100d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 54c 55b / *Objections and Replies* 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 3 SCHOL 374b c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk ii [237 249] 116b [310-328] 118a bk iii [274 343] 141b 143a esp [317-333] 142b bk v [600-615] 188b bk vi [569-588] 200a bk vii [539-573] 220a 221a [550-609] 229a 230b bk xii [223 248] 324a b / *Samson Agonistes* [667-673] 354a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 87b 345a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk I ch II SECT 5-6 103a c bk II ch XXVIII SECT 8 230a bk IV ch III SECT 28 29 327a 323a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 29 33 418c 419a SECT 51-53 422d 423a SECT 57 423d 424a SECT 60-66 424b 426a SECT 93 94 431b c SECT 105 107 433b 434a SECT 146-155 442a 444c

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36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 261b 266b esp 261b 262a 266b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 70a d

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk I la 2b bk xii 85d 86a bk xxvi 214b d 215a

41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 252c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 237b 238b 240b / *Judgements* 594d [fn 1]

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 158c 160b 168d 170b PART III 309d 310a PART IV 368d 369a c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk v 127b 137c passim

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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 5 6 2b c bk ii par 15 12b c bk vi par 4 36a b / *City of God* bk viii ch 15 361a 362c ch 7 362d 363b ch 14 15 366b d ch 20 370c 371a bk xiii ch 23 bk xiv ch 1 372a 377a bk xiv ch 26 395d 396c ch 27 397a bk xv ch 1 3

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19 ACCT 5 *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q A 2
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20 ACCT 5 *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 90
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21 D VTE *Dante Comedy* HELL, 112 4a PER
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23 H 15 *Leviathan* PART I 88c-89a PART II
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37 F *Epitaph* *Tom Jones* 38d

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46 H *CEL Philosophy of History* P RT III 310d
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52 *Dostoevsky II* *thers Karamazov* BK 127b-
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-(D) / *II Kings* 1-6 1320-21 20 1 1 /
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18 *Alcibiades City of God* BK X CH 8-13 302a
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19 ACCT 5 *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 89,
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20 ACCT 5 *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 63
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21 *Dante Divine Comedy* PARADISE XX V [55-
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(7) *Doctrines common to the Jewish Mohammedan and Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world and man 7e Miracles*

- 22 CHALCER *Tale of Man of Lau* 236b 255b esp [486-49 a] 242b 243b / *Priores s Tale* [13 418 6 o] 392a 395b / *Second Nuns Tale* [16 001-021] 471a b
- 23 HORRIS *Lexathan* PART I 83c PART II 137b ■ 160b PART III 166a 167b 188a 191a PART IV 249b 250a
- 30 BACON *Idiancement of Learning* 19b c 33c d 41b d / *New Atlantis* 201d 203c esp 203a b
- 32 MITT *Paradise Lost* BK XII [173-2-2] 323a 324a
- 33 LASCAR *Pensees* 643-644 290b 291b 803-806 328b 341b 8/6 345a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XVI SECT 13 371a b
- 35 BLACKLEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 62-63 425a c SECT 84 429b c
- 35 HUMF *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 54 474b c SECT X 488d 497b
- 40 CIBROV *Decline and Fall* 180b c 189b 191a 206b d 295c 296b 465d 466c 605b d
- 41 CIBROV *Decline and Fall* 227d 228a 232a c 398b 399b
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 126b c 350a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 247a PART III 307a b PART IV 338b c 348d 349a
- 47 GORTIUS *Gaus* PART I [762-770] 20a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 219b 220a
- 52 DOSTOYEVSKI *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 11a b BK II 21d 22b BK V 127b 137c passim BK VII 171a 177b 189d 190a

7f The Book of Life

- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 32 31-33 33 19 / *Psalms* 69 8-(D) *Psalms* 68 29 / *Isaiah* 4 3-(D) *Isaiah* 4 3
- ALOCRYPIA *Ecclesiasticus* 33 10 13-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 33 10-14
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 20 1 16 22 1 14 / *Luke* 10 20 / *John* 5 21 6 44 10-6 20 / *Acts* 13 48 / *Romans* 8 28-9 23 / *Ephesians* 1-3 / *II Thessalonians* 12 14 / *II Timothy* 1 8 9 19 20 / *Hebrews* 12 22 23 / *I Peter* 1 1-5 2 1-9 / *II Peter* 1 10 / *Revelation* 3 4 5 13 4 8 17 7-8 20 11-21 27 esp 15 21 27 22 18 19-(D) *Apocalypse* 3 4 5 13 4-8 17 7-8 20 11-21 27 esp 15 21 27 22 18 19
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH I 397b d 398c BK V CH 8 536d 538c CH 14-16 542d 544d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 24 141b 143c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 63 AT REP I 864c 865b PART III SUPPL Q 87 AT 97b 998c

- 21 DANTE *Divin Comedy* PARADISE XIV [103-148] 136a c XX [94 138] 137d 138a XVI [52 102] 138d 139b XXVII [40-84] 153a ■
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [356-363] 101a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 884 346a
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 238c 334b c

7g The resurrection of the body

- OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 14 13 15 19 23 27 / *Isaiah* 26 19 66 14-(D) *Isaiah* 26 19 66 14 / *Ezekiel* 37 1 14-(D) *Ezekiel* 37 1 14 / *Daniel* 12 1 3
- APOCRYPHA *II Maccabees* 12-41 45-(D) OT *II Maccabees* 1 4 46
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 23 33 27 2-51 28 / *Mark* 12 18 27 16 1-q / *Luke* 12 38 24 1 1- / *John* 2 18 22 / *Acts* 23 1 10 415 26 8 / *Romans* 4 17 6 3 11 9 10 11 / *Corinthians* 6 14 15 / *II Corinthians* 19-10 4 14 / *I Thessalonians* 4 13 17 / *Hebrews* 6 1 18
- AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 29 317b 318a BK XIII CH 1-2 360a 361a CH 16 20 367a 371a CH 22 4 371c-376a c BK XX CH 6 7 534a 536d CH 9-10 538 541a CH 12 17 541c 545c CH 20-23 547c 552c CH 26 555d 556a BK XX CH 30-BK XXI CH 10 559d 570b BK XXI 586b d 618d esp CH 4 5 586b 590a CH 7 591d CH 11 21 599c-606d CH 23-30 612a 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 19-1 629a II CH 23 24 630a 631a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 75-86 935a 996a c Q 93 1 1037d 1039a
- 21 DANTE *Divin Comedy* INFERNO VI [94 111] 9b-c X [1 15] 13d XIII [85 108] 18d 19a PARADISE VII [121-148] 116b c XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XXV [64 1 9] 145a c
- 23 HORRIS *Lexathan* PART III 191b 193 195b d PART IV 253b 255b 259b ■
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 248c 249c 311a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [22, 143] 140b 143a esp [294-3 9] 141b 142b BK VII [356-445] 327b 329a esp [411 420] 328a ■
- 35 BLACKLEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 95 431c
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Law* BK XVII 205d 206a
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 233d 234d
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 472a b

7b The Last Judgment and the end of the world

- OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 19 27 2, 21 2, 34 / *Psalms* 50 96 10-13-(D) *I Psalms* 49 95 10-13 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 16 17 11 9 10 1 14 / *Isaiah* 2 4 11 11 16 13 6 22 24 6 2, 30 34 35 65 17 25 60-(D) *Isaiah* 2 4 11 11 16 13 6-22 24 26 27 30 34 35 6 17 25 66 / *Daniel* 7 21 27 12 / *Joch* / *Miah* 4-(D) *Micheas* 4 / *Zephaniah*-(D) *Sophonias* / *Zechariah* 14-(D) *Zacharias* 14 / *Malachi* 3 4-(D) *Malachi* 3 4
- APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 17-(D) OT *Judith* 16 20 21 / *Rest of Esther* 10 4 11 12-(D) OT *Esther* 10 4 11 12

(8) Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning God and His people 8b God's Covenant with Israel circumcision assign of the Covenant)

73 19-20 77 104 esp 104 7-8 110 / *Isaiah* 24 1-5 33 1-8 54 esp 54 10 56 esp 56 4-6 59 20-21 61 esp 61 8—(D) *Isaiah* 24 1-5 33 1-8 54 esp 54 10 56 esp 56 4-6 59 20-21 61 esp 61 8 / *Jeremiah* 4 4 11 14 19 22 22 5-9 31-33 esp 31 31-33 32 40 33 20-26 34 13 20 50 4-5—(D) *Jeremiah* 4 4 11 14 19-22 22 5-9 31-33 esp 31 31 33 32 40 33 20-26 34 13-20 50 4-5 / *Ezekiel* 16-17 20 33-38 37 21-28 44 6-9—(D) *Ezekiel* 16-17 20 33-38 37 21-28 44 6-9 / *Hosea* 2 16-20 6 esp 6 7 8—(D) *Osee* 2 16-20 6 esp 6 7 8 / *Haggai* 2 4-5—(D) *Aggeus* 2 5 6

Apocrypha *Ecclesiasticus* 44 19-45 5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 44 20-45 6 / *I Maccabees* 1 44 63 2 19-6 8 esp 4 7-14—(D) OT *I Maccabees* 1 46-66 2 19-6 8 esp 4 7-14

New Testament *Luke* 1 70-75 2:21 / *John* 7 22-23 / *Acts* 3 25 7 1-8 51-53 15 1-29 21 20 21 / *Romans* 2 35 4 16 11 25-27 / *I Corinthians* 7 18 19 / *Galatians* 3 13-5 11 6 12 15 / *Ephesians* 2 11 13 / *Colossians* 2 10-14 3 9-11 / *Hebrews* 8 6-10 17

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk xvi ch 16 433c 434a ch 18 434c ch 21 28 435a-440b ch 32 441c-442c ch 36-38 443d 446a bk xix ch 22 525b c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 98 11 4-6 242b 245b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 82d 83a PART III 177c 180a 199b 201b 206c

32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 610-612 280b 282b 637-639 289b 290a 675 296b 297a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 322a b

8c The Law its observance as a condition of righteousness and blessedness

Old Testament *Genesis* 26 4-5 / *Exodus* 12 13 19 10 esp 20 1-17 / *Leviticus* passim esp 26 / *Numbers* passim / *Deuteronomy* passim esp 4 1-15 5 6-21 6 1-9 6 17-25 7 9-26 10 12 13 11 1-3 12 3 28 1-68 30 11 20 / *Joshua* 1 7-8 8 30-35 2 1-6—(D) *Joshua* 1 7-8 8 30-35 22 1 6 / *I Kings* 8 54 62—(D) *II Kings* 8 54-62 / *II Kings* 17 21 8—(D) *IV Kings* 17 21 8 / *I Chronicles* 22 12 13—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 22 12 13 / *II Chronicles* 31 33 8 35 1-19—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 31 33 8 35 1-19 / *Ezra* 9-10—(D) *I Esdras* 9 10 / *Nehemiah* 1 5-9 9 16-38—(D) *II Esdras* 1 5-9 9 16-38 / *Psalms* 1 19 7-14 37 30-31 40 8 78 89 20-36 esp 89 30-32 94 12 105 43-45 119—(D) *Psalms* 1 18 8 15 36 30-31 39 9 77 88 21-37 esp 88 31 33 93 12 104 41-45 118 / *Proverbs* passim esp 6:20-23 28 7 29 18 / *Isaiah* passim esp

5 24-25 30 9 42:21 25 51 7-8—(D) *Isaiah* passim esp 5 24-25 30 9 42:21 25 51 7-8 / *Jeremiah* passim esp 2 5-8 6 19 9 13 16 16 10-13 26 4 6 31 33 44 10-14 44:23—(D) *Jeremiah* passim esp 2 5-8 6 19 9 13 16 16 10-13 26 4-6 31 33 44 10-14 44:23 / *Ezekiel* 5 5-9 11 17-20 18 22 26 36:23 27 43-48—(D) *Ezekiel* 5 5-9 11 17 18 22 26 36 25 27 43 48 / *Dan* 9 1 13 / *Hosea* 4 6 8 1—(D) *Osee* 4 6 8 1 / *Amos* 2 4 6 / *Zephaniah* 3 1 7—(D) *Sophonia* 3 1-7 / *Zachariah* 7 12 14—(D) *Zacharias* 7 12 14 / *Malachi* 2 1 10 3 7 4 4—(D) *Malachias* 2 1-10 3 7 4 4

Apocrypha *Tobit* 14 8-9—(D) OT *Tobias* 14 10 11 / *Ecclesiasticus* passim, esp 2 16 9 15 10 19 11 15 17 11 14 19 17 20 19 24 24 23 32 15 33 2 34 8 39 11 41 8 4 1 2 45 1-5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* passim esp 2 19 9 22 23 10 23 11 15 17 9 19 17-18 19 21 24 32-33 32 19 33 34 8 39 1-15 41 11 42 1 2 45 1-6 / *Baruch*—(D) OT *Baruch* / *I Maccabees* 1 38-61 2 19-68—(D) OT *I Maccabees* 1 40-68 2 19 68 / *II Maccabees* 2 2 3 6-7 11 22 16—(D) OT *II Maccabees* 2 2 3 6-7 11 22 16

New Testament *Matthew* 5 17 20 1 13 15 1 20 19 3-9 / *Mark* 7 1 23 10 2 12 / *Luke* 6 1-9 11 37-41 14 2-5 16 16 17 / *John* 1 17 5 1 18 45-47 7 19-23 / *Acts* 10 9-15 25 28 13 38-39 15 1 10 21 20 21 / *Romans* passim / *Galatians* passim / *Ephesians* 2 14-15 / *I Timothy* 1 5 11 / *Hebrews* 7 10 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk x ch 11, 309c 310b bk x ch 28 556c 557a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 91 11 4 5 210c 212c QQ 98 105 239b 321a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE V 113-84 112b 113a passim

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 177d 178a 180a d 206c 207a 216b 218a 223a c PART IV 269a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 18b 11

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk xii 1223 260 324a 325a 1285 314 325b 326a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 610 280b 282a 619 6 0 284b 286a 6 8-634 287a 289a 6 8 297a b 680 298a

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 14b 15a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 179d 182c esp 181a 182a 208a-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 246c d

8d The Temple the Ark of the Torah

Old Testament *Exodus* 25 7 30 1-6 35 10-38 31 39 32 40 36 / *Leviticus* 26 11 / *Numbers* 9 15 22 / *Deuteronomy* 10 1-5 12 5-6 16 5-6 31 24 26 / *Joshua* 3 4 6 1 16—(D) *Joshua* 3 4 6 1 16 / *I Samuel* 4 3 7-12—(D) *I Kings* 4 3 7-12 / *II Samuel* 6 1 17 7 1 13—(D) *II Kings* 6 1 17 7 1 13 / *I Kings* 5-8—(D) *III Kings* 5-8 / *II Kings* 12 4 16

(9) Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny 9a The Trinity)

- REP 3 808d 809d Q 19 A 1 REP 1 816a 818b
QQ 20-24 821a 839c Q 5 A 1 ANS AND REP 3
839d 840d Q 26 A 2 ANS AND REP 2 846b d
Q 63 A 3 REP 1 866c 867c A 4 CONTRARY
867d 868b PART III SUPPL Q 95 A 1 REP -
1042c 1044c A 3 ANS 1045b 1046d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [34-
43] 56b PARADISE I [1-6] 120b VII [28-33]
177b VIII [124-147] 144a VIII [76-145]
157a III
- 2a CHAUCER *Troilus and Crestida* BK V STANZA
-67 155a / *Second Nun's Tale* [15 794-808]
467a b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 97c PART III
182a c 207b 207d 208c 227b PART II 259d
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 100c
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 159a
232b
- 32 MILTON *Christ's Nativity* [1-14] 1a b / *Paradise
Lost* BK III [56-115] 136b 144b esp [167 172]
139a [372 389] 143b 144a BK V [600-615]
188b BK VI [719 733] 212a BK XII [469-551]
329b 331a
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307a 314a esp 310b
311a 438b 441d esp 438b c 441a b 605a b
607a
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 422a c 520b 521c
esp 521c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 303d
304a 306a c

9b The Incarnation the God man

- NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1 14
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 20 32d 33a
BK VII par 13 14 47c-48b par 24-25 50d 51c
BK X par 7- o 83b 89a BK XI par 4 90a b /
City of God BK IX ch 15 293a 294a ch 17
295a III ch 21 296b d BK X ch 20 311b c ch
22 312a b ch 24 312d 313c ch 27-29 315b
318b BK XI ch 2 323a c BK XII ch 13 16
572c 574a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I ch 11 14
627b 628b ch 34 634b c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 62 A Q
REP 3 324a 325b Q 63 A 1 REP 4 334a
335c Q 73 A 1 REP 1 370a 371a Q 73 A 1
REP 1 306b 507c PART II Q 5 A 7 REP 2
642a d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III QQ 1 6
701b d 846d esp Q 6 A 1 REP 3 845b 816a
PART III SUPPL Q 76 A 1 939d 941a Q 93 A 3
ANS 1045b 1046d A 4 1046d 1047d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VIII
[106-120] 98d 99a VIII [76-126] 101c 102a
VIII [19-63] 102c 103a PARADISE II [31 45]
108a VI [10 1] 113d VII [16 1] 115b 116b
VIII [37-87] 125d 126b XXII [139] XXIII
[145] 156a 157d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 182a c

- 32 MILTON *Christ's Nativity* 1a 7b / *The Passion*
10b 12a / *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a /
Paradise Lost BK III [56-115] 136b 144b esp
[137-385] 325a 327b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 512 262a 763 63 322a 323a
325b 86- 342b 343a
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307d 308b
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 134a 161a c esp 134a
138a 150c 151b 230d 31a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 306b c
308a III
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 112b
137c

96(1) The divinity of Christ

- OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 9 6-7-(D) 12a c
9 6 7
- NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* thew passim esp 1 13-27
3 16 4 11 7-11 8 29-32 10 32 33 11-5 30
14 22 33 16 13 17 1-8 26 63-68 27 5-8
/ *Mark* passim esp 1 1 10 11 21 8 23
12 3 11 1- 5 2 7 9 1-8 14 60-65 15 39 16 14
/ *Luke* passim esp 2 49 4 41 9-5 36 10 1
32 22 29 24 49 / *John* passim esp 1 14 14 9
5 17 27 8 16 10 38 11 27 14 10-11
14 20 14 28 17 1-3 17 / *Acts* 8 37 / *Romans*
1 3 4 8 3 29-33 / *I Corinthians* 1-11
15 28 / *II Corinthians* 1 19 5 13 1 / *Philemon*
passim 2 5-6 / *Colossians* 1 15 17 2 8-9 /
I Timothy 3 16 / *Hebrews* 1 1-8 4 14 5 8
13 8 / *I John* 2 22 24 3 8 4 9-10 13 1
5 13 20 / *II John* 7-11 / *Jude*
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 51a c
/ *City of God* BK IX ch 15 293a 294a ch 17
295a c BK X ch 20 311b c ch 312a b
ch 4 312d 313c ch 27 29 315b 318b BK XI
ch 2 323a c BK XII ch 15 16 572c 574a
BK XIII ch 6 590a 591c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 3
723a 730b QQ 16 24 796a 839c Q 23 A 1
839d 840d PART III SUPPL Q 93 A 3 ANS
1045b 1046d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE III [16-1]
115b 116b
- 22 CHAUCER *Priores's Tale* 391a 395b
- 32 MILTON *Christ's Nativity* 1a 7b / *The Passion*
10b 12a / *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a /
Paradise Lost BK III [56-115] 136b 144b esp
[137 142] 138b [167-172] 139a [281 314] 141b-
142a [383 389] 143b 144a BK V [600-615]
188b BK VI [719-733] 212a BK XII [30 33b]
326a 327b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 34 317a 63 63 322a 323a
325b 841-842 336a 337a
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 308a b
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 134b 138a esp 135b-
136b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 270d
271c PART III 306d 307b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b-
137c passim BK VII 189 190

- (9) Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny 9c
Christ the Saviour and Redeemer the doctrines of the sinner and salvation.)

- 9d The Church the mystical body of Christ the Apostolate

OLD TESTAMENT Song of Solomon—(D) Canticles

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 3 4 18 22 5 18 3
9 35-10 42 11 1 15 13 1-53 16 17 4 15 15
20 20-25-8 24 14 25 28 16-0 / *Mark*
1 1-9 16 20 3 13-19 10-42 45 13 10 16 14
20 / *Luke* 3 1-20 4 43-44 5 11 6 13 16
8 16-17 9 1-6 11-48-50 12 11 1 22-34 30
24 47 / *John* 1 6-8 15-4 4 34 38 10 13 31
1 26 20 19 21-4 esp 20-20-23 21 15 17 /
Acts esp 1 8 13-26 2 1-47 5 1 12 13 17
16 1-40 22 14-15 / *Romans* / *I Corinthians*
passim esp 3 1-23 4 9-13 6 1 20 10 16-1
12 1-31 15 1-11 / *II Corinthians* esp 1 12 21
2 10-11 3 1 4 18 5-20-21 7 8-13 10 13 10
/ *Galatians* passim esp 1-2 3-28 4 1 31 /
Ephesians esp 1 2 23 3 8 1-4 12 5-7 33
/ *Philippians* 1-27 3-6 / *Colossians* passim esp
1 15-20 2 13-19 3-11 / *Hebrews* 3-6
/ *Peter* 2 4-10 / *I John*

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VI par 4 36a b /
City of God BK I CH 33 149b c BK X CH 20
311b c BK XIII CH 21 371a c BK XVII CH 9
461b d CH 11 462c-463a CH 15 16 465b
466d CH 20 469a-470c BK XVIII CH 48-52
501b 504d BK XIX CH 1-2 525b-c BK XX CH
7-12 535b 541d BK XXII CH 17 18 603a 606b
/ *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 16 628c d CH 15
628d 629a BK III CH 31-32 669c 670a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 95
A 1 REP 1 506b 507c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 1
A 9 CONTRARY and REP 3 5 388d 389d 10
ANS 389d 390d Q 1-11 6-8 393b-398b Q 5
410a-413c Q 183 189 625a 700d PART III Q
8 756c 763b PART III SUPPL Q 1 A 9 910d
912b Q 95 A 3 ANS and REP 4 1045b 10-6d
A 4 REP 1 5 1046d 10-7d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY IV { 3
145f 66c 67b XIX {127-141f 82d 83a XIX
[1] XXX [21] 97d 99c XXIII [1]-XXVIII [5]
102b 105a PARADISE XI 122a 123c esp { 3
39f 122b XII 123c 125a XXIII [1]-XXIV [5]
141b 146c passim XXVII [1-6b] 147b 147a
XXIX [109 114] 151b XXX XXIII 151d 156a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 151a-c PART III
198a 199a 207b 224c PART IV 247a 249b
275a 278d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII {436-514f 328b
330b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 473 - - - - - 646
291b 801-802 328b 9b
340a 852 341a b 85 9c
343b 349a

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 4b :
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of I.* 7b
310c PART IV 315d 331

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Others* v
127b 137c passim

54 FREUD *Guilt and Death* 763b c 92a

242b 243c A 6 REP 2 244c 245b Q 100 A
12 264d 265d Q 101 A 3 ANS and REP 1 268a
269a Q 102 A 2 ANS 271b 272a A 4 REP 2 5-
6 esp REP 6 276d 283c A 5 REP 5 283c 292c
Q 103 A 1 ANS 298b 299b A 2 299b 300d A 3
REP 1 300d 302a Q 104 A 3 ANS 305d 306d
Q 106-108 321a 337d PART II II Q 1 A 7 REP
1 4 385c 387a A 8 REP 4 387a 388c Q 2 A 7
396a 397c Q 14 A 1 REP 3 448d 449d PART
III Q 1 701b d 709c Q 26 845a 846d Q 60 A
3 ANS 848d 849c A 5 REP 3 850b 851b Q 61
A 1 REP 3 855a d A 3 856c 857c Q 6 A 5
REP 1 862b 863a A 6 ANS and REP 1 863a
864c PART III SUPPL Q 69 1 4 889c 890c Q
71 A 14 REP 2 916c 917b Q 72 A 2 REP 3-5
937a-938a Q 76 A 1 939d 941a Q 78 A 1
REP 3 947d 949b Q 89 A 2 ANS and REP 4
1006b 1007c A 5 ANS 1009b d Q 90 1012a
1016a Q 95 1042c 1049d Q 99 A 3 REP 1
1081d 1083a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL IV {46-63f 5d
6a PURGATORY XXVII {28-63f 102c 103a
XXVIII {52-72f 104d 105a PARADISE VII
{16-120f 115b 116b XIII {37-97f 125d 126b
XIV {103 111f 136a XXIII 141b 142c XXIII
{1-138f 134d 156a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK I STANZA
263 267 154b 155a / *Second Nun's Tale*
{15 788-822f 467a b / *Parson's Tale* par 8
497b 498a par 13 504b 505a par 68-69
533b 534b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 191b 192c
195d 196a 197c 198a 204a 207b 240c
242b 245a PART II 260b-c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV
269c 270b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT II
SC II {71-79f 182d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 68 SCHOL
445a b

3 MILTON *Christ's Nativity* 1a 7b passim / *The
Passion* 10b 12a / *Upon the Circumcision* 12b
13a / *Lycidas* {165 185f 31b / *Paradise Lost*
93a 333a esp BK I {1-6f 93b 94a BK III
{56-415f 136b 144b BK X {615-640f 287b 288b
BK XI {22-44f 299b 300a BK XII {285 484f
325b 329b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 425-856 243b 341b passim
esp 556-588 270b 277b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 181b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 334b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 482a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III
306b PART IV 331d 332a 354a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 318b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V
127b 137c passim

54 FREUD *War and Death* 763b c

to 10

The sacraments

- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 3 18 19.4-6 10-11 20:20-3 26:26-29 28 9 / *Mark* 1 4 8 10:12 12:32 40 14:22 24 16 16 / *Luke* 3:3 16 22 14 20 / *Joh* 1:25 27 33 3 1-8 6 esp 6:32 35 6 47-59 19 33 34 20:21 23 / *Act* 2:40-42 8 12 17:26-40 1 16 19:1 7 22 16 / *Roma* 5 6 3 4 / *I C* *rustians* 1 12 17 6 11 7 8-14 34 39 10 16-17 11:23 3 12 13 17:28-29 / *G* *lat* *a* 3 3-27 / *Eph* *u* *ns* 4 5 5:21 33 esp 5 31 32 / *Col* *ssa* 5 2 11 1 / *Hebrews* 5 1-6 / *James* 5 14 16 / *I Peter* 3:20-22
- 11 A CUSTI *Co* *f* *u* *ns* *bk* *ix* *par* 12 64d 65a *bk* *xi* *par* 26-29 117c 118c / *Cry of G d* *k* *x* *h* 5-6 301b-302d *ch* 19-20 310d 311c *bk* *xiii* *ch* 3 4 361 362 *ch* 7 362d 363b *k* *x* *ch* 26 555a 556b *k* *x* *i* *c* 16 573b-574 *ch* 0 575 d *ch* 5 579d 581a / *Christ Doctrine* *bk* *ii* *ch* 3 637c d *ch* 41 656a-c *k* *xiii* *ch* 9 661a-c *bk* *iv* *ch* 21 690d 691b
- 19 AQL: *S* *mma* *Th* *ol* *g* *ro* *r* *rt* *i* *q* *92* *A* *3* *A* 490c 491b *q* 13 *A* 5 *ans* and *rep* 3 579a d
- 20 Aq: *i* *s* *Summ* *Theol* *g* *ica* *pa* *t* *i* *h* *q* *10* 5 283c 292c *q* *i* *3* *A* 4 *ans* 302 304 *q* 8 2 *A* *s* *a* *d* *a* *p* 2 332b 333d *p* *r* *i* *i* *q* *i* *h* 380b 381 *A* 3 *p* *r* *4* 381d 382 8 *e* 6 387 388c *q* 3 *i* *re* *i* 400-401 *q* *i* *A* 12 *k* 5 436b-437d *r* *i* *q* *q* 60-65 847 854a-c *p* *rt* *ii* *up* *l* *q* 83 *A* 3 *A* *s* *a* *d* *e* 4 978c 980d *q* *99* *A* 4 1083a 1084
- 21 D *nte* *D* *r* *Com* *dy* *h* *ll* *x* *i* [67 13] 40c-41
- 22 Cl *l* *r* *P* *doner* *T* *le* [12 829-849] 381b / *P* *s* *T* *le* *pa* 2 2 504b 510b *c* *p* *pa* 22 510b
- 23 I: *Less* *than* *h* *rt* 71b *rt* *i* 180c d 206c 207 208b 211c 212c *h* *v* 249b-250c 263d 264
- 30 B *ov* *Ad* *a* *cement* *f* *Learn* *p* 101
- 31 D *c* *O* *by* *c* *d* *Replies* 162d 165d
- 32 A *l* *to* *P* *ad* *le* *Lost* *bk* *x* [436-445] 328b-329a
- 33 P *scal* *Pro* *cial* *Letters* 71b-80b 128b-137b / *Pen* *i* *s* 554 270 862 343 87 344 b 904-905 348b-349 923 351b
- 34 Lock *T* *lerat* *o* 12 / *h* *m* *Under* *ta* *d* *ing* *h* *i* *ec* 7 250d 251 *bk* *ch* *x* 391c 392
- 35 S *T* *s* *h* *andy* 221 224a 260b-261 373b 376
- 40 G *a* *Decl* *d* *f* *h* 193 b 297 d
- 41 G *o* *Decl* *ne* *d* *f* *h* 329d 334b-c
- 44 B *w* *ll* *f* *h* *o* 173d
- 46 H *cl* *Ph* *los* *phy* *f* *Hist* *ry* *v* 331d 332 338a d 349d 350
- 52 DOSTO *ky* *B* *others* *h* *a* *am* *x* *iii* 80c 81

9f The second coming of Christ

- N W TESTAMENT *Matthew* 1 14 15 11:20-24 12 36-37 13 36-43 47-50 24 25 / *Mark* 13 4 37 / *Luke* 10 11 15 17:20-37 19 11 28 21 5 36 / *Joh* 14 1 4 / *Act* 1 9-11 2 17 21 17 31 / *Roma* 5 2 5 11 / *I Corinthians* 15:23 28 / *Philpp* *a* *s* 3:20-21 / *I Thessalo* *ar* *s* 1 9-10 2 19 4 14-5-4 / *II Thessalonians* 1 2 / *II Timothy* 3 1 4 8 / *James* 5 7-9 / *II Peter* 2 9 3 7 13 / *I John* 2 18 29 / *Jude* 17 25 / *Revelation* esp 1-4 20-(D) *Apoc* *h* *ypse* esp 1-4 20
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Cry of God* *bk* *xiii* *ch* 2 360b 361a *c* 6 362c d *ch* 23 24 372a 376a *h* *bk* *xviii* *ch* 53 504d 505c *bk* *xv* 530a 560a *e* *bk* *xvi* *ch* 11 27 570b-586 *c* / *Christ an Doctr* *e* *bk* *i* *ch* 15 628b-c
- 20 AQUINA *Summa Theologica* *p* *rt* *iii* *suppl* *q* 73 *A* 1 921b-923c *A* 3 924b 925b *q* 77 *A* 2 *ns* 945a 946b *qq* 87-90 997a 1016a
- 23 HOBBS *Let* *th* *h* *rt* *iii* 179d 191b-192c 197 229c 230a 244b-c *h* *rt* *i* 248a b 251c 252b 254b-255b
- 32 MILTON *Christ* *nat* *er* *ty* *1a* 7b esp [133 72] 4b 5b / *A* *e* *S* *lemn* *Mun* *k* *13a* *b* / *Paradise Lost* *k* *iii* [274 343] 141b-143a *bk* *i* [139-173] 220 221a *bk* *vi* [72-83] 300b 301a / *Arceopagi* *ca* 404a b
- 33 PAS *c* *Penit* *es* 757 321
- 40 GIS *ov* *De* *l* *e* *a* *d* *Fall* 187b 188a
- 52 DOSTO *iskv* *Brothers* *h* *a* *am* *or* *bk* *i* *h* *d* *k* *v* 127 137c
- 10 The denial of God or the gods, or of a s per natural o der: the pos c on of the athe st
- O *d* *T* *sta* *i* *vt* *P* *lms* *14* 3 53 *i* 3--(D) *Psalms* 13 *i* 3 52 *i* 4
- 5 4 *TO* *u* *h* *ne* *Thermophor* *a* *rusae* [443 458] 605b
- 7 PL *to* *Ap* *l* *gy* 204c 205 / *La* *i* *bk* *x* 758b-763d esp 758b-759 759d 760c 761b *c*
- 11 AURE *i* *s* *M* *d* *ist* *o* *s* *k* *iv* *s* *rt* 3 263c *k* *ix* *s* *rt* 39 295a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Cry of G d* *bk* *v* *ch* 9 213
- 19 AQUINA *S* *mm* *Theologi* *a* *p* *rt* *i* *q* 2 *A* 3 *re* *i* 2 22c 14
- 23 HO *Let* *ath* *rt* *ii* 160a
- 25 M *igne* *E* *says* 211b 212
- 30 H *co* *Ad* *an* *ce* *ment* *of* *Learn* *g* *4b* *c*
- 31 DE *s* *M* *d* *ist* *o* *s* 72a b
- 32 MILTON *P* *d* *se* *Lo* *st* *k* *xi* [569-7 3] 311b 315a esp [617-623] 312b / *S* *ms* *Ag* *nister* [93 299] 346a
- 33 P *sc* *l* *Pen* *f* 183 241 205 217b
- 35 LO *k* *T* *lerat* *o* 18b / *Hum* *U* *der* *i* *d* *i* *g* *bk* *c* *i* *ct* 8 114 *c*
- 35 B *k* *y* *H* *m* *n* *h* *no* *ledge* *sect* 92-96 431 d 133 439d-440a *s* *ct* *134* 155 444 *c*
- 35 HUME *H* *ma* *U* *der* *st* *a* *d* *g* *s* *ct* *xii* *d* *v* 6 503c d
- 36 SWIFT *G* *laver* *t* *i* 29a

- (10) *The denial of God or the gods or of a super natural order the position of the atheist*
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 379c 380c
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk xiv 200b 201a bk xiv 208a
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 13a b
 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 11b c 192c d / *Judge ment* 595d 596c
 43 MILL *Liberty* 280d 281c
 50 MARY *Capital* 31c d 35b c 305d [fn 2]
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk v 196b d
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* oi bk i 11a c bk v 135b 136b bk xi 312b 314d 345a c
- 11 The denial of God as completely tran scending the world or nature the posi tion of the pantheist
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 14 120d 121c
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk ii sect 1 256b d sect 13 258c bk vii sect 9 280b c bk vii sect 30 310a b
 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr ix ch 16 75c 76a / *Third Ennead* tr viii 129a 136a / *Fourth Ennead* tr ix 205a 207a c / *Fifth Ennead* tr i ch 1-2 208a 209b tr ii 214c 215c tr iii ch 15-17 224c 226c tr viii ch 7-10 242d 244d
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 2 3 1b 2a bk iii par 10 15b d par 18 18b bk iv par 26 25c d par 31 26c 27a bk vii par 1-3 43b 44b bk v par 8 10 73b 74a bk xii par 7 100d 101a par 21 103d 104a / *City of God* bk iv (i) 12 13 195d 196b bk vii ch 6 248a b
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* part i q 3 a 8 19d 20c q 6 a 4 30b-d q 8 a 1 ans 34d 35c a 3 rep i 36b 37c q 16 a 6 98b d q 90 a 1 480d 481d q 105 a 5 542a 543b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part ii 162b
 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* vi 99c
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* part i 355a 372d esp def 3-6 355b i prop 1-15 355d 361d prop 18 363c prop 23 365b prop 28-29 365c 366c part ii prop 1 ii 373d 377c part iv pref 422b d 423b prop 4 425b d
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xiii sect 18 152a c
 47 KANT *Judgement* 564c 565d esp 565c d 566c d 580c d
 46 HICKE *Philosophy of History* intro 176b c part i 220c 221a
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 115b 117a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk v 216d 218b bk xiii 581c 582a bk xiv 608a b bk xv 631a c
- 12 The denial of a revealed and providential God the position of the deist
- 7 PLATO *Parmenides* 489d 490d / *Laos* bk x 765d 768c
 12 LUCRITIUS *Nature of Things* bk i [62 158] 1d 3a bk ii [167 183] 17a b [589-660] 22c

- 23b [1090 1104] 29a bk v [55-60] 61d 62b [136- 34] 63a 64a [306-310] 65a [161 124] 76b-77b bk vi [43-95] 80d 81c
 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk vi 91b-d
 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* tr ix ch 16 75c 76a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk v par 19 32b-c
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* part ii 162a b
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Chapter 30 GOOD AND EVIL

INTRODUCTION

THE theory of good and evil crosses the boundaries of many sciences or subject matters. It occupies a place in metaphysics. It is of fundamental importance in all the moral sciences—ethics, economics, politics, jurisprudence. It appears in all the descriptive sciences of human behavior such as psychology and sociology, though there it is of less importance and is differently treated.

The relation of good and evil to truth and falsity, beauty and ugliness, carries the discussion into logic, aesthetics, and the philosophy of art. The true, it has been said, is the good in the sphere of our thinking. So it may be said of the beautiful that it is a quality which things have when they are good as objects of contemplation and love, or good as productions. It is no less possible to understand goodness and beauty in terms of truth, or truth and goodness in terms of beauty.

On an analysis, with respect to the true, the good and the beautiful is to preserve their distinctness without rendering each less universal. This has been attempted by writers who treat these three terms as having a kind of parallelism in their application to everything, but who also insist that each of the three notions concerns things under a different aspect or in a different relation. As good adds to being, the notion of the desirable. Aquinas writes, "so the true adds a relation to the intellect, and it is also said that the end of the appetite, namely good, is in the desirable thing, whereas the end of the intellect, namely the true, is in the intellect itself."

In that part of theology which goes beyond metaphysics and moral philosophy we meet with the concept of infinite goodness—the goodness of an infinite being—and we then face the problem of how God's goodness is to be understood by man. The basic terms of moral

theology—righteousness and sin, salvation and damnation—are, like virtue and vice, happiness and misery, conceptions of good and evil in the condition of man. (Their special theological significance comes from the fact that they consider the goodness or evil of man in terms of his relation to God.) But the theological problem which is traditionally called the problem of evil concerns the whole universe in its relation to the divine perfection.

That problem, which is further discussed in the chapter on *WORLD*, can be formulated in a number of ways. How are we to understand the existence of evil in a world created by a God who is omnipotent and perfectly good? Since God is good and since everything which happens is within God's power, how can we account for the sin of Satan or the fall of man with all the evil consequent thereupon, without limiting God's power or absolving the erring creature from responsibility? Can it be said that this is the best of all possible worlds, if it is also true that this world is far from perfectly good and if, as certain theologians hold, God could make other things, or add something to the present creation, and then there would be another and a better universe?

THE CONTEMPORARY discussion of good and evil draws its terminology from economics rather than theology. The word *value* has almost replaced good and evil. What in other centuries were the various moral sciences are now treated as parts of the general theory of value. The substitution of value for good or of "alue judgment" for moral judgment reflects the influence of economics.

According to Marx, Aristotle was the first to analyze "the form of value." As indicated in the chapter on *WEALTH*, economics at its origin was treated by Aristotle, along with eth-

ics and politics as a moral discipline. But he made it subordinate to them because it dealt not with the whole of human welfare but only with wealth—one of the goods.

In the modern development of economics the word *goods* comes to have a special significance. It refers to commodities or utilities as in the phrase *goods and services*. More generally anything which is useful or exchangeable has the character of an economic good. This general sense is usually conveyed by the economist's use of the word *value*. According to Adam Smith the word *value* has two different meanings and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possessor of that object conveys. These two meanings are distinguished as *value in use* and *value in exchange*. Marx accepts this distinction but thinks that there is a more fundamental notion of value. He thinks it is possible to abstract from both use-value and exchange value and to discover the underlying property which gives value to all exchangeable things, namely that they are products of labor.

With Smith and Marx as with Aristotle the theory of value does not deal with every type of good but only with that type which earlier moralists called *external goods* or *goods of fortune*. But more recently the concept of value has been extended by economists and others to the evaluation of everything which men think of as desirable in any way. In consequence the age-old controversy about the objectivity or subjectivity of good and evil is now stated in terms of the difference between facts and values or between judgments of fact and judgments of value.

The issue as currently stated is whether questions of value can be answered in the same way as questions of fact. One position maintains that unlike questions of fact which can be answered by scientific investigation and can be objectively solved, questions of value elicit no more than expressions of opinion relative to the individual's subjective response or to the conventions of his society at a given time. The other side of the issue is held by those who insist that the norms of value are as objective and scientifically determinable as the criteria of fact or existence.

THE WORD *VALUE* does not change the problem in any way for what does evaluating any thing mean except judging it as good or bad, better or worse? The problem which has a history as long as the tradition of the great books is the problem of how we can defend such judgments and what they signify about the things judged. Are good and evil determined by nature or convention? Are they objects of knowledge or opinion?

The title of an essay by Montaigne—that the taste for good and evil depends in good part upon the opinion we have of them—indicates one set of answers to these questions.

If evils have no admission into us, he writes, but by the judgment we ourselves make of them, it should seem that it is then in our power to despise them or to turn them to good.

If what we call evil and torment is neither evil nor torment of itself but only that our fancy gives it that quality, it is in us to change it. Echoing Montaigne, Hamlet remarks that

there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The Greek sophists centuries earlier appear to take the same view. The statement of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, Plato thinks does not significantly apply to all things but only to such things as the good or the right, the true or the beautiful. In the *Theaetetus* Protagoras is made to say that as to the sick man his food appears to be bitter and to the healthy man the opposite of bitter, so in general men estimate or judge all things according to their own condition and the way things affect them. This theory of good and evil necessarily denies the possibility of moral science. Socrates calls it a high argument in which all things are said to be relative.

Plato and Aristotle respond to the sophists by arguing in the opposite vein. For Plato the good is not a matter of opinion but an object of knowledge. Knowledge of good and evil is the best fruit of the tree of knowledge. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, that is, to learn and discern between good and evil.

Aristotle does not think that ethics or any science which deals with good and evil can have as much precision as mathematics. Our discus-

tion will be adequate he writes if it has a much clearness as the subject matter admits of for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions. This however does not exclude the possibility of our knowing with great exactitude the first principles of moral science such as the nature of happiness and virtue. Indefiniteness and even a certain kind of relativity occur only when these principles are applied to particular cases. Hence in Aristotle's view the moral sciences such as ethics and politics can have objective and universal validity no less than physics or mathematics at least on the level of principles.

In modern times Locke and Kant also affirm the scientific character of ethics but without the qualification which Aristotle insists upon when we go from principles to practice. Locke explains the grounds on which he is bold to think that morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics for he says the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves may be certainly discovered in which consists in perfect knowledge. He is confident that from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifference and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences. But Locke adds this is not to be expected whilst the desire of esteem riches or power makes men espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion. He himself seems to tend in the opposite direction when he identifies the good with the pleasant and makes it relative to individual desires.

For Kant the two major parts of philosophy—physics and ethics—are on equal footing, the one concerned with the laws of nature the other with the laws of freedom. In each case there is both empirical and a priori knowledge. Kant calls the latter in each case metaphysics and speaks of a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. The nature of science, he thinks, requires us to separate the empirical from the rational part and prefix to physics proper (for empirical physics) a metaphysics of nature and to practical anthropology a meta-

physics of morals which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical.

This partial inventory of thinkers who stand against scepticism or relativism in the field of morals indicates that agreement on this point is accompanied by some disagreement about the reasons for holding what appears to be the same view. The opposite view seems also to be shared by thinkers of quite different cast such as Spinoza and Mill who differ from each other as well as from Montaigne and the ancient sophists.

The terms good and evil Spinoza writes indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves nor are they anything else than modes of thought. One and the same thing may at the same time be both good and evil or indifferent—according to the person who makes the judgment of it. Spinoza therefore defines good as that which we certainly know is useful to us. Apart from society he says there is nothing such by universal consent is good or evil since every one in a natural state consults only his own profit. Only when men live together in a civil society under law can it be decided by universal consent what is good and what is evil.

Holding that all men seek happiness and that they determine what is good and evil in particular cases by reference to this end Mill seems to offer the standard of utility as an objective principle of morality. But insofar as he identifies happiness with a sum total of pleasures or satisfactions it tends to become relative to the individual or the group. If competent judges disagree concerning which of two pleasures is the greater or higher there can be no appeal. Mill says except to the verdict of the majority. To this extent at least judgments of value are expressions of opinion not determinations of science. Nor does Mill hesitate to say that the ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our minds.

IN ORDER to clarify this basic issue it is necessary to take note of other terms which are usually involved in the discussion of good and evil—such terms as pleasure and pain desire and aversion being nature and reason. In the course of doing this we will perceive the relevance of the chapters which deal with those ideas.

ics and politics as a moral discipline. But he made it subordinate to them because it dealt not with the whole of human welfare but only with wealth—one of the goods.

In the modern development of economics the word *goods* comes to have a special significance. It refers to commodities or utilities as in the phrase *goods and services*. More generally anything which is useful or exchangeable has the character of an economic good. This general sense is usually conveyed by the economist's use of the word *value*. According to Adam Smith, the word *value* has two different meanings and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possessor of that object conveys. These two meanings are distinguished as *value in use* and *value in exchange*. Marx accepts this distinction but thinks that there is a more fundamental notion of value. He thinks it is possible to abstract from both use-value and exchange value and to discover the underlying property which gives value to all exchangeable things, namely that they are products of labor.

With Smith and Marx as with Aristotle the theory of value does not deal with every type of good but only with that type which earlier moralists called *external goods* or *goods of fortune*. But more recently the concept of value has been extended by economists and others to the evaluation of everything which men think of as desirable in any way. In consequence the age-old controversy about the objectivity or subjectivity of good and evil is now stated in terms of the difference between facts and values or between judgments of fact and judgments of value.

The issue as currently stated is whether questions of value can be answered in the same way as questions of fact. One position maintains that unlike questions of fact which can be answered by scientific investigation and can be objectively solved, questions of value elicit no more than expressions of opinion relative to the individual's subjective response or to the conventions of his society at a given time. The other side of the issue is held by those who insist that the norms of value are as objective and as scientifically determinable as the criteria of fact or existence.

THE WORD *VALUE* does not change the problem in any way for what does evaluating anything mean except judging it as good or bad, better or worse? The problem which has a history as long as the tradition of the great books, is the problem of how we can defend such judgments and what they signify about the things judged. Are good and evil determined by nature or convention? Are they objects of knowledge or opinion?

The title of an essay by Montaigne—that the taste for good and evil depends on good part upon the opinion we have of them—indicates one set of answers to these questions.

If evils have no admission into us, he writes, but by the judgment we ourselves make of them, it should seem that it is then in our power to despise them or to turn them to good.

If what we call evil and torment is neither evil nor torment of itself but only that our fancy gives it that quality, it is in us to change it. Echoing Montaigne, Hamlet remarks that there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The Greek sophists centuries earlier appear to take the same view. The statement of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, Plato thinks does not significantly apply to all things but only to such things as the good or the right, the true or the beautiful. In the *Theaetetus* Protagoras is made to say that as to the sick man his food appears to be bitter and to the healthy man the opposite of bitter, so in general men estimate or judge all things according to their own condition and the way things affect them. This theory of good and evil necessarily denies the possibility of moral science. Socrates calls it a high argument in which all things are said to be relative.

Plato and Aristotle respond to the sophists by arguing in the opposite vein. For Plato the good is not a matter of opinion but an object of knowledge. Knowledge of good and evil is the best fruit of the tree of knowledge. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge. Socrates says at the end of the *Republic* and seek and follow one thing only—that is, to learn and discern between good and evil.

Aristotle does not think that ethics or any science which deals with good and evil can have as much precision as mathematics. Our discus-

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problem of the objective and the subjective good. The apparent good varies from individual to individual and from time to time. If there were a real good, it would be free from such relativity and variability. Unless there are real as distinct from merely apparent goods, moralists cannot distinguish between what men should desire and what in fact they do desire.

For moral science deals with human behavior; its province can be separated from that of other sciences which treat the same subject in terms of a different treatment of that subject matter. Moral science must be normative or prescriptive rather than descriptive. It must determine what men should seek, not what they do seek. The very existence of normative centres, as well as their validity, would thus seem to depend on the establishment of a real, as opposed to a merely apparent, good.

This idea is no special difficulty for moralists who think that man knows what is really good for him, both in general and in particular, by intuition or rational deduction, through the commandments of the divine law or through the precepts of the law of reason. But for those who insist that the good is always somehow relative to desire and always involves pleasure, the distinction between the real and the apparent good raises an extremely difficult problem.

To say that an apparent good is not really good suggests, as we have seen, that what is called good may not be in itself desirable. That something which is really good may not in fact appear to be so, seems to imply that the word "good" can be significantly applied to something which is not actually desired—at least not consciously. How, then, is the good always relative to desire? The traditional answer to this question must appeal to the distinction between natural and conscious desire which is discussed in the chapter on *Desire*. It is by reference to natural desire that the good is said to be in itself always desirable—even when the really good thing is not consciously desired.

The relation of good and evil to pleasure and pain can also be clarified by a basic distinction between the pleasure which is an object of de-

sire and pleasure conceived as the satisfaction of desire. This is discussed in the chapter on *Pleasure and Pain*. If obtaining a desired good is satisfying, then there is certainly a sense in which the good and the pleasant (or the satisfying) are always associated, but it may also be true that pleasure is only one kind of good among various objects of desire and that certain pleasures which men desire appear to be but are not really good.

THE foregoing considerations apply to the good in the sphere of human conduct. But the human good, the practicable good, the good for man, does not exhaust the meaning of the term good. The idea of the good is, for Plato, the measure of perfection in all things. It is "not only the author of knowledge to all things known but of their being and essence and yet the good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power."

The absolute good is also, as in the *Diarrhoea*, the final cause or ultimate end of the motions of the universe. It is "the Alpha and Omega." Diarrhoea says, "of every scripture that I have read to me, the Essence wherein is such supremacy that every good which is found outside of it is manifestly else than a beam of its own radiance. The Love which moves the sun and the other stars."

So too, in Aristotle's cosmology, the circular motions of the celestial spheres, and through them all other circles of natural change, are sustained eternally by the prime mover which moves all things by the attraction of its perfect being. It therefore "moves without being moved" for it produces motion through being loved.

Though desire and love enter into the conception of the good as a cosmic final cause, they are not *human* desire or love. Though the goodness which inheres in things according to the degree of their perfection may make them desirable, it is not dependent on their being consciously desired by men.

In Jewish and Christian theology, for example, the goodness of God is in no way measured by human desires, purposes, or pleasures, nor is the goodness of created things which, according to Genesis, God surveyed and found "very good." The order of creation, moreover

It has been said for example that the good is identical with the pleasant that the good is what men desire that the good is a property of being or existence that the good is that which conforms to the nature of a thing that the good is that which is approved by reason. It is possible to see some truth in each of these statements. But each taken by itself may be too great a simplification. Searching questions can be asked by those who refuse to equate the good with the pleasant or the desirable: the real the natural or the reasonable. Are there no pleasures in any way bad no pains in any way good? Are all desires themselves good, or are all equally good? How does calling a thing good add anything to its being or existence? Does not evil exist or qualify existence? By what standards can the natural and the rational be judged good if the good is that which conforms to nature and reason?

These questions call for more analysis of each of these factors in the discussion of good and evil and suggest that no one of these factors by itself is sufficient to solve the problem of defining good and evil or formulating their criteria. Of the five things mentioned two particularly—pleasure and desire—seem to leave open the question whether good and evil are objective or subjective. They require us to decide whether things please us *because they are good* or are good *because they please us* whether we desire things because they are good or simply call them good when we desire them. On this issue Spinoza flatly declares that we do not desire a thing because we adjudge it good but on the contrary we call it good because we desire it. In saying that a thing is good so far as it is desirable Aquinas takes the opposite position for according to him a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect. It can be desirable therefore without being actually desired by this or that individual.

The other three terms—unlike pleasure and desire—seem to favor the objectivity of good and evil at least for those who regard the order of existence the nature of things and the laws of reason as independent of our desires or preferences. Thus for Spinoza the *nature* of man and his *reason* seem to provide an objective standard for determining what is good alike for all men. Nothing he writes can be good ex-

cept in so far as it agrees with our nature and therefore the more an object agrees with our nature the more profitable it will be. And in another place he says By good I understand every thing which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. That model he tells us is the man of reason the man who always acts according to the dictates of reason for those desires which are determined by man's power or reason are always good.

Nevertheless if desire and pleasure cannot be eliminated from the consideration of good and evil—at least not the good and evil which enter into human life—then the problem of finding a purely objective foundation for our moral judgments is not solved simply by an appeal to being nature and reason.

Some help toward a solution may be found in one often reiterated fact about the relation between the good and human desire. The ancients insist that no man desires anything but what at the time *seems* good to him in some way. No man Socrates observes voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils no one will choose the greater when he may have the less. This however does not prevent men from desiring what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils. Since they are mistaken in their judgment and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods.

The object consciously desired is always at least *apparently* good. When men are mistaken in their estimate of things as beneficial or injurious to themselves the apparent good—the good actually desired—will be really an evil that is something actually undesirable. An object which is really good may not appear to be so and so it will not be desired although it is desirable. The deception of appearances Socrates says tricks us into taking at one time the things of which we repent at another both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small.

THE DISTINCTION between the *real* and the *apparent* good is of course connected with the

reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a *meritum reusivum* whereas that ever is above all value and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity — not a merely relative worth but an intrinsic worth.

But since Kant thinks that only men or rational beings can have intrinsic worth he finds goodness only in the moral order. He agrees with the Stoics that good and evil occur only in the realm of freedom, not at all in the realm of existence or nature. Good or evil he writes, always implies a reference to the will as determined by the law of reason which is the law of freedom. According to Kant nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it which can be called good without qualification except a Good Will and in another place he says, 'If anything is to be good or evil absolutely it can only be the manner of action the maxim of the will. In this sense the free will complying with or resisting the imperatives of duty is either the seat or the source of all the goodness or evil that there is. Men may laugh, Kant says, at the Stoic who in the severest paroxysms of gout cried out 'Pain bow thee thou tormentest me I will never admit that thou art an evil he was right for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person but only that of his condition.

IN THE SPHERE of moral conduct and especially for those who make duty or pleasure rather than duty the principle there seems to be a plurality of goods which require classification and order.

Some things, it would appear are not desired for themselves but for the sake of something else. They are good only as means to be used. Some things are desired for their own sake and are good as ends to be possessed or enjoyed. This division of goods into means and ends—the useful and the enjoyable or pleasant—permits a third type of good which is an end in one respect and a means in another. Analysis of this sort leads to the concept of a *summum bonum*—that good which is not a means in any respect but entirely an end the supreme or highest good for which all else is sought.

The chief question with respect to the *summum bonum* is whether it is good or the good—whether it is merely one type of good more

desirable than any other or the sum of all good things which when possessed leaves nothing to be desired. An end and a Will seem to take the latter view in their conception of happiness as the *summum bonum*. Human nature, Mill says, is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness. Happiness, he insists is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole including all other goods within itself. It is the only good which is desired entirely for its own sake. Aristotle treats virtue and knowledge as intrinsic good but he also regards them as means to happiness. In Mill's terms their goodness remains subject to the criterion of utility from which happiness alone is exempt since it measures the utility of all other goods.

If the evaluation of all things by reference to their contribution to happiness as the ultimate good constitutes utilitarianism in ethics, then Aristotle no less than Mill is a utilitarian even though Aristotle does not refer to the principle of utility does not identify the good with pleasure and conceives the virtues as intrinsically good not merely as means. Kant would regard them as in fundamental agreement despite all their differences—or at least he would regard them as committing the same fundamental error.

To Kant any discussion of human conduct which involves the calculation of means to ends is pragmatic or utilitarian even when the controlling end is the *summum bonum* or happiness. Kant makes a sharp distinction between what he calls pragmatical rules of conduct which consider what should be done by one who wishes to be happy and what he regards as the strictly moral or ethical law which has no other motive than the worthiness of being happy. Morality, he says in another place, is not properly the doctrine of how we should make ourselves happy but how we should become worthy of happiness—through doing our duty.

Kant's criticism of Aristotle's ethics of happiness is therefore applicable to the utilitarianism of Mill and Mill's rejoinder to Kant serves as a defense of Aristotle. This basic issue concerning the primacy of happiness or duty—as discussed in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS where it is suggested

involves a hierarchy of inequalities in being and goodness. Even when each thing is perfect in its kind, all things are not equally good for according to the differences in their natures, diverse kinds are capable of greater or less perfection.

In the metaphysical conception of goodness that which has more actuality either in existence or power has more perfection. God's in finite goodness is therefore said to follow from the fact that he is completely actual—infinite in being and power. Things which have life, Augustine writes, are ranked above those which have none. And among those that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation, and among the sentient, the intelligent above those that have no intelligence.

Augustine contrasts these gradations of perfection which are according to the order of nature with the standards of value which are according to the utility each man finds in a thing. That which is less good in a metaphysical sense may be preferred on moral grounds as being better for man. Who, he asks, would not rather have bread in his house than mice, gold than fleas? Is it not true that more is often given for a horse than for a slave, for a jewel than for a maid?

According to Augustine, as well as to Aquinas, later metaphysical goodness consists in the value a thing has in itself in the scale of creation, while moral goodness depends upon the relation in which a thing stands to human need or desire, and according to the estimation placed upon it by human reason. It is in the moral, not the metaphysical sense that we speak of a good man, a good will, a good life, and a good society, or of all the things, such as health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, or knowledge, which it may be good for man to seek and possess. Only in the metaphysical sense can things be thought of as good entirely apart from man; only then can we find a hierarchy of perfections in the world which accords with a hierarchy of beings. Thus Spinoza declares that the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone, nor are they more or less perfect because they delight or offend the human senses, or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature.

THE METAPHYSICAL conception of goodness raises peculiarly difficult problems. Are there as many meanings of good as there are of being? When we say God is good, are we making a moral or a metaphysical judgment? Are we attributing perfection of being or goodness of will to God? If goodness is a property of being, then must not all evil become a privation of being? Conceiving evil in this way, Augustine points out that if things be deprived of all good, they shall cease to be, so that there is nothing whatsoever evil in itself, and Aquinas maintains that no being is said to be evil, considered as being, but only so far as it lacks being.

If to understand what the notion of goodness adds to the notion of being, it is necessary to say that being has goodness in relation to appetite; the question inevitably arises, Where appetite? Not man's certainly, for then the moral and the metaphysical good become identical. If God's, then not appetite in the form of desire, but in the form of love, for the divine perfection is usually thought to preclude desire.

Problems of this sort confront those who, conceiving the good both *apart from* and also *relative to* man, are obligated to connect the metaphysical and the moral meanings of good, and to say whether they have a common thread. Some writers, however, limit their consideration to the strictly moral good, and deny, as do the Stoics, goodness or evil to anything but man's free acts of will.

We should say, Marcus Aurelius judges, only those things which are in our power to be good or bad. In this we are entirely free for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgments. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing which disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just?

Though Kant develops what he calls a metaphysics of ethics, he does not seem to have a metaphysical as opposed to a moral conception of the good, unless in some analogous form, lies in his distinction between value and dignity, according to which whatever has

because they are all of the same nature but most strictly it is a common good if the happiness of each individual cannot be separated from the happiness of all

Aquinas seems to be using this meaning of common good when in defining law as a rule of conduct directed to the common good he refers not merely to the good of the community or body politic but beyond that to the last end of human life which is happiness or beatitude. Law he says must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness. Mill also seems to conceive happiness as a common good in this sense.

What the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, he writes, is that if the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned.

The several meanings of the common good create a fundamental issue. Some writers use it in one sense only, rejecting the others. Some not only use the term in all its meanings but also develop a hierarchy of common goods. They regard universal happiness for example as a common good of a higher order than the welfare of the political community. Yet in every order they insist upon the primacy of the common over the individual good. In the political order for example they think the welfare of the community takes precedence over individual happiness. They would regard Adam Smith's statement of the way in which individuals accidentally serve the common good while seeking their private interests as a perversion of the relationship. To say that an individual considering only his own gain is led

by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention (i.e. the general prosperity of society) does not excuse the individual's failure to aim at the common good.

The several meanings of the common good also complicate the statement of the issue between those who seem to say that the welfare of the community always takes precedence over individual well-being or happiness—that the good of the whole is always greater than the good of its parts—and those who seem to say that the state is made for man not man for the state or that the prosperity of the society in which men live is good primarily because it enables each of them to live well. This issue which runs through all the great books of political theory from Plato and Aristotle to Hume and Mill is discussed in the chapters on *CITIZEN AND STATE*.

The opposition between collectivism and individualism in economics and politics does not exhaust the issue which stated in its broadest moral terms is a conflict between self-interest and altruism. The primary problem to consider here is whether the issue is itself genuine or only an opposition between false extremes which needlessly exclude the half-truth that each contains.

The collective aspect of the common good may not need to be emphasized at the expense of its distributive aspect. The good of each man and the good of mankind may be inseparable. It may be the same good which in different respects is individual and common. It may be that no good can be supreme which is not both immanent and transcendent—at once the highest perfection of the individual and a good greater than his whole being and his life.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The general theory of good and evil
 - 1 The idea of the good: the notion of finality 615
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 - 3 The good: the true and the beautiful 616
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that in an ethics of duty right and wrong supplant good and evil as the fundamental terms and the *summum bonum* becomes a derivative notion rather than the first principle of morality.

At the other extreme are those who deny duty entirely and with it any meaning to right and wrong as distinct from good and evil. A middle ground is held by those who employ right and wrong as subordinate terms in the analysis of good and evil finding their special significance in the consideration of the good of others or the social good. To do right is to do good to others; to do wrong is to injure them. The question which Plato so insistently raises whether it is better to do injustice or to suffer it can also be stated in terms of good and evil or right and wrong. Is it better to suffer evil or to do it? Is it better to be wronged by others or to wrong them? As justice for Aristotle is that one among the virtues which concerns the good of others and the common good and as it is the one virtue which is thought to involve duty or obligation so the criteria of right and wrong measure the goodness or evil of human acts by reference to law and society.

THE DIVISION of goods into means and ends is not the only distinction made by moralists who recognize the plurality and inequality of goods.

Goods have been divided into the limited and the unlimited with respect to quantity, the pure and the mixed with respect to quality, sensible and intelligible goods or particular goods and the good in general, external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul, the pleasant, the useful and the virtuous. More specific enumerations of the variety of goods list wealth, health, strength, beauty, longevity, pleasure, honor (or fame), virtue, knowledge, friendship.

All of the foregoing classifications can be combined with one another but there is one distinction which stands by itself although it affects all the others. That is the distinction between the individual and the common good or between private and public good, the good for this one man and the good of all others and of the whole community. In the language of modern utilitarianism it is the distinction between individual happiness and what Bentham called 'the greatest good for the greatest number.'

The phrase common good has several meanings in the tradition of the great books. One sense which some think is the last significant refers to that which can be shared or used by many as for example land held in common and worked by a number of persons or families. Thus we speak of the commons of a town or village. This meaning applies particularly to economic goods which may either belong to the community as a whole or be divided into parcels of private property.

Another sense of common good is that in which the welfare of a community is a common good participated in by its members. The welfare of the family or the state is a good which belongs to a multitude organized for some common purpose. If the individual members of the group derive some benefit from their association with one another then the prosperity of the community is not only a common good viewed collectively but also a common good viewed distributively for it is the good of each member of the group as well as of the whole.

With this in mind perhaps Mill speaks of an indissoluble association between the individual's happiness and the practice of such mode of conduct, negative and positive as regard for the universal happiness prescribes so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself consistently with conduct opposed to the general good but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual modes of action. If this statement by Mill is used to interpret Bentham's phrase—the greatest good for the greatest number—then the greatest number cannot be taken to mean a majority for the good of nothing less than the whole collectively or of all distributively can be taken as the common or general good.

Still another conception of the common good is possible. A good may be common in the sense in which a specific nature is common to the members of the species—not as organized socially in any way but simply as so many like individuals. If all men seek happiness for example then happiness is a common good even though each individual seeks his own happiness. In a deeper sense it is a common good if the happiness each seeks is the same for all men.

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 *Horus* *Isis* bk ii [6] 53j12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PART SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53j12d, *Isis* Part 53j 115a 119b, the passages are in the upper half of page 115 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 163b 164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

ACTUS DIVISION One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference. In numbers in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Isis* bk ii [6] 53j12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the Latin, Greek and Doulos versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the Latin version is cited first and the Doulos indicated by a (D) follows e.g. *Old Testament* 45~(D) 11 *Exodus* 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "em" calls the reader's attention to one or more "emphatic" parts of a whole reference. "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed in various places rather than concentrated in the work or passages cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Greek* and consult the Preface.

1 The general theory of good and evil

- OLD TESTAMENT 1 *Isis* 45~(D) 11 *Isis* 45~
1 *Lamentations* 33j
ARISTOTLE *Enchiridion* 33-4 37 39-40~(D)
OT *Enchiridion* 33j 39 10
7 PL TO EUTHYDEMO 83b-84 / *Corpus* 28 c
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XVIII 13 36 150b-c 127 145 151c d
23 110a esp Le xehan, PART III 185d
31 D sca 7 a Objecti ons and Replies 229c d
32 VICTOR Pa odus Last BK III 135 143 138b
BK V 153 203 178b-1 9b BK VII 170-173
220b-221a
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge INTRO 8 CT
3 405b-c SECT 154 444a b
37 FIELD a Tom Jones 186c-d
46 H GEL Philosophy of Illus ry INTRO 169d
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52 DO TORVINY || Other h amazo BK V
127b 137c BK VI 167b-168c BK VI 189a
191 c

2b The d ne goodness and the problem of
e l

- Old T st m nt Deuteronomy 30 15 2 esp
3 15 / I S muel 16 4 23-(D) I Kings
6 14 23 / Job / Psalm 5 esp 5 4-6 9-1
13 22 esp 22 7 37 39 esp 39 8-12 44
73 88-(D) Psalms 5 esp 5 7 9 11 11
c p 21 8-9 36 38 esp 38 9-13 43 7 87
/ Proverbs 8 13 / Ecclesiastes 8 9 2 esp
8 10-14 9 13 / Isa h 45 7-(D) Is 1
45 / Jerem ah 12 esp 2 2-(D) Jerem 31
1 c p 12 1 / Lament 1 n 3 38 / Amos
3 6 / Micah 1 2-(D) Mic heas 1 12
A OCAVYN W d m of S lomo 1 13 16 2 23
24 11-4-(D) OT Book of W sdms 1 13 15
23 25 11 25 / E l 11 c p 11 4 16 25 11
20 33 0-15 29 25 31-(D) OT Eccle ast
cus 11 14 16 15 1 33 1 39 30-37

(1 *The general theory of good and evil 1d The origin nature and existence of evil*)

CH 5 95d 96a CH 7 96d 97a TR VI CH II 113b c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d / *Fifth Ennead* TR IV CH 10 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 28 335b d

■ AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III PAR 11-12 15d 16b BK IV PAR 24 25b c BK V PAR 20 32d 33a BK VII PAR 3-7 44a 45d PAR 11 23 47a 50d BK XIII PAR 45 123a / *City of God* BK VI CH 9 327c d CH 22 333d 334c BK VII CH 1-9 342b d 348b BK VIII CH 13 519a 520a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 2 25a d A 5 REP 3 4 26c 27c QQ 48-49 259b 268a ■ Q 65 A 1 REP 2 3 339b 340b PART I II Q 18 693b d 703a passim esp AA 1-4 694a 696d Q 29 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 745a c A 5 ANS 747c 748b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 79 AA 1-2 136b-158a Q 80 159d 162d Q 81 AA 1 2 163a 165c A 5 167a d PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 7 REP 9 891d 893c Q 74 A 1 REP 1 925c 926c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 142] 107b d VII [19 148] 115b 116c VIII [52-87] 126a ■ XIX [40-66] 135c d XXIV [49-66] 150d 151a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 191b d 195d 196a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC III [15-30] 296c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IX [494 1189] 258a 273a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 153 154 443d-444b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76-81 485a 487a

40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 81b c

41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 330a b

42 HANT *Practical Reason* 316a 317d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II PAR 139 48d 49b ADDITIONS 90-91 130b 131d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a 162a 163a 168d PART I 237d 238c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 30a 36b 117a 124b 131a 145a 171b 317a 321a 411a 419b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 344a d

2 *The goodness or perfection of God the plenitude of the divine being*

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 48 / *Luke* 18 18-19 / *John* 1 5 / *Revelation* 15 4--(D) *Apocalypse* 15 4

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus* 447a-448b / *Theaetetus* 530b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 602a 603b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH I [1145 15 2 395a CH I 4 [1154^b-0 31] 406c BK X CH I [1178^b-3] 433b ■ / *Poetics* BK VII CH I [13-3^b-25] 527c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 147c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 100a 1049b 1050b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* III 1 PAR 12 4a BK II PAR 10 11a b BK VII PAR 1 7 43b-45d PAR 16-23 48c 50c BK X PAR 38 81a BK XI PAR 6 90c d BK XIII PAR 1-5 110d 111d PAR 13 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 327d 378d BK XII CH 1-3 342b d 344b CH 8 346d 347b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 5 7 625d 626c CH 31-3- 633b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 1 REP 2 19a ■ Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q 13 A 2 ANS 63c 64d A 12 REP 2 73c 74b Q 15 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 REP 1 3 108d 109c Q 21 A 1 REP 4 124b 125b Q 150a 152a c Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b 276b Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 60 A 5 313b 314c Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d Q 6 A 8 ANS and REP 1 2 323c 324a Q 66 A 1 CONTRARY 343d 345c Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b 443c Q 91 A 1 ANS 484a 485b Q 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b passim Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART I II Q A 4 REP 1 618a d A 5 REP 2 618d 619c Q 9 A 6 ANS 662a d Q 18 A 1 ANS 694a d Q A 2 REP 1 721c 722c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 64 A 4 ANS and REP 2 69b 70a PART II II Q 9 A 4 REP 1 425d-426c Q 13 A 1 ANS 444b 445a Q 17 A 1 ANS 457a d Q 23 A 4 A 3 485d 486b Q 34 A 1 ANS 559a c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 184 A 2 ANS 679d 630d PART III Q 1 A 1 ANS 701d 703a Q 23 A 1 ANS 833a d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VI [40-81] 75d 76a XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII [64 148] 115d 116c esp [64-66] 115d XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a

22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [10 160-164] 336a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 33d / *Meditation* 1 77b c III 86a 88d IV 89a 93a passim / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 228a ■ 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 8 355b PROP 8 9 356d 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 14 359d 360a PROP 16 362a PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 166] 138b 139a BK VII [170 173] 220b 221a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 425 426 243b 244b 430 245a 247b

- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCIENCE
370a 371a
35 LOCK *Human Understanding* BK I CH
XIII SECT 34 35 213a-c BK III CH VI SECT
11 12 13 1b-272b *passim*
36 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI DIV
1st-10th 499c 500a *passim* DIV 113 502a b
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 230a II
4. KANT *Pure Reason* 203a b III d 239a /
Fund. Prin. Met. Prin. of Morals 263a b
278b-d / *Practical Reason* 307a-d 325d
326a 342c 343a-c 351b-352 / *Lectures*
597a-c

2a. God goodness as diffusive caus ng the
goodness of things: God's love

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 / *Exodus* 1-6
esp 20-6 3379 345 1 / *Deuteronomy* 4 1
40 esp 4-8 431 4 37 5-10 esp 570 5-
1 / 1 33 3 33 / *Psalms* *passim* esp 10-
16-8 20-23 2 6 9-7 1143 1152
1153 1194-6-(D) *Psalms* *passim* esp 8-9 15
1 19 21 2 24 6 9670 13 1 11 1
37-6 / *Proverbs* 371 12 / *Song of Solomon*—
(D) *Canticles* / *Lamentations* 40-66 *passim*,
esp 42 44 46 3 4 49 1 6 52 1 15 56 1-8
63 3-9-(D) *Lamentations* 40-66 *passim*, esp 4 44
45 3 4 49 1 6 52 1 56 1-8 63 3-9 / *Jeremiah*,
31 33-(D) *Jeremiah* 3 33 *Lamentations*
40-66 39 esp 32-3 378 / *Ezekiel* 16 esp
16-6 4 16 39-63-(D) *Ezekiel* 16 esp 6-6
11 16 39-63 *Hosea* esp 2 4 23 3 1 35
6 3 11 4 376 49-(D) *Isaiah* esp 2 4
23 3 35 67 3 11 4 147 10 / *Isaiah*
esp 27-33 / *Zachariah* 9 1 -(D) *Zachariah*
9 1 / *Malachi* 17 3-(D) *Malachi* 3
APOCALYPSE *Revelation* 17 3-(D) OT T 11
1172 / *Revelation* of *S. Simon*, 12 6 620-
29-(D) OT *Book of Revelation* 1 23
620-9 / *Revelation* 14 1 10 10 2-
1 4 esp 16 24-3 39 16 23 34-(D) OT
Revelation 11 14 7 626-15 74 esp 6 30-
3 39 21 30-40
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 62 34 - 11 /
Luke 112 13 12-6 6-33 / 1 1 5
3 6-2 33 35 142 157-16 1 2 5 /
Mark 2-4 8 31 39 / *Mark* 1 2 1
E *Mark* 314 1 5 2 / 1 *John* 3 4 esp
31 376 4-1 / *Revelation* 3 19-(D)
Revelation 3 19
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK II, 321d 322d KVI 11
334a 389c / *Titus* 441 448a
8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK II
CH I (337-27 34) 433d / *Metaphysics* BK XII
CH 602a-603b CH 0 (1075) 4) 603d
606a
- 12 ENRIQUEZ *Discurso* BK II CH 5 146a 14 c
16 H. N. *Harmonies of the World* 1049b-
1050b 10 1b
- 17 PLATO *First Foesd* 12 VII CH 2 26a-d
/ *First Foesd* 12 v 228b-235b / *Second Foesd*
12 v, CH 9 358d 399c

- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I par 2c d BK
II par 10 11 b BK VII par 4 41b-c par 16-
2 48c 50c BK XI par 6 90c d BK XIII par
1-5 110d 111d / *City of God* BK VII CH 31
261d 262a BK XI CH 21 333a 335a BK XII
CH 1 342b d 343c CH 9 347b-348b BK XIV
1 337c 338c BK XXII CH 24 609 612a /
Christian Doctrine BK I CH 31 32 333b-d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 2
A 3 A 5 and REP 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 REP 1
14b-15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a Q 6 28b-30d
Q 13 A 2 A 5 63c 64d Q 19 A 2 ANS and
REP 2 4 109c 110b A 4 ANS and REP 1 111c
112c Q 0 119d 124a Q 1 A 3 ANS 126a-c
Q 5 A 6 149a 150a Q 5 A 1 ANS 269b-270
A 3 ANS 271a 273b Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b-
276b Q 59 A 1 AN 306c 307b A 2 ANS 30 c
308b Q 60 A 5 313b-314c Q 91 A 1 A 1481a
485b Q 103 11 3a 534b Q 105 A 3 RE 2
53 b-d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 1 5 A 4 ANS 541c
542a Q 106 A 4 ANS 548b-549a P 871 11 Q
1 A 4 REP 1 612a-613a Q 2 A 5 REP 3 618d
619c Q 9 A 6 ANS 662a d Q 19 A 4 A 5
05b-c Q 1 A 3 CO TE 7 42a-d
- 21 D. V. *Dante Comedy* *Paradise* XI [10-
51] 75d 6a PARADISE, II [112 145] 109a b
VI [16-147] 115b-116c esp 16 5] 115d 116a
XIII [52-57] 126a 11 XII [40-90] 135c 136a
XXVI [1-69] 145d 146c XX VII 148d 150b
XXIX [13 56] 150b-c [1 145] 151c-d
- 23 H. 2 *Lectiones* P VII 185d
- 31 D. SC. TE *Optics* and *Reflexes* 229c-d
- 3 *Metaphysics* *Paradise Lost* XIII [135 143] 138b
BK V [153 207] 1 8b-179b BK VI [170 1 3]
220b-221a
- 35 BARKLEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT
340 b-c SECT 1 441a b
- 37 F. *Reading Time* or 186c-d
- 46 H. CH. P. *History of History* INTRO, 189d
170a
- 52 DONTOR *Key* *Brotherhood* BK I
127b-127c BK VI 167b-168c BK VII 189a
191a-c

b The divine goodness and the problem of
evil

- OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 30 5 0 esp
3 25 / 1 *Sarah* 16 14 23-(D) 1 *Isaiah*
16 14 23 / *Job* / *Psalms* 5 esp 5-4-6 9-1
3 22 esp 227-8 3 39 esp 39 3-12 44
3 89-(D) *Psalms* 5 esp 57 9 12 21
esp 213-9 35 33 esp 39-13 43 - 8
/ *Proverbs* 8 3 / *Ezekiel* 8 -9 12 esp
8 0-14 97 3 / *Isaiah* 4 7-(D) *Isaiah*
45- / *Jeremiah* 2 esp 1 -(D) *Jeremiah*
1 esp 12 2 / *Lamentations* 3 33 / *Amos*
36 / *Isaiah* 11 -(D) *Isaiah* 1 12
- APOCALYPSE *Revelation* / *Song* 13 16 23
24 1124-(D) OT *Book of Revelation* 1 3 16
223 3 12 2 / *Ezekiel* 11 14 6 5 11
20 33 10- 39 23 3 -(D) OT *Ezekiel*
11 14 6 15 1 23 33 0- 39 30-37

(1) *The general theory of good and evil 1d The origin nature and existence of evil*

CH 5 95d 96a CH 7 96d 97a TR VI CH II 113b c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH II 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 28 335b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III PAR 11-12 15d 16b BK IV PAR 24 25b c BK V PAR 20 32d 33a BK VII PAR 3-7 44a 45d PAR 11 23 47a 50d BK XIII PAR 45 123a / *City of God* BK XI CH 9 327c d CH 22 333d 334c BK XII CH 1-9 342b d 348b BK XIV CH 13 519a 520a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 2 25a d A 5 REP 3 26c 27c QQ 48-49 259b 268a c Q 65 A 1 REP 2-3 339b 340b PART I-II Q 18 693b d 703a possum esp AA 1-4 694a 696d Q 29 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 745a ■ A 5 ANS 747c 748b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 79 AA 1-2 156b 158a Q 80 159d 162d Q 81 AA 1-2 163a 165c A 5 167a d PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 7 REP 9 891d 893c Q 74 A 1 REP 1 925c 926c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 142] 107b d VII [19 148] 115b 116c XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-66] 135c d XXIV [49-66] 150d 151a

22 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 191b d 195d 196a

23 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC III [15-30] 296c

31 SPINOZA *Lithes* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IX [494 1187] 258a 273a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 153-154 443d 444b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76-81 485a-487a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 330a ■

42 HANT *Practical Reason* 316a 317d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II PAR 139 48d 49b ADDITIONS 90-91 130b 131d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a 162a 163a 168d PART I 237d 238c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 30a 36b 117a 124b 131a 145a 171b 317a 321a 411a 419b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* of BK XI 344a d

2 The goodness or perfection of God the plenitude of the divine being

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 48 / *Luke* 18 18-19 / *I John* 1 5 / *Revelation* 15 4-(D) *Apocalypse* 15 4

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus* 447a-448b / *Theaetetus* 530b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 602a 603b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH I [1147 15 2] 395a CH II [1154²⁰ 31] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178²⁸ 23] 433b c / *Politics* BK VII CH I [1323²²⁻²⁵] 527c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 1-6a 147c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1009a 1049b 1050b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confession* BK I PAR 12 4a 11 ■ PAR 10 11a b BK VII PAR I 7 43b-45d PAR 16 23 48c 50c BK X PAR 38 81a BK XI PAR 6 90c d BK XIII PAR 1-5 110d 111d PAR 53 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 337d 328d BK XII CH I-3 342b d 344b CH 8 346d 347b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 5 7 615d 626c CH 31-32 633b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 7 REP 2 19a ■ Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q 13 A 2 ANS 63c 64d A 1 REP 2 73c 74b Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 REP 1 3 108d 109c Q 21 A 1 REP 4 124b 125b Q 6 150a 152a c Q 61 A 1 REP 3 275b 276b Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 60 A 5 313b 314c Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d Q 6 A 8 ANS and REP 1 2 323c 324a Q 66 A 1 CONTRARY 343d 345c Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b 443c Q 91 A 1 ANS 484a 485b ■ 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b possum Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d 44 ANS 538a c Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART I II Q A 4 REP 1 618a d A 5 REP 2 618d 619c Q 9 A 6 A 1 662a d Q 18 A 1 ANS 694a d Q 22 A 2 P 1 721c 722c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 61 A 4 ANS and REP 3 69b 70a PART II II Q 4 A 4 REP 1 425d 426c Q 13 A 1 ANS 441b 445a Q 17 A 1 ANS 457a d Q 23 A 4 ANS 485d 486b Q 34 A 1 ANS 559a c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d PART III Q 1 A 1 ANS 701d 703a Q 23 A 1 ANS 833a d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII [64 148] 115d 116c esp 164-66] 115d XIII [52 87] 126a b XIX [40-101] 135c 136a

22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [10 160-164] 336a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* I 77b c III 86a 88d IV 89a 93a possum / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VII 130d 228a c 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 6 355b PROP 8 9 356d 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 14 359d 360a PROP 6 362a PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 166] 138b 139a BK VII [170 173] 220b 221a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 425 426 243b 244b 439 245a 247b

- 21 D. TE DATE COMERT PLR ATORT XVI 132
 4) 17b-73a x 113 1-x 1 1 79b-80c
- 30 B CON. *Discourses of Learning* 69d 6a
 83a-83a
- 31 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
 XVIII S CT 4 1 229b-232d
4. KAT. *Free Reason* 114d 115a 149d 150a
 150b 1 173b-174a / *Final. Prr. Mers* 145
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Prf. Metaphysica. Eternity of Eternity 365a
 37d esp 366d 37d / *1700 Mers* 145c of
 1700 387b / *1700 Mers* 594d (12 1) 595a-d
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 412a-4 6a-c
- 46 H. C. L. *Philosophy of Right* PART II P. 1
 45d 45d 54a
- 49 DIXON *Discourse* 304a 319a esp 304
 302a, 3 3a 319a
- 16 FALLO *W. and D. D. 7 Th.* 66a esp 757d
 753c, 2d 60a
34. Human nature and the determination of the
 good for man, the real and the apparent
 good, particular goods and the good in
 general
- NEW T. MENT. ROMAN 3 2
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 139, 631 136b-c /
Phaedrus 195-195 190a
- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 2d-3b esp 2a / *Protagoras*
 51d-62d *Euthydemus* 69a 71a 4b-6b /
Uran 17d 178b / *Gorgias* 261a-2 2c 322b-
 234b / *Phaedrus* x 1-1v 295a 306a x 111
 410a-c BK II, 421a-425b x 1, 439b-441a-c
Titus 4 4b-4 6b / *Theaetetus* 525,
 231a / *Republic* 557b-d / *Phaedrus* 619d-670b
Symposium 805d 806a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* K VII, CH 3 12, 6 0-14
 6 329c 330d *Meta. Physica* BK 1, CH 1 1340
 23 3 499a BK XII CH 1 0-14 6 6102b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* 1066 1067
 1067 230d 236a / *Ethica* BK CH 6 341b-342c
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 x 1, CH 6 347b-352d x 111 CH 4 3 9a-c
 CH 5 1147a 1157d 350b-361a x 1 CH
 1157d 3 6d 377a x 1 CH 5 352a-c
 x 1, CH 6-8 430d-434a / *Physics* K CH
 1 372 3 4 465d CH 5-6 447d-448b a
 11, CH 6 112-113, 9 473d-4 6a K VII, CH
 3 1133-1139 1 537a b CH 4 1 32a 51
 332a b *Rhetoric* BK 1, CH 6-7 60 d-60 d
 CH 1 34719 1 613a
1. LOCKE *Discourse of Things* BK II 1-6 1
 13a-d x 1 13 33 30d 1 41 43)
 75b-d K VI 1 1 80a-d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* K I, CH 6 110c 112b
 CH 115d 118d CH 15 121c-d CH 2 122b-
 123b x 111, CH 1 175a 177 CH 3 178d 180a
 BK CH 6 230b-232.
- 12 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II, S CT 9 25 d
 CT 1 23d B K 11 CT 24 753c-d CT
 32 257d CT 39 257 c 1 6
- 271b-d BK VI SECT 13 274d BK VII SECT 20
 281b SECT 55 281b-c BK VII SECT 1 285a b
 BK IX SECT 1 291a-c SECT 42 295c 296a-c
- 14 PLAT. *Rep. Phaedrus* 121a 122b
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK IV 26 11
- 17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 43 44
 181b-182b / *Sixth Ennead* TR IV CH 25 334c-d
- 18 A. C. C. *Confessions* BK X PAR 29-34 78d
 80c / *Cur of God* BK XII CH 3 343d 344b
 BK XII CH 1-9 507a 516c / *Christian Doctrine*
 BK I, CH 35 635c-d
- 19 A. C. C. *Summa Theologiae* P. I Q 12
 A 1 ANS 50c 51c Q 26 A 2 A 1 150c 151a A
 4 A and REP 1 151c 152a-c Q 59 A 1 A 1
 305c 307b A 3 ANS 308b-309a A 4 AN 309a
 310a Q 60 A 5 313b-314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d
 318c Q 80 A 2, REP 2 428a-d Q 8 A 4 REP 1
 434c-435c 5 A 5 435c-436c Q 9 A 1 A 5
 483d-489d Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a PART
 1-11 Q 1-5 609a-643d Q 9, A 6 REP 3
 662a-d Q 13 693b-d 703a Q 19, A 1 REP 1
 703b-d Q 22, A 3 REP 2 722d 723b Q 31 A 4
 771c 772b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P. II Q 54
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 64a Q 71 A 2 106d 10 Q 91 A 2 208d 209d
 Q 91 230d 235b P. II Q 11 Q 29, A REP 3
 531-d A 3 RE 1 531d 532c
- 21 D. TE DATE COMERT PLR ATORT XVI 135-
 14 177d 78a XVII 171-x 111 175 79b-80c
- 23 HO. RE. *Leviathan* P. II 1 61-6a 65a
 96a b
- 24 RA. ELIAS *Congressus et P. II* 111, BK 1
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 149b-d 231d 233a 487b-
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- 27 SH. KESSELER *Human* CT III 1 1 131
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- New* *Te* *MENT* *Matthew* 6 23 19-24 1324
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- 5 *Somno* *is* *f* *gove* [84 308] 133c d
- 5 *Ant* *rom* *es* *Florus* [7 153] 630a 631a
- 7 *PLATO* *II* *Antis* s 69a 71 / *Antis* *omv* bk ii
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bk ix 751b-d
- 12 *La* *re* *f* *The* *re* bk iii [1-93]
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80a d
- 12 *Epictetus* *Discourses* x c i 5 29d
131b bk i c 1 167d 170a c 1 174c-d
- 12 *Al* *RELIS* *M* *d* *Antis* bk i sect i 256b d
bk vi s c 2 291b k i c 4- 29c
296a-c bk xii s c i 308b-c
- 15 *T* *cit* 4c bk 51b
- 17 *Plotinus* *First* *Enad* bk i i 5 29a-c /
Second *Enad* *omv* ii 3 73d 74b / *Third*

- (3) *The moral theory of the good the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good*

3d Pleasure as the good a good or feeling good

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 59a 62d / *Gorgias* 275b 280d / *Republic* BK VI 384b d BK IX 421a 425b / *Philebus* 609a 639a e / *Lysis* BK II 656d 658b 660a d BK V 689c 690c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 40 68b / *Topics* BK III CH 2 [117^a23-25] 163d CH 3 [118^b-7 36] 165d 166a CH 6 [119 37-41] 166d BK IV CH 4 [124 15-20] 172d [124^b 14] 173b BK VI CH II [146^b13 19] 200c BK VIII CH 9 [160^b16-23] 218a II / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^b20 247^a19] 330a II / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072^b13-29] 602d 603a / *Soul* BK III CH 7 1431 8-9] 663c 664a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 6 [700^b23-29] 236a / *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095^b14 22] 340d CH 8 [1099^a7-30] 344c d BK II CH 3 350a c BK III CH 4 359a c BK VII CH 4 398a 399a esp [1148 2 -4] 398c d CH II 14 403c 406a c BK V CH 1-5 426a 430d / *Politics* BK VIII CH 5 [1339^b11-38] 545a c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6 [1362^b5-9] 603b CH 7 [1364^b23 27] 606c [1365^b11-13] 607d
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [14-21] 15a II BK V [1412 1436] 79b d
- 12 CRICETUS *Discourses* BK II CH II 150a 151b BK III CH 24 203c 210a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT II 12 258a e BK VI SECT 51 279b c BK VII SECT 27 281d SECT 64 284a b BK VIII SECT 10 286b SECT 19 286d 287a SECT 39 288c SECT 47 289b e BK IX SECT 1 291a e BK X SECT 34 35 301a b
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR IV CH 12 17d / *Second Ennead* TR IV CH 15 74d 75a / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 26 334c d CH 29 30 335d 336d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 20 225b 226a BK V CH 18 310b d BK XIV CH 1-3 507a 511a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART II Q 1 A 6 REP 1 614a c A 7 ANS 614c 615a Q A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 4 AA 1 2 629d 631a Q II 666d d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 39c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b 772b Q 39 790a 792d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II II QQ 28 -9 527b 533a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [127-139] 79d XVIII [19-39] 80a b
- 23 HORRER *Leviathan* PART I 61d 62c
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 28a d 70d 72a 35d 237d
- 30 PAGON *Advancement of Learning* 71a 74a

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 39 schol 408b d PART IV PROP 8 426b-c PROP 41 43 437a e

- 37 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [5,7-945] 171b 173a

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 1-2 176b e CH XXI SECT 4, 188d SECT 55 56 192c 193b SECT 63 194d 195a CH XXVIII SECT 5 229c d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 173b 174a / *Fund Pr Metaphysic of Morals* 259a b 265b / *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 304a 307d 314d 319b esp 315c 330 331a 338c 355d esp 341 342a / *Impr Metaphysic of Morals* 387b 388a / *Judgement* 478a 479d 584d 587a 588b [fn 2] 591b 592a 594c 596c

- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a-476a e passim esp 447b 457b 461c 464d

- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 216c 378a II

- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 316b c

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK IV 88d BK VI 343d 344a

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 94a b 808b 814b esp 810a 812b-814b

- 54 FREUD *Instincts* 418d 420b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 772a e 792b c

3e Right and wrong, the social incidence of the good doing or suffering good and evil

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 18 1 33 / *Exod* 1 20 1-17 32 21-28 23 1-9 / *Leviticus* 19 9-18 33 36 / *Numbers* 15 15 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16-21 10 17 19 / *1 Samuel* 24 6-(D) / *1 Kings* 4 16 / *Proverbs* 3 27-35 1 21 12 1 13 / *Isaiah* 3 13 15 10 1-3-(D) / *Lamentations* 3 13 15 10 1-3 / *Ezekiel* 18 5 22-(D) / *Ezekiel* 18 5 22 / *Hosea* 4 1 3 7 1 7-(D) / *Obadiah* 4 1 3 7 1 7 / *Amos* 2 6-8 4 1 2 8 4 / *Malachi* 6 8-(D) / *Micah* 6 8 / *Zachariah* 7 9 10-(D) / *Zachariah* 7 9 10

- APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 1 1-2 9 4 1 0-(D) / *OT Tobias* 1 1 2 9 4 1 20 / *Ecclesiastical* 12 14 esp 1 3 14 5 7 28 34 21 2-(D) / *OT Ecclesiastical* 7-8 12 14 esp 12 3 14 5 7 28 34 -5 -7, Susanna-(D) / *OT Daniel* 13

- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 7 passim esp 7 12 / *Luke* II 7-36 / *Romans* 1 17 1 / *Corinthians* 6 1 11 / *1 Peter* 2 13 1 3 9 18

- 5 Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* 40a 51d esp [941 103] 50b 51d / *Agamemnon* 52a 69d esp [1331-1673] 66b 69d / *Choephoros* c 70a 80d esp [235-851] 72c 76b / *Eumenides* 81a 91d

- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c / *Oedipus at Colonus* 1 55 291 116c d [115 120] 124d 125b / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* 143a 155a c esp [1015 1421] 152a 155a c / *Electra* 156a 169a e / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c

- 5 EURIPIDES *Alceus* 237a 247a c / *Suppliants* [195 250] 260a c / *Electra* 327a 339a c esp [880 1359] 335a 339a c / *Proenician Maidens* 378a 393d esp [60 645] 380b 383d [162a-

9 ARISTOTLE *Etica* bk 1 ch 332a-d ch 341d
342a ch 7 (109¹¹) 342 343a ch 9
[109²⁵ 32] 34 b bk vi ch [135¹⁶-2]
40 a b x x 116 [11-6 30-35] 436d-431a /
Pompey x vii ch 1 (3¹³) 413 527a-e
ch 13 [13¹⁰-2] 536d ch 13 [13¹³ 1-4]
532a b bk vii ch 2 542b-543d passim /
Rome bk 1 ch 1 (135⁵) 594d ch 5
[13¹ 4 24] 601c-d ch 6- 602d 60 d

1 EPICURE *Discourses* bk ii ch 14 189c-d
ch 1 203c 210a

17 PLATO *First Euthydemus* bk ii ch 3 17c-8c

18 A CRISTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 9-15 10d
13a / *City of God* bk vi 1 ch 3 265d 267
c 2 2a 271a bk xix ch 1 50 a 514b
ch 1 522b-524 / *Christian Doctrine* bk
ch 3 634a-d

19 ALEXANDER *Summus Theophrastus* bk 1 95 6
2 c 28b q 6 a 234a 32 b f 1-1
q 1 615d-616c q 3 A 2 622 623a
o a 1 62 633c-q 6 A 3 656a
65

21 H. 185 *Lettera* p 185 6 a

20 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2 c-d
71a b

31 M. 185 *Etica* p 185 447c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch 31
sect 63 194d 195a

34 STELL *Tractatus* bk 53a 539a

4. H. 185 *First Reason* 236d 23 a / *First Reason*
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257d 258b 271 279d ep 273d 277b /
185a-1 185a 314a 315c 327d 329a /
185a *Metaphysical Essays* f *Etica* 367c /
185a *Metaphysical* f *Etica* 38 b-38a /
185a 477b-c 478a-479d 586a 591b-
592d 595a-d

43 M. 185 *Tractatus* 446d-448a 461c-464d

45 H. 185 *Philosophy of Rhetoric* bk ii par 183
64 *Philosophy of Rhetoric* p 183 267a 268b

185a *Psychology* 72 b-726a

185a *Psychology and its Disposition* 79d
79b

46 Goods of the body and good of the soul

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 40b-41a / *Symposium*
162d 167d / *Menon* 178c-d / *Allegory* 205d
206d 209b-212a 215a d / *Phaedo*
214a-c / *Gorgias* 260a 270c / *Republic* bk
1 295d 296c 309b-310b bk iii 334b-339a bk
x 471a-475b / *Timaeus* 47b-d 6b / *Sophist*
556d 56d / *Letter* bk 1 613c-d bk 6 656d
658b

8 A. 185 *Psychology* bk ii ch 3 [16¹⁰-
24¹⁶] 329c 330d

9 A. 185 *Etica* bk 1 ch 7 [109¹¹ 3-109¹⁵
1] 343a-c / *First Reason* bk 1 [327²³ 24]
52 a-c / *Republic* bk 1 513b-19-1 61¹²
601 c [136¹ 1] 601a-d

12 L. 185 *Philosophy of Things* bk ii [1-61]
15a-d

11 EPICURE *Discourses* bk 1 ch 126c 127b
bk 1 ch 133a 233d

17 PLATO *First Euthydemus* bk ii 12b-19b ep
c 2-12d 16a ch 14 16 18a 19b bk ii ch
3 26d 27a

18 ACRISTINE *Confessions* bk x par 4 -66 82a
88b / *City of God* bk 11 ch 11 19 136d 142a
bk 11 ch 2 270a-d bk x ch 2-416a-c bk
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19 ALEXANDER *Summus Theophrastus* p 1 1 9
A 5 618d-621c q 3 A 3 624b-625a q 31
A 5 50c 756c

21 D. 185 *First Reason* bk 1 c 107x 1 14
114 7 d 8a xxx [5c]-xxx [20] 100a 101d

23 H. 185 *Lettera* par 1 6 c

24 R. 185 *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk 1
234a 235a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 538a d

31 DISC. 185 *Discourse* bk 1 41d-42a

37 FIELD *Tom Jones* 263c d

39 ROUSSEAU *Lettera* 338 d

43 M. 185 *Tractatus* 448a-450a 471a b

44 R. 185 *Lettera* 3 3a b

52 DISC. 185 *Discourse* bk 1 130b-
131b bk vi 164b-165a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 198b-199b

4d Intrinsic and external goods intrinsic
worth and extrinsic value

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 206a-d

9 A. 185 *Etica* bk 1 ch 8 [109¹¹ 19]
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433c-d / *Republic* bk 11 ch 11 [1 13] 34]
493c-496a bk vi ch 1 52 -d c 13 [13]
15- [526d 53 a / *Republic* bk 1 ch 5 600d
602d

12 L. 185 *Philosophy of Things* bk ii [1-61]
15a-d bk v [113-113] 70c-d

12 EPICURE *Discourses* bk 1 ch 16 156b-
158d bk 11 ch 20 192d 193d ch 24 203c
210a bk vi ch 4 22a 278a ch 10 238d 240d

12 ACRISTINE *Mediations* bk vi sect 7 279b-c
bk vi 1 c 3 279d 280a

14 PLATARCH *Solo* 4c 3c / *Pericles* 121
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15 ACRISTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 10 11a b /
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3 510c ch 5 523d 52 a

19 ALEXANDER *Summus Theophrastus* p 1 1 9
A 2 2 529a 530a p 1 1-1 9 A 1-4
615d-618d ep 2 4 618a-d q 4 A 5 7
632 636a ep 2 7 a 63 b-636a

21 D. 185 *First Reason* bk 1 11-66] 9c
10b

23 H. 185 *Lettera* p 185 73b-c 93b-c

25 M. 185 *Essays* 107a 112d ep 108c 109c
166b-178c 300c-306a

30 B. 185 *Advancement of Learning* 74b-81d
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- (3 *The moral theory of the good: the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good* 3f *The sources of evil in human life*)

Enn ad TR II CH 4-10 84c 88b CH 14 18
89b 93a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d
TR IV CH 18 167b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 9 18 10d
13a BK VII par 4 44b c BK VIII par 22-24
59a 60a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 24 283a b
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 17
A 1 ANS 100d 101d Q 48 A 6 ANS 264a d Q
49 A 1 REP 3 264d 265d Q 63 A 9 REP 1
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ
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- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VIII [65] IX
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[58 129] 77c 78a XVII [82]-XVIII [75] 79b 80c
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VIII [91-148] 117d 118c IV [127-142] 120a
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135a XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a

- 22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [2453-469] 200a b
/ *Prologue of Pardoner's Tale* [12 263 68]
372a / *Pardoner's Tale* [12 778 828] 380b 381b
/ *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a par 76-77
430b 431a / *Parson's Tale* par 20 508b 509a
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 153b

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 218c 219a 231d 238d
326b 327b 381b c

- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II
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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT IV
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- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d 18a
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d
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- 32 MILTON *Comus* 33a 56b esp [331-389] 40b
44a / *Paradise Lost* BK I [157 168] 97a [209-
220] 98a BK II [496-505] 122a [629-870]
125a 130a [890-1000] 130b 133a BK III [56-
134] 136b 138a BK IV [505-535] 163b 164a
BK VII [519-549] 28b 29a BK VIII [316 337]
239a b BK IX [679-784] 262a 264b BK XI [84
98] 301a BK XI [334]-BK XII [640] 306b 333a
/ *Samson Agonistes* [38-59] 340b [5-1 540]
351a b / *Areopagitica* 394b-395b 409b 410a

- 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a B 140a 162a
/ *Pensées* 850 340a

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338b-c 347d 348a
350c 351c 357a 360c 361c 363a 366d

- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b-c

- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 451b-452b

- 44 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 13
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354a-c

- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 3b-4a 204a 205a
209b

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 214c 215a ep
215a

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI
53b 54b BK V 122c 123b 130b 135d BK VI
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- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 531d 531a /
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esp 787a 788b

4 Divisions of the human good

4a Sensible and intelligible goods

- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaedrus* 120a
122a / *Symposium* 162d 167d / *Phaedo*
224a c 230c 242c 243a / *Republic* BK VI
386b d BK VII 397c 398b BK IX 423b-
424d / *Laos* BK V 689c 690c BK VIII 735c
736c

- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 6-9 34a
26a psum TR VIII CH 2 27c d / *Second En-*
nead TR IX CH 15-18 74d 77d / *Third Ennead*
TR I CH 7 104a 105a / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH
12 13 234a 235b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 20 24b c
par 24 25b c BK VI par 6 42d 43a BK VII
par 23 50b c BK X par 43-66 82a 88b

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63
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Q 82 A 5 ANS 435c-436c PART I II Q 2 A
6 ANS 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 ANS 625a 626b
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667b d Q 13 A 2 ANS 673c 674c Q 39
A 1 ANS 749a ■ Q 31 A 5 755c 756c A 6
ANS 756d 757c

- 46 HELL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 362b c

4b Useful and enjoyable goods: good for an end and good in itself

- 5 AESCHYLUS *Persians* [153 171] 16d 1 a
7 PLATO *Lysis* 22c 24a / *Protagoras* 60d 61d /
Euthydemus 69a 71a 74b 76b / *Meno* 183d
184b / *Cratylus* 262a 261b 266d 267a / *Re-*
public BK I 298a 299a BK II 310c d

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 15 [106 1 9] 149d
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[118] 7 36] 165d 166a BK IV CH 4 [124 15 0]
172d BK VI CH 9 [147 33 7] 201b c CH 12
[149] 31 39] 204b c BK VII CH 3 [153] 36-154
2] 209b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [1013 32 3]
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- [illegible]

(4 *Divisions of the human good 4d Intrinsic and external goods intrinsic worth and extrinsic value*)

- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 462a 255a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 37 33a b
 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 538a 539a
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 263c d
 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256b
 274d 275b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 387d
 388a / *Judgement* 591b 592a
 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c d
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 349a c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 4>
 23c d par 49 24c 25a par 63 65 28b 29a par
 67-69 29c 31a ADDITIONS 29 121c
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 194d
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 826a

4e *Individual and common goods*

- 7 PLATO *Crato* 213a 219a ■ / *Republic* BK IV
 342a d BK V 364c 365d / *Cratylus* 480a /
Statesman 588a b
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 10 [1075
 11-24] 605d 606a
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 8 [1141^b28-1142
 11] 390d 391a / *Politics* BK I CH I [1252 1-6]
 445a BK II CH 1-3 455b d 460a BK III CH 6-7
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 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 4 260b
 261a BK VII SECT 5 280a b
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 60
 A 5 ANS 313b 314c Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b 341b
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 513c PART I II Q 1 A 5 ANS 613a 614a
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90
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 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VI [40-
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 22 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 87c d
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71a b
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 36 434a b
 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d / *Civil Government*
 CH V 30b 36a passim
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 112a 113a
 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114a d / *Pref Metaphysic*
cal Elements of Ethics 369c 373b / *Science of*
Right 438d 439a
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 64 197d

- 43 MILL *Liberty* 297a / *Utilitarianism* 461d
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 393a-c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 46
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 par 49 78c par 287 97a ADDITIONS 2, 121b
 127 137b 145 140b
 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [II 559-572] 281b
 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 316c 317a 592d
 51 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI
 158b 159a

5 The order of human goods

5a The supreme good or *summum bonum* in existence and nature

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 164c 167d / *Gorgias* 254d
 255c / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d-401d esp III
 VI 383d 386c / *Philebus* 635b-639a ■
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK V CH 16 543a b
 BK VII CH 7 [1072^b13-29] 602d 603a
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH I I 339a 34 b
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 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61]
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 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b-c BK
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 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 34 273c
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 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 4 8a b TR
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 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 4 25b-c
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 / *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 10 270a 271d BK
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 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1
 I ANS 50c 51c Q 26 150a 152a c Q 62 A 1
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 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII
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 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK III STA 2A
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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I
 65c 66b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 28a d 149b d 279c
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 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 70b d
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PR I 9 431c
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 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 462a ■ 462 255a

(5 *The order of human goods 5b The judgment of diverse types of good their subordination to one another*)

- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 448a 450c 455c 456a 461c-464d 471a B
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 378a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 307b 308a PART II 365b E
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk v 194d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk vi 164b 165a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 198b 204b esp 199b 203a

5c *The dialectic of means and ends mere means and ultimate ends*

- 5 SOPHOCLES *Philoctetes* 182a 195a e esp 150-1 7182d 183c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk v 504c 507c
7 PLATO *Lysis* 22c 24a / *Loches* 29c / *Eurydemus* 69a 71a / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Coriarius* 262a 264b 280b d / *Republic* bk i ii 300d 315d esp bk ii 310c d / *Philebus* 632a d / *Laws* bk v 694d 695a bk ix 751c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* bk iii ch i [116^{b2} -36] 163b c / *Heavenly* bk ii ch i-2 [29 14 ^{b26}] 383d 384b / *Metaphysics* bk ii ch 2 [99^{a8}-16] 512d 513a bk v ch 2 [1013^{a32} b3] 533c [1013^{b5} 5 28] 533d 534a / *Soul* bk iii ch 10 [333 12 17] 665d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk i ch i 2 339a d ch 5 340d 341b esp [1096 5 10] 341a b ch 6 [1096^b 8-26] 341d 342a ch 7 [1097^{a15}-b22] 342c 343a ch 9 [1099^{b5}-32] 345b bk iii ch 3 [1112^{b1} -1113 2] 358c 359a bk vi ch 2 [1139 17-35] 387d 388a ch 5 389a e passim ch 9 [1142^{b17} 35] 391d 392b / *Politics* bk iii ch i [1323 22-21] 527a c ch 13 [1331^{b26} 1332 27] 536b 537a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6-7 602d 607d ch 8 [1366 3-16] 608b c
12 EPICURE *Discourses* bk iii ch 10 185d 187a ch 13-14 188b 190a ch 14 203c 210a bk iv ch 4 225a 228a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk v SECT 16 271c d bk vi SECT 40-45 277d 278c bk vii SECT 44 282b E bk viii SECT 19-20 286d 287a
14 PLUTARCH *Aleibiades* 160b 161b / *Lysander* 357a b / *Crasippus Nicetas* 456d 457c / *Agamemnon* 491a B / *Cleomenes* 660b 661a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr ii ch 3-4 7c 8c tr iv ch 6 15a b / *Second Ennead* tr ix ch 13 74d 75b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk viii ch 4 266d 267c ch 8-9 270a 271a bk xix ch i-3 507a 511a ch ii-17 516d 523a ch 20 523d 524a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b c ch 2 629b 630a ch 31-33 633b 634b ch 35 634c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 19 A 2 REP 2 109 110b A 5 ANS and REP 3 112d 113c Q 22 A 1 REP 3 127d 128d Q 23 A 7 ANS 138d 140a Q 65

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 51 A 2 REP 3 23d 24c Q 10, 11 ANS 325c 32 b Q 114 A 4 REP 1 373a II PART II Q 7 A 6 ANS 524c 525c
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* 401a-432a
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* ch viii 25d 26a
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 33a b 76c-d 90a PART III 237d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 28a d 52c 53c 330b-332a 368d 381a 388c passim esp 381c d 388a E
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT II SCENE 140-147] 334b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 75d 16a 91d 92a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 371b c PART II PREF 422b d-424a passim REP 7 424b PROP 65-66 444b d APPENDIX 1 447c
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 94a 97a / *Pensées* 98 190b 505 761a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch 15 SECT 52-54 191d 192b SECT 62 194c d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 538a 539a
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 245a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 234c 240b esp 235a b 236c d 238c 239a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 236a b 237c d 260a-c 265c 267d 268b 271c 279d esp 273d 277b 282b 283d / *Practical Reason* 307a d 315b-317b 318c 321b esp 320c 321b 327d 329a 33 a 355d 357c 360d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 367c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 387d 388a / *Science of Right* 397b 398a / *Judgement* 477b c 478a b 557d [fn 2] 586a B 588b [fn 2] 591b 592d 594b-595d 605d 606b [fn 2]
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 23 85a 87a passim esp 85b-c NO REB 31 103c d 104b-c NUMBER 40 129a B NUMBER 41 132b E
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445c d 446d 447a 461c 464d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 4 23c d par 61 27b-c PART II par 119-125 43b 45d esp par 122 44a par 140 49b 54a PART III par 182 64a par 191 66b par 223 73c d par 3 8 108b c par 340 110b-c par 348 111d ADDITIONS 38-10 122c II -6-81 128a 129a 116 135c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 167a 164c 166b 168d PART II 267a 268b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk xiii 586d 587d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk v 127b 137c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a 6b passim 14b 15a 199b 201b 203a 381b 382a 58a 789a

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *We sure f'r Measure* ACT 1 SC 1 [33 41] 174d ACT 1 SC 1 [7] 184d
- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 26c 27a
- 31 DESC RTE *Discourse* P T 1 43 P RT III 49d 50b
- 31 S 2 *Ethics* P T IV P 11 17 428a d P O 13 *Scho* 429 d P O 23 4430c d
- 32 M LTO *Paradise Lost* K VI [9-519] 228b-229a BK II [316-33] 239 b K IV [6 9-779] 262a 264a BK VI [34-98] 301a / *Sonnet on Agonistes* [38-59] 340b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK 1 P III 3 CT 16 117a BK II CH XXI 3 CT 35 185b-d 61CT 64 195
- 35 B A ELEY *Himala* ledge SECT 100 437b-c
- 36 SA PT *Glover* P RT 1 28b-29a P IV 159b 160
- 37 FI LD 46 *Tom Jones* 182a-c
- 38 R LS BA *I eq al ry* 343b-345c esp 345a-c / *Social Contract* K IV 434c
- 42 LA T *Pure Reason* 149d / *Fund Pri Meta* phi *f Morals* 265b 282b-283d / *Pr cte* I R 20 326b 327a
- 44 M L *Utilitar* sm 458b-459b
- 46 H 1 *Philosophy f Right* P T 1 par 139-14 48d 1 / *Philosophy of History* IVTRO 168b-d P II 280b-c
- 53 AM S *Psych logy* 82a b 806a 808a
- 54 F A D *Gener I* Introduction 560c d 625 b
- 66 The need for xpe ence of e I
- 7 PLATO *Rep bl* K II 337b-d / *Laws* K I 727c-d
- 11 PLU T 11 *Demetri* 726a d
- 17 PLATO T *Furth Enne d* T VI CH 7 204b-c
- 18 A 11 1 *Co f ons* K X par 54-57 85a 85a
- 19 AQUINAS *S mm Theol gie* ART Q 2 A 3 P 3 130d 131c
- 21 D T D *Com dy* II 11 1a 52d esp 1 [12 136] 2b-c XX III [43-51] 41d URG 70 T 1 53 54c
- 25 MO T ION *Essays* 167 169 passim 200d 203b 235c 236 509b-d
- 30 B ON *Adv nement f Legro g* 75b c
- 32 M 11 *Pa ad se Lost* BK IV [5 5-535] 163b-164 K VII [519-549] 228b-229 K III [3 6-337] 239 b BK X [679-779] 262a 264 [184-93] 301 / *Areop gu c* 389a 396a esp 390b 391 394b 395a
- 46 H 1 *Philosophy of H n ry* P RT 1 237d 238c T 354 c
- 47 G TH F 11 *Logos* [340-343] 9a
- 48 M 1 *M by Dick* 4b-5
- 51 T LSTOY *Har d Pace* BK X 481a 482
- 52 DO V K *Brothers* *La am* BK 53b-54b BK 122 125 132 135 K X 344 d

6c The goodness of knowledge or wisdom. the use of knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT *I Kings* 3 5 15 10-(D) III

K ngs 3 5 15 10 / II *Chronicles* 17 12 9 1

7-(D) II *Pa al pomenon* 17 III 9 1 7 / *Job*

23 12 20 / *Proverbs* 1 4 8 9 10-12 10 1

12 8 14 4 15-24 16 6 17 16 19 2 9

20 15 23 15 16 23 25 24 1 14 27 11 8 2

/ *Ecclesiastes* 1 18 2 12 6 6 8 7 11

12-16-19 9 11 13 18-(D) *Ecclesiastes* 17

19 2 12 26 6 8 7 12 13 17 20 9 11 13 18

/ *E. cl* 25.2 -(D) *E. cl* 28-7

ARO XTH *Wisdom of Solomon* 6-10-(D) OT

Book of Wisdom 6-10 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 16-19

4 11 19 6 18-37 11 1 14-20-15 8 21 12

13-21 24 1 3 5 10 11 8 37-44-26 40-25

41 14 15 51 13 28-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus*

1-20-24 4 12 2 6 18 3, 11 1 14-22 15-8

21 14 16 24 24 1 30 25 13 34 8 37-27-29

40-25 41 17 18 51 13 16

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5 SO HOCLES *Ochips* the A g [300-462] 102a

103 / *Am gone* [632 65] 136c 137d [1348-

1353] 142d

7 PLATO *Charm des* 8b / *Lysis* 16c 18b /

Laches 28a b / *Protagoras* 40 41 61d-62b

/ *Euthydemus* 69 71a 74b 76b / *Meno*

183d 184c / *Ph edo* 226a b / *Gorgias* 372b-

273b 291c 292b / *Rep bl* c BK VII 388a

401d esp 389d 398c BK IX 421a-423b /

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528c 531a / *Ph lebus* 609 639a c esp 635c

639 / *Laws* K I 643 BK III 669d 670

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8 ARISTOTLE *To act* BK III CH I [116 13 23]

162b-c / *Metaphy* 1 BK I CH I [980-22 28]

499a 112 500b-501c esp [932-4-933 11] 500d

501b BK X I CH 7 [107 13 29] 602d 603a /

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9 A 11072 *Ethics* K I CH 12 [1143-17

1144-6] 393b-c BK X CH 2 [1172-23 32] 426d

427a C I 7-8 431d 434a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6

[136 b 0-26] 603b-c

12 LUCRETIVS *N ture of Thing* K I [61 79] 1d

2 K II [48-6] 15c-d BK V [1-34] 61 d BK

12 [1 42] 80 d

12 EP CTETU *Discom se* K III CH 20 192d

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11 AURELIU *Meduat ons* BK V 3 CT 9 270b-c

K K 3 CT 12 298c d

14 PLUTARCH *Petri les* 121a 122b

18 AU U IN *Co f sso f* BK X par 54-57 85a

86a / *Cay f God* BK VII CH 8 270 d

19 AQUINAS *S mma Theologica* PART I Q 5 A

4 11 3 25d 26c RT Q I A 6 REP 1 2

614a-c Q 2 A I REP 2 615d 616c

20 AQUINAS *S mma Theologica* P RT II II Q 45

A 3 K 3 600c 601a P RT III SU L Q 96

A 7 1061b-1062a A II AM and REP 5 1063d

1064d A I 1064d 1065b

(5 *The order of human goods* 5d *The supremacy of the individual or the common good the relation of the good of the individual person to the good of other persons and to the good of the state*)

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 114b d / *Fund Prim Meta physic of Moral* 272d 273a / *Practical Reason* 304b 305c / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 369c 373b 373d 375d 376b / *Science of Right* 438d 439b

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US AMENDMENTS 1-X 17a d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 45 147c 148a NUMBER 64 197d NUMBER 85 256d 257a

43 MILL *Liberty* 267b d 274a 293b 323a c esp 322d 323a c / *Representative Government* 392b 396d / *Utilitarianism* 450b-455a 455c 456a 460a-461c 463a b 469b 470c 473c 476a c passim

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 221d 224a 261c d 304c 393a c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 46 23d 24a PART II par 125 126 44d-45b par 134 47b PART III par 155 57c par 170 60d par 183 64a par 192 66b c par 199 67c par 240 76d par 249 78c par 254 79c par 261 83a d par 277 92b c par 294 98b d par 308 102c 103a par 323 107a ADDITIONS 27 121b 47 124a b 127 135d 136a 127 137b 141 139c 145 140b 148 140c d 151 141b c 158 142d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 164b 192d 193a PART I 236a-c PART II 271c d 276a PART III 298c 299a PART IV 320c 321a 363c d 365b c 367d-368a

47 GÖTTE *Faust* PART II [11 559-57] 281b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310a 319a esp 312a 313a 314b 315d 316c 317c 321b 322d esp 322c d 592d

50 MARX *Capital* 237a

50 MARX ENGELS *Communism Manifesto* 429b ■

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 67d 68c 72d 74a BK V 214c 216d BK VI 260a 262a BK XI 475b-476c 505a 511b passim esp 509d 510a 514b 515a BK VII 537b 538a BK VIII 577b c BK XI 634a 635a EPILOGUE I 670d 671c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK VI 158b 159a 164a 167b BK VII 370b d

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 452c d 573b c / *War and Death* 757b 759d esp 759c d / *Civilization and Its Discontent* 780b 781d 799a 800a / *New Introductory Lectures* 853a b

6 Knowledge and the good

6a Knowledge wisdom and virtue the relation of being good and knowing what is good

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 / *Proverbs* 1 2 7-8 9 9 10 8 31 11 12 14 16-18 22 29 15 21 28 7 29 8

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 11 7 esp 14 6 8-10—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 11 7 esp 1-4 ■ 8 10 / *Ecclesiasticus* 19 22 24 30 11 43 33 50 28 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus*, 19 19-21 39 1 15 43 3, 50 30-31

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 3 1, 21 / *Romans* 1, 25 / *James* 4 17

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* [3, 2 430] 228b d

7 PLATO *Charmides* 7b-c 12a 13c / *Laches* 15a 37d / *Protagoras* 38a 64d / *Euthydemus* 6a 71a / *Cratylus* 86c d / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 183b 190a c / *Phaedo* 275d 276c 230d 231c / *Republic* BK I 306c 308a BK II 314d 315a BK III 333b 334b 337b d BK IV 354d 355a BK VI-VII 383d-401d esp BK VII 399d 398c BK X 439b 441a ■ / *Cratylus* 483b c / *Lysis* BK I 643c d BK III 669a 610c BK II 754a b BK VII 788d 789a / *Seventh Letter* 806a c

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK III CH 6 [120 6-31] 168a BK IV CH 2 [121 24 1 3] 169d 1 6a, CH 3 [124 10-14] 172d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 339d 340b BK II CH 4 350d 351b BK VI CH 8 390d 391c CH 12-13 393b 394d BK VII CH 3 395c 398a CH 10 [1152 7-4] 403a b BK X CH 3 [1176 15-20] 430c d CH 8 [117 16 1 14] 431d CH 9 [11, 9 54 1180 13] 434b d / *Poetics* BK IV CH 1 [1323 21-36] 527c d

12 CRICETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 5 110b-c CH 17 122d 124a CH 26 131b 132b CH 28 133b 134d BK II CH 22 167d 170a CH 26 174c d BK IV CH 1 213a 223d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 1 256b d SECT 17 259b d BK VII SECT 2 281b SECT 6 281c SECT 62 63 283d 284a BK VIII SECT 14 286c BK IX SECT 42 295c 296a c BK VII SECT 12 308b c

14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 121a 122b / *Anaximander* 265c d / *Agamemnon* 490d 491b / *Demetrius* 726a d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 6 79a 10a TR III CH 6 11d 12b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 2, 51d 52c BK VIII par 10-11 55c 56b / *City of God* BK VIII CH 3 266a d CH 8 270a d BK IX CH 20 296a ■ BK XI CH 28 338a d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 6 REP 3 6b 7a PART II Q 2 1 2 REP 1 615d 616c A 2 REP 3 615d 617b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57 A 4 ANS 38a 39a A 5 ANS 39a 40a Q 58 A 2 42a 43a A 4 5 44a 45d Q 65 A 1 REP 3 4 70b 72a PART II II Q 18 A 4 ANS 464c 465a Q 24 A II ANS 498b 499c

21 DANTE *Du ne Comedy* PARADISE XIX [40-66] 135c d XXVI [1-69] 145d 146c XXVIII [106 114] 150a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 59 60a 69d 75a esp 70d 71a 208a 478c 480c 514a b

26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT 1 SC II [13 -3] 408b-c

- 27 SH KE PE RE Measure f Measure ACT
1 C I [33 4] 174d ACT II SC IX [2 17]
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- 30 B COV Advancement f Learning 26c 27a
- 31 D SCART s Discourse PA T I 43c II RT III
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- 31 SMI OZA Eshet P R IV P P 13 17 428a d
7 OP 18 s HOL 429 d DEOR 23 24 430c d
- 32 M LTON Paradise Lost BK II [19-549] 228b
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Agon s [33-59] 340b
- 35 LOC Human Understa d g K I CI 331
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RECT 64 195a b
- 35 B ARSELEY H ma A o ledge s CT 100
437b c
- 36 S PT G User PART I 28b-29a PART IV
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- 37 FI LD G T m Jones 182a c
- 37 R ISRAEL Inequal y 343b-345c esp 345a c /
Social Contract BK IV 434c
- 42 HANT Pure Re so 149d / Fured Pryn Metz
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Re am 326b-327a
- 43 MIEL Liliuani sm 458b-459b
- 46 HZ Philosophy of Rights PART II par 139-
140 48d 54 / Philosophy f History IVTIO
168b d P RT II 280b c
- 53 M Pn hology 82 b 806a 808a
- 54 F LD General Interod ction 560c-d 625a b
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- 7 PLATO Ref ble BK III 337b-d / Laws BK
I 1 727c-d
- 14 PLUTARCH Demetrius 7 6a-d
- 17 PLUTARCH Furtif Enne d TR VIII CI 7
204b c
- 18 AL LECT e Conf n s BK X par 54-57 85a
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3 RA 3130d 131c
- 21 C IVT E mte Com dy HELL 3 32d esp 1
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- 25 MO T ICA Essay 167 169a pass m 200d
203b 235c 236a 509b-d
- 30 B CO Adv cement f Learning 75b c
- 3 M T P r disc Loat BK I [5 5-535] 163b-
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- 40 H EL Philosophy f History ANT I 237d
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- 4 G ITH F a o LOGUE [340-343] 9a
- 48 M LILL M by Dick 4b-5a
- 51 T LITOT Har and Pe ce BK X 483a
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- 52 DOSTO VSKY Brothers A am -ov BK IEE
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- 6c The goodness of knowledge or wisdom the
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12 15-19 9 11 13 13—(D) Eccl n des 1 17
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- ARISTOTELIA Wisdom of Sol mon 6-10—(D) OT
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13 31 24 1 22 25 10 34 37 24 26 40 25
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- 5 SO ocates Oed p sthe A g [300-462] 103a
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- 7 PLATO Charm des 8b / Lysis 16c 18b /
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/ Euthydemus 69a 71 74b-76b / Meno
183d 184c / Phaedo 216a b / Gorgias 272b-
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639a c / La s BK 1 643c BK III 669d 670c
K VII 792c d 794c 797 c / Seventh Letter
801b
- 8 ARISTOTELIA To ies BK III CI 1 [116 13 21]
162b c / Met physcs BK I CH 1 [9] 22 281
499a c 12 500b-501c esp [952 4-953 11] 500d
501b BK XI CH 7 [1072 13 29] 602d-603a /
S I BK I CH [40 c 7] 631a
- 9 ARISTOTELIA Eth cs BK I CI 12 [1143 7]
1144 76] 393b c BK I CH 2 [1172 28-32] 426d
427a 0 7 8 431d-434a / Rhetoric BK I CH 6
[36 40-36] 603b c
- 12 LUCRETIVS Nature of Things BK I [6 79] 16
2 K I [48-61] 15c d BK V [1-54] 61 d BK
1 [1 42] 80 d
- 12 E C ETOS Dico ses BK III CH 2 192d
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- 12 ALR LIO Meditatio s K V RECT 9 270b c
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- 14 PLUTARCH Percl s 121 122b
- 18 ALG STIVE Co f no s BK s par 54 57 85a
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A fuller treatment of the goodness and use of knowledge see ART 6c KNOWLEDGE 8a-8c
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

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Chapter 31 GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE usual connotation of government is political. The word is often used interchangeably with state. But there is government in a university in an economic corporation, in the church in any organization of men associated for a common purpose. The theologian speaks of the divine government of the universe and the moralist speaks of reason as the ruling power in the soul which governs the appetites or passions.

In all these contexts, the notion of government involves the fundamental relations of ruler and being, ruled of command and obedience. Though the character of these relations varies somewhat with the terms related there is enough common meaning throughout to permit a general consideration of the nature of government. But that is not the way in which government is discussed in the great books. For the most part government is considered in one or another of its special settings—as it functions in the family or the state in the soul or the universe. The common thread of meaning is noted only indirectly by the way in which comparisons are made or analogies are drawn between the various modes of government.

In view of this we have found it convenient to restrict this chapter to government in the political sense treating domestic and ecclesiastical government under FAMILY and RELIGION, economic government under WEALTH, divine government in the chapters on GOD and WORLD and government in the soul in the several chapters which consider the relation of reason to the passions such as DESIRE and EMOTION.

Government and state are often used as if they were interchangeable terms. Some writers differentiate their meanings by using state to signify the political community itself and

government to refer to the way in which it is politically organized. Yet the two concepts tend to fuse in traditional political theory. The kinds of states for example are usually named according to their forms of government. The great books speak of monarchical and republican states as we today speak of the fascist or the democratic state.

Nevertheless, we recognize the distinction between a state and its government when we observe that the state can maintain its historic identity while it undergoes fundamental changes in its form of government. The state is not dissolved by a revolution which replaces a monarchy by a republic or conversely. There is a sense in which Rome is the same state under the Tarquins, under the Republic and under the Caesars. In contrast some rebellions, such as the War of Secession in American history threaten to dissolve the state itself.

Despite the fact that government involves a relation between rulers and ruled the word is often used to designate one term in that relationship namely the rulers. When the citizens of a republic speak of the government they usually refer to the officialdom—not the body of citizens as a whole but only those who for a time hold public office. But government can not consist of governors alone any more than education can consist of teachers alone. The different forms of government can be distinguished as readily by looking to the condition of the ruled as to the powers of the rulers. Furthermore the same individuals may both rule and be ruled by turns as Aristotle observes of constitutional government.

Though the notion of government includes both rulers and ruled the word usually appears in political literature with the more restricted meaning. When writers refer to the branches or departments of government or when they

speech of the sovereignty of a government they direct attention to the ruling power and to the division of that power into related parts

THE GREAT BOOKS OF political theory ask a number of basic questions about government. What is the origin of government its nature and necessity? What ends does government serve and how do these ends define its scope and limits? What is the distinction between good and bad government between legitimate and illegitimate or just and unjust government? What are the forms of government of good government of bad government? What are the various departments or branches of government and how should they function with respect to one another?

These questions are related. The origin nature and necessity of government have a bearing on its ends and limits. These same considerations enter into the discussion of the legitimacy and justice of governments. They also have a bearing on the classification of the forms of government and on the evaluation of diverse forms. The way in which the several branches of government should be related is affected by the way in which the various forms of government differ.

These questions are not always approached in the same order. Some of the great political theorists—for example Hobbes Locke and Rousseau—find their fundamental principles in the consideration of the origin of government. They start with such questions as: What makes it legitimate for one man to govern another? Is the exercise of political power both justified and limited by the end it serves? In answering these questions they imply or make a distinction between good and bad government and indicate the abuses or corruptions to which government is subject. Though they enumerate the various forms of government in a manner which reflects the traditional classifications they do not seem to regard that problem as of central importance.

Other eminent political thinkers make the classification and comparison of diverse forms the central problem in the theory of government. Plato and Aristotle Montesquieu and Mill are primarily concerned with the criteria by which the justice or goodness of a govern-

ment shall be judged. They compare various forms of government as more or less desirable nearer to the ideal or nearer to the opposite extreme of corruption. In the course of these considerations they answer questions about the necessity the legitimacy and the ends of government in general.

THERE SEEMS TO BE considerable agreement on one point namely that government is necessary for the life of the state. It is generally held by the authors of the great books that no community can dispense with government for without government men cannot live together in peace. None is an anarchist like Thoreau or Kropotkin although Kropotkin claims that *War and Peace* and even Mill's *Essay on Liberty* contain anarchist ideas. Marx and Engels may be the other possible exception to the rule.

If Marx and Engels take the opposite view they do so simply on the ground that with the advent of a classless society after the communist revolution the class war will come to an end and there will no longer be any need for government. The state can quietly wither away. But according to Aquinas even if society were free from all injustice and iniquity even if men lived together in a state of innocence and with the moral perfection they would possess if Adam had not sinned even then government would be necessary. A social life he thinks cannot exist among a number of people unless government is set up to look after the common good.

The great books do not agree about the naturalness of the state. They do not agree about the way in which government originated historically or about the functions it should and should not perform. They do not all reflect in the same way on the good and evil in government. Nor do they all give the same reasons for the necessity of government. In consequence they set different limits to the scope of government and assign it different functions which range from the merely negative function of preventing violence to the duty to provide positively for human welfare in a variety of ways.

On all these things they differ but with the exceptions noted they do concur in thinking that anarchy—the total absence of government—is unsuitable to the nature of man. Man be-

in what he is, any form of government at all. In Darwin's opinion is better than none. Some like Hobbes and Kant identify anarchy with the state of nature which is for them a state of war. Some like Locke think that the state of nature is not a state of war yet find great advantages to living in civil society precisely because government remedies the inconveniences and ills which anarchy breeds. But though they often write as if men could choose between living in a state of nature or in a civil society they do not think man has any option with respect to government as if he wishes the benefits of the civilized life. They cannot conceive civil society as existing for a moment without government.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT about the necessity of government tends to include an agreement about the two basic elements of government—authority and power. No government at all is possible not even the most attenuated unless men obey its directions or regulations. But one man may obey another either voluntarily or *non-voluntarily*—either because he recognizes the right vested in that other to give him commands or because he fears the consequences which he may suffer if he disobeys.

These two modes of obedience correspond to the authority and power of government. Authority elicits voluntary compliance. Power either actually coerces or by threatening coercion, compels involuntary obedience. Authority and power are the right and might of government. Either can exist and may operate apart from the other but as Rousseau points out when might is lacking government is illegitimate and as Hamilton points out when authority is lacking it is ineffective.

In a famous passage the Federalists explain that rule by authority alone may not work in a society of animals. If it were men are men not animals, their obedience must be assured by the threat of force. In any society in which some men are good some bad and all may be either at one time or another force is the only expedient to get the unwilling to do what they should do for the common good. Even when the intentions of government have their authority from the consent of the governed they cannot function effectively without the

use of power or force. For this reason Hamilton dismisses the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law as having no place but in the theories of those political doctors whose severity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

If authority without force is ineffective for the purposes of government might without right is tyrannical. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins. Locke writes, and whoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law and makes use of the force he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not ceases in that to be a magistrate. The use of unauthorized force may take the form of either usurpation or tyranny. If it is the exercise of power which another hath a right to, Locke declares it is usurpation if it is the exercise of power beyond right which nobody can have a right to it is tyranny.

The distinction between legitimate rule and all dominations by force rests not on the use of power but on whether the power which must be employed is or is not legally authorized.

THE NOTION of sovereignty involves considerations of authority and power. The word itself is medieval and feudal in origin. It signifies the supremacy of an overlord who owes allegiance to no one and to whom fealty is due from all who hold fiefdoms under him. Since the supremacy of the sovereign lord is clothed with legal rights, according to the customs of feudal tenure sovereignty seems to imply the union of power with authority, not the use of naked force.

The political philosophers of antiquity do not use the term sovereignty. But the discussion of the distribution of political power is certainly concerned with the possession of authority as well as the control of force. Aristotle's question, for example, about "what is to be the supreme power in the state—the multitude or the wealthy? or the good? or the one best man?" deals with the same problem which modern writers express by asking where sovereignty resides. As Aristotle sees the conflict between the oligarchical and the democratic constitutions the issue concerns the legal definition of the ruling class whether the constitu-

tion puts all the political power in the hands of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn rich and poor alike. It does not seem to be too violent an interpretation for modern translators to use the word *sovereignty* here for *sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever person or class holds the supreme power by law*.

Within this meaning of *sovereignty* the basic difference between absolute and limited government or between the despotic and the constitutional regime leads to a distinction between the sovereign man and the sovereign office.

The ruler who holds *sovereignty* in his person is an absolute sovereign if his power and authority are in no way limited by positive law. According to some political philosophers *sovereignty* must be absolute. In the opinion of Hobbes for example the notion of a limited *sovereignty* seems to be as self contradictory as that of a supremacy which is not supreme.

After discussing the absolute rights which constitute *sovereignty* Hobbes goes on to say that *this great authority being indivisible there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings though they be singular majores of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be unnumerus minores of less power than them all together*. For if by *all together* they mean not the collective body as one person then *all together* and *every one* signify the same and the speech is absurd. But if by *all together* they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears) then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign's power and so again the speech is absurd.

It makes no difference Hobbes argues whether the *sovereignty* is held by one man or by an assembly. In either case the sovereign of a commonwealth is not subject to the civil laws. For having the power to make and repeal laws he may when he pleases free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him. The sovereign therefore has absolute power which consists in the absolute right or liberty to do as he pleases for he that is bound to himself only is not bound at all.

Aquinas seems to be taking the same view when he admits that the sovereign is

exempt from the law as to its coercive power since properly speaking no man is coerced by himself and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. But Aquinas differs from Hobbes in thinking that the authority is not the power of the prince is limited by the constitutional character of the kingly office. In the mediaeval conception of monarchy the king is bound not to himself alone as Hobbes insists but to his subjects. Their oath of allegiance to him is reciprocated by his coronation oath in which he assumes the obligation to uphold the customs of the realm.

WHERE AQUINAS CONCEIVES the sovereign prince as one element—the other being established law—in a government which is therefore both absolute and constitutional Hobbes conceives the sovereign as identical with a government which is wholly absolute. The distinction here implied—between a mixed regime and one that is purely absolute—is more fully discussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and MONARCHY. In contrast to both a republic or purely constitutional government substitutes the sovereign office for the sovereign man. It denies the possession of *sovereignty* to men except in their capacity as office holders.

According to the republican notions of Rousseau not even government itself has *sovereignty* except as representing the political community as a whole which is the sovereign. *Sovereignty* he writes is vested in the government simply and solely as a commission an employment in which the rulers mere officials of the Sovereign exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. Since this power is not theirs except by delegation it can be limited modified or recovered at pleasure for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the end of association.

The unity of *sovereignty* is not impaired by the fact that a number of men may share in the exercise of sovereign power any more than the unity of government is destroyed by its division into separate departments or branches, such as the legislative executive and judicial. Since in a republic the government (in all its branches or offices) derives its power and

authority from the constitution (or what Rousseau call "the fundamental law") and since it is the people as a whole not the officials of government who have the constitutive power the people are in a sense supreme or sovereign.

Popular sovereignty may mean that the people as a whole govern themselves without the services of magistrates of any sort but this would be possible only in a very small community. It is questionable whether a people has ever exercised sovereignty in this way in any sort of historic importance. Popular sovereignty more usually means that implied by Aquinas when he conceives the magistrate or ruler as merely the viceregent of the people. "To order anything, to the common good," he writes, "belongs either to the whole people or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. Hence the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has the care of the whole people." Similarly the exercise of coercive force is vested in the whole people or in some public personage to whom it belongs to inflict penalties.

The notion of a *public personage* as Aquinas uses it in these passages, is clearly that of a surrogate for or representative of the whole people. The people as a whole have in the first instance the authority and power to perform all the functions of government. Only if for convenience or some other reason they constitute one or more public personages to act in their stead, do individual men exercise sovereignty and then only as representatives.

Locke's fundamental principle—that men being by nature all free, equal, and independent no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent—is another expression of the idea of popular sovereignty. It appears in the Declaration of Independence in the statement that since governments are instituted by men to secure their fundamental rights they must derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

Hegel objects to the sense in which men have recently begun to speak of the sovereignty of the people "as something opposed to the sovereignty existent in the monarch. So op-

posed to the sovereignty of the monarch he writes, the sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the people. If the sovereignty of the people means nothing more than the sovereignty of the whole state then he says, the sovereignty which is there as the personality of the whole

is there in the real existence adequate to its concept as the person of the monarch.

But republican writers would reply that the sense in which they speak of the sovereignty of the people cannot be opposed to the sovereignty of government so long as that government is constitutional, not absolute. When the sovereignty of the people is conceived as the source or basis, not as the actual exercise of the legitimate powers of government there is no conflict between these two locations of sovereignty in the state. Yet the supremacy of the government always remains limited by the fact that all its powers are delegated and can be withdrawn or changed at the people's will.

THE QUESTION OF absolute or limited sovereignty and the connected question of unified or divided sovereignty have a different meaning in the case of the relation of governments to one another.

The theory of federal government discussed in *The Federalist* and in Mill's *Representative Government* contemplates a division of sovereignty not as between the people and their government but as between two distinct governments, to each of which the people grant certain powers. Distinguishing between the government of a national state and the government of a federal union Madison writes

Among a people consolidated into one nation supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme and may be controlled directed or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy no more subject within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere. The federal or general and the

tion puts all the political power in the hands of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn rich and poor alike. It does not seem to be too violent an interpretation for modern translators to use the word sovereignty here for sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever person or class holds the supreme power by law.

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The unity of sovereignty is not impaired by the fact that a number of men may share in the exercise of sovereign power any more than the unity of government is destroyed by its division into separate departments or branches such as the legislative executive and judicial. Since in a republic the government (in all its branches or offices) derives its power and

equally good all bad forms equally bad? If not what is the principle in terms of which some order of desirability or undesirability is established? For example — one good form of government better than another one bad form worse than another in terms of degrees of justice and injustice or in terms of efficiency and inefficiency? To put this question in another way — one form of good government better than another because it achieves a better result or merely because it achieves the same result more completely?

If there are several distinct forms of good government are there one or more ways in which these can be combined to effect a composite or mixed form? If a mixed form is comparable with the pure forms it unites is it superior to all to some to none of them? On what grounds? In what circumstances?

While proposing that they consider to be the ideal form of government some political philosophers admit that the ideal may not be realizable under existing circumstances or with men as they are. Plato for example recognizes that the state he outlines in the *Republic* may not be practicable and in the *Lysis* he proposes institutions of government which represent for him something less than the ideal but which may be more achievable. The Athenian Stranger says of the state described in the *Republic* that whether it is possible or not no man acting upon any other principle will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more evaluated in virtue. The state which he is discussing in the *Lysis* takes the second place. He refers to a third best which far from being even the practicable ideal may be merely the best form of government which now actually exists.

Aristotle also sets down the various ways in which forms of government can be judged and compared. We may consider the merits of what sort a government must be to be most in accordance with our aspirations if there were no eternal impediment but we must also consider that kind of government is adapted to particular states. In addition Aristotle thinks it is necessary to know the form of government which is best suited to states in general as well as to say how a state may be constituted under various conditions.

Most important of all it is necessary to know not only what form of government is best but also what is possible. Though political writers have excellent ideas Aristotle thinks they are often impractical. Since the best is often unattainable the true legislator ought to be acquainted not only with what is best in the abstract but also with what is best relative to circumstances.

Both Montesquieu and Mill later apply this basic distinction between the best form of government considered absolutely or in the abstract and the best form relative to particular historic circumstances. Among these are a people's economic condition level of culture political experience geography climate and racial characteristics. Montesquieu for example thinks that government by law absolutely considered is better than despotic government yet he also holds that despotic government is better for certain peoples. Mill thinks that the institutions of a representative democracy represent the ideal form of government but he acknowledges that absolute monarchy may be better for a rude or uncivilized people who have not yet advanced far from barbarism.

The great question here is whether the circumstances themselves can be improved so that a people may become fit or ready for a better form of government and ultimately for the best that is attainable that is the form relative to the best possible conditions. Since Montesquieu emphasizes what he considers to be fixed racial characteristics such as the servility of the Asiatics whereas Mill stresses conditions which are remediable by education economic progress and social reforms these two writers tend to give opposite answers. The issue is more fully discussed in the chapters on DEMOCRACY MONARCHY and PROGRESS.

Still other questions remain and should be mentioned here. Are the ideal state and the ideal form of government inseparable or can one be conceived apart from the other? How shall the ideal government be conceived—in terms of the best that is practically attainable given man as he is or can be or in terms of a perfection which exceeds human attainment and which men can imitate only remotely or imperfectly if at all? Does divine government for example set a model which human govern-

state or local governments draw on the same reservoir of popular sovereignty but the sovereignty which each derives from that source is limited by the definition of matters reserved to the jurisdiction of the other

The fundamental difference between the condition of states in a federation and the condition of colonial dependencies or subject peoples is that imperial government unlike federal government claims an unlimited sovereignty. The issues of imperialism which arise from the exercise of such power are discussed in the chapters on TYRANNY and SLAVERY

The one remaining situation is that of independent governments the governments of separate states associated with one another only by treaties or alliances or at most in the kind of loose hegemony or league represented by the Greek confederacies or the American *Articles of Confederation*. In this situation the word sovereignty applied to independent governments signifies supremacy not in the sense of their having the authority and power to command but in the opposite sense of *not being subject to any political superior*

This radical difference in meaning is explicitly formulated in Hegel's distinction between internal and external sovereignty

After stating the conditions of the sovereignty of the state in relation to its own people Hegel says: "This is the sovereignty of the state at home. Sovereignty has another side *re* sovereignty *vis à vis* foreign states. The state's individuality resides in its awareness of its own existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others and in this individuality Hegel finds the state's autonomy which he thinks is the most fundamental freedom which a people possesses as well as its highest dignity

But from the fact that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors it also follows according to Hegel that such sovereigns are in a state of nature in relation to each other. It is this state of nature which Hobbes had earlier described as a state of war. Precisely because independent states have absolute sovereignty in relation to one another they live in the condition of perpetual war and upon the confines of battle with their frontiers armed and cannons planted against their neighbors round about

In their relation to one another they are writes Kant like lawless savages. Following Rousseau he thinks it is fitting that the state viewed in relation to other peoples should be called a power. Unlike sovereign governments which unite authority with power in their domestic jurisdiction sovereign states in their external relations can exert force alone upon each other. When their interests conflict each yields only to superior force or to the threat of it. A fuller discussion of these matters will be found in the chapters on LAW, STATE and WAR AND PEACE.

AS ALREADY INDICATED in several places, the materials covered in this chapter necessarily demand a study of many related chapters dealing with political topics. This is peculiarly true of the problems concerning the forms of government. Separate chapters are devoted to each of the traditionally recognized forms, *ARISTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, MONARCHY, OLIGARCHY, TYRANNY*. Each of these chapters defines a particular form, distinguishes it from others and compares their merits. In addition the chapter on CONSTITUTION deals with what is perhaps the most fundamental of all distinctions in forms of government that between a republic and a despotism or between government by laws and government by men

Here then it is necessary only to treat generally of the issues raised by the classification and comparison of diverse forms of government. They can be summarized in the following questions

What are the criteria or marks of good government? Is the goodness of government determined by the end it serves by the way in which it is instituted by its efficiency in promoting whatever end it serves? Are such criteria of good government as justice, legitimacy and efficiency independent or interchangeable?

What is the nature of bad government? Can a distinction be made between the abuses or weakness to which good government is subject in actual operation and government which is essentially bad because perverse or corrupt in principle as well as practice?

Are there several forms of good government? Of bad government? How are they differentiated from one another? Are all good forms

1. The sovereignty of government the unity and disposition of sovereignty

(1) The sovereign person sovereignty vested in the individual ruler

(2) The sovereign office the partition of sovereignty among the offices created by a constitution

(3) The sovereign people the community as the source of governmental sovereignty

1. Self-government expressions of the popular will elections voting

2. The forms of government their evaluation and order

2. The distinction and comparison of good and bad forms of government

2. The combination of different forms of government the mixed constitution the mixed regime

2. The absolute and relative evaluation of forms of government by reference to the nature of man or to historic circumstances

2. The influence of different forms of government on the formation of human character

2. The ideal form of government the distinction between practicable and utopian ideals

3. The powers, branches, or departments of government enumerations, definitions, and orderings of these several powers

3. The separation and coordination of the several powers usurpations and infringements by one branch of government upon another

3. The relation of the civil to the military power

3. The legislative department of government the making of law

(1) The powers and duties of the legislature

(2) Legislative institutions and procedures

3. The judicial department of government the application of law

(1) The powers and duties of the judiciary

(2) Judicial institutions and procedures

3. The executive department of government the enforcement of law administration of decrees

(1) The powers and duties of the executive

(2) Administrative institutions and procedures

4. The property and the expenditures of government taxation and budget

5. The relations of governments to one another sovereign princes or states as in a condition of anarchy

5. Foreign policy the making of treaties the conduct of war and peace

5. The government of dependent peoples colonial government the government of conquered peoples

5. The relation of local to national government the centralization and decentralization of governmental functions

5. Confederation and federal union the division of jurisdiction between state and federal governments

6. Historical developments in government revolution and progress

ment should aim to approximate? Is that human government ideal which is most like the divine or on the contrary is the perfection of human government measured by standards drawn from the nature of man and the difficulties involved in the rule of men over men?

THE TRADITIONAL enumeration of the functions of government is threefold: the legislative, the judicial and the executive. Locke adds what he calls the federative power, the power of making treaties or alliances and in general of conducting foreign affairs. It may be questioned whether this function is strictly coordinate with the other three, since foreign like domestic affairs may fall within the province of the executive or the legislature or both as in the case of the Constitution of the United States.

In our own day, the multiplication of administrative agencies and the development of planning boards have been thought to add a new dimension to the activities of government, but again it may be questioned whether these are not merely supplemental to the functions of making law, applying law to particular cases and regulating by administrative decree those matters which fall outside the domain of enforceable law. The executive branch of government seems the most difficult to define, because it involves both law enforcement and the administration of matters not covered by legislative enactment or judicial decision.

If the threefold division of the functions of government is exhaustive, the question remains how these distinct activities shall be related to one another and by whom they shall be performed. In an absolute monarchy in

which the king is the government, all powers are in the hands of one man. Though he may delegate his powers to others, they act only in his deputies or agents, not as independent officials. This does not obliterate the theoretical distinction between legislation, adjudication, and execution, but in this situation there can be no practical separation of the three powers, certainly no legal system of checks and balances.

It is the separation of powers according to Montesquieu that is the basis of political liberty. Power should be a check to power, he writes. In a system of separated powers, the legislative body being composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative.

Whether or not Montesquieu is right in attributing this aspect of constitutionalism to the limited monarchy of England in his own day, his argument can be examined apart from history, for it raises the general question whether government by law can be preserved from degenerating into despotic government except by the separation of powers.

For the American Federalists, the system of checks and balances written into the Constitution so contrives the interior structure of the government that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Thus they consider the prime advantage to be gained from Montesquieu's principle of the separation of powers. The principle itself may hold to be the sacred maxim of free government.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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- 1a The origin and necessity of government: the issue concerning anarchy
- 1b Comparison of political or civil government with ecclesiastical government and with paternal or despotic rule
- 1c The ends and limits of government: the criteria of legitimacy and justice
- 1d The elements of government: authority and power or coercive force: the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* government
- 1e The attributes of good government
- 1f The abuses and corruptions to which government is subject

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PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk II [265-83] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

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 14 PLUTARCH Tiberius Gracchus 678b d
 20 AQUIN s Summa Theologiae RT II Q 90
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 35 LOCKE Ci l Government CH VI SECT 129d
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 38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 323d / Social Contract
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 400 401a-c BK III 406b d-410a 420a-421
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 40 GRAYSON Decl e and F II 100d 241b

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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 272d 273d 322a 323a c / *Representative Government* 332d 350a 356d 357a 367c 370a 380c 382c 387c d 436b 437a 439b ■
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 182c d 204b c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 165 145a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 174a 175c PART I 208b ■ PART II 275a b 276a PART IV 342a 343a
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [10 352 359] 249b 250a

1f *The abuses and corruptions to which government is subject*

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6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 436d 437d

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII IX 401d-427b / *Laws* BK IV 681d 682c

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 7 [1.66^b36-1.67^b10] 462c-463b BK III CH 15 [1.86 31-28] 484c d CH 16 [1 87 1-28] 485b 486a BK V CH 2 3 503b 505b CH 8 [1308^b31-1309 32] 511a c PASSIM CH 12 [1316^a1-27] 518d 519d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 4 [1360 17 29] 600c

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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 78b d PART II 100a ■ 104b d 116c d 148 153a 164a c PART IV 273a b CONCLUSION 279a c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 381b d 384b c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* 174a 204d

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35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 118 57b c CH XIII SECT 149 59b d CH XVIII SECT 199-201 71a ■

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 11b 15b 16b 28b 29a PART II 74a 76b PART III 120a PART IV 152b 154a 157a 158a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 100d 101a 268c 269b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 39c BK VIII 51a 53c BK XI 69a-c BK XXVIII 259b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360b 361c / *Political Economy* 371b 373a / *Social Contract* BK III 433a 434b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK II 148b c 149d 150a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 35a 521d 622d 623a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307a c 586c 587b

42 HANT *Science of Right* 435a-441d esp 435c 436b 437c d 438d-441d 450a-c

43 FEDERALIST VL IBER IO 49c 53a PASSIM NUMBER 15 65c 66a NUMBER 16 68c d NUMBER 22 82c 83d NUMBER 28 96c 98b PASSIM NUMBER 37 120d 121a NUMBER 41 137b c NUMBER 51 162d 165a PASSIM NUMBER 6 190a b NUMBER 66 201d 202a

43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 328d 330c 350d 351a 36 c 370a 376a c 387c d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 120a-c 176b c 197c-d 261c d 374b c

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [4,7 481] 118b 119b [10 42 284] 249b 250b

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1g *The sovereignty of government the unity and disposition of sovereignty*

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 6 [1278^b9-12] 475d CH 7 476c-477a CH 10 478d-479a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^b27 1366^a2] 608a b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q91 A 3 207a-c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 97c 98a c PART II 100c 105c 112b-c 114b c 116c d 117b-d 122b 124b 130d 131d 132a 148b 150b 151a 152a 153b 159c PART III 218b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [69-99] 192a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IX 38b d 60a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323d / *Political Economy* 368c 369a / *Social Contract* BK I 39 a 393b BK II 395a 398b BK III 406b d 409a 420d BK IV 423a-424b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 24b d 28b PASSIM esp 28a b 521b

42 HANT *Science of Right* 435a b 437c d 438b-c 439a-441d 450d-451b 452a d

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION II 5a b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 9 48b-49c esp 49b NUMBER 15 63d 66b NUMBER 16-20 66c 76f esp NUMBER 20 78a b NUMBER 32 105 107f PASSIM esp 105d NUMBER 33 108d 109a NUMBER 39 126b 128b NUMBER 42 138c NUMBER 44 146d 147a NUMBER 62 189c d NUMBER 81 240d 241a NUMBER 82 242b-c

43 MILL *Representative Government* 331c 332d 355b 356b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PAR 21 92b PAR 270 93a 94d PAR 287 96b PAR 321 322 106c 107a ADDITIONS 168 145c d 147d 148a 187 149b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 355c d 365a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 680b 684a

1g(1) *The sovereign person sovereignty vested in the individual ruler*

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- 1 The combination of different forms of government: the mixed constitution or the mixed regime
- 5 ARISTOTLES *Summary of Maieutics* [339-422] 5b-6b [600-624] 8d 9a
- 5 EURIPIDES *Symposium* [339-353] 261b-c
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk vi 153d 153b
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Pericles' Funeral Oration* bk iii 590a-b
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 398b-604b / *Laws* bk iii 66-67b bk iv 680d-681a bk v 699d 700b
- 9 ARISTOTLES *Politics* bk ii ch 6 [i 65-26-1, 66-4] 461b-c ch ii [127-2-3] ch iii [i 74-1, 69b-470d] ch iii ch iv 15 16 481b-486c esp ch i, [i 36 3] ch ii 16 [123-48] 485b-c bk iv ch 8-9 493c-494d ch ii 12 495b-497b bk v ch 7 [130-5 23] 509a-b ch 8 [130-5 10-130-7 32] 510d 511c ch ii [131-3 18 33] 515d 516a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [136-5 39 1366-4] 608b
- 4 PLATO *Charmides* 341b-35d / *Dion* 800c-d
- 3 THUCYDIDES *History* bk iii 59d bk vi 72a bk vi 97b
- 10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 99, A 4, 1299b-230c Q 107, A 1, 1307d 309d
- 13 M. C. C. *Principles of Politics* ch i 7-8a ch xix, 27a-b 79c-d
- 13 H. B. *Lessons in History* bk ii 103d 104b 106d 107c 151c-152a PART III, 278a-b
- 25 LOCKE *Second Treatise of Government* ch vii sect 94 46a-c ch x, sect 132 55a-b bk xi 55b-58b ch x ii 1 59b-64c passim ch xviii 197 199-206 71a 71c ch xix 73d-81d passim esp 1 c 13 74b-c
- 26 STURGEON *Tramontana* 216b
- 27 FIELDER *Tom Jones* 266d
- 28 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk i 7c-8c bk iii 11c 12b 13c bk i 35a-b bk ix 58b-d 60a bk xi 58b-d 84d bk xix, 142a 146a-c
- 28 ROUSSEAU *Emile* 357b-c / *Social Contract* bk iii 410c 414d-415b bk iv 42 a-428a
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall*, 24b 26d 28b 672d-673a 630b-d 631a
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall*, 71d 81c-d 218c 219a 403b-d esp 403c 404c-d 428a
- 42 HANT *Science of Rights* 430c-440a 441b-c 450a-452a
- 43 FIDELIX *17th Century* 39, 125c 126c bk 45 141-c bk 47 154-c bk 49 207a 210c passim NUMBER 20 213b-c bk 47 216a bk NUMBER 84 2 2b-c
- 43 M. L. *Liberty* 267d 268c / *Representative Government* 343c 344 3 1-c 353d-354b 355b-356b 401d-402b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 178a-b 2 5a-d 390a-b
- 45 H. B. *Philosophy of Rights* PART III part 273 90c 92a part 275 96 92a 97a bk vii, 70-1-2 145d 146d / *Philosophy of History* 368, d
- 51 TOULSTOY *War and Peace* bk vi 238c 43d
- 2c The absolute and relative evaluation of forms of government: by reference to the nature of man or to historic circumstances
- OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel*, 8- (D) *I Kings* 6
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk iii 10 c 108d 120b-c bk v 1 8a 180a bk vi 233a-c
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Pericles' Funeral Oration* bk iii 587a-b 590a-b
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk iii 339b-356a bk viii ix 401d-427b / *Laws* bk iii 663d 677a bk ix 754a-b
- 9 ARISTOTLES *Politics* bk i ch 12 453d 454a bk iii ch 12 [i 96b-2-1] 484d-485a ch i, 486c-487a bk iv ch i 487a-488b ch 2 [125g 13 0] 488c-d ch 12 496d-497b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Phocion* 605a-d
- 18 TACITUS *Historiae* bk i 193c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 104b-d 105c 106b 129b-130a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 46d
- 26 SH. RES. EARL *John Carter* ACT I 1c 1-41 568b-d 572c
- 27 SH. RES. EARL *Coriolanus* ACT III SC 1 [31 161] 370d 371
- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [41 2-6] 344b-345b
- 38 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch ii sect 13 28a-b ch vii sect 90-94 44d-46c ch viii sect 105 112 48c 51b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver's Travels* PART III 112a 113a 118a 121b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk i 3b-c bk iv 15c bk v 29a-b bk xiv 107a-d bk xii 118b-c bk xvii 122a 124d bk xviii 125a-c 126b-c bk xix 135a-b 135d 140d 141a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Emile* 359a-b / *Political Economy* 371c / *Social Contract* bk ii 403c-d bk iii 40 c 409a 410c 415b-41 c
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall*, 32b-34a c esp 33c 68b-d 69a 90d 91d 513b-c
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall*, 222d 224a 320d 321b
- 42 HANT *Philosophy of Rights* 114b-d / *Science of Rights* 438d-439a 450b-d
- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [23] 1a-b
- 43 F. DERALIST *NUMBER 6* 408-41a NUMBER 1 51c 52d NUMBER 15 65b-66b NUMBER 35 174c-d NUMBER 45, 25 a-c
- 43 M. L. *Liberty* 272a / *Representative Government* 327b-d 355b passim 366a 369b 436b-437a
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 190c-d
- 46 H. B. *Philosophy of Rights* PART III part 273 274 90c 92a ADDITIONS 15, 166 145a-c / *Philosophy of History* L. TRO, 173c-175c 203b-206a-c PART I 207d 209a 243b-c PART II 272c-d 273d 274 PART III 285b-d 300a 301c PART IV 344a-c
- 48 M. L. *Liberty* 272a 107a-b
5. DOSTOYEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk 127b 13 c passim
- 54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 883d-884c

(1g) *The sovereignty of government the unity and disposition of sovereignty* 1g(3) *The sovereign people the community as the source of governmental sovereignty*)

42 KANT *Science of Right* 436c 437c d 439a 441d 450a b 450d 452a esp 451c 452a

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [1-25] 1a b [43-47] 2a

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US PREAMBLE 11a c AMENDMENTS IX-X 17d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 22 84d 85a NUMBER 33 108b-c NUMBER 39 125a 128b NUMBER 46 150b c NUMBER 49 159c NUMBER 53 167d 168b NUMBER 84 252b c

43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 341d 350a passim esp 344d 355b 356b 380c 382c 386d 393a esp 387c d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 93a 94d par 308 102c 103a / *Philosophy of History* PART II 272b 273a PART III 300a 301c PART IV 365c 366b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 680b 684a

1b Self government expressions of the popular will elections voting

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9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk II ch 6 [1266 5-30] 461c d ch 9 [1270^b 7-34] 466d-467a [1271 9-17] 467b ch 12 [1273^b 36-1274 22] 470c d bk III ch 11 479b-480c bk IV ch 14 498b 499c bk VI ch 2-3 520d 522a / *Rhetoric* bk I ch 8 [1365^b 32-33] 608a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d 35c / *Coriolanus* 180b c / *Tiberius Gracchus* 676b 681a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 ANS 207a c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* 351a 392a c esp ACT II SC II III 364a 369a

32 MILTON *Sonnets* XII 65a b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 95-99 46c-47c CH XIII SECT 154 60c d CH XIX SECT 216 74d SECT 222 75d 76c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73b 74b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 6b BK XI 71a c BK XIX 142a d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324c 325b / *Social Contract* BK I 393a b BK II 396b d BK IV 425a-432b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 241b c 521a 523a c passim

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73b 562c 564b 587a

42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c 451c 452a

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US PREAMBLE 11a c ARTICLE I SECT 2 [5 10] 11b SECT 2 [17] SECT 3 [66] 11b 12a SECT 4 [96-102] SECT 5 [107 109] 12b ARTICLE II SECT I [321 374] 14b d AMENDMENTS XII 18a c XVII 19b-c XXIII 20d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125a b VI 12 49 50 159b 162c NUMBER 51 164d 168c

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43 MILL *Liberty* 268d 269a / *Representative Government* 370a-406a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 311 102c 104a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172d 173a

2 The forms of government their evaluation and order

2a The distinction and comparison of good and bad forms of government

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-450] 261d 261b

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk III 107c 108c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk II 396c d bk III 432b-c bk VI 520b c bk VIII 587a b

7 PLATO *Republic* bk I 301c d bk VIII-IX 401d-421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b / *Lysis* bk III 663d 677a esp 669d 672a 672c bk IV 679c 682c bk V 692c 693a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk VIII ch 10-11 412c 413d / *Politics* bk III ch 1 [1273 35 36] 477b ch 6-7 475d 477a ch 11 [1282^b 14] 480c ch 15 [1286^b 5 7] 484d bk IV ch 1 10 487a 490b / *Rhetoric* bk I ch 8 608a-c

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d 35c / *Coriolanus* 180b c

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk III 51b bk IV 72a b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 105 A 1 ANS 307d 309d

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* ch 1 3a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 104b 109a c 104d 105a 114b 115a 129b 130a 150c 151a 154b c 158b c PART III 228b PART IV 273a b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 90-91 44d 45c CH X SECT 132 55a b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 78a b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 216b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 268c 269b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II III 4a 13d BK IV 15a c BK V 25d 31b BK XI 32a 3 a 37d 38b BK VIII 54a b BK XI 69a-c BK XV 109a b BK XIX 145d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 359a b / *Social Contract* bk III 410b 415b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Science of Right* 439c-440a 441b-c 450a-452a / *Judgment* 580a 587a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 51c 52d NUMBER 14 60b 61a NUMBER 22 83b d NUMBER 39 125a 126b NUMBER 48 157c

43 MILL *Representative Government* 332d 355b

44 BOV VELL Johnson 195c II 260b 390a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 90c 92a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 203b-206a c

- 43 *Mill, Representative Government* 355b-424c
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- 45 *Hegel, Philosophy of Right* part III par 2 389d 92a addition 163 144c 145a / *Philosophy of History* part IV 364d 365a 366c-d
- 46 The separation and coordination of the several powers; usurpations and infringements by one branch of go extm at upon another
- 7 *Plato, Laws* bk III 671a-672a bk IX, 754c-d
9 *Aristotle, Politics* bk IV ch 14 16 498b-502a.c / *Athenian Constitution* ch 47 par 1 573d
- 14 *Plutarch, Solon* "od 7c / *Pericles-Solon*, 88d-8 a / *Athenian Constitution* ch 47 par 1 573d
- 15 *Tertius, Against* bk I, 2a 2a 2a b bk I 684c bk II, 101c bk III 126c-d
- 20 *Aquinas, Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q97 1 222 3 3 5c 227c
- 21 *Hobbes, Leviathan* PART II 103d 104a 150b 151 152a
- 25 *Locke, Civil Government* ch I-III 25d 29d passim ch VII sect 90-94 44d-46c ch VII sect 107 49b-d ch XII 25 58c-64c ch XVI 25 70c 74c ch XIX, 3 57 21 19 4a 75c
- 33 *Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws* bk II, 6b-8c bk 29a bk VI, 36a 37b bk XI 68b-d-84d esp 69d 75a bk XIX, 142b-143a bk XX III, 239b
- 38 *Rousseau, Social Contract* bk II 397b-c bk III, 406d-40 a 410d-411a 413a III 427b-c 43a 423d bk IV 43 b-433a
- 39 *Savigny, History of Law* bk V 312 313a.c esp 314d 315a.
- 40 *Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, 241b, 28b esp 20a 26a, 27a-b 154a b 343c
- 41 *Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, 74b- 5a 5d 78b esp 6a 38c 38 a
- 4 *Black, Science of Govt* 436b 437d-439a 440a-441b 450d-452a esp 451d-452a
- 42 *Declaration of Independence* 17-9) 1a 2b passim
- 43 *Articles of Confederation* IX [193 197] 7b
- 44 *Constitution of the U.S. ARTICLE I* SECT 4 [15 4] 11d SECT 3 [5-9] 12a b 3 57 7 [3-197] 22d 12a ARTICLE II SECT 1 [33] 54 [14b-d [353 393] 14d 15a SECT 2 [32] SECT 4 [155] 15b-c
- 45 *Federalist* NUMBER 6 68b-c NUMBER 22 83d-84b NUMBER 2 96a b NUMBER 47 49 123c 161b NUMBER 51 16 d 165a NUMBER 5 165c 167b NUMBER 6, 183d 292 passim NUMBER 64-67 18 b-205b esp NUMBER 67-66 198a 202a NUMBER 7 215a 216b NUMBER 73 216d 221 NUMBER 75-77 222d 229d NUMBER 5, 230a-232a NUMBER 8 23 d 239c NUMBER 8, 242d 243a
- 43 *Mill, Liberty* 322 d / *Representative Government* 350d 351a 353b-d 355b-363a 365b-366a 401d-402b
- 44 *Boswell, Johnson*, 1 8b-c 255d 411a b
- 46 *Hegel, Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 389d 92a par 297 99b par 300 100b par 302 101a-c par 312 313 104a b ADDITIONS 163 64 144c 145a 1 4 146d 147b 15-1 9 147d 148a / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 365c-d
- 35 The relation of the civil to the military power
- 6 *Hegel, History* bk II 79a-c
- 6 *Theodorides, Peloponnesian War* bk VII 551b-d bk VIII 582a 583c 58d 586b 58 a 589a 590a-c passim
- 7 *Plato, Republic* bk III v 340b-368d
- 9 *Aristotle, Politics* bk III ch 7 [127-130] 43 [4 6d bk IV ch 13 [129-130- 5] 497d-498a bk VI ch 8 [132-133-134] 526a b bk VII ch 9 [139-141] 533b-c
- 15 *Tacitus, Annals* bk I, 6b-15a bk IV 64a b / *Historiae* bk I 190b-c 194a-c 195c 197d esp 197c-d 210d 212d bk II, 239c 240a
- 23 *Machiavelli, Prince* ch XII 18a ch XIV 21b-22a
- 23 *Hobbes, Leviathan*, PART II, 103b 159a-c
- 25 *Locke, Civil Government* ch XII SECT 147 145 58d 59b ch XVI 65d 70c
- 36 *Swift, Gulliver* PART II 80a b
- 38 *Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws* bk I 30b 31 32b bk XI 74b-d bk XIX, 143c
- 38 *Rousseau, Inequality* 361a b / *Social Contract* bk III 424b
- 39 *Smith, Wealth of Nations* bk V 301a 309a.c esp 307d 308c
- 40 *Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, 25d 26d 30a b 42b-d-43b 50b-51a 63a-64d 68c 76b-77b 245d 246d esp 246c
- 43 *DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE* [60-61] 2a [67-67] 2b [30-94] 2b-3a
- 43 *ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION* VI [107 123] 6b-c VII 6d III [290- 95] 8a [313 367] 8b-d passim
- 43 *CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I* SECT 8 [26-242] 13b-c ARTICLE II SECT 2 [109-113] 15a AMENDMENTS III 17b
- 43 *FEDERALIST* NUMBER 8 45b-c 46a-47a NUMBER 24 29 87b 101 passim NUMBER 46 152b-153a NUMBER 4 221c-d
- 43 *Mill, Representative Government* 409d 425c-d
- 44 *Boswell, Johnson*, 281d 283a
- 46 *Hegel, Philosophy of Right* part III par 3 6 10 d 103a par 329 108c ADDITIONS, 163 144c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 375a b
- 51 *Torquatus, War and Peace* bk III 138d 144c 146d 153d 155a bk V 207a-c bk IX, 346a 365c passim, esp 353a 355b, 361b-d bk X 40c-405a bk XII, 533a 537b esp 535d 537b bk XIII, 565c 566d bk XIV 610d-611 bk X 627d-630a

(2) *The forms of government their evaluation and order*

2d The influence of different forms of government on the formation of human character

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK V 175b BK VII 232d 233d

THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396c d BK VIII 56+a c

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 416a / *Laus* BK VIII 733b 734a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 10-11 412c 413d BK X CH 9 431a 436a c / *Politics* BK III CH 4-5 473c-475d BK IV CH 7 [1293^b5-6] 493a b BK V CH 9 [1310 12-35] 512b c BK VII CH 2 [1324 5-23] 528a d CH 14 [1333 11-15] 537d 538a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 16 15d 16a par 23 18a u

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d esp 34b 37c / *Numa Pompilius* 59c 60b / *Lycurgus Numa* 61b d 64a c / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 60c 61d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [246-257] 116b / *Samson Agonistes* [241 276] 344b 345b / *Areopagitica* 384b 385b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II-V 8d 19d BK V 26c 27a BK XIV 138c 140d 142a 146a c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 372a b / *Social Contract* BK II 400d 401a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 23c 24a c 79c d 91c 92b 523d 524a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 161c 162b 202b c

42 HANT *Judgement* 586b c

43 MILL *Liberty* 298d / *Representative Government* 341d 350a passim

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51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE 1 668a 669d

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- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73a 74b 78b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 6b BK VI 69d 71a 72b *passim* BK XVII 262a 269a c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324c d / *Political Economy* 368c 369a 372a b / *Social Contract* BK II 399b-402a BK III 419d 420a
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 151b 156a 616d 617b 624b c
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- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [29-47] 1b 2a [62-64] [2-79] 2b
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- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 344a 346a / *Theaetetus* 531a b

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- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 167a b

- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 6b BK VI 21d 22c BK VI 69d 75a

- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 25d 27d 15a 130c 131a

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- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [29-47] 1b 2a

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- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 1-9 11a 14a ARTICLE II SECT 2 [41 43] 15b ARTICLE III SECT 3 [507] ARTICLE IV SECT 1 [518] 16a ARTICLE IV SECT 3 ARTICLE V 16b-c ARTICLE VI [591 599] 16d AMENDMENTS 1 17a XII-XC 18a 20d *passim*

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- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73a 74b PART IV 167a b

- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 435b-436a

- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 6b BK VI 22a c BK VI 71a d 72b d

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- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [29-47] 1b 2a [62-64] [72 79] 2b

- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 1-9 11a 14a ARTICLE IV SECT 1 16a ARTICLE V 16c ARTICLE VI [591-599] 16d AMEND

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- 43 *Mill Liberty* 315c d / *Representative Government* 335a b 356c d 366d 367a 383b-d / *Utilitarianism* 473 c

- 44 *Boswell* *Johnson* 281d 282a

- 46 *Hegel Philosophy of Right* PART III par 299 99c 100b ADDITIONS 177 147d / *Philosophy of History* PART I 226d 227b 243b par iii 299 c 310c PART IV 324b 325b-c 335a 336c 364d 365c d

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- 9 *Aristotle Politics* bk ii c h 9 (1280-35 b) 478a ii

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- 38 *Rousseau* *Emile* 355b-c / *Political Economy* 369 b

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 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 311c 315a c
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 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 64b 66b NUMBER 16 66c 68d *passim* NUMBER 1 78b d NUMBER 27-29 94d 99b NUMBER 48 157c NUMBER 67-77 203b-229d *passim*
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 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 433a-434b
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 43 MILL *Liberty* 319d 323a e / *Representative Government* 356b 359a 409d-417c 421c-424b
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 297-296 97d 99b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 365c d

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 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 15 [1297] 1300b 4 / 500a 501b BK VI CH 8 525b-526d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 43-52 572d 576d CH 54-61 577c 581b
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 22b BK VI 88d 89a
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 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 25d 27c *passim* 240b 246d 248d 251a
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 317d 318b 563d 564b 586c 587a
 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION IV [37-41] 5d IX [299-310] 8b IX [368]-X [375] 8d 9a
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE II 14b 15c AMENDMENTS XII 18a-c XX 19d 20b XXII XXIII 20c d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 13 59b-c NUMBER 66 201a 203a NUMBER 67-77 203b 229d *passim* NUMBER 84 255a b

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 2 *Testament Acts* 16.19-20 21 23 *passim*
 3 *Metaphysics* *Peripatetic* [52-90] 24b-d
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 6 *Herodotus History* bk 1 31d 32a 33c 36a
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 6 *Thucydides* *Peloponnesian War* bk 1 353d
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 7 *Plato* *Letter* bk 7 668c-d
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 13 *Ag. Friend* bk 1 [124] 96 [110a 111a bk
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 14 *Plat.* *Letter* 47d-48c / *Lucullus*
 409b-410d
 15 *Titus* *Annals* bk 11 39d-40c bk 11
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 191d 192a bk 1 290a-d
 16 *Ag. Five* *City of God* bk 1 *pref* 129a-d
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 219b ch 221b-222a bk 111 ch 21 524c-d
 23 *Mem. of* *Proter* ch 1 71 3c 14c ch
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 23 *H. L.* *Letter* 11 bk 11 106d 107c 108d
 109c 110b-111a 119a-c 126d 127a 137c
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 24 *U. Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk 11
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 29 *Ca. 1* *Don Quixote* bk 1 40d
 32 *U. S. Simon* *Apostle* [1-2] 26 [344b-
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 33 *Locke* *Treatise* 13c-d 14c 15a / *Carl* *Gor*
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 36 *Swift* *Gulliver* p 1 24b-25a p 11
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 39 *Smith* *Il. f. Nations* bk 11 279a 79b
 41 *G. A. on* *Decline and Fall*, 14d 15c 28a
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 41 *G. A. on* *Decline and Fall* bk 1 216c-d
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 42 *K. v. Science* *f. Right* 413d 454 455a 456c
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 43 *De* *La* *tion* *o* *l* *de* *p* *2* *c* 1a 3b *par*
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 43 *On* *the* *tion* *o* *the* *U.S.* *title* *11* *sect*
1 241 5 [16b]
 43 *F.* *U.* *U.* 43 140d 141a

- 43 *U. L. Liberty* 272a 281d 282b [17 17 *Rep*
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 44 *Boswell* *Journal* 179c 354c 365a 3 0a
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 46 *H. ed.* *Philosophy of History* PART 1 242d
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 5c *The* *relation* *of* *local* *to* *national* *govern*
ment *the* *centralization* *and* *decentral*
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 6 *Thucydides* *Peloponnesian War* bk 11 391c
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 9 *Aristotle* *Politics* bk 11 ch 1, [1 99¹⁵ 15]
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 14 *Plutarch* *The* *11* 9a-d
 23 *Hobbes* *Leviathan* PART II 120d 121a
 33 *Montesquieu* *Spirit of Laws* bk 30a-c
 38 *Rousseau* *Social Contract* bk 11 403a-c bk
 11 412a b 420d-421a
 39 *Smith* *Wealth of Nations* bk 1 318d 319a
 420b-d
 40 *G. A. on* *Decline and Fall* 14c 5 8b-c
 43 *CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE 1* *SECT*
1 17b *ARTICLE 1* *SECT 1* 16a b
 43 *F. D. RAUL* *U. S. A.* 30d 31a *U. S. A.* 3
 33d 35a *NUMBER 14* 61b-d *U. S. A.* 17 69a
 70d *NUMBER 1* 96c-98b *passim* *U. S. A.* 31
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 117d *passim* *U. S. A.* 126b-128b *U. S. A.* 2
 43 141a-d *U. S. A.* 44 144 145c *passim*
U. S. A. 45 148b-150b *U. S. A.* 46 150b-
 153b *passim* *NUMBER 8* 253d 254b
 43 *U. L. Liberty* 322a-d / *Remembrance* *o* *Gov*
ment 417c-424c
 46 *H. ed.* *P. A. of Right* PART III *par* 90
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 50 *M. A. ENGLA* *Communist* *1* *2* 421c-d
 5d *Conf* *deration* *and* *f* *d* *ral* *union* *the* *di*
vision *of* *jurisdiction* *between* *state* *and*
f *d* *ral* *governments*
 6 *Thucydides* *Peloponnesian War* bk 1 36a
 371b
 7 *Pl. v. L.* *Letter* bk 11 667c-6 0a
 9 *A. U. S.* *Politics* bk 11 ch 9 [30¹⁵ 32]
 4 2a-c
 11 *Plutarch* *Peloponnesian War* 296a b / *A. U. S.*
 834c-d
 38 *Montesquieu* *Spirit of Laws* bk 11 58b d
 60a
 39 *Smith* *Wealth of Nations* bk 1 42 b-d
 40 *G. A. on* *Decline and Fall* 103c-d
 41 *C. A. on* *Decline and Fall* 11, 218c 219a 5 7b-c
 43 *ARTICLE* *o* *CONFEDERATION* 5a 9d
 43 *CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.* 11a 20d *exp*
ARTICLE *1* [53¹⁵-99] 15d
 43 *F. D. RAUL* *U. S. A.* 3 29a 103c *passim*,
exp *U. S. A.* 11 52b-c *U. S. A.* 14 61b-c,
U. S. A. 5 65c-d *U. S. A.* 31 104c 111d
U. S. A. 36 114b 117b *U. S. A.* 2 119b-

- (5) *The relation of governments to one another*
sovereign princes or states as in a condition
of anarchy)

5a Foreign policy the making of treaties the
 conduct of war and peace

OLD TESTAMENT Numbers 31 / Deuteronomy
 2.26-37 9 1-4 20 / Joshua 9—(D) Josue 9
 / II Samuel 3 12 1—(D) II Kings 3 12—1 /
 I Kings 5 1 12—(D) III Kings 5 1 1.

APOCRYPHA I Maccabees 8 10 12 1-23
 13 34 41 14 16-24 15 1-9 15 7—(D) OT
 I Maccabees 8 10 12 1-23 13 34-41
 14 16-24 15 1-9 15-27 / II Maccabees
 11 16-38—(D) OT II Maccabees 11 16-38

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* 258a 269a c esp [399-
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5 ARISTOPHANES *Acharmans* [61-173] 455d
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 5.2d 534a / *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c esp [486
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6 HERODOTUS *History* bk I 6a b 15d 16a
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 206b d bk VII 239a 247c passim bk VIII
 286b 287d bk IX 289a 290b 310d 311a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk I 353d
 360c d 368c d 371b 372d 378a 380d
 bk III 418d 420c 425a 428d 430c 432b c
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 469b 476a 477a bk V 486c 500 502d
 508a c esp 504c 508a c bk VI 529b 533a
 bk VIII 568a c 572c 573a 578b 579a

7 PLATO *Republic* bk II 318c 319a / *Critias*
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9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk II ch 6 [1265 18 27]
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 538c d / *Rhetoric* bk I ch 4 [1359] 33 1360
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13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk XII [172 211] 358b 359b

14 PLUTARCH *Pomulus* 21a 27c / *Numa Pom-
 pilius* 55c 56a / *Pericles* 121a 141a c / *Nicias*
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15 TACITUS *Annals* bk II 34d 35c / *Histor es*
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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk VI ch 7 515a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q
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23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* ch XVI 32a d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 121b c 159c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk I
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26 SHAKESPEARE *I Henry VI* ACT V SC IV [93-
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 33b d 34c / *King John* ACT II SC I [416-560]
 384a 385c / *2nd Henry IV* ACT IV SC II 489d
 491b / *Henry V* ACT V SC II 563b 567a c

30 BACON *New Atlantis* 204d 205a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch V SECT 45 34d

35a CH XII SECT 145 148 58d 59b CH XI
 65d 70 PYSSIM CH XIX SECT 211 73d 74a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 21b-25b PART I
 75a b 77b 78b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 354a 355a 440
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spiru of Laus* bk I, 2d 31
 bk IV-X 58b II 62b bk V 63d 64a bk XII
 223c 224a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 325c d 355- / *Polite-
 Economy* 380a II / *Social Contract* bk
 390a c bk II 403c 404a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk V 319b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 4a b 83b-85a
 84d 85a 95b 96a 103c d 119a-c 150-151
 174d 175b 378b d 402b-404b 431d-432
 433d-435a 491d-492b 495d-496b 508
 507c esp 504d 506a 535d 537a 543a-c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 48d-49c 183:
 284a 428a d 503a-c

42 KANT *Science of Right* 452c d 454a-455b

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 5a 9d

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SEC
 8 [201-203] [223 225] 13b SECT 10 [206-
 14a [314-320] 14b ARTICLE II SECT 2 [211
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43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 4-8 35a-47a NUMBER
 9 47c 49c NUMBER 11 53b 56b NUMBER 1
 64c 65a NUMBER 16 66c 68a NUMBER 2
 80d 81c 83b d NUMBER 24 88d 89b NO
 BER 25 89c 91b NUMBER 34 110a 111b 11
 BER 41 132d 133b NUMBER 42 136b 138
 NUMBER 43 142d 143b d NUMBER 44 144
 145c NUMBER 62 190d 191a NUMBER 6
 191d 192a NUMBER 64 195b 198a NUMBER
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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 321
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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 295a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk II 83d 85a
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 630a EPILOGUE I 645a 646c 649c 650b

- 5b The government of dependencies colon
 government the government of con-
 quered peoples

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 Josue 9 esp 9 18 27 / I Kings 9 20-23-
 (D) II Kings 9 20-23 / II Kings 23 30-35
 24 12 16 25 5 30—(D) IV Kings 21 30 31
 24 12 16 25 5-30 / II Chronicles 8 8-
 (D) II Paralipomenon 8 7-8

- 1 MACCABEES 8 i 13—(D) OT
 1 MACCABEES 8 i 13 / II MACCABEES 5 i 14
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 5 AI CHYLLS Persians [852-908] 24b d
 5 AI TOPHANE Illustrata [562-586] 590b-d
 5 H K DORUS History BK I 31d 32a 35c 36a
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 5 THUCYDID 3 Peoponne an Hs BK I 353d
 368b 369a K II 403c-404a BK III 425a
 428d BK V 504c 507c BK VIII 579d 580b
 7 PLATO Laws BK VI 698c d
 9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK I C I 13 [1284 36-3]
 482c BK V H 7 [307-19 24] 509d BK VII
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 [333 1 334] 538c d
 13 VIR IL Aed c 1 [51 296] 110a 111a BK
 I [845-893] 233b-234a BK VIII [714 731]
 278a b
 14 PLUT ARCH Lycurgus 47d-48c / Lucullus
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 15 TITUS ANS K I 39d-40c BK XI
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 191d 192 BK IV 290a-d
 18 AU L TIT City f G d BK I PREF 129a d
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 219b CH 17 221b 222 BK XIX CH 2 524c-d
 23 M H VELL Prince CH II VIII 3 14c CH
 BK IX 31c
 24 H SES Les Otha A TII 106d 107c 108d
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 29 CRYSTER Do Quix PART I 40d
 32 MILTON Sami n Agon te [245 276] 344b-
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 35 Loc r Toler 10 13c d 14c 151 / C of Gov
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 65d 70c passim H IX 2 CT 2 73d 74a
 36 WIFT Gulliver PART 24b-25a PART V
 182b 183
 38 M VTESQ EU Spirit of Laws BK X 61b d
 68d BK XI 83 84c K X 109b-c 110a d
 BK XXI 1 0c 171d
 39 R O SE Politic l Economy 380 b
 39 SMITH W h f Nations K IV 239a 279b
 40 GIBON D lime d F I 14d 15c 18a
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 519 522 523 H 550b-551b 608b d
 624b-c 632d 633 638a 639
 41 G B O Decline and F II 65a-c 216c d
 285a-c 505b-c
 42 L V Science f Right 413d 454-455a 456c
 457a
 43 D LAR O O I D D C I 3b pas
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 43 C TITUT O TH US ARTICLE V 3 CT
 1 [544 55] 16b
 43 FE LS V MA 43 140d 141
 43 M LL Liberty 272 281d 282b [In 3] / Rep-
 resentative Government 339a 341a 353c 411b-
 412a 427a 428a passim 433b-44 d
 44 BOSWELL Johnson 179c 354c 365a 370
 511c d
 46 HEGEL Philosophy of History P RT I 242d
 243d P RT III 299a-c
 5 The relation of local to national go ern
 ment, the centralization and decentral
 ization of go ernmental functions
 6 THUCYDID 23 Peloponnesian War BK II 391c
 392a
 9 AI TITILE P lures BK IV CH 15 [1299-15 15]
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 IN PLUT ARCH Theseus 9a d
 23 H SES Lemathan PART II 120d 121a
 38 M VTESQ EU Spirit of Laws BK V 30a-c
 38 ROLS EU Social Contract BK I 403-c BK
 III 412a b 420d-421a
 39 CUTH Wealth of Nations BK 318d 319
 420b-d
 40 GIBON Decl e a d Fall 14c 578b-c
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT
 4 12b ARTICLE IV SECT I 2 16a b
 43 FEDERALIST NUMB R I 30d 31a NUMBER 3
 33d 35a NUMB R 14 61b-d VL IBER 17 69a
 70d NUM R 28 96c 98b passim VL IBER 31
 105b-c NUM ER 32 105c 107b passim VL
 IBER 34 109b 111d passim NUMBER 37 114c
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 43 141a d NUMBER 44 144a 145c passim
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 43 M LL Liberty 322 d / Representative Go er
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 46 HEGEL Philosophy of Rights RT III par 290
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 50 M AX EN ELS Communist Ma f no 421c d
 5d Confederation and federal union the di
 vision of jurisd ct on between state and
 federal go ernments
 6 THUCYDID 23 Peloponnesian War BK I 365a
 371b
 7 PLATO Laws BK III 667c-670a
 9 ARISTOTLE Politic K III CH 9 [1280 34 b3]
 4 8a-c
 14 P UTARCH Philoemen 296 b / A tus
 834c d
 38 M VTESQ EU Spirit of Laws BK IV 58b d
 60a
 39 SMITH W h f Nations BK V 420b d
 40 GIBSON Decline and Fall 103c d
 41 GIBON De nea d F II 218c 219a 577b-c
 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 5 9d
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. II 20d esp
 ARTICLE VI [583-599] 16d
 43 FEDE S NUMB R I 37 29 103c passim
 C P NUMB R 10 52b-c N B R 14 61b-c
 NUMBER 5 65c d VL B R 3 34 104 111d
 VL ER 36 115 11 b c ER 37 119b

(5 *The relation of governments to one another sovereign princes or states as in a condition of anarchy*)

5a Foreign policy the making of treaties the conduct of war and peace

OLD TESTAMENT *Numbers* 31 / *Deuteronomy* 26-37 9 1-4 20 / *Joshua* 9—(D) *Isaiah* 9 / *I Samuel* 3 12 21—(D) *II Kings* 3 12 21 / *I Kings* 5 1 12—(D) *III Kings* 5 1-12

APOCRYPHA *I Maccabees* 8 10 12 1 23 13 34-41 14 16-24 15 1-9 15-7—(D) *OT I Maccabees* 8 10 12 1-23 13 34-41 14 16-24 15 1-9 15-27 / *II Maccabees* 11 16-38—(D) *OT II Maccabees* 11 16-38

■ EURIPIDES *Suppliants* 258a 269a c esp [399-598] 261d 263c

8 ARISTOPHANES *Acharnians* [61-173] 455d 457b [497 556] 460d-461c / *Peace* [601-692] 532d 534a / *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c esp [486 613] 589a 591a [1072 1321] 596d 599a c / *Ecclesiazusae* [193-203] 617b

6 HERODOTUS *History* bk I 6a b 15d 16a bk IV 144b d bk V 175b c bk VI 193b 206b d bk VII 239a 247c passim bk VIII 286b 287d bk IX 289a 290b 310d 311a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk I 353d 360c d 368c d 371b 372d 378a 380d bk III 418d 420c 425a 428d 430c 432b c bk IV 450d-452d 457c d 461b 463a 468a 469b 476a 477a bk V 486c 500c 502d 508a ■ esp 504c 508a ■ bk VI 529b 533a bk VIII 568a c 572c 573a 578b 579a

7 PLATO *Republic* bk II 318c 319a / *Critias* 485a b / *Laws* bk III 667c 668d

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* bk II ch 6 [1.65 18 27] 460c ch 7 [267 18 21] 462d 463a bk III ch 9 [280 35-12] 478a b ch 13 [284 38-33] 482c bk VII ch 2 [324 35 1325 13] 528b 529a ch 6 531b d ch 14 [333b 10 1334 10] 538c d / *Rhetoric* bk I ch 4 [359 33 1360 18] 600a c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk XII [172-211] 358b 359b

11 PLUTARCH *Pompeius* 21a 27c / *Numa Pompeilius* 55c 56a / *Pericles* 121a 141a c / *Nicias* 427a-428c / *Aratus* 834d

15 TACITUS *Annals* bk II 34d 35c / *Historiae* bk IV 285c 287c

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk VI ch 7 515a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 105 A 3 316a 318b

23 MACHIAVELLI *Peace* ch XXI 32a d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 121b-c 159c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk I 36d 38a bk IV 276a d

26 SHAKESPEARE *I Henry VI* ACT V SC IV [94 175] 30 31b / *2nd Henry VI* ACT I SC I [1 74] 33b d 34c / *King John* ACT II SC I [416 560] 384a 385c / *2nd Henry IV* ACT II SC II 489d 491b / *Henry V* ACT V SC II 563b 567a c

30 BACON *New Atlantis* 204d 205a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 45 34d

35a CH XII SECT 145 148 58d 59b CH XII

65d 70c passim CH XIX SECT 211 73d 74a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 21b 25b PART II 75a b 77b 78b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 354a 355a 449b 453a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* bk I 2d 1b bk IV-X 58b d 62b bk X 63d 64a bk XVI, 223c 224a

38 ROLSSAU *Inequality* 325c d 355c / *Political Economy* 380a b / *Social Contract* bk I, 390a c bk II 403c 404a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* bk V 319b-c

40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 4a b 83b-85a esp 84d 85a 95b 96a 103c d 119a-c 150d 151c 174d 175b 378b d 402b-404b 431d 43 d 433d 435a c 491d-492b 495d-496b 503d 507c esp 504d 506a 535d 537a c 543a c

41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 48d-49c 283d 284a 428a d 503a c

42 HANT *Science of Rights* 452c d 454a-455b

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 5a 9d

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 8 [201-203] [223 225] 13b SECT 10 [296-297] 14a [314-320] 14b ARTICLE II SECT 2 [1 435] 15b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 4-8 35a-47a NUMBER 9 47c-49c NUMBER 11 53b 56b NUMBER 13 64c 65a NUMBER 16 66c 68a NUMBER 17 80d 81c 83b d NUMBER 24 88d 89b NUMBER 25 89c 91b NUMBER 34 110a 111b NUMBER 41 132d 133b NUMBER 42 136b 138c NUMBER 43 142d 143b d NUMBER 44 144a 145c NUMBER 6 190d 191a NUMBER 63 191d 192a NUMBER 64 195b 198a NUMBER 75 222d 225a passim NUMBER 80 233b 236c NUMBER 81 240b c NUMBER 83 248c NUMBER 84 254b c

43 MILL *Representative Government* 428b 431b passim 434a 436b

46 HECHEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 321 329 106c 108c par 332-337 109a 110a NOTIONS 153 141d 188 149b c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 278c 279b PART III 297a d 299a c PART IV 343b ■ 357c 358b 359c 360a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 295a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk II 83d 86a ■ bk V 204a 206c 208d 209a 232a 234a c ■ bk VIII 307d 309c bk IX 344b 355c bk XIII 565a b 572b 573d 574a 582a bk XV 629b 630a EPILOGUE I 645a 646c 649c 650b

5b The government of dependencies colonial government the government of conquered peoples

OLD TESTAMENT *Jo hua* 9 esp 9 18 27—(D) *Jo c* 9 esp 9 18 27 / *I Kings* 9 20-23—(D) *III Kings* 9 20-23 / *II Kings* 23 30-33 24 12 16 25 5 30—(D) *IV Kings* 23 30-33 24 12 16 25 5 30 / *II Chronicles* 8 5—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 8 7-8

- (5 *The relation of governments to one another sovereign princes or states as in a condition of anarchy* 5d *Confederation and federal union the division of jurisdiction between state and federal governments*)

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II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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Chapter 32. HABIT

INTRODUCTION

THE familiar word habit has a tremendous range of meaning. Some of its meanings in technical discourse are so divergent from one another—as well as from the popular understanding of the term—that it is difficult to find a common thread of derivation whereby to pass from one meaning to another.

We can eliminate at once the use of the word to designate apparel as when we speak of a "winter habit." Yet even this sense contains a root of meaning which cannot be dismissed. Augustine points out that the term habit is derived from the verb to have, and Aristotle considers the meanings of to have includes the sense in which a man may be said to have a coat or tunic along with the sense in which a man may be said to have a habit—a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Just as clothes are something a person *has* or *possesses* in a manner more or less fitting to the body, so habits in the psychological sense are qualities which a person has or possesses, and they too can be judged for their fitness.

This understanding of habit is conveyed in the ancient remark which has become a common expression—that habit is second nature. Habit is not original nature but something added thereto as clothes are added to the body. But unlike clothes, which are added externally and merely by contact habits as second nature are nature itself transformed or developed. In the words of an ancient poet whom Aristotle quotes with approval habits but long practice and this becomes men's nature in the end.

Not all as we shall see would grant that practice is essential to habit. Nevertheless the word practice suggests one not on that is common to all theories of acquired habit namely that habit is a retained effect—the result of something done or experienced. Whence this common understanding there are opposite views. Accord-

ing to one view the acquisition of habits depends on activity. According to another habits are modifications, passively not actively acquired.

The word habit is also used in a sense diametrically opposite to the meanings so far considered. It is the sense in which Aristotle in the *History of Animals* discusses the habits of animals and differentiates species according to the differences in their habits. Here the word habit is used to signify not an acquired pattern of behavior but an innate predisposition to act or react in a certain way. The difference between acquired habits and the habits to which there is an innate tendency, James tells us, is marked by the fact that the latter generally are called *instincts*.

The opposition between these two meanings of habit is clear. On the one hand habits represent what in the case of living things at least is added by nurture to nature—the results of experience, training or activity. On the other hand habits which are identical with instincts belong to original nature itself—part of the native endowment of the animal. Is there any common thread of meaning in the notions of acquired and innate habit which may explain the use of the word in such opposite senses?

The familiar statement that a person does what he is in the habit of doing indicates that a habit is a tendency to a particular sort of behavior. Knowledge of a person's habits enables us to predict what he is likely to do in any situation which elicits habitual conduct on his part. So, too, an animal's behavior in a particular situation may be predicted from a knowledge of its instincts. Instinct and habit—or innate and acquired habits—seem to have this common character that they are tendencies to behavior of a specific or determinate sort. They are definitely not random behavior. In the one case the

tendency is preformed a part of the inherited nature of the organism. In the other the tendency is somehow a product of experience and learning. In neither case does habit refer to mere capacity for action unformed and indefinite nor does it refer to the action but rather to the tendency to act.

THE MODIFIABILITY OF INSTINCTS by experience indicates another and more dynamic connection between innate and acquired habits. William James conceives innately determined behavior as if it were a plastic material out of which new patterns of conduct can be formed. The process of animal learning he thinks can be generally described as the replacement of instincts by habits. Most instincts he writes are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits and this purpose once accomplished the instincts themselves as such have no *raison d'être* in the psychological economy and consequently fade away.

Some years before the Russian physiologists Bechterev and Pavlov experimentally studied the conditioning of reflexes James described animal learning in terms of the substitution of new for old responses to stimuli which had previously called forth an instinctive reaction or in terms of the attachment of instinctive responses to new stimuli. The actions we call instinctive James writes all conform to the general reflex type and are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli. For example a predatory animal instinctively responsive to various perceptible signs of the whereabouts of its prey may learn to hunt for its food in a particular locality at a particular time and in a particular way. Or to take the example James gives if a child in his first attempts to pat a dog gets snapped at or bitten so that the impulse of fear is strongly aroused it may be that for years to come no dog will excite in him the impulse to fondle again. Similarly an animal which has no instinctive fear of man may acquire an habitual tendency to flee at man's approach as the result of experiences in which the appearance of man is associated with instinctively recognized signs of danger.

In the classification of animals from Aristotle on the instincts peculiar to each species have been used in their differentiation. In addition the degree to which the instincts of an animal

are either relatively inflexible at one extreme or easily modifiable at the other has been thought to indicate that animal's rank in the scale of intelligence. The higher animals seem to have a greater capacity to form habits and to be capable therefore of modifying their instinctive patterns of behavior as the result of experience. In consequence their behavior is both more adaptive and more variable than that of animals which always follow the lines of action laid down by instinct.

Species whose instincts are largely unmodifiable are at a disadvantage in a changing environment or in one to which they are not innately adapted. In the struggle for existence Darwin observes it is the organism that varies ever so little either in habits or structure which "gains an advantage over some other inhabitant of the same country. Though for the most part instincts seem to be directed toward the animal's survival intelligence or the power of modifying instincts by learning may sometimes be needed to save the animal from his own instinct.

If the lower animals are most dependent on their instincts and least able to modify them that would seem to indicate a kind of opposition between instinct and intelligence. Darwin quotes Cuvier to the effect that instinct and intelligence stand in an inverse ratio to each other but he himself does not wholly accept this view. He thinks that the behavior of bees for example or of certain classes of insects shows that a high degree of intelligence is certainly compatible with complex instincts. Yet he admits that it is not improbable that there is a certain amount of interference between the development of free intelligence and of instinct.

On this subject of instinct in relation to intelligence or reason James seems to take a less equivocal position. According to him man possesses all the impulses that [animals] have and a great many more besides. After enumerating what he considers to be the instinctive tendencies of the human species he concludes by saying that no other mammal not even the monkey shows so large an array. But since James also thinks that man has the keenest intelligence and may even be the only reasoning animal he cannot believe that there is any material antagonism between instinct and reason. On the

contrary a high development of the faculties of memory of associating ideas and of making inferences implies not the absence of instinct but the modifiability of instinct by experience and learning. Though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too. James writes he would never seem the fatal automaton which a *merely* instinctive animal would be.

The opposite point of view is taken by those who like Curvier hold that the more adequate an animal's instinctive equipment is for its survival the less it needs free intelligence for adaptive purposes and the less important is the role of learning and habit formation. Some writers like Aquinas go further than this and maintain that in the case of man the power of reason as an instrument of learning and of solving life's problems supplants instinct almost entirely or needs to be supplemented by instinctive impulses of an extremely rudimentary sort—hardly more complex than simple reflexes.

What other animals do by instinct man does by reason. Brute animals Aquinas writes do not act at the command of reason but if they are left to themselves such animals act from natural instinct. Since in his opinion habits can be formed only by acts which involve reason as a factor he does not think that strictly speaking habits are to be found in brutes. But he adds to the extent that man's reason may influence brutes by a sort of conditioning, to do things in this or that way so in this sense to a certain extent we can admit the existence of habits in brute animals.

THE MODIFICATION of instincts in the course of individual life raises a question about their modifiability from generation to generation. The question has obvious significance for the theory of evolution.

It is thought by some that an animal's instincts represent the past experience of the race. In a passage quoted by James Herbert Spencer for example maintains that reflex actions and instincts result from the registration of experience continued for numberless generations. Freud appears to hold much the same opinion. All organic instincts are conservative he writes. They are functionally acquired and are directed towards regression towards reintegration

of something earlier. Indeed he claims that the instincts of living things revert back beyond ancestral history to the inorganic. They go back to an ancient starting point which the living being left long ago. They are an imprint left upon the development of the organism by the evolution of our earth and its relation to the sun.

James on the other hand claims that there is perhaps not one single unequivocal item of positive proof in favor of the view that adaptive changes are inherited. He thinks the variability of instincts from generation to generation must be accounted for by some other means than the inheritance of acquired characteristics according to which the habits acquired by earlier generations gradually become through hereditary transmission the innate habits of later generations.

The question of their origin aside what is the structure of instincts? In the chapter on Emotion where this matter is considered instinctive behavior is described as having three components. It involves first an innate ability to recognize certain objects second an emotional reaction to them which includes an impulse to act in a certain way and third the ability to execute that impulse without benefit of learning.

James covers two of these three points when he defines an instinct as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends and without previous education in the performance and then touches on the remaining one when he declares that instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct he goes on to say excites an emotion as well but emotions fall short of instincts in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go further and enter into practical relations with the external object.

In the discussion of instincts from Aristotle to Freud the emphasis on one or another of these components has varied from time to time. Mediaeval psychologists if we take Aquinas as an example seem to stress the cognitive aspect. He speaks of the sheep running away when it sees the wolf not because of its color or shape but as a natural enemy. The point which he thinks

notable here is not the fact that the sheep runs away but rather the fact that without any previous experience of wolves the sheep recognizes the wolf as dangerous. The sheep seeing the wolf judges it a thing to be shunned not from deliberation but from natural instinct. This instinctive power of recognizing what is to the animal's advantage or peril Aquinas calls the estimative power and assigns it along with memory and imagination to the sensitive faculty.

Later writers stress the emotional and conative aspects of instinct—feeling and impulse. James for example indicates this emphasis when he says that every instinct is an impulse and Freud makes desire central rather than perception or action. An instinct he says may be described as a stimulus but it would be more exact to speak of a stimulus of instinctual origin as a need. The instincts are the basic cravings or needs and these instinctual needs are the primary unconscious determinants of behavior and thought.

What Freud calls instinctual needs seem to be the counterpart of what in an earlier phase of the tradition are called natural desires. These two notions are far from being strictly interchangeable but they do have a certain similarity in their reference to desires which are not conscious or acquired through experience. This matter is further discussed in the chapter on *DESIRE*.

IF WE TURN NOW to the consideration of habit as something acquired by the individual we find two major issues. The first of these has already been mentioned in connection with the conception of habit as a *retained effect*.

According to William James the capacity for habit formation is a general property of nature found in inanimate matter as well as in living things. The moment one tries to define what habit is he writes one is led to the fundamental properties of matter. He regards the laws of nature for example as nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other. In the organic world however the habits are more variable than this.

James attributes this universal capacity for habit formation to what he calls the plasticity

of matter which consists in the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits. He cites as examples of habit formation in inorganic matter such things as the magnetizing of an iron bar the setting of plaster scratches on a polished surface or creases in a piece of cloth. The matter in each of these cases is not only plastic and yielding but retentive through its inertia. When the structure has yielded he writes the same inertia becomes the condition of its comparative permanence in the new form and of the new habits the body then manifests.

The habits of living things or of the human mind are to be regarded only as special cases of nature's general plasticity and retentiveness. James does not fail to observe the difference between the magnetized bar the scratched surface or the creased cloth and the habits of a trained animal or a skilled workman. The latter are acquired by activity—by practicing the same act repeatedly. Furthermore they are not merely passive relics of a past impression but are themselves tendencies to action. They erupt into action almost spontaneously when the occasion for performance arises.

It may be questioned whether the word habit should be used so broadly. Unlike James most writers restrict its application to living things and even there they limit habit formation to the sphere of learning. If the capacity to learn from experience is not a property of plant life then plants cannot form habits. The same may be said of certain species of animals whose activity is entirely and inflexibly instinctive. Habits are possessed only by those organisms—animals or man—whose future conduct can be determined by their own past behavior. Aquinas as we have seen goes further than this and limits habit formation in a strict sense to man alone.

This leads at once to the second issue. For those who believe that man is not specifically different from all other animals man's habits and his habit formation require no special distinction or analysis. They hold that human intelligence differs from animal intelligence only in degree not in kind. No other factors they think are present in human learn-

ing than those which operate when animals somehow profit from experience or acquire new modes of behavior. In the great books there is to be found however a very special theory of habit which is part of the doctrine that man is specifically different from all other animals in that he alone is rational and has free will.

The issue about man's nature is discussed in other chapters (ANIMAL, EVOLUTION, MAN, MIND). Here we must examine the consequences for the theory of habit of these opposing views. Do animals and men form habits in the same sense of that term? The use of the word is not at stake for habit may be used in a different sense for the acquired dispositions of animals. Those who hold that brute animals and men do not have habits in the same sense acknowledge that men may have, in addition to the specifically human habits, the sort of modified instincts or conditioned reflexes which are typical of animal habit formation. Further more it is recognized that human and animal habits are alike in certain respects. Both are acquired by activity and both are tendencies to activity of a determinate sort.

The question therefore is simply this: Does one conception of habit apply to men and animals, or does human nature require a special conception applicable to man alone? To clarify this issue it is necessary to summarize the analysis of human habits which Aristotle and Aquinas develop more fully than other writers, even than those who share their view of the rationality and freedom of man.

THAT ARISTOTLE and Aquinas should be the authors of an elaborate theory of human habits becomes intelligible in terms of two facts.

In the first place they consider habit in the context of moral theory. For them the virtues moral or intellectual are habits, and so necessarily are the opposite vices. Virtues are good habits, vices bad habits; hence good or bad human habits must be so formed and constituted that they can have the moral quality connoted by virtue or vice. Since virtue is praiseworthy and vice blameworthy only if the possessor is responsible human habit is conceived as arising from freely chosen acts.

In the second place the understanding of habit is affected by their psychological doctrine

of faculties and especially by their analysis of the powers and activities which they think belong peculiarly to man. This in turn gives a metaphysical meaning to habit for they treat human powers and human acts as special cases of potentiality and actualization.

Aquinas bases much of his discussion of habit on Aristotle's definition of it as a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another. In calling a habit a disposition Aristotle goes on to say that all dispositions are not necessarily habits, for while dispositions are unstable or ephemeral habits are permanent or at least difficult to alter.

For a disposition to be a habit certain other conditions must be present according to Aquinas. That which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; he writes and hence should be related to it as potentiality is to act. If there is a being which lacks all potentiality he points out we can find no room in such a thing for habit—as is clearly the case in God.

It is also necessary that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. If there were a potentiality which could be actualized in one way and one way only then such a power of operation could not be determined by habits. Some of man's powers seem to be of this sort. His faculty of sensation, for example functions perfectly when the sense organs have normally matured. A man does not learn to see colors or to hear tones, and so the simple use of his senses—apart from aesthetic perceptions and trained discriminations—does not lead to sensory habits.

The exterior apprehensive powers as sight, hearing and the like Aquinas maintains are not susceptible of habits but are ordained to the fixed acts according to the disposition of their nature.

In contrast man's faculty of thinking and knowing can be improved or perfected by activity and exercise. The words improved and perfected are misleading if they are thought to exclude bad habits, for a bad habit is no less a habit than a good one. The definition of habit Aquinas points out includes dispositions which dispose the subject well or

ill to its form or to its operation. Hence when we say that a power of operation is improved or perfected by being exercised we must mean only that after a number of particular acts the individual has a *more determinate* capacity for definite operation than he had before.

A man may have at birth the mere capacity for knowing grammar or geometry but after he has learned these subjects he has the habit of such knowledge. This according to Aristotle and Aquinas means that his original capacity has been rendered more determinate in its activity. It would be so even if he had learned errors that is even if the intellectual habits he had formed disposed his mind in a manner which would be called ill rather than well.

The difference between a man who has learned grammar and one who has not is a difference in their capacity for a certain intellectual performance a difference resulting from the intellectual work which has been done by the man who has learned grammar. That difference is an intellectual habit. The man who has not learned grammar has the same undeveloped capacity for knowing grammar with which he was born. The man who has learned grammar has had his native capacity for grammatical knowledge developed. That developed capacity is a habit of knowledge or skill which manifests itself in the way in which he writes and speaks. But even when he is not actually exercising his grammatical skill the fact that he has formed this particular habit means that he will be able whenever the occasion arises to do correctly with speed and facility what the man who does not have the habit cannot do readily or easily if he can do it at all.

It may be helpful to illustrate the same points by reference to a bodily habit such as a gymnastic or athletic skill which being an art is a habit not of body alone but of mind as well. If two men are born with normal bodies equally capable of certain muscular coordinations they stand in the same relation to performing on the tennis court. Both are equally able to learn the game. But when one of them has learned to play his acquired skill consists in the trained capacity for the required acts or motions. The other man may be able to perform all these acts or go through all these motions but not with the same facility and grace or as pleasantly as

the man whose mastery of the game lies in a habit formed by much practice in doing what is required. As the habit gradually grows awkwardness is overcome speed increases and pleasure in performance replaces pain or difficulty.

Clearly then the habit exists even when it is not in operation. It may even develop during periods of inactivity. As William James remarks there is a sense in which we learn to swim during the winter and to skate during the summer when we are not actually engaging in these sports. This would seem to be inconsistent with the general insight common to all observers that habits are strengthened by exercise and weakened or broken by disuse or by the performance of contrary acts. But James explains that his point stated less paradoxically means only that during periods of rest the effects of prior activity seem to consolidate and build up a habit.

The dynamism of habit formation and habitual activity is summarized in the language of Aristotle and Aquinas by the statement that habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. On the one hand a habit is like a power or capacity for though it is an improvement on native ability it is still only an ability to perform certain acts it is *not* the actual performance of them. On the other hand habit is like operation or activity for it represents an actualization or development of capacity even as a particular operation is an actualization of the power to act. That is why habit is sometimes called a second grade of potentiality (compared to natural capacity as first potentiality) and also a first grade of actuality (compared to operation as complete act).

ACCORDING TO THE theory of specifically human habits habits are situated only in man's powers of reason and will. Habits are formed in the other powers only to the extent that they are subject to direction by his reason and will. Specifically human habits can be formed only in that area of activity in which men are free to act or not to act and when they act free to act this way or that. Habit the product of freedom is not thought of as abolishing freedom. However difficult it may be to exert a free choice against a strong habit even the strongest

habit is not conceived as unbreakable and if it is breakable it must permit action contrary to itself. Habitual behavior only seems to lack freedom because a man does habitually without conscious attention to details, what he would be forced to do by conscious choice at every step if he lacked the habit.

In the theory under consideration habits are classified according to the faculty which they determine or perfect on the ground that every power which may be variously directed to act needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Consequently there are intellectual habits, or habits of thinking and knowing, and appetitive habits, or habits of desire which involve the emotions and the will and usually entail specific types of conduct. Within a single faculty such as the intellect habits are further differentiated by reference to their objects or to the end to which their characteristic operation is directed. For example the habit of knowing which consists in a science like geometry and the habit of artistic performance such as skill in grammar both belong to the intellect but they are distinct habits according to their objects or ends.

All of these distinctions have moral as well as psychological significance. They are used in formulating the criteria of good and bad habits which are more appropriately discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE. But here one further psychological distinction deserves comment. Some of man's acquired habits are regarded as natural in a special sense—not in the sense in which instincts are called natural or innate habits. The distinction is drawn from the supposition that certain habits develop in all men because since human nature is the same for all men will it inevitably form these habits if they act at all. This word natural here applied to a habit simply means that it is common to all having the same nature.

For example the understanding of the law of contradiction—that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time—and other simple axioms of theoretic knowledge are said to be possessed by the human mind as a matter of natural habit. If a man thinks at all he will come to know these truths. It is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul, Aquinas writes, that man has long once grasped what is

a whole and what is a part should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part.

The sense in which Aquinas says that the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit applies to the first principles of the practical reason as well as to the axioms of theoretic knowledge. Just as no man who makes theoretic judgments about the true and the false can be in his opinion without habitual knowledge of the principle of contradiction so he thinks no man who makes practical judgments about good and evil can be without habitual knowledge of the natural moral law the first principle of which is that *the good is to be sought and evil avoided*. Since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually Aquinas writes while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually in this way the natural law may be called a habit.

In a different phase of the tradition Hume regards it as an inevitable tendency of the human mind to interpret any repeated sequence of events in terms of cause and effect. If one thing has preceded another a certain number of times in our experience we are likely to infer that if the first occurs the second will follow. The principle which determines us to form such a conclusion is Hume says, Custom or Habit. All our inferences from experience are effects of custom not of reasoning and since the habit of inferring a future connection between things which have been customarily conjoined in the past is in his opinion universally present in human nature Hume refers to it as a species of natural instinct which no reasoning or process of thought and understanding is able either to produce or prevent.

Even Kant's synthetic judgments *a priori* have a certain similarity to the thing called natural habit. They comprise judgments the mind will make because of its own nature or in Kant's terms, its transcendental structure. Though *a priori* the judgment itself is not innate for it arises only when actual experience provides its subject matter. So too the natural habit of first principles of which Aquinas speaks is not innate but a result of experience.

THERE IS STILL ONE other traditional meaning of the phrase natural habit. It occurs in

Christian theology Habits are there distinguished according as they are acquired by man's own efforts or are a gift of God's grace which adds to or elevates human nature The former are natural the latter supernatural

In the sphere of supernatural habits the theologian makes a distinction between grace itself and the special habits which accompany grace Aquinas for example writes that just as the natural light of reason is something different from the acquired virtues which are ordained to this natural light so also the light of grace which is a participation of the divine nature is something different from the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light These infused virtues like the natural virtues are good habits—principles of operation determining acts of thought or desire They are either the specifically theological virtues of faith hope and charity or the supernatural counterparts of the acquired intellectual and moral virtues—the habits which are called the infused virtues and the moral and intellectual gifts

Grace taken in itself rather than in its consequences is not an *operative* habit that is it is not a habit of performing certain acts Nevertheless regarded as something added to and perfecting nature it is considered under the aspect of habit But rather than a habit where by power is inclined to an act Aquinas includes it among those habits by which the nature is well or ill disposed to something and chiefly when such a disposition has become a sort of nature Through the habit of grace man's nature is elevated by becoming a partaker of the divine nature

To distinguish this kind of habit from those in the operative order it is sometimes called an *entitative* habit—a habit of the very *being* of man's personality On the purely natural plane health may be thought of in the same way as a habit which is entitative rather than operative It is a habit not of thought desire or conduct but of man's physical being

THE WORD *CUSTOM* is sometimes a synonym for habit and sometimes a variant with special connotations What a man does habitually is customary for him to do So far as the single individual is concerned there seems to be no

difference between habit and custom But we usually think of customs in terms of the group or community rather than the individual As indicated in the chapter on *CUSTOM AND CONVENTION* the prevailing modes of behavior in a society and its widely shared beliefs represent common habits of thought and action on the part of its members Apart from the habits of individuals social customs have no existence whatsoever But social customs and individual habits cannot be equated because with respect to any customary practice or opinion, there may be non-conforming individuals—men of divergent habit The prevalent or predominant customs are the habits of the majority

No society endures for long or functions peacefully unless common habits generate the ties of custom To perpetuate itself the state necessarily attempts to mould the habits of each growing generation—by every means of education by tradition by law So important is the stability of custom in the life of society according to Montaigne that it is very unjust to subject public and established customs and institutions to the weakness and instability of a private and particular fan He doubts whether any so manifest benefit can accrue from the alteration of a law received let it be what it will as there is danger and inconvenience in altering it His extreme caution with regard to changing the law comes from a preference for the stability of settled customs and from the recognition that government is a structure composed of diverse parts and members joined and united together with so strict connection that it is impossible to stir so much as one brick or stone but the whole body will be sensible of it

Without habits of action at least neither the individual nor society can avoid chaos Habits bind day to day in a continuity which would be lost if the recurring problems of conduct or thought had to be solved anew each time they arose Without habits life would become unbearably burdensome it would bog down under the weight of making decisions Without habits men could not live with themselves much less with one another Habits are as William James remarks the fly wheel of society

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOIER *Iliad* BK II [265-53] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [b 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 42-(D) II *Esdra*s 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Diverse conceptions of habit as second nature perfection of power retained modification of matter

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 330a

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8^b.6-9 13] 13d 14a / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [46 10-248 6] 329c 330d / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 20 544a / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417 1-418 6] 647d 648d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 14^b 2] 348b d 349a BK VII CH 10 [1152 9 33] 402b / *Politics* BK VII CH 13 [1332 39^b 10] 537a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1370 5-8] 613b

10 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII PART 10 55c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630d 631a

11 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 2 REP 2 105c 106b Q 8 A 2 466c 467b

12 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 1a 6a Q 94 A 1 221a d

13 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 489c d

14 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC IV [160-170] 56b

15 PASCAL *Pensees* 93 190a

16 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6 249a b

17 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 3^d 464d

18 MILL *Liberty* 260c d

19 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PART 3 57a

20 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119b d

21 JAMES *Psychology* 68a 83b esp 68a 69b 73b 74a 78b 19a

1a Habit in relation to potency and act

22 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^b 10 248 8] 329 330d BK VIII CH 4 [255 30^b 3] 340a c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 1 570b d 572a CH 5 573a c / *Soul* BK II CH [412 22 28] 642b CH 5 [417^a 21 418 6] 647d 648d BK III CH 4 [429^b 23] 661d 662a Sense and the Sensible CH 4 [441^b 16-24] 679i

23 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 14^b 2] 348b d 349a

24 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 I REP 1 75d 76c Q 18 A 2 REP 2 105c 106b Q 19 A 6 7 419b 421c A 10 ANS 423d 424d A 12 425c 426b Q 87 A 2 ANS 466c 467b Q 87 A 6 REP 3 478b d

25 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49-56 1a 35a *passim* Q 71 A 4 ANS and REP 108b 109a Q 94 A 1 REP 1 221a d

1b to 3a

1b Habit: relation to the plasticity of matter

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 50
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 111 121 Psychol 63 68a 71a 423-424a passim
 429a-430a
 34 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d
 652c

2 The kinds of habit: the distinction of habit from disposition and other qualities

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 8 [9^b 6-9 13] 13d
 14 CH 15 21c d / *Physics* bk 111 c 13 [46
 10-25^b] 329c 330d / *Metaphysics* K 1
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk 1 n. [103 14 2]
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 49
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2 Distinction of habits according to origin and function: innate and acquired; vegetative and operative habits

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk 1 CH 5 [103^b 31
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 49
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 23 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 48 c
 28 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 48 c
 33 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 48 c
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 42 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 303d 304a
 43 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 459b-461c
 49 DANILO *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 68b 69c esp
 89 119a d / *Descent of the Human Individual* 304b d [in 5]
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 53 HENRI DE LANCET *Psychology* 68
 54 FREUD *General Principles of Psychology* 591d 92b
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2b Distinction of habit as according to the capacity habit directed to the object of the habit as such

- 7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 518a b
 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk 1 CH 3 [34^b 0-
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk 1 c 13 [102^b 26-
 11 3] 1347d 348d K 1 12 [31 1]
 393c d / *Physics* K 1 n. [133] 16-36]
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 50
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 5 492b-493d
 28 HENRI DE LANCET *On the Generation of the Human Individual* 333a b

3 The first acts or innate habits of animals and men

- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk 11 320b-c
 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 8 [9 13 8] 14b /
Metaphysics bk 1 CH 5 [104^b 31 34] 573a
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk 1 CH 1
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 8] 122d / *Politics* bk 1 CH 13 [133 30-310]
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 10 GILBERT *Natural Faculties* bk 1 CH 12 173a n
 12 ILLIACUS *Nature of Things* bk 11 [41 14]
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 18 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 18
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* p. 111 n. q. 50
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 26 HENRI DE LANCET Henry V CH 11 [187 204]
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 28 HENRI DE LANCET *On Animal Generation* 428a-c
 35 HENRI DE LANCET *Human Understanding* SECT 14 DIV
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 33 MONTESQUIEU *Sp. of Laws* bk 1 2b d
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 334d 336
 40 GIBBO *De la d'F* 409d-410a
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119 135 c esp
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 51 TOULMIN *War and Peace* bk VII 278a 287a
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 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 17b esp 12b 47b
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 54 FREDERICK *Instinct* 412a-421a n esp 412b 413b /
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3a Instinctual needs or desires

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk 1 62d 63 67b c
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 7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b 163c 166b
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk 1 CH 1 [90^b 22
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 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk V CH 1 8
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 10 GILBERT *Natural Faculties* bk 1 CH 12 173a c
 12 LANCET *Nature of Things* bk 11 [1037
 1 57] 57d
 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk 1 CH 3 128c-d

(3) *The instincts or innate habits of animals and men* 3a *Instinctual needs or drives*

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 12 A 5 ANS and REP 3 672a c Q 13 A 2 REP 3 3 673c 674c Q 16 A 2 REP 2 684d 685b Q 17 A 2 REP 3 687d 688b Q 41 A 1 REP 3 798b d
- 21 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [10 75] 80a-c
- 22 CHAUCER *Maniciple's Tale* [17 104 144] 490a b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a d 84c 86b PART II 141a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 184a b 424d 425c 512a b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 339b 346a 347d 349a 350a 361c 362a 402a d 460d 461a 476b 477b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 72c 73a
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99d 103a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 4-9 398d 399c
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 78-80 42b 43a / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 3 104b d
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 38 466b DIV 45 469c SECT IX DIV 8, 488c SECT XII DIV 118 504c d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 342c 346d passim
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 469b 470c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 164b c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 286b 288a
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 122d 131b / *Descent of Man* 298a c 309a 314b esp 304b 305a 308a 310a 311a 312d 371c 372c 456b 457c 583a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE 1 665a d
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3b *The innate sense of the beneficial and harmful the estimative power*

- 8 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 63b c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BA VIII CH 12 [59^b 20 28] 122d BA IX CH 5-6 136d 138b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 20 167d 168b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 10 ANS 117d 118b Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 76 A 5 REP 4 394c 396a Q 78 A 4 ANS and REP 4-5 411d 413d Q 81 A - REP 2 429c 430c A 3 ANS and REP - 430c 431d Q 83 A 1 ANS 436d 438a Q 96 A 1 ANS and REP 4 510b 511b

- 22 CHAUCER *Nun's Priest's Tale* [15, 2, 9-3] 457b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 286d 287b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 456d 457a
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 100a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 9, 42c 43a / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 3 104b d BK II CH V SECT 3 141c d CH XI SECT 5 144d 145a SECT II 145d 146a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 144a b 146b 148a
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 121a 122c / *Descent of Man* 287d 288a 290c 291a 292d c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPIL 111a c 123a c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* BA 13a 708a 709a 720b 725a passim 729b
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 607d 609c 612c 614a esp 613d 614a 623b c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 640d 620a / *Inhibitory Symptoms and Anxiety* 721a 722c esp 1 a 737b 738a 751a 752b / *New Introductory Lectures* 845a 846a

3c *Instinct in relation to reason*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BA II CH 9 [199^b 20-31] 276c
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- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BA III SECT 16 262d 263a c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 20-1 167d 168c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 76 A 5 REP 4 394c 396a Q 78 A 4 ANS and REP 4-5 411d 413d Q 83 A 1 ANS 436d 438a Q 96 A 1 REP 4 510b 511b PART II Q 12 A 5 ANS and REP 3 672a c Q 17 A 3 REP 3 687d 688b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 90 A 3 8b 9a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 216b 219b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428a c
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BA I APH 10^a 18d
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 59d 60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 SCHOL 399c
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 339 344 233a b / *Vacuum* 357a b
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 38 466b DIV 45 469c SECT IX DIV 8, 488c SECT XII DIV 118-119 504c 505b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BA I 393b c
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 409d 410a
- 42 KANT *Fund P in Metaphysic of Morals* 256d 257a / *Practical Reason* 316c 317a / *Judgment* 602b d [fn 1]
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 164b c 171b c PART IV 361c d

- 40 D WYD *Descent of Man* 283d 289a esp 283c-d 292c-d 317b-c
- 51 JAMES *Psychology* 676b-677a 691 b 04a 706b
- 52 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 377c 380b / *Unconscious* 433b-d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651 / *Ego and Id*, 702c-d 715a 716b esp 715d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 800d-801a / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b-839b esp 838a-c 843d-845b
- 32 The instincts: the basis of habit formation, the modification of instincts and reflexes through experience or learning
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk iv ch 9 [376^b + 40] 63b x ix ch 49 156d 157a / *Politics* bk ii ch 13 [1332^a 39-10] 537a b
- 12 LI SI *On the Nature of Things* xiii [30^a 32-] 34a-b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 5 A 3 REP 2 8b-9a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 3 466b DIV 4 469c SECT IX DIV 8 487 488a esp iv 8 488c
- 46 H GEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIO 97 13 133a
- 49 DAWKIN *Descent of Man* 288b 290c 291 293d 29c 298a-c 317 319a 569c 571b passim, esp 570a 592d 593b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 8b-9a 13a 17b esp 17a 44 52b esp 49b-50a 705a 712b 718a 720a-b 725a 732b-735b 827a-835a esp 834-835a
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 15d 18a / *Narcissism* 407-408a / *Instincts* 415b-421a,c esp 415d-418a / *Repression*, 422a-423b / *General Introduction*, 574d 575d 587d 588b 590c 593b esp 592b-c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 640c / *Group Psychology* 693b-695c esp 693d-694b / *War and Death*, 757d 759d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781 -d / *New Introductory Lectures* 847a ii 870a b
- 55 The genes: transmission and modification of instincts in the course of generations
- 12 LI SI *On the Nature of Things* xii [661-668] 23b-c [741 753] 39c-d
4. HALL J *Journal* 580a b
- 49 D WYD *Origin of Species* 82d-85c III 119a 135a esp 171b-172d, 131c 134d 236d 237 *Descent of Man* 283b-c 292c 304b-d [61 5] 318a 319a passim 504c 507 esp 506c 507
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 691 ii 717a 725a passim, esp 718b, 714a, 714b-725a 851b 853a-858a 870b-877
- 54 FOUCAULT *Discourse of Power* 413b-c / *General Introduction* 591d 592b 594d 595b 613a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d-654c 660c / *Ego and Id*, 702c 708b / *War and Death*, 758d
- 4 Habit formation
- 4a The causes of habit practice: repetition teaching and the law
- 7 PLATO *Republic* bk iii 330a 333b-d / *Theaetetus* 518a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk ii ch 3 [246^a 10-248^b] 329c 330d / *Metaphysics* bk ix ch 5 [1047^a 31 34] 573a ch 8 [1049^a 29-1050^a 31] 575c-d / *Soul*, bk ii ch 5 [417^a 1 418^b] 647d-648d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vii ch i [571^a 23] 107b bk viii ch 29 [607^a 9-13] 132c / *Ethics* bk ii ch i-4 348b-d 351b passim bk iii ch 5 [1114^a 3 10] 360a ch i [1 9^a 2-34] 365d 366a / *Politics* bk ii ch 8 [1 9^a 23 34] 465b bk vii ch 1 1332^a 8-25] 539b-d bk iii ch i [1332^a 19-27] 542b ch 5 [1339^a 1 25] 544c-d / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 10 [1369^b 6-8] 612d
- 11 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk ii ch 18 161 167b bk iii ch 3 179d ch 8 184b-c
- 12 ALA LUTY *Modifications* bk i SECT 16 271c-d
- 14 PLOTINUS *Principles* 121 122b
- 18 ALBERTUS *Co. Secorum* bk viii par 10 50c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 86 A 2 in 462a-463a Q 89 A 6 REP 3 478b-d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 3 12a 15d Q 51 A 4 REP 1 3 25b-d Q 9 A 1 213c 214c A 2 REP 4 214d 215a,c Q 9 3 225c 229b Q 96 A 2 3 231c 233a
- 21 DANT *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY x i [8 114] 77d 78a
- 23 HORACE *Saturnalia* PART II 154d 155a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 15c-d 42b-44c 81a b 534a-c
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III S I [160-170] 56b
- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 79c
- 31 SEPTEMBER *Ethics* bk iv PROP 10 SCHOL 455a 456a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* xi ch xxi SECT 71 197b-198a ch xxxiii SECT 5 13 248d 251c passim
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 3 466b
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 357 360d
- 43 FOUCAULT *Discourse of Power* 413b-c
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 329d 330a
- 46 H GEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIO 97 13 c 133a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 251b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 70a 73b 332a 571a ii
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 573d
- 43 The growth and decay of habit: ways of strengthening and breaking habits
- 7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 518a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch 8 [10^b 6-11 4] 15d 16a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk ii ch i 348b-d 351b passim bk vi ch i [1 9^a 2-33] 403b

(4) *Habit formation 4b The growth and decay of habits ways of strengthening and breaking habits*

- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 27 132b 133b BK II CH 18 161a 162b BK III CH 12 187b 188b
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 16 271c d
- 17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Enn ad TR III CH 20* 293a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 52-53 15d 22d Q 54 A 4 REP 1 3 25b d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 64a b 390b c 391c 393b 395b 396d 525d 527a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69a 69d 70a 79b-c 80a b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b 49d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensees* 6 173a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 71 197b 198a
- 41 MILL *Utilitarianism* 464a d
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 259a
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 309c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 79b 83b 332a

5 The analysis of specifically human habits

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246 10-248 6] 329c 330d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1-6 348b d 352d passim
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 49-54 1a 25d
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* 1 1a 2a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 83b

5a Habits of body manual arts and the skills of play

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46c / *Republic* BK III 334d 335b BK VII 391d / *Theaetetus* 518a b / *Laws* BK VII 717b d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [4b 10-19] 329c 330a / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 20 [102^b 10-13] 544a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 33-35] 348d [1103^b 6-13] 349a / *Politics* BK IV CH I [1288^b 10-20] 487a b BK VII CH 15 [1334^b 28] 539b d CH 17 [1336 3 22] 541a b BK VIII CH 4 544a c
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Articulations* par 52 109b 110a par 55 111c par 58 112b 113a / *Aphorisms* SECT III par 49-50 133d
- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 15 190a-c
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV [590-620] 295a b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 40d 42a / *Coriolanus* 175b / *Philopoemen* 293d 294a / *Demosthenes* 693c 695b
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II CH 8 87a b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 49 A 2 REP 1 3 2b 4a A 3 REP 3 4b 5a A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 50 A 1 6a 7b A 3 REP 2 8b 9a Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a A 2 ANS 18a 19a Q 54 A 1 ANS 22d 23d

- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 28a 29b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 43d 66c 67a 73c 316b c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 53d 54a
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166b 167a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 53a BK V 337d 338a
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 5a b
- 42 KANT *Judgements* 586a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 52 25c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 26^b 268b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 269b 271a 278c-d
- 50 MARX *Capital* 164b 167a 170c 171a 237d 240c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 78b esp 75a 332a 774a

5b Habits of appetite and will the moral virtues as good habits

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^b 0-247 19] 330a b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VII CH I [581^b 11 22] 107b / *Ethics* BK II CH 1-6 348b d 352d BK VII CH 5 [1148^b 15 1149^d] 399a-c CH 10 [1152 28-33] 403b / *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334^b 8-28] 539b d
- 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 3 178d 180a CH 8 184b c BK IV CH I 213a 223d
- 14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 637b-c
- 16 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII par 10 55c d par 20-21 58c 59a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 49 A 1 RFP 3 1b 2b A 2 REP 3 2b-4a Q 50 A 3 8b 9a A 5 10b d Q 56 A 4 32b 33c A 6 34b 35a QQ 58-61 41a 59d Q 94 A 1 REP 1 221a d
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC IV [160-170] 56b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69d 70a 78d 81c esp 79a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 71 197b 198a
- 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 357c 360d / *Practical Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 368d 378a b / *Judgement* 521b 523c 604d 606d esp 606a d
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445d 446a 463d 465b
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 386a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171b-c
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 304a 305c esp 304b d [in 5] 310c 319a esp 311c d 318a 319a 321b 322d 593a b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 80a 83b 798b 808a par sum esp 799a b
- 54 FREUD *War and Death* 757c 759d

5c The natural habits of reason innate predispositions of the mind

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [102^b 22 28] 499a BK IV CH 3 [1005^b 15-34] 524d 527a BK XI CH 5 [1061^b 34 1062 5] 590a b

9 ARISTOTLE *Elmty* κ τ CH II [1143⁴⁵ 131]
392d 393a / *Rhetor* BK I CH I [1335¹⁴ 1]
5-6

11 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 23 127c 128c
111, CH 11 150a 151b

12 AUGUSTINE *Meditations* BK IV SECT 4 261a

13 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1 3 10a
11a TR VIII, CH 9, 31c

14 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P RT I Q 16 A
6, REP 1 98b-d Q 15 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 9,
AA 2 3425c-427a PART I II Q 1 A 4 REP
612a-613a A 5 ANS 613a-614a

15 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 51
A 1 A and REP 1 2 12b-13c Q 53 A 1 ANS
19d 21a Q 94 A 1 221a-d PART III Q 9 A 1
A 7 763b-764c

16 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy* PER ATORI XVI [3
61] 77c-d XVII (19-21) 80a (49-66) 80b-c

23 H ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* PART I 54a 60a b 86b-d

30 B CO *Attainment of Learning* 9c-d 60c
61c / *Notion of Order* BK I, ANS 3 110d 111a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* 1 1a b IV 5c-d VII
13c-d / *Discourse* PART I 41b PART V 54c /
Objections and Replies 224b-d

32 SPINOZA *Elmty* PART II PROP 19 429d

33 PASCAL *Prose* 1 171a 51 185b / *Geometrical*
Demonstration, 4-6b

34 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II, SECT 3-8 26a
1 / *Human Understanding* BK II 9 b d 121a-c
121a-c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 35
466b DIV 4 469c SECT XI DIV 15 504c-d

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 20a 43a-c 58a 59b 66d
72c esp 67-69c 109b-c 35 d 229b-c 234c /
Imagination 562a 564c 604d 606d esp 606a-d

43 F B RALIST *Tracts* 3 103c-d

43 *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* 44 A 446a 463a b
469b-470c

33 *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* 44 A 446a 463a b
469b-470c

36 The required habits of mind, the intellectual virtues

11 PLATO *Theaetetus* 518b 542a-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* κ τ CH 3 [24⁴⁵ 245
9] 330b-d κ τ CH 4 [330⁴⁵ 331] 340a-c /

1 *Metaphysics* BK IX, CH 5 [1 4⁴⁵ 34] 573a
CH 5 [1 49 3-1050⁴⁵] 870c-d / *Soul*, BK II

CH 5 [1 49 3-1050⁴⁵] 870c-d / *Soul*, BK II
CH 5 [1 49 3-1050⁴⁵] 870c-d / *Soul*, BK II

9 *Metaphysics* CH 2 [451⁴⁵ 456] 693a-694b
9 *Metaphysics* CH 2 [451⁴⁵ 456] 693a-694b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* κ τ CH 3 2 8d
180a II 8 184b-c BK IV CH 1 216c 223d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* κ τ CH 3 2 8d
180a II 8 184b-c BK IV CH 1 216c 223d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 14
1 275d 6c Q 9, AA 6-7 419b-421c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 14
1 275d 6c Q 9, AA 6-7 419b-421c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I, Q 14
1 275d 6c Q 9, AA 6-7 419b-421c

REP 3 8b 9a A 4 9a 10b Q 51 A 3 14b-15a
Q 52, A 1 ANS 15d 18a A 2 ANS 18a 19
Q 53 A 1 A 5 and REP 3 19d 21a A 3
AN and REP 3 21d 22d Q 54 A 4 REP 3
25b-d QO 5 -53 32a-45c Q 64 A 3 68b-
69b

23 HUME *Letter to the Author* PART I 54a 60a b 66c
68c

30 B CO *Attainment of Learning* 26a 27a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* 1 1a 2a / *Discourse* PART
I 41b d

31 SPINOZA *Elmty* PART II PROP 3 25 430d
431c PART V PROP 10 SCHOL 4 5a-456a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* κ τ CH IX
5 CT 8- b 139b-140b CH XXXIII SECT 5 13
248d 251c passim BK IV CH 1 CT 8-g 308b-
309b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 35
35 464c-466c DIV 40 467c DIV 41 468d-469c
SECT VI DIV 59-61 4 6b-4 8a passim SECT
IX DIV 53-54 48 c-488b

35 ROE *Seau Inequality* 347a b

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 223a-d

44 BOSWELL *Johnston*, 135c 136a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIO 5 97
132 133a

49 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy* 320b-321a passim
593a

53 JAM *Psychology* 83b 295b-298a ctn 296b
331b-336a 361 380a passim 427b-430a
433a-434a esp 434a 50a 50 a ctp 504
520a 526b esp 520b, 524a 525a 553a 557b
passim 852b-853a 860b-862a

5e 5 pernatural habits

5e(1) Grace as an enlivening habit of the person

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P RT II Q 50
A ANS c-8a Q 51 A 4 15a-d Q 8 A 1
168a-d Q 11a 347d 351d

5e(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural gifts

OLD TESTAMENT *1 Kings* 3 5 15 429-34 (D)

III *1 Kings* 3 5 429-34 / *1 Chronicles* 12 1

(D) *2 Peter* 1 10-11 / *11 Chronicles* 12 1

12-1 (D) *11 Peter* 1 10-11 / *2 Peter* 1 10-11

32-5 / *1 Peter* 1 10-11 / *1 Peter* 1 10-11

(D) *1 Peter* 1 10-11 / *1 Peter* 1 10-11

Proverbs 2 esp 2 6 / *Ecclesiastes* 2 26 / *Lamentations*

11 2-5 (D) *Lamentations* 11 2-5 / *Daniel* 1 esp 1 1

220-3

AROCRYM *Wisdom of Solomon*, 3 9 77-2

8-21 9 (D) *OT Book of Wisdom*, 3 9

7-2 8-21 9 / *Ecclesiastes* 1 1 1

11 15 5 5 24 24 25 43 33 50 29 51 47-

(D) *OT Ecclesiastes* 1 1 1 10 11 15 15 3

44 3 43 3 5 31 51 2 23

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 33 / *Act* 2 1 21

1 1 *Corinthians* 5 30 2 2 4 11 / *Ephesians*

1 16-18 4 1 5-1 / *Philippians* 3 9 / *James*

1 5 17 3 13 8 / *1 Peter* 1 1 10

5c Supernatural habits 5c(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural gifts)

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51
A 4 15a d Q 55 A 4 ANS and REP 6 28c 29d
Q 63 AA 3 4 65a 66c Q 68 87c 96c esp A 3 90d
91b Q 100 A 12 ANS and REP 3 264d 265d Q
110 A 3 ANS and REP 3 350a d A 4 REP I
350d 351d PART II II Q 8 9 416d-426c
19 465a 474d Q 45 598c 603c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 57c PART III
176d 177b PART IV 270c d

5c(3) The theological virtues

- OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 22 25 71—(D) *Psalms*
21 24 70 / *Proverbs* 3 1-26 / *Isaiah* 40 31—
(D) *Isaiah* 40 31 / *Jeremiah* 39 18—(D) *Jeremiah*
39 18
- APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 9—(D) OT
Book of Wisdom 3 9 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6-9
13 14—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6-10 13 18
- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 9.20 22 27-30
15 22-28 17 14 21 esp 17 19 21 19 16-23 esp
19 21—(D) *Matthew* 9 20-22 27-30 15 22
28 17 14-20 esp 17 18-20 19 16-23 esp 19 21
/ *Mark* 9 17-27 esp 9 23-24—(D) *Mark*
9 16-26 esp 9 22-23 / *Luke* 17 5-6 / *John*
14 21 20 26-29 / *Romans* 1 5 16-17 3 20-5 9
8 24 25 10 / *1 Corinthians* 13 / *Galatians* 5 5 6
/ *Ephesians* 2 1-10 / *Colossians* 1 1-8 / *1 Thessalonians*
5 8 / *Hebrews* 6 11 / *James* 2 14-26
/ *II Peter* 1 5 8 / *I John* / *II John* / *III John*
- II AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 3 300b
301a BK XXI CH 16 573b 574a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51
A 4 15a d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 43b 44a Q 6 59d
63a Q 63 A 3 65a d Q 64 A 4 69b 70a Q 67
AA 3 6 83b 87c Q 110 A 3 REP 1 350a d A 4
ANS 350d 351d PART II II Q 23 482c 489c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIV [1]-
XXVI [81] 142d 146c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 149c d PART III
241c 242a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c 4c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [576-605] 331b
332a

6 The force of habit in human life

- OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 20 II 13 / *Proverb* 2 6 /
Jeremiah 13 23—(D) *Jeremiah* 13 23
- II HERODOTUS *History* BK I 3 c d BK III 97d
98a BY IV 137a 138c
- 7 PLATO *Laus* BK VII 716a b 717d 718d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [994^b 31
995^a 6] 513c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I-6 348b d 352d
passim esp CH I [1101^b 22 25] 349b BK VII
CH I [1148^b 15 1149^a 4] 399a c CH IO [1152 2^a
33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH IO [1368^a 8-
1369^b 27] 612a 613a esp [1369 1-7] 612a b
[1369^b 6-8] 612d [1369^a 16-19] 612d 613a
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [30, 322]
31a b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 40b c
BK VIII par 18 57d 58a par 25 26 60a b /
Christian Doctrine BY I CH 24 630c 631a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49
AA 3-4 4b 6a
- 23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXV 35d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16c d 42b-43d 63d
64b 307c 308a 316b c 390b-c 391c 393b
395b 396d 489b-490c 524b 527a
- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 285b c
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b-49d
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 6 173a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 3,
36 464c 465c DIV 4-45 469b-c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 347a b
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 464d
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 125a
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 27 95c d
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 370c d /
Utilitarianism 464a d
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 259a
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b 317b d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 150c BK VI
244a b BK VIII 303a 305b BK XI 485a 1c
XII 556d 557a BK XIV 609d BK XV 639c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 83b
- 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 613d
646a esp 645b 646a

6a The automatic or unconscious functioning of habits

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8^b 26-9 13] 13d
14a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH IO [1152^a 27
33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1310 5-8]
613b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49
A 2 2b 4a Q 109 A 8 ANS 344d 346a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 307c 308a 316b-c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX
SECT 8-10 139b 140b passim
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 464a b
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 3b 73b 78b 93a 95b
298a esp 296b 774a 782a 789a esp 788b
789a 790b 791a 810a b
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 455b

6b The contribution of habit to the perfection of character and mind

- OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 2. 6 / *Jeremiah* 13 23
—(D) *Jeremiah* 13 23
- APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 30 8—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus*
30 8
- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [857-917] 265a b
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396d
397a
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 330a 331c 333b-d
BK VII 389d 390b 391c II / *Timaeus* 474d
475d / *Theaetetus* 518b / *Laus* BK II 653a-c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH IO [13 16-31] 18d
/ *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [216 10 48^a] 329c
330d

- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* κ vii ch i
[58]^b 22] 107b / *Ethics* κ i ch 4 [100]^b 4
1] 340c d ci 9 34 - c κ ii ch i-6 348b d
352d passim esp ch i [11 3 22 23] 349b κ
iii ch 5] 114 3 10] 350a κ κ ci 9 [1 79]³³
1180^a 32] 434a-435a / *Pol* ci κ iv ch ii
[129]^b 18] 495d κ vii ch 13 [1332 39-^b 9]
537 κ ch 15 [1334 8-28] 539b d ch 17
[1336^a 30-^b 38] 541c 542a
- 11 EPICUREUS *Discourses* κ i ch 4 108d 110
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Chapter 33 HAPPINESS

INTRODUCTION

THE great questions about happiness are concerned with its definition and its attainability. In what does happiness consist? Is it the same for all men or do different men seek different things in the name of happiness? Can happiness be achieved on earth or only here after? And if the pursuit of happiness is not a futile quest by what means or steps should it be undertaken?

On all these questions the great books set forth the fundamental inquiries and speculations as well as the controversies to which they have given rise in the tradition of western thought. There seems to be no question that men want happiness. Man wishes to be happy. Pascal writes and only wishes to be happy and cannot wish not to be so. To the question what moves desire? Locke thinks only one answer is possible: happiness and that alone.

But this fact even if it goes undisputed does not settle the issue whether men are right in governing their lives with a view to being or becoming happy. There is therefore one further question: Should men make happiness their goal and direct their acts accordingly?

According to Kant the principle of *private* happiness is the direct opposite of the principle of morality. He understands happiness to consist in the satisfaction of all our desires *extensive* in regard to their multiplicity *intensive* in regard to their degree *protensive* in regard to their duration. What Kant calls the pragmatic rule of life which aims at happiness tells us what we have to do if we wish to become possessed of happiness.

Unlike the moral law it is a hypothetical not a categorical imperative. Furthermore Kant points out that such a pragmatic or utilitarian ethics (which is for him the same as an ethics of happiness) cannot help being em-

pirical for it is only by experience he says that I can learn either what inclinations excite which desire satisfaction or what are the natural means of satisfying them. Such empirical knowledge is available for each individual in his own way. Hence there can be no universal solution in terms of desire of the problem: how to be happy. To reduce moral philosophy to a theory of happiness must result therefore in giving up the search for ethical principles which are both universal and *a priori*.

In sharp opposition to the pragmatic rule Kant sets the moral or ethical law the motive of which is not simply to be happy but rather to be *worthy* of happiness. In addition it being a categorical imperative which imposes an absolute obligation upon us this law he says takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them. Rather it dictates how we ought to act in order to deserve happiness. It is drawn from pure reason not from experience and therefore has the universality of an *a priori* principle without which in Kant's opinion genuine science of ethics—or metaphysics of morals—is impossible.

With the idea of moral worth—that which alone deserves happiness—taken away happiness alone is according to Kant far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination may desire it) except as united with desert. On the other hand Kant admits morality alone and with it mere *desert* is likewise far from being the complete good. These two things must be united to constitute the true *summum bonum* which according to Kant means both the *supreme* and the *complete* good. The man who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy of happiness must be able to hope for the possession of happiness.

But even if happiness combined with mora-

worth does constitute the supreme good. Kant still refuses to admit that happiness as a practical objective can function as a moral principle. Though a man can hope to be happy only if under the moral law he does his duty, he should not do his duty with the hope of thereby becoming happy. A disposition he writes which should require the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of complete happiness. The moral law commands the performance of duty *unconditionally*. Happiness should be a consequence, but it cannot be a condition of moral action.

In other words, happiness fails for Kant to impose any moral obligation or to provide a standard of right and wrong in human conduct. No more than pleasure can happiness be used as a first principle in ethics; if morality must avoid all calculations of utility or expediency whereby things are done or left undone for the sake of happiness, or any other end to be enjoyed.

THIS ISSUE BETWEEN AN ETHICS OF DUTY AND AN ETHICS OF HAPPINESS, as well as the conflict it involves between law and desire as sources of morality, are considered from other points of view in the chapters on *Desire and Duty* and again in *Good and Evil*, where the problem of the *summum bonum* is raised. In this chapter we shall be concerned with happiness as an ethical principle and therefore with the problems to be faced by those who in one way or another accept happiness as the supreme good and the end of life. They may see no reason to reject moral principles which work through desire rather than duty. They may find nothing repugnant in appealing to happiness as the ultimate end which justifies the means and determines the order of all other goods. But they cannot make happiness the first principle of ethics without having to face many questions concerning the nature of happiness and its relation to virtue.

Discussion begins rather than ends with the fact that happiness is what all men desire. Once they have asserted that fact, once they have made happiness the most fundamental of all ethical terms, writers like Aristotle or Locke, Aquinas or Mill cannot escape the question

whether *all* who seek happiness look for it or find it in the *same* things.

Holding that a definite conception of happiness cannot be formulated, Kant thinks that happiness fails even as a pragmatic principle of conduct. The notion of happiness is so indefinite he writes that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes. He cannot determine with certainty what would make him truly happy, because to do so he would need to be omniscient. If this is true of the individual, how various must be the notions of happiness which prevail among men in general.

Locke plainly asserts what is here implied, namely the fact that everyone does not place his happiness in the same thing or choose the same way to it. But admitting this fact does not prevent Locke from inquiring how in matters of happiness and misery men come often to prefer the worse to the better and to choose that which by their own confession has made them miserable. Even though he declares that the same thing is not good to every man alike, Locke thinks it is possible to account for the misery that men often bring on themselves by explaining how the individual may make errors in judgment—how things come to be represented to our desires under deceitful appearances—by the judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them.

But this applies to the individual only. Locke does not think it is possible to show that when two men differ in their notions of happiness, one is right and the other wrong. Though all men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object. Men may choose different things and yet all choose right. He does not quarrel with the theologians who on the basis of divine revelation describe the eternal happiness in the life hereafter which is to be enjoyed *alike* by all who are saved. But revelation is one, and reason another.

With respect to temporal happiness on earth, reason cannot achieve a definition of the end that has the certainty of faith concerning salvation. Hence Locke quarrels with the philosophers of old who in his opinion vainly sought to define the *summum bonum* or happiness in such a way that all men would agree that

happiness is or if they failed to some would be in error and misled in their pursuit of happiness.

It may be wondered therefore what Locke means by saying that there is a science of what man ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of happiness. He describes ethics as the science of the rules and measures of human actions which lead to happiness and he places morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration wherein from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifference and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences.

THE ANCIENT philosophers with whom Locke disagrees insist that a science of ethics depends on a first principle which is self-evident in the same way to all men. Happiness is not that principle if the content of happiness is what each man thinks it to be for if no universally applicable definition of happiness can be given—if when men differ in their conception of what constitutes happiness one man may be as right as another—then the fact that all men agree upon giving the name happiness to what they ultimately want amounts to no more than a nominal agreement. Such nominal agreement in the opinion of Aristotle and Aquinas does not suffice to establish a science of ethics with rules for the pursuit of happiness which shall apply universally to all men.

On their view what is truly human happiness must be the same for all men. The reason in the words of Aquinas is that all men agree in their specific nature. It is in terms of their specific or common nature that happiness can be objectively defined. Happiness so conceived is a common end for all since nature tends to one thing only.

It may be granted that there are in fact many different opinions about what constitutes happiness but it cannot be admitted that all are equally sound without admitting a complete relativism in moral matters. That men do in fact seek different things under the name of happiness does not according to Aristotle and Aquinas alter the truth that the happiness they

should seek must be something appropriate to the humanity which is common to them all, rather than something determined by their individually differing needs or temperaments. If it were the latter then Aristotle and Aquinas would admit that questions about what men should do to achieve happiness would be answerable only by individual opinion or personal preference not by scientific analysis or demonstration.

With the exception of Locke and perhaps to a less extent Mill those who think that a science of ethics can be founded on happiness as the first principle tend to maintain that there can be only one right conception of human happiness. They regard other notions as misconceptions which may appear to be but are not really the *summum bonum*. The various definitions of happiness which men have given thus present the problem of the real and the apparent good, the significance of which is considered in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.

IN THE EVERYDAY discourse of men there seems to be a core of agreement about the meaning of the words happy and happiness. This common understanding has been used by philosophers like Aristotle and Mill to test the adequacy of any definition of happiness.

When a man says I feel happy he is saying that he feels pleased or satisfied—that he has what he wants. When men contrast tragedy and happiness they have in mind the quality a life takes from its end. A tragedy on the stage in fiction or in life is popularly characterized as a story without a happy ending. This expresses the general sense that happiness is the quality of a life which comes out well on the whole despite difficulties and vicissitudes along the way. Only ultimate defeat or frustration is tragic.

There appears to be some conflict here between feeling happy at a given moment and being happy for a lifetime that is living happily. It may be necessary to choose between having a good time and leading a good life. Nevertheless in both uses of the word happy there is the connotation of satisfaction. When men say that what they want is happiness they imply that having it they would ask for nothing more. If they are asked why they want to be

happy they find it difficult to give any reason except for its own sake. They can think of no *bon* beyond happiness for which happiness serves as a means or a preparation. This aspect of ultimacy or finality appears without qualification in the sense of happiness as belonging to a whole life. There is quiescence too in the momentary feeling of happiness but precisely because it does not last it leaves another and another such moment to be desired.

Observing these facts Aristotle takes the word happiness from popular discourse and gives it the technical significance of ultimate good last end or *summum bonum*. The chief good he writes is evidently something final. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing. Therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Such a thing happiness above all else is held to be for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else.

The ultimacy of happiness can also be expressed in terms of its completeness or sufficiency. It would not be true that happiness is desired for its own sake and everything else for the sake of happiness, if the happy man wanted something more. The most obvious mark of the happy man according to Aristotle is that he wants for nothing. The happy life leaves nothing to be desired. It is this insight which Boethius later expresses in an oft repeated characterization of happiness as a life made perfect by the possession in aggregate of all good things. So complete happiness is not a particular good in itself but the sum of goods. If happiness were to be counted as one good among others Aristotle argues it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. But then there would be something left for the happy man to desire and happiness would not be something final and self-sufficient and the end of action.

Like Aristotle Mill appeals to the common sense of mankind for the ultimacy of happiness.

The utilitarian doctrine he writes is that happiness is desirable and the only thing desirable as an end all other things being only desirable as means. No reason can or need be given why this is so except that each person so far as he believes it to be attainable desires his own happiness. This is enough to prove that happiness is a good. To show that it is the good it is necessary to show not only that people desire happiness but that they never desire anything else.

Here Mill's answer like Aristotle's presupposes the rightness of the prevailing sense that when a man is happy he has everything he desires. Many things Mill admits may be desired for their own sake but if the possession of any one of these leaves something else to be desired then it is desired only as a part of happiness. Happiness is a concrete whole and these are some of its parts. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself and ultimately to happiness is desired as itself a part of happiness and is not desired for itself until it has become so.

THERE ARE OTHER conceptions of happiness. It is not always approached in terms of means and ends utility and enjoyment or satisfaction. Plato for example identifies happiness with spiritual well being—a harmony in the soul an inner peace which results from the proper order of all the soul's parts.

Early in the *Republic* Socrates is challenged to show that the just man will be happier than the unjust man even if in all externals he seems to be at a disadvantage. He cannot answer this question until he prepares Glaucon for the insight that justice is concerned not with the outward man but with the inward. He can then explain that the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another. He is in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and is at peace with himself.

In the same spirit Plotinus asks us to think of two wise men one of them possessing all that is supposed to be naturally welcome while the other meets only with the very reverse. He wants to know whether we would assert that they have an equal happiness. His own answer is that we should if they are equally

wise [even] though the one be favored in body and in all else that does not help towards wisdom. We are likely to misconceive happiness. Plotinus thinks if we consider the happy man in terms of our own feebleness. We count alarming and grave what his felicity takes lightly. he would be neither wise nor in the state of happiness if he had not quitted all trifling with such things.

According to Plotinus. Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme. fixing his gaze on That becoming like to That living by That. All else he will attend to only as he might change his residence. not in expectation of any increase in his settled felicity but simply in a reasonable attention to the differing conditions surrounding him as he lives here or there. If he meets some turn of fortune that he would not have chosen there is not the slightest lessening of his happiness for that. Like Plato. Plotinus holds that nothing external can separate a virtuous man from happiness—that no one can injure a man except himself.

The opposite view is more frequently held. In his argument with Callicles in the *Gorgias* Socrates meets with the proposition that it is better to injure others than to be injured by them. This can be refuted, he thinks, only if Callicles can be made to understand that the unjust or vicious man is miserable in himself regardless of his external gains. The fundamental principle he says is that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice. Happiness is one with justice because justice or virtue in general is the health and beauty and well being of the soul.

This association of happiness with health—the one is harmony in the soul as the other is a harmony in the body—appears also in Freud's consideration of human well being. For Freud the ideal of health, not merely bodily health but the health of the whole man, seems to identify happiness with peace of mind. Anyone who is born with a specially unfavorable instinctual constitution, he writes, and whose libido-components do not go through the transformation and modification necessary for suc-

cessful achievement in later life will find it hard to obtain happiness. The opposite of happiness is not tragedy but neurosis. In contrast to the neurotic the happy man has found a way to master his inner conflicts and to become well adjusted to his environment.

The theory of happiness as mental health or spiritual peace may be another way of seeing the self-sufficiency of happiness in which all striving comes to rest because all desires are fulfilled or quieted. The suggestion of this point is found in the fact that the theologians conceive beatitude or supernatural happiness in both ways. For them it is both an ultimate end which satisfies all desires and also a state of peace or heavenly rest.

The ultimate good. Augustine writes that for the sake of which other things are to be desired while it is to be desired for its own sake, and he adds it is that by which the good is finished so that it becomes complete—all satisfying. But what is this final blessedness, the ultimate consummation, the unending end? It is peace. Indeed Augustine says, we are said to be blessed when we have such peace as can be enjoyed in this life, but such blessedness is mere misery compared to that final felicity which can be described as either peace in eternal life or eternal life in peace.

THERE MAY BE differences of another kind among those who regard happiness in their ultimate end. Some men identify happiness with the possession of one particular type of good—wealth or health, pleasure or power, knowledge or virtue, honor or friendship—or if they do not make one or another of these things the only component of happiness they make it supreme. The question of which is chief among the various goods that constitute the happy life is the problem of the order of goods to which we shall return presently. But the identification of happiness with some one good to the exclusion or neglect of the others seems to violate the meaning of happiness on which there is such general agreement. Happiness cannot be that which leaves nothing to be desired if any good—anything which in any way desirable—is overlooked.

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when he possesses a board. That he may consider himself happy cannot be denied. Yet this does not prevent the moralist from considering him deluded and in reality among the unhappiest of men. The difference between such illusory happiness and the reality seems to depend on the distinction between conscious and natural desire. According to that distinction considered in the chapter on Desire, the miser may have all that he consciously desires, but lack many of the things toward which his nature tends and which are therefore objects of natural desire. He may be the unhappiest of men if with all the wealth in the world yet self-deprived of friends or knowledge, virtue or even health, his exclusive interest in one type of good leads to the frustration of many other desires. He may not consciously recognize these but they nevertheless represent needs of his nature demanding fulfillment.

As suggested in the chapter on Desire, the relation of natural law to natural desire may provide the beginning, at least of an answer to Kant's objection to the ethics of happiness on the ground that its principles lack universality or the element of obligation. The natural moral law may command obedience at the same time that it directs men to happiness as the satisfaction of all desires which represent the innate tendencies of man's nature. The theory of natural desire thus also has a bearing on the issue whether the content of happiness must really be the same for all men regardless of how it may appear to them.

Even if men do not identify happiness with one type of good but see it as the possession of every sort of good, can there be a reasonable difference of opinion concerning the types of good which must be included in the order in which these several goods should be sought? A negative answer seems to be required by the view that real as opposed to apparent goods are the objects of natural desire.

Aquinas, for example, adds to that "happy is the man who has all he desires or whose every wish is fulfilled" a good and adequate definition only if it be understood in a certain way. It is an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite, then it is true that he who has all that he desires

is happy since nothing satisfies man's natural desire except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of reason, Aquinas continues, then it does not belong to Happiness to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders a man from having all that he desires naturally. For this reason Aquinas points out when Augustine approved the statement that *happy is he who has all he desires* he added the words *provided he desires nothing amiss*.

As men have the same complex nature so they have the same set of natural desires. As they have the same natural desires, so the real goods which can fulfill their needs comprise the same variety for all. As different natural desires represent different parts of human nature—lower and higher—so the several kinds of good are not equally good. And according to Aquinas, if the natural object of the human will is the universal good, it follows that "naught can satisfy man's will save the universal good." Thus, he holds, it is to be found not in any created thing but in God alone.

We shall return later to the theologians' conception of perfect happiness as consisting in the vision of God in the life hereafter. The happiness of this earthly life (which the philosopher considers) may be imperfect by comparison, but such temporal felicity as men can attain is no less determined by natural desire. If a man's undue craving for one type of good can interfere with his possession of another sort of good, then the various goods must be ordered according to their worth and this order since it reflects natural desire must be the same for all men. In such terms Aristotle seems to think it possible to argue that the reality of happiness can be defined by reference to human nature and that the rules for achieving happiness can have a certain universality—despite the fact that the rules must be applied by individuals differently to the circumstances of their own lives. No particular good should be sought excessively or out of proportion to others, for the penalty of having too much of one good thing is deprivation or disorder with respect to other goods.

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This association of happiness with health—the one a harmony in the soul as the other is a harmony in the body—appears also in Freud's consideration of human well being. For Freud, the ideal of health, not merely bodily health but the health of the whole man, seems to identify happiness with peace of mind. Anyone who is born with a specially unfavorable instinctual constitution, he writes, and whose libido-components do not go through the transformation and modification necessary for suc-

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act as an obstacle to happiness. Hence Bezuikho in *It is a Life* learned during his period of captivity that man is created for happiness that happiness lies in himself, in the satisfaction of his natural human cravings that all unhappiness arises not from privation but from superfluity."

The vicissitudes of fortune seem to be what Solon has in mind when, as reported by Herodotus, he tells Croesus, the king of Lydia that he will not call him happy until he has seen that he has closed this life happily for often times God gives men a gleam of happiness, and then plunges them into ruin. For this reason, a judge of happiness, as "in every matter it behooves us to mark well the end."

Even if it is possible to call a man happy while he is alive—on the ground that virtue which is within his power may be able to withstand anything but the most outrageous fortune—it is still necessary to define happiness by reference to a complete life. Children cannot be called happy Aristotle holds, because their characters have not yet matured and their lives are still too far from completion. To call them happy or to call happy men of any age who still may suffer great misfortune is merely to race the horses we have for them. The most prosperous, Aristotle writes, may fall into great misfortunes as old as is told of Priam in the Trojan cycle and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly, no one calls happy.

Then, the goods of fortune which seem to have a bearing on the attainment of happiness, those which constitute the individual nature of a human being at birth—physical traits, temperament, degree of intelligence—may be unstable in the course of life. If certain inherited conditions either limit the capacity for happiness or make it completely unattainable, then happiness, which is defined as the end of man, is so the *summum bonum* for all, or not for all in the same way.

In the Aristotelian view for example, women cannot be happy to the same degree or in the same manner as men and natural slaves, like beasts, have no capacity for happiness at all, though they may participate in the happiness of the masters they serve. The theory is that through serving him, the slave serves the master

the leisure necessary for the political or speculative life open to those of auspicious birth. Even as the man who is a slave belongs wholly to another man so the highest good of his life lies in his contribution to the happiness of that other.

The question whether happiness can be achieved by all normal human beings or only by those gifted with very special talents, depends for its answer in part on the conception of happiness itself. Like Aristotle Spinoza places happiness in intellectual activity of so high an order that the happy man is almost godlike and at the very end of his *Ethics* he finds it necessary to say that the way to happiness must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered. Nevertheless, "true peace of soul" can be found by the rare individual. "All noble things are as difficult as they are rare." In contrast a statement like Tawney's—that "if a man has important work to do, and enough leisure and income to enable him to do it properly, he is in possession of as much happiness as is good for any of the children of Adam"—seems to make happiness available to more than the gifted few.

Whether happiness is attainable by all men, even on Tawney's definition, may also depend on the economic system and the political constitution, to the extent that they determine whether all men will be granted the opportunity and the leisure to use whatever talents they have for leading a decent human life. There seems to be a profound connection between concerning happiness in such a way that all normal men are capable of it and insisting that all normal men deserve political status and economic liberty. Mill, for example differs from Aristotle on both scores.

DIFFERING FROM the position of both Aristotle and Mill is the view that happiness is an illusory goal—that the besetting ills of human life as well as the frailty of men lead inevitably to tragedy. The great tragic poems and the great tragedies of history may, of course, be read as if they deal with the exceptional case but another interpretation is possible. Here we find large in the life of the hero, the great or famous man, is the tragic pattern of human life which is the lot of all men.

THE RELATION OF happiness to particular goods raises a whole series of questions each peculiar to the type of good under consideration. Of these the most insistent problems concern pleasure, knowledge, virtue, and the goods of fortune.

With regard to pleasure the difficulty seems to arise from two meanings of the term which are more fully discussed in the chapter on PLEASURE AND PAIN. In one of these meanings pleasure is an object of desire, and in the other it is the feeling of satisfaction which accompanies the possession of objects desired. It is in the latter meaning that pleasure can be identified with happiness or at least be regarded as its correlate, for if happiness consists in the possession of all good things it is also the sum total of attainable satisfactions or pleasures. Where pleasure means satisfaction, pain means frustration, not the sensed pain of injured flesh. Happiness, Locke can therefore say, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and Mill can define it as an existence exempt as far as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments. Nor does Aristotle object to saying that the happy life is also in itself pleasant.

But unlike Locke and Mill, Aristotle raises the question whether all pleasures are good and all pains evil. Sensuous pleasure as an object often conflicts with other objects of desire. And if pleasure means satisfaction, there can be conflict among pleasures, for the satisfaction of one desire may lead to the frustration of another. At this point Aristotle finds it necessary to introduce the principle of virtue. The virtuous man is one who finds pleasure in the things that are by nature pleasant. The virtuous man takes pleasure only in the right things and is willing to suffer pain for the right end. If pleasures or desires and their satisfaction can be better or worse, there must be a choice among them for the sake of happiness. Mill makes this choice depend on a discrimination between lower and higher pleasures, not on virtue. He regards virtue merely as one of the parts of happiness, in no way different from the others. But Aristotle seems to think that virtue is the principal means to happiness, because it regulates the choices which must be rightly made in order to obtain all good things, hence his defini-

tion of happiness as activity in accordance with virtue.

This definition raises difficulties of still another order. As the chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE indicates, there are for Aristotle two kinds of virtue: moral and intellectual, the one concerned with desire and social conduct, the other with thought and knowledge. There are also two modes of life, sometimes called the active and the contemplative, differing as a life devoted to political activity or practical tasks differs from a life occupied largely with theoretic problems in the pursuit of truth or in the consideration of what is known. Are there two kinds of happiness then, belonging respectively to the political and the speculative life? Is one a better kind of happiness than another? Does the practical sort of happiness require intellectual as well as moral virtue? Does the speculative sort require both also?

In trying to answer these questions and generally in shaping his definition of happiness, Aristotle considers the role of the goods of fortune, such things as health, wealth, auspicious birth, native endowments of body or mind, and length of life. These gifts condition virtuous activity or may present problems which virtue is needed to solve. But to the extent that having or not having them is a matter of fortune, they are not within a man's control—to get, keep, or give up. If they are indispensable, happiness is precarious or even unattainable by those who are unfortunate. In addition, if the goods of fortune are indispensable, the definition of happiness must itself be qualified. More is required for happiness than activity in accordance with virtue.

Should we not say, Aristotle asks, that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add, and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life? If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are and are to be fulfilled—but happy *men*.

THE CONSIDERATION of the goods of fortune has led to diverse views about the attainability of happiness in this life. For one thing, they may

maintained," Augustine describes as "the felicity of a life which is done with bondage"—to vice or conflict to time and change. In contrast the best human life on earth is miserable with limitations and an ennui that human nature cannot escape.

The doctrine of immortality is obviously presupposed in the theological consideration of happiness. For least immortality is a necessary condition of the soul's infinite progression and the moral perfection, the holiness, which alone deserves perfect happiness. But for theologians like Augustine and Aquinas, neither change nor progress play a part in immortal life. On the contrary the immortal soul finds its salvation a eternal rest. The difference between motion and rest, between time and eternity belongs to the very essence of the theologian's distinction between imperfect happiness on earth and perfect happiness hereafter.

These matters, of relevance to the theory of happiness, are discussed in the chapters on ETERNITY and IMMORTALITY and in the chapter on SIN. We find another religious dogma, that of original sin, which has an obvious bearing on earthly happiness as well as on eternal salvation. Fallen human nature according to Christian teaching is incompetent to achieve even the natural end of imperfect temporal happiness without God's help. Will one expounds this doctrine of indispensable grace in *Practical Love* in words which God the Father addresses to His Son:

Man shall not quite be lost, but soiled who was,
Yet not of will in him, but grace is our
Freedom, albeit once more I will renew
His kind powers, thou hast forfeit and entailed it
I as to feel exhorter I desire
I pledge by me, yet once more it shall stand
On even ground, against his mortal foe.
8 m. — I'd like, that he may know how frail
His fall a condition is, and to me owe
All his del. — grace and to none but me.

God's grace is needed for men to lead a good life on earth as well as for eternal blessedness. On earth, man's efforts to be virtuous require the reinforcement of supernatural gifts—faith, hope and charity and the infused moral virtues. The beatific vision in Heaven totally exceeds the natural powers of the soul and comes with the gift of added supernatural light. It seems, in short, that there is no purely natural

happiness according to the strict tenets of Christian doctrine.

Aquinas employs the conception of eternal beatitude not only to measure the imperfection of earthly life but also to insist that temporal happiness is happiness at all only to the extent that it is a remote participation of true and perfect happiness. It cannot be said of temporal happiness that it "excludes every evil and fulfills every desire." In this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils, to ignorance on the part of the intellect, to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite and to many penalties on the part of the body. Likewise "Aquinas continues, "neither can the desire for good be satisfied in this life. For man naturally desires the good which he has to be striving. Now the goods of the present life pass away since life itself passes away. Wherefore it is impossible to have true happiness in this life."

If perfect happiness consists in "the vision of the Divine Essence which men cannot obtain in this life," then, according to Aquinas, only the earthly life which somehow partakes of God has a measure of happiness in it. Earthly happiness, imperfect because of its temporal and bodily conditions, consists in a life devoted to God—a kind of inchoate participation here and now of the beatific vision hereafter. On earth there can be only a beginning "in respect of that operation whereby man is united to God.

In the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness and so much the greater as the operation can be more continuous and more on. Consequently the active life which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life which is busied with one thing, i.e., the contemplation of truth."

When the theologians consider the modes of life on earth in terms of the fundamental distinction between the secular and the religious, or the active and the contemplative, they seem to admit the possibility of imperfect happiness in either mode. In either a devout Christian dedicates every act to the glory of God, and through such dedication embraces the divine in the passing moments of his earthly pilgrimage.

Sophocles seems to be saying this when he writes in *Oedipus at Colonus* Not to be born is past all prizing best but when a man hath seen the light this is next best by far that with all speed he should go thither whence he hath come For when he hath seen youth go by with its light follies what troublous affliction is strange to his lot what suffering is not therein?—envy factions strife battles and slaughters and last of all age claims him for her own—age dispraised infirm unsociable unfriended with whom all woe of woe abides

Death is sometimes regarded as the symbol of tragic frustration Sometimes it is not death but the fear of death which overshadows life, so that for Montaigne learning how to face death well seems indispensable to living well

The very felicity of life itself he writes which depends upon the tranquility and contentment of a well descended spirit and the resolution and assurance of a well ordered soul ought never to be attributed to any man till he has first been seen to play the last and doubtless the hardest act of his part There may be disguise and dissimulation in all the rest but in this scene of death there is no more counterfeiting we must speak our plain and discover what there is of good and clean in the bottom of the pot

So too for Lucretius what happiness men can have depends on their being rid of the fear of death through knowing the causes of things But neither death nor the fear of death may be the crucial flaw It may be the temporal character of life itself

It is said that happiness consists in the possession of all good things It is said that happiness is the quality of a whole life not the feeling of satisfaction for a moment If this is so then Solon's remark to Croesus can be given another meaning namely that happiness is not some thing actually enjoyed by a man at any moment of his life Man can come to possess all good things only in the succession of his days not simultaneously and so happiness is never actually achieved but is always in the process of being achieved When that process is completed the man is dead his life is done

It may still be true that to live well or virtuously—with the help of fortune—is to live happily but so long as life goes on happiness is

pursued rather than enjoyed On earth and in time man does not seem able to come to rest in any final satisfaction with all his desires quieted at once and forever by that vision of perfection which would deserve Faust's Stay thou art so fair!

AS ALREADY INTIMATED the problem of human happiness takes on another dimension when it is treated by the Christian theologians. Is happiness which men can have on earth and in time according to Augustine rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity

Our very righteousness he goes on to say though true in so far as it has respect to the true good is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues For as reason though subjected to God is yet pressed down by the corruptible body so long as it is in this mortal condition it has not perfect authority over vice For though it exercises authority the vices do not submit without a struggle For however well one maintains the conflict and however thoroughly he has subdued these enemies there steals in some evil thing which it do not find ready expression in act slips out by the lips or inuicates itself into the thought and therefore his peace is not full so long as he is at war with his vices

Accepting the definition of happiness as the possession of all good things and the satisfaction of all desires the theologians compare the successive accumulation of finite goods with the unchanging enjoyment of an infinite good An endless prolongation of the days of our mortal life would not increase the chances of becoming perfectly happy because time and change permit no rest no finality Earthly happiness is therefore intrinsically imperfect

Perfect happiness belongs to the eternal life of the immortal soul completely at rest in the beatific vision for in the vision of God the soul is united to the infinite good by knowledge and love In the divine presence and glory all the natural desires of the human spirit are simultaneously satisfied—the intellect's search for truth and the will's yearning for the good

That final peace to which all our righteousness has reference and for the sake of which it is

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A 7 REP 1 3-4d 385c Q 8 A 2 ANS 432d
433c P I II Q 2, 8 621-622b Q 3 A 8
628d 629c Q 4-5 629c-643d Q 19, A 10 A P
1 710b-711d
20 AQUIN *Summa Theologiae* ART I II Q 53
A 2 REP 3 27a-d Q 6. 59d-63a Q 63 A 3 A. 1
2nd R P 2 62a-d Q 67 81b-87c Q 69, A 1 -6
89c-94c Q 69 96c 101c Q 109 338a 347d
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2-3 457d-4 9a Q 26 A 13 519d 520d P RT
III UPPL. Q 7 A 1 935b-937a Q 82-83
968a 992a Q 9-96 1025b-1066a
21 DANTÉ *Divine Comedy PURGATORY XXVIII*
[8] 75d 76a PAR. DI E, III [43-90] 109d 110b
XIV [1-66] 126d 127 XXI [1 2] 138b-139b
XXII [3] 139d 140c XXVI [-69] 145d 146c
XX I [1 4] 143d 150a
22 CH. VC R *Merchant's Tale* [9] 1-935[5] 325b-
326a

(7) *The distinction between temporal and eternal happiness 7c Eternal beatitude the perfection of human happiness*

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 65a b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 99b 100a
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 366d 367a
 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88d 89a
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP. 42 463b d
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 184-241 205a 217b 4 5-555 243b 270a passim
 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d 16a / *Human Understanding* BK II CH VII SECT 5 132c CH XXI SECT 38 187b-c SECT 45 189c d SECT 6 194c d SECT 72 198a e
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 366c d
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 233c 234d
 42 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347c
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 216d 218b BK VI 273c 274a c BK XI 525c 526b
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121c 125d 126d 127b 137c passim

7c(1) The beatific vision

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 32 24 30 / *Exodus* 24 esp 24 9-11 33 11-23 / *Numbers* 12 6-8 / *Deuteronomy* 34 10 / *Job* 19 26-27 / *Isaiah* 26 10- (D) *Isaiah* 26 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 8 / *John* 1 18 14 19-21 / *I Corinthians* 13 12 / *II Corinthians* 12 1-4 / *I Timothy* 6 15-16 / *I John* 3 1-2 / *Revelation* esp 4-5 7-8 11 14 15 16 1-19 21 21 1-22 21- (D) *Apocalypse* esp 4 5 7-8 11 14 15 16 1-19 21 21 1-22 21

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX par 25 68c BK XIII par 18 115b c / *City of God* BK IX CH 15 293a 294a BK X CH 2 79d 300a BK XII CH 20 355b BK XVII CH 29-30 614b 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 10-11 627b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 AA 1-11 50c 60d 66 A 3 151a-c Q 60 A 5 REP 5 313b 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c A 2 ANS 318d 319c Q 64 A 1 REP 1 334a 333c Q 82 A ANS 432d 433c Q 84 A 5 446c 447c Q 89 A 2 REP 3 475a d Q 91 A 8 REP 4 499b 500 Q 94 A 1 ANS and REP 1 501d 503a Q 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b PART I II Q 3 A 8 628d 629c 634 A 1-2 629d 631a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 67 A 3 83b 84d A 6 REP 3 87a-c Q 69 A 2 REP 3 97b 98c A 4 ANS and REP 3 100c 101c PART II II Q 1 A 8 ANS 387a 388c Q 8 A 7 421d 422c Q 9 A 4 REP 3 425d 426c Q 180 A 5 611d 613a PART III Q 9 A 2 764c 765a Q 15 A 10 795b 796a PART III SUPPL. Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 92 1025b 1037c Q 94 A 1 1040d 1041b 98 A 5 ANS 1075b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE V [12] 112a b XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XV [8-84] 178c 129b XV [1-102] 138b 139b XVIII [93 114] 149d 150a XXII [139] XXIII [145] 156a 157d

22 CHAUCER *Purton's Tale* par 10 499b 500a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 65a b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88d 89a

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347a

7c(2) The joy of the blessed the communion of saints

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 16 esp 10 10 3b esp 36 8-9 37 84 149- (D) *Psalms* 15 esp 15 10 35 esp 35 9-10 36 83 149 / *Isaiah* 65 8-25- (D) *Isaiah* 65 8 25 / *Daniel* 7.15

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 1-9 13 15 47-5 5 15-16- (D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3 1-9 13 15 47-5 5 15-17

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 11 19- 9 6 19- 21 33 13 43 19 16-30 esp 19 21 21 31 46b 25 34 25 46 / *Mark* 10 17 31 / *Luke* 16 19- 6 18 18 30 / *John* 6 38-40 8 31 10 31 11 23 27 16 20-24 17 1-3 / *Romans* 8 15 14 17 / *I Corinthians* 15 40 53 / *II Corinthians* 4 17-5 10 / *Galatians* 6 8 / *Ephesians* 2 18 21 / *Hebrews* 10 34 / *James* 1 12 / *I Peter* 1 3 10 / *I John* 2 15-17 3 1 3 / *Revelation* passim

esp 4-5 7 14 15 19 21 2 - (D) *Apocalypse* passim esp 4-5 7 14 15 19 21 22

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX par 16 23b BK IX par 6 63a b par 3 35 68a-c BK X par 38 39 81a-c par 65 87d 88a BK XII par 21 104b c BK XIII par 50-53 124c 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 11 13 328d 330b CH 29-33 339a 341d BK XII CH 20 355b 35a A BK XVIII CH 48 501b d BK XIX CH 10-11 516c 517b c 13 519a 520a CH 17 522b 523a CH 20 523d 524a CH 27 529a d BK XX CH 1 544d 545c BK XXII CH 30 616d 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 19- 2 629a 630a CH 38 635c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A 4 ANS 509b 510a Q 113 47 580b 581a PART I II Q 2 A 3 REP 1 617b 618a Q 4 A 1 2 629d 631a Q 34 A 3 770c 771c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 6, 14 84d 85d PART III Q 18 A 2 462d 463d Q 19 A 11 472d 473d Q 26 A 13 519d 520d Q 28 A 3 528d 529c PART III SUPPL. Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 93 1037c 1040c Q 94 A 3 1041d 1042c Q 96 1049d 1066a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [10-81] 75d 76a XVIII XXIII 96a 105d XIX 106a 157d esp III [43-90] 109d 110b 11 [112 126] 114d 115a XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XV [130-138] 138a XXI [1-102] 138b 139b XXII [52 72] 140b XXIII [91 114] 149d 150a XXIV-XXVIII 151d 157d

22 CHAUCER *Purton's Tale* par 103 549b 550a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 195d

32 MILTON *On Time* 12a b / *At a Solemn Music* 13a b / *Lycidas* [165 185] 31b / *Sonnet* XIV 66a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 143] 138b [344 415] 143a 144b BK VII [150-161] 220b BK VIII [618-630] 245a 246a BK XI [57-66] 300b [696-707] 314b BK XII [411-465] 328a 329a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 643 290b 291a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 234b-d

- 44 BOSWELL *John* 192d 193a
5. DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 22b-23c BK XI 341d 342c
JAMES *Psychol* 97 199b

7c(3) The misery of the damned

- Old Testament *Job* 20-3 9 / *Psalms* 9 16-1
21 9-1 116 3-(D) *Psalms* 9 1-18 20 9-
13 114 3 / *Isaiah* 57 1 13 4 3 6 1
66 24-(D) *Isaiah* 5 14 5 14 4 23 26 10
66 24 / *Ezekiel* 31 10-15-(D) *Ezekiel*,
3 10-15 / *Daniel* 12 2
Apoc *Rev* *Judith* 16 17-(D) *OT* *J* d. h
16 20- / *Wisdom* *Solomon* 4 16-23
passim-(D) *OT* Book of *Wisdom* 4 16-23
passim *Ecclesiastes*, 1 21 9-1 -(D)
OT *Ecclesiastes* 1 21 10 1

- New Testament *Matt* 8 12 13 41 42 49-
5 18 5-9 24 45 16 / *Mark* 9 44 18-(D)
Mark 9 41 47 / *Luke* 16 19-6 / *Romans*,
2 5-9 / *II Thessalonians* 1 7-9 / *James* 5 7 /
Revelation passim, esp 14 9-11 1 1 0 15-
(D) *Apocalypse* passim esp 14 9-11 1 1 0 15
18 *AGOSTINI* *City of God*, BK XI CH 31 341a-d
BK XII, CH 360b-361a CH 12 365d 366a
CH 14 3 366b-367d BK XII CH 24 BK XII
CH 1 3 66c 377a BK XII CH 15 383d 390a
BK XII CH 1 397b-d 398c BK XII CH 13 519a
570a CH 25 529d 530a c BK XII, CH 6 534
535a CH 14 13 542d 544b BK XII 560a
585a c esp CH 1 3 560a 562a, CH 9-10 568d
5 0b, CH 13 571c 572a, CH 17 574a b, CH 23
5 6c 577b *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 20-1
629b

- 19 *AGOSTINI* *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 1 A
3, REP 2 42c-43b Q 21 4 REP 1 126c 121c
20 *AGOSTINI* *Summa Theologiae* PART I-II, Q 87
A 3-5 187b-189c PART III UP L, Q 90 A 3
897d 900d Q 81 992b-996a c Q 87 A 1 REP 4
997b 998c Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 91 1040d
1042c Q 99-99 1066a 108a c

- III DANTE *Divine Comedy* *HELL* 3a 52d esp III
[15] 4 b, [32 129] 5a b VI [100-115] 9c, VI
[00-5] [10c-d, XI 15a 16b XIV [16-] 19c
20b XX I [5] 136] 40a-41b XXXIII [91 243]
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[10-12] 128c
22 C 1 C 18 *FRANZ* *Tac* [2 6-7234] 283b-284a
/ *Summoner* *Prologue* 284b-285a / *Priores*
Tal par 1 498b-501a

- 23 HORRER *Learned* PART III 195b-d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II
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26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* CT I SC IV [12
63] 115a b
29 CER ANTES *Don Quixote* P RT II 418c
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31 DESCARTES *Objections & Replies* 226d 227a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I II 93a 134a BK
I [96-8-11] 215a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI
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40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 188d 189a
41 GI BOM *Decline and Fall* 234a c
5. DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V
127c-d BK I 169c 170b BK II 185a c

7d The beatitude of God

- Old Testament *Exodus* 33 18-20 / *Chronicles*
29 11 11-(D) / *Paraphrase* 29 11 12 /
Psalms 8 19 24 104 113 4 135 145-(D)
Psalms 8 13 23 1 11 112 4 13 144 /
Isaiah 6 1 4-(D) *Isaiah* 6 1 4

- New Testament *Mark* 8 38 / *John* 8 54 /
I Peter 4 11 / *II Peter* 1 16-18 / *Revelation*
5 9-14-(D) *Apocalypse* 5 9 14

- 18 *AGOSTINI* *City of God* BK XI 1 par 4 111c
par 33 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK VII
CH 6 268d 269c BK XII CH 17 353a 354
BK XII CH 29 614b-616d

- 19 *AGOSTINI* *Summa Theologiae* P RT I Q 6
150a 152a c 62 A 4 ANS 320b-321b Q 63
A 3 327b-328b Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b-341b Q
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2 616d-617b Q 3 A 1 REP 1 622c-623a A 2
REP 1 623a-624b A 8 REP 2 628d-629c Q 5
A 3 REP 2 638b-639a A 7 ANS and RS 2
642a d

- 20 *AGOSTINI* *Summa Theologiae* P RT III Q 19,
A 3 819c-820c Q 26 A 1 REP 2 845b-846a
PART III SUPPL, Q 71 A 8 REP 1 909d-910d
Q 92 A 1 RE 5 1025c 1032b

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* *PARADISE* I [1-9]
106a XXXIII [16-145] 156d 157d

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PRO 17 456c-d
PRO 32 36 460d-461c

- 32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b-13a /
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- 42 H. T. *Practical Reason* 347d 348b / *Adg-*
ment 594d [in 1]

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For matters most relevant to the general theory of happiness, see GOOD AND EVIL 31 52 PLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6b, 6d.

Particular goods or virtues which are related to happiness, see COURAGE 5 HONOR 2b KNOWLEDGE 5b(4) LOVE 3a PRUDENCE 2a TEMPERANCE 3 VIRTUE AND VICE 1d WEALTH 10a VI DOM 2c and for the discussion of means and ends in the order of goods, see GOOD AND EVIL 4b 5b-5c.

Other treatments of the conflict between an ethics of happiness and an ethics of duty see DUTY 2 PLEASURE AND PAIN 8b PRINCIPLE 4-4b

- For The bearing of natural desire on the pursuit of happiness see *DESIRE* 23 32, b *LOVE* 52-52(1) *WILL* 7d
- The relation of happiness to death and the fear of death see *IMMORTALITY* 1 *LIFE AND DEATH* 82-8c
- Other considerations of individual happiness in relation to the state or the common good see *GOOD AND EVIL* 5d *STATE* 2f
- Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beatitude see *ETERNITY* 4d *GOD* 6c(4) 7d 7g *IMMORTALITY* 5c-5g *LOVE* 52(2) *PUNISHMENT* 5d 5c(1) *SIN* 3c-3d 4d 6d 7 *VIRTUE AND VICE* 8b 8c *WILL* 7c-7e(2)
- Another discussion of the beatitude of God see *GOD* 4h

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- A. SMITH *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* PART VI
- KANT *Lectures on Ethics*
- DOSTOEVSKY *Notes from Underground*
- *The Idiot*

II

- CICERO *De Finibus (On the Supreme Good)*
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Chapter 34 HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

Our language the term *History*.¹ Hegel observes, unites the objective with the subjective side. It comprehends not less what has happened than the narration of what has happened. This union of the two meanings we must regard as of a higher order than mere outward accord: we must suppose historical narrations to have appeared contemporaneously with historical deeds and events.

Our daily speech confirms Hegel's observation that history refers to that which has happened as well as to the record of it. We speak of the history of a people or a nation, or of the great events and epochs of history, and we also call a history the book which gives a narrative account of these matters.

It is as if we used the word *physics* to name both the object of study and the science of that object, whereas normally we tend to use *physics* for the science and refer to its subject matter as the physical world. We do not say that matter in motion is *physics*, but that it is the object of *physics*, one of the things a physicist studies. We must similarly have adopted the convention of using *history* in a restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge or a kind of writing, and then called the phenomena written about or studied "historical" but not history.

That however is not the pre-scientific usage. The word history seems to have at least four distinct meanings. It refers to a type of knowledge. It refers to a type of literature. It means an actual sequence of events in time which constitutes a process of irreversible change. This can be either change in the structure of the world or any part of nature, or change in human affairs in society or civilization.

Historical knowledge and historical writing can be about natural history or human history. In his classification of the kinds of knowledge

Francis Bacon makes this distinction when he divides history into natural civil ecclesiastical and literary. Whereas the last three deal with human things, the first is concerned with the non-human part of the natural world. At the same time this natural history is not in Bacon's judgment the same thing as natural philosophy, or what we would now call "natural science."

In this set of great books, natural history even cosmic history makes its appearance in works which we ordinarily classify as science or philosophy, for example Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Lucretius' *On the Nature of Things*, or Plato's *Timaeus*. The great books of history deal with man and society, not nature or the universe. For the most part this is true also of the great philosophies of history. They too, are primarily concerned with human civilization, not the physical world.

In its original Greek root the word "history" means research, and implies the act of judging the evidences in order to separate fact from fiction. The opening line of Herodotus is sometimes translated not "these are the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus" but "these are the researches."

The word research can of course mean any sort of inquiry—into what is the case as well as into what has happened. The title of one of Aristotle's biological works, the *History of Animals*, suggests that it is concerned with researches about animals. The book does not deal with natural history; it is not a history of animals in the sense of showing the stages of their development in the course of time. The redundancy of historical research can therefore be excused on the ground that it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of inquiry or research—scientific and historical.

- For The bearing of natural desire on the pursuit of happiness *see* DESIRE 23 33 ,b LOVE 5a-51(1) WILL 7d
- The relation of happiness to death and the fear of death *see* IMMORTALITY 1 LIFE AND DEATH 8a-8c
- Other considerations of individual happiness in relation to the state or the common good *see* GOOD AND EVIL 5d STATE 2f
- Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beatitude *see* ETERNITY 4d GOD 6c(4) 7d 7g IMMORTALITY 5c-5g LOVE 51(2) PUNISHMENT 5d 5c(1) SIN 3c-3d 4d 6d 7 VIRTUE AND VICE 8b 8c WILL 7c-7e(2)
- Another discussion of the beatitude of God *see* GOD 4h

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- LUBAC *Surnaturel*
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The contrast between history and science—or what for the purpose of comparison may be the same philosophy—is formulated in Aristotle's statement concerning poetry that it is more philosophical than history because poetry tends to express the universal history the particular History deals with what has actually happened whereas poetry like philosophy may be concerned with whatever is or can be.

One comparison leads to another. Unlike poetry history and science are alike in that they both attempt to prove what they say. But in distinction from science or philosophy history resembles poetry especially the great epic and dramatic poems in being narrative literature. The historian and the poet both tell stories.

If the poet and the historian—including of course a biographer like Plutarch—are also moralists they are moralists in the same way. Their works do not contain expositions of ethical or political doctrine but rather concrete exemplifications of theories concerning the conduct of human life and social practices. That fact explains why much of the content of the great historical books is cited in other chapters dealing with moral and political even psychological topics. But in this chapter we are concerned with history itself rather than with the particulars of history. We are concerned with the methods and aims of history as a kind of knowledge and literature and we are concerned with the historical process as a whole the consideration of which belongs to the philosophy of history.

THE AIMS AND METHODS OF WRITING HISTORY are discussed by the historian himself as well as by the philosopher. Philosophers like Hobbes, Bacon, or Descartes consider history largely from the point of view of the kind of knowledge it is and the contribution it makes to the whole of human learning. Historians like Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus, and Gibbon state more specifically the objectives of their work the standards of reliability or authenticity by which they determine what is fact and the principles of interpretation by which they select the most important facts ordering them according to some hypothesis concerning the meaning of the events reported.

Herodotus writes he tells us "in the hope of preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their due meed of glory." Thucydides proceeds in the belief that the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians was the greatest movement yet known in history not only of the Hellenes but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind. Not very different is the declaration of Tacitus. My purpose is not to relate at length every motion but only such as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy. Thus I regard as history's highest function to let no worthy action be uncommemorated and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds.

But though there seems to be a striking similarity in the purpose of these historians Tacitus alone of the three avows a moral purpose. Furthermore each of the three is conscious of the individual way in which he has put his intention into effect. Thucydides for example seems to have Herodotus in mind when he fears that the absence of romance in my history will detract somewhat from its interest but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past I shall be content. Like Thucydides Tacitus is an historian of contemporary events and he fears comparison with the historian of antiquity who can enchant and refresh a reader's mind with descriptions of countries the various incidents of battle glorious deaths of great generals. His own work may be instructive he thinks but it may also give very little pleasure because he has to present in succession the merciless bidings of a tyrant incessant prosecutions faithless friendships the ruin of innocence the same causes issuing in the same results, and [he is] everywhere confronted with a wearisome monotony in [his] subject matter.

As we have already noted Herodotus seems satisfied to let the reader decide between conflicting accounts. Only occasionally does he indicate which is more likely in his own judgment. Thucydides claims that he has made a greater effort to determine the facts. I did not even trust my own impressions, he writes the narrative rests partly on what I saw myself partly

Originally research set the historian apart from the poet and the maker of myths or legends. They told stories too, but only the historian restricted himself to telling a story based on the facts ascertained by inquiry or research. Herodotus deserves the title "father of history" for having originated a style of writing which differs from poetry in this extraordinary respect. He tries to win the reader's belief not by the plausibility of his narrative but rather by giving the reader some indication of the sources of information and the reliability of the evidence on which the narrative is based.

The poet tries to tell a likely story, but the historian tries to make credible statements about particular past events. He makes an explicit effort to weigh the evidence himself or, as Herodotus so frequently does, to submit conflicting testimony to the reader's own judgment. Such is the account which the Persians give of these matters; he writes, but the Phoenicians vary from the Persian statements, or, this much I know from information given me by the Delphians, the remainder of the story the Milesians add, or that these were the real facts I learnt at Memphis from the priests of Vulcan, or such is the truth of this matter. I have also heard another account which I do not at all believe, or again, thus far I have spoken of Egypt from my own observation relating what I myself saw, the ideas that I formed, and the results of my own researches. What follows rests on accounts given me by the Egyptians, which I shall now repeat, adding thereto some particulars which fell under my own notice.

Herodotus seems quite conscious of the difference between himself and Homer, especially on those matters treated by the poet which fall within his purview as an historian. The Trojan War lies in the background of the conflict with which Herodotus is directly concerned—the Persian invasion of Greece—for the Persians trace to the attack upon Troy their ancient enmity towards the Greeks.

Herodotus does not doubt that the siege of Troy took place as Homer relates, but he learns from the Egyptians a legend about the landing of Paris and Helen on Egyptian soil and the detention of Helen by Proteus, king of Memphis. Such is the tale told me by the priests con-

cerning the arrival of Helen at the court of Proteus. It seems to me that Homer was acquainted with this story and while discarding it because he thought it less adapted for epic poetry than the version which he followed showed that it was not unknown to him.

Herodotus cites passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to corroborate this point. He is willing to use the Homeric poems as one source of information but not without checking them against conflicting accounts. I made inquiry, he writes, whether the story which the Greeks tell about Troy is a fable or not. When he comes to the conclusion that Helen was never within the walls of the city to which the Greeks laid siege for ten years, he tells the reader his reasons for thinking so. Homer, however, when he narrates Helen's actions during the siege, does not bother to establish the facts of the matter or to give the reader contrary versions of what took place. That is not the poet's task, as Herodotus recognizes. It belongs to the historian, not the poet. The story which may have greater probability in fact may not be the better story for the poet.

SINCE HE IS BOTH an investigator and a story teller, the historian stands comparison with the scientist in one respect and with the poet in another. The special character of history as a kind of knowledge distinct from science and philosophy seems clear from its object—the singular or unique events of the past. The scientist or philosopher is not concerned with what has happened but with the nature of things. Particular events may serve as evidence for him, but his conclusions go beyond statements of particular fact to generalizations about the way things are or happen at any time and place. In contrast, the historian's research begins and ends with particulars. He uses particulars directly observed by himself or testified to by others as the basis for circumstantial inference to matters which cannot be established by direct evidence. The method of investigation developed by the early historians may be the precursor of scientific method, but the kind of evidence and the mode of argument which we find in Hippocrates or Plato indicate the divergence of the scientist and philosopher from the procedure of the historian.

even ages, corresponding to the seven days of creation. "The first age as the first day extends from Adam to the deluge the second from the deluge to Abraham. From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, each of which are fourteen generations—the first period from Abraham to David a second from David to the captivity a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now passing and cannot be measured by any number of generations. After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day when He shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself. The seventh shall be our Sabbath which shall be brought to a close not by an evening but by the Lord's day as an eighth and eternal day consecrated by the resurrection of Christ and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit but also of the body. This is what shall be in the end without end."

This same projection of history—in all its details at least—is laid before Adam by the archangel Michael in Milton's *Paradise Lost* just before Adam lies in the Garden of Eden.

Unlike the four major dispensations of which Augustine and Voltaire speak, Hegel's four ages of the world are epochs in the development of Spirit as manifested in the State. They are regularly defined as the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the German world and are seen as a progress of the consciousness of Freedom. The various grades in the consciousness of Freedom, Hegel writes, supply us with the natural division of universal History. The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as such—is free and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free—that one is therefore only a Despot—not a free man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free but they and the Romans likewise knew only that some are free—not man as such. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty was implicated with the institution of slavery. The German nations, under the influence of

Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness that man as man is free.

With the complete emancipation of man in the German-Christian world history is consummated for Hegel. "The grand principle of being is realized," he declares, "consequently the end of days is fully come." Another sign of the finality of the German-Christian world seems to be its reconciliation of Church and State. European history is the exhibition of the growth of each of these principles severally than of an antithesis on the part of both lastly of the harmonizing of the antithesis. In the German-Christian world the secular and the religious modes of life are ultimately harmonized fused in a single order of rational Freedom.

As yet from the opposition between the philosophical and theological approaches here represented by Hegel and Augustine, there seem to be two main issues in the general theory of human history. The first concerns the pattern of change the second the character of the causes at work.

The pattern most familiar because of its prevalence in modern speculations is that of progress or evolution. The progress may be conceived as a dialectical motion in the realm of Spirit, contrasted by Hegel with the realm of Matter or Nature according as the essence of Matter is Gravity and the essence of Spirit is Freedom. But it may also be thought to occur as in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, through the resolution of conflicting material or economic forces.

"The whole history of mankind," Engels writes in his preface to the *Communist Manifesto* "since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes. The history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which now and then, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class, the bourgeoisie, without at the same time and once for all emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and

on what others saw for me the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labor from the want of coincidence between the accounts of the same occurrences by different eye witnesses. But he thinks that his conclusions may safely be relied on undisturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft or by the compositions of the chroniclers which are attractive at truth's expense.

The historians are aware of the difficulty of combining truth telling with storytelling. Most men Thucydides remarks are unwilling to take enough pains in the investigation of truth accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. The difficulty according to Tacitus is the obscurity of the greatest events so that some take for granted any hearsay whatever its source others turn truth into falsehood and both errors find encouragement with posterity.

Reviewing the enormous scope of his work Gibbon at the very end concludes that the historian may applaud the importance and variety of his subject but while he is conscious of his own imperfections he must often accuse the deficiency of his materials. Because of the scarcity of authentic memorials he tells us in another place the historian finds it hard to preserve a clear and unbroken thread of narration. Surrounded with imperfect fragments always concise often obscure and sometimes contradictory he is reduced to collect to compare and to conjecture and though he ought never to place his conjectures in the rank of facts yet the knowledge of human nature and of the sure operation of its fierce and unrestrained passions might on some occasions supply the want of historical materials.

Clearly the historians have different criteria of relevance in determining the selection and rejection of materials and different principles of interpretation in assigning the causes which explain what happened. These differences are reflected in the way each historian constructs from the facts a grand story conceives the line of its plot and the characterization of its chief actors. Herodotus for example has been compared with Homer as writing in an epic manner Thucydides with the dramatic writers of

tragedy. Even if they all agreed on the accuracy of fact the great historians would differ from one another as the great poets do each has a style and a vision as personal and poetic as Homer or Virgil Melville or Tolstoy.

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The point of this comparison is not that God and His providence are omitted from the philosopher's view. On the contrary Hegel regards the history of the world as a process of development and the realization of Spirit—this is the true theodicy the justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—that what has happened and is happening every day is not only not without God but is essentially His Work.

The difference is rather to be found in the ultimate source of insight concerning human development and destiny. Augustine sees everything in the light of God's revelation of His plan in Holy Writ. Hegel and other philosophers of history from Vico to Toynbee seek and sometimes claim to find in the records of history itself the laws which govern and the pattern which inheres in the procession of events from the beginning to the end of human time.

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class struggle The four great economic systems—the systems of slave labor feudal serfdom industrial capitalism and the communistic or classless society—are thus seen as the stages of progress toward an ultimate perfection in which history comes to rest because it has at last fully realized its controlling tendency

The pattern of progress may be conceived not as a dialectical motion involving conflict and synthesis but rather as by Kant in terms of an increasing actualization of the potentialities for good in human life Giving the name of *culture* to the production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing Kant declares it is only culture that can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race The progressive realization of culture consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires whereby in our attachment to certain natural things we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own In these terms history moves toward a perfection which can never be fully achieved on earth for man's own nature is not so constituted as to rest or be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever

As conceived by the evolutionist progress may or may not attain its limit but in either case its manifestation in human history appears to be analogous to as well as an extension of the line of development along which the world or all of living nature has gradually advanced

THESE VIEWS ARE GIVEN FURTHER DISCUSSION in the chapters on EVOLUTION PROGRESS and WORLD Whether or not the same pattern of change obtains in the historical order of nature as in the history of man and society is a question to be answered by those who deny as well as by those who affirm progress There is cyclical change in nature the same pattern of birth growth decay and death repeating itself generation after generation That history too repeats itself with the rise and decline of cities and civilizations seems to be the ancient view It reappears in our day with Spengler and somewhat qualified by the possibility of progress with Toynbee

The cities which were formerly great Herodotus observes have most of them be-

come insignificant and such as are at present powerful were weak in olden time I shall therefore discourse equally of both convinced that prosperity never continues long in one stay Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both in the succession of worlds and in the succession of civilizations The myth of the golden age of Kronos and the earth bound age of Zeus, which Plato tells in the *Statesman* also applies both to nature and society

According to the myth there is a time when God himself guides and helps to rule the world in its course and there is a time on the completion of a certain cycle when he lets go, and the world being a living creature and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction Thus the history of the world runs through infinite cycles of years and one age succeeds another in an endless round

There is still a third view which sees history as neither cyclical nor simply progressive Virgil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by placing the golden age in the future It dawns with Rome where in the words of the 4th *Eclogue* the majestic roll of circling centuries begins anew Justice returns returns old Saturn's reign with a new breed of men sent down from heaven and the iron shall cease the golden race arise

Rome for Virgil is not only the beginning of the golden age it is also the consummation of history In the *Aeneid* Jupiter himself declares that he has given the Romans dominion without end—that he has ordained for them neither period nor boundary of empire The gown'd race of Rome shall be the lords of the world then war shall cease and the iron ages soften Thus Jupiter says it is willed and so a day will come in the lapse of cycles The perpetuity of Rome seems to leave little room for any further essential progress and no chance for another cycle of decay and regeneration

The Christian dogma of the fall of man from grace and his return through divine mediation to grace and salvation seems to give history a pattern that is partly Platonic in the sequence which makes the loss of a golden age the occasion for striving to regain it But it also seems

to be Virgilian in part. The epochal transitions of history happen only once. The coming of Christ is an absolutely singular event after which there is no essential progress in man's condition until the Last Judgment at the end of the world.

COMMON TO THESE diverse conceptions of the pattern of history is the problem concerning the causes which are at work as history unfolds. Whatever the factors they will operate in the future as they have in the past unless the millennium is already upon us or about to dawn. From the knowledge of their own past or from their dim perception of divine providence men derive a sense of the future but they look forward to that future differently according as some part of it will stem from choices freely made or according as all of it is inexorably determined by causes beyond their control.

The basic alternatives of fate and freedom of necessity and contingency. God's will and man's choice are considered in the chapters on CHANCE, FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. Sometimes the issue is resolved in the same way for the course of nature and the course of history: necessity reigns in both as there is contingency in the events of nature so there is freedom in the acts of history. Sometimes the processes of nature and history are distinguished: the motions of matter are governed by invariable laws whereas the motions of men are directed by laws which leave them free to work out a destiny which is determined by rather than determines the human spirit.

Those who do not deny freedom entirely in the realm of history seldom give it unlimited scope. What men can do is conditioned from below by the operation of material forces and from above by what Hegel calls God's purpose with the world. The vast arras web of Universal History is woven by the interaction between God's will (the Absolute Idea) and human purposes or interests which Hegel calls the complex of human passions.

History for him is the union of Freedom and Necessity where the latent abstract process of Spirit is regarded as Necessity while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as the interest belongs to the domain of freedom. But this freedom which coheres

with necessity seems to belong more to the human race as a whole than to individual men. The individual man is tossed aside if he tries to obstruct the path of history. He is powerless to change its course.

Not even great men can make or determine history. They are great only because sensing the next phase of the historical process they identify themselves with the wave of the future and conform their purposes to the march of events—the dialectical development of the Absolute Idea. A few men thus become world historical individuals because their own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World Spirit. They have an insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development—the very Truth for their age for their world, the species next in order so to speak and which was already formed in the womb of time.

Like Hegel and unlike the ancient historians Tolstoy also regards the leadership of great men as illusory. To believe in the efficacy of heroes or great men he thinks is to commit the fallacy of the man who watching the movements of a herd of cattle and paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different parts of the field or to the driving of the herdsmen attributes the direction the herd takes to the animal which happens to be at its head.

Great men are only celebrated puppets, pushed ahead on the moving front of history. The motion of history derives its force and direction from the individual acts of the innumerable nameless men who comprise the human mass. The act of the individual counts little. The mass motion is a complex resultant of slight impulses tending in many directions. But however slight the impulse each man gives his contribution to history is a free act conditioned only by the circumstances under which he makes a choice and by the divine providence which grants him the freedom to choose. Like every human action, history according to Tolstoy thus "appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability."

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The pattern of progress may be conceived not as a dialectical motion involving conflict and synthesis but rather as by Kant in terms of an increasing actualization of the potentialities for good in human life Giving the name of *culture* to the production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing Kant declares it is only culture that can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race The progressive realization of culture consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires whereby in our attachment to certain natural things we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own In these terms history moves toward a *perfection which can never be fully achieved on earth* for man's own nature is not so constituted as to rest or be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever

As conceived by the evolutionist progress may or may not attain its limit but in either case its manifestation in human history appears to be analogous to as well as an extension of the line of development along which the world or all of living nature has gradually advanced

THESE VIEWS ARE GIVEN further discussion in the chapters on EVOLUTION PROGRESS and WORLD Whether or not the same pattern of change obtains in the historical order of nature as in the history of man and society is a question to be answered by those who deny as well as by those who affirm progress There is cyclical change in nature the same pattern of birth growth decay and death repeating itself generation after generation That history too repeats itself with the rise and decline of cities and civilizations seems to be the ancient view It reappears in our day with Spengler and somewhat qualified by the possibility of progress with Toynbee

The cities which were formerly great Herodotus observes have most of them be-

come insignificant and such as are at present powerful were weak in olden time I shall therefore discourse equally of both convinced that prosperity never continues long in one stay Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both in the succession of worlds and in the succession of civilizations The myth of the golden age of Kronos and the earth bound age of Zeus which Plato tells in the *Statesman* also applies both to nature and society

According to the myth there is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course and there is a time on the completion of a certain cycle when he lets go and the world being a living creature and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction Thus the history of the world runs through infinite cycles of years and one age succeeds another in an endless round

There is still a third view which sees history as neither cyclical nor simply progressive Virgil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by placing the golden age in the future It dawns with Rome where in the words of the 4th *Eclogue* the majestic roll of circling centuries begins anew Justice returns returns old Saturn's reign with a new breed of men sent down from heaven and the iron shall cease the golden race arise

Rome for Virgil is not only the beginning of the golden age it is also the consummation of history In the *Aeneid* Jupiter himself declares that he has given the Romans dominion without end—that he has ordained for them neither period nor boundary of empire The gown'd race of Rome shall be the lords of the world then war shall cease and the iron ages soften Thus Jupiter says as it willed and so a day will come in the lapse of cycles The perpetuity of Rome seems to leave little room for any further essential progress and no chance for another cycle of decay and regeneration

The Christian dogma of the fall of man from grace and his return through divine mediation to grace and salvation seems to give history a pattern that is partly Platonic in the sequence which makes the loss of a golden age the occasion for striving to regain it But it also seems

to be Virgilian in part. The epochal transitions of history happen only once. The coming of Christ is an absolutely singular event after which there is no essential progress in man's condition until the Last Judgment at the end of the world.

COMMON TO THESE diverse conceptions of the pattern of history is the problem concerning the causes which are at work as history unfolds. Whatever the factors, they will operate in the future as they have in the past unless the millennium is already upon us or about to dawn. From the knowledge of their own past or from their dim perception of divine providence men derive a sense of the future but they look forward to that future differently according as some part of it will stem from choices freely made or according as all of it is inexorably determined by causes beyond their control.

The basic alternatives of fate and freedom of necessity and contingency, God's will and man's choice are considered in the chapters on CHANCE, FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. Sometimes the issue is resolved in the same way for the course of nature and the course of history: necessity reigns in both as there is contingency in the events of nature so there is freedom in the acts of history. Sometimes the processes of nature and history are distinguished: the motions of matter are governed by invariable laws whereas the motions of men are directed by laws which leave them free to work out a destiny which is determined by rather than determined, the human spirit.

Those who do not deny freedom entirely in the realm of history seldom see it unlimited in scope. What men can do is conditioned from below by the operation of material forces and from above by what Hegel calls God's purpose with the world. The vast arras web of Universal History is woven by the interaction between God's will (the Absolute Idea) and human purposes or interests, which Hegel calls the complex of human passions.

History for him is "the union of Freedom and Necessity" where the latent abstract process of Spirit is regarded as Necessity while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest belongs to the domain of freedom. But this freedom which coheres

with necessity seems to belong more to the human race as a whole than to individual men. The individual man is tossed aside if he tries to obstruct the path of history. He is powerless to change its course.

Not even great men can make or determine history. They are great only because sensing the next phase of the historical process they identify themselves with the wave of the future and conform their purposes to the march of events—the dialectical development of the Absolute Idea. A few men thus become "world historical individuals" because their own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World Spirit. They have "an insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development—the very Truth for their age, for their world—the species next in order so to speak—and which was already formed in the womb of time."

Like Hegel and unlike the ancient historians, Tolstoy also regards the leadership of great men as illusory. To believe in the efficacy of heroes or great men he thinks is to commit the fallacy of the man who, watching the movements of a herd of cattle and paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different parts of the field or to the driving of the herdsman, attributes the direction the herd takes to the animal which happens to be at its head.

Great men are only celebrated puppets, pushed ahead on the moving front of history. The motion of history derives its force and direction from the individual acts of the innumerable nameless men who comprise the human mass. The act of the individual counts little. The mass motion is a complex resultant of slight impulses tending in many directions. But however slight the impulse each man gives his contribution to history is a free act conditioned only by the circumstances under which he makes a choice and by the divine providence which grants him the freedom to choose. Like every human action history, according to Tolstoy, thus "appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability."

DIFFERENT FROM speculations on a grand scale concerning the whole historical process is that

type of philosophizing about history which considers its place in education—the light it affords to the mind and the lessons it teaches for the guidance of conduct

Montaigne for example makes the reading of history and biography the window through which a man looks out upon the world. This great world he writes is the mirror wherein we are to behold ourselves to be able to know ourselves as we ought to do in the true bias. Only against the large scene history reveals and amidst the variety of human nature it exhibits can a man truly know himself and his own time. In a similar vein Gibbon declares that the experience of history exalts and enlarges the horizon of our intellectual view. Hegel on the other hand insists that what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history or acted on principles deduced from it.

On the practical side political writers like Machiavelli, Montesquieu and the Federalists use history to exemplify or confirm their generalizations. They agree with Thucydides that an exact knowledge of the past is an aid to the interpretation of the future which in the course of human things must resemble it if it does not reflect it. Most men adds Tacitus learn wisdom from the fortunes of others.

It is on these grounds that the great books of history belong with treatises on morals and politics and in the company of philosophical and theological speculations concerning the nature and destiny of man. Liberal education needs the particular as well as the universal and these are combined in the great historical narratives. Apart from their utility they have the originality of conception, the poetic quality, the imaginative scope which rank them with the great creations of the human mind.

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- I Works by authors represented in this collection
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Chapter 35 HONOR

INTRODUCTION

THE notions of honor and fame are sometimes used as if their meanings were interchangeable and sometimes as if each had a distinct connotation. In the tradition of the great books both usages will be found. It is seldom just a matter of words. The authors who see no difference between a man's honor and his fame are opposed on fundamental issues of morality to those who think the standards of honor are independent of the causes of fame. This opposition will usually extend to psychological issues concerning human motivation and to political issues concerning power and justice. It entails contrary views of the role of rewards and punishments in the life of the individual and of society.

Praise and blame seem to be common elements in the significance of fame and honor. The meaning of honor seems to involve in addition the notion of worth or dignity. But whether a man is virtuous or not, whether he deserves the good opinion of his fellow men does not seem to be the indispensable condition on which his fame or infamy rests. Nor does his good or ill repute in the community necessarily signify that he is a man of honor or an honorable man.

The connection and distinction of these terms would therefore appear to be the initial problem of this chapter. Any solution of the problem must consider the relation of the individual to the community and the standards by which the individual is appraised—by himself and his fellow men. Honor and fame both seem to imply public approval, but the question is whether both presuppose the same causes or the same occasions for social esteem.

The manifestation of the value we set on one another, writes Hobbes, is that which is commonly called Honoring and Dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to honor him

at a low rate, is to dishonor him. But high and low in this case is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself. Does Hobbes mean that the value a man sets on himself is the true standard of his worth? Apparently not. Let men he says rate themselves at the highest value they can, yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others. What then is the measure of such esteem? The value or worth of a man answers Hobbes is as of all other things his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another.

Here then honor is not what a man has in himself but what he receives from others. Honor is paid him. He may think himself dishonored if others do not pay him the respect which accords with his self respect, but their evaluation of him is somehow independent of the standard by which he measures himself. It depends on the relation in which he stands to them in terms of his power and their need. Virtue and duty—considerations of good and evil, right and wrong—do not enter into this conception of honor. The distinction between honor and fame tends to disappear when honor reflects the opinion of the community based on the political utility rather than the moral worth of a man.

THERE IS ANOTHER conception of honor which not only separates it from fame but also makes it independent of public approbation. This is not an unfamiliar meaning of the term. The man who says on my honor or my word of honor may not be an honest man, but if he he pledges himself by these expressions to fulfill a promise or to live up to certain expectations. He is saying that he needs no ex-

ternal check or sanction. A man who had to be compelled by threat or force to honor his obligations would not be acting from a sense of honor.

It is not for outward show that the soul is to play its part. Montaigne writes, but for ourselves within where no eyes can pierce but our own there she defends us from the fear of death of pain of shame itself there she arms us against the loss of our children friends and fortunes and when opportunity presents itself she leads us on to the hazards of war. Not for any profit but for the honor of honesty it self.

A sense of honor thus seems to function like a sense of duty. Both reflect the light of conscience. Both operate through an inner determination of the will to do what reason judges to be right in the particular case. If there is a difference between them it is not so much in their effects as in their causes.

Duty usually involves obligations to others but a man's sense of honor may lead him to act in a certain way though the good of no other is involved. To maintain his self respect he must respect a standard of conduct which he has set for himself. Accordingly a man can be ashamed of himself for doing or thinking what neither injures anyone else nor ever comes to the notice of others. A sense of shame—the reflex of his sense of honor—torments him for having fallen short of his own ideal for being disloyal to his own concepts of what is good or right and his shame may be even more intense in proportion as the standard he has isolated is not one shared by others, but his own measure of what a man should be or do.

Drumt Karamazov exhibits these mixed feelings of honor and shame when he declares at the preliminary legal investigation. You have to deal with a man of honor a man of the highest honor above all—don't lose a bit of it—a man who's done a lot of nasty things but has always been and still is, honorable at bottom in his inner being. That's just what's made me wretched all my life that I yearned to be honorable that I was so to say a martyr to a sense of honor seeking for it with a lantern with the lantern of Diogenes, and yet all my life I've been doing filthy things."

The sense of honor and the sense of duty differ in still another respect. Duty presupposes law. The essence of law is its universality. A sense of duty therefore leads a man to do what is expected of him but not of him alone for he is no different from others in relation to what the law commands. In contrast a sense of honor presupposes self-consciousness of virtue in the individual. It binds him in conscience to live up to the image of his own character insofar as it has lineaments which seem admirable to him.

Without some self respect a man can have no sense of honor. In the great tragic poems the hero who dishonors himself in his own eyes dies spiritually with the loss of his self respect. To live on in the flesh thereafter would be almost a worse fate than the physical demise which usually symbolizes the tragic ending.

THE SENSE IN WHICH a man can honor or dishonor himself is closely akin to the sense in which he can be honored or dishonored by others. Both involve a recognition of virtue or its violation. But they differ in this that a man's personal honor is an internal consequence of virtue and inseparable from it whereas public honor bestowed upon a man is an external reward of virtue. It is not always won by those who deserve it. When it is it is given to a man as Aquinas points out on account of some excellence in him and is a sign and testimony of the excellence that is in the person honored.

There can be no separation between what a community considers honorable and what it considers virtuous or excellent in mind or character. But it does not necessarily follow that the man who is actually virtuous will always receive the honor which is due him. Public honor can be misplaced—either undeservedly or even or unjustly withheld. The virtuous should be prepared for this in the judgment of Aquinas since honor is not the reward for which the virtuous work but they receive honor from men by way of reward as from those who have nothing greater to offer. Happiness he goes on to say is the true reward for which the virtuous work for if they worked for honor it would no longer be virtue but ambition.

Tolstoy however deplores the injustice of the honor given Napoleon and the dishonor in which Kutuzov was held. Napoleon he writes that most insignificant tool of history who never anywhere even in exile showed human dignity—Napoleon is the object of adulation and enthusiasm he is *grand*. But Kutuzov—the man who from the beginning to the end of his activity in 1812 never once swerving by word or deed from Borodino to Vilna presented an example exceptional in history of self sacrifice and a present consciousness of the future importance of what was happening—Kutuzov seems to them something indefinite and pitiful and when speaking of him and of the year 1812 they always seem a little ashamed.

Kutuzov later received some measure of honor when he was presented with the rarely awarded Order of St. George. But what is perhaps a much higher honor came to him after his death when Tolstoy enshrined him as one of the heroes of *War and Peace*. Sometimes the virtuous or truly honorable man living in a bad society goes without honor in his own time to be honored only by posterity. He may even be dishonored by a society which has contempt for virtue. Sometimes a man of indifferent character and achievement or even one who is actually base and ignoble wins honor through cleverly simulating the possession of admirable traits.

It seems appropriate to consider the proportion between a man's intrinsic worth and the honor he receives. The distribution of honors raises questions of justice—in fact it is thought to be one of the chief problems of distributive justice. For those who hold that honor and fame are utterly distinct in principle this is the clear mark of their difference. Justice does not require that fame be proportionate to virtue. Though there is a sense in which fame may not be deserved the qualities in a person which justify fame are of a different order from those which honor should reward. Fame belongs to the great the outstanding the exceptional without regard to virtue or vice. Infamy is fame no less than good repute. The great scoundrel can be as famous as the great hero. Existing in the reputation a man has regardless of his character or accomplishments fame does not

tarnish as honor does when it is unmerited. But for the same reason fame is often lost as fortuitously as it is acquired. Fame has no stability. Aquinas observes it is easily ruined by false report. And if it sometimes endures, this is by accident.

THE DISTINCTION between honor and fame is not acknowledged by those who ignore fame as a condition of praise. Machiavelli for example places fame—or as he sometimes calls it glory—in that triad of worldly goods which men want without limit and without relation to justice. If the aim of life is to get ahead in the world money fame and power are the chief marks of success. A man is deemed no less successful if he acquires power by usurping it or gains it by foul means rather than fair so too if he becomes famous through chicanery or deception and counterfeits whatever form of greatness men are prone to praise.

Along with riches fame says Machiavelli is the end which every man has before him. This men seek to obtain by various methods one with caution another with haste one by force another by skill one by patience another by its opposite and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. Some methods he admits in another place may gain empire but not glory such as to slay fellow citizens to deceive friends to be without faith without mercy without religion. Nevertheless he declares Let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding a state the means will always be considered honest and he will be praised by everybody.

Because fame seems to be morally neutral it replaces honor in the discussions of those who measure men in terms of success instead of virtue duty or happiness. Because it is morally neutral it is the term used by those who wish to judge not men but the impression they make. What counts is the magnitude of that impression not its correspondence with reality.

To be famous is to be widely not necessarily well spoken of by one's fellow men now or hereafter. The man who stands above the herd whose outlines are clear and whose deeds are memorable takes his place among the famous of his time or of all times. Plutarch the moralist certainly does not regard the men whose lives

he writes as paragons of virtue. On the contrary he plainly indicates that many of them are examples of extraordinary depravity. But Plutarch the biographer treats them all as famous. He takes that as a matter of historic fact not of moral judgement. Good or bad they were acknowledged to be great men, leaders, figures of eminent proportions, engaged in momentous exploits. They were not all victorious. Few if any were successful in all that they attempted or were able to preserve what successes they achieved. But each ventured beyond the pale of ordinary men, and each succeeded at least in becoming a symbol of great deeds, a monument in human memory.

The opposite of fame is anonymity. In Dante's moral universe, only the Trampers on the rim of Hell are totally anonymous, neither good nor bad; they lack name and fame. Because they lived without infamy and without praise, Hell will not receive them for the damned would have some boast of them. To them alone no fame can be allowed. Honor and glory belong only to the blessed, but the damned in the pits of Hell, by the record they left for men to revile, are as well remembered, and hence as famous, as the saints in Heaven.

THAT MEN NORMALLY desire the esteem of their fellow men seems to be undisputed. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, Locke writes, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled to, but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his fellows, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance.

A society of misanthropes, despising each other as unthinkable as an economy of misers. The social nature of man requires sympathy and fellow feeling, love and friendship. All of these in some measure of approval based on knowledge or understanding of one's order, to one theory, the highest type of friendship springs from mutual admiration, the respect which men have for one another. The old saying that "there is honor among thieves" suggests that even among bad men there is a

desire to hold the approbation of those who share a common life. With this in mind apparently William James describes fame and honor as a man's image in the eyes of his own set, which exalts or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in another walk of life.

Though Pascal regards the pursuit of glory as the greatest baseness of man, he must admit that it is also the greatest mark of his excellence. For whatever possessions he may have on earth, whatever health and essential comfort he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem of men. He values human reason so highly that whatever advantages he may have on earth he is not content if he is not also ranked highly in the judgment of man. Those who most despise men and put them on a level with brutes, yet wish to be admired and beloved by men and contradict themselves by their own feelings.

But is this universal wish for the esteem of others a desire for honor or a desire for fame? Does it make any difference to our conception of happiness whether we say that men cannot be happy without honor or that they cannot be happy unless they are famous?

Even those who do not distinguish between honor and fame are led by these questions to discriminate between fame and infamy. As we have already noted, fame and infamy are alike since both involve the notoriety enjoyed by the outstanding, the exceptional, the great, whether good or bad. If that men desire is simply to be known by others and to have a kind of immortality through living on in the memory of later generations, then it will serve as well as good repute. All that matters is the size of the reputation and its vitality. But if the desire is for approbation or praise, good opinion alone will satisfy, and then the question becomes whether the object is fame or honor. Which does Iago have in mind when he says, "Good name in man and woman - dear my Lord - is the immediate jewel of their souls?"

Opposite answers seem to be determined by opposite views of human nature and human happiness. Those who, like Plato, think that virtue is an indispensable ingredient of happiness, ranked honor among the good things

which the virtuous man will seek in the right way. Possession of good things by itself is not sufficient. Socrates says in the *Euthydemus*. A man must also use them and use them well for

the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non use. Applied to honor this would seem to mean that the virtuous man will not seek praise for the wrong reasons—either for that which is not praiseworthy in himself or from others whose lack of virtue disqualifies them from giving praise with honesty. The virtuous man will not seek fame or be unhappy lacking it for fame like pleasure or wealth can be enjoyed by bad men as well as good and be sought for «rong as well as right reasons or in the wrong as well as the right way. Virtue according to the moralists protects a man from the seductions of money, fame and power—the things for which men undisciplined by virtue seem to have an inordinate desire.

In the theory of virtue honor unlike fame belongs only to the good and is always a good object worthy of pursuit. Honor is in fact the object of two virtues which Aristotle defines in the *Ethics*. One of these virtues he calls ambition and the Greek name for the other which is literally rendered by high mindedness is sometimes translated by the English word magnanimity and sometimes by pride. The Christian connotation of pride makes it a difficult word to use as the name for a virtue but it can nevertheless be so used when it is understood to mean a justifiable degree of self respect—not conceit but a middle ground between undue self esteem and inordinate self deprecation. When the Aristotelian names for these two vices are translated in English by vanity and humility it is again necessary to point out that humility must be understood not in its Christian significance as meaning the virtue of the truly religious man but rather as signifying an exaggerated meekness or pusillanimity.

The difference between pride and ambition lies in the magnitude of the other virtues they accompany and the scale of honor with which they are concerned. Both are concerned with honor which Aristotle calls the greatest of external goods. In both cases honor is the prize of virtue and it is to the good that it is rendered. The proud man is one who being

truly worthy of great things also thinks himself worthy of them for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool but no virtuous man is foolish or silly. The proud man will be pleased only by honors that are great and that are conferred by good men. Honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise since it is not this that he deserves.

Humility and vanity are according to Aristotle the vices of defect and excess which occur when a man fails to be proud. The unduly humble man underestimating his worth does not seek the honor he deserves. The vain man at the other extreme overestimates himself and wants honor out of proportion to his qualities. Honor like any other external good may be desired more than is right or less or from the right sources and in the right way. We blame both the over ambitious man as aiming at honor more than is right and from the wrong sources and the unambitious man as not willing to be honored even for noble reasons.

However words are used the point seems to be clear. It is possible for men to desire honor more than they should and less. It is also possible for honor to be rightly desired. Honor desired to excess or in the wrong way may be called fame even as the excessive desire for honor is sometimes regarded as the vice of ambition or an aspect of the sin of pride. The word pride seems to have both a good and a bad connotation. But the point remains that the difference between these two meanings of pride like the difference between honor and fame is understood by moralists in terms of virtue and it is discounted by those who reject the relevance of virtue.

THOUGH HONOR MAY be regarded as inseparable from virtue in moral theory certain political philosophers make its separation from virtue the principle of a type of government.

In Plato's *Republic* monarchy and aristocracy are defined in terms of the virtue of the rulers—either of the one wise man or of the excellent few. Government by the few is oligarchy rather than aristocracy when wealth rather than virtue is the principle of their selection. Plato sees the possibility of an intermediate between these two which occurs as a kind of transitional form when aristocracy

tends to degenerate into oligarchy. He calls that intermediate "timocracy" and describes it as a mixture of good and evil" in which the ruler is a lover of power and a lover of *honor*—claims to be a ruler not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms." In such a state he claims, "one thing and one thing only is predominantly seen—the spirit of contention and ambition, and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element." In a timocracy, in other words, honor is divorced from virtue and wisdom and becomes the only qualification for public office.

With Montesquieu, the situation is quite reversed. For him, virtue is absolutely requisite in popular government or democracy, and to a less extent in that other form of republic which he calls "aristocracy." As virtue is necessary in a republic, so is honor in a monarchy. Honor—that is, the prejudice of every person and rank—supplies the place of political virtue. A monarchical government supposes pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Since it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments and titles, it properly placed in this government."

Though Montesquieu and Plato differ in their classification of the forms of government they seem to agree that honor divorced from virtue is a counterfeit. Honor identified with ranks and titles, honor which moves individuals to serve the public good in order to promote their own interests, Montesquieu admits is a false honor "but even this false honor is as useful to the public as true honor could possibly be to private persons." Considering the laws of education characteristic of monarchical governments, Montesquieu points out that it is not in colleges or academies, but in the world itself which is the school of honor that the subjects of monarchy are chiefly trained. "Here the actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as *winning*; not as just but as great; not as reasonable but extraordinary."

his fellow men, the symbol of human greatness and the object of human admiration.

Honor, fame and glory combine in various proportions to constitute the heroic figures of classical antiquity—honor to the extent that none is without some virtue and each possesses certain virtues at least to a remarkable degree. Fame, because they are the great among men, outstanding and well known, godlike in their pre-eminence and glory almost in the theological sense inasmuch as the heroes celebrated by Homer and Virgil are beloved by the gods.

It is not accidental that the central figure in the Greek tragedies is called a "hero," since in the ancient view the tragic character must necessarily belong to a great man—a man of noble proportions, one who is "better than the ordinary man," says Aristotle. If he also has some fault or flaw it is a consequence of strength misused, not a mark of individual weakness. Such weakness as he has is the common fault of man.

In the modern world heroism and the heroic are more difficult to identify or define. We tend to substitute the notion of genius in considering the exceptionally gifted among men. Glory is dimly recognized and honor takes second place to fame. That portion of modern poetry which deals in heroes—as, for example, the tragedies and historical plays of Shakespeare—borrows them from, or models them on, legendary figures. The great modern novels, counterparts of the epic poems of antiquity, portray exceptional men and women without idealizing them to heroic stature. One of these novels, Tolstoy's *War and Peace* seeks to deflate the fame of great men. They do not deserve even their reputation for great deeds, much less the honor owed the truly great.

"If we assume as historians do that great men lead humanity to the attainment of certain ends, then it is impossible," Tolstoy declares, "to explain the facts of history without introducing the conceptions of *chance* and *genius*." But in Tolstoy's opinion "the words *chance* and *genius* do not denote any really existing thing and therefore cannot be defined." We can dispense with these meaningless words, he thinks, if we are willing to renounce our claim to discern a purpose immediately intelligible to us and admit "the ultimate purpose to be beyond

HEROISM IS DISCUSSED IN THE CHAPTER ON COURAGE, and the role of the hero—the leader or great man—in the chapter on HISTORY. Here we are concerned with the hero in the extreme of

our ken. Then not only shall we have no need to see exceptional ability in Napoleon and Alexander but we shall be unable to consider them to be anything but like ordinary men and we shall not be obliged to have recourse to *chance* for an explanation of those small events which made these people what they were but it will be clear that all those small events were inevitable.

This view of history with its emphasis on impersonal forces finds another expression in Marxist theory. The machine and the proletariat are the heroes of history or of the revolution. Yet the modern period is not without an opposite strain of thought. Machiavelli calls for a great man a hero to become the liberator of Italy who shall yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. His maxims for the prince may be read not merely as advice for getting and holding power but as preparing for an heroic effort in which the prince's power and fame will be used for liberty. The great man has the historic mission of a pioneer not the role of a puppet.

Even in the Renaissance however Machiavelli is answered by Montaigne who prizes moderation too much to praise heroism more than a little. Comparing Socrates and Alexander Montaigne places all of the latter's actions under the maxim: Subdue the world whereas Socrates he says acts on the principle that it is wise to carry on human life conformably with its natural condition. To Montaigne the virtue of the soul does not consist in flying high but in walking orderly its grandeur does not exercise itself in grandeur but in modesty.

The mediaeval Christian conception of heroism centers on the practice of heroic virtue by which the theologian defines sanctity. In the calendar of saints there is every type of spiritual excellence but all alike—martyrs, virgins, confessors, doctors—are regarded as having with God's grace superhuman strength. The saints not only perform acts of exemplary perfection they are godlike men in their exemption from the frailties of human flesh.

The heroes of antiquity also wear an aspect

of divinity but like Achilles each has a weakness in his armor. Moreover the heroes of the *Iliad* the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* are men of overweening pride. They are relentlessly jealous of their honor. They strive not so much for victory as for the due meed of honor which is its fruit. Nothing grieves them so much as to have their deeds go unrequited by abundant praise. In the contribution made by this love of praise to the growth of the Roman empire Augustine sees the providential working of God. In order that that empire might overcome the grievous evils which existed among other nations he writes God purposely granted it to such men as for the sake of honor and praise and glory consulted well for their country in whose glory they sought their own and whose safety they did not hesitate to prefer to their own suppressing the desire of wealth and many other vices for this one vice namely the love of praise.

To Augustine however this glory found in human praise is far removed from the true glory. It is in fact a sin. So hostile is this vice to pious faith he writes if the love of glory be greater in the heart than the fear or love of God that the Lord said: How can ye believe who look for glory from one another and do not seek the glory which is from God alone?

The Christian hero consequently seeks not his own glory but the glory of God and in contrast to the pagan hero he is great not in pride but in humility. His model is seen in the Apostles who according to Augustine amidst maledictions and reproaches and most grievous persecutions and cruel punishments were not deterred from the preaching of human salvation. And when great glory followed them in the church of Christ they did not rest in that as in the end of their virtue but referred that glory itself to the glory of God. For their Master had taught them not to seek to be good for the sake of human glory saying: Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men to be seen of them but let your works shine before men that they may see your good deeds and glorify your Father who is in heaven.

The word glory in its theological connotation thus has a meaning distinct from and even opposed to the sense in which it is sometimes

used as a synonym for "fame." In the liturgy of the church, the psalms and hymns (especially those of the doxology which sing the *gloria Patri* and the *gloria in excelsis Deo*) render unto God the homage which is due His infinite goodness, the reflective splendor of which is the divine glory. As in the strict moral sense honor on the human plane is due to virtue alone so in a strict theological sense glory belongs only to God.

Strictly God's glory cannot be increased by human recognition. Yet every act of religious devotion is said to redound to the greater glory of God and to diffuse His glory among creatures through the divinity they acquire when they love God and are beloved by Him. God is all

fullness in Himself and the height of all perfection nevertheless. Montaigne writes, "His name may be augmented and increased by the blessing and praise we attribute to His exterior works."

According to Dante "the glory of Him who moves everything, penetrates through the universe and is resplendent in one part more and in another less. In his journey through Paradise he beholds the saints whom God loves especially each with a distinct degree of glory according to the proximity with which he approaches the presence of God. Their halos and aureoles, in the imagery of Christian art, are the symbols of the glory in which they are bathed as in reflected light.

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AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45-(D) II *Ezra* 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 122.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBL. REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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- 14 PLUTARCH *Marcellus Pelopidas* 262d / *Arsides* 265c d / *Marcus Cato* 282a / *Agis* 648b d 649a / *Demetrius* 737b d
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- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] 115a 116b BK VI [886-892] 234b 235a BK VII [608-731] 275a 278b BK X [276-286] 309b 310a [656-688] 320a 321a BK XI [376-444] 338b 340a
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- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c d
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 ■ ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 6-9 361a 364b BK IV CH 3 370b 372b passim esp [1123^b31-33] 370d [1124^b7-9] 371b-c / *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1312-24-39] 514d
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 idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups.

I. Works by a writer represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
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Chapter 36 HYPOTHESIS

INTRODUCTION

A COMPARISON of their Greek and Latin roots shows that the English words hypothesis and supposition are synonymous. To hypothesize or to suppose is to place under—to make one thing the basis of another in the process of thought.

The word hypothesis is today often popularly misapplied to mean a guess or hunch. The sleuth in a detective story speaks of having an hypothesis about who committed the crime. The popular notion of what it means to suppose something or to entertain a supposition more accurately reflects the meaning of hypothesis in logic, mathematics, and scientific or philosophical method.

A supposition is generally understood to be something taken for granted, something assumed for the purpose of drawing implications or making inferences. What is supposed is not known to be true; it may be true or false. When we make a supposition, our first concern is to see what follows from it and only then to consider its truth in the light of its consequences. We cannot reverse this order when we employ suppositions and ask first about their truth.

The word *if* expresses the essence of supposing. The word *then* or the phrase *it follows that* introduces the consequences for the consideration of which we make the supposition. We are not interested in the *if* for its own sake but for the sake of what it may lead to. In any statement of the "*if* . . . *then* . . ." sort, it is the *if*-clause which formulates the supposition or the hypothesis; the other part of the statement, the *then*-clause, formulates the consequences or implications. The whole complex statement, which makes an *if* the logical basis for a *then*, is not an hypothesis. Rather it is what is traditionally called in logic a hypothetical proposition.

There is one use of the word hypothesis in mathematics which seems at odds with the foregoing summary. In Euclid's *Elements* for example, an hypothesis is that which is given not as the basis from which the conclusion is drawn or proved but as a condition of solving the geometric problem under consideration. Let us take Proposition 6 of Book I. It reads: *If in a triangle two angles be equal to one another, then the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to one another.* In the demonstration of this theorem, a triangle having two equal angles is regarded as given or granted. That figure or geometrical condition is a fact obtained by hypothesis. It is the fact stated in the hypothesis or the *if* clause of the theorem.

If the geometrical reality of that fact itself is questioned, the answer would have to be obtained by a prior proof that such a figure conforming to the definition of an isosceles triangle can be constructed by the use of no other instruments than a straight edge and a compass. The construction is not made, however, as part of the proof of Theorem 6, any more than is the demonstration of an antecedent theorem, which may have to be used in the proof of Theorem 6. In the proof of Theorem 6, the first line beginning with the word *let* declares that the constructibility of the figure is to be taken for granted as a matter of hypothesis.

The whole problem of Theorem 6 is to prove that the *then*-clause follows from the *if*-clause. Euclid appears to accomplish this by introducing other propositions—drawn from his axioms, definitions, postulates, or theorems previously demonstrated—which establish this connection and so certify the conclusion as following from the hypothesis. Two points about this procedure should be noted.

First, the conclusion does not follow from

the hypothesis directly for if that were so the if then proposition would be self evident and would need no proof. The mind which sees immediately that the sides opposite to the equal angles in an isosceles triangle are necessarily equal does not need any demonstration of the connection between equal angles and equal sides. The Euclidean demonstration consists in making this connection which is not immediately evident, *mediately* evident that is evident through the mediation of other propositions. It is not the hypothesis alone which proves the conclusion but the hypothesis in the company of other propositions which serve to take the mind step by step from the hypothesis granted to the conclusion implied.

Second the proposition with the truth of which the reasoning seems to end is not the proposition to be proved. The Q.E.D. at the end of a Euclidean demonstration does not apply to the last proposition in the line of proof but to the theorem itself for that is the proposition to be proved. The last proposition in the reasoning is merely the consequent which according to the theorem is proposed as following from the hypothesis. When he is able to verify the proposed connection between the hypothesis and its conclusion or consequent Euclid says Q.E.D. to the theorem as a whole—the whole if then statement.

The process of proof seems to be the same when the theorem is stated categorically rather than hypothetically. For example Theorem 6 might have been stated as other Euclidean theorems are in the following manner. The sides subtended by equal angles in a triangle are also equal to one another. This variation in mode of statement raises a question not about the meaning of *by hypothesis* in Euclidean proof but about the difference between hypothetical and categorical propositions which we will consider later.

THE EUCLIDEAN USE of a given (that is a constructible) figure as an hypothesis does not seem to be a method of making a supposition in order to discover its implications. Nor does it seem to be a way of testing the truth of an hypothesis by reference to its consequences. Both of these aspects of hypothetical reasoning do appear however in Plato's dialogues.

In the *Meno* for example Socrates proposes at a certain turn in the conversation about virtue and knowledge that he and Meno entertain the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge. Socrates immediately inquires about the consequences. If virtue is knowledge he asks, will it be taught? Since Meno already understands that knowledge is teachable he answers the question affirmatively. The utility of advancing the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge gradually appears in the next phase of the dialogue wherein it is discovered that virtue is not teachable at all or at least not in the way in which the arts and sciences are teachable. The discovery throws some doubt on the truth of the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge at least it does not seem to be knowledge in the same sense as science or art.

This mode of reasoning exemplifies the use of an hypothesis to test its truth in terms of its consequences. The underlying logical principle is that the denial of the consequences requires a denial of the antecedent hypothesis just as an affirmation of the antecedent would require an affirmation of the consequent. Nothing follows logically from a denial of the hypothesis, or from an affirmation of its consequences.

This example from the *Meno* also illustrates the difference between Euclid's and Plato's use of hypotheses. Socrates is not here trying to prove that *if* virtue is knowledge *then* virtue is teachable. The validity of the foregoing if then statement is already understood in terms of the fact that *knowledge is teachable*. With the if then statement accepted as valid Socrates uses it for the purpose of ascertaining whether or in what sense virtue is knowledge. It is not the hypothetical or if then statement which is proved but the hypothesis—the antecedent in that statement—which is tested.

The same general method of employing hypotheses and testing them is found in the empirical sciences. In medical practice the physician according to Hippocrates must be able to form a judgment from having made himself acquainted with all the symptoms and estimating their powers in comparison with one another. He should then cultivate prognosis since he will manage the cure best who has foreseen what is to happen from the present state of matters.

The preliminary diagnosis states an hypothesis (what the disease may be) and the prognosis foresees a set of consequences (what is likely to happen if the diagnosis is correct). Observation of the course of the symptoms and the patient's changing condition will either confirm or invalidate the prognosis. Confirmation leaves the diagnosis a lucky guess but fails to prove it. If the disease does not run the predicted course however the diagnosis on which the prognosis was based can be dismissed as a false hypothesis.

When an hypothesis takes the form of a prediction of what should happen if the hypothesis is true, the failure of the consequences to occur refutes the hypothesis. Though discussions of scientific method frequently speak of prediction and verification, it would seem as though prediction can only lead to the refutation of an hypothesis rather than to its verification. An hypothesis is overthrown when its prediction fails, but it is not verified when its prediction comes true. To think that it can be verified in this way is to commit the logical fallacy of arguing from the truth of a conclusion to the truth of its premises. How then do empirical scientists prove an hypothesis to be true? What do they mean by prediction and verification in relation to the use of hypothesis?

There seem to be two possible ways in which an hypothesis can be proved by empirical or experimental research. One way can be used when we know that the consequences implied follow only from the truth of the hypothesis. Should the consequences implied be impossible unless the supposed condition exists, then the confirmation of the prediction verifies the hypothesis.

The other possible method of verification has come to be called the method of multiple working hypotheses. The validity of this method depends on our knowing that the several hypotheses being entertained *exhaust* all the relevant possibilities. Each hypothesis generates a prediction, and if upon investigation the observed facts negate every prediction except one, then that one remaining hypothesis is verified. If negative instances have eliminated the false hypotheses, the hypothesis remaining must be true on the condition of course that it is the only possibility which is left.

Both of these methods seem to be valid only if a prerequisite condition is fulfilled. To verify one of a series of multiple hypotheses through the elimination of the others, the scientist must know that the hypotheses enumerated are truly *exhaustive*. In the verification of a single hypothesis by the confirmation of its prediction the scientist must know that the observed consequences can follow from no other supposition. Since such knowledge is often unavailable, probability rather than complete proof results from the testing of hypotheses by observation or experiment.

In his *Treatise on the Vacuum* Pascal offers a summary of the logical situation by distinguishing the true, the false and the doubtful or probable hypothesis. Sometimes its negation brings a conclusion of obvious absurdity and then the hypothesis is true and invariable. Or else one deduces an obvious error from its affirmation and then the hypothesis is held to be false. And when one has not been able to find any mistake either in its negation or its affirmation, then the hypothesis remains doubtful so that in order that the hypothesis may be demonstrable, it is not enough that all the phenomena result from it, but rather it is necessary if there ensues something contrary to a single one of the expected phenomena that this suffice to establish its falsity.

Born the use of hypotheses and the method of verifying them vary from science to science according as the character of the science happens to be purely empirical (e.g. the work of Hippocrates, Darwin, Freud) or experimental (e.g. the work of Harvey and Faraday) or a combination of experimentation with mathematical reasoning (e.g. the work of Galileo, Newton, Fourier). Not all scientific work is directed or controlled by hypotheses, but in the absence of well-formulated hypotheses, the research can hardly be better than exploration.

A well-constructed experiment especially what Bacon calls an *experimentum crucis* derives its demonstrative character from the hypothetical reasoning which formulates the problem to be solved. The value of such a crucial experiment appears in Bacon's reasoning about the rise and fall of the tides. If it be found he writes, that during the ebb the surface of the

waters at sea is more curved and round from the waters rising in the middle and sinking at the sides or coast and if during a flood it be more even and level from the waters returning to their former position, then assuredly by this decisive instance the raising of them by a magnetic force can be admitted if otherwise it must be entirely rejected.

In the field of mathematical physics and particularly in astronomy, the meaning of hypothesis is both enlarged and altered. So far we have considered hypotheses which are single propositions implying certain consequences. But in mathematical physics a whole theory—a complex system of propositions—comes to be regarded as a single hypothesis.

In his preface to the work of Copernicus Oslander says that the task of the astronomer is to use painstaking and skilled observation in gathering together the history of the celestial movements and then—since he cannot by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these movements—to think up or construct whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases such that by the assumption of these causes those same movements can be calculated from the principles of geometry for the past and for the future too. The elaborate system constructed by Copernicus and the system constructed by Ptolemy which Copernicus hopes to replace are sometimes called the Copernican hypothesis and the Ptolemaic hypothesis and sometimes these two theories are referred to as the heliocentric hypothesis and the geocentric hypothesis.

A whole theory regarded as an hypothesis must be tested in a different way from a single proposition whose implication generates a prediction. As rival hypotheses one theory may be superior to another in internal consistency or in mathematical simplicity and elegance. Kepler is thus able to argue against Ptolemy by appealing to criteria which Ptolemy accepts, pointing out that Ptolemy himself wishes to construct hypotheses which are as simple as possible if that can be done. And so if anyone constructs simpler hypotheses than he—understanding simplicity geometrically—he on the contrary will not defend his composite hypotheses.

But even if the Copernican hypothesis is superior on the grounds of being geometrically

simpler it must meet another test. As indicated in the chapter on ASTRONOMY mathematical theories about physical phenomena must be more than ideal constructions of possible universes. They must try to account for this on real world and are therefore subject to the test of their applicability to reality. However elegant it may be mathematically an hypothesis—when considered from the point of view of physics—is satisfactory only if it accounts for the phenomena it was invented to explain. In the words of Simplicius it must save the appearances.

An hypothesis can therefore be tested for its application to reality by the way in which it fits the observed facts. In those sciences where mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural phenomena Galileo writes the principles which are the foundations of the entire superstructure must be established by well chosen experiments. By such means Galileo chooses between the hypothesis that the uniform acceleration of a freely falling body is proportional to the units of space traversed and the hypothesis that it is proportional to the units of time elapsed.

To borrow Plato's expression in the *Timaeus* the mathematical consistency of a theory makes it a likely story. The theoretical integrity of the hypothesis makes it credible. But when competing credible hypotheses exist each saving the relevant appearances equally well which is to be believed? The fact that one of them as in the case of the Copernican Ptolemaic controversy is mathematically superior cannot decide the question since the question is Which is true of reality?

Sometimes a single fact such as the phenomenon of the Foucault pendulum may exercise a decisive influence if one of the two competing theories finds that fact congenial and the other leaves it inexplicable. Sometimes as appears in the discussion of the Copernican hypothesis in the chapter on ASTRONOMY of two hypotheses which are equally satisfactory so far as purely astronomical phenomena are concerned one may have the additional virtue of covering other fields of phenomena which that hypothesis was not originally designed to explain.

As interpreted by Kepler and as developed in Newton's theory of universal gravitation

the Copernican hypothesis brings the terrestrial phenomena of the tides and of falling bodies under the same set of laws which applies to the celestial motions. The hypothesis then has the amazing quality of consilience—a bringing together under one formulation of phenomena not previously thought to be related. This seems to be what Huygens has in mind when he considers the degree of probability that is attainable through experimental research. We have scarcely less than complete proof, he writes, when things which have been demonstrated by the principles assumed correspond perfectly to the phenomena which experiment has brought under observation and further principally when one can imagine and foresee new phenomena which ought to follow from the hypotheses which one employs and when one finds that therein the fact corresponds to our prevision.

Then in common parlance we say that it is no longer a theory but has become a fact. Yet the question remains whether the empirical tests which eliminate the less satisfactory hypothesis can ever make the more satisfactory hypothesis more than a likely story.

In *THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY* Newton says: "I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena and I frame no hypotheses for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis and hypotheses whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy." The context of this passage and of a similar statement at the end of the *Optics* as well as the association in Newton's mind of hypotheses with occult qualities, substantial forms, and hidden causes seems to indicate a special meaning of hypothesis.

Newton criticizes the vortices in the physics of Descartes on the ground that it is unnecessary to appeal to occult or unobservable entities in order to explain natural phenomena. The Cartesian vortices like the substantial forms of Aristotle are for Newton hypotheses in a very special sense. They are *hypothetical entities*. They are not inferred from the phenomena. Although treated as if they were realities under-

lying the phenomena, they are as Gilbert says of the *primum mobile* a fiction something not comprehensible by any reasoning and evidenced by no visible star but purely a product of imagination and mathematical hypothesis.

There is almost a play on words in this identification of hypotheses with imaginary entities to which reality is attributed for in their Greek and Latin roots the words hypothesis and hypostasis, supposition and substance are closely related. The first word in each of these pairs refers to a *proposition* which underlies reasoning, the second to a *reality* which underlies observable qualities or phenomena. To make hypotheses in the sense in which Newton excludes them from experimental philosophy is to *hypostatize* or to *reify*; that is, to make a thing out of or to give reality to a fiction or construction of the mind.

It has seemed to some critics that no less than the Cartesian vortices, the ether in Newton's theory of light is an hypothesis in precisely this sense—an imaginary entity. For many centuries the atoms and molecules postulated to explain chemical combinations and changes were attacked as fictions and defended as useful hypotheses. On the one hand there is an issue concerning the theoretic usefulness of such constructions, on the other a question concerning their counterparts in reality.

It is sometimes thought that fictions are useful for purposes of explanation even when their unreality is admitted. Rousseau, for example, explicitly denies any historical reality to the idea of man living in a state of nature prior to the formation of society by the social contract. In this matter he says we can lay facts aside as they do not affect the question. These related notions—the state of nature and the social contract—are rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin, just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world.

Similarly Lavoisier posits the existence of "caloric" for its explanatory value. It is difficult, he writes, "to comprehend these phenomena without admitting them as the effects of a real and material substance or very subtle fluid which insinuating itself between the particles of bodies separates them from each

other and even allowing the existence of this fluid to be hypothetical we shall see in the sequel that it explains the phenomena of nature in a very satisfactory manner

ONE OTHER MEANING of hypothesis remains to be considered. It is the sense in which postulates or assumptions are distinguished from axioms in the foundations of a science. In Euclid's geometry as in Descartes both sorts of principles appear. The axioms or common notions are those propositions which are immediately seen to be true without proof. The postulates or assumptions are hypotheses in the sense that their truth is taken for granted without proof.

Both sorts of propositions serve as principles or starting points for the demonstration of theorems or the conclusions of the science. Both are principles of demonstration in that they are used to demonstrate other propositions without themselves being demonstrated. But axioms are traditionally regarded as intrinsically indemonstrable whereas hypotheses—postulates or assumptions—may not be indemonstrable. They are simply asserted without demonstration.

The possibility of demonstrating an hypothesis gives it the character of a provisional assumption. In the *Discourse on Method* Descartes refers to certain matters assumed in his *Dioptries* and *Meteors* and expresses his concern lest the reader should take offence because I call them hypotheses and do not appear to care about their proof. He goes on to say:

I have not named them hypotheses with any other object than that it may be known that while I consider myself able to deduce them from the primary truths which I explained above yet I particularly desired not to do so in order that certain persons may not for this reason take occasion to build up some extravagant philosophical system on what they take to be my principles.

The distinction between axioms and postulates or hypotheses raises two issues. The first concerns the genuineness of the distinction itself. Axioms self-evident propositions or what William James calls necessary truths have been denied entirely or dismissed as tautologies. The only principles of science must then be

hypotheses—assumptions voluntarily made or conventionally agreed upon. This issue is more fully discussed in the chapter on PRINCIPLE. The other issue presupposes the reality of the distinction but is concerned with different applications of it in the analysis of science.

Aristotle for example defines scientific knowledge in terms of three elements one of which consists of the primary premises upon which demonstrations rest. The principles of a particular science may be axioms in the strict sense of being self-evident truths and hence absolutely indemonstrable or they may be provisional assumptions which though not proved in this science can nevertheless be proved by a higher science as in the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems in mechanics or optics or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics. The latter are not axioms because they are demonstrable yet in a particular science they may play the role of axioms insofar as they are used without being demonstrated to demonstrate other propositions.

Reasoning which rests either on axioms or on demonstrable principles Aristotle calls *scientific* but reasoning which rests only on hypotheses he regards as *dialectical*. Reasoning results in scientific demonstration according to Aristotle when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. In contrast reasoning is *dialectical* if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted and Aristotle explains those opinions are generally accepted which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers—i.e. by all or by a majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. In another place he adds one important qualification. In defining a dialectical proposition as one that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers he adds provided it be not contrary to the general opinion for a man would assent to the view of the philosophers only if it were not contrary to the opinions of most men.

For Aristotle dialectical reasoning or argument moves entirely within the sphere of opinion. Even an opinion generally accepted not only by the philosophers but also by most

men, remains an opinion. The best opinions are probabilities—propositions which are not self-evident and which cannot be proved. They are not merely provisional assumptions. Resting on assumptions which cannot ever be more than probable, the conclusions of dialectical reasoning are also never more than probable. Since they lack the certain foundation which axioms give, they cannot have the certitude of science.

Plato, on the other hand, seems to think that the mathematical sciences are hypothetical in their foundation, and that only in the science of dialectic, which he considers the highest science, does the mind rise from mere hypotheses to the ultimate principles of knowledge. The students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences," Socrates says in the *Republic*, "assume the odd and the even, and the figures and the three kinds of angle and the like in these several branches of science: these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give an account of them either to themselves or others." There is a higher sort of knowledge he goes on, "which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to first principles.

The issue between Plato and Aristotle may be only verbal—a difference in the use of such words as science and dialectic. Whether verbal or real is considered in the chapters on Dialectic and Metaphysics. In any case, the issue throws light on the difference between an hypothesis as a merely provisional assumption, susceptible to proof by higher principles, and an hypothesis as a probability taken for granted for the purposes of argument, which is itself incapable of being proved.

FIGURE 117 comes to the meaning of hypothetical in the analysis of propositions and judgments. The distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical proposition or judgment, briefly touched on in Aristotle's *Organon*, is developed in the tradition of logic which begins with that book.

In his work on Interpretation he distin-

guishes between simple and compound propositions. The compound proposition consists of several simple propositions in some logical relation to one another. In the tradition of logical analysis, three basic types of relation have been defined as conjunction, three different kinds of compound proposition. One type of relation is the *conjunctive*: it is signified by the word "and." Another is the *disjunctive*: it is signified by the words "either . . . or." The third type is the *hypothetical* and is signified by the words "if . . . then."

To take an example we have already used: virtue is knowledge and virtue is teachable are simple propositions. In contrast the statement, "if virtue is knowledge then virtue is teachable" is a compound proposition hypothetical in form. If the proposition were stated in the sentence either virtue is knowledge or it is not teachable it would be disjunctive in form; if stated in the sentence if virtue is knowledge and virtue is teachable it would be conjunctive in form. In each of these three cases, the compound proposition consists of the two simple propositions with which we began, though in each case they appear to be differently related.

Whereas Aristotle divides propositions into simple and compound, Kant divides all judgments into the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. In the categorical judgment, he says, "we consider two concepts in the hypothetical, 'two judgements' in the disjunctive: 'several judgements in their relation to one another.' As an example of the hypothetical proposition he offers the statement "If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished." As an example of the disjunctive judgment we may say [that] the world exists either by blind chance or by internal necessity or by an external cause. Each of these three alternatives, Kant points out, "occupies a part of the sphere of all possible knowledge with regard to the existence of the world while all together occupy the whole sphere." The hypothetical judgment does no more than state the relation of two propositions. Whether both these propositions are true remains unsettled. It is only the consequence," Kant says, "which is laid down by this judgment."

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [26, 23] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [26, 23] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. Old Testament *Jeremiah* 7-45-(D) *II Esdras* 7-46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*; consult the Preface.

1 The use of hypotheses in the process of dialectic

7 PLATO *Charmides* 9d 10a / *Protagoras* 49a / *Meno* 183b-190a.c / *Phaedo* 242b-243c / *Republic* BK IV 350d 351b BK VI 383d 388a.c, 386d 388a.c, 397a 398c / *Timaeus*, 462b-c / *Parmenides* 491a 511d / *Sophist*, 570a-d

8 ARI. TOTL. *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24² 21 6] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 6 [5² 15-3] 10a-b / *Topics* 143a 223a.c esp BK I CH 3 143a 144b CH 10-11 147b-148c, 114 149a-d, BK VII 211 223a.c

9 EPICUREUS *Discourses* BK CH 7 112b-113d

10 A. T. *Pure Reason* 227a 230c esp 227d 228b / *Science f/Right* 457a-b / *Judgement* 603b-c

2 Hypothetical reasoning and hypothetical constructions in philosophy

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b-190a.c / *Phaedo* 242b-243c / *Republic* BK VI 350d 388a.c, 397a 398c / *Parmenides* 491a 511d

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH [24² 19-2] 98d BK II CH 6 125d 126b / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 12 [3² 3, 2] 373a-b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 3 [100² 5, 1] 524c-d

19 A. T. *Summa Theologiae* ART I Q 14 6 1680c-681a

20 MONTAGNE *Essay* 258d 259a

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35 LOCKE *Civil Government* BK I, SECT I 25a-c / *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 10 123b-d CH XIII SECT 19-20 152c-d CH XXIII 1 CT 204a-c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* 1 CT XI DIV 107 499c 500b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329a 331d *passim*, esp 329d 330b 333d 334a 348a.c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7-d 176d 177b 186d 187a 194b-200c 227a 230c 232 233d / *Science f/Right* 457a III / *Judgement* 603b-c

46 HECKL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 156d 158a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 84a 119b *passim* 221a 238b 820b-827 830b-836a esp 834b-835a

3 The foundations of mathematics: postulates and assumptions

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b-c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a BK VII, 397-d

8 ARI. TOTL. *Posterior Analytics* BK I, CH I [7² 1] 6] 97a-b CH 2 [72 19-24] 98d CH 10 104d 105d CH I [77² 36² 15] 106c-d BK I CH 9 [93² 11 25] 12a-b / *Physics* BK CH 2 [3² 3] 259c-d / *Metaphysics*, BK III CH 4 [302² 27-31] 394a / *Metaphysics* BK XI, CH 3

In the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle distinguishes between the categorical and the hypothetical syllogism. The following reasoning is categorical in form: Knowledge \equiv teachable; virtue is knowledge; therefore virtue is teachable. The following reasoning is hypothetical in form: If virtue is knowledge it is teachable, but virtue is knowledge; therefore it is teachable. Or: If virtue is knowledge it is teachable, but virtue is not teachable; therefore it is not knowledge.

The basic issue with respect to the distinction between categorical and hypothetical syllogisms is whether the latter are always reducible to the former. One thing seems to be clear. The rules for the hypothetical syllogism formally parallel the rules for the categorical syllogism. In hypothetical reasoning the consequent must be affirmed if the antecedent \equiv affirmed; the antecedent must be denied if the consequent \equiv denied. In categorical reasoning the affirmation of the premises requires an affirmation of the conclusion, and a denial of the conclusion requires a denial of the premises.

With respect to the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical proposition there is also an issue whether propositions stated in one form can always be converted into propositions having the other form of statement. In modern mathematical logic for example general propositions such as 'All men are mortal' are sometimes expressed in hypothetical form

If anything is a man it is mortal. Logicians like Bertrand Russell think that the hypothetical form is more exact because it explicitly refrains from suggesting that men exist; it merely states that if the class 'man' should have any existent members they will also belong to the class 'mortal'.

Apart from the question whether a universal proposition should or should not be interpreted as asserting the existence of anything there seems to be a formal difference between the categorical and hypothetical proposition. This is manifest only when the hypothetical \equiv truly a compound proposition, not when it is the statement of a simple proposition in hypothetical form as for example the simple proposition 'All men are mortal' is stated in hypothetical form by 'If anything is a man it is mortal'. Because it is truly a compound proposition and not merely the hypothetical statement of a general proposition, the proposition

If virtue \equiv knowledge, then virtue \equiv teachable cannot be restated in the form of a simple categorical proposition.

A simple proposition, whether stated categorically or hypothetically, may be the conclusion of either a categorical or a hypothetical syllogism. But the hypothetical statement which is really a compound proposition can never be the conclusion of any sort of syllogism though it may be one of the premises in hypothetical reasoning.

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Chapter 37 IDEA

INTRODUCTION

AS the topical analysis or outline in each chapter indicates, the great ideas are not simple objects of thought. Each of the great ideas seems to have a complex interior structure—an order of parts involving related meanings and diverse positions which, when they are opposed to one another, determine the basic issues in that area of thought.

The great ideas are also the conceptions by which we think about things. They are the terms in which we state fundamental problems; they are the notions we employ in defining issues and discussing them. They represent the principal content of our thought. They are *what we think as well as what we think about*.

If, in addition to its objects and content we wish to think about thought itself—its acts or processes—we shall find in the tradition of the great books a number of related terms which indicate the scope of such inquiry. Some of them are *idea*, *judgment*, *understanding*, and *reasoning*; *perception*, *memory*, and *image*; *intuition*, *sense*, and *mind*. Here we are concerned with one of these—the *idea* *idea*. It is probably the most elementary of all these related terms, for according to different conceptions of the nature and origin of *idea*, the analysis of thought and knowledge will vary. Different positions will be taken concerning the faculties by which men know the acts and processes of thinking and the limits of human understanding.

Does the word *idea* when it is used in the technical discourse of metaphysics or psychology signify that which is known or understood? Does it signify not the object of thought but the thought itself? Or both? Certainly in popular speech the word is used both ways: for men speak of understanding an idea and note that others in their understanding of the same

idea and they also say that they have different ideas about the same thing, meaning that they understand the same thing differently.

The word *idea* has many other oppositions of meaning in its tremendous range of ambiguity. It is sometimes used exclusively for the eternal types in the divine mind or the intelligible forms that exist apart from material things which are their copies; sometimes for concepts in the human mind abstracted from sense-experience; sometimes for the seeds of understanding which belong innately to the intellect and so do not need to be derived from sense. Sometimes *idea* means a sensation or a perception as well as an abstract thought; and then its connotation extends to almost every type of mental content. Sometimes it is denied that there are any abstract or general ideas; and sometimes *idea* has the extremely restricted meaning of an *image* which is the memory of a sense-impression.

Kant vigorously protests against what he thinks is a needless abuse of the term *idea*. I beg those who really have philosophy at heart, he writes, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression *idea* its original significance. There is, he insists, no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation without encroaching upon terms which are proper to others.

Kant proposes a graduated list of such terms. He begins with *perception* which he divides into *sensation* and *cognition* according as it is subjective or objective. A *cognition*, he then goes on, is either an *intuition* or a *concept* according as it has either an immediate or a mediate relation to its object. Dividing conceptions into the *empirical* and the *pure*, Kant finally reaches the term *idea* as one *sub-d-ivision* or pure concept only. If the pure *conception* has its origin in the understanding

- (4) *The role of hypotheses in science* 4d *The task of verification, the plurality of hypotheses)*
- 54 FREUD *Narcissism* 401a / *General Introduction* 502d 503c / *New Introductory Lectures* 815a b 818c 819b
- 5 Hypothetical propositions and syllogisms the distinction between the hypothetical and the categorical
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21-216] 39a c CH 23 [40^b 23 9] 57b-c [41 21-41]

- 58a b CH 29 62d 63d CH 44 68d 69b BK II CH 11-14 81b 84b / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 6 125d 126b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 5 REP 13 116a d
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40d 41c 51d 52a 110d 111c esp 111b 129a-d 179c 180c 193a 200c esp 194b d 232c 233c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265c 267a esp 266a-c / *Practical Reason* 297a 298a

CROSS REFERENCES

- For The distinction between axioms and postulates assumptions and hypotheses see JUDGMENT 8a PRINCIPLE 2b(2) 3c-3c(3) TRUTH 4c 7a
- Other discussions of the use of hypotheses in dialectic and philosophy see DIALECTIC 2(2) LOGIC 4d PHILOSOPHY 3b-3c and for the distinction between scientific and dialectical reasoning see PRINCIPLES 3c(2) REASONING 5b-5c
- Other discussions of postulates in mathematics see LOGIC 4a MATHEMATICS 3a and for other treatments of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical reasoning see JUDGMENT 6d REASONING 2b
- The employment and verification of hypotheses in empirical science see ASTRONOMY 2b EXPERIENCE 5a-5c LOGIC 4b MECHANICS 2b PHYSICS 4b-4d SCIENCE 4c 5c

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

- DESCARTES *The Principles of Philosophy* PART III 43-47
- HOBBS *Concerning Body* PART IV CH 26
- SPINOZA *Correspondence* VI XIII
- KANT *Introduction to Logic* 7
- J S MILL *A System of Logic* BK III CH 14

II

- ARNAULD *Logic or the Art of Thinking* PART II
- BOYLE *Reflections upon the Hypothesis of Alkali and Acidum*
- T REID *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* I CH 3
- BROWN *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* VOL I pp 220-241
- HERSCHEL *A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* par 202 208 210 216
- COMTE *The Positive Philosophy* BK III CH I
- WHEWELL *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* VOL II BK XIII
- *On the Philosophy of Discovery* APPENDIX II

BERNARD *Introduction to Experimental Medicine* PART I CH 2

TYNDALL *Scientific Use of the Imagination*

JEVONS *The Principles of Science* CH 23

BRADLEY *The Principles of Logic* BK I CH 2

BOSANQUET *Logic* VOL II CH 5

C S PEIRCE *Collected Papers* VOL II par 619-641 669-693 755-791 VOL VI par 7-34

VENN *Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic* CH 16

POINCARÉ *Science and Hypothesis* PART IV CH 9-10

MACH *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (Die Hypothese)

DURER *La theorie physique son objet—sa structure*

PIRELLA *The Mind and Society* VOL I CH 4-5

N P CAMPBELL *Physics the Elements* CH 6

— *What Is Science?* CH 5

BOHR *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*

NORTHROP *Science and First Principles*

EINSTEIN *On the Method of Theoretical Physics*

FISHER *The Design of Experiments*

DEWEY *Logic the Theory of Inquiry* CH 7

tion which would destroy the universe of discourse. There is a slender thread of meaning which ties all the elements of the tradition together—not in a unity of truth or agreement but in an intelligible joining of issues.

This unity can be seen in two ways. It appears first in the fact that any consideration of ideas—whether as objects or contents of the mind—involves a theory of knowledge. This much is common to all meanings of *idea*.

Those like Plato and Berkeley, for whom ideas constitute a realm of intelligible or sensible being, make knowledge of reality consist in the apprehension or understanding of ideas. Those like Aristotle and James, for whom ideas have no being except as perceptions or thoughts, make them the instruments whereby reality is known. On either view, knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known, or between a knowing faculty and a knowable entity, but on one view ideas are the reality which is known and on the other they are the representations by which is known a reality that does not include ideas among its constituents. These two views do not exhaust the possibilities.

Ideas are sometimes regarded both as objects of knowledge and as representations of reality. Some writers (as for example Plato) distinguish two orders of reality—the sensible and the intelligible—and two modes of apprehension—sensing and understanding, and they use the word *idea* for both the intelligible object and the understanding of it. Locke begging the reader's pardon for his frequent use of the word *idea*, says that it is the term which serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. But Locke also distinguishes between knowledge of real existences through ideas, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, and knowledge of the relations among our own ideas, which the mind gets from their comparison with one another. For Hume too, ideas as well as impressions are involved in our knowledge of matters of fact, but relations between ideas may also be objects of knowledge as in the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic.

This double use of *idea* is sometimes accompanied as in Aquinas, by an explicit ac-

knowledgement and ordering of the two senses. For Aquinas, concepts are primarily the means of knowledge, not the objects of knowledge. A concept Aquinas writes is not *what* is actually understood, but *that by which* the intellect understands—that by which something else is known. Secondly, however, concepts become *that which* we know when we reflectively turn our attention to the contents of our own mind. Using the phrase "intelligible species" to signify concepts, Aquinas explains that, since the intellect reflects upon itself by such reflection, it understands not only its own act of intelligence but also the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the object of which the species is the likeness.

It is possible therefore to have ideas about things or ideas about ideas. In the vocabulary of this analysis by Aquinas, the ideas or concepts whereby real things are understood are sometimes called the first intentions of the mind. The ideas whereby we understand these ideas or first intentions are called the mind's second intentions. An idea is always a mental intention, an awareness or representation, never an independent reality for the mind to know.

Locke's differentiation between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection seems to parallel the mediaeval distinction between first and second intentions, but whereas second intentions are ideas engaged in a reflexive understanding of ideas as objects to be understood, Locke's ideas of reflection comprise the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got. A closer parallel perhaps is to be found in Locke's distinction between our knowledge of reality or of real existences and our knowledge of the relations existing between our own ideas.

THE SECOND WAY of seeing a connection among meanings of *idea* depends on recognizing what is common to contrary views.

The word *pen* is utterly equivocal as we have noted, when it names a writing instrument and an animal enclosure. Hence men

alone and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image it is a *notio* or notion and a conception formed from notions which transcends the possibility of experience is an *idea* or a conception of reason

According to Kant anyone 'who has accustomed himself to these distinctions will find it quite intolerable to hear the representation of the color red called an *idea*. Tolerable or intolerable the word *idea* has been used quite persistently with the very meaning that Kant abominates as well as with a variety of others. The reader of the great books must be prepared for all these shifts in meaning and with them shifts in doctrine for according to these differences in meaning there are different analyses of the nature or being of ideas different accounts of their origin or their coming to be in the human mind and different classifications of ideas. These three questions—what ideas are how ideas are obtained and of what sorts they are—are so connected that the answer given to one of them tends to circumscribe the answers which can be given to the other two

THE UNITY OF EACH chapter in this guide to the great books depends on some continuity of meaning in its central term some common thread of meaning however thin or tenuous which unites and makes intelligible the discussions of various authors about the same thing. Without this they would not move in the same universe of discourse at all. Nor could they even disagree with one another if the words they used were utterly equivocal as for example the word *pen* is equivocal when it designates a writing instrument and an enclosure for pigs.

The extraordinary ambiguity of the word *idea* as it is used in the great books puts this principle to the test. Are Plato and Hume talking about the same thing at all when the one discusses ideas as the only intelligible reality and the other treats ideas as the images derived through memory from the original impressions of sense experience? Is there any common ground between Aristotle and Berkeley—between the identification of human ideas with abstract or general conceptions quite distinct from the perceptions or images of sense and the

identification of ideas with particular perceptions accompanied by a denial of abstract or general notions?

Do writers like Locke or William James for whom ideas of sensation and abstract ideas (or percepts and concepts) belong to the one faculty of understanding or to the single stream of consciousness communicate with writers like Plotinus Descartes and Spinoza for whom ideas belong to the intellect or to the thinking being separate from matter and from sensations which are only bodily reactions? Or with writers like Aristotle and Aquinas for whom there is a sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and intellect? Can Aristotle and Aquinas in turn explain the origin of concepts or intelligible species by reference to the intellect's power of abstracting them from experience or sensible species and still carry on discussion with Plato Augustine and Descartes who regard the intellect as in some way innately endowed with ideas with the principles or seeds of understanding?

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive inventory. It fails for example to ask about the sense in which the theologians speak of ideas in the mind of God and of the illumination of the angelic or the human intellect by ideas divinely infused (What is the common thread of meaning between such discourse and that concerned with the formation of abstract concepts or with the revival of sense impressions in images?) It fails also to question the meaning of *idea* in Kant's tripartite analysis of the faculties of intuition judgment and reasoning or in Hegel's ultimate synthesis of all nature and history in the dialectical life of the Absolute Idea (What do these meanings of *idea* have in common with the sense in which Freud distinguishes between conscious and unconscious ideas?)

The inventory is also incomplete in that it does not indicate the many divergent routes taken by authors who seem to share a common starting point. Even those who on certain points seem to talk the same language appear to have no basis for communication on other points in the theory of ideas. But the questions which have been asked suffice for the purpose at hand. However great the ambiguity of *idea* it does not reach that limit of equivoca-

Just as the extreme version of the first position is taken by those who identify ideas with perceptions, so here the opposite extreme consists in the denial of any connection between ideas and all the elements of sense-experience. The ideas in the divine mind or the ideas infused by God into the angelic intellects, have no origin in experience nor any need for the perceptions, memories, or images of sense. They are not abstract ideas, that is, they are not concepts abstracted from sense material.

"Our intellect," Aquinas writes, "abstracts the intelligible species from the individuating principles"—the material conditions of sense and imagination. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect," he continues, "is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself. The divine ideas, Aquinas quotes Augustine as saying, "are certain original forms or permanent and immutable models of things which are contained in the divine intelligence." Following Augustine's statement that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it, Aquinas restricts the word "idea" to the exemplars existing in the divine mind and to the species of things with which God informs the angelic intellects. He uses the word "concept" where others speak of "ideas in the human mind."

Descartes, on the other hand, endows the human mind with ideas—not concepts abstracted from and dependent on sense, but intuitive apprehensions which, since they cannot be drawn in any way from sense-experience, must be an innate property of the human mind. He does not, however, always use the word "idea" in this strict sense. Some ideas, he says, "appear to be innate: some adventitious, and others to be formed or invented by myself." The ideas called "adventitious" are those which seem to come from the outside, as when "I hear some sound or see the sun or feel heat." Those which we form or invent ourselves are "constructions of the imagination. Only innate ideas, in Descartes' view, are truly ideas in the sense of being the elements of certain knowledge and the sources of intellectual intuition. By intuition," he says, "I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of the imagination,"

but "the undoubted, conception of an undoubted and attentive mind which springs from the light of reason alone."

As mind and body are separate substances for Descartes—mind being conceived by him as a *res cogitans* or thinking substance quite separate from a *res extensa* or the extended matter of a bodily substance—so ideas and sensations are independent in origin and function. Like infused ideas in the angelic intellect, innate ideas in the human mind are not abstract for they are not abstracted. But unlike the angelic intellect, the human mind even when it employs innate ideas, is discursive or cogitative. It is never conceived as entirely free from the activities of judgment and reasoning even when its power is also supposed to be intuitive—that is, able to apprehend intelligible objects without analysis or without recourse to the representations of sense.

The doctrine of innate ideas does not always go as far as this in separating intellectual knowledge—or knowledge by means of ideas—from sense-experience. In the theories of Plato and Augustine for example, sense-experience serves to awaken the understanding to apprehend the intelligible objects for the intuition of which it is innately equipped.

To learn those things which do not come into us as images by the senses," Augustine writes, "but which we know within ourselves without images . . . is in reality only to take things that the memory already contains scattered and unarranged . . . and by thinking bring them together." Moreover the memory contains, not only "images impressed upon it by the senses of the body, but also the notions of the very things themselves, which notions we never received by any avenue of the body."

This process of learning by remembering appears to be similar to the process which Plato also calls "recollection" or reminiscence. In the *Meno* Socrates demonstrates that a slave-boy who thinks he knows no geometry can be led simply by questioning to discover that he knew all the while the solution of a geometric problem. "There have always been true thoughts in him," Socrates tells Meno, thoughts "which only needed to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him. Hence 'his soul must always have possessed this knowledge.'"

cannot contradict one another no matter what opposite things they may say about *pens* in one sense and *pens* in the other. The two meanings of *pen* are not even connected by being opposed to one another. But all the meanings of *idea* do seem to be connected by opposition at least so that writers who use the word in its different senses and have different theories of *idea* cannot avoid facing the issues raised by their conflicting analyses.

The root of this opposition lies in the positive and negative views of the relation of ideas to sensations—or more generally to sense and the sensible. Though there are different analyses of sensation one or both of two points seems to be agreed upon: that sensations are particular perceptions and that sensations result from the impingement of physical stimuli upon the sense organs of a living body.

Berkeley insists upon the first point while emphatically denying the second. Ideas or sensations are always particulars but he says the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense however blended or combined together (that is whatever objects they compose) can not exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them and their cause is neither physical matter nor the perceiving mind but some other will or spirit that produces them. Others like Lucretius and Hobbes who regard sensations as particular perceptions do not use the word *idea* as Berkeley does for perceptions of external origin but restrict it to inner productions of the mind itself in its acts of memory or imagination.

The various theories of *idea* thus range from those which identify an *idea* with a sensation or perception or with the derivatives of sensation to those which deny the identity or even any relationship between ideas and sensations or images of sense.

THE FIRST POSITION is taken by writers who conceive mind or understanding in men or animals as the only faculty of knowledge. It performs all the functions of knowing and thinking. It is sensitive as well as reflective. It perceives and remembers as well as imagines and reasons.

Within this group of writers there are differences. Berkeley for example thinks the ob-

jects of human knowledge include either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind or lastly ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination—either compounding, dividing or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. Hume on the other hand divides all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species which are distinguished by their different degrees of force or vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated *Thoughts* or *Ideas*. The other species want a name in our language and in most others.

Let us therefore use a little freedom and call them *Impressions*. By this term Hume explains I mean all our more lively perceptions when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will.

Another use of terms is represented by Locke who distinguishes between ideas of sensation and reflection, simple and complex ideas, particular and general ideas and uses the word *idea* both for the original elements of sense experience and for all the derivatives produced by the mind's activity in reworking these given materials whether by acts of memory, imaginative construction or abstraction. Still another variation is to be found in William James. Despite the authority of Locke he thinks that the word *idea* has not domesticated itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations. Accordingly he restricts the word *idea* to concepts and never uses it for sensations or perceptions. Nevertheless like Locke he does not think that the development of concept from percept needs the activity of a special faculty. Both concept and percept belong to the single stream of thought and are states of consciousness.

THE SECOND POSITION is taken by writers who in one way or another distinguish between sense and intellect and regard them as quite separate faculties of knowing. The one is supposed to perform the functions of perception, imagination and memory, the other the functions of thought—conception, judgment and reasoning or if not these then acts of intellectual vision or intuition. Here too there are differences within the group.

the Ideas or Forms apart from both matter and mind. It is in the context of this argument that the traditional epithet *realism* gets one of its meanings, when it signifies the view that ideas or universals have an independent reality of their own. The various opponents of this view are not called idealists. If they deny any existence to universal ideas outside the mind they are usually called *conceptualists*; if they deny the presence of universals even in the mind they are called *nominalists*. These doctrines are more fully discussed in the chapters on SAME AND OTHER, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.

The controversy about the being of ideas has another phase that has already been noted in this chapter—and it is in this connection that the epithet *idealism* gets one of its traditional meanings. The doctrine is not that ideas have real existence outside the mind. On the contrary it is that the only realities are mental—either minds or the ideas in them.

Berkeley's famous proposition—*esse est percipi*—*to be is to be perceived*—seems intended to permit only one exception. The perceiving mind has being without being perceived but nothing else has. Everything else which exists is an idea, a being of and in the mind. According to this doctrine (which takes different forms in Berkeley and in Hegel for example) the phrase *idea of* is meaningless. Nothing exists of which an idea can be a representation. There is no meaning to the distinction between thing and idea. The real and the ideal are identical.

Plato is sometimes called an *idealist* but not in this sense. He has never been interpreted as completely denying reality to the changing material things which imitate or copy the eternal ideas, the immutable archetypes or Forms. Applied to Plato or to Plotinus, idealism seems to signify the superior reality of ideal (as opposed to material or physical) existence. Just as idealism has these widely divergent meanings, so does realism when it designates, on the one hand those who attribute independent reality to ideas and on the other hand those who affirm the existence of an order of real existences independent of the ideas which represent them in the mind.

It is not who distinguish between things and ideas, or between the order of reality and the

mind's conception of it, face the problem of differentiating between these two modes of being. To say that ideas or concepts exist only in the mind is not to say that they do not exist at all but only that they do not exist in the same way as things outside the mind.

Does an entity in its real existence apart from knowledge have the same character that it has when as an object known it somehow belongs to the knowing mind? Is there a kind of neutral essence which can assume both modes of existence—real existence independent of mind and ideal existence or existence in the mind as an object conceived or known? Is an idea or concept in the mind nothing but the real thing, objectified or transformed into an object of knowledge or is the real thing the thing in itself, utterly different from the objects of experience or knowledge—neither knowable nor capable of representation by concepts?

These questions, relevant to the consideration of ideas as representations of reality are of course also relevant to problems considered in the chapters on BEING, EXPERIENCE, and KNOWLEDGE. The issues indicated are there discussed.

Intimately connected with them are questions about the truth of ideas. Can ideas or concepts be true or false in the sense in which truth and falsity are attributed to propositions or judgments? Under what conditions is an idea true? In what does its truth consist and what are the signs or marks of its truth? These matters are discussed in the chapter on TRUTH. Here it is sufficient to point out that the traditional distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas, and the comparison of clear and distinct with obscure and confused ideas are used to determine the criteria of truth. It may be the truth of a concept taken by itself or of the judgment into which several concepts enter. To the extent that ideas are regarded as representing their truth (or the truth of the judgments they form) seems to consist in some mode of a recency or correspondence with the reality they represent or as Spinoza says its *adequation*.

Within the conceptual or mental order itself, there is a further distinction between ideas which do not perform a representative function and those which do. The former are treated as

Learning according to this doctrine of innate ideas must therefore be described as an attempt to recollect not what you do not know but rather what you do not remember.

Learning by recollection or reminiscence seems to be a process in which latent ideas (whether they are retained by the soul from a previous life or are part of the soul's endowment at its creation) become active either through the questioning of a teacher or through being awakened by the perceptions of the bodily senses. Though such bodily stimulation of thought implies a functional connection between body and soul nevertheless both Plato and Augustine hold that ideas are independent in origin. They are not derived from sense though their appearance may be occasioned by events in the world of sense.

ONE OTHER VIEW still remains to be considered. It denies that ideas are innate in the human mind at the same time that it distinguishes between the intellect and the senses as separate faculties of knowing. Having to explain whence the intellect gets its ideas writers like Aristotle and Aquinas attribute to the human intellect an abstractive power by which it draws the intelligible species from sensory images which Aquinas calls phantasms.

The concepts by which our intellect understands material things we obtain by abstracting the form from the individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Through the universal concept thus abstracted we are able, Aquinas holds, to consider the nature of the species apart from its individual principles. It should be added here that abstractions are not vehicles of intuitive apprehension. Conception, which is the first act of the mind, yields knowledge only when concepts are used in subsequent acts of judgment and reasoning.

Abstract or universal concepts are as different from the ideas which belong to intellects separate from bodies—the divine or angelic intellects—as they are different from the particular perceptions or images of sense. They occupy an intermediate position between the two just as, according to Aquinas, the human intellect holds a middle place between angelic intelli-

gence and corporeal sense. On the one hand the human intellect is for Aquinas an incorporeal power; on the other hand it functions only in cooperation with the corporeal powers of sense and imagination. So the concepts which the human intellect forms being universal are immaterial but they are also dependent in origin and function on the materials of sense. Not only are universal concepts abstracted from the phantasms but for the intellect to understand physical things it must of necessity, Aquinas writes, turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.

This theory of abstract ideas seems not far removed from the position of Locke who distinguishes between particular and general ideas (which he calls abstract) or that of William James who distinguishes between universal concepts and sense perceptions. Yet on one question the difference between them is radical, namely whether particular sensations and universal ideas belong to the same faculty of mind or to the quite distinct faculties of sense and intellect.

This difference seems to have considerable bearing on the way in which these writers explain the process of abstraction or generalization with consequences for certain subtleties acknowledged or ignored in the analysis of the grades of abstraction. Nevertheless the resemblance between the positions of Locke and Aquinas or those of William James and Aristotle, each affirming in his own way that the mind contains nothing not rooted in the senses, serves to mediate between the more extreme positions.

THE DISPUTE ABOUT innate ideas and the controversy over abstract ideas are issues in psychology inseparable from fundamental differences concerning the nature and operation of the faculty or faculties of knowing. There are other issues which concern the being or the truth of ideas. Here the first question is not whether ideas are objects of knowledge but whether the existence of ideas is real or mental—outside the mind or in it.

One aspect of this controversy is considered in the chapter on FORM, *et* the argument between Aristotle and Plato about the being of

less logical classes. What seems to be peculiar to Aristotle's analysis of species and genera is the setting of upper and lower limits to the hierarchy of universal terms, with a small number of irreducible categories (or *summa genera*) under which all species fall, and at the other extreme with a finite number of lowest (or *ultima*) species which are incapable of subsuming other species.

The terms which fall under the lowest species must either be particulars or accidental classes. Those which seem to be predicable of the categories themselves, such as being or one, cannot be genera. These are the terms which Aristotle's medieval followers call "transcendental" and analogical. Using the word "transcendental" in a different sense Kant enumerates a set of concepts which bear some resemblance to Aristotle's *summa genera* but which he treats as transcendental categories.

The difference among concepts with respect to generality is of interest to the psychologist as well as the logician, for it raises the problem

of whether the more or the less general takes precedence in the order of learning. The order and relation of ideas is even more the common ground of both logic and psychology. Both for example deal with the position and sequence of terms or concepts in reasoning though the logician aims to prescribe the forms which reasoning must take in order to be valid whereas the psychologist tries to describe the steps by which thinking actually goes on.

Only the logician, however is concerned with the way in which terms are ordered to one another as positive and negative or as contraries just as from Aristotle to Freud only the psychologist deals with the association of ideas in the stream of thought by relationships of contiguity and succession, similarity and difference. According as the logical connection of ideas or their psychological association is made the primary fact radically divergent interpretations are given of the nature of mind, the life of reason and the process of thought.

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fantasies fictions or chimeras the latter are called by contrast real ideas or ideas having some reference to reality The question of the reality of ideas takes precedence over the question of their truth at least for those who regard the division into true and false as applicable only to representations Yet the criteria of the distinction between the real and the imaginary are difficult to separate from the criteria of true and false The separation is made most readily by those who use idea to mean memory image They can test the reality of an idea by tracing it back to the impression from which it originated

Another sort of test is applied by those who measure the reality of abstract ideas by their fidelity to the sense perceptions from which they were abstracted Still another criterion proposed by William James is that of freedom from contradiction An idea has truth and its object has reality if it remains uncontradicted The idea of a winged horse illustrates the point

If I merely dream of a horse with wings James writes my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known and say for example That is my old mare Maggie having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall the whole case is altered for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former

THE CONSIDERATION of ideas or concepts belongs to logic as well as to psychology and metaphysics The logician sometimes deals with concepts directly and with the judgments into which they enter sometimes he deals with them only as they find verbal expression in terms and propositions

The distinction between concepts and judgments (or between terms and propositions) is discussed in the chapter on JUDGMENT There also we see that the classification of judgments or propositions depends in part on the acceptance or rejection of the notions of subject and predicate in the analysis of concepts or terms and if they are accepted on the way in which

terms are distinguished both as subjects and as predicates

This in turn depends upon certain traditional divisions which are applicable to terms if not always to concepts such as the familiar distinctions between concrete and abstract and particular and universal terms When the concept which is sometimes called the mental word is regarded as by its very nature abstract and universal these distinctions are applicable only to the physical words which are terms Concrete and particular terms are then treated as verbal expressions of sense perceptions or images abstract and universal terms as verbal expressions of ideas or concepts But when ideas are identified with sense perceptions or images and abstract concepts are denied the existence of general names in ordinary discourse suffices for the distinction between particular and universal terms even though the latter do not express any actual content of the mind

Unlike the foregoing other divisions of terms, as for example the distinction between the univocal and the analogical or between species and genera do not occur throughout the tradition of logic They tend to be characteristic of the logic of Aristotle and its medieval development Of these two distinctions that between univocal and analogical terms or concepts appears explicitly so far as this set of great books is concerned only in the *Summa Theologica* Nevertheless Aquinas does have some background for his special theory of analogical terms in Aristotle's treatment of univocal and equivocal names and in his separation of terms which predicate a sameness in species or genus from those which predicate a sameness by analogy The analysis of these distinctions is undertaken in the chapters on SAME AND OTHER and SIGN AND SYMBOL

Other writers in dealing with universal terms recognize that they have different degrees of generality They sometimes formulate this as an order of more and less inclusive classes Sometimes they refer to the intension and extension or connotation and denotation of terms The more general terms have a less restricted connotation and hence represent more extensive or inclusive classes The more specific terms have a more determinate meaning and so also have a narrower denotation and represent

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 Hume *Lead*, BK II [6, 33] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James *Psychology* 116a-119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHORIAL DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference list numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Lead* BK II [265-233] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. Old Testament *Nehemiah*, 7-45—(D) *Esdras* 7-46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Idea*, consult the Preface.

1 Doctrines of dea

1a. Ideas of relations between deas as objects of thought or knowledge; the ideas as eternal forms

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a-c / *Phaedrus* 125a 126d / *Symposium* 167a-d / *Euthyphro* 192a-c / *Phaedo* 124 c 228d 230c 231c 232a 241b-243c / *Republic* 331b-333b 334b 335c 373c-375c 376c 377d 378a 379b-380b 381a 382a 383a 384a 385a 386a 387a 388a 389a 390a 391a 392a 393a 394a 395a 396a 397a 398a 399a 400a 401a 402a 403a 404a 405a 406a 407a 408a 409a 410a 411a 412a 413a 414a 415a 416a 417a 418a 419a 420a 421a 422a 423a 424a 425a 426a 427a 428a 429a 430a 431a 432a 433a 434a 435a 436a 437a 438a 439a 440a 441a 442a 443a 444a 445a 446a 447a 448a 449a 450a 451a 452a 453a 454a 455a 456a 457a 458a 459a 460a 461a 462a 463a 464a 465a 466a 467a 468a 469a 470a 471a 472a 473a 474a 475a 476a 477a 478a 479a 480a 481a 482a 483a 484a 485a 486a 487a 488a 489a 490a 491a 492a 493a 494a 495a 496a 497a 498a 499a 500a 501a 502a 503a 504a 505a 506a 507a 508a 509a 510a 511a 512a 513a 514a 515a 516a 517a 518a 519a 520a 521a 522a 523a 524a 525a 526a 527a 528a 529a 530a 531a 532a 533a 534a 535a 536a 537a 538a 539a 540a 541a 542a 543a 544a 545a 546a 547a 548a 549a 550a 551a 552a 553a 554a 555a 556a 557a 558a 559a 560a 561a 562a 563a 564a 565a 566a 567a 568a 569a 570a 571a 572a 573a 574a 575a 576a 577a 578a 579a 580a 581a 582a 583a 584a 585a 586a 587a 588a 589a 590a 591a 592a 593a 594a 595a 596a 597a 598a 599a 600a 601a 602a 603a 604a 605a 606a 607a 608a 609a 610a 611a 612a 613a 614a 615a 616a 617a 618a 619a 620a 621a 622a 623a 624a 625a 626a 627a 628a 629a 630a 631a 632a 633a 634a 635a 636a 637a 638a 639a 640a 641a 642a 643a 644a 645a 646a 647a 648a 649a 650a 651a 652a 653a 654a 655a 656a 657a 658a 659a 660a 661a 662a 663a 664a 665a 666a 667a 668a 669a 670a 671a 672a 673a 674a 675a 676a 677a 678a 679a 680a 681a 682a 683a 684a 685a 686a 687a 688a 689a 690a 691a 692a 693a 694a 695a 696a 697a 698a 699a 700a 701a 702a 703a 704a 705a 706a 707a 708a 709a 710a 711a 712a 713a 714a 715a 716a 717a 718a 719a 720a 721a 722a 723a 724a 725a 726a 727a 728a 729a 730a 731a 732a 733a 734a 735a 736a 737a 738a 739a 740a 741a 742a 743a 744a 745a 746a 747a 748a 749a 750a 751a 752a 753a 754a 755a 756a 757a 758a 759a 760a 761a 762a 763a 764a 765a 766a 767a 768a 769a 770a 771a 772a 773a 774a 775a 776a 777a 778a 779a 780a 781a 782a 783a 784a 785a 786a 787a 788a 789a 790a 791a 792a 793a 794a 795a 796a 797a 798a 799a 800a 801a 802a 803a 804a 805a 806a 807a 808a 809a 810a 811a 812a 813a 814a 815a 816a 817a 818a 819a 820a 821a 822a 823a 824a 825a 826a 827a 828a 829a 830a 831a 832a 833a 834a 835a 836a 837a 838a 839a 840a 841a 842a 843a 844a 845a 846a 847a 848a 849a 850a 851a 852a 853a 854a 855a 856a 857a 858a 859a 860a 861a 862a 863a 864a 865a 866a 867a 868a 869a 870a 871a 872a 873a 874a 875a 876a 877a 878a 879a 880a 881a 882a 883a 884a 885a 886a 887a 888a 889a 890a 891a 892a 893a 894a 895a 896a 897a 898a 899a 900a 901a 902a 903a 904a 905a 906a 907a 908a 909a 910a 911a 912a 913a 914a 915a 916a 917a 918a 919a 920a 921a 922a 923a 924a 925a 926a 927a 928a 929a 930a 931a 932a 933a 934a 935a 936a 937a 938a 939a 940a 941a 942a 943a 944a 945a 946a 947a 948a 949a 950a 951a 952a 953a 954a 955a 956a 957a 958a 959a 960a 961a 962a 963a 964a 965a 966a 967a 968a 969a 970a 971a 972a 973a 974a 975a 976a 977a 978a 979a 980a 981a 982a 983a 984a 985a 986a 987a 988a 989a 990a 991a 992a 993a 994a 995a 996a 997a 998a 999a 1000a

17 PLATO *Third Euthyphro*, TR II CH I 136a-d / *Fourth Euthyphro*, TR II CH I 228b-229d / *TR II CH I 229b-230a* / *Sixth Euthyphro*, TR II CH I 279b-280a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 16-17 75b-81a *passim* / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6-7 268d 269d BK XII CH 7 346c-d

19 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Theology* P RT I Q 84 111 243d-443c 444a 445a 446a 447a 448a 449a 450a 451a 452a 453a 454a 455a 456a 457a 458a 459a 460a 461a 462a 463a 464a 465a 466a 467a 468a 469a 470a 471a 472a 473a 474a 475a 476a 477a 478a 479a 480a 481a 482a 483a 484a 485a 486a 487a 488a 489a 490a 491a 492a 493a 494a 495a 496a 497a 498a 499a 500a 501a 502a 503a 504a 505a 506a 507a 508a 509a 510a 511a 512a 513a 514a 515a 516a 517a 518a 519a 520a 521a 522a 523a 524a 525a 526a 527a 528a 529a 530a 531a 532a 533a 534a 535a 536a 537a 538a 539a 540a 541a 542a 543a 544a 545a 546a 547a 548a 549a 550a 551a 552a 553a 554a 555a 556a 557a 558a 559a 560a 561a 562a 563a 564a 565a 566a 567a 568a 569a 570a 571a 572a 573a 574a 575a 576a 577a 578a 579a 580a 581a 582a 583a 584a 585a 586a 587a 588a 589a 590a 591a 592a 593a 594a 595a 596a 597a 598a 599a 600a 601a 602a 603a 604a 605a 606a 607a 608a 609a 610a 611a 612a 613a 614a 615a 616a 617a 618a 619a 620a 621a 622a 623a 624a 625a 626a 627a 628a 629a 630a 631a 632a 633a 634a 635a 636a 637a 638a 639a 640a 641a 642a 643a 644a 645a 646a 647a 648a 649a 650a 651a 652a 653a 654a 655a 656a 657a 658a 659a 660a 661a 662a 663a 664a 665a 666a 667a 668a 669a 670a 671a 672a 673a 674a 675a 676a 677a 678a 679a 680a 681a 682a 683a 684a 685a 686a 687a 688a 689a 690a 691a 692a 693a 694a 695a 696a 697a 698a 699a 700a 701a 702a 703a 704a 705a 706a 707a 708a 709a 710a 711a 712a 713a 714a 715a 716a 717a 718a 719a 720a 721a 722a 723a 724a 725a 726a 727a 728a 729a 730a 731a 732a 733a 734a 735a 736a 737a 738a 739a 740a 741a 742a 743a 744a 745a 746a 747a 748a 749a 750a 751a 752a 753a 754a 755a 756a 757a 758a 759a 760a 761a 762a 763a 764a 765a 766a 767a 768a 769a 770a 771a 772a 773a 774a 775a 776a 777a 778a 779a 780a 781a 782a 783a 784a 785a 786a 787a 788a 789a 790a 791a 792a 793a 794a 795a 796a 797a 798a 799a 800a 801a 802a 803a 804a 805a 806a 807a 808a 809a 810a 811a 812a 813a 814a 815a 816a 817a 818a 819a 820a 821a 822a 823a 824a 825a 826a 827a 828a 829a 830a 831a 832a 833a 834a 835a 836a 837a 838a 839a 840a 841a 842a 843a 844a 845a 846a 847a 848a 849a 850a 851a 852a 853a 854a 855a 856a 857a 858a 859a 860a 861a 862a 863a 864a 865a 866a 867a 868a 869a 870a 871a 872a 873a 874a 875a 876a 877a 878a 879a 880a 881a 882a 883a 884a 885a 886a 887a 888a 889a 890a 891a 892a 893a 894a 895a 896a 897a 898a 899a 900a 901a 902a 903a 904a 905a 906a 907a 908a 909a 910a 911a 912a 913a 914a 915a 916a 917a 918a 919a 920a 921a 922a 923a 924a 925a 926a 927a 928a 929a 930a 931a 932a 933a 934a 935a 936a 937a 938a 939a 940a 941a 942a 943a 944a 945a 946a 947a 948a 949a 950a 951a 952a 953a 954a 955a 956a 957a 958a 959a 960a 961a 962a 963a 964a 965a 966a 967a 968a 969a 970a 971a 972a 973a 974a 975a 976a 977a 978a 979a 980a 981a 982a 983a 984a 985a 986a 987a 988a 989a 990a 991a 992a 993a 994a 995a 996a 997a 998a 999a 1000a

30 B COM *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44c

31 D SCARLET *Meditations* 71d 72a III 82d 83a VI 96d-97a / *Objections and Replies* 121a-c DEF II-III 130a D AXIOM I VI 131d 132a 137d 157b-158a 212c 213a

32 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO, SECT 8 95c-d BK II CH VII, CT II 134b-c CH IX SECT 1 138b-c CH XII SECT 5 179c-d BK III CH V SECT 12 266d 267 SECT 14 267b-c BK IV CH I SECT I-CH IV SECT 12 307a 326d *passim*, esp CH II SECT 1 309b-311a, SECT 13 312d 313a, CH III SECT 31 323c-d CH IV CT 18 328d 329a CH VI SECT 13 335c-d SECT 16 336d CH VII 5 CT 1-7 337a 338c esp 5 CT 2 337a CH XI SECT 13 14 357d 358c CH XVII SECT 2 371d 372b SECT 8 377b-d

33 B ARISTOTLE *Human Knowledge* 404 444d *passim*, esp INTRO, SECT 2 541b-412a c, SECT 1 413a b, SECT 18 416b-c, 5 CT 23 417b-c SECT 86-91 429c-431a, SECT 13, 142 440 441c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 0 458b

42 HUME *Pure Reason* 16a-c esp 16b 113b-115c esp 113c-d 173b-174 esp 173b-d / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551 552c

46 H L *Philosophy of Right* P RT II par 140 53a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 300a 301a 307a

- 2g The abstraction of ideas from sense experience the concept as the first act of the mind the grades of abstraction
- 2h The derivation of transcendental ideas from the three syllogisms of reason
- 3 The division of ideas according to their objective reference
- 3a Ideas about things distinguished from ideas about ideas the distinction between first and second intentions
- 3b Adequate and inadequate ideas clear and distinct ideas as compared with obscure and confused ideas
- 3c Real and fantastic or fictional ideas negations and chimeras
- 4 The logic of ideas
- 4a The verbal expression of ideas or concepts terms
- 4b The classification of terms problems in the use of different kinds of terms
- (1) Concrete and abstract terms
- (2) Particular and universal terms
- (3) Specific and generic terms *infimae species* and *summa genera*
- (4) Univocal and analogical terms
- 4c The correlation opposition and order of terms
- 5 Ideas or concepts in the process of thought
- 5a Concept and judgment the division of terms as subjects and predicates kinds of subjects and predicates
- 5b The position and sequence of terms in reasoning
- 5c The dialectical employment of the ideas of reason
- 5d The order of concepts in the stages of learning the more and the less general
- 5e The association comparison and discrimination of ideas the stream of thought or consciousness
- 6 The being and truth of ideas
- 6a The distinction between real and intentional existence between thing and idea ideas as symbols or intentions of the mind
- 6b The nature and being of ideas in relation to the nature and being of the mind
- 6c The agreement between an idea and its object the criterion of adequacy in correspondence
- 6d Clarity and distinctness in ideas as criteria of their truth
- 6e The criterion of genesis the test of an idea's truth or meaning by reference to its origin
- 6f The truth and falsity of simple apprehensions sensations or conceptions contrasted with the truth and falsity of judgments or assertions

- and REP 1 34 5d-4 6c Q 109. A 3 ANS 540c
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- 20 AGRIUS *Summa Theologiae*, PART II Q 61
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- 1 DIXIE *D-ty Comedy PARADISE*, XII 63
8 125a b
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK I APR 23 108c-
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- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 137d
- 31 STROVER *Etica*, PART I, PROP 1 SCHOL 362c
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 0-33
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- 45 HERR *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 169d
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Y Ideas as the unity of determinate existence
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- 46 H1 21. *Presumption of Right*, PART 6a 7a
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169d 171b 176b-c 182d

The origin of d revision of ideas in the
human mind

4. The infusion of d and divine illumination

- 18 AGRIUS *Conf. moral*, BK IV PAR 3 23c
BK VII, PAR 8 45d PAR 16 48c-49a PAR 23
50b-c BK XI 1 PAR 10 115c-d / *City of God*,
BK III, CH 269c-d CH 9 270d 2 1 K X
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- 19 AGRIUS *Summa Theologiae*, PART I Q 9. A
4 444d-446b Q 9 A 1 REP 3 473b-473c 474
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- 20 AGRIUS *Summa Theologiae*, PART I Q 9. A
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- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99a b
- 35 B. ARLEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 6-
31 418a-419a 3 1 423d 424 SECT 6
425a b
4. K. T. *Pure Reason* 113b-c

23 The innate endowment or retention of
ideas: the act various of the mind's nature
content or structure by sense by memory
or by experience

- 7 PL. TO *Phaedrus* 124a 126c EP 126a-c /
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230d / *Theaetetus* 515d 51 b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1
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physics* BK I CH 9 99a-11-99a-11 511a-c
- 12 EPICUREUS *Diogenes* BK I, CH 2 127c 128.
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- 17 PLUTARCH *Fort. Eventus*, TR II CH 4 8b-c /
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- 20 AGRIUS *Conf. moral*, BK X PAR 15 1975a
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- 19 AGRIUS *Summa Theologiae*, P AT I Q 95. A
2 259d 250d A 3 REP 1 791a-d Q 57 A 1 REP
3 395a-d Q 84 A 3 443d-444d A 4 1 444d
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- 23 HERR *On Animal Generation* 333d 335a
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- 30 B. CON *Advancement of Learning* 1b-c
- 31 DESCARTES *Rites* IV 5c-d 6d VIII 13c-d /
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tions* INT 177d-81d III 82b 83c-d VI 96d 97a
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I,
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- 35 HERR *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV I-
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 14a 108a-c EP 14a b,
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cal Reason*, 30c 353a / *Judgment* 531a 589c
- 33 JAMES *Psychology* 831a-890a EP 851b-853a,
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- 54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 512b-513b EP
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chology* 632d-687a 689b [in 1] / *Ego and Id*,
70 c 708b EP 708b
- 7c The acquirement of ideas by perception or
intuition: simple ideas or forms as direct
objects of the understanding
- 7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a-c / *Republic* K VI
383d 388a K 1 397b-393c / *Timaeus* 45 c
458a / *Parmenides* 487d-488a / *Theaetetus*,
535b-d
- 18 AGRIUS *City of God*, K VIII CH 6,
269b-c BK XII CH 1-346c-d

(1 *Doctrines of idea*)

16 Ideas or conceptions as that by which the mind thinks or knows

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH I [16 4-8] 25a / *Soul* BK III CH 4 661b 662c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 2 51c 52c AA 9-10 58b 59d Q 13 A 1 ANS 62c 63c A 5 ANS 66b 67d Q 14 A 1 ANS and REP 3 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 2-3 76d 77d A 4 ANS 78b 79a A 5 esp REP 2-3 79a 80a A 6 REP 1 80a 81c A 8 ANS 82c 83b A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 17 A 3 ANS 102d 103c Q 27 A 1 ANS and REP 2-3 153b 154b A 2 ANS and REP 2 154c 155b Q 32 AA 2-3 178a 180b Q 34 A 1 185b 187b QQ 55-58 288d 306b ■ 82 A 3 ANS 433c 434c Q 84 440b-451b Q 85 A 2 453d-455b A 4 457a d A 8 REP 3 460b 461b Q 86 A 1 ANS 461c 462a A 2 ANS and REP 2-4 462a 463a Q 87 A 1 465a-466c Q 88 A 1 REP 2 469a 471c Q 89 A 2 ANS and REP 2 475a d A 6 ANS and REP 2 478b d
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 71d 72a III 82d 83a / *Objections and Replies* 108b 109d 121a-c DEP II-III 130a b AXIOM V-VI 131d 132a 137d 157b 158a 212c 213a
- 31 SPIOZA *Ethics* PART II DEP 3 373b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH IV SECT 3 324b c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15b c 22a c 30b-c 31a d 38a 39c 41c 42a 53b 54b 58c 59b 85d 93c 109d 113b esp 112d 113b 115b-c 130b-c 197a b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 300a 314b esp 300a 301b 302b 303a 307a 313a 314a

1c Ideas as the data of sense experience or their residues

- 12 LUCRATIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722 817] 53d 54d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 7 269c d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 49a 52c 54b-c PART IV 261a 262a b
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 137d
- 31 SPIOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 48 SCHOL 391b-c PROP 49 SCHOL 392a ■
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 98d 99a BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 17 125c d CH I SECT 20-CH IV SECT 1 126d 129c CH IV SECT 6-CH V 131a b CH VII IX 131c 141a passim esp CH IX SECT 1 7 138b 139b SECT 15 141a CH XII SECT 1-2 147b d passim SECT 8 148c d CH XIII SECT 2 149a CH XIV SECT 31 161d 162a CH XV SECT 1-2 176b-c SECT 17 177d CH XXIII SECT 1 204a b SECT 3 204c d SECT 7 205d 206a SECT 9 206b c SECT 15 208c d SECT 29-30 211d 212b SECT 32 37 212c 214b passim CH XXXII SECT 14 16 245c 246b BK III CH I SECT 5 252b ■ CH IV SECT 7 15 260d 263b esp SECT 11 15 261d 263b CH VI SECT 46 47

281d 282b CH XI SECT 21 -3 304d 305b BK II CH II SECT 11-13 311c 312b CH III SECT 23 320a c CH IV SECT 4 324c

- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b SECT II 416b c SECT 29 33 418c 419a SECT 36 419c d SECT 88-91 430a 431a
- 35 HELM *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b 457b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c 478a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 234b 236b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 45b 46a esp 45d-46a 48b-c 54b 55a 101b 102a esp 102a 115b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b c
- 54 FREUD *Unconscious* 442b 443a / *Ego and Id* 700a 701a 701d

1d Ideas as the pure concepts of reason regulative principles

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16a 37b 39c 108a 209d esp 108a 109c 113b 115c 117b 119a 129c 131c 158a 159d 166c 171a 173b-174a 187a c 193b d 200d 202a 203b-d 209b-d 237b 239a 240b / *Practical Reason* 310d 311d 329a d 343a 349b 355d esp 349b 350c / *Inpro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b / *Judge ment* 461a-462d 464c-467a 489b-c 504d 505a 506a 511a esp 509d 510a 518c 530c 542b 544c 570b 572c 581a 582c 596c 598b 604a b

1e Ideas in the order of supra human intelligence or spirit the eternal exemplars and archetypes the modes of the divine mind

- 12 LUCRATIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [151 200] 63b-c
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH I 2 18a d TR VI CH 2 3 21d 23a CH 9 26a / *Third Ennead* TR IV CH I 136a-c / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 13 164d 165b / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d passim esp TR III 215d 226c TR V VII 228b 239b TR VIII CH 7 242d 243c TR IX 246c 251d / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 21 279b 280a TR VII CH 2-17 322b-331a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a BK XII par 38 108d 109a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 3-7 266a 267c BK XI CH 10 328d c BK XII CH 17 18 353a 354d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654b-c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 PREAMBLE 75c d A 4 ANS 78b 79a A 5 79a 80a A 6 esp REP 3 80a 81c A 8 ANS 82c 83b A 11 REP 1-2 84c 85c A 14 ANS and REP 2 88d 89b Q 15 91b 94a Q 16 A 1 ANS and REP 2 94b 95c Q 18 A 4 107d 108c QQ 22-24 127c 143c passim Q 31 A 3 REP 4 188b 189a Q 44 A 3 240b-241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256a 257b QQ 55-56 288d 294d Q 58 300b 306b passim ■ 74 A 3 REP 5 375a 377a c Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b-443c A 3 REP 1 443d 444d AA 4 5 444d-447c Q 85 A 4 ANS 457a d Q 86 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 465a 466c Q 89 A 3 ANS

18 AUGUSTIN *Confessions* bk x par 14 74d 75a
19 AUL 4 *S. mma Theol. gica* p RTI Q 12 A
9 RE 2 58b-59a

23 H BE *Letter* n p RTI 50d

31 DES ART 5 *M. d. tations* i 76a b iii 83b /
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32 M: TOV *Paradise Lo* i AK v [95 128] 177b-
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35 LOCKE *Human Underst d* g BK II H I
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2 127d 128b CH VII s CT 10 133a b CH XI
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passim exp CH XIII s CT 1 148d 149 SECT
4-6 149b-d SECT 27 154c d CH XIV s CT 27
31 160d 162a c i xv SECT 2 3 162c d SECT
9 164b-d CH XVI SECT 1 2 165c d s CT 5
166b-c SECT 8 167 H X II SECT 3 168b
85 T 5 168d 169 s CT 22 173d 174a CH XXI
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9 202c 203 CH XXV SECT 9 216d s CT II
217 CH XXVIII SECT 14 231d 232 SECT 18
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I CH I SECT 5-8 324d 325c SECT 11 2
3 6b-d

35 BE K L V *Human Knowledge* INT O SECT
1 406d-407b CT 1 413a b SECT 28 418b-c

35 HUM *ff m n C. derivation* SECT II DIV
3 14 455d-456b CT 11 DIV 18 457c d
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38 R. L. U *Ineq al ty* 338a 341d 342a

42 H. VT *Pu e Re so* 5d 5b 31c d 45d-46a
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195 211d 216c f j *gement* 493c-495a c
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363b 480 481a

54 FIELD *Interpret n of Dreams* 270c 271a

g The bst ction of id s from sense-
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8 A STON *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19
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587c-d BK XII CH 2 (1 77¹) CH 3 (07⁸ 5)
608d 610a / *So I* p CH 8 (4 3² 6)
632 b BK III CH 4 (4 9¹⁰-23) 661d-662a
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1
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20 AQUINAS *S. mma Theologica* PART III Q 9
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28 HARRY *Circulatio n of the Blood* 305a / *On
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31 D SC RTES *Rul s* XIV 29b-30d / *D scourse*
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31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 40 SCI OL 2
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35 LOCKE *Human Underst d* g BK I CH I
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35 KARELY *Hum n Knowl dpe* INTRO 403
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35 HUME *Human Underst d* g SECT XII DIV
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38 ROLZ *2AV I equality* 341b-342b

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 23a 24a 45d-46a 115b-c
193a 195a

49 D RWIV *Descent of M* 296c 297b passim

53 JAM s *Psychology* 305a-312a passim 329
331b esp 331b

54 FREUD *Unco scious* 442b-443d

2b The dect ion of transcend ntal ideas from
the three syllog sm of reason

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 109d 120c esp 110d 111c

3 Th d is on of ide s according to th e
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3a Ideas bo e thngs d st ngw hed from
d s about ideas the d st ction be
tween first and second intent o s

19 AQUINAS *S. mma Theologica* PART I Q 12 A
9 A P 2 58b-59a Q 14 A 6 RE 1 80a 81c A
13 RE 3 86d 88c Q 5 A 2 ANS d RE
2 92a 93b Q 29 A 1 RE 3 162a 163b Q 3
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(2) *The origin or derivation of ideas in the human mind* 2c *The acquirement of ideas by perception or intuition simple ideas or forms as direct objects of the understanding*)

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 84 A 1 ANS and REP 1 440d-442a A 2 ANS 442b 443c A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 444d 446b AA 5-7 446c-450b
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 4a b / *Meditations* VI 99a-c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 14-23 380c 383c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 98d 99a CH III SECT 31 118b 119a BK II CH I-IX 121a 141b *passim* esp CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 17 125c d CH I SECT 20-CH IV SECT 1 126d 129c CH IV SECT 6-CH V 131a II CH IV SECT 1 7 138b 139b SECT 15 141a CH VI SECT 17-CH XII SECT 2 147a d CH XII SECT 8 148c d CH XIII SECT 1 149a CH XIV SECT 2 155b c SECT 31 161d 162a CH XV SECT 9 164b d CH XVI SECT 1 165c d CH XVII SECT 22-CH XVIII SECT 1 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT 6 174c d CH XX SECT 1 2 176b c SECT 15 177d CH XXI SECT 75 200b d CH XXIII SECT 1 204a b SECT 3 204c d SECT 5 205a II SECT 7 205d 206a SECT 9 206b II SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 30 211d 212b SECT 32 37 212c 214b *passim* CH XXV SECT 9 216d SECT II 217a CH XX SECT 1 238b c CH XXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXII SECT 14-16 245c 246b BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH IV 260a 263c *passim* esp SECT 11 15 261d 263b CH V SECT 2 263d 264a CH VI SECT 46-47 281d 282b CH VI SECT 21-23 304d 305b BK IV CH II SECT 11-13 311c 312b CH III SECT 23 320a c CH IV SECT 4 324c CH XVIII SECT 3 381b-c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b SECT 18 416b-c SECT 25-33 417d 419a *passim* SECT 36 419c d SECT 88-91 430a 431a *passim*
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b 457b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c-478a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 319a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a II 23a 33d esp 25b c 27c 28d 29d 32a-c 34a c 41c-42a 45b 46a 53b 53a 66d 72c esp 69c 72c 85d 93c 99a 107b 131a-c 186d 187a / *Judgement* 465a-c 528c 530c 570c 572b
- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1c d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 502a 505b esp 502a
- 2d Reflection as a source of ideas the mind's consideration of its own acts or content
- ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429^b26-430 9] 662b-c
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH I 105a 106c CH 17 122d 124a CH 20 126c 127b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1. 31 74b-79d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 12 9 REP 2 58b 59a Q 28 A 4 REP 2 160c 161 Q 85 A 2 453d 455b Q 87 A 3 467b-468a
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 96d 97a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 17 125c d SECT 24 127b II CH III SECT 1 128d CH VI VII 131b-133b CH IX SECT 1-2 138b c CH VI SECT 14 146d CH VII SECT 1 2 147b d SECT 8 148c d CH XIV SECT 2-6 155b 156c SECT 31 161d 162a CH XVII SECT 22 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT 1 174c d CH XX SECT 1 2 176b-c SECT 15 177d CH XXI SECT 4 178d 179c SECT 43 200b d CH XXIII SECT 1 204a b SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 30 211d 212b SECT 3 -37 212c 214b *passim* CH XXI SECT 9 216d SECT II 217a BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH V SECT 2 263d 264a BK IV CH III SECT 23 320a-c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 14 456b
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 55a 56c 99a 107b 121a 123b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 138 48c d ADDITIONS 89 129d 130a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 121a II 122b 126a *passim* esp 122b 124b
- 2e The genesis of ideas by the recollection of sense impressions the images of sense
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 8 18 73b-76a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 49a d PART II 258b-c 262a b
- 30 BACON *Noctum Organum* BK II APH 26 156a 157a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* VII 19a 20d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 17 18 380d 382b PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b PROP 49 SCHOL 391d 392c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 31 118b 119a BK II CH V 141b 143d *passim* esp SECT 2 141b-c SECT 7 142c d BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b d
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b-457b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c 478a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341d 342a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 54b 55a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 480a 501b esp 480a b
- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 351c 352d esp 351d 352a 363c 364b 367b-c 384c 385c esp 385b-c / *Unconscious* 442d-443a / *General Introduction* 518c d / *Ego and Id* 700a 701d
- 2f The production of ideas by the reworking of the materials of sense the imaginative construction of concepts or the formation of complex from simple ideas
- 12 LUCRETIIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722 748] 53d 54a

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII
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36 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO, SECT
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38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342.

45 LA O S I R *Elements of Chemistry* PRE 1b-c

49 D RWIN *Origin of Species* 40c-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 127b-128a 153b-154

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54 FR UD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 662a b

46 The classification of terms problem in the
use of different kinds of terms

46(1) Concrete and abstract terms

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* KI CH 34 66b-c

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* PA TI Q 3 A

3 2 16a-d Q 13 A1 REP 2 62c-63c A 9.

3 71b-72 Q 3 A 2 178a 179b Q 39 AA

4-3 205c 208c Q 54 A1 P 2 285a-d

23 HOA *Letathan* PART I 57

36 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III C VIII

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38 ROLLS *On Inequality* 341b-c

53 J M S *Psychology* 305a 308b esp 308b-309b

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54 FA C *General Introduction* 516b-c

46(2) Particular and universal terms

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 [120-9] 5b-c

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17 PROTI *Es Ffsh Ernead* TR IX CH 12 251a

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A

9 71b-72c Q 29, A1 162a 163b 4 1 and

3 4 165c 167a Q 3 A 4 170c 171b Q 33 A

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462 463a PA 1-31 Q 30 A 4 R 2 751c

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20 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* III Q 7 A

13 REP 3 755c 7 6c Q 10, A 3 R 2 769d

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22 HO *Letathan* PART I 5 b-c

31 SPINOZA *Ethica* P RT II PR 4 SCHOL I

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36 LOCK *Human Understanding* BK I C I I

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35 B ARKLEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO, SECT

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19 410a-c SECT 122 437b-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b-342b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 307a 312a

46(3) Specific and generic terms *infimae species*
and *summa genera*

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 3-9 5d 16d / *Prior*

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151 BK IV CH 1 [120^b 36-121^b] 168d 169a

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CH 4 [125^b] CH 5 [125^b 19] 173d 174d CH 6

[123 13 29] 177d 178a BK V CH 3 [132 10-23]

182d 183a CH 4 [132^b 35 133^b 11] 184 BK VI

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17 19] 289a BK VII CH 4 330d 333a esp

[249^b 3-26] 332a 333a / *Metaphysics* BK III CH 4

[312 12 17] 403d / *Generation and Corruption*

KI CH 3 413c-416c / *Metaphysics* BK III CH

1 [99^b 27-31] 514b CH 3 517a 518a BK V

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545c CH 28 [1024^b 10-16] 548c K V I CH 3

[1039^b 11 26] 551c-d CH 12 13 561b-563a BK

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9 A ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 3 [642^b

20-643^a 28] 166a-d

18 AQUIN *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 34

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19 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* II RT I Q 3 A

4 REP 1 16d 17c A 5 17c 18b A 6 REP 2 18c

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164b Q 3 A 4 AV and REP 3 170c 171b Q

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20 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 49

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23 HO *Des Letathan* TI 55b-c

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 51 158d

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(3) *The division of ideas according to their objective reference 3a Ideas about things distinguished from ideas about ideas the distinction between first and second intentions*)

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 270a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 79c BK III 150a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH II 252d 254c passim CH IV SECT 2 260b CH V SECT 12 266d 267a SECT 14 267b c CH VI SECT 19 273b SECT 48-50 282b d CH VI SECT 10 302b SECT 24 305b d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15d 16c esp 16c 55a 56c 99a 101b 121a 123b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 158a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 300b

3b Adequate and inadequate ideas clear and distinct ideas as compared with obscure and confused ideas

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH I 259a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 6 ANS and REP 3 55b 56a Q 13 62b 75b Q 14 A 6 80a 81c A 12 REP 2 85d 86d Q 55 A 3 291a d Q 85 A 3 455b-457a A 4 REP 3 457a d A 8 ANS 460b-461b Q 89 A 1 ANS 473b 475a A 2 ANS and REP 2 475a d A 3 ANS and REP 2 4 475d 476c A 4 ANS and REP 2 476c-477a Q 94 A 1 REP 3 501d 503a Q 117 A 1 REP 4 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 10 A 2 REP 3 768b 769c PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 1 REP 2 1025c 1032b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 333d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 14-17 107d 108a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b 52a / *Meditations* 73d 74a III 82a d 85b 86b VI 99a c / *Objections and Replies* POSTULATE V-VI 131b-c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 4 373b PROP 34-36 385d 386b PROP 38 386c d PROP 40-43 387a 389b PART III DEF 1-3 395d 396a PROP 1 396a-c PROP 3 398b e PART IV AP PENDIX II 447b PART V PROP 3-4 453a d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 91d 92c BK I CH III SECT 19 117c d BK II CH XIII SECT 17 20 152a d CH XVI SECT 3 4 165d 166b CH XVII SECT 7-8 169b 170a SECT 12-1 170d 173d passim esp SECT 15 171b 172a CH XXV SECT 8 216b c CH XXVIII SECT 19 233b c CH XXIX 233d 238a CH XXXI 239b 243c passim CH XXXII SECT 18 246d 247a BK III CH VI SECT 37 279b SECT 40 280a b SECT 43-51 280c 283a CH X SECT 2 4 291d 292c CH XI SECT -4 305b e BK IV CH II SECT 15 312d 313a CH III SECT 26 321b c CH VII SECT 14 362d 363a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30 418c SECT 33 419a SECT 36 419c d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII IV 48-49 470d-471d SECT XII DIV 125 506d 507a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 18 4a c 30b 31a 125b [fn 1] 193a b / *Judgement* 603c d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 311b 312b [fn 1] 480b 484a

3c Real and fantastic or fictional ideas negations and chimeras

12 LUCRETII *Nature of Things* BK IV [22 745] 53d 54a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 9 REP 2 58b-59a Q 17 A 2 REP 2 102a d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 50d 57b-c PART IV 258b d 261a 262a c

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 60 112c 113a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* I 76a 77c III 83b / *Objections and Replies* 210d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII SECT 1-6 133b-134a CH XVII SECT 12 2170d 173d esp SECT 15 171b 172a CH XXX 233a 239b BK III CH I SECT 4 252a BK IV CH IV SECT 1-12 323d 326d passim CH V SECT 7-8 330b d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 29-30 418c SECT 33-34 419a c SECT 36 419c d SECT 8 -84 428d-429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 62d 63a 174d 175b 193a-c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 300b 639a 644a esp 640a 641b 642b [fn 2] 643b [fn 1] 646b 655a 659a 660b

54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 158a d 270c 271a / *General Introduction* 597b 598a

4 The logic of ideas

4a The verbal expression of ideas or concepts terms

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a c / *Phaedrus* 138c 140c / *Sophist* 575d 577b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* 5a 21d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24^b 16-18] 39c CH 35 66c d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XIII par 36 120c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 34 A 1 ANS 185b 187b Q 85 A 2 REP 3 453d-455b Q 107 A 1 ANS 549b 550b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54c 58a PART IV 270a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 57d 58a 60b c 61b c 62c e / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 14 107d 108a APH 59 112b e

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 26b c / *Objections and Replies* 137a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 49 SCHOL 392a-c

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 392 239b 240a

(4b) *The classification of terms problems in the use of different kinds of terms* 4b(3) *Specific and generic terms infimae species and summa genera*)

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III SECT 8-9 256a-c CH IV SECT 16 263b c CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b SECT 32-33 277c 278c SECT 36 41 279a 280b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b 342b

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 42b-43b 193a 200c

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 30d 31b 64a 207a 208a esp 207d 210b 211b 238b-c 241d 242a / *Descent of Man* 332b c 347a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 345a b 870b 871a

4b(4) *Univocal and analogical terms*

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH I 5a b / *Topics* BK I CH 15 [107 3-18] 151a b BK VI CH 10 [148 23-25] 202b [148 38-41] 202c BK VIII CH 3 [158^b 159 2] 215b m / *Sophistical Refutations* CH I [165 6-12] 227b-c CH 33 [162^b 13 -1] 251d / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185 -0]-CH 3 [187 10] 260a 262a BK VII CH 4 [49 3-24] 331d 332b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1003 33 ^b 15] 522b-c BK VII CH 4 [1030 3-3] 553a b BK VI CH 3 [1060^b 34 1061 10] 589a b BK VII CH 4 5 599d 601a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 6 REP 1 18c 19a Q 13 AA 5-6 66b 68c A 10 72c 73c Q 16 A 6 ANS 98b d Q 29 A 4 REP 4 165c 167a Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d 178a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 61 A 1 REP 1 54d 55c PART III Q 60 A 1 ANS and REP 3 847b 848a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60b-c / *Logum Organum* BK I APH 43 109d 110a APH 50-60 112b 113a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1-387b-388b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IV SECT 5 131a CH XIII SECT 18 152a c CH XXIV SECT 6-12 234d 236c BK III CH VI SECT 28 276a B SECT 41-51 282a 283a CH IV 285a 291c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 62-63 4, 8b-d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 307b 308b

42 HANT *Judgement* 547b 548c 602b 603a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 549b 550a 689a b

4c *The correlation opposition and order of terms*

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 49a 50b / *Phaedo* 226d 227a 242d 245c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d esp 351b 352b BK VII 392b 393b / *Sophist* 573b 574a

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [3^b 24 31] 8a CH 6 [5^b 11-6^a 8] 10a-c CH 7 11a 13d CH 8 [10^a 11-25] 15d CH 10-15 16d 21d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 46 70b 71d / *Topics* BK II CH 7-8

158b 160a BK IV CH 3 [123^b 124 10] 171d 172c CH 4 [124 35 ^b 34] 173a d [125 ^b 14] 173d 174c BK V CH 6 187a 188a BK VI CH 8 200b 201a CH 9 [147^a 23-148 9] 201b 202a CH 12 [149^b 4 23] 203d 204a / *Physics* BK III CH 1 [201^a 4-8] 278c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 1 [1004 9-17] 523a B [1004^b 27 1005 2] 523d 5^a 4a BK V CH 10 539a-c CH 15 542a 543a BK VI CH 1 [1046 29-36] 571b CH - [1046^b 7-15] 571c d BK X CH 3 [1054^b 23]-CH 10 [1059 15] 581c 586d BK XI CH 3 [1061 15 3] 589b-c BK XII CH 10 [1075^b 20-24] 606c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 11 A 7 68d 70d B 16 AA 3-4 96b 97c Q 17 A 1 ANS 100d 101d A 4 ANS 103c 104b Q 28 151c 161d passim Q 3 A 2 ANS 178a 179b Q 33 A 4 REP 1-3 183c 185a QQ 40 41 213a 224a passim Q 48 A 1 ANS and REP 1 259b 260c A 3 REP 3 261b 262a Q 49 A 3 ANS and REP 1 265d 268a c Q 103 A 3 REP - 330a-c 48 REP 3 533d 534b PART II Q 18 A 8 REP 1 699d 700b Q 29 A 2 REP 1 745c 746b Q 35 A 4 ANS and REP 2 774d 775d Q 36 A 1 ANS 780c 781b Q 46 A 1 REP 2 813b 814a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 64 A 3 REP 3 68b 69b Q 67 A 3 ANS 83b-84d Q 71 A 6 REP 1 110b 111b Q 72 A 6 115b-117a PART II-II Q 21 A 3 REP 2 479c-480b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 57b-c 58a-c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 12d 13b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 869a 872b 878a-879b

5 *Ideas or concepts in the process of thought*

5a *Concept and judgment the division of terms as subjects and predicates kinds of subjects and predicates*

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 3 5b d CH 5 [2 11-3^b 24] 6a 8a / *Interpretation* 23a 36d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 7 [43^a 25-44] 60c d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 4 100a 101b CH 19 [81^b 3-30] 111d / *Topics* BK I CH 4-9 144b 147b / *Physics* BK I CH 3 [186 22 18, 10] 261b-262a CH 6 [18 28 33] 264d

18 ALGUSTINE *Confession* BK IV PAR 8 29 26a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 12 74c 75b Q 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 58 A 2 301b d A 4 302d 303c Q 6 A 3 ANS 301a 393a Q 8^a A 2 REP 3 453d 455b AA 5-6 457d-459c A 8 ANS 460b-461b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 270a-c

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22a b / *Meditations* III 83a / *Objections and Replies* DEP 15 130d

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 39a-44c 51d 52b 59c 66d esp 63d 64a 180c 182b / *Judgement* 480d 482b 562a B 572b 575b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a B 178a 179a 313a B 638b 861b 870b 873a

- 51 274d 283a *passim* BK IV CH IV SECT 4-5
324c-d SECT II 12 326b-d CH XI SECT 4-9
355b-357a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human kn ledge* 404a-444d esp
s CT 2 4 413b-414a s CT 25 33 417d-419a,
s CT 48-49 422a b SECT 86-91 429c-431a
- 42 KA T *Pure Reason* 13c 15c 34a 35b 113c
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/ *Judgement* 461a-462d 542b-544c 551a
5 2c 604 b
- 46 HAGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a /
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- 50 M AX CA *nal* 11b-c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 104a 115a *passim*, esp 10 b-
106b 110a b 113a 115a 149b-154a esp 151b-
153b 322a 327 esp 326a b (fo i) 394a b
- 54 F T *Unconscious* 430d-432c esp 431c
432c 442b-443a
- 6c The agreement between an idea and its ob-
ject: the criterion of adequacy in cor-
respondence
- 31 D CAR T *Meditations* III 83a 84a-85a
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121a-c DEF I-1: 130a b AXIOM I VI 131d
132a 153a-c 157b-158a
- 31 S OZLA *Ethics* PART I: AXIOM 6 355d P RT
II DEF I 4 373a b RO 24-40 383c 388b
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* g BK II CH III
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134b CT 15 135c CH XXII CT 8-11 206a
207 *passim* CT 3 214a b CH XXX XXXI
238a 243c CH XXII CT 8 244d SECT 13 3
245c 247 *passim* X II CH VI SECT 9 1 Od
271 SECT 23-3 276a 277 *passim* s CT 37
279b SECT 40 280a b CT 46-47 281d 282b
CH XI SECT 24 303b-d SECT IV CH IV SECT I
1 323d 325d esp CT 33 4b-c
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 44
458d-469c esp 469b-c
- 43 KANT *Pure Reason* 36b-37 27b-d 85d-88a
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- 43 LAI XA *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1b-c
- 48 M TALL *Atty Duck* 231
- 53 JAMES s *Psychology* 143 142a 301b-302a
307 b 480b-484a
- 54 F T D *Unconscious* 430b-c
- 6d Clarity and distinctness of ideas as cri-
teria of their truth
- 31 D CAR T *Meditations* III 73d 74 III 82a-d
85b-86d 89a b V 93a-96a esp 90a-94
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- 31 S OZ *Ethics* I 1 4373b OP 24
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* g 91d 93c K
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3 211d CH XX 2 233d 238a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human kn ledge* SECT 30 418c
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV
12 506d 507a
- 6e The criterion of genesis: the test of an idea's
truth or meaning by reference to its ori-
gin
- 12 LEE EYUS *As are of Thm* s BK I [60-700]
9- BK II [469-521] 50b-51a
- 23 HORRES *Letter* 27 P RT I 49 54b-c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a 43d
44c 57d 58b
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditatio* VI 99a-c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* g BK I CH XXX
s CT 2 238b-c BK IV CH IV SECT 4 324c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human kn ledge* SECT 29-30
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84 428d-429c SECT 86-91 429c-431a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* g SECT II 455b-
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- 50 MARK E. GELS *Constitutionalist Manifesto* 427a b
478b-d
- 6f The truth and falsity of simple apprehen-
sions: assertions or conceptions, con-
trasted with the truth and falsity of
judgments or assertions
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 82a-86b 107c 108b / *Republic*
LE BK VI 392b-393b / *So hist* 575d 577b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 4 [2 4 10] 6a /
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- 12 LAI XA *Nature of Things* BK I [324-321]
48c 51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
- 13 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 16 A
93c-96b Q RT AL 2 3 102a 103c Q 3 A 4
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- 23 HO T *Letter* 27 P RT I 56b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 57d 58b /
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- 31 DESCARTES *Rule* X 118b-25a *passim* / *Dis*
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- 31 S OZLA *Ethics* PART II P OP 32 35 385c
386b P O 49, SCHOL 392 d
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* KII CH XXXII
243c 248b BK III CH VII SECT I 283a b K
II CH V 329a 331b CH VI s CT 16 336d
4. LAI T *Pure Reason* 36b-37d 64d-65c
108a-d 179c 180c 193a b 211c 218d / *Judge*
ment 5 0b-571c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 299a-314b *passim* 638b
640b 668a-6 1a

(6 *The being and truth of ideas* 6a *The distinction between real and intentional existence between thing and idea ideas as symbols, or intentions of the mind*)

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 5 A 2 ANS 24b 25a Q 11 A 1 ESP REP 3 46d-47d A 3 REP 2 49a c Q 12 A 2 51c 52c Q 13 A 1 ANS 62c 63c A 3 ANS and REP 3 64d 65c A 4 65c 66b A 7 ANS and REP 2 4-6 68d 70d A 9 ANS and REP 2 71b-72c A 11 ANS 73c 74b A 12 74c 75b Q 14 A 1 ANS and REP 3 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 2-3 76d 77d A 6 REP 1 80a 81c A 8 ANS 82c 83b A 9 ANS 83b d A 13 REP 2-3 86d 88c Q 15 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 91b 92a A 3 REP 4 93b 94a Q 16 A 2 95c 96b A 7 REP 2 99a 11 Q 17 A 3 ANS 102d 103c Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 19 A 3 REP 6 110b 111c Q 27 A 1 ANS and REP 2 153b 154b A 2 ANS and REP 2 154c 155b A 3 ANS 155c 156a A 4 ANS and REP 2 156b d Q 28 157c 161d passim Q 29 A 1 REP 3 162a 163b 110 A 1 REP 4 167a 168a A 4 170c 171b Q 32 AA 2 3 178a 180b Q 34 A 1 185b 187b A 3 ANS 188b 189a Q 37 A 1 ANS 197c 199a Q 50 A 2 ANS 270a 272a QQ 55-58 288d 306b passim Q 66 A 2 REP 2 345d 347b Q 67 A 3 ANS 351b 352a Q 74 A 3 REP 5 375a 377a,c 76 A 3 REP 4 391a 393a A 6 REP 2 396a d Q 78 A 3 ANS 410a-411d A 4 ANS and REP 2 411d-413d Q 79 A 4 REP 4 417a-418c Q 82 A 3 ANS 433c-434c Q 84 440b-451b Q 87 A 2 453d-455b A 3 REP 1 4 455b-457a A 4 457a d A 5 REP 3 457d 458d A 8 REP 3 460b 461b Q 86 A 1 ANS 461c 462a Q 87 A 1 465a-466c 88 A 1 REP 2 469a-471c A 2 REP 4 471c 472c Q 89 A 2 ANS and REP 2 475a d A 3 ANS and REP 1 3 475d-476c A 5 ANS 477a 478b PART II Q 5 A 6 REP 2 641a 642a Q 6 A 6 ANS and REP 2 649a 650a Q 8 A 1 ANS and REP 3 655b 656a Q 12 A 3 REP 1 3 670d 671b Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d 689c 22 A 2 ANS and REP 3 721c 722c Q 28 A 1 REP 3 740b 741a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 93 A 1 REP 2 215b d 216c PART III Q 2 A 5 REP 2 715a 716b PART III SUPPL Q 82 A 3 ANS and REP 2 971a 972d
- 21 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 53c PART III 172a d PART IV 262a d 270a c
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Pichard II* ACT V SC V [1-41] 349d 350a
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 1a 8c 18d 22a PART II 285a 288c
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 71d 72a III 83b 86a v 93a-94a / *Objections and Replies* 108b-109d 121a-c DEF 1 IV 130a b AXIOM V-VI 131d 132a 157b 158a 212c 213a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d esp 371c 372c PART II PROP 5-9 374c 376c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII 133b-138b passim esp SECT 8 134b c CH

- XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XXX SECT 2 238d c CH XXXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXXII SECT 8 244d SECT 14-18 245c 247a BK III CH III, SECT 12 257b 260a CH IV SECT 2 260b CH V SECT 12 266d 267a CH VI 268b-283a passim BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b d CH II SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b 357a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I-9b 413a-431d esp SECT I-24 413a 417d SECT 29-44 418c 421a SECT 48-49 422a 11 SECT 82-84 428d 429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 44 468d-469c SECT XII DIV 117 123 504a 506a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23a 33d 85d 93c 93a d 97a b 117b 118a 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 528c d 551a 553c 604a 11
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 134c d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 11 158a 160b 188d 189a PART I 219d 220a 236a c 257c d PART IV 354b 364b-c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 385b
- 50 MARX *Capital* 11b 11
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 128a b 14a b 176a 184a passim esp 176a b 178a 181a 191b 197a 299a 302a esp 302b [in 1] 307a 311a esp 311b-312b [in 1] 639a 645b esp 640a 659a b 852a 865b 866a 868b 878a 882a esp 880b 882a 889a 890a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 467d 597d 598a
- 6b *The nature and being of ideas in relation to the nature and being of the mind*
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Republic* BK V 369a 373c BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 486a 491d / *Sophist* 567a 569a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 4 661b 662c
- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [723-817] 53d 54d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V pat 16-38 75b-81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 269b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 15 A 1 esp REP 1 91b 92a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 29 A 2 REP 4 163b 164b Q 76 A 2 REP 3 388c 391a Q 79 A 3 ANS 416a 417a Q 84 A 1 ANS 440d 442a QQ 85-89 451b 480c passim Q 110 A 1 REP 3 564c 565d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 49a
- 30 BALON *Advancement of Learning* 43d 44c
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 162b 212c 13a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 3 373b PROP II DEMONSTR 377b PROP 49 SCHOL 392a-c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 15 98d 99a BK II CH VIII 133b 138b passim CH XXII SECT 2 201a 11 CH XXX 238a 239b passim esp SECT 2 3 238b d CH XXXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXXII SECT 14 11 245c 246b BK III CH V 263d 268a C VI SECT 26-

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Ideas of the Western World but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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- The theory of ideas as universal conceptions abstracted from the materials of sense *see* FORM
 3a-3b MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5b 6c(1) SENSE 5a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2b
 4c-4d and for abstraction in relation to generalization and induction *see* EXPERIENCE b
 INDUCTION 1a 3
- The theory of ideas as sense impressions or sense images *see* MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1a
 5a SENSE 1d 5a
- The doctrine of innate ideas and the related theory of reminiscence and intuitive knowledge
see KNOWLEDGE 6c(3) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3a MIND 4d(2)
- The theory of the transcendental concepts or ideas as constitutive or regulative principles,
see FORM 1c 3a KNOWLEDGE 6b(4) 6c(4) MIND 4d(3) PRIVILEGE 2b(3) and for the
 dialectical employment of the ideas of pure reason *see* DIALECTIC 2c(-)
- The theory of the Absolute Idea *see* HISTORY 4a(3) MIND 10f-10f(2)
- The theory of the divine ideas as eternal exemplars or of the ideas infused into angelic intel-
 lects *see* ANGEL 3d FORM 2b GOD 5f KNOWLEDGE 7a-7b MIND 10c 10g UNIVERSAL
 AND PARTICULAR 4b
- The issue concerning the distinction of and the relation between sense and intellect *see*
 BEING 8a-8b KNOWLEDGE 6a(1) 6b-6b(4) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5b 6b 6d
 MIND 1-1g(3) SENSE 1a-1b 4a 5c
- Another discussion of the distinction between first and second intentions and of the related
 distinction between first and second impositions *see* SIGN AND SYMBOL 2a-2b
- Other discussions of adequate and inadequate or clear and distinct ideas *see* KNOWLEDGE
 6d(3) OPINION 3b TRUTH 1a and for other considerations of mental fictions or chimeras,
see BEING 7d(5) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5a
- The consideration of the expression of ideas in words or terms *see* LANGUAGE 1a 7 SIGN
 AND SYMBOL 1f for the distinction of concrete and abstract terms *see* SIGN AND SYMBOL
 2e for the distinction of particular and universal terms *see* SIGN AND SYMBOL 2d UNI-
 VERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5c for the distinction of species and genera *see* RELATION 5a(4)
 SAME AND OTHER 3a(1) UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5b and for the distinction between
 univocal equivocal and analogical terms *see* RELATION 1d SAME AND OTHER 3b 4c
 SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d
- The treatment of the definition of terms as the expression or analysis of concepts *see* DEFINI-
 TION 1 1b
- The correlation and opposition of concepts or terms *see* OPPOSITION 1a-1b RELATION 1c
 4a
- The role played by concepts in the acts of judgment and reasoning or for terms in relation
 to propositions and syllogisms *see* JUDGMENT 5b-5c REASONING 2a(1)
- Other discussions of the association of ideas *see* MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2c MIND
 1g(1) RELATION 4f
- The metaphysical problem of the being of ideas and for the theory of intentional existence
see BEING 7d-7d(5) SIGN AND SYMBOL 1b UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2c
- Another consideration of the truth or reality of ideas *see* TRUTH 3b(1)

of consideration the theme of immortality is never merely a matter of speculative interest never merely a question of spiritual substances and their subsistence. It is always a problem for the moralist.

Is this earthly life and its brief temporal pain enough for the aspirations of the human spirit and for its striving toward a perfection of knowledge of love and of repose? If external sanctions are needed to support the voice of conscience are earthly rewards and punishments—either humanly dispensed or capriciously distributed by chance or fortune—sufficient sanction for the moral law? Can perfect justice be done unless there is a divine law and a divine judge—a judge who can see beyond the acts of men into their hearts, from whose judgment no one escapes, and whose rewards and punishments are supernaturally established states of blessedness and misery for the soul?

Whether or not God, freedom and immortality are as Kant suggests, the three great objects of speculative thought, they do seem to form the backbone of religious beliefs. In the religions of the west these beliefs take various forms, but the belief in immortality is seldom if ever found separate from belief in a supernatural order in gods or a God to whom man owes certain duties and before whom man stands to be judged as a responsible moral agent who was free to obey or disobey the divine commands. But this fact admitted, the question remains whether the principles of morality can be adequately stated or made effective in the regulation of human conduct without a religious foundation, or at least without reference to God and immortality.

On this the moralists disagree. The argument in Plato's *Gorgias* (I exempl) about whether it is better to do or suffer injustice ends with a myth which tells of the soul standing naked before its divine judge after a man's death, showing no marks of the evil the man had done during his life but only of the evil he had done. The reader who thinks the myth is necessary to compel to the argument concerning justice and punishment, takes one position on the question. He adopts the view that without the judgment of souls in an after life justice cannot be done.

The preoccupation with immortality in a

great many of Plato's dialogues is not always based upon moral considerations. It appears as frequently in discussions of the relation between the soul and the objects of its knowledge. If, to be proper objects of knowledge, the Ideas must be eternal, the soul which knows them must also be immortal. But when the discussion of immortality involves a comparison of this life and the life to come it usually turns on considerations of goodness rather than of knowledge and truth. For Kant if not for Plato immortality is almost entirely a moral matter and where the Platonic myth deals with just rewards and punishments in an after life the Kantian argument is concerned with the achievement of moral perfection.

In his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant affirms immortality along with the existence of God and the freedom of the will as necessary practical postulates—indispensable conditions of the moral life. The perfect accordance of the will with the moral law, *homo noumenon*, is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. It can only be found in a progress *in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance. It is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. The realization of happiness, or the *summum bonum*, Kant concludes, is only possible *practically* on the supposition of the immortality of the soul.

The opposite view appears to be taken in Aristotle's *Ethics* and Mill's *Utilitarianism*. The *summum bonum* is a temporal happiness, a perfection attainable on earth and by purely natural means. In those passages in which Aristotle defines happiness in terms of contemplation and activity he also speaks of it as a godlike life and therefore one which has a touch of immortality. Man is able to lead such a life, he writes, only "in so far as something divine is present in him. To lead the life of reason which is divine in comparison with any other mode of human life we must be says, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us.

But to be immortal in this way seems to mean the possession of a godlike quality in this life rather than the promise of a life hereafter.

Chapter 38 IMMORTALITY

INTRODUCTION

THE mortality of man defines by contrast the immortality which some men hope for some men fear some men scoff at but no man ever fails sooner or later to consider The life of man like that of other animals moves through a normal span of years between birth and death Legend tells of certain heroes upon whom the immortal gods bestowed immortal life gracing them with an aspect of their own divinity Jewish and Christian faith holds that Adam with all his posterity would never have suffered disease or death if he had refrained from sin But according to the theologians the imperishability of the bodily frame of man in a state of grace is a preternatural condition Except then for the miraculous or the super-natural death follows birth and life that which comes to be passes away all things of flesh and blood perish

The proposition All men are mortal has been repeated during centuries of lessons in logic Its truth has never been seriously challenged even by those who have criticized the syllogism which reaches the conclusion that since he is a man Socrates is mortal But throughout the same period the great books of poetry and religion of philosophy and theology have recorded the qualifications which men have placed upon this truth

Man dies in the flesh so be reborn in the spirit Man composite of soul and body perishes as do all things which are subject to dissolution but the soul itself a simple spiritual substance is immortal living on after its union with the body is dissolved The immortal soul is sometimes conceived as having many incarnations inhabiting now this body now that in an endless pilgrimage through endless time and sometimes as in the Christian faith each soul has only one embodiment on earth It is specially created by God to inform the body of a human

being It is destined to be his immortal spirit in a future which belongs to eternity rather than to time

Except for the form it takes in the doctrine of reincarnation or the transmigration of souls the idea of immortality is usually attended by conceptions of an after life in another world—the life of the shades in the Elysian Fields or in Hades the life of the blessed in Heaven or of the damned in Hell The after life is never merely a continuation of the life begun on earth The other world is not just an abode for the disembodied soul It is a place of judgment of rewards and punishments in which the soul realizes the good or pays the penalty for the evil toward which its earthly career inclined The connection of immortality with rewards and punishments appears even in the theory of reincarnation for as the soul passes from one embodiment to another it enjoys or suffers the consequences befitting its previous existence

STATED AS A speculative problem the question of immortality is traditionally formulated as a question about the soul or the spirit of man whether it exists by itself either before or after its conjunction with a human body and if so in what manner it subsists For those who affirm the soul's separate existence there seems to be no question about its everlasting endurance either without beginning at all or from the moment of its creation But the manner of the soul's subsistence leads to speculation concerning an after life or an other life in a world of spirits or in realms as far apart as Heaven and Hell

We shall presently consider to what extent such speculations have been submitted to argument and to what extent they have been matters of religious belief But in both these modes

of Hades and dread Proserpine we are told that the Theban prophet Teiresias alone has his reason still unshaken. All the other ghosts flit about aimlessly. The shades of good men and bad alike languish in the domain of darkness. Tityus, Tantalus and Sisyphus are subjected to special punishments for their grievous sins and transgressions; but all the shades—even of those men whom the gods loved and honored—seem to be in a state of misery. Though they are not all beset with torments and agonies, none seems to be overcome with joy or to have reached contentment.

Those whom the gods love do not join the spirits on Mount Olympus. When they enter the somber realm of Pluto—the deity of the underworld—they like all the other shades whom Charon ferries across the river Styx are more remote from the gods than are mortal men on earth. The only exception perhaps is Heracles whom Odysseus meets in Hades; or rather his phantom only for he is feasting ever with the immortal gods and has lovely Hebe to wife.

The general attitude of all who dwell in the under-world is summed up by Achilles when he tells Odysseus: Say not a word in death's favor. I would rather be a paid servant in a poor man's house and be above ground than king of kings among the dead. And the mother of Odysseus describes the condition of the dead in the abode of darkness as one in which the unweary no longer hold the flesh and bones together; these perish in the fierceness of consuming fire as soon as life has left the body, and the soul flits away as if it were a dream.

Among other ancient peoples such as the Egyptians, the Babylonians and the Persians, Herodotus found other views of immortality than those which prevailed in Greece. He reports for example the doctrine of transmigration or reincarnation—a doctrine which also appears in the myth of Er at the end of Plato's *Republic* and is alluded to elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. The Egyptians, Herodotus writes, were the first to broach the opinion that the soul of man is immortal and that when the body dies it enters into the form of an animal which is born at the moment of ceasing on from the animal into another until it has circled through the forms of all creatures

which tenant the earth, the water and the air after which it enters again into a human frame and is born anew.

Herodotus however seems more interested in the effect of such beliefs on the practices of the living, especially their funeral rites and other devotions, than he is with the truth of conflicting theories of immortality.

The doctrine of a future state according to Gibbon was scarcely considered among the devout polytheists of Greece and Rome as a fundamental article of faith. Before the time of Christ the description of the infernal regions had been abandoned to the fancy of painters and of poets who peopled them with so many phantoms and monsters who dispensed their rewards and punishments with so little equity that a solemn truth, the most congenial to the human heart was oppressed and disgraced by the absurd mixture of the wildest fictions. Lacking an acceptable or satisfying belief yet inclined to believe in as men are inclined to hope for a better life, the pagan world, Gibbon thinks, could not long resist the appeal of Christian teaching. When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the Gospel, it is no wonder he declares that so advantageous an offer would have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman empire.

THE ARGUMENTS for personal immortality which Christian theologians draw from the nature of the human soul do not differ essentially from the proofs offered by philosophers without recourse to religious faith. This applies to arguments advanced before Christianity by Plato and Plotinus as well as to those developed by philosophers like Descartes and Locke who belong to the Christian community. The exclusively theological aspects of the Christian doctrine of immortality are those matters which since they are beyond the reach of reason belong to faith alone.

The doctrine that the individual soul is created and that it has a unique affiliation with one human body is not capable of being proved or defended by reason against the quite opposite theory that the soul has always existed and

Aristotle demands only a complete term of life as a necessary condition for 'the complete happiness of man'. He passes lightly over the question whether the dead share in any good or evil. So far as he considers a *blessedness* which the gods can add to human happiness it does not belong to an after life but consists rather in the good fortune which the gods grant to some men and which increases and secures their happiness beyond that which is attainable by virtue alone.

The moral issue concerning immortality is more explicitly faced by Mill in his examination of the need for religious or supernatural sanctions. While he does not admit their indispensability, neither does he deny their utility. 'There is evidently no reason,' he declares, 'why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality as completely and as powerfully as to any other.' Yet he himself stresses the possibility of giving to the service of humanity even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion.

Mill does not go as far as Lucretius in regarding the belief in immortality with the attendant possibility of everlasting torment for the soul as itself an immoral doctrine. For Lucretius it is a nightmare which haunts the waking hours of men, filling them with false fears and putting future pains in the way of present pleasures. He dedicates his poem to driving headlong forth that dread of Acheron troubling as it does the life of man from its inmost depths and overspreading all things with the blackness of death, allowing no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed.

Where others see in man's fear of death his natural desire for immortality, Lucretius thinks it is the dread of immortality which causes man's fear of death. We have nothing to fear after death, he says, if death is the end. He who exists not cannot become miserable.

IN THE GREAT POEMS of antiquity we find the imagery and detail of the pagan conception of the life hereafter. Both Odysseus and Aeneas visit the underworld. They see the shades of the departed heroes, all that is visible to the bodily eye, are summoning wraiths. They talk with the

departed, listen to their memories or hear them speak prophetically of the future. From Anchises his dead father Aeneas learns his destiny, and Odysseus hears in Hades what has befallen his companions at Troy and his family at home during his years of wandering.

Yet there is a striking difference between Virgil's poem and Homer's with respect to the after life. The division which Virgil makes between Elysium and Tartarus corresponds much more closely than anything in Homer—or for that matter in the other Greek poets—to the Christian distinction between Heaven and Hell. Though Elysium and Tartarus both belong to the underworld, one is the abode of the blessed, the other a place of torment for sinners.

In the sixth book of the *Aeneid* the Sibyl explains the topography of the underworld to Aeneas. There is a place where splits the road in twain, she says:

The right leads to the giant walls of Dis
Our way to Elysium, but the left wrecks doom
On sinners and to guilty Tartarus sends

Tartarus, the abode of the condemned, is surrounded by a fierce torrent of billowy fire and is filled with the noise of punishment. Elysium, on the other hand, is

The happy region and green pleasaunces
Of the blest woodlands, the abode of joy
An ampler ether with purpureal light
Clothes here the plain, another sun than ours
And other stars they know

Its inhabitants in sharp contrast with the unfortunates in Tartarus seem to pass their time in peace and pleasure.

Homer makes no such sharp division between the realm of the blessed and the realm of the condemned. Plutarch speaks of 'the isles of the blessed celebrated by Homer'; but the reference cannot be substantiated. In one passage in the *Iliad* Menelaus is promised that he will be taken to the Elysian plain, which is at the end of the world. There fair-haired Rhadamanthus reigns, and men lead an easier life than anywhere else in the world, for in Elysium there falls not rain nor hail nor snow. But even this seems to describe a different life rather than an after life.

So far as the underworld is described on the occasion of Odysseus' descent into the house

of Hades and dread Proserpine we are told that the Theban prophet Teiresias alone has his reason still unshaken. All the other ghosts sit about aimlessly. The shades of good men and bad alike languish in the domain of darkness. Tithonus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus are subjected to special punishments for their grievous sins and transgressions; but all the shades—even of those men whom the gods loved and honored—seem to be in a state of misery. Though they are not all beset with torments and agonies, none seems to be overcome with joy or to have reached contentment.

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The doctrine that the individual soul is created and that it has a unique affiliation with one human body is not capable of being proved or defended by reason against the quite opposite theory that the soul has always existed and

inhabits any number of bodies in the course of many reincarnations. The existence of Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven as supernatural states of the soul, the time, place, and manner of the Last Judgment, the resurrection of the body, and the difference between the bodies reunited with the souls of the blessed and the damned, the joy of eternal happiness and the misery of eternal damnation—these dogmas of Christian orthodoxy go far beyond all merely philosophical attempts to prove the soul's immortality or to consider its life apart from the body.

The great theologians undertake to do more than expound these articles of faith. Reason asks questions which the man of faith must try to answer, defending his faith, not by proof, but by overcoming doubts, by answering objections, by making dogmas intelligible. Yet the great theologians admit an irreducible core of mystery. The joy of the soul united to God in the beatific vision surpasses temporal understanding. The mysteries of Hell are perhaps even greater.

The deprivation of God's love and exclusion from His presence constitute a spiritual misery comparable to the beatitude of beholding God and being within the circle of the divine light. One is an infinite anguish of frustration and loss, the other an infinite rest of peace and fulfillment. But the theologians also teach that the damned suffer the pains of sense in Hell, as well as the pains of deprivation. "That hell, which also is called a lake of fire and brimstone," Augustine says, "will be material fire and will torment the bodies of the damned." When hell, fire, and the expiatory punishments of Purgatory are not merely symbols for the imagination, they raise extraordinarily difficult questions, as both Augustine and Aquinas admit.

Dante asks us to read the descriptions he gives of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise in the *Divine Comedy* in a strictly literal sense, as well as in several symbolic meanings, such as the moral and the allegorical. But he explains in his own commentary on the poem that the literal meaning also involves symbolism, insofar as the things that the words refer to when taken in their literal sense are themselves the symbols of other things. In any case, the poet may be more successful than the theologian in making intelligible through symbol and metaphor what

in its literal significance is strictly unimaginable. The imagery of darkness, sultriness, noise, and heaviness, which grows more intense as the descent proceeds in the *Inferno*, does more than the anguished outcries of the damned to convey the reality of Hell.

The metaphors of music and agility express the harmony of Heaven. But it is especially the symbolism of light which captures the invisible in terms of vision, except perhaps when it reaches a climax in the blinding effulgence at the end of the *Paradiso*. As Dante moves upward in the realm of love, where courtesy prevails in every speech and charity suffuses every will, he sees the mystic rose of Heaven entirely through reflected light. The saints, and especially those glorious spirits who instruct his progress, become pale mirrors of the ineffable vision which they themselves behold.

Milton too pictures Heaven and Hell, but in *Paradise Lost* the destiny of the immortal soul remains a prophecy, a consequence of the earthly immortality which Adam lost. Except for the Prologue, Hell and Heaven are offstage in Goethe's *Faust*, though they are the main implications of the wager Faust makes with Mephistopheles, which puts his immortal soul in the balance.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL issue concerning immortality cannot be separated from issues concerning the existence and nature of man's soul. The various arguments for immortality seem to rest not merely on the reality of the distinction between soul and body, but more precisely on the immateriality of the soul. Lucretius, for example, does not deny the existence of soul, nor does he fail to differentiate the soul from the body, wherein it is located. The soul, according to Lucretius, like everything else in the universe, consists of atoms. They differ from those of the body by their roundness, smoothness, and mobility. They are much smaller than those of which our body and flesh are formed; they are also much fewer in number and are disseminated merely in scanty number through the frame.

On this view of the soul as material in nature and as constituted of many quite separable parts, the soul is necessarily as perishable as the rest of the body. When the body has been

shattered by the mastering might of time. Lucretius writes, and the frame has drooped with its forces dulled. It naturally follows then that the whole nature of the soul is dissolved like smoke into the hazy air, since we see it is begotten along with the body and grows up along with it and breaks down at the same time worn out with age.

It should be observed, however, that it is not the materiality of the soul but rather its divisibility into parts which accounts for its mortality. The atoms after all are material but since as the ultimate units of matter they are simple bodies and so are absolutely indivisible they cannot perish. Only the simple is imperishable.

The *immortality of the simple* (i.e. of that which has no parts) occurs as a premise in one of the great arguments for the immortality of the soul. In Plato's *Phaedo* which formulates this argument as immortality is discussed in the prison cell where Socrates awaits his execution two assumptions seem to be made: first that the soul is the principle of life in animate bodies, for as Socrates says "whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life and second, that as an immaterial being, the soul must be simple for only bodies are composite and 'changing'."

From the first of these assumptions the argument proceeds in terms of what it means for bodies to be alive or dead. Socrates argues from examples. If any one asks you, he says, "what is that of which the inherent makes the body hot?" you will reply not heat but fire. Or if any one asks you why a body is diseased you will not say from disease but from fever. So if any one asks, what is that of which the inherent will render the body alive? the answer is not life but "the soul. As the principle of life itself the soul will never receive the opposite of what she brings, namely death. Therefore the soul is immortal."

On the second assumption the endless duration of the soul follows from its simplicity as an immaterial and immutable being. The compound or composite Socrates says may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded so also of being dissolved but that which is uncompounded and that only must be, if anything is, indissoluble. "When the

soul leaves the body for which it has been both motor and pilot the body ceases to be alive and perishes in the manner of material things: the soul lives on freed from temporary bondage to the body its prison house. It departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational.

The argument from simplicity as repeated in Moses Mendelssohn's *Phädon* is criticized by Kant. Admitting that a truly simple being cannot cease to exist, Kant contends that the *knowable* soul—which is for him the empirical ego or consciousness—may have intensive though it lacks extensive quantity. It would therefore be capable of diminution in reality and so it can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees.

With regard to the soul as an immaterial and simple substance (i.e. the transcendental ego) Kant is willing to affirm that immortality necessarily belongs to such a nature. But he denies that we can have any knowledge of the soul except as a phenomenon of experience. There can be no valid theoretic argument for immortality precisely because there can be no scientific knowledge of the nature of transcendental objects—beings beyond all possible experience. What Kant calls the *paralogisms of rational psychology* are offered to show the dialectical futility of proofs or disproofs of immortality in the same way that the cosmological antinomies attempt to expose the untenability of arguments for or against the infinity of time and space, the infinite divisibility of matter, the existence of a free will and of God.

Without deciding whether Kant's theory of experience and knowledge is true, this much we can learn from him about the issue of immortality. Those philosophers who like Descartes and Locke think they have grounds for affirming the existence of the soul (or mind or spirit) as an immaterial substance also have grounds for affirming its immortality. Those who like Lucretius and Hobbes think they have grounds for denying the existence of anything except material particles also have grounds for denying either the existence of the soul or its having a permanence not possessed by other material wholes. And those who, like Hume, think there are no grounds for affirming the existence of any kind of enduring substance material or

spiritual—even to the point of doubting personal identity from moment to moment—can admit no grounds for affirming a substantial much less an immortal soul

ONE OTHER POSITION remains to be considered. Though it does not fall outside the foregoing alternatives Aristotle's theory represents an important variation on one of them. As against Hume or Kant Aristotle holds that substances exist and are knowable. The sensible material things of experience are such substances. But according to Aristotle these substances are not *exclusively* material. They are composed of two principles: matter and form, neither of which is a substance capable of existing by itself. As the exposition of this theory (in the chapters on FORM and MATTER) tries to make plain, form and matter exist only in union with one another. It is the composite substance resulting from their union which exists in and of itself.

The form which enters into the composition of a substance can be called its substantial form. In relation to the matter with which it is united, the substantial form is the actualization of the potentiality in matter to exist as a substance of a certain kind. Not all substances are of the same kind. Some are alive, some inanimate and inert. In the case of living substances the substantial form, according to Aristotle, confers upon matter not only the act of existing as a substance, but also the act of being alive. Because it thus differs from the form of an inanimate substance, Aristotle gives a special name to the substantial form of a living thing. Because the word *soul* has long been used to designate the principle of life in living things, Aristotle feels justified in using it as the name for the substantial forms of plants and animals as well as men.

This theory and its principal opposite (which regards the human soul as a complete substance, not a substantial form) are more fully discussed in the chapter on SOUL. Here we are concerned only with the consequences of Aristotle's theory for human immortality. If, as he seems to hold, substantial forms exist only insofar as they exist in the substances of which they are the forms, then when a composite substance perishes, it is as if the decomposition of its matter and

form, the form perishes also. Souls—the substantial forms of living things—would seem to be no exception. The soul, Aristotle writes,

is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts)—for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all.

The exception which Aristotle seems to have in mind is that part of the human soul which is the intellect. It differs from other powers of the soul, he suggests, as the eternal from the perishable. It alone, he says, is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. He argues that, in so far as the realities it knows—or at least some of them—are capable of being separated from their matter, so is it also with the power of the mind.

What is the significance for the immortality of the human soul of the supposed ability of the intellect to act independently of the body? Aristotle answers in terms of the principle that

if there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible. If we consider nutrition, sensation, and emotion, there seems to be, he admits, no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body. The one possible exception may be thinking, but Aristotle adds at once that, if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.

Later, when he is discussing the power of thought, Aristotle flatly insists that the soul never thinks without an image, and that no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, for when the mind is actively aware of anything, it is necessarily aware of it along with an image. According to his own principles, it would seem to follow that since thinking proves to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. Hence the intellect is not separable from matter, nor is the human soul of which the intellect is the highest power.

Nevertheless, Aristotle declares in a passage which has become famous, that mind as the active power of thinking is separable from

possible unmixed and with this declaration of the intellect's separability from matter he seems to affirm immortality at least for the intellectual part of the soul. When mind is set free from its present conditions, he writes, it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal.

THE PASSAGES QUOTED have been subject to conflicting interpretations. The Arabic commentators on Aristotle, notably Averroes, find in them no basis for the immortality of the individual human soul. The texts, according to their view, support the theory of a *single active intellect* which exists apart from the minds of individual men—almost a divine principle in the universe which, acting on the rational souls of individual men, enables them to think and understand. Aquinas argues against them to the opposite conclusion.

Against the Averroists Aquinas contends that if the individual man Socrates can be said to think, then whatever powers are required for thinking must belong to his individual nature. The powers required for thinking are according to Aquinas twofold: an active intellect able to abstract the intelligible forms of things from their material representation in sensory images; and a possible or potential intellect capable of receiving these forms when separated from matter by the act of abstraction.

The theory of knowledge and thought which this involves is discussed in the chapters on FORM, IDEA, MIND and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. Here we are concerned only with the point which Aquinas makes: that since thinking involves universal notions and since forms can be universal only apart from matter, the intellect which abstracts and receives abstractions must itself be immaterial. The intellectual powers do not operate through a bodily organ, as the power of nutrition operates through the alimentary system or the power of vision through the eye. The brain in other words is not the organ of understanding or thought but rather, along with the external sense-organs, its material organ of perception, memory and imagination.

The argument for the immortality of the human soul then proceeds on the premise that that which can exist apart from matter can also

exist apart from matter. The intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation *per se* apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation *per se* for nothing can operate but what is actual, wherefore a thing operates according as it is. Hence Aquinas concludes that the human soul which is called the intellect or mind is something incorporeal and subsistent. The attribution of subsistence to the human soul means that although it is the substantial form of the human body, it is also capable of existing in and of itself as if it were a simple substance.

Unlike angels, which as spiritual substances are by their very nature separate forms, not forms of matter, human souls are substantial forms which, having a certain degree of immateriality, are also to that degree separable from matter. But the reverse is also true. To the extent that the soul's powers, such as sensation and imagination, require corporeal organs, the soul is inseparable from the body. Since furthermore Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that every act of understanding or thought involves imagination, he faces the difficulty of explaining how the soul can function in any way when separated from the body after death.

To solve this difficulty he says we must consider that as nothing acts except as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body and another when apart from it. The soul therefore when united to the body has consistently with that mode of existence, a mode of understanding by turning to corporeal images which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body it has a mode of understanding by turning to simply intelligible objects as is proper to other separate substances. Nevertheless Aquinas adds it is not natural for the soul to understand in the latter way for it is not by nature a separate substance. Therefore to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature.

THIS LAST POINT has both philosophical and theological significance. Philosophically it may be easier to prove the immortality of the soul if one starts as the Platonists do with the proposition that the soul is a purely spiritual prin-

spiritual—even to the point of doubting personal identity from moment to moment—can admit no grounds for affirming a substantial much less an immortal soul

ONE OTHER POSITION remains to be considered. Though it does not fall outside the foregoing alternatives, Aristotle's theory represents an important variation on one of them. As against Hume or Kant, Aristotle holds that substances exist and are knowable. The sensible material things of experience are such substances. But according to Aristotle these substances are not *exclusively* material. They are composed of two principles: matter and form, neither of which is a substance capable of existing by itself. As the exposition of this theory (in the chapters on FORM and MATTER) tries to make plain, form and matter exist only in union with one another. It is the composite substance resulting from their union which exists in and of itself.

The form which enters into the composition of a substance can be called its substantial form. In relation to the matter with which it is united, the substantial form is the actualization of the potentiality in matter to exist as a substance of a certain kind. Not all substances are of the same kind. Some are alive, some inanimate and inert. In the case of living substances, the substantial form according to Aristotle confers upon matter not only the act of existing as a substance, but also the act of being alive. Because it thus differs from the form of an inanimate substance, Aristotle gives a special name to the substantial form of a living thing. Because the word *soul* has long been used to designate the principle of life in living things, Aristotle feels justified in using it as the name for the substantial forms of plants and animals as well as men.

This theory and its principal opposite (which regards the human soul as a complete substance, not a substantial form) are more fully discussed in the chapter on SOUL. Here we are concerned only with the consequences of Aristotle's theory for human immortality. If, as he seems to hold, substantial forms exist only insofar as they exist in the substances of which they are the forms, then when a composite substance perishes through the decomposition of its matter and

form, the form perishes also. Souls—the substantial forms of living things—would seem to be no exception. The soul, Aristotle writes, is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts)—for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all.

The exception which Aristotle seems to have in mind is that part of the human soul which is the intellect. It differs from other powers of the soul, he suggests, as the eternal from the perishable. It alone, he says, is capable of existing in isolation from all other psychic powers. He argues that, in so far as the realities it knows—or at least some of them—are capable of being separated from their matter, so is it also with the power of the mind.

What is the significance for the immortality of the human soul of the supposed ability of the intellect to act independently of the body? Aristotle answers in terms of the principle that

if there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible. If we consider nutrition, sensation, and emotion, there seems to be, he admits, no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body. The one possible exception may be thinking, but Aristotle adds at once that, if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.

Later when he is discussing the power of thought, Aristotle flatly insists that the soul never thinks without an image, and that no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, for when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image. According to his own principles, it would seem to follow that since thinking proves to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. Hence the intellect is not separable from matter, nor is the human soul of which the intellect is the highest power.

Nevertheless, Aristotle declares in a passage which has become famous, that mind as the active power of thinking is separable im-

For Hegel it is Spirit itself which is immortal. "The success & phases of Spirit that animate the Nations is a necessitated gradation: the stages are themselves only steps in the development of the one Universal Spirit which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-contained totality. In considering the history of the world, he regards everything as the manifestation of Spirit, and because of this, even when we traverse the past we have to say, 'only to do with what is present' for philosophy is occupying itself with the True has to do with the eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present. Spirit is immortal: with it there is no past, no future, but an essential now. This necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit comprehends within it all earlier steps. The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it it still possesses in the depths of its present."

What Spirit is for Hegel, Nature is for Spinoza. Spinoza, however, conceives a kind of immortality for the individual man, which is achieved through his participation in the eternity of Nature. The body of the individual man, according to Spinoza, belongs to the infinite matter of Nature. It is "a certain mode of extension actually existing." The individual human mind is similarly "a part of the infinite intellect of God." In one sense both the body and the mind are temporal things which, like all other finite modes of God or Nature, have a fixed and limited duration. Furthermore, the personal memories and thoughts of the individual man depend on the co-existence of his mind and body. The mind can remember nothing nor can it recollect anything that is past. "Spinoza writes, 'except while the body exists.'"

But Spinoza also maintains that "only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body can the mind be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited by a fixed time. Of every individual thing—whether it is a finite mind or a finite body—there exists in the infinite and eternal essence of God a conception or idea. To conceive things under the form of eternity," Spinoza writes, "is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God. Because, he holds that the human mind can have adequate knowledge of God, he holds that the mind can conceive "

self and its body under the form of eternity." Hence through knowing, God or the eternal truth about temporal things, the mind participates in eternity.

Imagination and memory may belong to time but not the intellect which is capable of knowing God. To explain why we feel "that we are eternal," Spinoza points out that "the mind is no less sensible of those things which it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers." Although we cannot imagine or remember that "we existed before the body, we can know rationally something about mind and body which belongs to eternity because in addition to conceiving them as existing with relation to a fixed time and place "we can conceive them as "contained in God" and as following "from the necessity of the divine nature." Since it "pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity," Spinoza concludes that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal."

Such immortality is, in a way, enjoyed in this life for it is a present participation in eternity through the mind's knowledge of God. There is also the impersonal immortality which men enjoy through contemplating the perfection of the species, or more particularly the perfection of an image of themselves in their offspring. In the *Symposium* Socrates reports a conversation with Diotima in which she explains to him that in procreation "the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal." "It is hope that offspring "will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But if procreation through the pregnancy of the body is a way of achieving immortality, artistic creation through a kind of pregnancy in the soul Diotima argues, is even more so. "Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets," she asks, "would not rather have their children than ordinary ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?"

One need think "and of the ambition of men" and what they will do "for the sake of

ciple or substance which does not depend upon the body. But then according to Aquinas you prove the immortality of the soul at the expense of destroying the unity of man: for if the soul is a substance rather than a form, the individual man composed of body and soul consists of two distinct substances.

Theologically, Christian faith believes in the resurrection of the body after the Last Judgment and the end of the world as well as in the soul's separate existence immediately after death. From the point of view of a theologian like Aquinas, a philosophical proof of immortality must corroborate both of these dogmas. In his judgment a proof which rests upon the proposition that the soul has a nature akin to that of an angel (*i.e.* a purely spiritual substance) makes the Christian dogma of the resurrected body unintelligible or even abhorrent.

If the immortal soul were a complete and separate substance, it would have no need for its body in the life hereafter. It has that need only if its nature is that of a substantial form partly immersed in matter and partly separate therefrom. Then, because of these two aspects of its nature, it can be said not only that the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, but also that it has an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

The incompleteness of the soul without the body and even more the dependence of man's mind upon his bodily senses and imagination raise, as we have seen, the difficult problem of how the soul exists and operates when separated from the body by death and before it is reunited to a resurrected body. It may even raise the question whether the reasoning of Aquinas constitutes a valid philosophical argument for the actual existence of the soul in separation from the body or merely suggests the possibility of such existence. But the facts which create these difficulties are the very facts to which Aquinas appeals in his *Treatise on the Resurrection* in order to explain the basis in nature for the miraculous re-union of the body with the soul.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR and against immortality so far considered are couched in the form of proofs or disproofs which aim at certainty. All

except one are moreover theoretical or speculative in the sense that they proceed in terms of observations, assumptions and inferences about the nature of things—about atoms and substances, matter and form, extension and thought, inert bodies and living organisms. The one exception already mentioned is Kant's practical argument based on the moral necessity of an immortal life.

There is still another argument, both speculative and practical in character, which does not aim at certainty nor take the form of a proof. It is the proposal of a wager concerning the equally unknown alternatives of oblivion after death and eternal life. Supposing no rational evidence to favor the truth of either alternative, Pascal weighs the probability of gain and loss which is consequent upon living according to each hypothesis. The probability, he thinks, vastly preponderates on the side of those who choose to forego the worldly life because to take the chance of gaining the whole world during the short term of earthly life they would risk the loss of eternal happiness for their immortal souls.

Locke engages in the same type of calculation. When infinite happiness is put into one scale, against infinite misery in the other, if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be right, who, Locke asks, can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within the possibility of infinite misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass. If wagering on immortal life, the good man be right, he is eternally happy; but if he mistakes—if death ends all—he is not miserable, he feels nothing.

ALL THESE THEORIES, including Kant's postulate and the wager proposed by Pascal and Locke, are clearly concerned with arguing for personal immortality or individual survival. Among those who deny the survival of the individual human spirit, some—Hegel and Spinoza, for example—conceive an impersonal type of immortality.

REFERENCES

To find the passage cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 *How a *Iliad* bk ii [265-283] 12d* the number 4 is the number of the volume in the series, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTION. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 *James Psychology* 116a-119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example in 7 *Plato Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BOOK, CHAP-TER, etc.) are sometimes noted in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases. e.g. *Iliad* bk i [265-283] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. The reference is to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions are used the number of chapters or verses the King James version is followed by the Douay version and cited by a (D) follows. e.g. *Old Testament Nehemiah* 7:45-(D) *Iliad* 7:46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole. etc. etc. means that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For details of the format and the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style in the general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* in the Preface.

1 The desire for immortality: the fear of death

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14 *Plutarch Aristides* 263d

17 *Petrarch's For the Love of the Virgin* bk 16 19a / *Petrarch's For the Love of the Virgin* bk 16 19a

18 *Aquinas's Confession* bk i ch 11 par 11 21d / *Aquinas's Confession* bk i ch 11 par 11 21d

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25 *M. Aquinas Summa Theologiae* bk i q 72 6a 383 384c

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22 *Chivalry's S. C. d. N. S. Tale* [1573-8] 1:467a

25 *M. Aquinas's Essay* 33d 36b 99b-100a 211a-b 267a-c 402-403c

leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal to realize how deeply they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. Even deeper according to Diotima is their love of the good or more precisely their desire for the everlasting possession of the good which leads all men necessarily to desire immortality together with the good.

Whether it is to be attained through the perpetuation of the species through survival in the memory of mankind through knowledge of God or through the subsistence of the soul the desire for immortality seems to express

man's dread of disappearance into utter nothingness. Yet facing death Socrates faces the alternatives with equanimity. Either death he declares is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness or as men say there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Either it is like a dreamless and undisturbed sleep or it opens a new world to which the good man can look forward with hope. On either alternative we can be of good cheer he tells his friends if we believe that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death.

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14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 28a 29b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr i ch ii 5b c / *Third Ennead* tr iv ch 6 99b 100b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iii ch 27 156d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk x ch 30 318b 319b bk xx ch 25 554c 555a bk xxi ch 13 571c 572a ch 24 577b 579d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 69 a 2 ans and REP 2 880c 887d a 7 ans and REP 6 891d 893c Q 71 a 6 908b 909c Q 97 a 1 REP 2 1066b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY 53a 105d esp i n 53a 55d ix 65d 67b x [106 139] 68c d xiii [34 93] 72b d xvii [82-139] 79b d xix [97-126] 82c d xxi [34-72] 85b d xxiii [1-75] 88b 89a xxvii 94c 96a xxx-xxxi 99b 102b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 2-4b c PART IV 251b c 255b 258b 271a b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC V [9 22] 37a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 234b 520c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 173d 193a E

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or bk xi 341c 345c passim

5e The state of the damned Hell

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 32 2 / *Job* 26 6 / *Psalms* 9 16-17 116 3—(D) *Psalms* 9 17-18 114 3 / *Proverbs* 7 27 15 11 24 17-20 / *Ecclesiastes* 6 6 / *Isaiah* 5 14-15 14 4-23 6 10 33 10-14 66 24—(D) *Isaiah* 5 14-15 14 4-23 26 10 33 10-14 66 4 / *Ezekiel* 31 10-18—(D) *Ezekiel* 31 10-18

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 17—(D) OT *Judith* 16 20-21 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 4 16-5 14 esp 4 19—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 4 16-5 15 esp 4 19 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7 17 18 4 21 9-10—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 19 18 4 21 10 11 / *Baruch* 2 17—(D) OT *Baruch* 2 17

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 3 7 12 5 22 9 8 12 10 28 11 20-24 13 41 42 49-50 18 7 9 35 31-46 esp 25 41 25 46 / *Mark* 3 29 43-50—(D) *Mark* 3 29 9 42-49 / *Luke* 11 5 16 19-26 / *John* 15 6 / *I Thessalonians* 1 7-9 / *Hebrews* 10 26-31 / *Jude* 6-7 / *Revelation* passim esp 9 12 17 19-20—(D) *Apocalypse* passim esp 9 17 19-20

4 HOMER *Odyssey* bk xi 243a 249d esp [487-489] 247d [568-600] 248d 249a

■ ARISTOPHANES *Frogs* [143-159] 565d 566a

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 249c 250a / *Republic* bk x 437c 438c / *Laus* BK IX 757a BK X 767c 768c

12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK III [9, 8 1023] 42d 43b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [548-627] 225b 227b [735-747] 230b 231a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VI CH 33 341a d BK XIII CH 2 360b 361a CH 12 365d 366a CH 14-15 366b d BK XIII CH 23 BK XIV CH 372a 377a BK XIV CH 15 388d 390a BK XV CH 1 397b d 398c BK XIV CH 13 519a 520a CH 18 529d 530a c BK XV CH 15 543d 544b BK XVI 560a 586a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 10-21 629b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 3 REP 10 42c 43b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 69 885a 893c Q 70 A 3 897d 900d Q 86 992b 996a c Q 87 A 1 REP 4 997b 998c Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a QQ 97-99 1066a 1085a c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL 1a 52d esp iii [1-18] 4a b [82-129] 5a E VI [100-111] 9c VII [100-130] 10c d XI 15a 16b XIV [16-72] 19c 20b XXVII [55-136] 40a 41b XXVIII [139-142] 43a XXXIII [91-150] 50c 51a PARADISE VII [64-84] 115d 116a XV [10 12] 128c

22 CHAUCER *Friar's Tale* 278a 284a / *Summoner's Prologue* 284b 285a / *Pirons's Tale* par 10 499b 502a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 193d 195d PART IV 250c 251b 254a 255b 271a b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 119b 122a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 266c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT I SC IV [42 63] 115a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 418c 419a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 227a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 11 93a 134a esp BK I [44 270] 94b 99a BK II [521-628] 122b 125a BK VI [867-877] 215a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 62 194c d SECT 72 198a c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 188d 189a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 149c 150c passim 234a c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363a b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 347a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* or BK I 10c d BK V 127c d BK VI 169c 170b BK XI 341c 345c

5f The state of the blessed Heaven

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 16 esp 16 10 36 esp 36 8 9 37 84 149—(D) *Psalms* 15 esp 15 10 35 esp 35 7-10 36 83 149 / *Isaiah* 65 8 25—(D) *Isaiah* 65 8-25 / *Daniel* 7 18

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 15 3 1-9 13 15 4 7-5 5 5 15 16—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 15 3 1-9 13 15 4 7 5 5 16-17

NEW TESTAMENT *Mattheu* 5 1-12 19 20 6 19-21 33 7 21-23 13 43 19 21 25 31-46 esp 25 34 25 46 / *Luke* 16 19 26 / *John* 6 38 40 8 51 10 24-30 11 23 27 16 20 24 17 1 3

CROSS REFERENCES

- For Other discussions of man's attitude toward mutability and death see CHANGE 12b HAPPINESS 4b LIFE AND DEATH 8c TIME 7
- The basic terms and propositions involved in arguments for or against the immortality of the soul see BEING b(1)-7b(4) ETERNITY 4a FORM d 1a1 3a-3a() 3 MATTER d MIND 1b 2a d-ve SOUL 3a-3d 4b and for the contrast between souls and angels with respect to their mode of being see ANGEL 4 ETERNITY 4a FORM d MAN 3b SOUL 4d(2)
- Other discussions of immortality as a postulate of the practical reason see METAPHYSICS 2d NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4b
- Another statement of the doctrine of reincarnation or the transmigration of souls, see SOUL 4d(1)
- Articles of religious belief bearing on immortality such as predestination the Last Judgment and the resurrection of the body see GOD 7f-7h HAPPINESS 7c SOUL 4d(3)
- The role and of the doctrine of innate ideas in immortality see IDEAL 2b KNOWLEDGE 6c(3) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3a MIND 4d(2)
- The relevance to immortality of the theory of mind or intellect as an incorporeal power see MAN 3a() MATTER 4d MIND 2a SOUL 3b
- The state of the soul separated from the body see KNOWLEDGE 7c SOUL 4d
- The moral significance of immortality in relation to divine rewards and punishments see GOD 5i PUNISHMENT 5d.
- Other discussions of the underworld or of Hell Purgatory and Heaven see ETERNITY 4d HAPPINESS 7c-7c(3) PUNISHMENT 5c-5c(2) SIN 6d-6e.
- The immortality of enduring fame see HONOR 4d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I Works by authors represented in this collection.

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

I

- AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS *the Immortality of the Soul*
AQ 1. *Sententia Contra Gentes* B IV CH 9-92
— *Quaestiones Disputatae* D 42-43
DANTE ALIGHIERI *The Divine Comedy* 13
CH 9 (1-6)
F. B. CONYBEARE *Of Death and Immortality*
H. W. C. *Of the Immortality of the Soul*
— *Of Suicide*
J. S. MILL *Thesis* 1841 in *Three Essays on Religion*
R. LAMONT *Immortality*

II

- EPICURUS *Letter to Menoeceus*
CICERO *De Republica (The Republic)* VI
— *Trajectories*
— *De Senectute (Of Old Age)*

- OSTO *Metamorphoses*
SENeca *De Consolatione ad Marcum* (On Consolation to Marcia)
GR. GORTY *LYSSA, O the Soul and the Resurrection*
PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* PROPOSITIONS 1-103 208-210
SLADE, GAON *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* THE TISE VIII
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R. BACON *Opus Majus* PART VII
ALBO *The Book of Principles (Sefer ha-Ikharim)* BK IV CH 9-11
NICOLAS OF CUSA *Thesis on God*
P. M. 221 *On the Immortality of the Soul*
V. PERS. *The Resurrection*
L. V. *The Exequy*
BROWNE *H. H. and his*
H. MORE *The Immortality of the Soul*

(6 Doctrines of impersonal survival 6a Immortality through offspring the perpetuation of the species)

- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 364a 384b 390c 391c
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 29a b 72c 73a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 173 61a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 189b c PART I 212b c 246d 247a
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 340b 341a
 54 FREUD *Narcissism* 401b 406c / *General Introduction* 616a b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 653b ■ 655b 656a

6b Enduring fame survival in the memory

- OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 10-7 / *Ecclesiastes* 9 5
 APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 20-25—(D) OT *Judith* 16-24 31 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 4 1-6 8 9-13 —(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 4 1-6 8 9-13 / *Ecclesiasticus* 37 26 39 1-11 40 19 44 8 15 46 11-12—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 37-9 39 1-15 40 19 44 8-15 46 13-15 / I *Maccabees* 3 1-7—(D) OT I *Machabees* 3 1-7 / II *Maccabees* 6 21-31—(D) OT II *Machabees* 6 21-31
 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK IV [410-429] 61b c BK VII [309-328] 85b c BK XXII [299-305] 158b / *Odyssey* BK XXIV [191-202] 319a
 5 SOPHOCLES *Philoctetes* [1408-1444] 194d 195a c
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 1a b
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 398a c
 7 PLATO *Symposium* 165b 167a / *Lysis* BK IV 683b c
 8 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH II [1312 23 39] 514d
 12 LUCRETIIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [121 124] 2c
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 10 261d 262a BK IV SECT 19 265a SECT 33 266c d BK VI SECT 18 275d BK VII SECT 6 280b BK VIII SECT 44 289a BK IX SECT 30 294b c

- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [453 463] 115b [606-610] 119b BK IV [3 1 3-2] 175b
 14 PLUTARCH *Perciles* 125b
 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK I 195a b
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL IV SC 7a XVI [1-90] 22c 23b PURGATORY XI [73 117] 69c 70a PARADISE IX [37-63] 119a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 77a b
 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 81a d
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 112d 113a 267a-c 301b c 304d 306a
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Sonnets* LV 594c d LXV 596a b LXXVI 598c d
 28 HARRY *Circulation of the Blood* 312c d
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 226d 228d
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 27a 28c 29a b 36a c 72c 73a
 32 MILTON *On Shakespeare* 1630 16a
 33 PASCAL *Pen der* 148 201a
 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 535a 536a
 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 273b 274d
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 94a b 219d
 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 494b d-496a
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 428b-429a
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 57d 58a 163d [fn 4]
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 348 111d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153b c PART I 212b c 254d 255d PART II 262c 263a 274a 275a 278d 279a 281d 282d
 47 GOETHE *Faust* PRELUDE [59-74] 2b-3a PART II [9981-9982] 243a

6c Participation in the eternity of truth ideas or love

- 17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 34 36 338b 339d
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 21 32 458a 463d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 168c esp 156d 157b 168b c 190a b 203c 206a c

Chapter 39 INDUCTION

INTRODUCTION

AS the list of Additional Readings indicates, the theory of induction falls within the province of logic and is part of the logician's concern with the methods of inference or reasoning employed in the sciences. The great controversies about induction seem to be of relatively recent origin in the history of logic, beginning perhaps with the argument between William Whewell and J. S. Mill over the contributions of reason and experience to the inductive process. Later in the nineteenth century and in our own time writers like Johnson and Keynes, Russell and Nicod who present different formulations of inductive inference, call attention to the unsolved problems with which any theory is left. They and those the assumptions that seem to be unavoidable in an statement of the formal conditions which validate the so-called inductive leap—the jump from observed particulars to general truths, truths having a wider generality than the particular instances from which they are drawn or on which they are based.

The problem of induction, in anyone's version of it, is the problem of generalization. This may involve philosophical questions about how the mind generalizes from experience. But however they are answered, the basic logical questions remain substantially unaltered. By what criteria is a law distinguished from fallacious induction? Can induction be secured from error by rules of self-correction? Is induction indispensable in the development of scientific knowledge, or is there, as Whewell, for example, suggests, a sharp distinction between the inductive and the deductive sciences?

What is the relation of induction to deduction? Is it the relation of a method of discovery to a method of demonstration or proof? Is it a relation between two modes of reasoning, both of which can be formulated as processes of

proof? Is there both an inductive and a deductive type of syllogism, or is induction the very opposite of all forms of reasoning and proof?

It is with these last questions that the discussion of induction begins in the great books, especially in Aristotle's *Organon* and Bacon's *Novum Organum*, but also in the writings of Descartes and Locke and in observations on scientific method by Newton, Harvey, and Pascal. Though many of the controversies and problems which become central in the nineteenth century do not appear explicitly in the earlier tradition, they are anticipated by the fundamental distinctions and issues which can be found in the earlier writers.

Bacon's dissatisfaction with Aristotle for example, leads him to formulate specific rules for induction. Gougeon, further in the same general direction, Mill later develops his elaborate theory of inductive inference. We move in the opposite direction if we are guided by Aristotle's distinction between scientific and dialectical induction and by his way of setting induction off as the very opposite of reasoning. The question then arises whether Bacon and Mill are treating induction in all or in only one of several quite distinct senses.

As the chapter on Logic indicates, the names of Aristotle and Bacon are sometimes used as the symbols of opposed tendencies in logic. The one is supposed to represent an almost exclusive emphasis on deduction, the other the primacy and importance of induction. An opposition between Aristotle and Bacon is also implied in the current use of such phrases as "inductive logic and deductive logic." These phrases are sometimes used to suggest that the inductive or the deductive process can be favored to the exclusion, or at least the subordination, of the other. Such understanding, of

LEIBNITZ *Discourse on Metaphysics* XXXII-XXXVI

— *Monadology* pp 19-28

J BUTLER *The Analogy of Religion* PART I CH I
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the Gospel* CH I

SWEDENBORG *Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell*

VOLTAIRE *Heaven Hell Hell (Descent into)
Purgatory Resurrection in A Philosophical
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MENDELSSOHN *Phädon oder Ueber die Unsterblichkeit
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LESSING *How the Ancients Represented Death*

WORDSWORTH *Intimations of Immortality*

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Good* PART III (16)

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individuellen Fortdauer*

J H NEWMAN *The Immortality of the Soul in
Parochial and Plain Sermons*

KIERKEGAARD *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*
pp 152-158

SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea* VOL
III SUP CH 41

— *Immortality A Dialogue in Studies in Pes
simitism*

FECHNER *Life After Death*

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SANTAYANA *Reason in Religion* CH 13-14

HÜGEL *Eternal Life*

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FARNELL *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*

MCTAGGART *The Nature of Existence* CH 43 62

SCHILLER *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*

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PART IV BK I CH 5-6 PART V CH 16 PART VII
CH 10-II

— *Man God and Immortality* PART IV

J S HALDANE *The Sciences and Philosophy* LECT
XXIII

WHITEHEAD *Process and Reality* PART V

KIER *The Vision of God*

HOCKING *Thoughts on Death and Life*

A E TAYLOR *The Christian Hope of Immor-
tality*

PERRY *The Hope for Immortality*

Induction and intuition are however not identical for Aristotle. In one passage in the *Posterior Analytics* he considers syllogistic induction, which can hardly be called "intuitive." And in the *Ethics* where he discusses intuitive reason, he distinguishes between two sorts of primary truth that can be known by intuition.

"Intuitive reason," he writes, "is concerned with the ultimates in both directions: for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument; and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasoning grasps the last and variable facts, as the minor premise. For these variable facts are the starting-point for the apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason."

This applies to theoretic as well as practical knowledge. By intuitive reason, it seems, we grasp both the universal principles or axioms and the particular facts of sense-perception. As perception is intuition on the part of the sensitive faculty, so induction is an intuitive use of the intellect (though Aristotle attributes both to intuitive reason).

These two forms of intuition are functionally related. The induction of universal truths from particulars is impossible without sense-perception, for it is sense-perception alone which is able to grasp the particulars. But, according to Aristotle, a single isolated perception does not give rise to an intuitive induction. Repeated perceptions of things of a certain sort—particulars of a certain class—are formed by memory into what he calls "an experience." Because the experience refers not to a single individual, but to a class of similar individuals, it provides the material for the mind's intuitive act of induction.

This theory of the role of experience in induction is more fully discussed in the chapter on Experience. For our present purposes, the main point is that the universal, lying implicitly in the experience, is ready as it were to be extracted therefrom and made explicit. "Though the act of sense-perception is of the particular in content is universal," Aristotle writes. With

the help of memory and experience induction makes the latent universal manifest.

Bacon's criticism of the logic of Aristotle seems to rest on two counts: first he complains of Aristotle's over-emphasis on syllogisms, whether they are used dialectically or demonstratively; and second he charges Aristotle with a superficial understanding of induction. One of the chief efforts of the *Novum Organum* is to correct the latter mistake.

"There are and can exist," says Bacon, "but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles, and from their supposed indisputable truth, deduces the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, until it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way."

Where Aristotle proposes that only the primary truths or first principles be established by induction, while all the others (which Bacon calls "intermediate axioms") are to be derived from them by demonstration, Bacon urges a method of induction which shall mount gradually from the least general to the most universal propositions. We should not "suffer the mind to stand to jump and fly from particulars to remote and most general axioms." We should "proceed by a true scale and successive steps, without interruption or breach, from particulars to the lesser axioms, thence to the intermediate (namely, one above the other) and lastly to the most general."

According to this theory, induction can intuitively draw more general from less general truths, as well as the least general truths from the particulars of perception. It might seem at first as if there were no place for deduction in the development of science. But Bacon divides the study of nature into two phases: "the first regards the eliciting or creating of axioms from experiments, the second the deducing, or deriving of new experiments from axioms. Here too there seems to be a crucial difference between Bacon and Aristotle. This difference is indicated by Bacon's emphasis upon experiments both as

the matter usually includes the popular notion that induction is always reasoning from particulars to universals and deduction always reasoning from universals to particulars.

But none of these things seems to be true or at least not without serious qualification. Neither Aristotle nor Bacon emphasizes deduction or induction to the exclusion of the other. On the contrary both appear to insist on the absolute priority of induction since according to them it provides deductive reasoning with its ultimate premises. Far from conflicting induction and deduction complement each other.

The consistency of the results of both these processes. Mill writes, each corroborating and verifying the other is requisite to give to any general proposition the kind and degree of evidence which constitutes scientific proof.

Until principles are established the deduction of their implications or consequences can not begin. Unless principles once they are obtained are then used in the proof of other truth, or are otherwise rationally employed the purpose of inductive generalization is not fully realized. In this understanding of the relationship between induction and reasoning Aristotle and Bacon do not seem to disagree nor does either of them conceive induction as a process of reasoning from particulars to universals.

There is no question that the direction of induction is from particulars but in the precise sense in which induction precedes deduction—the sense in which both Bacon and Aristotle regard it as the source of axioms—they do not think it is a process of reasoning or a form of proof. As for deduction it is questionable at least for Aristotle whether its direction can be described as from the universal to the particular.

Aristotle seldom uses the word deduction as the name for that phase of thought which is complementary to induction. He speaks rather of demonstration. Demonstration takes place through the various forms of reasoning which he calls syllogisms. As the chapter on REASONING explains these are collections of premises each of which yields a conclusion by valid inference. In the most perfect forms of reasoning the conclusion is as universal as its premises and though there are syllogisms in which a par-

ticular proposition can be demonstrated from a universal and a particular premise it is seldom the case that from exclusively universal premises a particular conclusion can be validly drawn. The statement that deduction is reasoning from universals to particulars certainly does not seem to fit Aristotle's theory of the syllogism and even less his conception of scientific demonstration the aim of which is to prove universal not particular propositions.

WE LEARN EITHER by induction or by demonstration. Aristotle writes in the *Prior Analytics*.

Demonstration develops from universals in deduction from particulars. In the *Posterior Analytics* he says that the ultimate premises of demonstration must be primary or basic truths. A basic truth is an immediate proposition—what is sometimes called a first principle or an axiom. Since in his view an immediate proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it the basic premises cannot be demonstrated.

Whence come these primary premises which are indispensable to demonstration but which demonstration cannot establish? Aristotle's answer is that we know the primary premises by induction. In another place he says, it is by intuition that we obtain the primary premises.

The word intuition indicates an essential characteristic of the sort of induction which because it is not itself a form of reasoning can be prior to all reasoning and must be in order to supply the premises from which reasoning proceeds. Reasoning is discursive. It is a process involving steps. One proposition is drawn from another by the mediation of a third. Intuition in contrast is immediate. Like an act of seeing it apprehends its object at once and directly. When Aristotle speaks of induction as a kind of intuition he implies therefore that it consists in the immediate grasp of a universal truth. The proposition thus held he calls immediate precisely because it can be known intuitively and in no other way. Intuitive induction as opposed to what may be called inductive reasoning consists in seeing the universal in the particular. When what is seen is expressed in the form of a proposition the universal implicit in the known particulars is made explicit.

our inferences from experience are frequently fallacious." Descartes writes, deduction or the purification of one thing from another cannot be erroneous when performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational."

Nevertheless, Descartes does not exclude induction as the source of the axioms of mathematics or for that matter of metaphysics. He only excludes the kind of induction which depends upon experiments. Such axioms as *when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal* or *the whole is greater than any of its parts* are products of induction, as may be seen he points out, from the fact that a child can be taught these general truths only by showing him examples in particular cases." Similarly the metaphysical truth in the proposition *I think, therefore I exist* cannot be learned by deduction or syllogistic reasoning. The axiom that *I think, I exist* has to be learned by induction from the experience of the individual—that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars."

FROM THE FOREGOING we can gather that different theories of induction may be in large part theories about different kinds of induction. Common to induction of every sort is the motion of the mind from particulars, apprehended by sense to general propositions or universal notions. But the character of the induction, or its conditions and method may differ according to the precise character of its source (1) whether it arises from ordinary sense-experience or from planned experiments and (2) whether it is based upon a single experiment or upon an enumeration of instances. There remains the most radical distinction in type of induction (3) whether it is intuitive or discursive—a conclusion reached by an act of immediate insight or by a process of reasoning from premises to conclusion.

These three divisions cross one another to some extent. Descartes, for example, seems to regard the complete enumeration of a series of connected facts as a way of drawing a general conclusion about their connection. That he has inductive reasoning rather than intuitive induction in mind, we learn from his statement

that by adequate enumeration or induction is meant that method by which we attain surer conclusions than by any other type of proof with the exception of simple intuition."

Pascal seems to be making the same point when he says that in all matters whose proof is by experiment and not by demonstration no universal assertion can be made except by the general enumeration of all the parts and all the different cases." Bacon on the other hand, always thinks of induction as intuitive generalization and therefore maintains that "induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is perilous leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance."

The elaborate procedure which Bacon proposes for collating instances stresses, not completeness of enumeration but an examination of their relation to one another and in the light thereof an interpretation of their significance. Mill's four or five methods of induction bear a close resemblance to Bacon's more numerous tables of instances but Mill's methods are attempts to formulate the rules of inference for inductive reasoning whereas Bacon's rules are rules, not of reasoning but of tabulating the particulars from which intuitive generalizations can be formed.

On Mill's view of induction, it may be questioned whether induction from an exhaustive enumeration is induction at all for it seems to result in a summary of the facts enumerated rather than a generalization from particulars. Where there is no inductive leap there is no induction. Where the inductive leap does occur however it seems easier to understand it as an intuitive act—a seeing of the universal in the particular—rather than as a process of reasoning. Each of Mill's methods requires a rule of inference which is itself a universal proposition. His critics have asked: Whence come these universal propositions about the relations of cause and effect or about the order and uniformity of nature? They point out that he cannot answer that these propositions are themselves conclusions of inductive reasoning without begging the question.

SUCH CRITICISM of inductive reasoning does not seem to apply to this title's conception of

the source of inductive generalization and also as that which is ultimately derived by deduction from axioms

The difference between *experience* (which Aristotle makes the source of induction) and *experiment* is more than verbal. The axioms now in use, Bacon contends, are derived from a scanty handful as it were of experience and a few particulars of frequent occurrence. There has been too little attention given to negative instances—that is, of cases which seem to run counter to the generalization being formed. In establishing any true axiom, Bacon insists, the negative instance is the most powerful.

The chapter on *EXPERIENCE* dwells on the difference between ordinary experience and planned experiments. Where Aristotle seems to be satisfied with the ordinary experience which arises from the perceptions of men in the course of daily life, Bacon thinks it does not suffice. Because it is haphazard, it fails to collect the variety of instances, both positive and negative, upon which genuine and solid inductions can be founded. Unusual and special experiences must be sought out, and the effort must be made to invent experiences which do not arise spontaneously. For this experiment—or the production of experiences—is necessary, Bacon thinks we must, by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true axioms.

TWO CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW from the several differences we have noted between Aristotle's and Bacon's theories of induction.

In the first place, Aristotle does not seem to think that induction can be methodically prescribed by logical rules. It is a natural act of intelligence to draw universals from experience. Though men may differ in the readiness of their native wit, the induction of the primary truths, which are the axioms or first principles of science, does not require special genius, nor can it be improved or rendered more certain by following rules. Precisely because it is intuitive rather than discursive, induction, unlike reasoning, cannot be regulated by rules of inference such as those which govern the syllogism.

Without disagreeing that it is intuitive rather than argumentative, Bacon seems to think

that induction requires the practice of the most detailed and precise method. Not only must the various ascending stages of induction be regulated by observance of an order of generality, but the making of experiments and the collection and arrangement of particulars, forming tables and coordinations of instances, must be governed by a complex set of rules. The twenty-seven tables of instances set forth in the second book of the *Novum Organum* constitute the heart of Bacon's method of induction. This new method of discovering the sciences, he observes, levels men's wits and leaves but little of their superiority, since it achieves everything by the most certain rules.

In the second place, since genuine induction depends for Bacon upon ample experiments, it belongs primarily to the method of the experimental sciences—the physical or natural sciences in which experimentation is possible. Though the first principles or axioms of arithmetic and geometry may be learned by induction, the method of gradual ascent from experiments through intermediate generalizations does not apply to mathematics. Here we may have the beginning of the notion that only the experimental sciences are primarily inductive, whereas other sciences, like mathematics, are primarily deductive.

But such a division of the sciences does not accord with Aristotle's theory of induction. He thinks mathematics and metaphysics require induction for their foundation no less than physics and in no different way. If any thing, induction is of the greatest importance for metaphysics, because all its principles are indemonstrable, whereas some of the principles needed in mathematics and physics can be demonstrated in metaphysics. Yet no science is peculiarly inductive, just as none stands in a special relation to experience. All depend equally upon experience for the induction of the primary truths on which their demonstrations rest.

Descartes seems to fall somewhere between Aristotle and Bacon. He regards arithmetic and geometry as more certain than the physical sciences, because mathematics is largely developed by deduction, whereas the study of nature depends upon induction from experiments. In this lies the superiority of mathematics. While

our inferences from experience are frequently fallacious, Descartes writes, deduct on or the purification of one thing, from another can not be erroneous when performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational.

Nevertheless, Descartes does not exclude induction as the source of the axioms of mathematics or for that matter of metaphysics: he only excludes the kind of induction which depends upon experiments. Such axioms as *when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal* or *the whole is greater than any of its parts* are products of induction, as may be seen: he points out, from the fact that a child can be taught these general truths only by showing him examples in particular cases. Similarly the metaphysical truth in the proposition *I think, therefore I am* cannot be learned by deduction or syllogistic reasoning. The axiom that *to think is to exist* has to be learned by induction from the experience of the individual—that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars.

FROM THE FOREGOING we can gather that different theories of induction may be in large part, theories about different kinds of induction. Common to induction of every sort is the motion of the mind from particulars apprehended by sense to general propositions or universal notions. But the character of the induction, or its conditions and method may differ according to the precise character of its source: (1) whether it arises from ordinary sense-experience or from planned experiments; and (2) whether it is based upon a single experiment or upon an enumeration of instances. There remains the most radical distinction in type of induction: (3) whether it is intuitive or discursive—accomplished by an act of immediate intuition or by a process of reasoning from premises to a conclusion.

These three divisions cross one another to some extent. Descartes for example seems to regard the complete enumeration of a series of connected facts as a way of drawing a general conclusion about their connection. That he has inductive reasoning rather than intuitive induction in mind we learn from his statement

that by adequate enumeration or induction is meant that method by which we attain surer conclusions than by any other type of proof with the exception of simple intuition.

Pascal seems to be making the same point when he says that in all matters whose proof is by experiment and not by demonstration, no universal assertion can be made except by the general enumeration of all the parts and all the different cases. Bacon, on the other hand always thinks of induction as intuitive generalization and therefore maintains that induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is powerless leads to uncertain conclusions and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance.

The elaborate procedure which Bacon proposes for collating instances stresses, not completeness of enumeration but an examination of their relation to one another and in the light thereof an interpretation of their significance. Mill's four or five methods of induction bear a close resemblance to Bacon's more numerous tables of instances but Mill's methods are attempts to formulate the rules of inference for inductive reasoning whereas Bacon's rules are rules not of reasoning but of tabulating the particulars from which intuitive generalizations can be formed.

On Mill's view of induction it may be questioned whether induction from an exhaustive enumeration is induction at all for it seems to result in a summary of the facts enumerated rather than a generalization from particulars. Where there is no inductive leap there is no induction. Where the inductive leap does occur however it seems easier to understand it as an intuitive act—a seeing of the universal in the particular—rather than as a process of reasoning. Each of Mill's methods requires a rule of inference which is itself a universal proposition. His critics have asked: Whence come these universal propositions about the relations of cause and effect or about the order and uniformity of nature? They point out that he cannot answer that these propositions are themselves conclusions of inductive reasoning without begging the question.

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SUCH CRITICISMS of inductive reasoning does not seem to apply to Aristotle's conception of

it for with him it is not as with Mill distinct in form from the syllogism. It is simply a distinct type of syllogism which consists in reasoning from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect. Nor does the observation that an inductive inference cannot be more than probable apply to what Aristotle means by an inductive syllogism.

The certainty or probability of non syllogistic induction depends on the source of the inference—whether it derives from a single specially constructed experiment or from an enumeration of particular instances with or without a statistical calculation based on their frequency. The conception of a perfect experiment implies that the operation of a universal law can be exhibited in a single case. It is almost as if the controlling aim of the experiment were to make the universal manifest in the particular.

Newton's experiments on reflection and refraction seem to be of this sort. From them certain laws of optics are directly induced even as according to Aristotle and Descartes the axioms of mathematics or metaphysics can be directly induced from simple experiences available to a child or familiar to all men. Yet Newton does not think that the inductive establishment of such laws is as certain as demonstration.

The analytic method he writes consists in making experiments and observations and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction. And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of and may be looked upon as so much stronger by how much the induction is more general. If no exception occur from phenomena the conclusion may be pronounced generally but if at any time afterwards any exception shall occur from experiments it may then begin to be pronounced with such exceptions as occur.

Because it must depend on inductive generalizations from experience which in his view can never be certain Locke doubts that physics can ever become a science. I deny not he writes that a man accustomed to rational and regular experiments shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies and guess righter at their yet unknown properties than one that is a

stranger to them but yet as I have said this is but judgment and opinion not knowledge and certainty. This way of getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience and history which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity can attain to makes me suspect Locke concludes that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science.

Hume offers two reasons for the inconclusiveness and uncertainty which he thinks qualify all our generalizations or inductions from experience. The first calls attention to the fact that unlike mathematical reasoning inferences from experience in the realm of physical matters depend on the number of cases observed.

The conclusions which [reason] draws from considering one circle he says are the same it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man having seen only one body move after being impelled by another could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse.

The principle which determines him to form such a conclusion is according to Hume

Custom or Habit and precisely because inductive generalization is an effect of custom rather than of reasoning in the strict sense the strength of the induction—or the force of custom—varies with the number of cases from which it arises. After the constant conjunction of two objects—heat and flame for instance weight and solidity—we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis Hume maintains seems the only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand instances an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance that is in no respect different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation.

Since all the relevant cases can never be exhaustively observed the inference from a customary conjunction must always remain uncertain no matter how high a probability it derives from the multiplication of like instances. To this first point concerning the dependence of the probability of generalizations from experience upon the frequency of the observed instances Hume adds a second point about the similarity of the cases under obser-

vation. Analogy, he says, leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar the analogy is perfect and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity the analogy is less perfect and the inference is less conclusive though still it has some force in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance. The absence of perfect similarity is the second reason for the inconclusiveness or uncertainty of inductive generalizations.

The contrary supposition—that one case can be perfectly representative of an infinite number of similar cases—may explain why Aristotle seems to think that induction is able to produce the primary truths or principles of science with a certitude which gives certainty to all the demonstrations founded on these axioms. Another explanation of Aristotle's view may be found in his distinction between scientific and dialectical induction. He regards the former as based on the kind of common experience which unlike even the best experiment admits of no exception. In contrast dialectical induction or the still weaker form of induction which he calls rhetorical is based on an enumeration of cases (which may not be complete) or a single example (which provides no safeguard against possible exceptions).

In its dialectical form the inductive argument proceeds from a number of particulars

taken for granted. Aristotle offers this example of dialectical induction. Supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective and likewise the skilled charioteer then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. In its rhetorical form no more than a single example may be used when the orator generalizes that honesty is the best policy from the story of a particular individual who was finally rewarded for his virtue.

In both forms, the inductive generalization is at best probable and it is more or less probable according to the soundness of the suppositions or the examples from which it originates—to be tested only by extending the enumeration of particulars. But if an induction is merely probable in the first place it can only be made more probable; it can never be made certain by multiplying cases or by increasing their variety.

Aristotle's theory of dialectical induction thus seems to have a bearing on the probability of induction from limited experiments (or from a single experiment whose perfection is not assured) and of induction from the frequency or variety of observed instances. The other point to be noted is that Bacon's basic rule of gradual ascent from particular cases through less general to more general propositions seems to be relevant to dialectical induction, but not on Aristotle's view to that kind of induction which produces the axioms or principles of science.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

- 1 The theory of induction: generalization from particulars
 - 1a Induction and intuition: their relation to reasoning or demonstration
 - 1b Inductive reasoning: the issue concerning inductive and deductive proof
- 2 The conditions or sources of induction: memory, experience, experiment
- 3 The products of induction: definitions, axioms, principles, laws
- 4 The use of induction in argument
 - 4a Dialectical induction: securing assumptions for disputation
 - 4b Rhetorical induction: inference from example in the process of persuasion
- 5 The role of induction in the development of science: the methods of experimental and enumerative induction

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-83] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [65-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45-(D) II *Esdra*s 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The theory of induction generalization from particulars

1a Induction and intuition their relation to reasoning or demonstration

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [72^b18-4] 99b ■ CH 23 [84^b31-85 1] 115d 116a CH 31 [87^b39-88 17] 120a c CH 33 [88^b30-89 1] 121b ■ BK II CH 2 [90 24-30] 123b c CH 19 136a 137a c / *Topics* BK I CH 12 148d BK VIII CH 1 [155^b35 156 7] 211d 212a [156^b10-18] 212c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992^b24-993 1] 511a b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1098 34-33] 343d BK VI CH 3 388b ■ CH 6 389d CH 8 [1142 23-31] 391b c CH 11 392c 393b esp [1143 32-36] 392d 393a / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 20 [1393 25-6] 641a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 333d 334d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d 44c 59c 61d 96d 97a / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK I APH 11-26 107d 108d APH 69 116a b APH 105 128b c BK II APH 1 10 137a 140d APH 15-16 149a b APH 20-22 150d 153c APH 52 194c 195d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 3b 5a esp 4a b VII 10c 12a IX 14d 15d XI 17b d / *Objections and Replies* 123a b 167c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 1-5 171a 173a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 2 451b ■ DIV 9 454c 455a SECT IV DIV 26 460b c

1b Inductive reasoning the issue concerning inductive and deductive proof

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 3 90a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [71 11] 97a CH 3 [72^b25-33] 99c CH 18 111b ■ BK II CH 7 [92 34^b1] 126b / *Topics* BK I CH 18 [108^b7 12] 152d / *Physics* BK VIII CH 1 [252 23 25] 336a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095 30-38] 340c CH 7 [1098 35-33] 343d BK VI CH 3 388b ■ / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [135^b5 18] 596a b

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 252a b

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 280c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42a c 57b 58b 61d 96d 97a / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK I APH 11 26 107d 108d APH 69 116a b APH 103 106 127d 128c BK II APH 10-52 140c 195d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a VII 10c 12a XI 17b 18b XII 24a b / *Discourse* PART VI 61d 62c / *Objections and Replies* 167c d

2 p 4x

- 31 NEWTON *Principles* BK 11 HLLH IV 271b /
 Q-act BK 11 313a b
 35 LOCKE *II* PLAT L *Servants* p BK IV C XII
 SECT IV 361b c
 35 HUME *Human* *Endeavour* d g SECT IV DIV
 264-266 SECT IV DIV 82 487b c SECT XI
 DIV 131 132 508d 509d *passim*
 42 HUNT *Princ* R. 200 43b-46a
 43 MILL *Li* *human* *nm* 445a-447b *passim*
 475b, d (f 1) *passim*
 45 F RADLEY *Researches in Electricity* 659a
 51 TOLSTOY *War* o d *Peace* 281b, c, 281 690b
 53 JAMES *Psychol* gy 674 & 5b esp 675b

2. The conditions or sources of information.
memory experiments experiment

- [illegible]

- 4 h r Fine Kerosene 5a 13d 45b 4m 66d 23c
 1 f Jumper 562d 53b
 45 F n r ke 260000 450000 450000
 45 Hs 11 Ph 2 phy f Hs 000 r ar iv
 361a b
 54 1st 0 1st 0 412a

3 The products of induction definition as
10m principles laws

- 8 A TITTLE Prior & Hay BK I CH 2390c
/ Pomeroy & H S BK I CH 31 2 25 7190c
C 123 111bc CH 31 74-79 31 1 1270ac BK
H C 1 2 {20 24 3} 123bc C 1 {32 34 6}
126b CH 10130a 127ac / T f BK I CH 10
146d CH 15 { 5- 12} 152d BK VI : CH 1
{155 15 156-1} 211d 212a {15 10 15} 212 d
/ Generators and Corruption BK I CH 2 {117
3 4} 412e
- 9 A TITTLE Flax BK I CH 4 {1005 3-48]
310c CH - [1005 34 9] 243d B VI N 3
{ 17725 51} 38a C 6399d 112 {1145+25
13} 392d-393a
- 10 A TITTLE Summa Thro'pus p st i Q m
II ANS 425e-42 b
- 28 CIL at Load or in lac
28 CILIN Two Year Summ THO D D V
700 b 207d 208a
- 29 JI v IV On 1 real Genr nre 333d 333a
CH 236c d
- 30 FI CH Surancement flarning 34b 57b d
96d 97a / Yarnes Ozer n BK I APN 1 25
208a-d E 1 103 106 127d 128c BK I H
1 10 127 140d
- 31 Disc uses Objections and hant's 123a b
II c-d
- 34 NEWTON Proct let BK III BLR III IV 270b
2 lb / O.ers BK III 543 b
- 35 LOCKE Human Understanding g BK I CH III
sect 25 120c-d
- 35 RIBLEY Hum t ha ledy sect 107
433d-434
- 35 HUMPHREY Human Understanding sect : DIV 2
451bc DIV 9 454c-455a sect IV DIV 26
460b e
- 42 HA T Pure Reason Sa 13d 66d 93c 110a
- 43 WILL LINGEN on 475b d {in 1}
- 46 HEZEL Philosophy f History p r i
361a b
- 51 TOLSTOY War and P ce 239a-241 690b
54 Field 1 sect 41 a b

4 The use of induction in argument

- 4c D lectal induction secur k assumpt
ions for d p tation
- 8 A tottal Topics wk 1 12 148d ch 13
[108^h 12] 132d wk 11 ch 1 [155^h 16 157^h]
211b-212 [156^h 10 19] 212c d w 2 [157^h 19-
213^h 213b d c 8 [160^h 35^h 1] 217d ch 14 [164
12 17] 222d
- 9 A tottal Rector wk 1 ch 2 [1356 36-26]
596a b

(4) *The use of induction in argument*

4b Rhetorical induction inference from example in the process of persuasion

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 24 90c 91a / *Topics* BK VIII CH I [156^b10-18] 212c d CH 8 [160 35-^b1] 217d / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [995 6-8] 513c

II ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356 36-1358 3] 596a 597d CH 9 [1368 29-31] 611b c BK II CH 20 640d 641d CH 23 [1398 32-^b18] 646d 647a CH 25 [1403 5-9] 652d BK III CH 17 [1417^b35-1418 3] 672b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 58c 59a

42 KANT *Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376c d

5 The role of induction in the development of science the methods of experimental and enumerative induction

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 23 90a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [72^b25-33] 99c CH 18 111b c BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185 13-14] 259d BK V CH I [224^b8-30] 304d BK VIII CH I [252 23-^b5] 336a b / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 5-14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992^b30-993 1] 511b BK VI CH I [1025^b 1 16] 547b BK XI CH 7 [1064 4-9] 592b BK XIII CH 4 [1078^b28-30] 610b

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK V CH 8 [788^b10-21] 330c / *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095 30-^b8] 340c CH 7 [1098 34-^b3] 343d BK VI CH 3 388b-c

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 1-2 199a 200a esp 199c d

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* PREF 1a c

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 200a b 207d 208a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 280c 285c-d / *Circulation of the Blood* 324c d / *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 334c d 383d 473a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a 34b 42a-c 56b 58c 96d 97a / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK I APH II 26 107d 108d APH 69 116a b APH 104-106 128a-c BK II APH I-10 137a 140d APH 15 16 149a b APH 20 21 150d 153b APH 52 194c 195d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a VII 10b 12a / *Discourse* PART VI 61d 62c / *Objections and Replies* 167c d

33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a b / *Arithmetical Triangle* 451b 452a 458b 459b 464a-466a

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE III IV 270b 271b GENERAL SCHOL. 371b 372a / *Optics* BK III 543a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 107 433d-434a

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CROSS REFERENCES

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Discussions dealing with the sources or conditions of induction generalization or abstraction see EXPERIENCE 2b IDEA 2g MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3c 6c(1) SENSE 5b UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c

Induction as the source of principles axioms or scientific laws see PRINCIPLE 3b SCIENCE 4d UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4f

Other treatments of dialectical and rhetorical induction see DIALECTIC 2b 3b RHETORIC 4c(1) and for their contrast with dialectical and rhetorical reasoning see DIALECTIC 3c REASONING 5c-5d RHETORIC 4c(2)

The role of induction in the experimental sciences see EXPERIENCE 5a REASONING 6c SCIENCE 4d 5d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups.

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the work, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

- I
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- *Philosophy of Science: Its Scope and Limits*
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Chapter 40 INFINITY

INTRODUCTION

ONE of the persistent questions concerning infinity is whether we can know or comprehend it. Another is whether the infinite exists and if so to what kind of thing infinity belongs. It is not surprising therefore that the discussion of infinity often borders on the unintelligible.

The idea of infinity like the idea of eternity lacks the support of the imagination or of sense experience. The fact that the infinite cannot be perceived or imagined seems sufficient to lead Hobbes and Berkeley to deny its reality. What soever we imagine is *finite* writes Hobbes.

Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite*. When we say any thing is infinite we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named having no conception of the thing but of our own inability.

On similar grounds Berkeley rejects the possibility of infinite division. If I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any infinite extension he writes it is certain that they are not contained in it but it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line surface or solid which I either perceive by sense or figure to myself in my mind wherefore I conclude that they are not contained in it.

But for most of the great writers on the subject the impossibility of representing infinity and eternity to the imagination does not render them inconceivable or meaningless. Yet it does account for the difficulty of grasping their meaning a difficulty further increased by the fact that whatever their meaning *infinity* and *eternity* are indefinable. To define the infinite would be to limit—even in thought—the unlimited.

The notion of infinity involves greater perplexities than that of eternity. The meaning of

eternity is weighted with the mystery of God the world and time. All these affect the conception of infinity but for the infinite there are also the mysteries of number and of space of matter and motion. In the sphere of quantity or of things subject to quantity *infinity* is itself the source of mystery or at least the root of difficulty in analysis. It is the central term in the discussion of the continuous and the indivisible the nature of series and of limits.

As indicated in the chapter on ETERNITY that idea in each of its applications seems to have one or the other of two meanings—(1) the meaning in which it signifies infinite time time without beginning or end and (2) the meaning in which it signifies the timelessness or immutability of being. Both meanings are negative so far as our understanding is concerned. Yet what is signified by the second is in itself something positive at least in the opinion of those who think that to be exempt from change entails having every perfection or being lacking in nothing.

This split in meaning also occurs in the idea of infinity. As applied to being the term *finite* signifies something positive even though our understanding of what is signified remains negative or at best analogical. An infinite being is one which lacks no attribute that can belong to a being. This is the positive condition of absolute perfection. The infinite here still means the unlimited but that which is unlimited in being has no defect. To lack deficiencies is to be perfect.

It is in this sense that Spinoza defines God as Being absolutely infinite that is to say substance consisting of infinite attributes each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. Like Spinoza Aquinas maintains that besides God nothing can be infinite. But he

distinguishes the absolute or positive sense in which God alone is infinite from the sense of the word in which it can be said that things other than God can be relatively infinite but not absolutely infinite. This other meaning according to Aquinas, is not only relative but negative for it connotes "something imperfect." It signifies indeterminacy or lack of perfection in being.

What Aquinas calls the relative or potential infinite he attributes to matter and to quantities—to bodies to the magnitudes of space and time and to number. This sense of infinite corresponds to that meaning of "eternal," according to which time consists of an endless series of moments, each having a predecessor each a successor no matter how far one counts them back into the past or ahead into the future.

But in the field of quantities other than time the meanings of infinite and eternal part company. There is, of course, some parallelism between infinite space and infinite time insofar as an infinite extension is one which does not begin at any point or end at any but the consideration of space and number leads in an aspect of infinity which has no parallel in the consideration of eternity.

In sizes or numbers, Pascal writes, "nature has set before man two marvellous infinities. For from the fact that they can always be increased it follows absolutely that they can always be decreased. If we can multiply a number up to 100,000 times, say we can also take a hundred thousandth part of it by dividing it by the same number we multiply it with and thus every term of increase will become a term of division by changing the integer into a fraction. So that infinite increase includes necessarily infinite division. As endless addition produces the infinitely large so endless division produces the infinitesimal or the infinitely small.

A trillion trillion is a finite number because the addition of a single unit creates a larger number. The fact that the addition of another unit produces a different number indicates that a trillion trillion has a determinate size which is the same as saying that it is a finite number. An infinite number cannot be increased by addition for it is constituted—in thought at

least—as a number larger than the sum of any two finite numbers which is another way of saying that it is approached by carrying on the process of addition endlessly. The size of an infinite number is therefore indeterminate.

What Galileo points out about two finite quantities seems to hold for an infinite and a finite quantity. He asks us to consider the totality of all integers (which is infinite) and the totality of their squares (which is also infinite). On the one hand there appear to be as many squares as there are integers; on the other hand the totality of integers includes all the squares. I refuse because "the number of squares is not less than the totality of all numbers, nor the latter greater than the former." Galileo means that the attributes equal, greater and less are not applicable to infinite but only to finite quantities. "Nor does the sense in which one finite quantity can be greater or less than another—that is, by a definite difference between them—apply in the comparison of a finite and an infinite quantity. The latter being indefinitely large is indeterminately larger than any finite quantity."

These remarks apply to the infinitely small as well. The infinitesimal is immeasurably small or indeterminately less than any finite fraction, no matter how small, because its own size is indeterminate. The finite fraction, itself a product of division, can be divided again, but if an infinitesimal quantity were capable of further division, it would permit a smaller and since that smaller quantity would be a determinate fraction of itself the infinitesimal would have to be determinate in size. Since that is not so, the infinitesimal must be conceived as the indivisible or as the limit approached by carrying on division endlessly.

Because the hypothesis of indivisibles seems somewhat harsh, Newton proposes an analysis in terms of what he calls nascent and evanescent quantities, or quantities just beginning to be more than nothing or just at the point at which they pass into nothing. As there is a limit which the velocity at the end of a motion may attain but not exceed, there is a like limit in all quantities and proportions that begin or cease to be. Newton warns his

reader therefore that if he should happen to mention quantities as least or evanescent or ultimate the reader is not to suppose that quantities of any determinate magnitude are meant but such as are conceived to be always diminished without end

Later speaking of quantities which are variable and undetermined and increasing or decreasing as it were by a continual motion or flux he adds Take care not to look upon finite quantities as such The method of fluxions provides an infinitesimal calculus on the hypothesis of limits rather than of indivisibles

THROUGH ALL THESE conceptions of infinity—metaphysical mathematical and physical—run the paired notions of the unlimited and of limits approached but not attained The finite is neither unlimited nor does it insensibly approach a limit There are also the opposite notions of the perfect and the indeterminate The finite is neither for it is determinate without being a totality or complete

Though they have a common thread of meaning and though each raises similar difficulties for the understanding the conception of infinity in being or power and the conception of infinite (or infinitesimal) quantity require separate consideration The same questions may be asked of each questions about the existence of the infinite and about our knowledge of it but the same answers will not be given in each case There are those who deny the existence of an actually infinite body or an actually infinite number yet affirm the infinite existence of God There are those who declare the infinity of matter to be intrinsically unintelligible but maintain that God Who is infinite is intrinsically the most intelligible object They add of course that the infinite being of God cannot be comprehended by our finite intellects

On each of these points an opposite view has been taken but the dispute concerning the infinity of God involves issues other than those which occur in the controversy over the infinite divisibility of matter or the infinity of space and time It seems advisable therefore to deal separately with the problems of infinity as they arise with respect to different objects or occur in different subject matters

THE CONCEPTION of God in the words of Anselm as a being than which a greater can not be conceived—or in the words of Kant as an *ens realissimum*—most real being—expresses the plenitude of the divine nature and existence The mediaeval thesis defended by Descartes that God's essence and existence are identical implies that neither is contracted or determined by the other The still earlier notion of Aristotle repeated by Aquinas that God is pure actuality carries with it the attributes of completeness or perfection which are the positive aspects of immutability or incapacity for change Spinoza's definition of substance as that which exists not only in itself but through itself and by its very nature entails the autonomy or utter independence of the divine being

These are so many different ways of stating that God is an infinite being Both Aquinas and Spinoza make infinity the basis for proving that there can be only one God When Spinoza argues that a plurality of substances possessing the same nature is absurd he has in mind the identification of infinite substance with God

If many gods existed Aquinas writes they would necessarily differ from each other Something would therefore belong to one which did not belong to another And if this were a privation one of them would not be absolutely perfect but if it were a perfection one of them would be without it So it is impossible for many gods to exist—that is of course if infinity is a property of the divine nature Aquinas makes this condition clear when he goes on to say that the ancient philosophers constrained as it were by the truth when they asserted an infinite principle asserted likewise that there was only one such principle

But while it is impossible for there to be two infinities of being it is not impossible for there to be two or more infinite quantities One explanation of this difference seems to be the actuality or existence of an infinite being in contrast to the conceptual character of the infinite objects of mathematics which are sometimes called potential infinities because they are conceived as in an endless process of becoming or as approaching a limit that is never reached

When the physical existence of infinite quan-

ness is asserted as, for example, a universe of infinite extent or an infinite number of atoms, the uniqueness of these actual totalities seems to follow. Two infinite worlds cannot co-exist, though the one world can be infinite in several distinct respects—in space or duration, or in the number of its constituents—even as the infinity of God, according to Spinoza, involves infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

Spinoza's argument against two actual infinities seems to find confirmation in the position taken by Aquinas that God's omnipotence does not include the power to create an infinite world. God's infinity, as we have already noted, follows from the identity of God's essence and existence. Since a created being has existence added to its essence, Aquinas asserts that it is against the nature of a created thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore," he continues, "as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictions are true at the same time) so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite."

On this view an infinite world cannot co-exist with an infinite God if in their separate existence one is dependent on the other as creature upon creator. The infinity of the world or of nature in Spinoza's conception, is not separate from the infinity of God but consists in the infinity of two of God's attributes—extension and thought.

In our time there has arisen the conception of a finite God—a God who, while the most perfect being yet is not without capacity for growth or change—a God who is eternal without being immutable. This conception, which in the light of traditional theology appears to be as self-contradictory as round square, has arisen in response to the difficulties certain critics have found in the traditional doctrine of an infinite being. They point to the difficulty of understanding how finite beings can exist separate from, yet in addition to, an infinite being; they also cite difficulties in the notions of infinite knowledge, infinite power, and infinite goodness.

The infinity of the divine omniscience extends to the possible as well as to the actual. But the possible includes things which are in-

compatible with one another things which in the language of Leibniz are not compossible. The *impossible* would thus seem to be embraced in the infinite scope of divine thought or knowledge. In the view of one theologian, Nicolas of Cusa, the mystery of God's infinity is best expressed by affirming that in God all contradictions are somehow reconciled.

The infinity of God's power, or the divine omnipotence, also gives occasion for the question: possible and the impossible. Is not it impossible to God or must it be said that there are certain things which not even God can do, such as reverse the order of time or create a world which shall be as infinite and perfect as Himself? In the assertion that God cannot do the impossible, Aquinas sees no limitation on God's power. The impossible, he writes, does not "come under the divine omnipotence not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a possible or possible thing." For this reason, he claims, "it is better to say that such things cannot be done than that God cannot do them." The inability to do the *impossible* constitutes no violation of infinite power, even as the lack of nothing does not deprive infinite being of anything.

The infinite goodness of God is sometimes set against the fact of evil or the existence of imperfections in the created world. This is part of the problem of evil, like that which concerns man's freedom to obey or disobey the divine will, cannot be separated from the fundamental mystery of God's infinity—in power and knowledge as well as in goodness. The problem is considered in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL. The point there mentioned that evil is essentially non-being or deprivation of being leads to one solution of the problem. It accepts the finitude and consequently the imperfection of creatures as a necessary consequence of God's infinity. The best of all possible worlds cannot be infinitely good.

TO MAN ALONE, among all admittedly finite things, has infinity been attributed and even made a distinctive mark of his nature. Does this introduce a new meaning of infinity, neither quantitative nor divine?

It has seldom if ever been questioned that man is finite in being and power. The limits of

human capacity for knowledge or achievement are a perennial theme in man's study of man. Yet it is precisely with regard to *capacity* that certain writers have intimated man's infinity.

Pascal for example finds the apparent contradictions in human nature intelligible only when man is understood as yearning for or impelled toward the infinite. We burn with desire, he says, to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks and the earth opens to abysses. In this fact lies both the grandeur and the misery of man. He aspires to the infinite yet he is a finite being dissatisfied with his own finitude and frustrated by it.

It is sometimes said that the touch of infinity in man—the suggestion that it is a touch of madness—consists in his wanting to be God. Those who regard such desire as abnormal or perverse interpret it as a misdirection of man's natural desire to know God face to face and to be filled with the love of God in the divine presence. But according to the theory of natural desire the tendency of each nature is somehow proportionate to its capacity. If man's restless search for knowledge and happiness can be quieted only by the possession of the infinite truth and goodness which is God, then man's intellect and will must somehow be as infinite in nature as they are in tendency. Yet that is not an unqualified infinity for the same theologians who teach that man naturally seeks God also hold that man's finite intellect cannot comprehend the infinite being of God as God knows Himself. Nor do they think that man's capacity for knowing and loving God can be fulfilled except in the beatific vision which is a super-natural gift rather than a natural achievement.

These and related matters are discussed in the chapters on *DESIRE* and *KNOWLEDGE*. The great books speak of other objects than God as objects of man's infinite desire. The appetite for money, for pleasure, or for power seems to be an infinite craving which no finite quantity of these goods ever satisfies. Two comments are made upon this fact which is so amply evidenced in the human record. One is that man's infinite lust for worldly goods expresses even as it conceals his natural desire for a truly infinite good. The other is that these worldly goods are

seductive objects precisely because they are infinite.

Here the word *infinite* is used not in the sense which signifies perfection but in the quantitative sense which has the meaning of indetermination. Plato's division in the *Philebus* of goods into the finite and the infinite separates measured and definite goods from those which need some limitation in quantity. Socrates exemplifies the distinction by reference to the fact that into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less and since there is never any end of them they must also be infinite. In contrast when definite quantity is once admitted there can be no longer a hotter or a colder. Such things he says which do not admit of more or less belong in the class of the limited or finite.

Following the line of this example Socrates later distinguishes between infinite and finite pleasures or pleasures without limit and those which have some intrinsic measure. Pleasures which are in excess he says have no measure but those which are not in excess have measure: the great, the excessive. We shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite and of the more and less and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. The fact that the goodness of wealth or of certain pleasures is indeterminate or indefinite makes it necessary to determine or measure the amount of wealth it is good to possess or the quantity of such pleasure it is good to enjoy.

As in the case of desire so the human intellect is also said to be infinite in the sense of reaching to an indefinite quantity. On the theory which he holds that the intellect knows by means of universal concepts Aquinas attributes to the human mind an infinite power for it apprehends the universal which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Each universal signifies what is common to an indefinitely large class of particular instances.

There is still another sense in which the intellect is said to be infinite, namely by reason of its having the potentiality to apprehend all knowable things. But this is a relative infinity as is the corresponding infinity of prime matter which is conceived as the potentiality for taking on all forms. In both cases the infinite is qualified by a restriction—on the kind of things

knowable to the intellect and the type of forms receivable in matter. The infinity of prime matter—matter totally devoid of form—is also comparable to the infinity of God in a contrast of extreme opposites: the absolute indeterminacy of pure potentiality on the one hand, the absolute perfection of pure actuality on the other.

THE INFINITY OF matter involves different considerations when the problem concerns not prime matter but material things—bodies. The question is twofold. Can there be a body of infinite magnitude? Is there an infinite number of bodies? To both questions Aristotle gives the negative answer while Spinoza seems to answer the first and Lucretius the second affirmatively.

Spinoza's affirmation may be qualified of course by his conception of infinite body as an attribute of God. But there is no qualification on Lucretius' assertion that the first beginnings of things are infinite unless it is his statement that the first beginnings of things have different shapes, but the number of shapes is finite. It is only the number of atoms which is infinite, not their variety.

Aristotle presents many arguments against the existence of an infinite body or an infinite number of things, all of which ultimately rest on his distinction between an actual and a potential infinity. It is not that infinity in magnitude, or multitude, is impossible—for he affirms the infinity of time and he insists upon the infinitude of matter—but rather that if an infinite body existed, its infinity would have to be actual. Its actuality would necessarily involve certain determinations, especially those of dimension and place, which would be inconsistent with the indeterminacy of the infinite. Similarly, a multitude of co-existing things—unlike the moments of time which do not co-exist—cannot be infinite because their co-existence implies that they can be actually numbered, whereas the infinity implies that they are numberless.

The potential infinite Aristotle writes exhibit itself in different ways—in time in the generations of man and in the division of magnitudes. For generally he says, the infinite has this mode of existence: one thing is always

being taken after another and each thing that is taken is always finite but always different. When this takes place in the division of spatial magnitudes, what is taken persists, while in the succession of times and of men, it takes place by the passing away of those in such a way that the source of supply never gives out.

The opposition between Lucretius and Aristotle with regard to the divisibility of matter is discussed in the chapter on ELEMENTS. The notions of infinity and continuity are differently employed on the two sides of the argument. Where Aristotle makes the continuity of matter the condition of its infinite divisibility, Lucretius makes the atom's continuity—its solidity or lack of void—the cause of its indivisibility. Where Aristotle asserts that at any moment there can be only a finite number of particles in the world because the partition of matter cannot be infinitely carried out short of infinite time, Lucretius, on the contrary, claims that the division of matter into smaller and smaller parts finds an end in the atom particles and yet he also asserts an infinite number of atoms.

To contain an infinite number of atoms an infinite space is required according to Lucretius. This presents no greater difficulty for him than an infinite time. Aristotle, on the other hand, differentiates between space and time with respect to infinity. Time can be potentially infinite by way of addition because each part that is taken passes in succession out of existence. But though space may be infinitely divisible it cannot be infinitely extended for all its parts unlike those of time must co-exist. It would therefore have to be an actual rather than a potentially infinite quantity and thus Aristotle thinks is impossible.

These and other conflicting views concerning the infinity of space and time appear in Kant's statement of the first cosmological antinomy. His intention is not to resolve the issues but to show that they cannot be resolved by proof or argument. To do this, Kant sets up what seems to him to be equally strong—or equally inconclusive—arguments for and against the infinity of space and time.

Suppose it be granted that Kant argues on the one hand that the world has no beginning in time. Then it would follow that up to every given moment in time an eternity must have

human capacity for knowledge or achievement are a perennial theme in man's study of man. Yet it is precisely with regard to capacity that certain writers have intimated man's infinity.

Pascal for example finds the apparent contradictions in human nature intelligible only when man is understood as yearning for or impelled toward the infinite. We burn with desire, he says, to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks and the earth opens to abysses. In this fact lies both the grandeur and the misery of man. He aspires to the infinite yet he is a finite being dissatisfied with his own finitude and frustrated by it.

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These and related matters are discussed in the chapters on *Desire and Knowledge*. The great books speak of other objects than God as objects of man's infinite desire. The appetite for money, for pleasure, or for power seems to be an infinite craving which no finite quantity of these goods ever satisfies. Two comments are made upon this fact which is so amply evidenced in the human record. One is that man's infinite lust for worldly goods expresses even as it conceals his natural desire for a truly infinite good. The other is that these worldly goods are

seductive objects precisely because they are infinite.

Here the word *infinite* is used not in the sense which signifies perfection but in the quantitative sense which has the meaning of indetermination. Plato's division in the *Philebus* of goods into the finite and the infinite separates measured and definite goods from those which need some limitation in quantity. Socrates exemplifies the distinction by reference to the fact that into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less and since there is never any end of them they must also be infinite. In contrast when definite quantity is once admitted there can be no longer a hotter or a colder. Such things, he says, which do not admit of more or less belong in the class of the limited or finite.

Following the line of this example Socrates later distinguishes between infinite and finite pleasures or pleasures without limit and those which have some intrinsic measure. Pleasures which are in excess, he says, have no measure but those which are not in excess have measure, the great, the excessive. We shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite and of the more and less and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. The fact that the goodness of wealth or of certain pleasures is indeterminate or indefinite makes it necessary to determine or measure the amount of wealth it is good to possess or the quantity of such pleasure it is good to enjoy.

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elapsed and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in the world. But since the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed by means of a successive synthesis it also follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence.

On the other hand Kant argues with what he thinks is equal force: let it be granted that [the world] has a beginning. A beginning, he explains, is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist. Then Kant continues: on the above supposition it follows that there must have been a time in which the world did not exist—that is a void time. But in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible because no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being in preference to that of non being. Consequently many series of things may have a beginning in the world but the world itself cannot have a beginning and is therefore in relation to past time infinite.

With regard to the infinity or finitude of space Kant proceeds similarly. If we suppose space to be infinite then the world must be an infinite given total of co-existent things. But in order to cogitate the world which fills all spaces as a whole the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed—that is to say an infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of all co-existing things. This Kant argues is impossible and therefore an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given whole. Hence it follows that the world is as regards extension in space not infinite but enclosed in limits.

If however we suppose that the world is finite and limited in space it follows according to Kant that it must exist in a void space which is not limited. We should therefore meet not only with a relation of things in space but also a relation of things to space. But the relation of the world to a void space is merely a relation to no object and such a relation and consequently the limitation of the world by void space is nothing. It follows therefore Kant concludes that the world as regards

space is not limited—that is it is infinite in regard to extension.

The way in which these opposite arguments nullify each other reveals more than our inability to prove or disprove the infinity of space and time. It shows in Kant's theory of human knowledge that we are not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience—the world of sense.

ONE OTHER PROBLEM of infinity in the sphere of physics receives its initial formulation in one of the great books—in the part of the *Dialogues Concerning the Two New Sciences* where Galileo discusses the uniform acceleration of a freely falling body. The body which is said to accumulate equal increments of velocity in equal intervals of time is also said to start from finite slowness, i.e. from rest. One of the persons in the dialogue challenges this saying that as the instant of starting is more and more nearly approached the body moves so slowly that if it kept on moving at this rate it would not traverse a mile in an hour or in a day or in a year or in a thousand years indeed it would not traverse a span in an even greater time a phenomenon which baffles the imagination while our senses show us that a heavy falling body suddenly acquires great speed.

What our senses seem to show us is corrected by an experiment which refines the observation. But this still leaves a purely analytical question. Against the statement that the velocity can be increased or diminished without limit Simplicio points out in the dialogue that if the number of degrees of greater and greater slowness is limitless they will never be all exhausted and therefore the body will never come to rest when it is slowing down or be able to start to move when it is at rest.

This would happen. Salvati answers if the moving body were to maintain its speed for any length of time at each degree of velocity but it merely passes each point without delay in more than an instant and since each time interval however small may be divided into an infinite number of instants these will always be sufficient to correspond to the infinite degrees of diminished velocity.

The problem of the infinitesimal velocity provides another illustration of the difference

even granted an infinite time the relation between the premises and conclusion of reasoning permits an infinite regression. If the truth of a conclusion cannot be known until the truth of its premises is known then the pursuit of truth may be vitiated by a search *ad infinitum*.

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I Works by authors represented in this collection

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Chapter 41 JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE word "judgment" has a range of meanings which includes three principal variations referring to (1) a *quality* of the mind (2) a *faculty* of the mind and (3) an *act* of the mind. Of these three meanings, it is the third which is extensively considered in this chapter and it is this meaning of "judgment" which many writers use the word "proposition" to express. They sometimes substitute the one word for the other, sometimes they use both words, not as strict synonyms, but to express distinct yet closely related aspects of the same fundamental phenomenon.

The sense in which judgment is a *quality* of the mind is the sense in which we ordinarily speak of a person as having sound judgment or poor judgment. We credit the same people "Aristotle is," "with possessing judgment and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding." To be a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgment," he continues, is to be "able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned."

The capacity to judge well concerning what is to be done is often connected with the capacity to deliberate about the advantages and disadvantages or other circumstances relevant to the action in question. It may or may not be accompanied by a capacity to resolve how he will act, to carry into execution the decision which judgment has formed. These three qualities of mind—deliberateness, judgment and decision—being conceived by Aristotle and Aquinas as belonging together as parts of the intellectual virtue they call "prudence" or practical wisdom. The qualities may occur separately but the prudent man will possess all three.

This meaning of "judgment" is reserved for discussion in the chapter on *Prudence* and in the chapter on *Law* will be found the consider-

ation of the judgment which a court renders—the judgment which is the decision of a judge when he applies the law to the particular case. In the legal sense of a judicial decision, judgment reflects not so much the quality of the judgment as the duty and authority to dispose of the case and to have his decision executed by the appropriate officers of the law. The legal significance of judgment is not primarily psychological or logical and just as the moral consideration of judgment falls under prudence, the legal consideration is also more appropriately developed in the context of other ideas.

We are left with the meanings which belong to psychology, logic and the theory of knowledge. The sense in which "judgment" designates a *faculty* or *function* of the mind—a distinct sphere of mental operation—is much more special than the sense in which "judgment" or "proposition" signifies a *particular act* of the mind in the process of knowing or in the verbal expression of that process. Many authors discuss the kinds of judgment which the mind makes, and the kinds of propositions it forms and asserts or denies, but only a few—notably Locke and Kant—use the word "judgment" to name a mental faculty.

Locke for example says that "the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood." One is the faculty of knowing, the other of judging. "The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had is judgment whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree and disagree or which is the same, any proposition to be true or false without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The way in which Locke distinguishes between knowing and judging and the fact that he relates this distinction to the difference be-

tween certainty and probability suggest the parallel distinction between knowledge and opinion. The faculty of judgment for Locke is the equivalent of what other writers treat as the forming of opinions.

Kant also makes judgment a faculty. Along with understanding and reason judgment is one of the three faculties of cognition. It has a distinct function of its own and is coordinate with the other two. As the laws of nature are the work of the understanding in the sphere of speculative reason, as the rules of the moral law are the work of the reason in the practical sphere, wherein it is related to the faculty of desire, so the purposiveness of nature comes under the faculty of judgment which operates in relation to the faculty of pleasure and pain.

Kant divides all the faculties of the soul into three which cannot be any further derived from one common ground: the *faculty of knowledge*, the *feeling of pleasure and pain* and the *faculty of desire*. He sees each of the three cognitive functions (of understanding, judgment and reason) as standing in a peculiar relation to these three primary faculties. The faculty of judgment functions with respect to pleasure and pain, which is connected with the faculty of desire. Yet the aesthetic judgment of beauty and the theological judgment of purposiveness in nature are of a speculative rather than a practical character. Because of these two related facts Kant holds that the judgement in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason.

Kant perhaps more than any other thinker makes judgment—both as a faculty and as an act—one of the central terms in his philosophy. It is pivotal in each of the three critiques, but it is the *Critique of Judgement* which serves to connect the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The Understanding legislates *a priori* for nature as an object of sense—for theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates *a priori* for freedom and its peculiar causality as the supersensible in the subject for an unconditioned practical knowledge. The realm of the natural concept under one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence which

they might have upon one another (each according to its fundamental laws) by the gulf that separates the supersensible from phenomena. It is the judgment according to Kant which furnishes the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom.

KANT'S THEORY of the faculties of understanding, judgment and reason is so complex a doctrine that it cannot be readily compared with other analyses of the capacities or functions of mind. His threefold division bears a superficial—perhaps only a verbal—resemblance to Aquinas' division of mental acts into conception, judgment and reasoning.

According to Aquinas judgment is the second of the three acts of a single cognitive faculty variously called mind or intellect or reason. This faculty he writes first apprehends something about a thing such as its essence and this is its first and proper object, and then it understands the properties, accidents and various dispositions affecting the essence. Thus it necessarily relates one thing with another by composition or division, and from one composition and division it necessarily proceeds to another and this is *reasoning*.

The first act of the mind is conception, i.e. the simple apprehension of the essence and properties of a thing. Judgment, the second act, unites or separates concepts by affirming or denying one of another. As in the Kantian analysis judgment is a kind of mediating link, for after the judgment is formed by what Aquinas calls the composition or division of concepts, it in turn serves as the unit of the mind's third act which is reasoning. Reasoning is the process of going from judgment to judgment.

The act of judgment is that act of the mind and the only act which can have the quality of truth or falsity. Truth, Aquinas writes, resides in the intellect composing and dividing, for when the intellect judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth. In every proposition the mind either applies to or removes from the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate. Moreover, the judgment involves assertion or denial as the

concept does not. Whatever truth there is implicitly in concepts must be explicated in judgments and the truth of the conclusion in reasoning depends upon the truth of the judgments which are the premises. The judgment, therefore, is the basic unit of knowledge.

On this last point Kant seems to be in agreement with earlier writers. It is possible, therefore, to compare Kant's classification of judgments or propositions with the classifications of Aristotle, Descartes, or Locke. But it is necessary first to consider the relation between judgment and proposition. After that we can examine the difference between theoretic and practical judgments. With respect to the theoretic judgment (or proposition) we shall be able to state opposite views of the nature of the judgment and diverse views of the formal structure of judgments, the material content, their relation to one another and to the whole process of knowing.

THE STATE OF "all men are mortal" can be interpreted as expression, a judgment or a proposition. From certain points of view the choice of interpretation makes no difference for example it does not matter whether in a consideration of all men are mortal and some men are not mortal, the comparison is expressed in terms of universal and particular affirmative and negative judgments or propositions, or whether it is said that these are contradictory judgments or contradictory propositions. The basic problems of logic seem to be concerned in the same way by writers like Aristotle and Locke who tend to use "proposition" in place of judgment and by writers like Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant who tend to use both words with some difference in meaning.

What is the difference? It is sometimes understood as a difference between an act of the mind asserting, denying and the subject matter being asserted or denied. The proposition is that which may be either asserted or denied or the third alternative stressed by Descartes, the mind may suspend judgment and merely entertain the proposition. It may decline to judge it true or false and so refuse to assert or deny it. The fact that the proposition is itself either affirmative or negative does not signify its assertion or denial but a judgment of the

mind for an affirmative proposition can be denied and a negative can be affirmed.

Judgment adds to the proposition in question the mind's decision with respect to its truth or falsity. That decision may be right or wrong. A proposition which is in fact true may be denied. The truth of the proposition is unaffected by the falsity of the judgment or if the mind suspends judgment on a proposition which is true the truth of the proposition has failed to elicit a judgment. This seems to confirm the separation between the proposition and the judgment.

Sometimes the difference between the judgment and the proposition is found in the difference between the mind's act of "comprehension" or "dilecting" concepts and the formulation of that act in words. On this view the proposition is related to the judgment as the term to the concept as the physical to the mental word as language to thought. In consequence there is no separation for either the judgment or the proposition between that which can be asserted or denied and the assertion or denial of it. The affirmative judgment is an assertion, the negative a denial and the universal is for the affirmative and the negative proposition.

But on either theory of the difference it is thought necessary to distinguish between the sentence and the proposition, especially when the proposition is also regarded as a verbal formulation—a statement of thought in words. This is particularly important in a logical treatise like Aristotle's which analyzes terms, propositions and syllogisms rather than sentences, judgments and reasonings.

In both the *Categories* which deals with terms, and the treatise *On Interpretation* which deals with propositions, Aristotle differentiates between a grammatical and a logical handling of the units of language. His distinction, for example between simple and composite expressions (words and phrases on the one hand and sentences on the other) is related to, but it is not identical with his distinction between terms and propositions. Not every simple expression can be used as a term. For example propositions and conjunctions cannot be used as terms, as nouns and verbs can be. Nor can every sentence be used as a proposition.

"A sentence is a significant portion of speech."

Aristotle writes 'some parts of which have an independent meaning that is to say as an utterance though not as the expression of any positive judgment. Every sentence has meaning he goes on by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition only such are propositions as have in them truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition for this last concerns our present inquiry whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

It seems possible to relate the two separate distinctions we have been considering—that between sentence and proposition and that between proposition and judgment. As the proposition can be regarded as a sentence logically (rather than grammatically) construed so it can also be regarded as the linguistic expression of a judgment of the mind. The proposition thus appears to be a kind of middle ground between language and thought for when a sentence is used for the purpose of stating a proposition it can also express a judgment. When a judgment is expressed in words the verbal statement is also a proposition. The proposition is thus the logical aspect of a sentence and the verbal aspect of a judgment. A similar consideration of terms in relation to words and concepts occurs in the chapter on IDEA.

WHAT IS PERHAPS the most fundamental division in the sphere of judgments—the separation of the practical from the theoretic or speculative—can be initially explained by reference to the forms of language. Aristotle's remark about sentences and propositions tends to identify propositions with declarative sentences. Sentences in the subjunctive mood state prayers or wishes not propositions. An interrogative sentence asks a question to which the answers may be propositions or they may be hopes and desires. The imperative sentence issues a command to act in a certain way whether the command is a direction for others or a decision for one's self. This last type of sentence represents the practical mood of thought as well as speech—thought concerned with actions to be done or not done rather than with what does or does not exist.

The imperative sentence is not the only kind of practical statement. It is merely the most terse and emphatic. It is also the expression of that type of practical judgment which most immediately precedes action itself or the execution of a command. There are other sentences which because they are apparently declarative in form conceal their imperative mood. Yet upon examination their essentially practical rather than theoretic significance can be discovered.

Sentences which contain the words *ought* or *should* are of this sort e.g. *Men ought to seek the truth. You should work for peace.*

I ought to make this clear. By omitting *should* or *ought* these sentences can be changed into the strictly declarative mood of theoretic propositions e.g. *Men do seek the truth. You will work for peace. I shall make this clear. They can also be made plainly imperative e.g., Seek the truth etc.* The chief difference between the blunt form of the imperative and its indicative expression using

ought or *should* is that the latter indicates the person to whom the command is addressed.

The contrast in significance between a declarative and an imperative statement does therefore convey the distinction between a theoretic and a practical proposition or judgment. Kant's further division of practical judgments into the hypothetical and the categorical simply differentiates commands or *oughts* which involve no preamble from those which propose that action be taken to achieve a certain end or which base a direction to employ this or that means on the supposition that a certain end is desired or sought. Examples of hypothetical or conditional imperatives would be such judgments as *If you want to be happy seek the truth or Seek the truth in order to be happy.*

The distinction between theoretic and practical judgments is currently made in terms of the contrast between statements of fact and statements of value or as in judicial procedure between statements of fact and rules of law. A rule of law has the form of a general practical statement usually a conditional rather than a categorical imperative whereas the decision of a court applying the rule to a case is a particular practical judgment.

Beginner with Francis Bacon, the distinction between the theoretical and the practical is also made in terms of the difference between the pure sciences and their applications in technology. Technical judgments, prescribing the way to make something, or produce a certain effect, are traditionally associated under the head of the practical, with moral judgments concerning the good to be sought and the ways of seeking it. Both are prescriptive of conduct rather than descriptive of existence or nature in the manner of theoretical statements.

Thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant who divide science or philosophy into the theoretical disciplines (e.g. physics, mathematics, metaphysics) and the practical or moral disciplines (e.g. ethics, economics, politics) place the discussion of the difference between theoretical and practical judgments in the context of other distinctions, as, for example, between the theoretical and the practical reason, or between theoretical and practical knowledge, or in the context of considering the kinds of truth appropriate to each, and the modes of evidence or demonstration in each. These related distinctions and considerations are treated in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE, VALUE, REASONING, and METHOD.

For the most part however the great books in the tradition of logic itself do not give an analysis of practical judgments or reasoning, in any way comparable to their treatment of the theoretic forms of thought and statement. Theoretical problems concerning propositions or judgments, now to be considered, apply only to the theoretic forms.

Two basic issues in the theory of propositions or judgments have their origin in the tradition of the great books, but for their explicit and full development other works must be consulted—the special treatises on logic of relative recent date, listed in the Additional Reading List. One of these two issues has already been briefly commented on, but for the full implications of the distinction between propositions and judgments one must go to such writers as Henry Bradley, Bosanquet, Cook, Wilson, W. E. Johnson, and John Dewey, who make this distinction the crux of a constructivist over the scope of formal logic.

The other basic issue lies in the opposition between what has come to be called “*sub-categorical logic*” and “*relational logic*.” Here one side is fully represented by the *Organon* of Aristotle, and by the later books which adopt the Aristotelian logic of predication. The other logical theory is in various but not fully developed by such writers as Locke, Hume, Kant, and William James who, though they sometimes employ the subject-predicate formula, tend to consider the unit of knowledge—the proposition or judgment—as a relation between ideas or concepts.

The latter has placed subjects and accidents under the category of relation can be taken as exemplifying this tendency, as can Lock’s emphasis on the connection of and agreement or disagreement between, instead of. Nevertheless, there are at present no traces of the theory that the proposition is a relation of two or more terms, not its application of a predicate to a subject. As indicated in the chapter on LOGIC, the relational theory does not receive an adequate exposition until the modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic, begun with the writings of Boole, De Morgan, and Venn, and culminated in such works as the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead.

In the Aristotelian logic simple propositions consist of a subject and a predicate—what is being talked about and what is said of it. The copula “is” is the sign of predication; it also signifies an affirmation of the unity of subject and predicate. For example, in “Socrates is a man” the predicate *man* is applied to the subject *Socrates* and the unity of *he—Socrates* and *being a man* is affirmed. All the terms of discourse can be classified according to their character as subjects and predicates so, too, can propositions be classified by reference to the type of subject term and the type of predicate term which comprise them. The formal structure not only of the proposition, but also of the syllogism, is determined by the order of subjects and predicates. “When one term is predicated of another” Aristotle writes “any term which is predicable of the predicate will also be predicable of its subject.”

According to the theory of the proposition as a relation of terms or of classes, predication

represents merely one type of relationship—the membership of an individual in a class or the inclusion of one class in another. There are many other types of relation which it is held cannot be reduced to class membership or class inclusion as for example the relationship stated by the proposition *John hit James* or the proposition *January comes before February*. Propositions can be classified according to the number of terms involved in a single relationship or by reference to the type of relation which organizes them whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical transitive or intransitive reflexive or irreflexive. In this theory it is the character of the relationship *not* the character of the terms which is the fundamental element in logical analysis and this determines the formal structure of inference as well as of propositions.

It has been claimed for each of these logical theories that it is the more general analysis and that it is able to reduce the formulations of the opposite theory to its own terms or subsume them as a special case. Certainly it is verbally possible to convert all predications into statements of relationship or all relational statements into subject predicate propositions. But this by itself does not seem to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of either theory each side contends that such reductions violate its fundamental principles. Stated in its most drastic form the unresolved question is whether there is one logic or two—or perhaps more.

WITHIN THE tradition of Aristotelian logic there are divergent schemes for classifying propositions or judgments. So far as the great books are concerned this can be best illustrated by mentioning Kant's departures in analysis.

Aristotle distinguishes between simple and composite propositions the former consisting of a single subject and predicate the latter compounded of several propositions. For example since the two predicates in the proposition *This man is good and a shoemaker* do not form a unity the sentence expresses a conjunction of two simple propositions *This man is good* and *This man is a shoemaker*. Other types of compound propositions are the hypothetical and the disjunctive e.g. *If Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal* and *Either all men*

are mortal or no men are mortal. Kant treats these distinctions under the head of *relation*. He calls the proposition which is a relation of the predicate to the subject *categorical* and he regards the hypothetical or disjunctive judgment (based on relations of cause and effect or of the parts of a whole) as concerned with propositions in relation to each other.

Aristotle classifies simple propositions by reference to their quantity and quality. In regard to quantity he distinguishes between the universal (e.g. *All men are mortal*) and the particular (e.g. *Some men are mortal*). To these he adds the indefinite proposition which leaves the quantity (*all or some*) undetermined. Under the head of quantity Kant makes a threefold division according to unity plurality and totality. He adds the singular proposition *Socrates is mortal* to Aristotle's particular and universal. The difference between the singular on the one hand and the particular and the universal on the other seems to be represented in Aristotle's thought by the distinction between propositions about an individual subject and propositions about a universal subject.

The quality of categorical propositions according to Aristotle is either affirmative (*re positive*) or negative e.g. *All men are mortal* and *Some men are not mortal*. To these two Kant adds a third type of judgment under the head of *quality*—the infinite judgment which affirms a negative predicate of a subject e.g.

The soul is non mortal. Though Aristotle recognizes the special character of a term like *non mortal* since it is both negative and indefinite he does not seem to think that the use of such terms affects the quality of a proposition.

Finally Aristotle divides propositions according to whether they are simple assertions of fact or are assertions qualified by the notions of necessity or contingency (*re possibility*). Every proposition he says states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else. The distinction between the necessary and contingent modes of statement has come to be called a difference in modality and statements which have one or another modality are called modal propositions.

It is sometimes thought that the Aristotelian classification treats only necessary and contin

gent propositions with their several opposites as modal propositions and separates the simple or pure assertion from them as non modal. In contrast to this Kant makes a threefold division of judgments under the head of modality: the problematical (*i.e.* the possible what may be) the assertoric (*i.e.* the existent what is) and the apodictic (*i.e.* the necessary what must be).

The classification of the types of judgment or proposition is usually preliminary in logical analysis to a consideration of their order and connection.

The formal pattern of what is traditionally called the square of opposition is determined by the quality and quantity of the simple propositions which are therein related as contradictory, contrary and sub-contrary. Two propositions are contradictory if they are opposites in both quality and quantity (e.g. All men are mortal is contradicted by Some men are not mortal). Two universal propositions are contrary if one is affirmative and the other negative (e.g. All men are mortal is contrary to No men are mortal) and an affirmative and a negative particular proposition are related as sub-contraries (e.g. Some men are mortal and Some men are not mortal). The significance of these three basic relationships for the truth and falsity of the opposed propositions is discussed in the chapter on Opposition, and in the chapter on Necessity and Contradiction the special problems of opposition among modal propositions are examined.

Other than their opposition the only formal relationship of propositions or judgments occurs in the structure of inference or reasoning. According to the traditional analysis the implication of one proposition by another—insofar as that is determined by the form of each—is immediate inference. In contrast the pattern of mediated inference or reasoning always involves at least three propositions ordered not only with respect to the sequence from premises to conclusion but also by the relation of the premises to one another. These matters are discussed in the chapter on Reasoning.

With respect to their origin status or import judgments or propositions are subject to

further distinctions in type. The certainty or probability with which propositions are asserted or judgments are made is connected by some writers with the distinction between knowledge and opinion, by others with the difference between science and dialectic and by others with the difference between knowing the relation of ideas and knowing matters of fact or real existence. Propositions which express certain knowledge are furthermore divided by some analysts into those which are axiomatic, self-evident or immediate and those which are known only by mediated inference: reasons or demonstration, not by intuition or induction. The former are also sometimes called "principles," the latter "conclusions."

Locke's distinction between *trifling* and *instructive* propositions, like Kant's distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* judgment is made in the general context of an examination of how we learn or know.

Trifling propositions according to Locke are universal propositions which though they be certainly true yet they add no light to our understanding or give no increase to our knowledge. All purely identical propositions are of this sort—propositions such as "body is body" or "a vacuum is a vacuum." Such propositions teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told: that the same term is the same term and the same idea the same idea. They are all instances of the law of identity or as Locke expresses it they are all equivalent to this proposition: *what is is*. If the trifling proposition be an analytical judgment or what in our day is called a tautology goes beyond the statement of an identity between subject and predicate: it goes no further than the explication of a definition. It predicates Locke says a part of the definition of the word defined, as for example in the proposition "Lead is a metal."

Analytical or explicative judgments Kant says in the *Prolegomena* express nothing in the predicate but what has already been actually thought in the concept of the subject. When I say "all bodies are extended" I have not amplified in the least my concept of body but have only analyzed it. On the contrary this judgment "All bodies have weight" contains in

represents merely one type of relationship—the membership of an individual in a class or the inclusion of one class in another. There are many other types of relation which it is held cannot be reduced to class membership or class inclusion as for example the relationship stated by the proposition John hit James or the proposition January comes before February. Propositions can be classified according to the number of terms involved in a single relationship or by reference to the type of relation which organizes them whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical transitive or intransitive reflexive or irreflexive. In this theory it is the character of the relationship not the character of the terms which is the fundamental element in logical analysis and this determines the formal structure of inference as well as of propositions.

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its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of body it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept and must therefore be called synthetic

For Locke not all axioms or self-evident propositions are trifling or tautological for some go beyond statements of identity or the explication of definitions as for example that the whole is greater than the part. Nor are they all useless. Some which Locke distinguishes from the rest by calling them maxims are of use he maintains in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced but of little or none in advancing them further. They are of use in disputes for the silencing of obstinate wranglers and bringing those contests to some conclusion.

For Kant there is a further division of judgments into the *a posteriori* and the *a priori* according as their truth is or is not grounded in the data of experience. The former are empirical in origin the latter transcendental that is they have a foundation which transcends experience. These two types of judgment express two corresponding types of knowledge—*a priori* knowledge by which Kant understands not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge or that which is possible only *a posteriori* that is through experience.

In Kant's view there is no problem about the truth of analytic judgments for these have an *a priori* foundation in the principle of contradiction. (The contradictory of an analytic judgment is always self-contradictory.) Nor do synthetic judgments which are empirical or *a posteriori* raise any special difficulties. The central question in the theory of knowledge concerns the possibility and validity of synthetic judgments *a priori*.

If I go out of and beyond the conception A in order to recognize another B as connected with it what foundation have I to rest on Kant asks whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take for example the proposition everything that happens has a cause. In the conception of something that hap-

pens I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite outside the above conception and indicates something entirely different from that which happens and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception—that which happens—something entirely different from that conception and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it yet as belonging to it and even necessarily? What is here the unknown X upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found outside the conception A a foreign predicate B which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It is the discovery and solution of this problem which Kant believes to be the signal contribution of his transcendental logic of the judgment.

It may be wondered whether this problem can be stated in terms other than those peculiar to Kant's analytical vocabulary. Other writers admit that propositions which are particular and contingent have existential import. Their truth concerns real existences and so whether they are true or not can and must be learned from experience. These are like Kant's synthetic judgments *a posteriori*. Universal and necessary propositions on the other hand are sometimes interpreted as having no existential significance. Instead of being read as asserting that anything exists they are taken simply as statements of the relation between our own ideas. These for Locke and Hume are like Kant's *a priori* analytic judgments.

What remains is to discover a parallel for Kant's synthetic judgments *a priori*. In terms other than Kant's the most likely parallel seems to be the universal and necessary proposition conceived as a statement about reality rather than about relations in the realm of our own concepts. When universal propositions are so interpreted two questions arise. How do we establish that the subjects of such propositions really exist? What is the ultimate ground for the truth of such propositions the unlimited universality of which outruns experience? In these two questions we find a problem which is at least analogous to Kant's problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*.

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For Locke not all axioms or self evident propositions are trifling or tautological for some go beyond statements of identity or the explication of definitions as for example that the whole is greater than the part. Nor are they all useless. Some which Locke distinguishes from the rest by calling them maxims are of use he maintains in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced but of little or none in advancing them further. They are of use in disputes for the silencing of obstinate wranglers and bringing those contests to some conclusion.

For Kant there is a further division of judgments into the *a posteriori* and the *a priori* according as their truth is or is not grounded in the data of experience. The former are empirical in origin the latter transcendental that is they have a foundation which transcends experience. These two types of judgment express two corresponding types of knowledge—*a priori* knowledge by which Kant understands not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge or that which is possible only *a posteriori* that is through experience.

In Kant's view there is no problem about the truth of analytic judgments for these have an *a priori* foundation in the principle of contradiction. (The contradictory of an analytic judgment is always self contradictory.) Nor do synthetic judgments which are empirical or *a posteriori* raise any special difficulties. The central question in the theory of knowledge concerns the possibility and validity of synthetic judgments *a priori*.

If I go out of and beyond the conception A in order to recognize another B as connected with it what foundation have I to rest on? Kant asks whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take for example the proposition everything that happens has a cause. In the conception of something that hap-

pens I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite outside the above conception and indicates something entirely different from that which happens and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception—that which happens—something entirely different from that conception and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it yet as belonging to it and even necessarily? What is here the unknown X upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found outside the conception A a foreign predicate B which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It is the discovery and solution of this problem which Kant believes to be the signal contribution of his transcendental logic of the judgment.

It may be wondered whether this problem can be stated in terms other than those peculiar to Kant's analytical vocabulary. Other writers admit that propositions which are partial and contingent have existential import. Their truth concerns real existences and so whether they are true or not can and must be learned from experience. These are like Kant's synthetic judgments *a posteriori*. Universal and necessary propositions on the other hand are sometimes interpreted as having no existential significance. Instead of being read as asserting that anything exists they are taken simply as statements of the relation between our own ideas. These for Locke and Hume are like Kant's *a priori* analytic judgments.

What remains is to discover a parallel for Kant's synthetic judgments *a priori*. In terms other than Kant's the most likely parallel seems to be the universal and necessary proposition conceived as a statement about reality rather than about relations in the realm of our own concepts. When universal propositions are so interpreted two questions arise. How do we establish that the subjects of such propositions really exist? What is the ultimate ground for the truth of such propositions the unlimited universality of which outruns experience? In these two questions we find a problem which is at least analogous to Kant's problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*.

- 20 AQL s *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 57
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- 31 DE CARTES *Discourse* PART I 44a-c / *Other*
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- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 190c 191a / *Fund. Prin.*
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- 43 MULL *Libertarianism* 443c-d
- 46 H. GEL *Philosophy of Rights* PART 3c 6a
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- 53 JAMES *Psychol.* 186a
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK III CH 1 162a 166b
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 329d 340b BK
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- 17 PLATO *3rd Ennead* TEXT CH 1 106b-107a
- 18 A. QUIN *Confutatio* BK III PART 13 16c-d
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- 19 A. QUIN *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 59
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- 20 A. QUIN *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 57
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- 22 CH. V *The Philosophy of* 401a-422a esp
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- 23 H. QUIN *Leviathan* PART I 54 60d
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- 25 MONTGOMERY *Essays* 51a 55d esp 52c 53c
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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Titus Andronicus* ACT I
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- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 86c 95b
- 31 D. S. REES *Disco* 19c PART III 49a b / *Ob-*
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- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 4 172b 98 190b 375 385
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 17g BK I CH XX
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- 35 H. QUIN *Human Understanding* 17g BK I CH 3
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- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 114d 115 190c-d 216d
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- 43 PASCAL *1st Ennead* 29d
- 43 H. QUIN *Liberty* 275a 278c *passim* esp 276b-
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- 46 H. QUIN *Philosophy of Rights* PART II par 147
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- 53 J. M. *Psychology* 202b 204a 298b 295b-
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- 54 TALLEY *Civilization and its Discontents* 792b-c
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- 4 The distinction between the aesthetic and
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- 42 H. QUIN *J. de. ment.* 471b-473a 476a 483d
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- 5 The nature of theoretic judgments
- 5a The linguistic expression of judgments:
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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85d-8-b 107a b / *S.* 1 4
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 4-5 26a-c /
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- 19 A. QUIN *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13
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- 20 AQL s *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 3
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- 23 H. QUIN *Leviathan* PART I 56b 60a PART IV
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- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 433a 11
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
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- 38 R. LEBLANC *Inequality* 341b-342c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a b
- 5b The judgment as a predication (the class
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 3 5b-d c 11
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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk 11 / 63 83/12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk 11 [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdra*s 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Judgment as an act or faculty of the mind its contrast with the act of conception or with the faculties of understanding and reason

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 4 [24 10] 6a / *Interpretation* CH 1 [16 9-18] 25a b / *Metaphysics* BK VI CH 4 [1027^b 18 28] 550a c BK IX CH 10 577c 578a c / *Soul* BK III CH 6 662d 663c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 50b c BK X par 10 73d 74a / *City of God* BK VIII CH II 269b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 12 ANS 74c 75b Q 14 A 14 88d 89b II 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 17 A 3 102d 103c Q 58 A 2 ANS 301b d A 4 ANS 302d 303c II 85 A 5 ANS and REP 3 457d 458d A 6 458d-459c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 1 A 2 381a II

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 66c 67b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 59c 61d esp 59c 60a 64a b

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 21d 22a / *Meditations and Replies* 124b c 141a 215d 216c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 48 49 391a 394d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 5 179c d BK IV CH V SECT 5-6 329d 330b CH XIV 364b 365a

42 HANT *Pure Reason* 16d 19a 34a-45b esp 39a c 41c 42c 51d 52b 59c 64a esp 60a c 64d 66d 99a 101b 108a 112d esp 110d 111c 166c 171a 193a 200c 240b 243c / *Fundamental Metaphysics of Morals* 282b c / *Jurament* 461a-4 5d esp 465c-467d 474b-475d 550a 551a c 558a 572b 575b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 178a 179a 213b-214a 313b 638a b 859a 861b

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8 ARISTOTLE *Heavenly* BK III CH 7 [306 14 18] 397b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 499a 500b BK IV CH 4 [1008^b -32] 527d 528b / *Soul* BK III CH 7 [431^b 2 1] 664a b CH 9 [432^b 26-433 9] 665c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 339d 340b EN 7 [1098^a 25-35] 343d BK II CH 2 [1103^b 26-1104 9] 349b II BK VI CH 2 [1139 21 31] 387d 388a CH 5 [1140^b 11 19] 389b c CH 8 [1142 13 19] 391b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 16 90b 91b Q 79 AA II 13 424d-427a PART I II Q 13 A 6 REP 2 676c 677b

19 Aristotle *Semantic Theology* p 111 Q 11
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20 301d 303c Q 7a A 5-9 421c-43d Q 5.
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21 Bo = *Leviathan* p 111 3ae 60a

22 B con *Leviathan* f *Leviathan* 59c-60a

23 Descartes *Rules* x v 8bc

24 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iv ch ii
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25 Kant *Pure Reason* 110d 112d 115d 119a /
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27 The differentiation of judgments accord g
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29 Aristotle *Practical* f 111 117 bk 2 1
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30 Aristotle *Leviathan* x v ch 3 111 115 311
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31 Aristotle *Semantic Theology* p 111 Q 11
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32 Aristotle *Semantic Theology* p 111 Q 11
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33 Aristotle *Leviathan* 119d 121a 122a d

34 B con *Leviathan* f *Leviathan* 59c d
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35 Descartes *Rules* n 4 d 211 20d 25a /
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36 Descartes *Practical* 111-112a

37 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iv ch ii
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3 37d 372b ch 11 3 8c 319c

38 Kant *Pure Reason* 39a c 99a c 110d 111e
21 218d / *Practical* 543d 543a

39 Kant *Practical* 111 117 117 103c-d 117 117
5 244b c

40 Kant *Leviathan* 445a-44

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35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i 1 v
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4 Kant *Pure Reason* 111 119a 31a d 64d 66d

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42 *A priori* and *a posteriori* non-
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35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch i
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- (5) *The nature of theoretic judgments* 5b *The judgment as a predication the classification of subjects and predicates)*

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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 5 66b 67d A 12 ANS 74c 75b ■ 16 A 2 95c 96b A 6 ANS 98b d Q 58 A 2 301b-d A 4 302d 303c Q 76 A 3 ANS 391a 393a Q 85 A 5 REP 3 457d 458d

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART IV 270a c

- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* DEF IX 130d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 51d 52b 180c 182b

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a b 313a b 638b 861b 870b 873a

- 5c *The judgment as relational types of relation*

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH I SECT 1-7 307a 308a CH XII SECT 6-8 360a c

- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 10 458a b

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40c d 51d 52b

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 174b 176a 302b 304b 638b 869a 873a esp 870b 871a 872b 878a 879b 889a b

- 6 *The division of theoretic judgments according to formal criteria*

- 6a *The division of judgments according to quantity universal particular singular and indefinite propositions*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 5b c / *Interpretation* CH 7 [17 37-16] 26d 27a / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 16-1] 39a

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 55b 36a

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH V SECT 10 331a CH VI 331b-336d passim CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 13-14 357d 358c

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c 41c esp 39d-40a

- 6b *The division of judgments according to quality positive negative and infinite propositions*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [12^b6-15] 17d 18a / *Interpretation* CH 5 [17^a8-9] 26b CH 6 26c d CH 10 29d 31c / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [25^b19-26] 40c CH 46 70b 71d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 25 [86^b30-38] 118d

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- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 33 161b d

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VII SECT 1 283a b BK IV CH V SECT 5-6 329d 330b passim

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40a 210c d

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 25c d

- 6c *The division of judgments according to modality necessary and contingent propositions problematic attention, and apodictic judgments*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 12 13 32d 35c / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 3 40a c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 3 ANS 110b 111c A 8 REP 1 3 116a d

- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22a ■ 23a c

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14c 15c 39c-41c esp 40d 41c 179c 180c 193a 200c esp 194b-d 217c d / *Judgement* 491c 495a ■

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 851a

- 6d *The classification of judgments by reference to relation simple and composite propositions categorical hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 5 [17^a20-24] 26c

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 8 REP 1 3 116a-d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40c d 44a b 110d 111c esp 111b 194b-c / *Fund Prin Meta phys of Morals* 265c 266d / *Practical Reason* 297a 298a / *Judgement* 483d-491c

- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 859b

- 7 *The order and connection of judgments*

- 7a *The formal opposition of judgments the square of opposition*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [13^b1-35] 19a c / *Interpretation* CH 6-7 26c 27d CH 10 29d 31c CH 12-14 32d 36d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [72 13] 98c

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 64 A 3 REP 3 68b 69b

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 64d 65c 156d 157b 174b d

- 7b *The conversion of propositions the problem of immediate inference*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 7 [17^b23 31] 27b c CH 10 [20 16-37] 30d 31b / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 2-3 39d 40c BK II CH 8 10 79b 81b CH 22 [67^b 6-68 24] 89b d

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 17d 18a 109d 111c esp 109d 110a 110d 111c

- 7c *Reasoning as a sequence of judgments the chain of reasoning*

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 3 [1^b10-16] 5c d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 3 39a-40c CH 23 [40^b30-41^b7] 57c d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 2 97a 99a

(9) *Degrees of assent, certainty and probability*

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 86d 88c Q 57 A 3 ANS 297b 298a ■ 58 A 7 REP 3 305c 306b Q 86 A 4 ANS 463d 464d PART I II Q 17 A 6 ANS 690b d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 3 14b 15a Q 67 A 3 ANS 83b 84d PART II II Q 1 14 4-5 382c 384b Q 4 A 8 409a d Q 9 A 1 ANS and REP 1 423c 424b A 2 ANS 424b 425a Q 18 A 4 464c 465a PART III Q 7 A 3 REP 3 747b 748a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 65b c
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31 DESCARTES *Rules* I-II 1a 3b VII 23a c / *Discourse* PART IV 53c d PART VI 63c 64d / *Meditations* 74a c IV 92c 93a / *Objections and Replies* 125b 126b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO SECT 2 6 93b-95a BK IV CH VI 331b 336d *passim* esp SECT 13 335c d CH VI SECT 3 353a b SECT 6 12 356b 357d CH XIV XVI 364b 371c CH XVII SECT 2 371d 372b SECT 14 17 378c 379a CH XIX SECT 1 384c d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VI 469d 470d SECT X DIV 86-91 488d 491c *passim* esp DIV 87 489b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348a c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 194b c 228c d 240b 243c / *Judgement* 600d 604b *passim*

43 MILL *Liberty* 275a 277b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 636a 638b 659a 660b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 463d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 661c 667a / *New Introductory Lectures* 818c 819b

10 *The truth and falsity of judgments*

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 71c 74a / *Cratylus* 85d 86d 109a b / *Theaetetus* 541a 544a / *Sophist* 561d 577b esp 575a 577b

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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [353-351] 48d 51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 31 34 651d 653b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 12 74c 75b Q 14 A 15 REP 3 89b 90b Q 16 A 2 95c 96b A 7 ANS and REP 4 99a d A 8 REP 3 4 99d 100d Q 17 AA 3 4 102d 104b Q 58 A 4 REP 2 302d 303c A 5 303c 304c Q 85 A 1 REP 1 451c 453c A 5 REP 3 457d 458d A 6 458d 459c Q 94 A 4 505a 506a

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For The comparison of judgment with other acts of the mind see IDEA 2g 53 KNOWLEDGE 6b(4) REASONING 1 and for the relation of judgment to other faculties of the mind see MIND 1c-1c(3)

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Other considerations of practical or moral judgments and of judgment in relation to prudence see GOOD AND EVIL 5b-5c KNOWLEDGE 6c(2) PRUDENCE 51 and for the theory of the categorical imperative see DUTY 5 NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(2)

Other treatments of language in relation to thought see IDEA 4a LANGUAGE 7

The thesis seems to have two applications. For the stronger it means that they have the right as far as they have the right to exact from the weaker whatever serves their interests. Their laws or demands cannot be unjust. They cannot do injustice. They can only fail to exert sufficient might to hold on to the power which can secure them not from the charge of injustice but from reprisals by those whom they have oppressed or injured.

The thesis also means, for the weaker, that they can only do injustice but not suffer it. Injustice on their part consists in disobeying the law of their rulers. Hence for them, too, justice is expediency only now in the sense that they are likely to suffer if they try to follow their own interests rather than the interests of the stronger.

This thesis appears to be repeated in somewhat different language by Hobbes and Spinoza. To men living in a purely natural condition, the notions of justice and injustice do not apply. They apply only to men living in civil society. Where there is no Commonwealth, Hobbes writes, there is nothing unjust. So that the nature of justice consists in the keeping of valid covenants but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them. The breach of civil laws or covenants may be called injustice and the observance of them justice.

It is Spinoza's opinion that everything has by nature as much right as it has power to exist and operate. It follows therefore that in a natural state there is nothing which can be called just or unjust but only in a civil state. Here as before justice consists in obedience to justice in disobedience to whatever laws the state has the power to enforce the laws themselves being formulated not by reference to justice but to the interests of the state which must seek its own preservation and has the right to do so, so long as it has the power.

Those who take the opposite view agree that justice is political in the sense that the state in organization and operation, is a work of justice. Wisdom is the virtue of the rulers in the Republic but justice the organizing principle of Platonic ideal state.

Aristotle maintains that man is a political animal whereas other animals are merely gregarious. He cites the fact that man alone has a power of speech able to communicate opinions about the expedient and the just. Justice is the bond of men in states for the administration of justice which is the determination of what is just is the principle of order in political society. Aristotle describes man "when separated from law and justice as the worst of animals." Augustine describes the state with justice as "no better than a band of robbers thieves."

Those who agree that political institutions involve justice are confronted by these alternatives either the principle of justice is antecedent to the state its constitution, covenants, and laws or the determination of what is just and unjust is entirely relative to the constitution of a state dependent upon its power and consequent to its laws.

When the second alternative is chosen the proposition that justice is political is seriously qualified. It is merely political. There is no natural justice no justice apart from man made laws, nothing that is just or unjust in the very nature of the case and without reference to civil institutions. On this theory only the individual who is subject to government can be judged just or unjust. The government itself cannot be so judged nor can its constitution, its laws or its acts for since these determine what is just and unjust they cannot themselves be judged for their justice.

The opposite answer conceives political justice as a determination of natural justice. Political justice," Aristotle remarks, "is partly natural and partly conventional or legal. The fact that there is a sense in which just action on the part of a citizen consists in law-abiding conduct does not exclude another sense in which the laws themselves can be called just or unjust not only the laws but the constitution of the state itself. Though the justice of civil laws is partly relative to the constitution under which they are made and administered there are some enactments which, since they violate natural justice cannot be justified under any constitution. The constitution, moreover cannot be regarded as the ultimate standard of justice by those who compare the justice of different forms of government or of diverse constitutions. On

Chapter 42 JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

THE discussion of justice is the central theme in two dialogues of Plato—the *Republic* and the *Gorgias*. The dispute between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the one and between Socrates and Callicles in the other is of such universal scope and fundamental character that it recurs again and again in the great books with little change except in the personalities and vocabularies of the disputants.

It is a conflict of such polar opposites that all other differences of opinion about justice become arguable only after one or the other of the two extreme positions is abandoned. It is the conflict between the exponents of might and the exponents of right—between those who think that might *makes* right and that justice is expediency and those who think that power can be wrongly as well as rightly exercised and that justice the measure of men and states cannot be measured by utility.

Though Plato gives us the first full fashioned statement of this issue he does not fashion it out of whole cloth. The issue runs through the fabric of Greek life and thought in the age of the imperialistic city states which played the game of power politics culminating in the Peloponnesian War. In his history of that war Thucydides highlights the Melian episode by dramatically constructing a conversation between the Athenian envoys and the representatives of Melos a little island colony of Sparta which had refused to knuckle under to Athenian aggression.

Recognizing the superior force of the aggressors the Melians enter the conference with a sense of its futility for as they point out if they insist upon their rights and refuse to submit they can expect nothing from these negotiations except war and in the end slavery. The Athenians reply with a frankness that is seldom found in the diplomatic exchanges of our own

day though in their *real* contentions the conferences which have preceded or followed the world wars of our century repeat what happened if not what was said at Melos.

The Athenians tell the Melians that they will not waste time with specious pretences either of how we have a right to our empire or are now attacking you because of a wrong you have done us. Why make a long speech they say which would not be believed? Instead they come directly to the point and put the matter simply or as we now say realistically. You know as well as we do they tell the Melians

that right as the world goes is only in question between equals in power whereas the stronger do whatever they can and the weaker suffer whatever they must. There is nothing left for the Melians except an appeal to expediency. You debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest they reply to the Athenians before trying to persuade them that their policy will end in disaster for Athens.

The language of Thrasymachus in the *Republic* resembles that of the Athenian envoys. I proclaim he says that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. The different forms of government make laws democratic aristocratic tyrannical with a view to their several interests and these laws which are made by them for their own interests are the justice which they deliver to their subjects and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unjust. And this is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice which is the interest of the government and as the government must be supposed to have power the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice which is the interest of the stronger.

part of the natural law. Sometimes the statement of the first precept of the natural law is "Seek the good and avoid evil." Sometimes it is "Do good to others; injure no one and render to every man his own." In this second formula too the natural law seems to be identical with the precept of justice. The essential content of this precept seems to be present—separate from any doctrine of natural law—in Aristotle's analysis of the nature of justice both as a virtue and as a quality of human acts.

"The just," Aristotle says, "is the lawful and the fair." What he means by the word lawful in this context does not seem to be simply the law-abiding in the sense of conforming to the actual laws of a particular society. He thinks of it as aiming at the common advantage. He calls those acts just, he writes, that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. Lawful (or just) actions thus are those which are for the common good or the good of others; unlawful (or unjust) actions, those which do injury to others or despoil the society.

It is in this sense of justice that both Plato and Aristotle lay down the primary criterion for differentiating between good and bad governments. Those which are lawful and serve the common good are just; those which are lawless and serve the private interests of the rulers are unjust. This meaning of justice applies as readily to all citizens—to all members of a society—as it does to those who have the special duties or occupy the special offices of government.

Whether it is stated in terms of the good of other individuals or in terms of the common good of a community (domestic or political) this understanding of justice seems to consider the actions of a man as they affect the well-being not of himself but of others. Justice alone of the virtues, says Aristotle, is thought to be another's good because it is related to our neighbor. Concerned with what is due another, justice involves the element of duty or obligation. To each one, Aquinas writes, is due what is his own, and it is equally pertinent to justice, he adds, that a man give another his due. That is why justice alone of all the virtues implies the notion of duty. Doing good to others or not injuring them when

undertaken as a matter of strict justice goes no further than to discharge the debt which each man owes every other.

In consequence a difference of opinion arises concerning the adequacy of justice to establish the peace and harmony of a society. Some writers like Kant seem to think that if perfect justice obtained a multitude of individual wills would be perfectly harmonized in free action. Others, like Aquinas, think justice necessary but insufficient precisely because it is a matter of duty and debt. "Peace," he writes, "is the work of justice indirectly in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since charity according to its very nature causes peace for love is a unifying force." The bonds of love and friendship unite men where justice merely governs their interaction. What men do for one another out of the generosity of love far exceeds the commands of justice. That is why mercy and charity are called upon to qualify justice or even to set it aside. Earthly power, Portia declares in the *MERCHANT OF VENICE*, doth then show itself God's when mercy seasons justice.

THE PARABLE TO RENDER UNTO OTHERS WHAT IS THEIR DUE is read in a different light when the other aspect of justice is considered. When the just is conceived as the fair, the fairness which is due ourselves or others applies not to benefit and injury generally but to the exchange and distribution of goods or burdens. What is the principle of a fair exchange or a fair distribution? Aristotle's answer to this question is in terms of equality.

In the transactions of commerce fairness seems to require the exchange of things equivalent in value. The rule of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, is another expression of the principle of equality as the criterion of a fair penalty or a just compensation. If honors or rewards are to be distributed, equals should in fairness be treated equally, and those who are unequal in merit should receive unequal shares. For all to share alike is not a just distribution of goods if all do not deserve alike. Awards should be according to merit. Aristotle writes. He claims that all men agree with this, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit but democrats identify it with

their view the ultimate measure of justice in all human institutions and acts as well as in the characters of men is not itself a man made standard but rather a natural principle of justice holding for all men at all times everywhere

THE ISSUE JOINED BY these two theories of justice extends by implication into many related matters. The opposition for example between those who affirm the reality of natural law as the source of legality in all civil regulations and those who derive the legality of positive laws from the will of the sovereign alone is considered in the chapter on Law but its parallelism with the issue of natural and conventional justice should be noted here.

Those who deny natural justice and natural law also tend to deny natural rights which unlike civil rights are not conferred on the individual by the state but are inherent in his human personality. They are according to the Declaration of Independence unalienable in the sense that the state cannot rescind them. What the state does not create it cannot destroy. If a government transgresses natural rights it negates its own reason for being since it is to secure these rights [that] governments are instituted among men.

Those who deny natural rights among which the right to liberty is usually included do not have a standard for judging when governments violate the rights and invade the liberties of men. When men are thought to have no rights except those granted by their rulers the absolute power which the rulers exercise cannot be criticized as tyrannical or despotic.

Considering the situation of men in what he calls a state of perfect freedom—apart from government and civil institutions—Locke says of this state of nature that it has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone and reason which is that law teaches all mankind who will but consult it that being all equal and independent no one ought to harm another in his life health liberty or possessions. Everyone as he is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station willfully so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind and not unless it be to do justice on an offender take away or

impair the life or what tends to the preservation of the life the liberty health limb or goods of another. Since this law of nature and its implied principle of just dealing between men is not abolished when men associate in the common life of a civil society natural justice and natural rights remain according to Locke and others to limit the powers of government and to measure the justice of its laws.

The principle of natural justice is sometimes not accompanied by a doctrine of natural law and natural rights as for example in Greek thought. Their connection first seems to occur in Roman jurisprudence and mediaeval theory. Not all the opponents of natural justice avoid the use of the words natural law and natural rights. Using these words in a different sense Hobbes for example speaks of men living under natural law in a state of nature which is a condition of war of every one against every one and in such condition every man has a right to everything even to another's body. Only when men abandon this unlimited right in order to form a commonwealth do they acquire in recompense certain civil rights or as Hobbes says proprieties. Then and only then can there be any meaning to justice conceived according to the ancient maxim which Hobbes accepts that justice is the constant will to render to each man what is his due.

Both Spinoza and Hume make the same point. Where there is no recognized title to property or legally established right there can be no justice—no respecting of what is a man's own or giving him what belongs to him. The difference between Locke and these others seems to lie in his conception of property as the natural right which a man has to the preservation of his life liberty and estate. There can be justice therefore between men in a state of nature for even then each has some property that the others are bound to respect.

THE MEANING of natural justice can be examined apart from these different interpretations of the so-called state of nature. Those who like Aristotle and Aquinas do not conceive the origin of political society as a transition from the state of nature do nevertheless appeal to a principle of natural justice. For Aquinas this principle seems to be an integral

part of the natural law. Sometimes the statement of the first precept of the natural law is "Seek the good, avoid evil." Sometimes it is "Do good to others, injure no one, and render to every man his own." In this second formula, too, the natural law seems to be identical with the precept of justice. The essential content of this precept seems to be present—separate from any doctrine of natural law—in Aristotle's analysis of the nature of justice both as a virtue and as a quality of human acts.

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THE PRECEPT "to render unto others what is their due" is read in a different light when the other aspect of justice is considered. When the just is conceived as the fair, the fairness which is due ourselves or others applies not to benefit and injury generally but to the exchange and distribution of goods or burdens. What is the principle of a fair exchange or a fair distribution? Aristotle's answer to this question is in terms of equality.

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the status of freeman supporters of oligarchy with wealth or with noble birth and supporters of aristocracy with excellence. The unequal treatment of unequals however still derives its fairness from the principle of equality for there is an equivalence of ratios in the proportion of giving more to the more deserving and less to the less.

Aristotle employs the distinction between these modes of equality—arithmetic and geometric or simple and proportional equality—to define the difference between fairness in exchange and fairness in distribution. The one is the type of justice which is traditionally called commutative corrective or remedial the other distributive.

The type of justice which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man Aristotle further divides into two kinds. Of transactions he writes (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary—voluntary such transactions as sale purchase loan for consumption pledging loan for use depositing letting while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine such as theft adultery poisoning procuring enticement of slaves assassination false witness and (b) others are violent such as assault imprisonment murder robbery with violence mutilation abuse insult. The sphere which Aristotle assigns to commutative or corrective justice thus appears to cover both criminal acts and civil injuries. But as applied to civil injuries the principle of fairness in exchange usually involves a payment for damages restitution or compensation in kind whereas the principle of commutative justice as applied to criminal wrongdoing usually calls for a punishment somehow equalized in severity to the gravity of the offense. This last is the principle of the *lex talionis*—an eye for an eye a life for a life. The problems of justice which it raises are considered in the chapter on PUNISHMENT.

JUSTICE is SOMETIMES divided into economic and political according as on the one hand fairness or equalization concerns the kind of goods which originate with the expenditure of labor or as on the other hand it involves the status of men in the state. The difference between these two modes of justice seems to be largely

dependent upon the kind of transaction to which the principle of justice is applied. The forms of justice—the two modes of equality or fairness—appear to remain the same. The special problems of economic justice are more fully examined in the chapters on LABOR and WEALTH as the special problems of political justice are treated in greater detail in all the chapters dealing with the state government and the several forms of government. Here we shall consider only the generalities and especially those which touch the main issues in the theory of justice.

Though Karl Marx does not engage in the controversy over natural justice he seems to take the side which looks upon justice as a universal standard that does not derive from but rather measures human institutions. Something like from each according to his ability to each according to his needs—or in another variant of the maxim to each according to his deserts—seems to be for Marx the maxim of a just economy stated without argument as if a principle self evident in the very nature of the case. So too in his consideration of the exploitation of labor in its various historic forms—chattel slavery feudal serfdom or agrarian peonage and what he calls wage slavery under industrial capitalism—Marx assumes that a clear and unquestionable principle of justice is being violated when the goods produced by the labor of one man enrich another disproportionately to that other's contribution or desert. Such basic words in *Capital* as expropriation exploitation and unearned increment seem never to be simply terms of description, but of evaluation. Each implies a specific injustice.

The labor theory of value the origin of which he attributes to Adam Smith Marx conceives as solving a problem in justice which Aristotle stated but did not solve. He refers to the chapter in the book on justice in Aristotle's *Ethics* in which Aristotle discusses money as a medium to facilitate the exchange of commodities. Money permits so many units of one commodity to be equated with so many units of another. But the problem is how to determine equivalents in the exchange of unlike things apparently incommensurable in value. How can the value of a house be commensurated with the

value of a bed so that an equality in value can be set up between a house and a certain number of beds? Abstracting entirely from considerations of supply and demand, the determination of a just exchange or a fair price requires an equation of comparable quantities.

As Aristotle tells us, Marx points out why he found the problem insoluble. It was the absence of any concept of value. What is that equal something that common substance which admits of the value of beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing in truth cannot exist says Aristotle. And why not? Compared with beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is—human labor. The brilliance of Aristotle's genius is shown by this alone: that he discovered in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived alone prevented him from discovering what in truth was at the bottom of this equality.

We cannot help notice the character of the labor theory of value as an analysis not only of justice in exchange but also of just compensation to labor for its productivity. The principle of justice here employed seems to be the same as that underlying in the medieval condemnation of interest as unjust or usurious, or the later effort to discriminate between just and unjust interest rates. The principle even seems to be implicitly involved in Adam Smith's distinction between real or natural price and the market price which fluctuates with variations in supply and demand.

When the economic problem is one of distribution rather than exchange, another standard of fairness—the proportional equality of distribution—becomes relevant.

The assumption of a primitive man possesses one of all things in common, especially land and its resources, is the background against which such thinkers as Aquinas and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Montesquieu and Hegel, Adam Smith and Karl Marx consider the origin or justification of private property. Insofar as the question is one of justification rather than of actual historic origin, the division of common holdings into privately held shares is a matter of justice in distribution. In the opinion of many a just

distribution would recognize that labor alone entitles a man to claim power over the raw materials improved by his work and of the finished products of that work.

The other face of the problem assumes an existing inequitable distribution. It is then asked how this can be rectified by some method of redistributing wealth more justly, or it is proposed that the whole system of private property be reformed in the direction of public ownership of the means of production as the basis for a just distribution of the fruits of human productivity.

The connection which has become evident between justice and both liberty and equality does not imply that these three basic notions are simply coordinate with one another. On the contrary, equality seems to be the root of justice at least insofar as it is identified with fairness in exchange or distribution, and justice in turn seems to be the foundation, not the consequence of liberty.

The condemnation of slavery confirms this observation. If slavery were not unjust, the slave would have no right to be free. The injustice of treating a man as a chattel ultimately rests on the equality between him and his master as human beings. His right to the same liberty which his master enjoys stems from that equality. The justice of equal treatment for equals recognizes that right and sets him free. Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is based on a supposition of natural inequality which is thought to justify the enslavement of some men and the freedom of others. Whenever slavery is justified or a criminal is justly imprisoned, neither the slave nor the criminal is regarded as deprived of any liberty to which he has a right.

It would seem to follow that if a man is justly treated, he has all the liberty which he deserves. From the opposite angle, Mill argues that a man is entitled to all the liberty that he can use justly—that is, use without injuring his fellow man or the common good. More liberty than this would be license. When one man encroaches on the rights of others, or inflicts on them any loss or damage not justified by his own rights, he is overstepping the bounds of liberty and is, according to Mill a fit object of

moral reprobation and in grave cases of moral retribution and punishment

The various relations of liberty to justice and of both to law are considered in the chapters on LIBERTY and LAW. All the writers who make the distinction between government by law and government by men fundamental in their political theory also plainly express a preference for the former on grounds both of justice and liberty

Absolute government which violates the equality of men unjustly subjects them even when it does not through tyranny enslave them. The benevolence of the despot ruling for the common good has one aspect of justice but there are other aspects of political justice which can be achieved as Mill points out only if despotism consents not to be despotism and allows the general business of government to go on as if the people really governed themselves. The greater justice of constitutional government consists in its granting to men who deserve the equal freedom of equals the equality of citizenship—an equality under the law which levels those citizens who happen to hold public office with those in private life

The major controversy over the several forms of constitutional government turns on a third point of justice. The defenders of democracy and oligarchy each contend that equalities or inequalities in birth or wealth justify a broader or a narrower franchise. It is Mill again who insists that nothing less than universal suffrage provides a just distribution of the political status of citizenship and that it is a personal injustice to withhold from anyone unless for the prevention of greater evils the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people

Of the three points of justice which seem to be involved in the comparison of forms of government only the first (concerned with whether political power is exercised for the common good or the ruler's private interests) is not recognizable as a matter of distributive justice. Yet even here the requirement that the ruler should treat the ruled as ends rather than as means derives from a fundamental equality between ruler and ruled. The injustice of tyranny lies in a violation of this equality

ONE MEANING of justice remains to be considered. It is related to all the foregoing considerations of economic and political justice of just constitutions, just laws and just acts. It is that meaning of justice in which a man is said to be just—to possess a just will—to be just in character—to have the virtue of justice. Here difference in theory reflects the difference between those moralists for whom virtue is the basic conception and those who like Kant emphasize duty or who like Mill reduce the propensity for justice to a moral sentiment. But even among those who treat justice as a virtue there seems to be a profound difference in analysis

For Aristotle the virtue of justice like other moral virtues is a habit of conduct. It differs from courage and temperance in that it is a habit of action not of the passions. It is not a rationally moderated tendency of the emotions with regard to things pleasant and painful. It is that settled inclination of the will in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer by choice of that which is just and one who will distribute either between himself and another or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbor (and conversely with what is harmful) but so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion

Another difference between justice and the other moral virtues is that courageous and temperate acts are performed only by courageous and temperate men whereas an act which is outwardly just can be done by an unjust man as well as by a just one

Fair dealing in the exchange or distribution of goods determined by objective relations of equality is the substance of justice as a special virtue but there is in addition what Aristotle calls general as opposed to special justice. Aristotle calls the general virtue of justice complete virtue because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also. It embraces all the moral virtues insofar as their acts are directed to the good of others

Justice in this sense he goes on to say is not a part of virtue but virtue entire whereas special justice—the justice of distributions and exchanges—is merely a part of moral virtue

merely one particular virtue. Yet special justice no less than general justice is a social virtue. The difference between the way each directs actions toward the good of others seems to be like the difference between the lawful and the fair or the difference between the common good of society as a whole and the good of other individuals.

The thoroughly social conception of justice in Aristotle may have some parallel in the meaning of justice in Plato's *Gorgias* (where the question is whether it is better to suffer than to do injustice) but the definition of justice as a virtue in the *Republic* does not express or develop the social reference. In the state as in the soul, justice is a fitting position or harmonious order—of the several classes of men in the state of the several virtues in the soul. The just state is not described as acting justly toward other states, nor is the just man pictured as a doer of good deeds. Rather the picture of the soul in which justice resides is one of interior peace or spiritual health—the well being of happiness.

Justice, Socrates declares, is concerned not with the outward man, but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one

another or any of them to do the work of others—he sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself. His is one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature.

This conception of justice bears a certain resemblance to what the Christian theologians mean by original justice. The perfect disposition of Adam's soul in a state of supernatural grace considered according to Aquinas in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason and the body to the soul—the first subjection being the cause of both the second and the third since while reason was subject to God the lower powers remained subject to reason. The justice of man's obedience to God seems to be inseparable from the justice internal to his own members.

The way in which justice is discussed in the *Corpus* may similarly be inseparable from the way it is defined in the *Republic*. Certainly Callicles will never understand why it is always better to suffer injustice than to do it unless Socrates succeeds in explaining to him that the man who is wronged suffers injury in body or in external things, while the man who does wrong injures his own soul by destroying what, for Socrates, is its greatest good—that equitable temper from which all fitting actions flow.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Diverse conceptions of justice

1a Justice as the interest of the stronger or conformity to the will of the sovereign

1b Justice as harmony or right order in the soul or original justice

1c Justice as a moral virtue directing activity in relation to others and to the community—the distinction between the just man and the just act

1d Justice as the whole of virtue and as a particular virtue—the distinction between the lawful and the fair

1e Justice as an act of will or duty fulfilling obligations to the common good—the harmonious action of individual wills under a universal law of freedom

1f Justice as a custom or moral sentiment based on considerations of utility

2. The precepts of justice—doing good, harming no one, rendering to each his own, treating equals equally

3. The duties of justice compared with the generosity of love and friendship

4. The comparison of justice and expediency—the choice between doing and suffering, justice—the relation of justice to happiness

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P. 2. **SIGNOS.** When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 1533 **JANE F.** folio 116a-119b the page numbers in the upper half of the page 116a and ends in the lower half of page 119b. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 1714 **PLATO SYRUS** folio 163b-164c, the page number a is the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

4. **ACTING DIRECTOR.** One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as Part I, Section 1, etc.) are sometimes included in the reference list numbers, in brackets, as given in the two cases of *Landmark* [65-93] 12d.

¶ 114 RASIA c13 The references are to book chapter and verse. Where the h = James and Dom = Domitian in title of book or in the number of chapters or verses. The King James version is cited first and the Domitian indicated by a (D) follows e.g. Old Testament 1st (D) II Esdras 16.

Synopsis The abbreviation *esp.* calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Index*; consult the Preface.

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14. Justice as the interest of the stronger or conformity to the will of the sovereign

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 6b *The relation between natural and positive rights innate and acquired rights private and public rights their correlative duties*

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [513-565] 262d 263b / *Bacchantes* [878-911] 347b c / *Phoenician Maidens* [1625-1682] 392b d / *Orestes* [491-604] 399a-400a

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8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 12 [173-7-31] 238b e

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laus* BK I 1a 3a BK VIII 52a b BK XVI 215b 216c 217b 221c d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333a d 342c 347d 362d 363a c / *Political Economy* 370b d / *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c BK II 396d 398b 399b c

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 94 AA 5-6 224d 226b II 96 A 6 235a d Q 97 235d 239b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 87c d 90a b 94b d PART II 115a 116a 142b-c

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laus* BK XV 109a 110a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 388a-c 399a 390d BK II 396d 398b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 61b

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42 KANT *Science of Right* 401b-402a 421c-422d 445c 446a 451d-452a 454d-455c

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US AMENDMENTS II 17d

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43 MILL *Liberty* 270d 316b d

44 BOSWELL Johnson 363c 364a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 57 26b 27a par 66 29a-c / *Philosophy of History* PART III 310d 311a

6d Justice as the basis for the distinction between liberty and license

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laus* BK III 10a BK VIII 51a 52c BK XI 69a-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324a II / *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 622d 623c 653a

43 MILL *Liberty* 271c 273b 302d 323a c passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 319 105b 106c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 342b d

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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 96 A 4 512d 513c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 138c

(7) *Domestic justice the problems of right and duty in the family*

- 50 MARX *Capital* 241a d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 38d 41a 45b 47b EPILOGUE I 654a 662a
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 1a 11a BK II 34d 36b BK XII 370b 371c 395a 398a
 54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 876c

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- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 10 15 17 / *Leviticus* 19 11 35-36 35 35-37 / *Deuteronomy* 5 19 21 24 10-15 25 13 16 27 17 / *II Samuel* 12 1-6—(D) *II Kings* 12 1-6 / *I Kings* 21—(D) *III Kings* 21 / *II Kings* 5 20-27—(D) *IV Kings* 5 20-27 / *Achemiah* 5 1-1—(D) *IV Kings* 5 1-12 / *Job* 4 / *Proverbs* 1 10-19 6 30-31 11 1 14 31 16 11 20 10 21 6-7 2 16 2-23 23 10-11 28 8 24 30 8-9 / *Isaiah* 3 14-15 10 1—(D) *Isaiah* 3 14 15 10 1-2 / *Jeremiah* 17 11—(D) *Jeremiah* 17 11 / *Ezekiel* 22 12-13 25 29 45 9-12—(D) *Ezekiel* 22 12 13 25-29 45 9-12 / *Amos* 2 6-7 5 11-12 8 1-7 esp 8 4-6 / *Micah* 6 9-12—(D) *Micah* 6 9-12 / *Zachariah* 5 3—(D) *Zachariah* 5 3

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- ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130 13 17] 377c 378a BK VIII CH 13-14 414d 416d passim / *Politics* BK I CH 3 11 446d-453d passim BK II CH 5 458a 460a CH 7 461d 463c BK V CH I [1301 25-21] 502b c / *Athenian Constitution* CH 12 557b 558a

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- AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 21 A 1 124b 125b Q 98 A 1 REP 3 516d 517c

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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 93b-c PART 124d 126a 156c 157a

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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I 351a 354d

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 86b-c

- 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 91a-94a

- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V 30b 36a passim

- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b

- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 19a d 23a 25a 29c BK XIII 96a 102a c BK XVIII 128b BK XX 146b d BK XXIII 199b 200a c

- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348b 354a-355b 360b 361a 365b 366a / *Political Economy* 377b 385a c / *Social Contract* BK III 415b 417c

- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 20b 23b passim esp 21a c 27b 37b esp 33c BK V 309a 311c

- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 22c

- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 86d 87c

- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 443b d 445a B

- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 2 [17-29] 11b SECT 9 [73 275] 13d ARTICLE VI [578-582] 16d AMENDMENTS V [645-648] 17c VII 17d XIV SECT I [748 750] 18c SECT 4 19a XVI 19b

- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 73 218d 219b NEWBERRY 79 233c d

- 43 MILL *Liberty* 322c d / *Representative Government* 335a b 366c 367a / *Utilitarianism* 470c-471b passim 472d-473c

- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125b-c

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 49 24c 25a PART III par 241 76d 77a ADDITIONS 9 121c 148 140c d / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 353b-c

- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 297a

- 50 MARX *Capital* 1a 383d esp 19a 25d 37d 38b [fn 5] 42b-47a 79a 84a c 89a 94a 113c 113c 150a 151a c 161b 162d 261d 26 3 264a 275c 280c 286a 327b 354b c 377c 378d

- 50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 415a 434d esp 420b 423a 425d-426d 428d 429c 434c d

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 197b-c 211a 213a

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b 166a

- 54 FIELD *Caspar and His Discontents* 787d 788a

8a Private and public property the just distribution of economic goods

- OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 10 15 17 / *Leviticus* 19 11 / *Deuteronomy* 5 19 21 27 17 / *II Samuel* 12 1-6—(D) *II Kings* 1 1-6 / *I Kings* 21—(D) *III Kings* 21 / *Job* 24 / *Proverbs* 6 30-

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- (8) *Economic justice justice in production distribution and exchange* 8b *Fair wages and prices the just exchange of goods and services*

- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1-167] 351a 353a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 30c d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVIII 128b BK XX 146b d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353b 365d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 13a 16a 20b 23b esp 20c 21c 27b 37b esp 33c 42a 62a passim esp 52b-c 56b 57a 61c d 106c 107a BK IV 225d 228a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 22c
42 HANT *Science of Right* 424b 425a 446a b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. AMENDMENTS VIII 17d
43 MILL *Liberty* 309a-c 322c d / *Representative Government* 366d 367a / *Utilitarianism* 467b 470c d 472d-473a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 36 76a c ADDITIONS 145 140b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 353b-c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 297a
50 MARX *Capital* 13a 50a esp 13d 18a 19d 20b 24c 25d 27a c 31b 33b 37c 39c 42b-44c 69a 84a esp 74c 78a 79c 84a 89d 102b passim esp 93b 96a 100a 101a 171a c 256b-260c esp 258b c 264a 275c 296c 298a 305c 307c 324a 327b esp 327b 366a 368a
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 423c d 425d 427b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 572d 573b

8c Justice in the organization of production

- 50 MARX *Capital* 33d 36c esp 34d 35a 37d 38b [fn 5] 85a 263d esp 111c 115c 160d 164a 171d 180d 192d 209a 215a 217b 226d 227d 261c 262a 279d 286a esp 285c 286a 311c 321b 354a 355d 377c 378d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 419d 425b esp 421a 422c 426a-427b

8c(1) Economic exploitation chattel slavery and wage slavery

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1134^b 17] 382b c BK VIII CH II [1161 30^b 10] 413c d / *Politics* BK I CH 3 7 446d 447c CH II [1259 18] CH 13 [1260^b 7] 453c-455a BK III CH 6 [1278^b 3-37] 476a b / *Athenian Constitution* CH 2 553a-c
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46c 47a / *Marcus Cato* 278d 279c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A 4 ANS AND REP I 4 318b 321a
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1-51] 339b 340b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b-155a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 352a 353c 355b 365b 366a

- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 28a d 61c d 109d 110d BK III 165b 170c BK IV 253 254a 287c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 144b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 45b
42 HANT *Science of Right* 421c-422d 445c 446a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE I SECT 9 [260-266] 13d ARTICLE IV SECT [529-531] 16b AMENDMENTS VIII 18c
43 MILL *Representative Government* 339d 340
44 BOSWELL Johnson 363c 364a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 335b-336c
50 MARX *Capital* 1a 383d esp 102b-103c 112c 115c 127c 131a 150a-c 176a 178d 193a 209a 264a 275c 282d 286a 296c 301b 354a 355d 366a 368b 376c 377a 379a 383d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420c d 422c-423a 424b-425a 426b-428a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 211a 213a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b c

8c(2) Profit and unearned increment

- 14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 287c d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 20b-23b passim esp 21a-c 27b 28a 109d 110d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 243 77b-c
50 MARX *Capital* 71d 72c 85a 263d esp 92c 94a 100a 101b 104b 105c 112c 154d 156d 198c 199b 254c 255a 263c d 267b 267d 275c passim esp 271b-c 286a 301b passim esp 288b 289c 295a d 301a b 327b

8d Justice and the use of money usury and interest rates

- OLD TESTAMENT Exodus 2 25 / Leviticus 5 35 37 / Deuteronomy 23 19 20 4 10-13 / Nehemiah 5-(D) II Esdras 5 / Psalm 15 5-(D) Palms 14 5 / Proverbs 28 8 / Jeremiah 15 10-(D) Jeremiah 15 10 / Ezekiel 18 4 1 esp 18 8 13 18 17 2 12-(D) Ezekiel 18 4 21 esp 18 8 18 13 18 17 22 1
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 408c d / *Lysis* BK V 694c d BK VI 775c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH [1130 13^b] 377c 378a CH 5 [1133 5^b 9] 380d 381c BK IX CH 2 [1164^b 30-1165 11] 417d-418a / *Politics* BK I CH 9 10 450d 452d esp CH III [1258 38^b] 452d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 12 par 4 557d 558a
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 287c d / *Lucullus* 409b d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 90a-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A 2 REP 4 309d 316a
21 DANTY *Dante Comedy* HELL VI [91 111] 16a b XVII [31 5] 24a c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 133b 140b

- 20 *See* *Respect to Merchants of Venice* ACT 1
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- 31 *Practical Provenance Letters* 55a 57a
- 38 *Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws* BK 1 29c BK
21 92d-93 x 2 169a 170b BK XXII
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- 39 *Smith's Wealth of Nations* BK 1 37b-41d
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- 40 *Gibson's Decline and Fall* 493c
- 41 *Gibson's Decline and Fall* 90d 91a
- 42 *Hart's Science of Rights* 424a-425b
- 44 *Boswell's Johnson* 304b-c 409a b
- 46 *Hegel's Philosophy of History* v BK IV 353b-c
- 50 *Alfred's Capital* 77c 78b 252b 293a d [f 1]
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- 9 *Political justice as just as in government*
- 61 *Hebrews' History* BK 1 23b-d
- 6 *Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War* BK II 396c-d
- 7 *Plato's Critique* 213a 219a c / *Republic* 295a
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- 9 *Aristotle's Ethics* BK 1 1 29th 14 19]
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- 12 *Athenian Mediations* BK I SECT 14 254b-c
- 14 *Plutarch's Lives* 46c-47a
- 18 *Aristotle's City of God* BK 1 CH 21 142d
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- 20 *Aquinas's Summa Theologiae* CH 2 BK II Q 96
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- 23 *Hans Reiss's Leviathan* v BK 1 86b 91 b p 7
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- 31 *Spiro's Ethics* BK IV PROP 37 s 104 2
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- 35 *Locke's Civil Government* CH IX 53c 54d
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- 36 *Spiro's City of God* BK 1 28a b
- 38 *Rousseau's Inequality* 353b-362b passim /
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- 39 *Smith's Wealth of Nations* BK 1 307 311c
- 42 *Hegel's Science of Rights* 433c-434d 435c-437c
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- 43 *Mill's Representative Government* 369d 370a
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- 45 *Mill's Philosophy of Rights* v BK III par
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- 47 *Goethe's Faust* v BK II [4 72 451] 118b-
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- 49 *Alfred's Capital* c 15 Comm in M f 510 428d
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- 9a *The natural and the conventional in political justice* natural law and the general will
- 7 *Plato's Critique* 271b-275d / *Republic* 295a
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- 9 *Aristotle's Ethics* BK 1 CH 1 352c 353a /
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- 18 *Alexander's Confessions* BK III par 14 15
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- 20 *Aquinas's Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 91
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- 23 *Hobbes's Leviathan* PART I 86b 91a b PART
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- 25 *Mill's Utilitarianism* 281a 283c
- 31 *Spiro's Ethics* PART IV p 3 3 110c 2
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- 33 *Pascal's Pensées* 201 315 225a 233a
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- I Works by authors represented in this collection.
- II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 43 KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

KNOWLEDGE like being is a term of comprehensive scope. Its comprehensiveness is in a way correlative with that of being. The only thing which cannot be an object of knowledge or opinion which cannot be thought about in any way except negatively is that which has no being of any sort—in short *nothing*. Not all things may be knowable to us, but even the skeptic who severely limits or completely doubts man's power to know is usually willing to admit that things beyond man's knowledge are in themselves knowable. Everyone except Berkeley would agree that the surfaces of bodies which we cannot see are not for that reason in themselves invisible.

The consideration of knowledge extends therefore to all things knowable to all kinds of knowers, to all the modes of knowledge, and all the methods of knowing. So extensive an array of topics exceeds the possibility of treatment in a single chapter and requires this chapter to be related to many others.

The Cross References which follow the References indicate the other chapters which deal with particulars we cannot consider here. For example, the nature of history, science, philosophy, and theology, and their distinction from one another, are treated in the chapters devoted to those subjects. So too the chapters on metaphysics, mathematics, physics, mechanics, and medicine deal with the characteristics and relations of these special sciences. The psychological factors in knowing—the faculties of sense and mind, of memory and imagination, the nature of experience and reasoning—also have their own chapters. Still other chapters deal with the logical elements of knowledge, such as idea and judgment, definition, hypothesis, principle, induction and reasoning, logic and dialectic.

THE PROGRAM which Locke sets himself in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is often taken to include the basic questions about knowledge. His purpose, he tells us, is "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." Two other matters, not explicitly mentioned by Locke in his opening pages, assume central importance in the fourth book of his essay. One is the question about the nature of knowledge itself. The other concerns the kinds of knowledge.

It may be thought that certain questions are prior to these and all others. Is knowledge possible? Can we know anything? The man the skeptic challenges is one who thinks that knowledge is attainable and who may even claim to possess knowledge of some sort. But the issue between the skeptic and his adversaries cannot be simply formulated. Its formulation depends in part upon the meaning given knowledge and the various things with which it is sometimes contrasted, such as belief and opinion, or ignorance and error. It also depends in part on the meaning of truth and probability. It would seem therefore that some consideration of the nature of knowledge should precede the examination of the claims concerning knowledge which provoke skeptical denials.

The theory of knowledge is a field of many disputes. Most of the major varieties of doctrine or analysis are represented in the tradition of the great books. But the fact that knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known seems to go unquestioned. William James expresses this insight perhaps more dogmatically than some would allow in the statement that knowledge is a thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other

rather makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world and one simply knows or is known to, its counterpart. This remains true even when attention is turned to the special case of knowledge about knowledge or the knower knowing himself. The mind's examination of itself simply makes the mind an object to be known as well as a knower.

This suggests a second point about the nature of knowledge which seems to be understood. If knowledge is a knower to a known then what is somehow possessed when a person claims to have knowledge is the object known. It does not seem possible for anyone to say that he knows something without meaning that he has that something in mind. "Some sort of signal," James writes, must be given by the thing to the man's brain, or the knowing, will occur. We find as a matter of fact that the mere existence of a thing outside the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike the brain in some way as well as be there to be known. What is not in any way present to or represented in the mind is not known in any of the various senses of the word "know." What the mind cannot reach to and somehow grasp cannot be known. The words which are common synonyms for knowing—"apprehend," "comprehend," "conceive," thus sense that knowledge is somehow takes hold of and surrounds its object.

That knowledge is a kind of possession occasions the comparisons which have been made between knowledge and love. The ancient is observed that likeness and union are involved in both. Plotinus, for example, suggests in the *Symposium* that both the knower and the lover strive to become one with their object. "Love is also a philosopher," Diogenes tells Socrates, and, as a lover of wisdom, the philosopher is also a lover.

With regard to some objects, love and knowledge are almost inseparable. To know them is to love them. But this does not hold for all objects, nor does the inseparability of knowledge and love in certain cases prevent their anal-ogy from holding in all. Love is known by use but makes a fact each object. Furthermore, according to our theory of knowledge, expounded by Aquinas, the knower is assumed to possess a union with the thing to be known. This union

provides the likeness through which knowledge occurs and thus, Aquinas writes, "the idea of the thing, understood is in the one who understands." The lover, on the other hand, is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. He seeks to be united with it directly. The nobility or baseness of the object known does not affect the knower as the character of the object loved affects the lover. This understanding of the difference between knowledge and love leads Aquinas to say that "to love God is better than to know God but on the contrary, to know corporeal things is better than to love them."

The principle of likeness between knower and known does not go undisturbed. On the contrary, the opposite views here form one of the basic issues about the nature of knowledge. The issue is whether the thing known is actually present to the knower existing in the mind or consciousness exactly as it exists in itself or whether the thing is represented in the mind by a likeness of itself through which the mind knows it. In this view, the mode of existence of the thing outside the mind is different from the way in which its representative exists in the mind.

Berkeley at one extreme identifies being and being known. "As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible," he writes. "Their *esse* is *percipi* nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the mind or thinking things which perceive them."

At the other extreme are those like Kant for whom the thing in itself is unknowable precisely because there can be no resemblance between the phenomenal order of objects represented under the conditions of experience and the noumenal order of the unconditioned. "All appearances of things in themselves," he writes, "must be referred to an intuition, and with us men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as appearances."

The unconditioned," he adds, "can never be found in this chain of appearances."

In between these extremes there are those who agree that things exist apart from being known without ceasing to be knowable but who nevertheless differ with respect to whether

the thing exists in reality in the same way that it exists in the mind. The several forms of idealism and realism distinguished in the chapter on IDEA mark the range of traditional differences in the discussion of this difficult problem.

FOR ANY THEORY of what knowledge is there is a distinction between knowledge and ignorance—between having or not having something in mind. Nor does anyone confuse ignorance and error. The mind in error claims to know that of which in fact it is ignorant. This as Socrates points out in the *Meno* makes it easier to teach a person aware of his ignorance than a person in error for the latter supposing himself to know resists the teacher. Hence getting a person to acknowledge ignorance is often the indispensable first step in teaching.

But though the difference between knowledge and ignorance and that between ignorance and error seems to be commonly understood it does not follow that everybody similarly agrees upon the difference between knowledge and error. This much is agreed that to know is to possess the truth about something whereas to err is to be deceived by falsity mistaken for truth. The disagreement of the philosophers begins however when the meaning of truth and falsity is examined.

Truth is one thing for those who insist upon some similarity between the thing known and that by which it is known or represented in the mind. It is another for those who think that knowledge can be gained without the mediation of images or representations. In the first case truth will consist in some kind of correspondence between what the mind thinks or understands and the reality it tries to know. In the other truth will be equivalent to consistency among the mind's own ideas.

The examination of this fundamental disagreement is reserved for the chapter on TRUTH. Here the identification of knowing with having the truth calls for the consideration of another distinction first made by Plato. In his language as in that of Aristotle and others it is the difference between knowledge and opinion. Sometimes as with Locke a similar distinction is made in terms of knowledge and judgment; sometimes it is made in terms of knowledge and belief; sometimes in terms of adequate and

inadequate or certain and probable knowledge.

The difference between these opposites, unlike that between knowledge and error is not a matter of truth and falsity. There is such a thing as right opinion according to Socrates and it is not less useful than knowledge. Considering the truth so far as it affects action Socrates claims that the man with right opinion will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth as he who knows the truth. The difference between right opinion and knowledge is here expressed by the contrast between the words thinks and knows. It does not consist in the truth of the conclusion but in the way that conclusion has been reached or is held by the mind.

The trouble with right opinion as compared with knowledge Socrates explains is that it lacks stability and permanence. Right opinions are useful while they abide with us but they run away out of the human soul and do not remain long and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause—or in other words until they are fixed in the mind by the reasons on which they are grounded. When they are bound Socrates declares they have the nature of knowledge and they are abiding.

At this point in his conversation with Meno Socrates makes the unusual confession that there are not many things which I profess to know but this is most certainly one of them namely that knowledge differs from true opinion. It may be that Socrates claims to know so little because he regards knowledge as involving so much more than simply having the truth as the man of right opinion has it. In addition to having the truth knowledge consists in seeing the reason why it is true.

This criterion can be interpreted to mean that a proposition which is neither self-evident nor demonstrated expresses opinion rather than knowledge. Even when it happens to be true the opinion is qualified by some degree of doubt or some estimate of probability and counter-probability. In contrast when the mind has adequate grounds for its judgment when it knows that it knows and why it has the certainty of knowledge.

For some writers such as Plato certitude is inseparable from knowledge as truth is. To speak of a false knowledge as well as a true seems to him impossible and uncertain knowledge is as self contradictory a phrase as false knowledge.

Others use the word knowledge more loosely to cover both adequate and inadequate knowledge the probable as well as the certain. They make a distinction within the sphere of knowledge that is equivalent to the distinction between knowledge and opinion.

Spinoza for example distinguishes three kinds of knowledge. He groups the perception of individual things through the bodily senses, which he calls knowledge from vague experience with knowledge from signs which depends on ideas formed by the memory and imagination. These two ways of looking at things he writes I shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind—opinion or imagination. In contrast that which is derived from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things he calls reason and knowledge of the second kind.

The third kind which he calls intuition is that sort of knowing which advances from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Knowledge of the second and third kinds he maintains is necessarily true. That there can be falsity in the first kind and only there and states that it is not genuinely knowledge at all, but what other writers would insist upon calling opinion.

The several meanings of the word belief are determined by these distinctions. Sometimes belief is associated with opinion sometimes with knowledge and sometimes it is regarded as an intermediate state of mind. But in any of these meanings belief stands in contrast to knowledge and thus contrast has a bearing on knowledge and opinion as well. To know or to opine puts the mind in some relation to the real or actual rather than the merely possible and subjective to the criteria of truth and falsity. The fanciful or imaginary belongs to the realm of the possible (or even the impossible) and the mind in imagination is fancy free—from the restraints and restrictions of truth and reality.

SKEPTICISM in its most extreme form takes the position that there is nothing true or false. But even those who like Montaigne deny certitude with respect to everything except matters of religious faith do not go this far.

In his *Apology for Raymond de Seborde* he concedes that if opinions are weighed as more or less probable their truth or falsity is implied—at least as being the limit which an increasing probability or improbability approaches. Referring to ancient skeptics of the Academic school he comments on the fact that they acknowledged some things to be more likely than others—as, for example that snow is white rather than black. The more extreme skeptics the Epicureans he points out were bolder and also more consistent. They refused to incline toward one proposition more than toward another for to do so, Montaigne declares is to recognize some more apparent truth in this than in that. How can men suffer themselves he asks to incline to and be swayed by probability if they know not the truth itself? How should they know the similitude of that whereof they do not know the essence?

In this respect Montaigne's own skepticism tends to be of the more moderate variety since in the realm of action at least he would admit the need for judgments of probability. But in all other respects, he takes a firm skeptical stand that nothing is self evident nothing has been proved. The contradictory of everything has been asserted or argued by someone. Men can have no principles, he writes if not revealed to them by the Divinity of all the rest. The beginning the middle and the end are nothing but dream and vapor. Every human presupposition and every declaration has as much authority one as another. The persuasion of certainty is a certain testimony of folly and extreme uncertainty.

The skeptical extreme is represented in the great books only through references to it for the purpose of refutation. Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* for example reports the position of those who say that all propositions are true or that all propositions are false and who therefore deny the principle of contradiction and with it the distinction between true and false. But if all propositions are true then the proposition Some propositions are false is also true if

all propositions are false the proposition *All propositions are false* is also false. The skeptic may reply of course that he is not checked by arguments which try to make him contradict himself for he does not mind contradicting himself. To this there is only one answer which is not to argue with the skeptic any further.

From the skeptic's point of view his position is irrefutable so long as he does not allow himself to accept any of the standards by which refutation can be effected. From his opponent's point of view complete skepticism is self refuting because if the skeptic says anything definite at all he appears to have some knowledge or at least to hold one opinion in preference to another. His only choice is to remain silent. If he insists upon making statements in defiance of self contradiction his opponent can do nothing but walk away.

It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the skeptics to destroy *reason* by argument and ratiocination. Hume writes yet this is the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes. He has in mind the excessive skepticism or *Pyrrhonism* from which he tries to distinguish a mitigated and beneficial form of skepticism. Referring to Berkeley's arguments against the independent reality of matter or bodies Hume says their effect is skeptical despite Berkeley's professed intention to the contrary. That his arguments are skeptical appears from this that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of skepticism.

Here and elsewhere as in his comment on Descartes' skeptical method of doubting every thing which can be doubted Hume does not seem to think that excessive skepticism is refutable or even false. But it is impractical. The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of skepticism he says is action and employment and the occupations of life. Extreme skepticism becomes untenable in thought the moment thought must face the choices of life and take some responsibility for action.

There is however a more mitigated skepticism or *academical philosophy* which may be both durable and useful. This according to Hume consists in becoming sensible of the

strange infirmities of human understanding and consequently in the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.

His own view of the extent and certainty of human knowledge seems to him to exemplify such mitigated skepticism in operation. The only objects with respect to which demonstration is possible are quantity and number. Mathematics has the certitude of knowledge but it deals only with relations between ideas not with what Hume calls matters of fact and existence. Such matters are evidently incapable of demonstration. This is the sphere of moral certainty which is not a genuine certainty but only a degree of probability sufficient for action. Probabilities are the best if experimental reasoning or inquiry about matters of fact can achieve. If probability is characteristic of opinion rather than knowledge then we can have nothing better than opinion concerning real existences.

THE DIAMETRICAL opposite to the extreme of skepticism would have to be a dogmatism which placed no objects beyond the reach of human knowledge which made no distinction between degrees of knowability and admitted equal certitude in all matters. Like excessive skepticism this extreme is not a position actually held in the great books. All the great thinkers who have considered the problem of human knowledge have set limits to man's capacity for knowledge. They have placed certain objects beyond man's power to apprehend at all or have distinguished between those which he can apprehend in some inadequate fashion but cannot comprehend. They have indicated other objects concerning which his grasp is adequate and certain.

They all adopt a mitigated skepticism — to use Hume's phrase — if this can be taken to mean avoiding the extremes of saying that nothing is knowable at all and that every thing is equally knowable. But they differ in the criteria they employ to set the limits of knowledge and to distinguish between the areas of certainty and probability. Consequently they differ in their determination of the knowability of certain types of objects such as God or the infinite substance or cause matter or spirit the real or the ideal the self or the thing in itself.

For example! Plato and Aristotle agree that knowledge must be separated from opinion and even appeal to certain common principles in making that separation but they do not define the scope of knowledge in the same way as is indicated by the disagreement about the knowability of sensible things. Nor do Descartes and Locke. Bacon and Spinoza. Hume and Kant agree about the knowability of God or of the soul or about the conditions any object must meet in order to be knowable. All alike proceed from a desire to be critical. Each criticizes what other men have proposed as knowledge and each proposes a new method by which the pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded from illusory hopes or endless controversies.

In this last respect the moderns depart most radically from their medieval and ancient predecessors. At all times men have been interested in examining knowledge itself as well as in examining their powers to know. But in the earlier phase of the tradition knowledge about knowledge does not seem to take precedence over all other inquiries or to be prerequisite to them. On the contrary the ancients proceed as if the study of knowledge necessarily presupposed the existence of knowledge. With them the examination takes place because the mind is essentially reflexive rather than for reasons of self-criticism. But beginning with Descartes *Discourse on the Method* in which a method of universal doubt is proposed to clear the ground before the foundations of the sciences can be laid the consideration of knowing is put before any attempt to know.

Sometimes, as with Descartes and Bacon, the emphasis is upon a new method which will at last establish knowledge on a firm footing of advance learning. Sometimes, as with Locke and Hume, attention is given first of all to the faculty of understanding itself.

If we can find out "says Locke" how far the understanding can extend its views, how far it has faculties to attain certainty and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate of what we may expect

from them we shall not be inclined either to sit still and not set our thoughts to work at all in despair of knowing anything nor on the other side question every thing and disclaim all knowledge because some things are not to be understood.

Hume also proposes that a study of human understanding precede everything else in showing from an exact analysis of its powers and capacities "what subjects it is or is not fitted to investigate. There is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding." No one can doubt that a science of the mind—or knowledge about knowing—is possible unless he entertains "such a skepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculations, and even action."

Disagreeing with the principles of Locke and Hume as well as with their conclusions, Kant does approve the priority they give to the question of the possibility of knowing certain objects. To proceed otherwise, as Kant charges most other philosophers with doing, is dogmatism. The use of the word *critique* in the title of Kant's three major works signifies his intention to construct a critical philosophy which does not presume that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason. He does not object to what he calls the dogmatical procedure of reason in the development of science but only after reason's self-criticism has determined just how far reason can go. For Kant as for Bacon, dogmatism and skepticism are the opposite extremes which only a critical method can avoid.

These two different approaches to the theory of knowledge seem to result in different conclusions concerning the nature and scope of human knowledge. Those who begin with the established sciences and merely inquire into their foundations and methods, appear to end with unqualified confidence in man's ability to know. Those who make the inquiry into the foundations and methods of science a necessary preparation for the development of the sciences tend for the most part to set narrower boundaries to the area of valid knowledge. The two approaches also affect the way in which the various kinds of knowledge are distinguished and compared.

There are two sorts of comparison involved

in the classification of kinds of knowledge. One is a comparison of human knowledge with divine or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge of brute animals. The other is a comparison of the parts or modes of human knowledge according to such criteria as the objects to be known, the faculties engaged in the process of knowing, and the manner of their operation. Though made separately, those two comparisons are seldom independent of one another. As the nature of man is conceived in relation to other beings superior or inferior to himself, his faculties will be rated accordingly, and his power as a knower will suggest the methods or means available to him for knowing.

Aquinas, for example, attributes to man the kind of knowledge appropriate to his station in the hierarchy of beings. Man is superior to the brutes because he has a faculty of reason in addition to the faculties of sense and imagination which he shares with them. Man is inferior to purely spiritual beings—the angels and God—because since he is corporeal, his intellect can not function independently of his bodily senses and imagination. Unlike the angels and God, he is not a purely intellectual being.

Accordingly, the essential characteristics of human knowledge are: first, that it is always both sensitive and intellectual, never merely sense perception as with the brutes or pure intellectual intuition as with the angels; second, that its appropriate object is the physical world of sensible material things, with respect to which the senses enable man to know the existence of individuals, while the intellect apprehends their universal natures; and finally, that the way in which the human mind knows the natures of things is abstractive and discursive, for the intellect draws its concepts from sense and imagination and proceeds therefrom by means of judgment and reasoning.

This analysis denies innate ideas. It denies man's power to apprehend ideas intuitively or to use them intuitively in the apprehension of things. It can find no place for a distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, since sense perception and rational activity contribute elements to every act of knowing. It affirms that knowledge is primarily of real existence, not of the relations between ideas, but it does not limit human knowledge to the changing

temporal things of the material universe. Though these are the objects man is able to know with greatest adequacy, he can also know something of the existence and nature of immaterial and eternal beings.

Yet according to Aquinas, even when man's knowledge rises above the realm of experienceable things, it is obtained by the same natural processes and involves the cooperation of the senses with reason. The theologian does, however, distinguish sharply between knowledge gained through man's own efforts and knowledge received through divine revelation. In addition to all knowledge acquired by the natural exercise of his faculties, man may be elevated by the supernatural gift of knowledge—the wisdom of a faith surpassing reason.

The foregoing summary illustrates in the case of one great doctrine, the connection between an analysis of the kinds of knowledge and a theory of the nature and faculties of man in relation to all other things. There is no point in this analysis which is not disputed by someone—by Plato or Augustine, Descartes, Spinoza, or Locke, by Hume, Kant, or William James. There are many points on which others agree—not only Aristotle and Bacon, but even Augustine, Descartes, and Locke.

These agreements or disagreements about the kinds of knowledge or the scope of human knowledge, its faculties, and its methods seldom occur or are intelligible except in the wider context of agreements and disagreements in theology and metaphysics, psychology, and logic. Hence most of the matters considered under the heading kinds of knowledge receive special consideration in other chapters. The Cross-References should enable the reader to examine the presuppositions or context of the materials assembled here.

THE CULT OF IGNORANCE receives little or no attention in the tradition of the great books. Even those who like Rousseau glorify the innocence of the primitives, or who satirize the folly so often admitted with human wisdom and the follies attending the advance of learning, do not seriously question the ancient saying that all men by nature desire to know. Nor is it generally doubted that knowledge is good, that its possession contributes to the happiness of men.

and the welfare of the state that its pursuit by the individual and its dissemination in a society should be facilitated by education by the support and freedom of scholars and scientists and by every device which can assist men in communicating what they know to one another.

But knowledge is not valued by all for the same reason. That knowledge is useful to the productive artist to the statesman to the legislator and to the individual in the conduct of his life seems to be assumed in discussions of the applications of science in the various arts in the consideration of statecraft and in the analysis of virtue. In this last connection the problem is not whether knowledge is morally useful, but whether knowledge of good and evil is identical with virtue so that sin and vice result from error or ignorance.

If there is a negative opinion here it consists in saying that knowledge is not enough. To know is not to do. Something more than knowledge is required for acting well.

The more radical dispute about the value of knowledge concerns the goodness of knowledge for its own sake without any regard to its technical or moral utility. Is the contemplation of the truth an ultimate end or does the goodness of knowledge always consist in its power to effect results in the mastery of nature and the guidance of conduct? The utility of knowledge is seldom denied by those who make speculative wisdom and theoretic science good in themselves, even the highest goods quite apart from any use in which they may be put. The con-

trary position however does not admit the special value of contemplation or the separation of truth from utility. To those who say that

the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any utility or extent of effects Francis Bacon replies that truth and utility are perfectly identical and the effects are more of value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men.

How knowledge and action are related is one question. How knowledge itself is divided into the speculative and practical is quite another. Bacon for example insists upon the necessity of distinguishing the speculative and practical branches of natural philosophy—concerned with

the search after causes and the production of effects. Unlike Aristotle and Kant he does not use the word practical for the kind of knowledge which is contained in such sciences as ethics or politics but only for the applied sciences or technology. Ethics and politics fall under what he calls civil philosophy.

Despite these differences in language the way in which Bacon divides the whole sphere of knowledge closely resembles Aristotle's tripartite classification of the sciences as theoretic, productive (or technical) and practical (or moral) and no less a similar threefold division by Kant. But Kant and Aristotle (and it should be added Aquinas) give a more elaborate analysis of these three types of knowledge especially with regard to the principles appropriate to each, the nature of the judgments and reasoning by which they are developed and the character and criteria of their truth.

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in the classification of kinds of knowledge. One is a comparison of human knowledge with divine or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge of brute animals. The other is a comparison of the parts or modes of human knowledge according to such criteria as the objects to be known, the faculties engaged in the process of knowing and the manner of their operation. Though made separately, those two comparisons are seldom independent of one another. As the nature of man is conceived in relation to other beings superior or inferior to himself, his faculties will be rated accordingly, and his power as a knower will suggest the methods or means available to him for knowing.

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5b The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable to us

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(3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from knowledge of our ideas or of the relations between them

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk. 11 [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* bk. 11 [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Ezra* 7 46.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

- 1 The nature of knowledge: the relation between knower and known; the issue concerning the representative or intentional character of knowledge.

- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124c 126c esp 126a e / *Meno* 179d 183a esp 180a b 182c 183a 188d 189b / *Phaedo* 228a 230d 231b 232b / *Republic* bk. III 333b d bk. V 371b 37 c bk. VI-VII 383d 398c esp bk. VII 397a 398c / *Timaeus* 476b / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 521d 522b 538d 541a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d.

- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* ch. 7 [6^b 1-6] 11a [3^b 22 8 12] 12c 13a ch. 8 [11 20 39] 16b c / *Interpretation* ch. 1 [16 4 9] 25a / *Topics* bk. IV ch. 1 [121 1-6] 168d ch. 4 [124^b 15 19] 173c [124^b 27-34] 173c d bk. VI ch. 5 [143 9 12] 196c ch. 6 [145 12 18] 198d ch. 8 [146 37-39] 200b c ch. 12 [149^b 23] 203d 204a / *Physics* bk. VII ch. 3 [247^b 248^b 6] 330b d / *Metaphysics* bk. V ch. 15 [10 1² 3] 542c d bk. IX ch. 6 [1048^b 18 34] 574a c ch. 9 [1051 22 34] 577b c bk. X ch. 1 [1053^b 32-33] 588a bk. XII ch. 7 [107 14 29] 602d 603a ch. 9 605a d bk. XIII ch. 10 [1087 10 25] 619c / *Soul* bk. I ch. 5 [1097^b 18 411^b] 639c 641a bk. II ch. 2 [114 4-13] 644a b ch. 5 [116^b 32 417^b] 647b

- [417 17-21] 647d [418^a 2-6] 648c d bk. III ch. 2 [425^b 17 20] 657d 658a ch. 3 [427^b 16-16] 659c d ch. 4 661b 662c ch. 5 [430 14 16] 662c [430 20-22] 662d ch. 7 [431^b 1-8] 663c ch. 8 664b d / *Memory and Reminiscence* ch. 1 [450 25-451 19] 691a 692b.

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk. VI ch. 1 [1133 6-11] 387c.

- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* bk. IV [26-109] 44b-45c [722-817] 53d 54d.

- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* tr. I ch. 7 3d-4a / *Third Ennead* tr. VIII ch. 6 132a ch. 8 132d 133b ch. 9 134a b / *Fifth Ennead* tr. I ch. 4 210b c tr. III ch. 4-5 217b 218c ch. 10-13 221b 224b tr. V ch. 1 2 228b 229d tr. VI ch. 7 249b c / *Sixth Ennead* tr. VII ch. 36-41 339c 342c.

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk. X par. 11 38 74a 81a esp par. 17 75c d par. 19 76a b par. 22 24 76d 77c par. 27 28 78b d / *City of God* bk. VIII ch. 6 269b / *Christian Doctrine* bk. II ch. 38 654c.

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q. 3 A. 3 REP. 16a d Q. 5 A. 4 REP. 125d 26c Q. 8 A. 3 REP. 3 36b 37c Q. 12 A. 1 REP. 4 50c 51c A. 2 51c 52c A. 4 ANS and REP. 1 53b 54c A. 1 9-10 58b 59d Q. 13 A. 7 A. 3 and REP. 6 68d 70d Q. 14 A. 2 ANS and REP. 3 75d 76c A. 76d 77d

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 5 110b-c
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X, par 10 73d
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 93
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- 21 DAVID *Dixie Comedy* PA DISE 1 [115]-
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- 23 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 150d 151a 238c d
- 30 BACH *Notum Org m* BK 1 A 39 45
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- 31 DCAVES *Rule* I II 1a 3b XII 24a-c /
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- 31 S OZA *Ethics* P RT II P OF 43 SCHOL
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- 33 P CAL *Pensées* 263 221a b 327 231a b /
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- 35 LOC *Humana Understa d g* BK IV CH
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- 42 HAVY *Pure Re so* 224-c
- 46 H O *Philosophy of Rights* 7a INTRO
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 141 142a
- 54 FOUCAULT *General Introduction* 560c 561 /
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- 48 KNOWLEDGE *beliefs and opinions, the re-*
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- 6 THUCYDIDES *History of the Peloponnesian War* BK 1 353d
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- 7 PLATO *Cratyl* 113c 114a-c / *Phaedrus* 125a
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- 8 Aристотель *Categories* CH 7 [5 35 14] 13b-c
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 / *Soul* BK III C 13 [127^a 16-128^a 9] 659c 660d
- 9 Аристотель *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1091^a 12 25]
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- 17 PLATO *Timaeus* 78 1x CH 7 219b-c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 18 b BK
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 8
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 5
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- 21 DAVIES *Dixie Comedy* P RADISE XX [67
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- 22 CAUCAS *Troilus and Cressida* K IV ST 24
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- 23 HORACE *Les aitha* EPI RT 1 58d 59a 65b-
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 80b 82b 98b 99 150c
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- 28 HUBER *O A small Generation* 333c d
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- 30 BACH *Advancement of Learning* 16a b 95d
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- 31 DE CARTES *Rules* II III 2 5 / *Discourse*
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- 31 S OZA *Ethics* EPI T I APPENDIX 369b
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 49 EPI 391d 394d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* 406 b
- 33 P CAL *Pensées* 99 191a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* d g INTRO SECT
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 120d K IV 11 SECT 307 111 CT 14
 312b CH 1 3 CT 13 335c d CH XIV XV

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- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 335b c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 130b 151d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 157b-158a
 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [354-517] 11a 14b [522-601] 15a 16b [1765 1, 84] 42b
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 4b 5a
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 522b 525a esp 524b 525a 711b 712b 729a 730a 851b 852a
 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 16b

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- 7 PLATO *Phaedo* 228a 230c / *Republic* BK III 333b d BK IV 350d 351b BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Theaetetus* 544d 547c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
 8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 136a 137a / *Physics* BK I CH 1 259a b CH 5 [188^a26-189 9] 264b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 499a 500b BK V CH 1 [1013 14 23] 533b CH 6 [1016^b18-25] 537b / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [413 11-13] 643a
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139^b25 34] 388c CH 6 389d
 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [690-100] 9c BK IV [469-521] 50b 51a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a b BK IV par 25 25c BK V par 4 27d 28a BK V par 65 87d 88a BK XIII par 46 123a-c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 4 7 266d 269d CH 9-10 270d 271d BK X CH 2 299d 300a BK XI CH 7 326a c CH 24 25 335c 336d CH 27 29 337b 339b BK XIX CH 18 523a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 37-40 635b 636a c BK II CH 7 638d 639c BK III CH 37 674a d
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 10d 11d Q 15 91b 94a passim esp A 3 ANS 93b 94a Q 18 A 2 ANS 105c 106b Q 84 A 4-6 444d-449a Q 85 A 3 455b 457a Q 89 A 3 REP 1 472c-473a Q 105 A 3 540c 541b PART II Q 2 A 4 REP 2 612a 613a A 5 ANS 613a 614a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 50 A 3 REP 3 8b 9a Q 51 A 1 ANS 12b 13c PART III Q 11 A 6 REP 3 775d 776b
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [49 60] 80b / PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 285c 286a
 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 333d 334d
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 39d-40a 58b / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 14 107d 108a APH 39-40 109c
 31 DESCARTES *Rules* 1 1a 2a 1c 5c d 6d VI 8d 9a VIII 13c d / *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* II 77d 81d / *Objections and Replies* 224b d
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 37-40 386b-388b

- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 23 120a BK II CH I 121a 127d passim esp SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 2-35 127a d CH VII SECT 10 133a b CH IV SECT 15-CH X SECT 1 141a-c CH V SECT 8 142d 143a CH VII 147b 148d CH XIV SECT 2 155b-c CH XVII SECT 2-CH XVIII SECT 1 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT II 174c-d CH XXII SECT 9 202c 203a CH XXI SECT 9 216d SECT II 217a BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH XI SECT 2 3305a b BK IV CH I SECT 9-CH II SECT 1 308c 309d CH II SECT 7-8 310d-311a CH III SECT 1 2 313a CH VII 337a 344d esp SECT 1 337a SECT 10-11 339b 340a CH XII SECT 1-6 358c 360a SECT 15 363a b
 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 4 405c d SECT 25 412a SECT 1 2 413a b SECT 25-33 417d 419a SECT 89 430b-c
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 453b-457b esp DIV 13-14 455d-456b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c 339b
 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 35b 66d 72c esp 67d 68a / *Practical Reason* 343a / *Judgement* 492c d 517d [1a 2] 530a 551a c 562a d 570b 572b 577b 578a d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 2 9b-10a
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 213b 214a 299a 300a 315a 319a esp 317b 318a 360a 453a-459b esp 453b-454a 455a-457a 859a 860b
 54 FREUD *Ego and Id* 700a 701d

4 Knowledge in relation to other states of mind

4a Knowledge and truth the differentiation of knowledge error and ignorance

- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b / *Meno* 179b 183a esp 180d 181d 182c d 188c 189b / *Apology* 201d 202d / *Gorgias* 256b / *Republic* BK I 368c 373c BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 450b c 457c d / *Parmenides* 490b-d / *Theaetetus* 535c 536a 542a 544a / *Sophist* 557c 558b / *Laos* BK IX 748a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 21 87d 89b / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 6 [75 1 18] 103a CH 16-18 109b 111c / *Topics* BK VI CH 9 [147 16-21] 201a b [14^a26-14^a9] 201d 202a CH 14 [151 3-13] 206b-c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 1 511b d 512b BK IV CH 7 [1011^a 25 29] 531c [1012 1 17] 531d 532a BK V CH 29 [1024^b27 38] 546d 547a BK VI CH 4 550a c BK IX CH 10 577c 578a c BK XII CH 10 [1075^a20-24] 606c / *Soul* BK III CH 3 [427 16-16] 659c d
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 9 [1142^b 12] 391d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1355^a21 39] 593c d
 11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I 403b
 11 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [469-521] 50b 51a

- Q 6, 1 REP 2184-d W T H-H Q 23 A 6
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- 21 D NIX *Dance Comedies* PL C. TORY T H
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- 25 SHAKESPEARE *Love's Labour's Lost* ACT IV
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- 31 D SCARLE *Objections* *Ad Res-Les* 227b-c
- 31 SCINOL *Elms* PART II AX OM 3 3 3d
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- 33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 440a
- The extent or limits of human knowledge
- a. The knowable the unknowable and the
unknown, the knowability of certain
objects
- 7 PLATO *Men* 179d 183a esp 180a / *Parmen-*
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- 8 ARISTOTEL *Metaphysics* CH 3 [619-36]
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- 9 ARISTOTEL *Parts of Animals* BK 1 CH 5 [644b
-645c] 168c-d
- L. EPICTETUS *Discourses* K II CH 10 164c
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- 17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead*, TR III 215d 226c
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* K 1 PAR 1-6 1a 2c
/ *Cry* / *God* BK XI CH 2 323a-c K XII CH 7
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* P T L Q 3 4
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* ART III, Q 10
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- 21 DANTÉ *Dante Comedies* H LL, II [61-96]
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essay* 80b-82b 98b-99a 238c
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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III C I [6-85]
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- 28 HARTLEY *On Animal Generation* 363d 364
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- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 2c-4c
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- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2a 3b VIII II 14a
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- 31 S I OZ *Elms* P RT 1 P OF 30 366c d
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- 3 MILTON *Para* *u* *Love* BK V [544-5-6]
18 a b BK VII [109-13] 219b-220a BK III
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son Agn *oes* [60-6] 340b-341a
- 33 P CAL *Project* 72 181 184b 263 221a b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO. SECT
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- 35 BE KELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO. SECT
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV
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- 40 GI NOV *Decline and Fall* 159a-c 308. d
- 42 H. VT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a c 19d 20c 117b-
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224 c / *Fund* *Præ* *Mis* *hinc* of *M* *is*
281 282d 285a 287d / *Practical Reason*
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/ *Judgment* 465a-c 564a-c 599d-600d
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- 47 GO TIE F *et* P RT 1 [6-2-6 5] 18a PART II
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- 48 V L TEL *Molt* *Dix* 366a b
- 53 J MEE *Psychology* 116a 119b esp 117b 119b
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5a(1) God is an object of knowledge

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4 2522 6 / *H* *et* 22 22 62 36-(D)
Over 22 636
- APOCRYPH *Wisdom of Solomon*, 8 1 4 9 3
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9 13 6 13 1-9 / II *Macabees* 728-(D)
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- (4 *Knowledge in relation to other states of mind*
 4b *Knowledge belief and opinion their relation or distinction*)

- 364b 366c esp CH XV SECT 1-3 365a d CH VI SECT 14 371b c CH XVII SECT 2 371d 372b SECT 14-24 378c 380d passim CH XVIII XIX 380d 388d
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d passim esp DIV 20-1 458a c DIV 30 461d-462b SECT VI 469d [fn 1]
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 165a b
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 335d 336a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 2a 4a c 228c d 240b 243c / *Judgement* 601d 607c esp 601d 602a 603a b 603d 604b 604d 606d
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 274b 293b passim
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF Ia 7d passim INTRO par 1 9a PART II par 132 46b c PART III par 147 55d 56a par 316 104c ADDITIONS 115a d
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 11a b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 636a 638b passim
- 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 661c 662a / *New Introductory Lectures* 881d 882b

- 4c *The distinction between knowledge and fancy or imagination*

- 7 PLATO *Ion* 142a 148a c / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 389c BK X 427c 431d esp 430b 431b / *Sophist* 577a b / *Laos* BK IV 684b c / *Seventh Letter* 809b 810b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 3 659c 661b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 191d 192b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10-11 15b 16a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 12 A 3 ANS and REP 3 52c 53b A II REP 1 59d 60d A 13 ANS and REP 2 61c 62b Q 17 A 2 REP 2 102a d Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 57 A 1 REP 2 295a d Q 78 A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 84 A 2 REP 1 442b-443c A II REP 1-2 447c-449a A 7 REP 2 449b 450b A 8 REP 2 450b 451b Q 93 A 6 REP 4 496b 498a PART II Q 17 A 7 REP 3 690d 692a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III SUPPL Q 70 A 2 REP 3 896a 897d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [13-45] 78c 79a
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 335a c
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 189d 193c PART II 205a 209d 273c 278a 326c 331a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d 33c II 38d 39b 55a d / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 15 108a APH 60 112c 113a / *New Atlantis* 203a
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 4a b VIII 13a 14b XIV 29b 31c / *Discourse* PART IV 53b 54a b / *Meditations* I 75d 76c II 79a 81d III 82d 86a VI 96b 103d passim esp 96b d / *Objections and Replies* 112c d 136d 137a 212a 218c d 219b-c

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- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1810-1815] 43a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 631a c
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 312a 631a
- a(5) The past and the future as objects of knowledge
- OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 27:1 / *Ecclesiastes*
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7:1 8:6-7 9:11 12:11 26
- APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 8:8--(D) OT
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- NEW TESTAMENT James 4:13 14--(D) James
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- 5 AESCHYLUS *Suppl. am. Mo. dens* [86 103] 2a b
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [403 51-]
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- 5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [1415-1419] 224c / *Ilexis*
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- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 349b
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- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 479d / *Theaetetus* 531a 532a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 9 28a 29d / *Mem-
ory and Reminiscence* CH I [449^b 3 9] 690a-c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 19 [1392^b 14
1393 8] 640b e
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 1 19a b /
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- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [713-755] 230a 231a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 1a b / *Pericles* 129a
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 79b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 3 24
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- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 12
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- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 53c 54a 65b c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 41c d 439c 440a
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 13d 14a
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- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 259a b
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VI 469d
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- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348a c / *Social Con-
tract* BK IV 428a
- 40 GIBBY *Decline and Fall* 88a c 96b d
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 234d / *Judgement* 579d
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- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 277c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 155b c
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- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1770-1775] 16a PART II
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- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 366b
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 42a 59d 60a
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- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 584d 585b
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 852b
- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 387a e
- 5a(6) The self and the thing in itself as ob-
jects of knowledge
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 6 [430^b 21 26] 663b
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 27 133a b

- 5 *The extent or limits of human knowledge 5c*
Dogmatism skepticism and the critical
attitude with respect to the extent cer
tainly and finality of human knowledge)
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* iv 5a d / *Discourse* PART
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 4 373b PROP 37-
 47 386b 391a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 381-385 238b 239a 432
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO 93a
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 19 354a c CH XII SECT 9-13 360d 362d CH
 XIV SECT 1 2 364b-c CH XVII SECT 9-10
 377d 378a
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV
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- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c 15c 16c 19a
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- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 31 103d 104a NUMBER
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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 274b 293b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 121c d 126a b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 7a INTRO
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- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [656-673] 17b 18a
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- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 78a b 250b 257a
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- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 253d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 195a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 881b
- 54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 828b c
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 883d 884a
- 5d The method of universal doubt as prereq
 uisite to knowledge God's goodness as
 the assurance of the veracity of our facul
 ties
- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2a 3b / *Discourse* 41a
 67a c esp PART II 44c-48b PART IV 51b 54b /
Meditations 72b d i 75a 77c III 82b d
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 134b c 142c 143c 162a 167a-c 206a-c
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
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 3 349b c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 3
 405b c
- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV
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 508a d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 881b
- 5e Knowledge about knowledge = the source
 of criteria for evaluating claims to
 knowledge
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 87d INTRO
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 4
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- 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV /
 10 453c-455b SECT II DIV 17 457a b SECT
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 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 12d esp 1b d 8c 9a
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- 6 The kinds of knowledge
- 6a The classification of knowledge according
 to diversity of objects
- 6a(1) Being and becoming the intelligible and
 the sensible the necessary and the con
 tingent the eternal and the temporal the
 immaterial and the material as objects
 of knowledge
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 86b d 113c 114a c / *Phae*
drus 125a 126c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo*
 223d 232d esp 223d 225a 228b 232d / *Re*
public BK III 333b 334b BK V 368c 373c esp
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 / *Statesman* 595a c / *Philebus* 610d 613a
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 809c 810d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [4 10-b19] 8b 9a
 / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 13 [32b 23] 48b-d
 / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [71b 9 16]
 97d 98a CH 4 [73 21 30] 100a 101a CH 6-8

- [illegible]

6a The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects 6a(2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of individuals)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 211c 218d / *Judgement* 572a b 572d 574b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 305a 312a esp 309a 312a

6a(3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from knowledge of our ideas or of the relations between them

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 84 A 1 REP 1 440d-442a B 85 A - 453d-455b

22 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60a b 65c 71c d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 16 98d 99c SECT 23 101b 102a BK III CH V SECT 12 266d 267a SECT 14 267b c CH VI SECT 43-51 280c 283a esp SECT 43 280c d BK IV CH I SECT 1-7 307a 308a CH II 309b 313a passim esp SECT 14 312b d CH III 313a 323d esp SECT 29 322c 323a CH IV SECT 1-12 323d 326d passim SECT 18 328d 329a CH V SECT 6-8 330a d CH VI SECT 13 335c d SECT 16 336d CH IX 349a c CH XI 354c 358c esp SECT 13-14 357d 358c CH XII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 8 377b d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 18-20 416b 417a SECT 23 417b c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d esp DIV 20-21 458a c DIV 30 461d-462b SECT V DIV 34-38 464b-466c SECT IX 487b-488c esp DIV 8-487b c SECT XII DIV 131-132 508d 509d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREP 5c 6a / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 354b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 157b 161a esp 158b 159b 301b 304b passim 453a b 867a 890a esp 868b 869a 879b 882a 886a 889a b

6a(4) Knowledge in relation to the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal the sensible and supra sensible

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 25c 26a 27b 33d 37b d 53b 59b 93c 99a esp 94b 95a 96a 97b 97d 98c 101b 108a c esp 106b 107b 117b 118a 120c 121d 153a 157d 164a 165c 172c 173a 193a b 224a 230c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253a d 264d 281c 282d 285a 287d / *Practical Reason* 291a 296d esp 292a 293b 307d 314d esp 307d 308b 310d 311d 319c 321b 328a 329a 331a 332d 337a c 340a 342d esp 340c 341c 349b 355d / *Intro Meta physic of Morals* 383c d 390b / *Judge ment* 465a c 474b 475d esp 474d [1x] 497a-498b 500c d 501d 502a 506d 507a 510b-c 530a 541a 542a 543a 543c 544c 564a c 570b 572b 574b 577a 578d 579a 581a b 584c d 587d 588a 596c 598b 599d 600d 603a b 603d 606d esp 603d 604b 606a d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 233a 234b

6b The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a 232d esp 224a 225a 228b 232d / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 393c BK X 431c d

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analyt* 1st BK II CH 19 [99^b34 100^b31] 136b d / *Topics* BK II CH 4 [125^a25-33] 174b / *Physics* BK I CH 5 [185^b26 189 g] 264b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^a28-98-1] 499a 500b BK III CH 4 [999 24-b5] 518a b / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417^b1, 5] 648b-c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 7 3d-4a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 13 164d 165b TR VI CH 2 189d 190b / *Fifth Ennead* TR III CH 2 3 216b 217b TR V CH I 228c 229c CH 7 232d 232b TR IV CH 7 249b-c / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 18 291a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10-11 15b 16a BK X par 8 38 73b 81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 7 268d 269d BK XI CH 2 3 323a d BK XII CH 18 523a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 12 627c d BK II CH 2, 39 650a 655b esp CH 27 650a BK IV CH 5 677b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 3 52c 53b A 4 ANS and REP 3 53b 54c Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A REP 1 76d 77d Q 18 A 2 ANS and REP 1 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 30 A 3 REP 3 8b 9a PART II II Q 8 A 1 ANS 417a d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60a b 71c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d 55b d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 29b 31c / *Meditations* VI 96b 103d passim / *Objections and Replies* I 119d 120c 124d 125a POSTULATE I II 130d 131a AXIOM V 131d 132a 136d 137a 157c d 162d 165d 211d 212a 217c d 218c d 219b-c 228c 229c 229d 230c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 10 376c 377a PROP 40 SCHOL PROP 44 388a 390a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH II 309b 313a passim esp SECT 14 312b d CH III SECT -5 313a c CH IX SECT 2 349a CH XI SECT 13 14 357d 358c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT I 405a B SECT 18 416b c SECT 27 418a B

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 74b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 144b 145a 157b 167b esp 157b 161a 167b 450a 451b 453a 457a esp 453b 455a

6b(1) Sensitive knowledge: sense perception and knowledge judgments of perception as judgments of experience

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a 225a 231c 232a / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 398c esp BK VI 386d 387a 387d 388a BK VII 389b 392c 393a / *Timaeus* 447b / *Theaetetus* 517b 536a c p 521d 526d 533a 536a

- 8 A ISOTOPOL *Poetorum Analitica* BK II C 1 19
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1063^b9] 591a b CH 7 [1064 4-9] 592b / *S. ul.*
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- 9 AUSTOTIA *General on of A. mals* BK I CH
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- 10 HYPOTHESES *Surgery* par 1 70b
- 1 LA RETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [379-
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- 14 P. CT. B. M. *Marcellus* 251b-c
- 17 PLOTIN. *F. with Ennead* TR I CH 1 6-7 3c-4a /
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- 18 ALGISTINE *Co. f. s. i. o. i.* BK III par 10-11
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- 19 AQUIN. *S. m. m. Theologia* PART 1 Q 5
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- 20 AQUIN. *Summa Theologica* BK III CH VI
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- 21 D. T. *Dura. Come y* F. R. D. S. IV [28-
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- 22 H. RES. *Letitia* PART 49a d
- 25 M. V. *Essay* 285c 286a
- 28 H. V. *On A. m. i. General* 332a 335c
- 30 BACO. *Novum Organum* BK I A 1 A 1 109c d
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- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* P. RT IV 53b / *Metho-*
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* P. RT II AXIOM 4-5 373d
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- 34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE III 270b-
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH III
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- 35 BRANDELEY *Human A. o. led. c. intro* SECT 1
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- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 108a d
- 46 HIGGAL *Ph. l. o. m. h. y. of Right* PART III PAR 227
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- 53 J. WES. *Psychology* 450a-471a esp 453a-459b
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- 66(2) Memory as knowledge
- 8 ARIOTTE *T. f. c. s. BK II CH 4 [111^b24 31]
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- 17 PLOTINUS *F. with Ennead* TR III CH 25 TR
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- 18 ALGISTINE *Co. f. s. i. o. i.* BK X par 11 35
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- 19 AQUIN. *Summa Theologica* P. RT I Q 54
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- 20 AQUIN. *Summa Theologica* P. RT II Q 51
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- 21 DANT. *D. i. c. Comedy* PARADISE V [34 42]
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- 23 HORACE *Letitia* P. RT I 50b-c 53a 54a
- 30 B. COV. *Advancement of Learning* 32d
- 31 D. SCARLES *Rules* III 4c d III 10b-c VI
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* P. RT II P. OP 15 SC OL
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH III
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367a
- 53 J. WES. *Psychology* 145a 421 -422 passim
424b-427 450a-451b

5b The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing 6b(2) Memory as knowledge)

54 FREUD Unconscious 428d / General Introduction 484c 486a

5(3) Rational or intellectual knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Phaedo* 224a 232d esp 224a 225a 228b 232d / *Republic* bk vi vii 383d 398c esp bk vi 387a 388a bk vii 389b 393a c / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Laws* bk x 765b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* bk vii ch 3 [247^b1-248 9] 330b d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch i [980^a25 98-1] 499b 500b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk vi ch i [1139^a6-11] 387c ch 3-7 388b 390d

10 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iv [469 521] 50b 51a

14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 53b c / *Marcellus* 252b e

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch i 159a d tr vi ch 2 189d 190b / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch i 228c 229c tr ix ch 7 249b e / *Sixth Ennead* tr iii ch 18 291a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk x par 10 73d 74a par 16-19 75b 76b par 30 79b-c par 36 80c d / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 31-38 651d 654c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 1 76d 77d A 11 ANS and REP 1 2 84c 85c A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 17 A 3 102d 103c Q 18 A 2 ANS and REP 1 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b-107c 54 284d 288d passim Q 57 A 1 REP 2 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a Q 59 A 1 REP 1 306c 307b Q 78 A 1 ANS 407b 409a A 4 ANS and REP 4-6 411d 413d Q 79 413d 427a QQ 84-89 440b 480c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 57-78 33a 45c

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 58a 61a 65c d 71c PART II 163a PART IV 267a-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* II 77d 81d passim vi 96b 103d passim / *Objections and Replies* 119d 120c 124d 125a DEF I-II 130a b AXIOM V 131d 132a 162d 165d 228c 230c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 37 40 386b-388b PROP 44 COROL 2 PROP 46 390a-c PART V PROP 29 459b d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk iv ch ii sect 1-8 309b 311a ch iii sect 2-4 313a-c ch ix sect 2 349a ch xi sect 13 14 357d 358c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT I 405a b SECT 89 430b c

40 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 227 74b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 299a 314b esp 302b 304b 313b-314a

6b(4) Knowledge in relation to the faculties of understanding judgment and reason and to the work of intuition imagination and understanding

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23a 110d esp 25b 27c 28d 29d 32a c 34a c 37b 39c 41c-45b 48c d 52c 55a 57d 59b 65d 66d 94b 95a 99a 101b 109d 110d 130b c 166c 171a 193a 195a / *Fund Prim Metaphysic of Morals* 282b e / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385a c / *Judgement* 461a-476c 493c 495a e 518a d 542b-543c 570b 572b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 232b 235a

6c The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing

6c(1) Vision contemplation or intuitive knowledge distinguished from discursive knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 150c 151a 167a d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a / *Republic* bk vi-vii 386d 389- / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* bk vii ch 10 [1036 1-8] 559b-c bk xii ch 7 [1072^b13 29] 603d 603a ch 9 [1075 5-11] 603c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk x ch 8 [1178^b20-3] 433b c

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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ix par 23 68a c bk xii par 16 102d 103a / *City of God* bk ix ch 16 294a b ch 2 296d 297a bk xi ch 2 323a c ch 7 326a-c ch 21 333a d ch 29 339a b bk xvi ch 6 426c 427a bk xxii ch 29 614b d

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- 31 DESCARTES *Rules* bk i sc-d 6d 1 8d 9a
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(6c) *The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing* 6c(3)
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I 95b d 121a c *passim* BK II CH I SECT 6 122 b c CH IX SECT 6 139a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 17 457b d [in 1]

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 633a 635a 851a 862a esp 851a 852b 856a 858a 859a 860a 867a 868a 877b 878a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512b 513b 526c d 532b 599a b

6c(4) *The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge the transcendental or speculative and the empirical*

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH IV SECT 6-8 325a = CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 371d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d *passim* esp DIV 20 21 458a c DIV 30 462a SECT V DIV 34 38 464b 466c SECT V DIV 89 490b c SECT XVII DIV 131 132 508d 509d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 5a d 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d-33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a 48d 57d 59b 64b 66d 115d 120c 121a d 170d 171a 172c 173a 177d 199a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c 254d / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d / *Science of Rights* 405b d / *Judgement* 600d 603d esp 603a b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b *passim*

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 158a

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6c(5) *The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration*

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 6 A 3 61c 62b Q 67 A 3 83b 84d Q 100 A 4 REP 1 253d 255a Q 108 A 2 REP 1 332b-333d Q 109 A 1 338b 339c Q 110 A 3 REP 1 350a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d Q 112 A 5 359c 360c PART II III Q 1 AA 4-5 382c 384b Q AA 3 4 392d 394b A 10 399b 400b Q 4 402a 409d Q 8-9 416d 426c Q 19 A 7 469d 470c Q 45 598c 603c Q 188 A 5 REP 2 3 679d 681a PART III QQ 9 12 763b 779d PART III SUPPL. = 92 1025b 1037c

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- 21 *H. 2 25 Letters* bk. p. 171 60c 61a 63b-c
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- 30 *H. COV. Vocum Organum* bk. ii, ap. 11
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- 35 *H. HUME Human Understanding* 5 c 1 n div
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- 42 *H. C. Phil. sophy f. Rights* part. ii par. 140,
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- 43 *FRANCIS General Introduction*, 463d

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I 95b d 121a c passim BK II CH I SECT 6 122 b c CH IX SECT 6 139a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 17 457b d [fo 1]

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 633a 635a 851a 862a esp 851a 852b 856a 858a 859a 860a 867a 868a 877b 878a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512b 513b 526c d 532b 599a b

6c(4) *The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge the transcendental or speculative and the empirical*

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH IV SECT 6-8 325a c CH IX SECT 1 349a CH VII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 2 371d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d passim esp DIV 10 458a c DIV 30 462a SECT V DIV 34-38 464b 466c SECT X DIV 89 490b c SECT XII DIV 131-132 508d 509d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 5a d 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d 33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a-48d 57d 59b 64b-66d 115d 120c 121a d 170d 171a 172c 173a 177d 199a / *Fund Prin Metaphys of Morals* 253c 254d / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d / *Science of Right* 405b d / *Judgement* 600d 603d esp 603a b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 158a

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6c(5) *The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration*

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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 9 143a c CH XXIII SECT 36 213c d BK III CH VI SECT 3 268d CH VI SECT 23 305a ■ BK IV CH III SECT 6 315a ■ SECT 23 320a c CH XVII SECT 14 378c d

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- 50 MARK *Capital* 167a 171c *passim* esp 170a 171a 176d 178d 180d 189b esp 188b-189b 239b-241a 299b d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 361d 365c BK X 424a \equiv 425b-426a 441b-c 456a-45 \equiv EPILOGUE II 685a
- 54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 123a 124a esp 123b 125a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 777a-c 778b d

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8b(1) *The knowledge of good and evil the relation of knowledge to virtue and sin*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 9 16 17 31 722 / *Job* 28 28 / *Psalms* 37 30 82 45-(D) *Psalms* 36 30 81 45 / *Proverbs* 1 1 23 21 20 7-8 esp 8 8 20 10 8 31 11 12 14 9 16-18 22 29 15 21 19 8 24 1-14 28 7 29 8 / *Ecclesiastes* 2 26
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- NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 23 34 / *John* 3 17 21 / *Romans* 2 17-3 7 esp 7 15 25 16 19 / *Philippians* 1 9-11 / *Colossians* 1 9-11 / *Timothy* 1 16 / *Hebrews* 5 14 / *James* 4 17 / *II Peter* 1 1 11
- 5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* [373 387] 228b-c
- 6 TRUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c 402d 403b
- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 7b-c 12a 13c / *Laches* 31a b 33a 37a / *Protagoras* 40b-41a 56b 57d 64d / *Euthydemus* 69a 71a 74b 76b / *Meno* 174a 190a esp 177d 178b 183b 190a c / *Phaedo* 225d 226c 230d 234c / *Gorgias* 256d 259c 280c 281b / *Republic* BK I 301d 302c 306c 308a BK II 314d 315a BK III 333b d 337b d BK IV 354d 355a BK V II 383d-401d BK X 439b-441a \equiv / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a / *Laos* BK I 643c d 645b 652d BK III 670b BK V 689d 690c 696c-697a BK VII 724c 728a BK X 748a b 754a b BK XII 788d 789a 792c d 795c d / *Seventh Letter* 801b 806b \equiv 809c 810d esp 810c d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 25 [69^a 20-28] 91a / *Topics* BK II CH 9 [114^b 9-13] 160b BK III CH 6 [120^a 26-31] 168a BK IV CH 2 [121^a 24 122^a 2] 169d 170a CH 3 [124 10-14] 172d BK V CH 7 [137^a 13 17] 189b / *Metaphysics* BK III CH 2 [99^b 21-23] 514d 515a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 1 3 339a 340b CH 4 [1095 30-31] 340c d CH 6 [1096^b 32 1097^a 14] 342b-c BK II CH 2 [1103^b 26-1104^a 9] 349b-c CH 4 350d 351b esp [1105^a 1-4] 351a [1105^b 13 18] 351a \equiv CH 6 [1106^b 36-1107^a 3] 352c BK III CH 1 [1110^b 17 35] 356b-c BK V CH 8 [1135^b 9 1136^a 9] 383c 384a BK VI CH 5

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 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 44c-45a / *Meno* 188b
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 23 M CHAVELLE *Pr ce la* 37d
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 76 A- ANS 141d 142c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61a b 64b-c
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT V SC II [37-255] 68b 70c
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 5 179c SECT 7-13 180a 181b esp SECT 13 181b SECT 69 196d 197a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 149d 150a 164a 165c 169c 170a / *Practical Reason* 333a 334b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b-d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 117 42c d par 139 48d 49b PART III par 142-143 55a ADDITIONS 90 130b d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 767b 768a

- 8b(3) *Knowledge in relation to prudence and continence*

- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 59c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [109^a29 1095 12] 340a b CH 13 [1102^b13-28] 348a b BK VI CH 5-13 389a 394d BK VII CH I [1145^b8]-CH 2 [1146 8] 395b 396a CH 3 396c 398a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Timoleon* 197c 198a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 4 512a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 6 ANS 6b 7a Q 22 A 1 127d 128d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 56 A 3 ANS 31a 32b Q 57 AA 4-6 38a-41a Q 58 A 3 43b 44a A 5 ANS 44d-45c Q 7 AA 2 3 145d 148b PART II CH 1 Q 181 A 2 617d 618c PART III Q II A 1 REP 3 772b 773a
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE x [109-114] 121b c VIII [37-111] 125d 126c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 60a 61a 84c d PART IV 267a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 60c 61c 327b d 520c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 14-17 428a d
- 32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 389b 391a
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 586a 587a

- 8b(4) *The possession or pursuit of knowledge as a good or satisfaction its relation to pleasure and pain its contribution to happiness*

- OLD TESTAMENT I Kings 10 1-8—(D) III Kings 10 1-8 / II Chronicles 9 1-7 22-23—(D) II Paralipomenon 9 1-7 22-23 / Joh 28 12 20 / Proverbs 1 24 33 3 13 20 10 1 14 24 16 16 19 8 20 15 23 23-25 24 13-14 / Ecclesiastes 1 13 18 2 12-21 6 8 7 11 13 9 13 18

- APOCRYPHA Ecclesiasticus 6 18 37 121 23 10 37 24 51 13-28—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 6 18 37 21 24 25 7 13 37-27 51 18 36
- NEW TESTAMENT I Corinthians 8 1 13 2
- 5 AESCHYLUS *Agamemnon* [160-183] 53d 54a
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [1348-1353] 142d
- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 12a 13c / *Protagoras* 59a 64d / *Luthydemus* 69a 71a 74b 76b / *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Meno* 183d 184c / *Republic* BK I 295d 296c BK II 310c d 323c d BK VI 374a 375a BK VII 421a 425b / *Timaeus* 475d-476b / *Philebus* 609a 639a c / *Laus* BK II 655a 656a 660a 662a BK III 669b 670c BK V 688c BK VII 728b d / *Seventh Letter* 801b 808c 809a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 12 [291^b24 9] 383b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I 499a 501c BK VII CH 7 [1072^b14 29] 602d 603a / *Soul* BK I CH I [402 1-6] 631a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [64^a22-64^a26] 168c 169a / *Ethics* BK I CH 8 [109^b21 29] 344a b passim BK III CH 10 [1117^b28-32] 364b BK VI CH 12 [1143^b17 1144 6] 393b m BK VII CH 12 [1152^b33 1153^a40] 404a [1153 21 24] 404c BK V CH 3 [1173^b15 18] 427d 428a CH 4 5 428b-430d passim CH 7 8 431d 434a / *Poetics* BK VIII CH 3 [1335 4-13] 543b CH 5 [1339^a27-3] 544d [1339^a27 20] 545a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1371 30-34] 614d [1371^b4-10] 615a [1371^b26 28] 615b / *Poetics* CH 4 [1448^b5-20] 682c d
- 12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [62 14] 1d 2d [921-950] 12b-c BK II [1-61] 15a d BK III [1053 1075] 43c d BK IV [1 25] 44a b BK V [1-54] 61a d [1113 1135] 75c d BK VI [1 42] 80a d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH I 138b d 140c BK III CH 2 177c 178d CH 10 185d 187a CH 15 190a 191a CH 22 195a 201a CH 23 202c 203b BK IV CH 4 225a 228a CH II 230b 232c
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 6 261a-c SECT II 261d BK IV SECT 16 264d BK V SECT 9 270b-c BK VI SECT 12 274c BK X SECT 12 298c d
- 13 VIRGIL *Georgics* II [490-493] 65b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 121a 122a 122d 123c / *Alexander* 543b 544a
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 6 9a-c TR IV 12b-19b esp CH 3 4 13d 14b CH 9 16d 17a CH 15 18c d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 19 27 5d 7d BK III par 7-8 14c 15a BK V par 7-9 28c 29b BK VI par 26 42d-43a BK IX par 23 25 68a c BK X par 33-34 79d 80c par 54 57 85a 86a BK XI par 2-5 89c 90c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 270a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 7 638d-639c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1 3b-4a A 4 5a b A 5 ANS and REP 1 5c 6a Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c 51c A 5 ANS and REP 3 54c 55b A 6 ANS 55b 56a A 7

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29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 40d
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32 MILTON *Sr Henry Vane* 69b / *Areopagitica*
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH V
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36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b 29b PART II
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VII 85b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329a 331d / *Political Economy* 371b c / *Social Contract* BK II
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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 337d 338c
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8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I
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9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139^b 25 31
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17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* T. III CH 2 3 10d 11a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 45c
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36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 109b-112a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 340a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 337c d
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40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83c d 597a
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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 80c d 231a 527c
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- 16 PAUL *General Introduction* 449a-451a / *New Introductory Lectures* 820c-829d esp 820d, 822b 829a-c
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- 18 TELESTICHOS *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c BK III, 423a-d 427a-c
- 19 PLATO *Allegory* 200a 212a-c / *Laws* BK XII 895b-90a
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- 22 PLUTARCH *Alexander* 343b-d
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- 24 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 2, 336b-d
- 25 ACRITIUS *Summa Theologica*, PA I III SUPPL. Q 96 7 1061b-1063a A 2 ANS and RE 5 1063d 1064d 12 1064d 1065b
- 26 H. H. LEMMA, *Y* BY II 102d 103a 114d 115a 149b-d 150c 151a 155d 156b PART IV 274c-d CO CLY I OV 232d 283a
- 27 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 53d-62a esp 60a-c 65a 69a 270a-271
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- 30 B. CO *Advancement of Learning* 7a-c 32a / *New Atlantis* 214 II
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 60d-61a / *Objections and Replies* 283c 284a
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- 36 ROUSSEAU *Letter* *to* *Ly* 339d 340a
- 37 SMITH *Health of Nations* BK V 340c 343d 347 d
- 38 CH. 104 *Decline and Fall*, 148a II 670b-671a
- 39 CH. 104 *Decline and Fall* II 161c 161b 300a-b 334d 335a-c 523a-b
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Chapter 44 LABOR

INTRODUCTION

MEN have dreamed of a golden age in the past when the world was young and everything needed for the support of life existed in profusion. Earth, Lucretius writes, "first spontaneously of herself produced for mortals goodly corn-crops and joyous vineyards of herself gave sweet fruits and glad pastures which now-a-days scarce attain any size even when furthered by our labor we exhaust the oven and the strength of the husbandmen we wear out our iron, scarcely fed after all by the tilled fields so niggardly are they of their produce and after so much labor do they little grow. When the aged plowman compares present times with times past" Lucretius adds, he praises the fortunes of his sure living in the time of earth's plenty.

This ancient myth of a golden age has sometimes taken the form as with Rousseau of an idyllic primitive society uncorrupted by civilization, in which an easy almost effortless existence corresponded to the simplicity of man's needs. Rousseau pictures a situation in which the produce of the earth furnished [man] with all he needed and instinct told him how to use it, "so that singing and dancing the true offspring of love and leisure became the amusement or rather the occupation of men and women assembled together with nothing else to do.

In our own day industrial utopias have been projected into a future made free from toil by the adequacy of machines or the efficiency of atomic energy. Long before the industrial era Aristotle envisioned as a supposition contrary to fact a society built upon labor-saving machines.

If every instrument could accomplish its own work, he writes, if it could obey or anticipate commands, if the shuttle would weave without a hand to guide it, the chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.

In all these conceptions of a better life labor is eliminated or reduced. The implication seems to be that the labor required for the maintenance of all historic societies is an affliction, a drudgery a crushing burden which deforms the lives of many if not all. The pains of toil do not belong to human life by any necessity of human nature but rather through the accident of external circumstances which might be other than they are. Work became indispensable according to Rousseau only when property was introduced and then vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow. It was the result of some fatal accident which, for the public good should never have happened. Man might have realized his nature more surely and richly if like the lilies of the field he neither toiled nor spun.

The contrary view would maintain that work is not a curse but a blessing filling man's hours usefully turning to service energies which would otherwise be wasted or mispent in idleness or mischief. The usefulness of sloth implies the virtue of work. The principle of activity according to Hegel, whereby the workman has to perform for his subsistence gives man a dignity which consists in his depending entirely on his diligence, conduct, and intelligence for the supply of his wants. In direct contravention of this principle are pauperism, laziness, inactivity.

It is even suggested that useful occupations save men from a boredom they fear more than the pain of labor as evidenced by the variety of amusements and diversions they invent or frantically pursue to occupy themselves when work is finished. The satisfactions of labor are as peculiarly human as its burdens. Not merely to keep alive but to keep his self-respect man is obliged to work.

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In the morning when thou risest unwilling the emperor Marcus Aurelius tells himself let this thought be present—I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this to lie in the bed clothes and keep myself warm? But this is more pleasant. Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure and not at all for action and exertion? 1

The perspectives of theology give still another view of labor. It is not an accidental misfortune which men may some day be able to correct. But neither is it a blessing nor the thing for which man was created. When the golden age of Saturn came to an end and Jupiter replaced him on the throne of heaven then as Virgil tells the story, labor was first introduced into the world. Before Jove

Fields knew no taming hand of husbandmen
To mark the plain or mete with boundary line—
Even this was impious for the common stock
They gathered and the earth of her own will
All things more freely no man bidding bore
He to black serpents gave their venom bane
And bade the wolf go prowl and ocean toss
Shook from the leaves their honey put fire away
And curved the random rivers running wine
That use by gradual dint of thought on thought
Might forge the various arts with furrow's help
The corn blade win and strike our hidden fire
From the flint's heart

Here while labor may in some sense be a punishment or at least a fall from the golden age it still does result in benefits. The divers arts arose from Jove's whetting the minds of men with care on care nor suffering realm of his in drowsy sloth so stagnate. But although toil conquered all it is still remorseless toil.

According to Christian doctrine labor is an inevitable consequence of man's fall from grace. It is punishment for Adam's disobedience like disease and death. In the earthly paradise of Eden the children of Adam would have lived without labor or servitude of any sort. But when Adam sinned the Lord God said unto him "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return into the ground."

That work should be painful belongs to its

very essence. Otherwise it would not serve as a penalty or a penance. But in the Christian as in the Virgilian view labor also contributes to such happiness as man can enjoy on earth. The distinction between temporal and eternal happiness is a distinction between a life of work on earth and the activity of contemplation in Heaven. This does not mean the elimination of leisure and enjoyment from earthly life but it does make labor their antecedent and indispensable condition. It also means that even in his highest activities—in the development of his arts and sciences—man must be perpetually at work. His achievement of truth or beauty is never so perfect and lasting that he can rest in it.

IN THESE DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS of the relation of labor to human life work seems to have several different meanings. It always involves activity or exertion. Its clearest opposite is sleep. But other things are also opposed to work—play or amusement, leisure, idleness. When leisure is not identified with idleness it involves activity no less than work. So too many of the forms of play require intense exertion of body or mind. The difference therefore must lie in the nature or purpose of the activity.

Aristotle suggests what the difference is when he puts play, work, and leisure in an ordered relationship to one another. Nature, he writes, requires that we should be able not only to work well but to use leisure well. Leisure is the first principle of all action and so leisure is better than work and is its end. As play and with it rest (i.e. sleep) are for the sake of work, so work in turn is for the sake of leisure.

The characteristics of work as the middle term here seem to be first that work is activity directed to an end beyond itself and second that it is productive of the necessities which sustain life rather than of the goods by which life is perfected. The political or speculative activity which Aristotle considers the proper occupation of leisure is intrinsically good or enjoyable. For participation in such activities, leisure—in the sense of time free from labor—is required but since the good life cannot be lived unless life itself is sustained, labor also is a prerequisite.

Work is thus defined by wealth as its immediate end—the production of the external eco-

economic or consumable goods which support life. Though play has the immediately enjoyable character of an activity performed for its own sake, Aristotle subordinates it to work, assigning to it the same utility which rest has. Both refresh men from the fatigues of labor and recreate the energies needed for work. Amusement, he writes, 'is needed more amid serious occupations than at other times, for he who is hard at work has need for relaxation and amusement gives relaxation.'

The economic sense which connects work and labor with wealth seems to be the primary but not the only sense in which these terms are used in the great books. There is the more general sense of human work as any productive activity in which men exercise some art or skill. The familiar distinction between skilled and unskilled labor may be only a distinction in degree if there is truth in the theory that some degree of skill—some rudimentary art at least—is required for the performance of the simplest tasks of hand and eye.

Kinds of work according to this theory can be differentiated by reference to the type of art involved. The ancient distinction between the *servile* and the *liberal arts* also divides workers into those who manipulate and transform physical materials and those who employ the symbols of poetry, music, or science to produce things for the mind. This distinction between manual and mental work, based on the character of the work itself, is not to be identified with the distinction between slave and free labor. The latter is based on the status of the worker. Even in the slave economies of the ancient world some freemen were artisans, farmers or sailors, and some slaves were philosophers. Nor is mental as opposed to manual work necessarily directed to the production of the goods of the mind. The white-collar workers of an industrial economy employed with the symbols of finance, hunting or management do mental work which has its ultimate end in the production or exchange of material goods.

THERE ARE STILL other traditional distinctions among kinds of work and types of workers, all of which cannot be put together into a single scheme of classification without much overlapping. Some distinctions like that between

hand work and machine labor or between healthful and unhealthful occupations turn on the characteristics of the work itself. Some depend on the social conditions under which the work is done or on the relationship between the individual worker and other men. The work to be done may be accomplished by an individual working alone or by the cooperative labor of many and in the latter case the social organization of the laboring group may involve the ranking of men according to the functions they perform.

Here we get the division into the master craftsmen who plan and superintend and all grades of helpers who execute their directions. One meaning of the word *menial* as applied to work signifies the inferior tasks in the hierarchy of functions, but it is also used to express society's opinion of those who perform certain tasks, such as that of the domestic servant. The distinction between what is menial and what is dignified work varies, of course from society to society.

The characterization of labor as productive or non-productive and of work as useful or wasteful, is based on strictly economic criteria and on considerations of social welfare. The sense in which work cannot be divorced from the production of some extrinsic effect is not violated by the conception of non-productive labor as work which in no way increases the wealth of nations.

There is one sort of labor which adds to the subject upon which it is bestowed, there is another which has no such effect. The former, writes Adam Smith, may be called productive, the latter unproductive labor. The labor of some of the most respectable orders in society is unproductive of any value. The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy are unproductive laborers. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.

The standard by which Marx judges the usefulness of labor also implies the economic notion of a commodity. Nothing can have value, he says, without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in

it' But Marx also adds a criterion of social utility. Whoever directly satisfies his own wants with the produce of his labor, creates in deed use values but not commodities. In order to produce the latter he must not only produce use values but use values for others: social use values. It is by this last criterion that Marx criticizes the capitalist economy for its most outrageous squandering of labor power in superfluous or socially useless production.

THE PRINCIPLE OF the division of labor does not depend upon any particular classification of work or workers according to type. Nor does it belong to one system of economy rather than another. But the ancients, concerned as they were with its bearing on the origin and development of the state, saw the division of labor as primarily of political significance, whereas the moderns are more concerned with its economic causes and consequences.

Thucydides compares the poverty and crude life of the early Hellenic tribes with the wealth, the power and the civilization of Athens, Sparta, Corinth and other city-states at the opening of the Peloponnesian War. The difference is not to be accounted for in terms of the invention of new tools but rather in terms of the greater efficiency in production which is obtained by a division of labor. This is both an effect and a cause of the enlargement of the community, and its increasing population. The greater the number of men associated in a common life, the greater the number of specialized tasks which can be assigned to different members of the community.

This observation is formulated by Plato and Aristotle in their accounts of the origin of the state. The advantages which the state confers upon its members are in part won by the division of labor in which they participate.

The isolated family, Aristotle remarks, is barely able to supply the everyday wants of its members. The tribe or village, which is an association of families, can achieve a little more than bare subsistence but not until several tribes unite to form a city does a truly self-sustaining community come into existence, and one with an adequate division of labor. Some men, if not all, can then acquire the leisure to engage in the arts and sciences and politics—the

pursuits of civilization which have their material basis in sufficient wealth.

The effect of the division of labor on the social structure of the state seems to be generally agreed upon by all observers, ancient and modern. Men are divided into social classes according to the kind of work they do—not only by reference to the type of economically productive labor but also in terms of the distinction between labor and leisure, or between economic and other functions in society.

All do not agree, however, that such class distinctions are as beneficial to society as the increase of wealth or opulence which the division of labor affords. They not only threaten the unity and peace of the society but tend to degrade the condition of labor by reducing the individual worker to a cog in the machine. The division of labor frequently restricts him to a slight and insignificant task, repetitively performed, and so makes it impossible for him to develop his skill or to enjoy any pride of workmanship. From a purely economic point of view, Adam Smith advocates the greatest intensification of the division of labor. Each more minute sub-division of tasks augments efficiency in production. But from the human point of view, he sees that this method of maximizing wealth by dividing men into functional groups—one man, one task—leads to the mental impoverishment of the men who require a multiplicity of functions for their development.

In the progress of the division of labor, Smith writes, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labor comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently one or two. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention.

He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The situation seems even worse to Marx. The industrial system, revolutionizing the mode of work, converts the laborer into a crippled monstrosity by forcing his detailed dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities and instincts. It makes the individual worker the automatic motor of a fractional operation.

THE GREAT ISSUES concerning labor seem to be moral and political rather than economic. The consideration of the division of labor from the point of view of efficiency in production remains purely economic only when it is abstracted from any concern about the effect upon the laborer. The analysis of factors affecting the productivity of labor ceases to be merely economic when the hours, conditions, and organization of work are viewed in terms of the working men.

The determination of wages by the buying and selling of labor (or, as Marx insists, of labor power) as a commodity subject to market conditions of supply and demand—the difference between real and nominal wages as determined by the level of wages in relation to the price of other commodities—the so-called "iron law of wages" according to which wages cannot be reduced below the minimum of bare subsistence for the laborer and his family—these are matters which the economist may deal with in a descriptive or historical manner, calculating rates and ratios without regard to questions of justice. But in terms of such formulations questions of justice are raised and become the great issues concerning the rights of workmen to the fruits of their labor to the security of full employment and other forms of protection, to collective bargaining, to a voice in the management of industry or business.

Stated in this way the issues seem to be peculiarly modern. These are the problems of a capitalist economy to which the partisans of capital and of labor propose different solutions. Yet the principles of justice to which the parties in conflict appeal seem to be no less applicable to earlier conflicts in other economic systems—between master and slave or between feudal lord and serf. All the institutional differences among these three economies should not, according to Karl Marx, conceal from us the profound analogy which obtains in the relation between owners and workers, whether the workers are chattel slaves, peons bound to the land or industrial proletarians selling their labor power.

"Wherever a part of society possesses a monopoly of the means of production," he writes, "the laborer free or not free must add to the working time necessary for his own maintenance

an extra working time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production, whether this proprietor be the Athenian gentleman, Etruscan theorat, civic Romanus, Norman baron, American slave-owner, Wallachian boyard, modern landlord or capitalist."

Marx undertakes to explain how the surface difference between slave labor and wage labor conceals the analogy. "In slave labor even that part of the working-day in which the slave is only replacing the value of his own means of existence in which, therefore, he works for himself alone, appears as labor for his master. All the slave's labor appears as unpaid labor. In wage-labor on the contrary even surplus labor or unpaid labor appears as paid. There the property relation conceals the labor of the slave for himself; here the money relation conceals the unrequited labor of the wage-laborer."

Two phrases here—unpaid labor and unrequited labor—indicate that Marx is thinking in terms of justice. Elsewhere he calls the industrial proletariat "wage-slaves" to emphasize the presence in an apparently free economy of the same unjust exploitation which the word "slave" connotes when it refers to the use of men as chattel. The essential similarity in all forms of economic exploitation—which makes all forms of economic slavery essentially similar—is seen by Marx in terms of the production of a surplus value by the laborer: that is, he produces a greater value in commodities than he needs to support his own subsistence. This surplus value, when appropriated by the owner of the materials and the tools on and with which the propertyless laborer works, becomes an *unearned increment*, or, in other words, an unjust profit from the work of another man.

The controversy over the theory of surplus value in Marx's *Capital* can be separated from the controversy over the revolutionary program of the *Communist Manifesto*. But neither can be separated from issues of justice. It is questionable whether these economists join issue with Marx who entitles his analysis in terms of the facts or conclusions of economics as a purely descriptive science and who put aside all considerations of the fair and the equitable. Yet these facts or conditions, especially with regard to the operation of the capitalist economy

become relevant in the dispute as to whether capitalist profits are intrinsically unjust because they are incapable of accruing except from the exploitation of labor

Those who dispute this matter seldom deny that chattel slavery is unjust. On that there may be conflicting opinions as indicated in the chapter on SLAVERY but they are not germane to the present issue. Nor do the opponents seem to argue their case in terms of a different theory of what is just and unjust. They themselves appeal to the common principle of fairness in exchange and distribution to defend the rights of the owners of capital to a profit in return for their own prior labor in accumulating capital stock as well as for the risks they take when they invest their reserves in productive enterprises. The problem therefore seems to narrow down to such questions as whether laborers are exploited when they receive in wages less than the full value their work creates, whether capitalist profits are entirely reaped from the surplus value which is the differential between what labor creates and what labor receives, or whether if profit is not identical with surplus value it always contains a marginal element of unearned increment derived from the exploitation of labor.

THE NOTION OF VALUE—the value of commodities and the value of labor itself—is obviously of central importance. As indicated in the chapter on JUSTICE the formulae of equality which determine fair exchanges or distributions require some measure of equivalents in value. What determines the intrinsic value of a commodity according to which it can be compared with another commodity without reference to the price of each in the market place? Adam Smith's answer to this question is *labor*. It is the answer given before him by Locke and after him by Marx.

Equal quantities of labor at all times and places, Smith declares, may be said to be of equal value to the laborer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits, in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in

return for it. Of these indeed it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity, but it is their value which varies, not that of the labor which purchases them. From this Adam Smith concludes that labor alone therefore never varying in its own value is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price, money is their nominal price only.

This labor theory of value raises the further question of the value of labor itself. What determines its natural or real price as opposed to its market or nominal price? On this Marx and Smith appear to part company, which may account for their further divergence when Marx declares that the real value of labor is the cost of its production, not the average price it can command in the market, and then goes on to explain how a surplus value is derived by the capitalist who pays for labor power on a basis of the cost of producing and sustaining the laborer, but uses his labor power to produce a real value in commodities which exceeds the real price of labor itself.

Smith on the other hand holds that the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer only, in that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. When land becomes private property, the landlord makes the first deduction, in the form of *rent*, and the capitalist, or the person who invests some part of his stock accumulation, makes a second deduction, in the form of *profit*. After rent and profit are taken, the laborer's *wage* represents what is left of the whole produce of labor.

Yet Smith also says of the landlords that as soon as the land of any country has all become private property, they like all other men love to reap where they never sowed. The implication of unearned increment in this remark suggests that Smith is neither disinclined to mix moral judgment with economic description, nor at variance with Marx on the principle of economic justice. That Smith regards profit as the price properly paid for the use of capital and that he does not see reaping without sowing as an essential element in profit making may perhaps be read as a challenge to Marx's develop-

ment of the labor theory of value into a theory of surplus value and unearned increment

It is possible, of course, that the difference in the conclusions of Smith and Marx from a common premise can be explained by the different directions their analyses take. It may not represent a direct opposition on a point of fact. The proposition that value derives from labor seems to yield a number of theoretical consequences.

Locke, for example, holding that it is labor which puts the difference of value on every thing makes this the basis for the right to private property certainly in its original appropriation from the common domain which is God's gift to mankind. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes it his property.

This view seems to be shared by Rousseau. It is impossible to conceive, he says, how property can come from anything but manual labor for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally create so as to make them his own property? In the same vein Smith declares that the property which every man has in his own labor as it is the original foundation of all other property so it is the most sacred and inviolable.

What further conclusions follow from this justification of private property as a right founded upon labor? How is the original right to property extended into a right of inheritance? How does this conception of the origin of property bear on the Marxist conception of the origin of the proletariat—the propertyless workers who have nothing but their labor power to sell? Denying the charge that communists desire to abolish the right of personally acquired property as the fruit of a man's own labor, Marx and Engels make the countercharge that the development of industrial capitalism has to a great extent already destroyed and is still destroying it daily. They propose public ownership of the means of production to protect the property rights of labor

they seek to abolish only the bourgeois form of private property which in their view is a use of property to exploit labor.

The rights of labor seem to be central in any formulation of the problem of a just distribution of wealth. But when other rights are taken into consideration the problem of economic justice becomes more complex and different solutions result from differences in emphasis. Even with regard to one group of solutions, J. S. Mill observes that some communists consider it unjust that the produce of the labor of the community should be shared on any other principle than that of exact equality; others think it just that those should receive most whose wants are greatest. To weigh the merits of competing solutions, as well as to reach an adequate statement of the problem, the discussion of labor must be connected with the discussion of related considerations in the chapters on JUSTICE, REVOLUTION and WEALTH.

THERE ARE ISSUES of justice concerning labor other than the strictly economic problem of distribution. In the ancient world, for example, not only chattel slaves but also free artisans were frequently regarded as incapable of participation in political life. Only men of independent wealth had enough leisure for the activities of citizenship which in the Greek city states, was almost a full time occupation. Thus, according to Aristotle is one reason for the disfranchisement of the laboring classes who must devote a great part of their energy to earning a living, and who have neither the time nor training for liberal pursuits. Since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties, citizens, he maintains, cannot lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen.

Against this oligarchical view (which also involves the notion that wealth deserves special political privileges) the Greek democrats take the position that all free men should be citizens on an equal footing regardless of the amount of their property or their conditions of labor and leisure. But the oligarchical principle still tends to prevail among republicans in the 18th century. Kant, for example, holds that citizenship presupposes the independence or self-sufficiency of the individual citizen among the peo-

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ple On this basis he excludes from the suffrage as only passive citizens the apprentice of a merchant or tradesman a servant who is not in the employ of the state a minor (*naturaliter vel civiliter*) all women and generally everyone who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others (the state excepted) They are without civil personality and their existence is only as it were incidentally included in the state

The preference shown by the writers of *The Federalist* for a republican as opposed to a democratic form of government—or representative government as opposed to direct democracy—rests partly on their fear of the political incompetence as well as the factional interests of wage earners and day laborers While expressing disapprobation of poll taxes they still defend the right of the government to exact them in the belief that there may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource Yet such a tax would seem to be primarily a device for disfranchising working

men of no property and small income and in the opinion of a later day it is so regarded

The democratic revolution does not begin until the middle of the 19th century But even then Mill who advocates universal suffrage argues for the disqualification of paupers or those on the dole without raising the question whether the right to work—to avoid poverty and involuntary indigence—is not a democratic right inseparable from the right to citizenship It is required by first principles Mill writes 'that the receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise He who cannot by his labor suffice for his own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the community for actual subsistence he abdicates his claim to equal rights with them in other respects

The historic connection of democracy with a movement toward political justice for the laboring classes seems to suggest that political democracy must be accompanied by economic democracy in order to attain its full realization

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 84d-85b

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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [381 31
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- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42b-d 44c
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- 14 PLUTARCH *Pompey* 512c-d

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- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 597a b
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 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 316a b
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 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 573c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 772d 781d 782c

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 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* INTRO 1a d BK I 6a d 8b 10b passim
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 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 243d 244c 245a PART II 267a b 268a b PART IV 333c 353b-c

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 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 355a b 365d 366a
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 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b 167b

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- 7 PLATO *Charmides* 6c / *Republic* BK I 303a 306b / *Lysis* BK VIII 733b d BK XI 774a 775a
 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VII CH 8 [1328^a 22 35] 532c
 13 VIRGIL *Georgics* I [118 159] 40a-41b
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36c d / *Pericles* 121a 122b / *Marcellus* 252a 255a / *Pompey* 512c d / *Alexander* 560b b
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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42b d 54d 55a BK III 164a BK V 340c 343d

42 HANTY Judgement 524a b

50 MARX *Capital* 85c d 117c 130c passim 166b e 176d 178a 194b 195c 200a 204c passim esp 204a-c 206b 209a 227d 231b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 79b

3d Types of work distinguished by reference to the manner in which the work is done solitary and group work the relation of master craftsmen and helpers

7 PLATO *Statesman* 581c 582a

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981 31-7] 499d

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 4 [1277^a 30-36] 474b c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 3d 5b 35c 36a 50a-c 51b 53b 109a

43 MILL *Representative Government* 385b d

50 MARX *Capital* 157a 164a esp 158d 159d 160d 162a 165d 166b 170c 171b 186b 188c 251b c

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50 MARX *Capital* 16b 17a 17c 86d 87d esp 87b [fn 2] 96a 97a 219a d 251a 252a 290d 292a

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7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 318b d

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 4 [1290^b 37-1291 33] 490a e BK VII CH 8-g 532c 533d

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VI [91-111] 16a b

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7 PLATO *Charmides* 5d 12a e / *Republic* BK II 316a 319c BK IV 349a 350a / *Timaeus* 442b c 445c d / *Critias* 480a-481b / *Laws* BK VIII 740d 741a

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4a The economic causes and effects of the division of labor its relation to the exchange production and distribution of goods and services its bearing on opulence

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 316c 319a

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36 SMITH *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b

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- 5 *Elia v. i. Suppliants* [2 8 45] 260b-c
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5c *The wage earner or industrial proletariat in a capitalist economy*

- 38 **ROUSSEAU** *Inequality* 365d 366a
39 **SMITH** *Wealth of Nations* bk i 20b 21c 27b 3 b passim 42a 62a passim
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6c *The distinction between real and nominal wages variable factors affecting wage levels*

- 39 **SMITH** *Wealth of Nations* bk i 13a 20b esp 14b d 23c 27b passim 27b 37b esp 28a 32b 39d-40b 42a 62a 82d 83a 87b c bk ii 123b 124a bk iv 265a // bk v 380b d 382a // 383b 387b 391b 392a
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6d *The natural wages of labor and the labor theory of value*

- 35 **LOCKE** *Civil Government* ch v 30b 36a
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7 *Economic and political justice to the laborer*

7a *Fair wages hours and working conditions labor legislation*

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Other discussions of the division of labor and its consequences, see FAMILY 31-3b | PROGRESS 7a STATE 5c WEALTH 3d.

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Another discussion of the problems of poverty and unemployment see **WEALTH 8c-8d**

The general theory of the class war as it occurs in different economic systems, see **OPPOSITION** 5b **REVOLUTION** 5a-5c **STATE** 5d(2)-5c **WAR AND PEACE** 2c **WEALTH** 9b

7c The consequences of economic inequality or oppression the class war

7c(2) The organization of workmen and the formation of trade unions to protect labor's rights and interests

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43 MILL *Liberty* 309b c / *Representative Government* 345d 346a 366d 367b

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Chapter 45 LANGUAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic are all concerned with language. Each of these disciplines establishes its own rules for the use of language, each by reference to a special standard of excellence or correctness which measures language as an instrument of thought or communication. Together these three arts regulate discourse as a whole. Their relation to one another represents the relation of the various aspects of discourse—the emotional, the social and the intellectual.

The tradition of the great books is the tradition of the liberal arts. Their greatness consists not only in the magnitude of the ideas or problems with which they deal, but also in their formal excellence as products of liberal art. Some of the great books are expositions of logic or rhetoric. None is a treatise on grammar. But they all plainly exemplify, even where they do not expound, the special refinements of the arts of language, and many of them, especially the works of science, philosophy and theology, and even some of the poetical works, deal explicitly with the difficulties of discourse, and the devices that have been used to overcome them. Language is their instrument and they are consciously critical in its use.

One of the great books—Augustine's treatise *On Christian Doctrine*—is directly and explicitly concerned with grammar in the broad sense of the art of reading. Addressed to earnest students of the word, it attempts to lay down rules for interpretation, and in so doing it is compared by Augustine to one who teaches reading, that is, shows others how to read for themselves. It is not reading in general, however, but the reading of one book—the Bible—with which Augustine is concerned. We shall return later to this special problem of interpreting the word of God or language which is thought to be inspired.

In our day there is a lively interest in the problems of language. This is partly because of the development of historical and comparative studies of the various human languages, and the scientific formulation of what is common to all languages in origin, structure and change. But it also results in part from the claims of a discipline popularly called semantics to have discovered the properties of language as a medium of expression, and especially to have discovered its limitations. The claims of semantics often go so far as to find in the misuse of language the origin of many human ills. The novelty of semantics is supposed to lie both in the diagnosis and in the remedies proposed.

Of these two sources of current interest in language, the second calls attention to the vitality of the liberal arts, of which semantics is a contemporary formulation. It might almost be said that there is nothing new about semantics except the name. Hobbes, Bacon and Locke, for example, deal explicitly with the abuses of language and the treachery of words. Each makes recommendations for the correction of these faults. Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Berkeley and Hume, are similarly concerned with ambiguity in speech, with the multiple senses in which discourse of every sort can be interpreted, and with the methods by which men can approximate precision in the use of language.

The other interest in language is also represented in the great books. Though the science of linguistics and the history of languages are researches of recent origin, speculation about the origin of language and in that context consideration of the natural and conventional aspects of language extend throughout the tradition. At all times the discussion of the nature of man and society considers language as one of the principal characteristics of the specifically

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups.

I Works by authors represented in this collection

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ference between the sophist and the philosopher is not one of skill but of purpose. When he uncovers the trickery of sophistical argument he also acknowledges the cleverness with which the sophists juggle words and propound absurdities under the cover of superficially significant speech. The sophistical fallacies which Aristotle enumerates are seldom accidental errors. Far from being the result of the impediments which language places in the way of thought, they are in large measure artfully contrived equivocations. They are ways of using language against logic. According to Aristotle they represent "foolish things in disputation" and are resorted to only by "those who are resolved to win at all costs."

IN THE MODERN treatment of language there is more of an imputation that words cause men unwittingly to deceive themselves as often as they enable one man intentionally to deceive another. Men are duped or tricked by the tendency of words to counterfeits a reality which does not exist. Thus, in the view of Hobbes or Locke, Berkeley or Hume, is particularly true of general or universal names—or words that signify nothing, which can be perceived or imagined.

"We cannot imagine anything infinite," says Hobbes. Hence a word like "infinite" is a form of absurd speech "taken upon a credit (without any signification at all) from deceived philosophers and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen." In addition to the deceptions of ordinary ambiguity and of metaphorical speech, Hobbes pays particular attention to its absurd, insignificant or nonsensical use of words, whereby we conceive nothing but the sound." He gives as examples, not merely "round quadrangle," but "infused virtue," "free will," and "immortal substance."

In the light of the examples, this theory of insignificant or meaningless speech explains what Hobbes means when he says that "words are the men's counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools." It also tells how Hobbes uses the susceptibility of men to self-deception through language as a way of explaining the errors—he calls them "absurdities"—into which his predecessors have fallen. What is novel here is not that he disagrees with

earlier thinkers on points of psychology and metaphysics or theology, but that he reduces what might be supposed to be an issue between true and false opinions to a difference between significant and absurd speech. His opponents might reply that unless his own views about matter and mind are true, his semantic criticism of them does not hold. They have been seduced by language into talking nonsense only if Hobbes is right in his metaphysics and psychology.

The criterion of arguments which seem to rely on metaphors is not peculiarly modern. In his attack on the Platonic theory of ideas, Aristotle dismisses the statement that the Forms "are patterns and other things share in them" as a use of empty words and poetical metaphors. But Hobbes carries this method of criticism much further. He frequently rests his case against other philosophers entirely on the ground that they are talking nonsense. Though he himself catches the imagination almost as often as Plato does, by his skillfully wrought metaphors, he would insist that what he says can always be read and taken literally, whereas the metaphors of others conceal the insignificance of their speech.

Bacon provides another illustration of the modern attitude which ascribes a diabolical character to language. "There arises from a bad and unapt formation of words," he writes, "a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy—words still manifestly force the understanding to throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies. He goes on to say that "the idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either names of things which have no existence, or they are names of actual objects but confused, badly defined and hastily or irregularly abstracted from things."

Here, as in the case of Hobbes, a theory of reality and of the way in which the mind draws its ideas from experience seems to underlie the charge that language troubles the mind in a web of words, so that it deals with words rather than with things. In the same spirit, though not from the same premises, Locke tells his reader why

human world or compares the language of men with the speech of brutes

In addition there is the broad philosophical inquiry into the nature of signs and symbols in general. This is not limited to the problem of how written or spoken words get their meaning. The general question calls for an examination of every type of signifying and every sort of symbol: verbal and non verbal, natural and artificial, human and divine. Though these matters are closely related to the problems of language and may therefore be touched upon here, their main treatment is reserved for the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL.

THE TREATMENT of language seems to have a different tenor in ancient and modern times. The philosophers of antiquity appreciate the need to safeguard discourse from the aberrations of speech. Plato and Aristotle usually preface their discussion of a subject with an examination of the relevant words in current use. Discovering the variety of meanings attached to common words, they take pains to enumerate the various senses of a word and to put these meanings in some order. They pursue definitions or construct them to control the ambiguity that is latent in the language anyone must use to express or communicate ideas. But they do not expect to remove ambiguity entirely. They tend to accept the fact that the same word will have to be used in a number of senses and they discriminate between the occasions when it is desirable to be precise about a word's meaning and those times when the purpose of discourse is better served by permitting a word to carry a whole range of meanings. They see no special difficulty in abstract as opposed to concrete words or in general names as distinguished from the proper names which designate individuals or in words which refer to purely intelligible objects like ideas rather than to the objects of sense experience.

The mood of the ancients, which also prevails for the most part among the philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages, seems to express a certain tolerance of the imperfections of language. If men do not think clearly, if they do not reason cogently or argue honestly, the fault is primarily the result of the misuse of their faculties, not of the betrayal of their in-

tentions by the intractable character of language as an instrument. Even when men misunderstand one another, the inadequacy of language as a medium of communication is not solely responsible for the failure of minds to meet through the interchange of words. With greater effort, with a more assiduous application of the liberal arts, men can succeed even if language works against them.

Some things are inexpressible in human speech even as they are incapable of being fully grasped by human thought. My vision, Dante says when he reaches the mystic rose of Paradise, was greater than our speech. Such knowledge as we can have of the highest matters and the first principles of things, Plato thinks, does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge. In his *Seventh Letter* he even goes so far as to say that no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language.

With these exceptions the ancients seem to adopt a mood of tolerance towards language. This does not imply an underestimation of the difficulties of using language well. It simply does not make of language an insidious enemy of clarity and truth. The deficiencies of language are like the weaknesses of the flesh. As man can in large part overcome them through the discipline of the moral virtues, so through the discipline of the liberal arts—by skill in grammar, rhetoric, and logic—he can make language express almost as much truth as he can acquire and communicate it almost as clearly as he can think it. Men need not succumb to the tyranny of words if they will make the requisite effort to master language to serve their purpose.

But the liberal arts do not guarantee purity of purpose. Obscurantism, obfuscation, deception and falsification are sometimes the aim. Men try to persuade others at all costs or to win the argument regardless of where the truth lies. They try to confuse their opponents or mislead their audience. The use of language for such ends requires as much skill as its employment in the service of truth. If such use is a misuse, then language is equally available for use or misuse.

It is an ancient saying that only the competent in grammar can make grammatical errors intentionally. So, as Plato recognizes, the dis-

modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic from Boole and Venn to Peano Couturat Russell and Whitehead. The hopes to be realized by an algebra of logic find expression in Jevons' plan for a logical abacus which like an adding machine or comptometer would be a thinking machine able to solve all problems that can be put in sustainable terms.

Is the ideal of a perfect and universal language a genuine hope or a utopian dream? Not all modern scientists seem to agree with Lavoisier's point that the improvement of a science and the improvement of its language are inseparable. Faraday for example apologizing for the invention of new words to name electrical phenomena says that he is fully aware that names are one thing and science another. The utopian character of the ideal seems to be implied in Swift's satirization of a universal language. On his voyage to the cloud land of the scientists in *Laputa*, Gulliver learns of a project which is being considered by the professors of language: "Since words are only names for things it would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the particular business they are to discourse on. The substitution of things for words would thus provide a universal language to be understood in all civilized nations."

In the ancient world the imperfection of ordinary speech gives rise not to the conception of a perfect language which man should try to construct but to the consideration of the distinction between a hypothetical natural language and the existing conventional languages actually in use. If there were a natural language it would not only be the same for all men everywhere but its words would also be perfect images or imitations of things. That human language is conventional rather than natural may be seen not only in the plurality of tongues but also in the fact that existing languages embody contradictory principles of symbolization.

This fact Plato suggests in the *Cratylus* indicates that human language does not originate as a gift from the gods for if the gods had given men the names they use signs would be perfectly and consistently adapted to things signified. The hypothesis of a natural or god-given language is not proposed as an ideal to inspire

men to try to invent a perfect language for themselves. It functions rather as a norm for the criticism of man-made language and for discovering the natural elements common to all conventional languages.

Like human society human language seems to be partly natural partly conventional. As there are certain political principles, such as that of natural justice common to all societies despite the diversity of their customs and institutions so all conventional languages have certain common characteristics of structure which indicate their natural basis in the physical and mental constitution of man. In the tradition of the liberal arts the search for a universal grammar applicable to all conventional languages, represents not the hope to create a universal or perfect language but the conviction that all languages have a common natural basis.

The hypothesis of a natural language takes another form and has another implication in the Judeo-Christian tradition where it is discussed in the light of certain portions of revelation. Yet it retains the same fundamental relevance to the problem of the origin and characteristics of the many conventional languages which now exist.

Genesis relates how after God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air He brought them to Adam to see what he would call them and whatsoever Adam called every living creature that was the name thereof. The names which Adam devised constituted a natural language at least insofar as according to Augustine's interpretation it is the one common language of the race both before the flood and for some time after. But there is the further question whether the names which Adam gave to things were their rightful or proper names—whether they were natural signs in the sense of true representations of the natures of the things signified.

Hobbes suggests one answer when he says that the first author of speech was God himself who instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight. Augustine suggests another answer by identifying the original language of man with Hebrew and by affirming the continuity of the Hebrew spoken after Babel with the language all men spoke before the confusion of tongues.

he found it necessary to include in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* the long third book on language which examines in detail the imperfections as well as the abuses of words and the remedies therefor

Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language he says have so long passed for mysteries of science and hard or misapplied words with little or no meaning have by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance and hinderance of true knowledge. So few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it

Without judging the fundamental issues involved concerning the nature of things and of man and his mind one point seems to be clear. According as men hold different conceptions of the relation of language to thought (and in consequence assume different attitudes toward the imperfections or misuse of language) they inevitably take opposite sides on these issues. Whether the discipline of language is called semantics or the liberal arts the standards by which one man criticizes the language of another seem to depend upon what he holds to be true.

The present work on the great ideas aims in part to record the agreements and disagreements among the great minds of the western tradition. It also records how those minds have used the same word in different senses or have used quite distinct words for the same thing. It could not do either unless it did both. This indicates the basic relationship between language and thought which the great books exemplify even when they do not explicitly make it the basis of their discussion of the relation between language and thought.

THE IDEAL OF a perfect and universal language seems to arise in modern times from dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of ordinary language for the analytical refinement and precision of mathematics or science. As Descartes holds up the method of mathematics as the procedure to be followed in all other inquiries and subject matters so his conception of a universal mathe-

sis calls for a language which shall be the perfect instrument of analysis and demonstration.

It is sometimes supposed that the symbolism of mathematics is itself that perfect language. Lavoisier quotes Condillac to the effect that algebra in the most simple, most exact and best manner is at the same time a language and an analytical method. Of the analytical equations which Descartes was the first to introduce into the study of curves and surfaces Fourier remarks that they extend to all general phenomena. There cannot be a language more universal and more simple, more free from errors and obscurities that is to say more worthy to express the invariable relations of natural things. Its chief attribute is clearness; it has no marks to express confused notions. It follows the same course in the study of all phenomena; it interprets them by the same language.

This praise of mathematical symbolism indicates that one feature of the ideal is an exact correspondence between words and ideas. Like three impressions of the same seal, Lavoisier says, the word ought to produce the idea and the idea to be a picture of the fact. If there were a perfect one to one correspondence between physical symbols and mental concepts there would never be any failures of communication. Men would be able to understand each other as well as if they could see directly into each other's minds. Though they still used external signs as a medium of communication they would approximate the immediate communication which the theologians attribute to angels. In addition the process of thinking itself quite apart from communication could be perfectly regulated by the rules of grammar—the rules for manipulating symbols.

In the sense in which Lavoisier says that the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged, the rules of thought might be reduced to the rules of syntax if there were a perfect language. If the symbols of mathematics lack the universality to express every sort of concept then it may be necessary as Leibnitz proposes to construct a universal characteristic which would make possible a symbolic calculus for the performance of all the operations of thought. This conception seems to contain the principle and the motivation for the various logistical schemes which accompany the

association from the companionship of gregarious animals.

Human speech is for Descartes, one of the two criteria by which we can recognize the difference that exists between men and brutes. For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots that they cannot arrange different words together forming of them a statement by which they can make known their thoughts while on the other hand there is no other animal which can do the same. It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass for it is evident that magpies and parrots can utter words just like ourselves and yet they cannot speak as we do that is, so as to give evidence that they think of what they say. This does not merely show that the brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all.

The difference between men and other animals is more fully discussed in the chapter on MAN. Here we are concerned with opposite opinions on that subject only in relation to opposite views of human language and its origin. When, as in Descartes, "if human language is distinguished by syntax and grammar or as in Locke, by man's special power to use sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for ideas within his own mind the origin of human speech does not seem explicable in evolutionary terms.

THE RELATION OF grammar to the other liberal arts and to the various uses of language is considered in the chapters on LOGIC, POETRY and RHETORIC. Isolated from these others, grammar is primarily concerned with the distinction of the parts of speech such as noun and verb or particle and adjective.

By a noun says Aristotle we mean a sound significant by convention which has no reference to time and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In contrast to the noun the verb is defined by Aristotle as the sort of word which in addition to its proper meaning carries with it the notion of time. Moreover he continues, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else. The grammatical function of nouns and verbs is in Locke's opinion more generally

recognized and better defined than that of particles, prepositions, and conjunctions. Such words, Locke writes, show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, etc. [a man] gives to each respective part of his discourse. He who would show the right use of particles and what significance and force they have must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

Grammar is also concerned with the difference between words (or phrases) and sentences, or in Aristotle's terms, between simple and composite expressions and with the rules of syntax which govern the order and agreement of words according to their function as parts of speech. By reference to these rules the grammarian criticizes the misuse of language and classifies a great variety of common errors.

One test of whether grammar is a universal art applicable to all languages—not just a set of rules for using a particular conventional language correctly—is the naturalness of its theoretical distinctions. Does Aristotle's distinction between noun and verb for example, respond to something natural in all discourse or is it peculiar to the Greek or to the Indo-European languages?

THERE IS A MEANING of language which includes more than the speech of men and brutes. From Hippocrates on the physicians regard the symptoms of disease as if they were a connected system of signs, a language for which his diagnostic art provides a grammar of interpretation. This is particularly true in the psychological realm where in the psychoanalysis of the neuroses and especially in Freud's interpretation of dreams, both symptom and dream-symbol are treated as an elaborate language. That language serves to express the unconscious thoughts and desires which cannot be expressed in the ordinary language of social intercourse over which consciousness exercises some control.

These medical examples represent a conception of language according to which the whole of nature is a book to be read by the scientist. He penetrates the mysteries of nature by learning the grammar of natural signs. To know the relation of natural things as cause and effect or

At the time when men began to build a tower whose top may reach unto heaven Genesis tells us that the whole earth was of one language and one speech. And the Lord said Behold the people is one and they have all one language and this they begin to do and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do Go to let us go down and there confound their language that they may not understand one another's speech

This according to Hobbes means that the language gotten and augmented by Adam and his posterity was again lost at the tower of Babel when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language. If the further implication is that the lost language was unlike any of the conventional languages in the historical record then it may be supposed to have been that natural form of speech in which each thing is named according to its nature. The modern ideal of a perfect and universal language may even be looked upon as an impious wish to achieve what God took away from men at Babel.

THE PROBLEM of the origin of human language is not an easy one for the theologian. It is more difficult still for those who speculate about it in purely naturalistic terms. Rousseau tries to expose some of the perplexities in such speculations.

If speech did not become a social necessity until men passed from isolation in a state of nature to living together in society how he asks could societies have been formed before languages had been invented? If men need speech to learn to think he remarks they must have stood in much greater need of the art of thinking to be able to invent that of speaking. The development of languages already in existence or the way in which the child learns to speak through living in an environment where speech exists by no means explains how languages were originally formed.

Rousseau imagines a primitive condition in which men uttered instinctive cries to implore assistance in case of danger or relief in case of suffering he supposes that to such cries men may have added gestures to signify visible and

movable objects and imitative sounds to signify audible ones. Such methods of expression being insufficient to convey ideas about absent or future things men had at last to invent the articulate sounds of the voice and to institute these as conventional signs. But as he observes, such an institution could only be made by common consent itself still more difficult to conceive since such a common agreement must have had motives and speech therefore seems to have been highly necessary in order to establish the use of it.

The problem of the origin of human language is not only connected with the problem of the origin of human society but also with the problem of the origin of man himself. The faculty of articulate speech does not according to Darwin offer any insuperable objection to the belief that man has been developed from some lower form. Though the habitual use of articulate language is peculiar to man he uses in common with the lower animals inarticulate cries to express his meaning aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face. The songs of birds and the speech of parrots show that animals can learn to make and repeat certain definite sounds and even to connect words with things. It seems to Darwin quite credible that man's articulate language owes its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds the voices of other animals and man's own instinctive cries aided by signs and gestures.

SUCH AN ACCOUNT of the origin of human speech is not credible however to those who disagree with Darwin's statement that the lower animals differ from man solely in his almost infinitely larger power of associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas. Those who hold that human rationality differs in kind rather than degree from animal intelligence tend to find a corresponding difference in kind between human language and the sounds of brutes. Aristotle for example says that man is the only animal whom nature has endowed with the gift of speech. Mere vocalization is only an indication of pleasure and pain and is therefore found in other animals but men alone have the power to discuss the expedient and the just and this fact distinguishes human

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trine K II CH 4-5 637d-638a
20 AQUINA *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 90
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21 D T *Divine Comedy* I LL, XXXI [34-81]
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54c 55a b PART
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5 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 253c 254 323c 324b
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30 H CO *Advancement of Learning* 23a 26a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-83] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [65-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g., OLD TESTAMENT Lamentations 7:45—(D) II Esdras 7:46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference. *passim* signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The nature and functions of language the speech of men and brutes

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 11:1-9

ΑΡΧΑΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ Ecclesiasticus 4:24—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 4-9

NEW TESTAMENT I Corinthians 14 / Ephesians 4:29

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 61a ff

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a c / *Theaetetus* 547c d / *Sophist* 575d 577b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 6 [4^b3- 36] 9b / *Interpretation* CH I [16 4-8] 25a / *Soul* BK II CH 8 [420^b5-421^a6] 651d 652c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488 33-33] 9b c BK IV CH 9 62a 63c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 16 [659^b28] CH 17 [660^b3] 186d 187c / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253^b7-18] 446b c / *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 [1404^b1 3] 654c CH 10 [1410^b9-29] 662c d / *Poetics* CH 6 [1450^b10 15] 685a CH 19 [1456 33 38] 691d 692a

12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK V [1028-1090] 74c 75b

14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes* 692a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 3 8a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 18 151b c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I PAR 19 76a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d BK II CH 3 637c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 13 A 1 ANS 62c 63c Q 34 A 1 ANS 185b 187b Q 107 A 1 REP 1-3 549b 550b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III Q 60 A 8 ANS 851b 852b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXII [124-133] 147a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54c 55b PART II 100b PART IV 270a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215b 216b 218a c 300c 323c 324b

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT I SC III [154 173] 325b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 62c 63a / *Notion Organum* BK I APH 14 107d 108a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 59c 60b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [369-451] 240a 242a BK IX [49-612] 259b 260b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 45 178b 912 349b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XI SECT 8 II 145b 146a CH XVIII SECT 7 174d 175a CH XXII SECT 5 201d CH XXVII SECT 8 221a 222a CH XXVIII SECT 2 228c 229a CH XXIX SECT 7-8 244c d BK III CH I 251b d 252d CH II 252d 254c *passim* CH III

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4 395a-c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Kno ledge* INTRO, SECT
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- 36 SWIFT *G Letter* PART III, 111 b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Ineq. Jury* 339d 342c 349d 350a
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 120a b
- 45 L. VOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PR V 18-c
- 46 H. GEL. *Phil. sophy of History* INTRO, 182b-c
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 297c-300c 349d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 18b 35b-37b 683b-685a
715b-716a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 512d 513a
- 14 The role of language in thought
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a-c / *Phaedrus* 138c
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Theaetetus 520b 524c-d 526b 537d 538a
547-d / *Sophist* 37 d 377b / *Statesman*,
590d 591a / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 1-5 25a 26c /
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105c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 525a 528b /
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric*, BK III CH 10 [1410th 9-] 3]
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- 18 A. GUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI PAR 5 90b-c
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K XIII PAR 36 120c-d / *Christian Doctrine*
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- 19 A. GUSTINE *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q12 A 2
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1 3 185b-187b A 3 AN 183b-189a Q 63 A 8
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- 20 A. GUSTINE *Summa Theologiae* P RT III, Q 6
6 RE 3 744d 745b Q 60 A 6 AN 851b-
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- 23 H. LEVITZMAN ART 1 54c 58c PART IV
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- 25 M. T. I. V. *Essay* 75c d 253c 254
- 25 M. T. I. V. *Advancement of Learning* 61b-c 62
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- 31 DE CARTES *Rules* XII 26b-c / *Discourse* BK
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- 31 S. OKA *Eliaht* PART II PR P 40 SCHOL I
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- 33 P. SCAL. *Pensers*, 23 175b 32 239b-240a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK 2, CH 1
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XXII SECT 7-8 244c-d CH XXIII SECT 9
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- 328d CH V SECT 3 4 329b-d CH VI SECT
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT
19 410c SECT 21 25 411b-412a SECT 121-
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- 36 SWIFT *G Letter* RT IV 169a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 418a-419b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 342c EXP 340d
- 40 GIB. ON *Decline and Fall* 88d
- 45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PRF 18-c
4a 5c 7c
- 45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 173a b
- 45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 362c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* P RT I PAR 78
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c P RT I 218a-c
- 47 GOETHE *F. M. H.* RT I [199, 000] 47 b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 299b-300a 349d
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 36b-37a 127b-128b 153b-
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447b-448a 608b 650b 689a b
- 54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 385b-c / *U-
conscious* 442a-443a / *Ego and Id*, 700b-701d
714b-c
- 16 The service of language to society
- OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 117-9
- 5 Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* [44 461] 44c-d
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [33 35] 134a-b
- 5 EURIPIDES *Sapientia* [201 210] 260a b
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120a b / *Gorgias*, 270d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics*, BK I CH 2 [12, 37 15]
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- 12 E. CRETZ *Disco-ant* BK III CH 23 201
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- 18 A. GUSTINE *City of God* K X T CH II 429d
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trine* BK II CH 4-5 637d-638a
- 20 A. GUSTINE *Summa Theologiae* PART I-II Q 90,
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- 21 D. NT *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXXI [34-81]
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan*, PART I 54c 55a b P RT
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- 25 M. T. I. V. *Essay* 253c 254a 323c-324b
- 26 SH. KESPEARE *Richard II* ACT I SC III [159-
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38] 452a-c / *Henry V* ACT V SC II [93 306]
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- 30 B. COV. *Advancement of Learning* 23a 26a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K II CH
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 19-21 410c-411b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 25b 26a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 349d 350a 350d
40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 15d 16c *passim*
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 300a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 347b d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278a 294d 295a
54 FRIED *General Introduction* 450a c / *Group Psychology* 668c 682a

2 Theories of the origin of language

- 1 OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 19-20 11 1-9
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [44-461] 44c d
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [332-375] 134a b
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [201-210] 260a b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49a d
17 PLATO *Protagoras* 44c / *Cratylus* 85a 114a c esp 106b-c / *Phaedrus* 138c 139b / *Gorgias* 271b 272b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1028 1090] 74c 75b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XVI CH 4 425b 426a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4-5 637d 638a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXXI [34 81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54d 55a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 218a-c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2d 3a 17d 18b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [267-277] 238a [338-356] 239b 240a BK XII [1-62] 319a 320b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH I SECT 5 252b ■ CH II SECT 1 252d 253a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 349d 350a 350d
40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 10d esp 675d [n 83] 756a [n 43]
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 225a ■ 338b 342b c 706c [n 22]
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 509b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 221a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 211b-c / *Descent of Man* 300c 301c 329a ■
53 JAMES *Psychology* 685b [fn 1]
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512d 513b

2a The hypothesis of one natural language for all men

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 19-20 11 1-9
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a c esp 110c 111c
8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH I [16 4-9] 25a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XVI CH ■ 429d 431a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4-5 637d 638a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXXI [34 81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54d 55a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 161a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2d 3a 18b

- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [267 277] 238a [338-356] 239b 240a BK XII [1-62] 319a 320b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH II SECT 1 252d 253a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 18 457c d

2b The genesis of conventional languages the origin of alphabets

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 10 5 11 1-9
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 12a b BK II 60a d 80a-c BK V 171a b
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 107c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 138c 139b / *Philebus* 612d 613a
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XI 103c d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4 637d 638a CH 24 648d 649a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXXI [34-81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 54c 55a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 62d 63a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [38-62] 320a ■
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVII SECT 2 201a b SECT 5 7 201d 202b CH XXVIII SECT 2 228c 229a BK III CH II SECT 1 252d 253a SECT 8 254b-c CH V SECT 8 265c 266a CH VI SECT 43-51 280c 283a *passim* esp SECT 51 282d 283a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 349d 350a 350d
40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 10d esp 675d [n 83] 756a [n 43]
41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 225a ■ 338b 342b c 706c [n 22]
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 509b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 221a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 211b c / *Descent of Man* 300c 301c 329a ■
53 JAMES *Psychology* 685b [fn 1]

3 The growth of language

3a The invention of words and the proliferation of meanings

- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [116, 1182] 628c d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 128d
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 89a 107b
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH II [104^b 34 105^b 1] 148c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 [1006^b 9-14] 525c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH ■ [1405 3^b 21] 655b-656a CH 3 [1406^b 5 19] 657c d ■ 10 [1410^b 5-15] 662c CH II [1412 18 21] 664c / *Poetics* CH 21 [1457^b 1-1458^b 7] 693a ■
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 10 640d 641a CH 16 641b d BK III CH 5 659d 660a CH 24 25 666d 667c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 13 A 2 REP 2 63c 64d A 8 70d 71b Q 37 A 2 ■ 199a 200c Q 67 A 1 349d 350b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I

- 30d 31a BK II 77b-78b BK III 178b-179c
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- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 42 c-423c
- 26 GILBERT *Loose-Love* PREF 2b-c
- 27 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 336d 337a-c
- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 42c-43a / *Novus Organum*, BK I APH 59 112b-c
- II DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 290c-d
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVIII, SECT 7 174d 175a CH XXII, SECT 2 201a b 5 CT 5-7 201d 202b CH XXVIII, SECT 218c 229a BK III CH I 5 CT 5 252b-c CH III, SECT 6-9 255c 256c CH V 263d 268a CH VI SECT 5 274d SECT 43-51 290c 283a *Promiss. exp. s. CT 5* 282d 283a
- 33 ROUSSEAU *Equality* 341a 342b 349d 350a / *Social Contract*, BK III 419b-c
- 40 G GINSON *Decline and Fall* 775c 776a (1-3-1 4)
- 41 GINSON *Decline and Fall* 106b-c 773d [a 23]
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b-c / *Practical Reason* 294b-c 337c 338a
- 43 MULL *Utilitarianism* 467b-c
- 44 BOSWELL, JOHNSON, 59d-60d 191a 353c 354a 412a b 434a
- 45 LA OITTE *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 4a-5d BK I, 24c-d 25c 29d
- 45 F LAMAR *Researches in Electricity* 361a 362d 829d 830a
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 300c 301b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 689a b
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 509d 512 513b 516b-c 517c 518b
56. The spoken and written word in the development of language
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK V 171a b
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 83a 10 c exp 100d 101 103c-d / *Phaedrus* 138c-139a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation*, CH I [1673-8] 25a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH I [140575 31] 654b-c
- 13 AUGUSTINE *City of God* X XVII CH 39 494c-495a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH 4 637c-638a
- II DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
- III H B DE LITZGAGE, PART I 54c
- 35 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341a b
- 40 GINSON *Decline and Fall* 88c-d
- 44 BOSWELL, JOHNSON, 253a-b 330d 331
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 182b-c ART I, 218a-c 247d 248.
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 379a b
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 540b-541a
- 5c Tradition and the life of languages
- Old Testament *Deuteronomy* 6-1-9
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Tonics* BK VI, CH 10 [14576-23] 202d 203a / *Metaphysics* BK V 533a 547a-c
- 15 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH III 641 c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART II-II Q I A 9 358d 359d
- 22 CHALC A *Tronius and Crosses* BK II STANEA 2 3 21b-22a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* CONCLUSION 282c-d
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II 81d-83b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 77c 79a 422c-423c 476b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 11b-12b 42c-43a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 290c-d
- 35 LOCKE *Treatise* 22c-d / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII, SECT 7 202a b
- 36 SWIFT G *Letter* PART III 128a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 350d
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 334c 335b
- 40 GINSON *Decline and Fall* 15d 16c 623a b 629a
- 41 GINSON *Decline and Fall*, 106b-c 152a 300a b 325c 328a c exp 325c 326a, 327a b 335b 527b-528a c exp 522c 523a, 526a-c 527d 528a c
- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b-113c
- 43 MULL *Utilitarianism* 467b-c
- 44 BOSWELL, JOHNSON 151c-d 166d 307c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* I, TWO, 182b-c
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 211b-c / *Descent of Man* 300c 301a
4. The art of grammar
- 4a. Syntax: the parts and units of speech
- 7 PLATO *Cratylus* 10 d 106a 109a b / *Sophist* 575d 576b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Categories*, CH 2 [167 19] 5b CH 4 [167 10] 6a CH 7 [167-8] 11a [673 36] 11c / *Interpretation*, CH I-5 23a 26c / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 3 [101476-3] 534c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 [140576 6-140572] 635a III / *Poetics* CH 19-21 691d 694a
- III AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 1 REF 3 62c-63c
- 43 HOBBS *Leviathan*, PART I 64c-65a PART III 182b PART IV 270a-c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70d 71a
- 30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 44a b 62c-63c
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VII 283a-28-b exp SECT 253b-c
- 36 STERN *Tristram Shandy* 257b-283a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b-342c exp 341b-c, 342b-c
- 44 BOSWELL, JOHNSON 23d 24b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 229b-c
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 516b-c
- 4b Standards of correctness in the use of language grammatical errors
- 5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [675-693] 496c-497a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 14 239a-d CH 32 250d 251

- (4) *The art of grammar* 4b *Standards of correctness in the use of language* grammatical errors)
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 654c 656b CH 5 657d 658c / *Poetics* CH 22 694a 695a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 10 254a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 13 642b 643a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70d 71a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXX SECT 4 238d 239a CH XXXI SECT 4-5 240b d BK III CH VI SECT 51 282d 283a CH IV SECT 8 286c d CH VI SECT 11 302b c
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 287b 288a
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 361d 362a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 164a b
- 5 The imperfections of language
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV CH 4 525a 528b
- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c / *Cratylus* 108c 110b / *Phaedrus* 138c 140a / *Republic* BK V 369b / *Cratylus* 478b d / *Theaetetus* 526b 534a / *Sophist* 561d 563b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK IV CH 4 525a 528b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* CH 25 [1461 9-18] 697c 698b
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK I [136 139] 2d
- 17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 242c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 13 349b d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 6 626a b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 AA 1-2 62c 64d A 3 ANS 64d 65c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXVIII [1-6] 41b XXXIV [1-27] 51b c PURGATORY XXXI [133-145] 102b PARADISE I [38-81] 106c 107a c [28 48] 120c d XXIII [40-69] 141d 142a XXX [19-36] 152a XXXIII 156b 157d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 101d 102a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 253c 254a 422c-423c 476b
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 336d 337a c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60b c 65b c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 43 109d 110a APH 59-60 112b 113a
- 31 DESCARTES *Meditations* II 80d 81a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 47 SCHOL 390c 391a
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 18 152a-c BK III CH V SECT 16 267d 268a CH VI SECT 43 280c d CH IX SECT I-CH XI SECT 7 285a 301c
- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 21 25 411b-412a c SECT 52 422d 423a SECT 74 427c SECT 143 144 441c d
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 307b-308b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340d 341a 342a-c / *Social Contract* BK II 401c
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 40c d
- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 400d
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 70d 71b
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- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK II STANZA 37 26b STANZA 147-149 40b-41a BK V STANZA 257 153b 154a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 55b 57d 58a 78a b PART II 135c 157c
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 66b 67d BK II 77b 78b 101b 106a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 75a 77d 148a 149a 253c 254a 284d 285c 422c-423c 448d 449a 517b 519a
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- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART II PROP 47 SCHOL 390c 391a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 22-23 175b 393 239b 240a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b-434a
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- 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 19 410c SECT 52 422d 423a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 342c
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- 7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c / *Phaedrus* 131b 141a c / *Symposium* 172b c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* ch i [16 4-8] 25a ch 4 [17 1-] 26b 1

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* bk iii ch i 1 653b d 667b / *Poetics* ch 21 [1457^b 1458^b] 693a d ch 22 694a 695a
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk i [142 156] 107a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 42c-43b / *Alcibiades* 159a b / *Marcus Cato* 279d 281b / *Phocion* 606c d / *Demosthenes* 692d 695d passim / *Marcus Brutus* 803b c
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk iii par 7-8 14c 15a bk v par 10 11 29b 30a par 23 24 33c 34b / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 6 638a d bk iv 675a 698a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLO 1a 1a b
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* bk ii STANZA 2-4 21b-22a STANZA 147 149 40b 41a / *Prologue* [725-746] 171b 172a / *Franklin's Prologue* 351a / *Prologue to Melibee* 400b 401a / *Manciple's Tale* [17 154-186] 491a b / *Parson's Prologue* [17 341 375] 494a b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 127d 128d PART IV 270a CONCLUSION 282c d
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk ii 77b 78b 101b 106a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 75a 77d 309c 310c 422c 424c 448d-449c 482b-483b
- 28 GILBERT *Loathsome* PREF 2b c
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 1b c
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk iii ch v SECT 34 299d 300a
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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 292b 293b passim
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 59c 61d 284b 353c 354a 381d 382a 454a
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 40c d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk ix 347b 348a
- 54 FREUD *General Introduction* 450b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 662a

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- 17 PLATO *Protagoras* 52d 57a / *Ion* 143a-c
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- 6 HEROTOCES *History* bk i, 8a b 12b-d 17a b
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- 12 LACRATIVES *Nature of Things* bk iii [931-
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- 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk i 9a b bk ii 26c 27a 27b bk iv 79b bk vi 95d 96a bk vii 101b 103a b bk xii 112d 113a 119b 124b bk xiii 141a b bk xiv 147a b 149b-c bk xv 159b c 168d 169a / *Historiae* bk i 189d 190a 195b c 206a bk ii 228a b 235a-c bk iii 256d 257a bk iv 293a 294a
- 16 KEPLER *Epitome* bk iv 853b 854a / *Harmonies of the World* 1080b 1085b passim
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk i par 13 4b-c bk iii par 19-20 18b 19a bk viii par 6-18 112a 124a passim / *City of God* bk i PREF 129a d ch 36 149c d bk ii ch 1-3 150c 151c bk iv ch 33-34 206c 207a c bk v ch 1 207d 208c ch 11-26 216c 230a c bk x ch 5 301b-302a ch 8 303a d ch 11-20 306d 311c bk xi ch 18 331d 332a ch 24 28 335c 338d bk xv ch 1 397b d 398c ch 1-22 415b 416c bk xvi ch 25 438a b bk xvii ch 1-3 449a-451c bk xviii ch 1-2 472b d-473d bk xxi ch 30 618c d / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 2 624d 625a bk ii ch 1-3 636b d 637d esp ch 1 637a bk iv ch 21 690d 691b
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART III Q 12 A 3 REP 2 778b 779a QQ 60-65 847a 884a c esp Q 60 A 2 ANS AND REP I 848a d A 4 REP I 849c 850b
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, CANTO I [1-31] 34d CANTO III [1-90] 49c 50c PURGATORY IV [13-60] 66a CANTO I [1-69] 81c 82a
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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 53c d 80b c 81d 82b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 146a 147d 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 169d 1 5c 178a 215c 218a
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 NEW TESTAMENT *Mark* 16 17 / *Acts* 2 1 21
 III 44-47 19 5-6 / *I Corinth* o s 12 14 esp 14
 17 *Plotinu* F with *Ennead* ταιη CH 18 151b-c
 III *Augustine* *City of God* BK XVI CH 6 426c 427a
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 30 *B* *Advancement of Learning* 55a b / *New Atlantis* s 203c
 35 *Locke* *Human Understanding* g BK II CH XXI s CT 36 213c-d
 40 *Gibbon* *Decline and Fall* 189b
 53 *JAM* s *Psychology* 846a 847b esp 846b-847b [in 3]
 54 *FREUD New Introductory Lectures* 820c 829d esp 820d 821a 822b-823d 829a-c

12 The language of God or the gods the deliverances of the oracle the inspiration on revelation, and interpretation of Sacred Scripture

- OLD TESTAMENT *Gen* s 1 / *Exodus* 4 11 12 24 2 31 18 32 5 16 34 1 / *Numbers* 12-6 8 220-38 / *Deuteronomy* 4 2 8 3 9 10 18 8 21 29 29 30 11 4 / *Job* 35-42 / *Psalms* 26 33 69 119 1 130- (D) *Psalms* 117 32 69 8 105 130 / *Proverbs* 3 5-6 / *Isaiah* 28 9-13 34 16 4 8 5 15 16 55 8 1 59 2 - (D) / *Isaiah* 28 9 3 34 16 40 8 51 15 16 55 8 11 59 21 / *Jeremiah* 1 7-9 5 4 3 5 16 18 -6 23 28 3 24 36 1 4 - (D) *Jeremiah* 17-9 5 4 13 11 5 16 18 1-6 23 28 3 24 36 1 4 / *Ezekiel* 1 2 7 3 - (D) *Ezekiel* 2 7 3 1 / *Daniel* 2 20- 28- 9 47 5 28 / *Josiah* 2 28- 9
 AROC *Book of Wisdom* f *Solomon* 6 26- (D)
 OT *Book of Wisdom* 16 26 / *Ecclasiasticus* 5 39 6- 7 42 5 9 43 26- (D) OT *Ecclasiasticus* 5 39 16-17 42 15 19 43 28 / *I Mach* b 1 9- (D) OT *I Mach* beers 12 9
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The language of God or the gods in Sacred Scripture or oracular utterances and for the problem of interpreting the divine word see GOD 6c(1) PROPHECY 3a-3d RELIGION 1b(1) SIGN AND SYMBOL 5c THEOLOGY 4b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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 PART II

Chapter 46 LAW

INTRODUCTION

THE notion of law is associated with a diversity of subject matters and its meaning undergoes many variations as the discussion shifts from one context to another. The most radical difference separates the way in which natural scientists use the term *law* from the way in which it is used in the arts and in morals or politics.

We ordinarily think of law as a rule—a command or a prohibition—which should be obeyed and can be disobeyed. Both alternatives are usually present. Though the duty or obligation which a law creates is one of obedience, there would be no moral significance to discharging this duty if the law could not be violated. But the laws of nature which the scientist tries to discover do not have this characteristic. They are inviolable. The so-called law of gravitation, for example, or Newton's three laws of motion cannot be disobeyed. Scientists may disagree about the truth of any formulation of a natural law, but if the formulation is valid, then the general rule of behavior is supposed to obtain without exception, and if exceptions are found, they are not interpreted as instances of disobedience, but rather as cases to which the law does not apply.

The rules of an art may be violated either unwittingly or intentionally. For example, grammatical errors can be made by those ignorant of the rules or by those who wish to disregard them. The so-called law of contradiction in the art of logic seems to be like the rules of grammar or of any other art. Men certainly contradict themselves in spite of the rule which places the penalty of error on those who make contradictory statements.

But according to another conception of the law of contradiction, which belongs to the science of metaphysics rather than to the art of logic, nothing can both be and not be at the

same time in the same respect. This law of being like the laws of motion is regarded as inviolable by those who think it true. In this it has the aspect of a scientific or natural law. The law of contradiction, conceived as a rule of logic, may also be natural in the sense of *not being man made*. In the opinion of certain philosophers, man does not invent either the metaphysical rule which all existences *must* observe or the logical rule which the human mind *should* always obey. He discovers both.

There still remains that other class of rules to which the word *law* is most commonly applied. These are rules of moral action or social conduct which, like rules of art, are essentially violable. Laws in their most general significance, Montesquieu writes, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws. But he points out that law operates differently in the realm of physical nature and in the realm of intelligent beings like man. The latter, he says, does not conform to [its laws] so exactly as the physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature and consequently liable to error, and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence, even the laws of their own instituting they frequently infringe.

The profound division between laws of nature and laws of human conduct thus seems to involve two points: (1) the former may apply to all things, the latter are addressed to man alone; (2) the former being inviolable state the necessities of behavior, the latter precisely because they are violable imply freedom in those to whom they are addressed.

These two kinds of law have this much in common. Both the laws of nature discovered by the scientist and the rules of conduct instituted by the legislator are general rather than particu-

lar. Their generality has been made in the tradition of jurisprudence the *lex* is for differentiating rules of law from particular decisions or decrees. On theological grounds however the two kinds of law can be said to have a more significant characteristic in common.

Aquinas conceives the laws of nature which the scientist discovers as laws implanted in the very nature of things at their creation by God. The laws which God implants in human nature do not differ in their eternal origin in the divine intellect and will or in their manifestation of the divine government of the world. They differ only in that it is part of man's nature to be free and therefore able to disobey even the rules of his own nature. Thus both sorts of law are directions of behavior. Only if the laws which science discovers are not attributed to God will they seem to be merely descriptive rather than prescriptive.

In this chapter we shall be primarily concerned with law as a direction of human conduct or as Kant would say law in the sphere of freedom. But within the one meaning of law which concerns us here there are still many important distinctions of type. The distinction of law in a divine and human, natural and positive private and public moral and political—to name only some of the traditional distinctions—determines the outlines of the diverse philosophies of law which the great books contain and underlies the great issues concerning the origin the properties, and the authority of law.

DIFFERENT WRITERS use different criteria to set up their classification of the kinds of law. It is nevertheless possible to perceive certain parallels in analysis and classification. The opposite of natural law is sometimes called "human law," "positive law" or "written law" sometimes "civil law" or "municipal law." Sometimes, as with Kant for whom the analysis of law derives from an analysis of rights, the differentiation between natural and positive right is also expressed in terms of innate and acquired right public and private right.

Thus for Kant "natural right rests upon pure rational principles *a priori* positive or statutory right is what proceeds from the will of a legislator. Innate right is that right which belongs to everyone by nature independent of

all juridical acts of experience. Acquired right is that right which is founded upon such juridical acts. From natural or innate right develops

the system of those laws which require no external promulgation and which therefore belong to the sphere of private right. Positive or civil rights are the acquired rights of men living in a state of civil society under the system of those laws which require public promulgation" and which therefore belong to the sphere of public right. The source of differentiation here seems threefold: whether the right is inherent in human nature or acquired from the state whether men are viewed as living in a state of nature or as living in a civil society whether the laws do or do not need to be publicly promulgated.

The distinction between the state of nature and the state of civil society is used by many other writers in differentiating between natural and positive (or civil) law e.g. by Hobbes Spinoza Locke Montesquieu Rousseau. They also recognize that the law which governs men living in a state of nature is natural in the sense of being instinctive or a rule of conduct which man's reason is innately competent to prescribe whereas the civil law originates with specific acts of legislation by a political power vested in a sovereign person or a representative assembly or in the whole body of the people.

Dividing all laws into two kinds—laws of nature and laws of the land—Hegel holds that "the laws of nature are simply what they are and are valid as they are." In contrast positive law is "valid in a particular state and this legal authority is the guiding principle for the knowledge of right in this positive form, i.e. for the science of positive law. Our manner of knowing their content further distinguishes between these two kinds of law. To know the law of nature Hegel explains, "we must learn to know nature since its laws are rigid and it is only our ideas about them that can be false. Knowledge of the laws of the land is in one way similar but in another way not. These laws too we learn to know just as they exist. But the difference in the case of laws of the land is that they arouse the spirit of reflection and their diversity at once draws attention to the fact that they are not absolute.

This leads us to the heart of the distinction. The law of the land or civil law is something posited something originated by men. It is positive law in the sense that it must be *posited* (i.e. officially instituted) in order to exist. The civil law is not something *discovered* by examining man's nature. It is *made* and must be externally promulgated so that those who are subject to it can learn its provisions. Anyone who will inquire can learn the natural law for himself, or he can be helped to discover it by a teacher who instructs him in this matter as he would instruct him in geometry not as a lawyer informs clients concerning the prevailing laws of the state.

AQUINAS BOTH subtracts from and adds to this analysis of the difference between natural and positive law. On the one hand he does not appeal to the condition of man in a state of nature as contrasted with civil society. On the other hand he finds the chief difference between the natural and the positive law in their originating sources. The one is made by God the other by man. The natural law Aquinas writes is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law. It is God's eternal law with respect to man as that which is received and exists in human nature. It exists in man as the first principle of his practical reason and includes all the precepts which can be discovered by reasoning therefrom.

Hence for Aquinas as for Locke the law of nature is not only the law of reason but the law of nature's God. But Aquinas distinguishes between the law of nature generally or the eternal law and the natural law in man. The latter is a moral law both in the sense that it is a law governing free acts and also in the sense that it directs man with regard to good and evil in the sphere of his private life not merely with regard to the political common good.

Natural and positive law are alike in the very respects in which they differ. Both share in the nature of law which according to Aquinas is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated. Each has a maker God or man each proceeds in a certain way from the reason and will of its maker each must be promulgated though not in the same

manner and each is concerned with a common good—human happiness or the welfare of the state.

The further additions which Aquinas makes consist of distinctions with respect to divine and human law. With respect to the divine law he distinguishes between God's eternal ordinances and His positive commandments. The eternal part of the divine law as we have seen is that which at the moment of creation God imprints on the whole of nature to instill in each created species the principles of its proper actions. If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculties Aquinas writes there would be no need for man to have any further direction

besides the natural law and the human law which is derived from it. But man is ordained to the end of eternal happiness and since salvation is a supernatural end which exceeds man's power to achieve without God's help it was necessary that man should be directed to this end by a law given by God.

God gave such a body of law to man not at creation but at a certain moment in history. He did not implant it in his nature but promulgated it in the manner appropriate to positive law through verbal declaration—through His revealed word in the Old and the New Testaments e.g. the Ten Commandments and the two precepts of charity.

The human law Aquinas divides into the law of nations [or the *ius gentium*] and civil law. The civil law is that which is instituted by a community for its own members. With regard to the *ius gentium* Aquinas follows the tradition of the Roman jurists. What he has in mind in using this term should therefore not be confused with what later writers such as Grotius treat as the *ius inter gentes* or international law. Yet applicable to both the law of nations and international law is the question whether such law belongs more properly to the sphere of natural or to the sphere of positive law.

International law concerns the relations between autonomous states which as Hegel points out are in a state of nature in relation to one another since the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to others. Laws cannot be applied to sovereign states with the coercive force of positive law. It follows says

Hegel that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized the matter can only be settled by war. His statement that international law does not go beyond an ought to be separates it from positive law. On similar grounds Aquinas separates the *ius gentium* from positive law. He recognizes as will presently appear that it does not result from legislative enactment. Furthermore, he points out that it is discovered by reason and derives its rules by way of deduction from natural law. The law of nations is, therefore, not positively instituted.

That the law of nations lacks some of the properties of civil law does not make it for Aquinas, less essentially a body of law but for Hegel it falls short of the essence of law which consists in a determinate and universal rule of right posited by a sovereign will. The great legal positivists of the 19th century, such as Austin, go further and deny that anything is truly law except the positive enactments of a government which has the power to enforce its ordinances. The laws of nature are laws only in a metaphorical sense.

The Greeks also appear to regard law as primarily a creation of the state. Aristotle conceives political justice as part natural part legal—natural that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that legal that which is originally indifferent but when it has been laid down is not indifferent. This tends to identify the legal aspect of justice with the conventional. The threefold division of law into civil law, law of nations, and natural law is not Greek but Roman in origin.

Yet the Greeks do not hold that all law is of human institution or merely a matter of local convention. The fundamental opposition between the divine law and the man-made law of the state occurs frequently in the Greek tragedies and with particular force in the *Antigone* of Sophocles. In burying her brother Antigone violates the king's edict but in her view not to have done so would have been to violate the unwritten statutes of heaven which she declares, are not of today or yesterday but from all time and no man knows when they were first put forth. Not through dread of any human pride," she says, "could I answer to the gods for breaking these

Aristotle cites this passage from Sophocles when in his *Rhetoric* he advises the forensic orator (or trial lawyer) to appeal to the universal law and insist on its greater equity and justice if the written law tells against our case. Under such circumstances, he thinks it is wise to urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless and that the universal law does not change either for it is the law of nature whereas written laws often do change. Under the opposite circumstances that is, when the written law supports our case, he prescribes an opposite course—to cite the laws of the state and to urge that they be upheld.

Though Aristotle here speaks of the law of nature, he seems to have in mind the notion of a universal law or a body of law that is common to all peoples. For the most part he speaks of natural justice rather than natural law. Whether or not the two notions are equivalent, his principle of natural justice stands in the same relation to political enactments as, for later writers, the natural law stands to the positive law. Plato's conception of law as a disposition of reason which orders things according to their natures even more explicitly recognizes that law neither depends upon nor derives its authority from the power of the state. The phrase natural law may be infrequent in the Greek books but its meaning is not unrepresented in Greek thought.

OTHER DISTINCTIONS in kinds of law—written and unwritten, statutory and customary, constitutional law and the various particular bodies of law such as the law of contracts, of crimes or of torts—are for the most part subdivisions of positive law. The one exception perhaps is the unwritten law which when not identified with customary law stands for the natural law or the law of reason. With respect to these parts of law the chief problems concern constitutions and customs. The difference between a constitution as law and all other laws obtaining in a state is considered in the chapter on CONSTITUTION and the legal force of custom both in itself and also in relation to legislative enactments, is discussed in the chapter on CUSTOM.

Here our major concern is with positive law as a whole with its properties and defects but also with its relation to natural law. Some

of the properties of positive law are agreed upon even by those who sharply disagree concerning its relation to natural law

It is generally agreed for example that a rule of positive law cannot be made by *any* man but only by him who exercises the legislative authority and has the power to enforce the rule. Agreement also prevails concerning the mutability of positive law though not all would go as far as Montaigne in holding that there is nothing more subject to perpetual agitation than the laws. Yet it is generally recognized that the content of positive law continually undergoes change with the nullification or amendment of old rules and the addition of new ones and that positive regulations on any particular matter may vary from state to state.

No less common is the understanding of the indispensability of courts and judges. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. Hamilton writes: Though rules of law in distinction from decrees are formulated to cover an indefinite number of like cases the cases to which they must be applied by the judicial process are far from uniform. Courts and judges have the task of deciding whether the facts of the particular case bring that case under the specific provisions of the law. This is the field of judicial discretion and the battleground of litigants and lawyers.

The propensities of men of law on the bench and at the bar to protract and complicate the procedures of a trial to multiply and divide the issues to separate themselves from laymen by a heavy curtain of language have been satirically noted in the great diatribes against the legal profession from Aristophanes to Chaucer Rabelais Montaigne and Swift.

Rabelais for example has Pantagruel undertake to arbitrate in the litigation between

Lord Kissbreech plaintiff of one side and Lord Suckist defendant of the other whose controversy was so high and difficult in law that the court of parliament could make nothing of it. Pantagruel conducts the proceedings in an unusual style. When the counsellers and attorneys delivered into his hands the bags wherein were the writs and pancarts concerning that suit which for bulk and weight were almost enough to load four great couillard

or stoned asses Pantagruel said unto them: Are the two lords between whom this debate and process is yet living? Upon being told they are alive to what a devil then said he: serve so many paltry heaps and bundles of papers and copies which you give me? Is it not better to hear their controversy from their own mouths whilst they are face to face before us than to read these vile fopperies which are nothing but trumperies deceits diabolical contrivances of Cepola pernicious slights and subversions of equity.

Furthermore Pantagruel continues seeing the laws are excerpted out of the middle of moral and natural philosophy how should these fools have understood it that have by G— studied less in philosophy than my mule? In respect of human learning and the knowledge of antiquities and history they are truly laden with these faculties as a toad is with feathers. And yet of all this the laws are so full that without it they cannot be understood. Therefore if you will that I make any meddling in this process first cause all these papers to be burned secondly make the two gentlemen come personally before me and afterwards when I shall have heard them I will tell you my opinion freely without any feignedness or dissimulation whatsoever. The trial which Pantagruel then conducts in which the two lords are forced to plead without benefit of counsel is a choice and proper piece of litigation.

THE PROBLEMS of casuistry with which Pascal deals at length in his *Provincial Letters* are sometimes thought of as peculiar to the canon law but casuistry in the sense of distinguishing cases and examining them in relation to general rules necessarily occurs in the judicial application of any body of law. The most difficult cases are those which may fall under the letter of a law but seem to be inconsistent with its spirit. The reverse also happens: cases fall outside the letter of the law but the purpose of the law seems to cover them. All such cases indicate an unavoidable defect in rules of law.

The defect is unavoidable. Aristotle says Law aims at universality but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. To remedy this defect

the intention of the lawmaker should be considered. The particular case should be treated as he would have treated it if he had had it in mind when he framed the general rule. Such handling of the difficult case is what Aristotle means by the equitable—a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality.

The law which equity is called upon to correct may be a just rule, but that does not prevent its being unjustly applied. Equity prevents the injustice of misapplication by dispensing justice in the particular case according to the spirit, not the letter of the law. It is a kind of justice Aristotle says not legal justice but a correction of legal justice not better than absolute justice but better than the error which arises from the absoluteness of the rule.

Those who share Aristotle's theory of equity acknowledge a standard of justice by which not only the law's application, but also the law itself, is to be measured. In his terms, natural justice provides this standard. The justice of laws made by the state is not only relative to the constitution of the state, but since the constitution itself can be more or less just there is a standard of justice prior to and independent of the state—in this sense natural.

Essentially the same point is made by those who, like Montesquieu and Locke, appeal to the natural law both as a measure of constitutions and as a criterion for distinguishing good from bad law. Before laws were made, Montesquieu writes, "there were notions of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the description of a circle all the radii were not equal."

The law of nature according to Locke does not apply only to the conduct of men living in a state of nature. The law of nature which Locke describes as a rule of common reason and equity such as that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security is not abolished when men enter into civil society. The definitions of the law of nature cease not in society but only in many cases are drawn closer and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule

to all men legislators as well as others." The rules of positive law writes Locke must be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God of which that is the declaration. The municipal laws of any particular state are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

The position of Locke and Aquinas makes natural law the source as well as the standard of positive law. As a source natural law gives rise to positive law in a way which, for Aquinas at least, differentiates it from the law of nations or the *ius gentium*.

Something may be derived from the natural law in two ways," he writes. First as a conclusion from premises secondly by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way he explains, is like to that by which in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles while the second mode is likened to that whereby in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Now "to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the like without which men cannot live together which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law according as each state decides on what is best for itself."

Aquinas exemplifies the determinations of positive law by pointing out that the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished but that he be punished in this way or that is a determination of the law of nature "which the positive law must institute. He might also have used as an example the fact that the universal prohibition of killing is a conclusion from the principle of natural law that "one should do him no harm," whereas the various kinds and degrees of murder are differently defined in different countries according to the determination of the natural law made by the positive law of homicide in each country.

The rules of positive law cannot be arrived at deductively. They do not follow necessarily from principles. They are only determinations which particularize the precepts of natural law in a manner which fits the contingent circumstances of a particular society. Whatever is made determinate by positive law is something which the natural law leaves indeterminate because no point of justice or right is involved. Other determinations could have been made. An element of choice is involved in the making of positive laws. In addition to being formulated by the reason they must be posited by the will of whoever has the authority to make laws.

Rules of positive law are the work of reason to the extent that reason is called upon to propose various possible determinations of the natural law e.g. one or another definition of murder in the first degree, one or another definition of the penalty for it. Since a definite rule of positive law cannot be instituted until a choice is made among the alternative possibilities, the positive law cannot be solely the work of reason. Choice according to Aquinas is always an act of the will.

Though he recognizes the role of choice and hence of the will in the enactment of positive law, Aquinas does not go to the other extreme of making the will the sole arbiter of what is law. The legality of the state's ordinances does not depend entirely on their being posited by the will of a sovereign authority. If a positive regulation is not derived from the natural law, it cannot be a just rule. Quoting Augustine's remark that a law which is not just is a law in name only, Aquinas goes on to say: 'Every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.'

An ordinance which had no other foundation than the will of a sovereign prince or government might have the coercive force of law, but it would lack the moral authority of law. It would bind men not through conscience but only through their fear of punishment for disobedience. That force and tyranny may be an element in law, writes Hegel, is accidental to law, and has nothing to do with its nature.

A COMPLETELY opposite view is taken by those who deny natural law or principles of innate right and natural justice. There is in addition a theory of natural law which leads to an opposite view of the legal and the just, though the opposition in this case is qualified to some extent.

According to Hobbes, civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law. 'The law of nature and the civil law he says contain each other and are of equal extent. But he also says that the laws of nature are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience.'

Before the formation of a commonwealth by the contract or covenant whereby men transfer the rights and liberties which they possess in a state of nature, the natural law directs men first to preserve their lives in the war of every man against every man, and second to seek the security of peace by leaving the natural state of war to join with their fellow men in the order of a civil society. The nineteen precepts of natural law which Hobbes enumerates seem to set forth reason's recognition of the advantages of civil society over the state of nature, and also reason's understanding of the conditions indispensable to a firm foundation of the commonwealth.

These rules of reason are the laws of nature dictating peace for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. But until the commonwealth exists, the laws of nature bind in conscience only, and they are therefore not effective in achieving their end, which is security. When a commonwealth is settled, then they are actually laws and not before, as being then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws. For it is the sovereign power which obliges men to obey them.

The distinction between natural and civil law then becomes a distinction between unwritten and written rules, but the test of whether any rule is actually a law is the same, namely, whether it is adopted and enforced by the sovereign. All laws written and unwritten have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth. Hobbes writes:

The difference between the Hobbesian theory and that of Locke or Aquinas reveals itself in its

consequences Under what circumstances can a subject or citizen refuse obedience to the laws of the state? On the ground that they are unjust or tyrannical? By the criterion that they violate precepts of natural law or the positive commandments of God? Is the individual bound in conscience to obey every command of the civil law because the civil law includes the natural law interprets it and gives it the authority and force of law and because the natural law itself commands obedience to the civil law once a commonwealth has been instituted? Or on the contrary is an individual in conscience free to disobey those positive enactments which lack the authority of law because they are not in conformity to the natural law or the divine law?

To questions of this sort and to the whole problem of the right of rebellion different answers seem to be given in terms of different views of the nature of law the sources of its authority and its sanctions.

At one extreme there is the doctrine that rebellion is never justified that the security of peace which the maintenance of law and order provides, is always better than the anarchy and war which result from rebellion. Hobbes for example holds that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject on what pretence soever can properly be called an injustice or injury The rebel would therefore always be a criminal a man who takes the law into his own hands and uses force to gain his ends. A man may be justified in using force according to Hobbes only to repel force used against him and then only in defense of his life So much the law of nature permits or requires But it does not permit or require him to decide which laws enacted by his sovereign he shall obey or disobey

At the other extreme there is the doctrine of civil disobedience as expounded by Thoreau and of course Gandhi. Unjust laws or laws which violate a man's conscience may have the force of the state behind them. But they exert no authority over him. The just man is called upon to break them and to submit gladly to the consequences of breaking them by suffering whatever penalties may be attached to their breach. It is not enough for the individual cit-

izen to satisfy his conscience by criticizing the government and joining with like-minded fellow citizens in an effort to get unjust laws abolished or reformed. He is obliged in conscience not to await help from others or to be patient in the use of gradual means. He is obliged to act alone and at once—by disobeying the unjust law.

Kant seems to go this far when he interprets the precept *Do wrong to no one* as meaning "Do no wrong to anyone even if thou shouldst be under the necessity in observing this duty to cease from all connection with others and to avoid all society. But he qualifies this somewhat by the precept. Enter if wrong cannot be avoided into a society with others in which everyone may have secured to him what is his own.

Another sort of qualification limits disobedience rebellion or secession from society—even when the individual conscience recoils from the injustice or illegality of a civil ordinance. The principle as stated by Aquinas seems to be that the common good may under certain circumstances be better served by acquiescence than by disobedience. Unless what the law commands involves a transgression of God's commandments an unjust law may be obeyed in order to avoid scandal or disturbance.

Even with regard to reforming law by legal means Aquinas recommends that the disadvantages resulting from the change of law be weighed against the advantages. The effectiveness of law depends upon the habits of obedience it forms and upon the customary behavior it establishes. Consequently Aquinas says when a law is changed the binding power of law is diminished in so far as custom is abolished. This harm to the common welfare may of course be compensated rather by the benefit conferred by the new enactment or by the fact that the existing law is clearly unjust or its observance extremely harmful.

Locke states the principle somewhat differently. So long as due process of law is available to remedy unjust ordinances or illegal acts the individual is not justified in disobedience for such action would unhinge and overturn all politics, and instead of government and order leave nothing but anarchy and confusion. Nor

is it effective for the individual to act alone in using force to resist tyranny or injustice. But if these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people and they are persuaded in their consciences that their laws and with them their estates, liberties and lives are in danger and perhaps their religion too, how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience I confess that attends all governments. There is no alternative then but rebellion—properly a state of war wherein the appeal lies only to heaven.

As the foregoing discussion indicates the basic issues in the philosophy of law are inseparable from questions about justice and liberty, the rights of the individual and the authority of the state, the powers of government, and the fundamental alternatives of crime and punishment, war and peace. These matters are considered in the chapters appropriate to the terms mentioned above. More particular consequences of the theory of law, especially natural law, are found in such chapters as *REVOLUTION*, *SLAVERY* and *TIRANNY*, *CITIZEN*, *CONSTITUTION* and *WEALTH*.

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PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d.

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SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

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 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 266a b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3a 3c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368d 371a /
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 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK 1 CH 9 [1180a14 4]
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 23 HORSES *Leviathan* P RT II 100c 101
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 29 C A 1 *Deus* D N *Quintus* PART I 347a
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 31 D 10A 1 *Discourse* PART VI 61a
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 6 229d
 38 ROT 1A *Political Economy* 350a / *Social*
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 42 HANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 393c /
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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [450-460] 135a
 5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia Among the Tauri* [1435-1499] 424a d
 7 PLATO *Laws* BK IV 684c 686b BK IX 745c 746a BK X 760c 761b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 3 [1113 3-13] 359a / *Athenian Constitution* CH 7 par 1 555c
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 4 207d 208b Q 91 A 1 REP 2 208b d Q 93 A 2 216c 217b A 5 REP 1 219a d Q 106 A 1 321a 322a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 132b 133d 137b 138b 143b c 157c d 160b
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 47c d
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 94d 95a
 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 14b / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 9 27a b CH VI SECT 57-60 36d 38a CH IX SECT 124 53d 54a CH XI SECT 136-137 56c 57b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIV 266b 268c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 371a / *Social Contract* BK II 401c 402a
 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 616d 617a
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73a 73d 74b passim
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a b
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 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 210-211 69d 70c par 215 71c d par 217 72b c par 224 73d ADDITIONS I 115a d 141 139c

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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [441-525] 134d 135c [891-943] 138d 139a / *Ajax* [1047-1421] 152a 155a c
 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [513-565] 262d 263b / *Bacchantes* [878-911] 347b
 7 PLATO *Laws* BK IV 681b 683a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 12 [173^a 7-31] 238b c
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 7 382c 383a / *Politics* BK I CH 6 448c-449b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1368^b 7-10] 611d CH 13 [1373^b 17] 617c d
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 17a b par 17 17d 18a / *City of God* BK XIV CH 17 522b 523a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 63 A 2 ANS 641b 65a Q 91 208b 213c Q 97 A 3 REP 1 237b 238b Q 100 A 1 251b 252a A 2 ANS 252b-253a Q 107 A 1 ANS 325c 327b

- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXX [9, 1-3] 152d 153a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 86c d PART I 131a-c 136d 137b 138c 151a-c PART II 245c 246a PART IV 249a
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 281a 283c 516c 517a 519a b
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 100d
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II 25d 28c passim CH IV SECT 21 29d CH VI SECT 56-57 36d 37d CH IX 53c 54d passim / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 13 10 d 108c BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6-13 229d 231b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a 3a BK XXIV 202b c BK XXVI 214b d 215a 218a 221c d
 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 399b c
 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 72a
 42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 392b *Science of Right* 400b d-403b 429a-c 434b 436b
 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 467c d
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 3 10a 11b ADDITIONS I 115a d

3 The divine law

3a The eternal law in the divine government of the universe the law in the nature of all creatures

- OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 119 esp 119 91-(D) *Psalms* 118 esp 118 91 / *Proverbs* 8 15 30
 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH II 216c d BK XI CH 22 333d 334c BK XIV CH II 1 516d 520d
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 21 A 1 REP 2 124b 125b A 2 125c d PART I II Q 19 A 4 703b c A 6 ANS and REP 2 707a 708a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 1 208b d A 2 ANS and REP 3 208d 209d Q 93 215b d 220d
 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [94 14] 107b d XXX [97 123] 152d 153a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 159d 160b
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71a b
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 55a b
 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30-32 418c 419a passim
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a 2b
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 243b d

3a(1) The natural moral law as the eternal law in human nature

- OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 37 30-31-(D) *Psalms* 36 30-31
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 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [450-460] 135a
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 9 10d BK III par 13 15 16c 17b
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 19 A 4 705b c

20 AOCEN 5 *Summa Theologica* P RT II-II Q 91
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220d

21 HOBBS *Leviathan*, PART I 96b PART II
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30 B COX *Advancement of Learning* 100d

33 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I CH II,
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331d / *Social
Contract* R IV 437

36(2) The distinction between the eternal law
and the positive commandments of God

NEW TESTAMENT ROMANS 2 1 6

20 AOCEN 5 *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 91
A 2 and REP 210c 211c

21 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 135d 138b
160b-c P III 171 c 199b 216c 217a

30 B COX *Advancement of Learning* 71a B 100d

31 The divine positive law the difference between
the law revealed in the Old and
the New Testament

OLD TESTAMENT GENESIS 9:3-17 7-4 14 62-
5 / Exodus 19 3-6 30 / Deuteronomy 5
1 25-19 27 1-8 312b / Joshua 8:30-35-
(D) / 1 Sam 8:30-35 / Psalm 1 40 5 119
passim, esp 1 9:1 16 1 9:33 4 119:29-136
(-D) Psalm 1 39 7 1 3 *passim*, esp
118 16 118:33 4 1 29-36 / Proverb
37 2 620-23 / Jeremiah, 31 33-(D) Jer
emias 3 33

APOCRYPH. Ecclesiasticus 2 16 1 12 19:7-
2 32 3 33 3 39 1 11-(D) OT Eccle
siasticus 9 17 9 19 7 13 32:9 13:3
13:7-39 15

NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 5 17 44 esp 57
20 22 36-40 / Luke 6 47 / 1 Cor 1 7
29-23 / 1 Cor 1 48 13:35-39 32 29
21 9-5 esp 21:20-25 / Romans *passim* /
1 Corinthians 9 19-21 1 23 33 / Galatians
passim, esp 1-5 2 / Ephesians 2 14 15 /
Colossians 2 3 23 / 1 Timothy 2 14 11 /
Hebrews esp 9 / James 1:2, 2:8-2

18 AOCEN *Civ f God* K K II 17 309c
3 0b K 25 313c 314c K XVII CH II
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20 AOCEN 5 *Summa Theologica* II-II Q 91
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 137b-138b 160b-
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2. MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII 101 314 321b-
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31 FASCAL *Provincial Letters* 9b / PIERCE 520
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33 LOCKE *Treatise*, 34b-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 402a BK

1 435c

40 G ARON *Decline and Fall* 181b-c

41 GIBBO *Decline and Fall* 252c

36(1) Law in the Old Testament: the moral the
judicial, and the ceremonial precepts of
the Old Law

OLD TESTAMENT GENESIS 9:3 7 17:9-14 62-5
/ Exodus 12 13 0-31 34-35 40 / *Leviticus* /
Numbers *passim*, esp 15 1-19, 27 30 35 36 /
Deuteronomy esp 4 27 / 1 Sam 17-8 8 30-
32 2 1-6-(D) 1 Sam 1-8 8 30-32 2 1-6
/ 1 Samuel 13:9-14-(D) / *1 Kings* 13:9-14 /
/ *1 Kings* 1:5-(D) / *1 Kings* 21:5 / *1 Chro*
cles 22 1 12-(D) / *Paralipomenon* 22 12 17
/ *1 Chronicles* 34 32 esp 35 1 19-(D) / *11*
Paralipomenon 34-35 esp 35 19 / *Ezra* 9-10
-(D) / *Ezra* 9 10 / *Nehemiah* 1:5-9 9 16-
35-(D) / *11 Esdras* 1 5-9 9 16-35 / *Psalm*
8 89 30-3 94 1 102-43-45 119 *passim*-(
D) Psalm 88 31 33 93 22 104 43 45
118 *passim* / *Proverbs* 3 1 2 4 1 2 620-23 /
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(D) *Isaiah* 1 10-11, 5 24 25 42:21-25 51-8
/ *Jeremiah* 6 19 9 13 6 16 10-13 26 4-6
31 33 44 10-14 25-(D) *Jeremiah* 6 19 9 13-
16 16 10-13 6 4-6 31 33 44 10-14 23 /
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43 43-(D) *Ezekiel* 5:6-9 11 18-0 15
22 26 36:2, 2 43 45 / *Daniel* 9 2 12 /
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6:6-8-(D) *1 Micah* 6:6-8 / *Zephaniah*, 3 1-
7-(D) *So Jonas* 3 1 7 / *Zechariah*, 2 14
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cabees 6- 15 17-(D) OT / *11 Maccabees*
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18 AOCEN 5 *Civ of God* K K II 17 309c
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20 AOCEN 5 *Summa Theologica* P RT II-II, Q 91
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23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 137b-c 154b-
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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 18b-c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK X 1:13 3:1 324a
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(3b) *The divine positive law the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament 3b(1) Law in the Old Testament the moral the judicial and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law)*

- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 619 620 284b 286a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 180b 182c passim 208a c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 467c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 246c 247a

3b(2) Law in the New Testament the law of love and grace ceremonial precepts of the New Law

- NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5-7 esp 5 17 20 16 18-19 18 18 22 34-40 28 19 / *Mark* 12 28 34 / *Luke* 6 20-49 10 25-37 16 16-17 22 15-20 / *John* 3 1-8 6 esp 6 47-58 13 31-17 26 20 21-23-(D) *John* 3 1-8 6 esp 6 47 59 13 31-17 6 20 21-23 / *Acts* 2 37 42 8 14 17 26 30 10 34-48 13 2-4 38-39 15 22-29 19 1-7 21 20-25 / *Romans* esp 3-13 / *I Corinthians* 11 23-34 13 / *Galatians* esp 3 6 / *Colossians* / *I Timothy* 4 14 / *Hebrews* 7-10 / *James* 5 14 15 / *I Peter* 4 8-11 / *I John* / *II John*

- III AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 5 313c 314c BK XX CH 4 532b III / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22-30 629b 633b CH 35 634c d BK III CH 10 661c 662a

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 5 211c 212c Q 98 A 4 ANS 242b 243c Q 101 A 2 ANS 267a 268a A 4 REP 2 269a 270b Q 102 A 1 REP 1 270c 271b A 4 REP 2-4 276d 283c A 5 REP 3 283c 292c Q 103 A 3 ANS 300d 302a QO 106-108 321a 337d PART II-II Q 16 A 1 REP 2 454c-455c

- 22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 31 517b 518b par 68 533b 534a

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 180c d 206c 207a 218a 219d 210d PART IV 257c 258a

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 81a 100d

- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [285-314] 325b 326a [576-603] 331b 332a

- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 672 296a

- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 259a / *Practical Reason* 327c d

- 43 MILL *Liberty* 286b 287a

- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 525c 526b

- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* ot BK V 121d 137c esp 121d 122b 126c 127b BK VI 150a c 166c 170a

4 The natural law

4a The law of reason or the moral law the order and habit of its principles

- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT II 262a B BK IV SECT 4 264a BK VII SECT 55 283b-c BK XI SECT I 302a b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par o 10d

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 12 425c-426b

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 58 A 4-5 44a 45c Q 63 A 1 63a 64a Q 90 A 1 205b 206b Q 91 A 2 208d 209d A 5 REP 3 211c 212c A 6 212c 213c Q 94 220d 226b

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 86b 87a 91a 96b esp 96b PART II 132c d 133b

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 23b-c 184a B 520c d

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 96a c

- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 18 SCHOL 429a d PROP 31-35 432a-434a PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a

- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II 25d 28c esp SECT 6 II 26b 27d CH VI SECT 56-63 36d 38c CH IX SECT I 433d 54a / *Human Understanding* 90d BK I CH II SECT 5-6 105a B passim SECT 13 108b c

- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 399b

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 235a b 236d 237a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253d 254d 259c 261d 264b 265a 268d [in a] 271c d 282b 287b / *Practical Reason* 306d 310b 314d 321b 360d 361d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b 387a c 388b c 390b

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140 52a 53a PART III par 213 71a ADDITIONS I 115a d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 170d 171a

4b The law of men living in a state of nature

- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 311b 312d

- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 84c 87b PART II 99a b

- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20c d

- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II III 25d 29d CH IX 53c 54d

- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2b-d

- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330a 331b 333b-d 342c 348a esp 343b 345c / *Social Contract* BK I 389d 390a

- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 237c

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 222b c / *Science of Right* 402c 433c 436c

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 93 36a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171c 172b

4c The *a priori* principles of innate or abstract right universal law in the order of freedom the objectification of the will

- 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 110c 114b 115a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b 392b / *Science of Right* 400b d 40 a 412c-414c 416b 417b 429a B 435a-436b

- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 446a B 458d 459d

- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 4 30 12d 19c esp par 4 12d 13a par 15 16a b par 22 17c d par 27 30 18d 19c par 33 20b d PART I 21a 39d esp par 36 21b-c par 94 36b PART II par 106 114 40a-42b par 133 47a par 135

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3 33
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18 Al sti Confessions BK II par 9 10d
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19 Aq I Summa Theologica P RT I 11 Q 9
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21 H AB 1 Levith n PART I 91a 96b esp 95d
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5 SOPHOCLES Antigone [420-460] 135a
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18 AC 1 T 1 City of God BK XIX CH 21 524a
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38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 330a 331b

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5 SOPHOCLES Antigone [420-460] 135a

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18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK III par 15 17 b
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20 Aq IV 1 Summa Theologica PART II Q 91
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38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK I 1c-d BK
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38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 333b-c 353d 355b
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- 42 HANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 393c / *Science of Right* 397a b 436b c 438b c 451d-452a
- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [29-47] 1b 2a [62 64] [78 79] 2b
- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US ARTICLE I SECT 1-9 11a 14a
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 33 107b 108c NUMBER 38 121b 124a NUMBER 40 130c 132a NUMBER 44 145c 146d NUMBER 53 168b 169b
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 356b 362c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 255d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 298 99c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 271d 273a PART III 290a b PART IV 364d 365d
- 5e *The mutability or variability of positive law the maintenance or change of laws*
- OLD TESTAMENT *Ezra* I 19 / *Daniel* 6 esp 6 8 6 15
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6c BK III 108c
- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 425a c 438a b
- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 344b 345d BK VIII 403a 404a / *Statesman* 598b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 679c 680d BK VI 705d 706c 707a b BK VII 717d 718c BK VIII 740c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 7 [1134] 1135 41 382c d / *Politics* BK II CH 8 [1268] 1269 28 [1269 28] 464d 465b BK V CH 9 [1310 12 19] 512b-c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 15 [1375 25 25] 619d 620b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 38c 47a-48a / *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Solon* 69c d / *Agesilaus* 494a e / *Agesilaus Pompey* 539a
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 21b-c BK III 51a 52a 57d 58b BK XI 106d, BK XIV 151d 152c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 97 235d 239b
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 78b-c PART II 116a b 157c d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 47a 51a 131b 132a 281a e 318c 319b 462c 465c 504c 506a 516c 517a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 157 158 61c 62b CH XIV SECT 223 76c e
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XI 77d BK XIV 102b 104c BK XVIII 126d BK XIX 135d 136a BK XXIX 268d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324d / *Social Contract* BK II 405d 406b BK III 419c-420a
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 166a
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 78b-81c passim esp 80d 81b 96b-c
- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 441b c 450d-452a
- 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [76-77] 2b
- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE US ARTICLE V 16c
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 118d 119b NUMBER 39 127d 128b NUMBER 40 128b 132a NUMBER 43 143a b NUMBER 49-50 159b 162c NUMBER 53 167d 168b NUMBER 62 190d 191c NUMBER 64 197a c NUMBER 73 220a b NUMBER 81 239a b NUMBER 85 257a 259a
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 359d d 360c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 203d 205a 205d 276a b 277b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 3 11c d PART III par 216 71d 72a ADDITIONS 176 147c d
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1972 1979] 46b 47a
- 50 MARTYNOV *Communist Manifesto* 427a b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d BK VIII 308d
- 5f *The relation of positive law to custom*
- 5 EURIPIDES *Bacchantes* [877-911] 347b c / *Heracles* [793-805] 359d
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 97d 98a
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 154a c / *Republic* BK IV 344b d BK VII 401c d / *Statesman* 600a b / *Laws* BK III 666b c BK IV 678d 679a BK VII 713c 716b 718b e 730d 731b BK VIII 736c 737a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [992 4-6] 513c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 7 382c 383a / *Politics* BK II CH 8 [1268] 1269 28 [1269 28] 464d 465b BK III CH 16 [1287] 1288 7 [1288] 486a BK V CH 8 [1307] 30 38 [1309 510a CH 9 [1310 12-19] 512b-c
- 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a 48d esp 38b d / *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Themistocles* 99b c
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XII 111b c BK XIV 151d 152c

- Practical Reason 325d 326b 356a-c / *Prof Metaphysic* I Elements of Eth cs 365b-366d 375b-d 379b d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 389a b 391a-c / *Science of Right* 399 400b-d
- 41 FEDERALIST NUMB R 15 65a b NUMBER 16 66c-68d *passim* NUM R 17 69d 70a NUM R 7 94d 96c
- 42 MILL *Liberty* 295d 296b 302d 303a / *Rep resentative Government* 329c 330a 339c 340d / *Utilitarianism* 457c-461c 465d-466b
- 44 BOXWELL / *hanson* 181b
- 46 H E 2L *Philosophy of Right* p 2 2b 3a 4d 5a PART III par 144 55b par 261 83a d par 270 84d 89c *passim* ADD TIONS 1 115a d 93 132 14 139b-c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 186b-c PART I 207b-c 211a-c PART I 271d 272d PART III 290a b PART IV 333c d 333c d 365b-c
- 49 H E 2L *Descent of Man* 304a 305c esp 305a 310a 317d esp 310d 313d 314c 317
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE 670c 671a
- 62 The exemptio of the so ere gn person from the coercive force of l w
- 6 H ODORIS *History* R II 95d 96b 107 d
- 7 PLATO *Laws* K IV 682b-c K IX 754a b / *Seventh Letter* 807a b
- 14 PLUT ARCH *Ale xander* 564d 566b
- Q AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* P RT I II Q 96 5 233d 234d
- 23 H E 2L *Law* th RT I 102b-c 125b-c 130d 149d 150a 153b
- 29 C RIVANT / *Don Q xote* PART I 377a b
- 30 B COV *New Atlantis* 208b
- 35 LOR E Ca / *Government* CH VII 5 CT 90-94 44d-46c CH X 5 CT 95 70a b CH XVI 1 2 3 4 6 72 c
- 38 RO 1 U In qu / *ry* 357b-c / *Polit c* / *Econ om*y 370d 371a / *S cial Contract* R 399d 400
- 40 G R 4 *Decline and Fall* 27b-c Sic d
- 41 G 304 *Decline and Fall* 74c
- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 438b-c 439c 446a b
- 43 ARTICLE 10 COV E RATION V [74-8] 6a
- 44 CON TITUTION OF THE U S TIC R 1 ACT 613 4 112c RTIC R II SECT 4 15
- 45 F D RAU T N L M ER 69 207b-c NUM ER 8 240c 241
- 44 BO WILL / *hans* 120a-c
- 45 HICCL *Philosophy of Right* PART II pa 284 96b
- 6c The force of ty on cal was st or bad laws the right of bellion or d obed nce
- 5 ARIC W *Seven Against Theb s* [1 11 082] 28b-39 c
- 5 SOPHOC *Antigone* 131 142d esp [1-99] 131 132a [14-525] 134d 13c [640-68] 136d 137 [891-913] 138d 139
- 5 E C R D S *Phoenicia* M idens [16 5 1682] 371b-d
- 7 PLATO *Apology* 200a 212a-c / *Crato* 213a 219a-c / *Laws* BK VI 706b-c / *Seventh Letter* 800c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 8 [1294 1-8] 493d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [1373^b 17] 617c d CH 15 [1375^a 26-25] 619d 620b [1376 33 3^b 1] 621a =
- 14 PLUTARCH *Tiberius Gracchus* 678b-d / *Marcus Brutus* 805c 811a
- 15 TACITUS *Historiae* BK IV 269d 270b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 171 a 18a / *City of God* BK XIX CH 17 522b 523a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 1 REP 3 205b-206b Q 92 A 1 REP 4 213c 214c Q 93 A 3 REP 2 217b-218a Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 96 A 4 ANS and REP 2 3 233a d Q 97 A 2 236d 237b PART II II Q 42 A 2 REP 3 54b d
- 23 HO B S *Let athan* PART II 102b-c 113d 114b 115a 116a 134c 135b 153c 157b PART I 1 228b 238b-c P RT IV 273a d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 7c 504c 506a
- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [888-902] 339a
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 326 231a
- 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 16c 17c / *Civil Govern ment* CH XII SECT 155 60d 61a CH XIV SECT 168 64b-c CH XVI XIX 63d 81d *passim*
- 38 ROUSS AU *Social Contract* BK I 388d 389a
- 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 397a c
- 42 H UT *Science of Right* 439a-441d 450d-451b
- 43 U CLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b *pas sim*
- 43 F D RALIST NUMBER 16 68b-c NUMBER 28 97c d NUMBER 33 108b-109 NUM ER 78 230d 232d
- 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465d 466b 467c d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE 668a 669d
- 6d The ed cat e funct on of l w in relat on to rtue and ice th efficacy of law as limited by rtue to the ind vidu l citizen
- 5 ARACHTUS *Edmonides* [681 710] 88b-c
- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d BK VI 232d 233 233c d
- 6 THUCYD I S *Peloponnesian War* K I 370b c BK II 396c d
- 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45b-47c / *Apology* 203d / *Rep ble* BK IV 344a 345d BK IX 426c d / *Statesma* 607b-608d / *Laws* K I 640a 644b BK III 669d-670a BK IV 684b 686c K V 690d-691b BK VI 706b-c BK VIII 735c 738c BK XII 792c d 794a 799a c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1 0 3-25] 347c K II CH I 348b d 349b *passim* esp [1103^a 3 7] 349 BK V CH I [11 9^b 12 24] 377 CH 2 [1130^b 0-29] 378b BK X CH I [1179^b 35 1180^b 28] 434a-435c / *Politics* K VII CH 14 537b 538d esp [133 33 1333^b 29] 537 538c
- 14 PLUT ARCH *Lycurgus* 32a 48d / *Lycurgus Num* 63d 64a / *S lon* 64b d 77 c / *Ly sander* 361b-d / *Cleomenes* 659d-660a

(5) *The human or positive law the sanction of coercive force* 5g *The application of positive law to cases the casuistry of the judicial process the conduct of a trial the administration of justice*)

- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65a b NUMBER 17 69d 70a NUMBER 22 83d 84a NUMBER 65 198a 200c *passim* NUMBER 73 221b c NUMBER 78-83 229d 251a *passim*
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 133b c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 85 35a b PART III par 214 71a b par 219 72d 73a par 222-229 73b 75b ADDITIONS 141 139c / *Philosophy of History* PART I 250d 251a
 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 295a
 50 MARY *Capital* 139b 140b
 51 GOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 547a d
 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 168c d BK IX 235b d 271d BK XII 348b d 401d

5b *The defect of positive law its need for correction or dispensation by equity*

- 7 PLATO *Laus* BK VI 699d 700b BK IX 754b d BK XI 777d 778b BK XII 785c 786a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 3 [141 15-18] 194b
 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 10 385c 386b esp [1137^b10-28] 385d 386a / *Politics* BK III CH 15 [1286 10-37] 484b d CH 16 [1287^a24 28] 485d [1287^b15-25] 486a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [1374 17-24] 618c 619a
 14 PLUTARCH *Fabius* 150d 151a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 96 A 6 235a d Q 97 A 4 238b 239b Q 100 A 8 ANS and REP 1 259d 261a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 94d PART II 132d 133d 135d 136b 156b c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 50b 51a
 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIV SECT 159-160 62b d
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 152b 154a
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 343c
 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 73d 74b 77d 78a 91b c
 42 KANT *Science of Right* 399c-400d
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 78 232c d NUMBER 80 237a b NUMBER 83 248d 249a
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 214 71a c par 223 73c d

6 Law and the individual

6a *Obedience to the authority and force of law the sanctions of conscience and fear the objective and subjective sanctions of law law duty and right*

- OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 52b 29 13 11 17 12 13 19 18 20 21 20-21 23 58-59 / *Ecclesiastes* 12 13
 NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 13 1-5 / *1 Peter* 2 13-16

- 5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [490-562] 86b 87a [681-710] 88b c
 5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [362 3,2] 134b [630-680] 136d 137a / *Ajax* [666-6,6] 148d [1047-1421] 152a 155a c
 5 EURIPIDES *Orestes* [491-525] 399a b
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370b BK II 396c d 400d 401a BK III 425a c
 7 PLATO *Apology* 206b d / *Cratylus* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK II 311b 312b / *Statesman* 599c 604b / *Laus* BK III 675c 676b / *Seventh Letter* 807a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 12 [1144 12 21] 393d BK V CH 9 [1179 35-1180^b28] 434a 435c / *Politics* BK II CH 8 [1269 12 23] 465a b BK III CH 15 [1286^b28 41] 485b BK IV CH 8 [1294 1-8] 493d CH II [1295^b2 c] 495d d BK V CH 8 [1307^b30-38] 509d 510a
 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1143 1160] 76a b
 12 FICHTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 7 234d 235a
 14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 38c 48a / *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a c / *Solon* 66a / *Ageilaus* 480b d-481a / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A 1 ANS and REP 2 213c 214c A 2 ANS and REP 4 214d 215a c Q 95 A 1 ANS and REP 1 226c 227c Q 96 AA 4-6 233a 235d
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 90b d PART II 99a b 112b d 115a b 130b 131c 132d 133d 149b c 153b c PART III 224d 240a 241a 244d 246a c CONCLUSION 279a c 283c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 48b 50a 319b 383c d 480b c 520b
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT III SC I [263 336] 372c 373b
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 68b 3a 177a b PART II 362b
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b 436a
 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1334-13,9] 368b-369b
 33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 114b / *Pensees* 297 303 227a b
 35 LOCKE *Tolerantia* 3a 16c 17c / *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 94 46a c CH VIII SECT 97 47a b SECT 120-122 52d 53c CH IX 53c 54d *passim* CH XI SECT 134 55b d / *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 5-6 105a c *passim* SECT 13 107d 108c BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6 229d
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76 485a
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XI 69a c
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 366d / *Political Economy* 371a 372b / *Social Contract* BK II 398d 401c 402a 406c d BK IV 426b d
 39 SUTHER *Wealth of Nations* BK V 308a 309a 311c *passim* 397a c
 42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic. of Morals* 253d 254b 259a c 273d 287d esp 273d 274a 275b d 277d 279d 281c 282d 283b d /

- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 446a b
 26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT I SC 1
 1110 286b-d
 27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* CT 1
 SC III 177b-d ACT V SC I [318-324] 202b
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2
 435b-436a PR V 51 SCH L 439d PROP 63
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 32 LOCKE *Treatise 2a / Civil Government* CH
 II SECT 7 IN 26c 28a / *Human Understanding*
 BK I CH II SECT 13 107d 108c
 33 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV
 76 485a
 37 FOLIO *G Tom Jones* 150b 267b-268b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 37d
 38a 38d-40b BK XIX 139c
 39 ROLLE *U I equality* 351b-d / *Political*
Economy 371a-c 372 / *Social Contract*
 BK II 399a
 40 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 309-c
 40 C1a 0 *Decline and Fall* 175c-d 216a
 41 G1a 0 *Decline and Fall* 83 85-c 92b
 42 HUME *Science of Right* 446a-449c esp 446b
 447 448b-d
 43 MILL *Liberty* 271c 272d 313a 316b / *Rep*
resentative Government 334d 335a / *Utili*
tarianism 471b-472d
 44 BOWEN *Johnson* 7d-8a 204b-c 301c-d
 335c
 46 HEC *L Philosophy of Right* PART I par 99
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 A D THOMAS 62 126a / *Philosophy of History*
 B AT 214d 216
 49 DARR *Descent of Man* 314b
 52 DOUGLAS *Baker* 8a 8ma or BK II 30d
 32 33c 34b K II 185c
 54 FARR *Calat on and his Discontents* 787c
- 6e(3) The punishment of crime
 5 A S WILSON *Men des* [490-562] 86b-87a
 1681 7 188b-c
 5 SOMERSET *Antique* [630-680] 136d 137a /
Elm 1 501 507 169a
 5 E FIO *Or* 149-604 399a-400a
 6 HEC *Philosophy of Right* 32b-c BK III 116b-
 117a BK I 133c 136a K V 164c BK VII
 251a b
 6 THUCYDIDES *Platonian War* BK III
 421d-428a
 7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45-46d / *Gorgias* 267c
 270c / *Staccas* 603 602d / *Laws* BK V
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 b 769d 770c K XI 771b-784b *passim* BK
 XI 784b-786b 792 793a
 9 A FOLIO *Ethics* BK I 4 379b-380b
 5 1 3221 1 380b-c CH II 1 133b 133
 386b-c BK I 1 9 170 33 180 32 434
 435a / *Politics* BK II 1 6 132 30-432 25
 325d 376a K I CH 13 1332 10-16 536d /
 1 *Acad* 1 *Cons* 10n CH 52 376b-d CH 57-59
 579b-580c *Rhetoric* BK I 112 1372 3 16
 615c 616b CH 4 619a d

- 11 PLUTARCH *Solon* 70d 73a / *Themistocles*
 97b d / *Cicero* 711c 712d / *Alexander* 651a b
 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 57a
 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 6 514b
 515a BK XXI C I 11 570b 571a
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I II Q 92
 A 2 ANS and REP 3 4 214d 215a c 196 A 5
 233d 234d 1105 A 2 ANS and REP 9 12
 309d 316a
 22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibee* par 40 418b
 419a
 23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 145a 148b 157d
 158a CONCLUSION 281a d
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 519a c
 26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT II SC III
 [1 15] 44c d / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT I SC 1
 [71 110] 286b-d ACT III SC I [146-202] 302c
 303a / *Rich d II* ACT I SC III [118 153] 324d
 325b / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC II [65 143]
 498d-499b / *Henry V* ACT II SC II 339a
 541a
 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 58b 73a
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 51 SC 10L 439d
 33 P. S. *Protagoras* 108b 109a
 35 LOCKE *Treatise 2a / Civil Government* CH
 I SECT 3 25d CH II SECT 6-13 26b 28b CH
 VII 1 87-88 44a-c CH IX SECT 128 54b c
 SECT 130 54c CH XV SECT 171 65a b / *Human*
Understanding BK I CH XVIII SECT 6 229d
 SECT 9 230b
 35 HUME *Human Understanding* 3 c CT VII 11 DIV
 76 485a
 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* RT I 28a b 29b
 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 37d
 43d K XII 85c 92b
 38 ROLLE *U I equality* 351b-d / *Political*
Economy 371a-c / *Social Contract* BK II
 398b 399 406c
 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 175d 176a 388c d
 617b-d
 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 83b-c 91a 94c
 42 HUME *Practical Reason* 306b-c / *Science of*
Right 446a-449c esp 446b-447c 448a d 430a
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT
 9 [2, 1 72] 13d 1 c CT 10 [300-301] 14a
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 [507-511] 16a AMENDMENT V 17b-c VIII
 12d XII 18c
 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65a b NUMBER 21
 78b-d NUMBER 65 198a 200c *passim*
 43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 471d-472d 474d
 44 BOWEN *Johnson* 204b
 46 HEC *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 90-
 103 35d 39b esp par 96-100 36c 38a K XII
 par 332 46b-47a K XI par 2 8 72c d par
 230 73a b par 233 75d par 319 106a 101
 THOMAS 60 125d 133 139 b / *Philosophy of*
History RT I 320b-c
 50 MILL *Capital* 1 364 367a *passim*
 52 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 505a 511b
 52 DOUGLASS *Brotherly Love* BK II 30b-
 32a BK V 168c-d BK XII 398b-d

- (6 *Law and the individual* 6d *The educative function of law in relation to virtue and vice the efficacy of law as limited by virtue in the individual citizen.*)
- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 57b 58d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 213c 215a c Q 93 A 1 226c 227c Q 96 AA -3 231c 233a Q 98 A 6 ANS 244c 245b Q 100 251a 265d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI (85-105) 77d
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 131a b 140b 141b 149b-c 153a 155c
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 131b 132a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT I SC III [19-39] 177c ACT II SC I [22-70] 181a c ACT V SC I [318-324] 202b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 81c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [237-306] 325b 326a / *Arcopaguna* 383a 395b
- 35 LOCKE *Toleration* 8c 14a / *Human Under standing* BK II CH XLVIII SECT 9 13 230b 231c
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 267b 268b
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spiru of Laws* BK IV 13b d 17b BK V 18b d 23a BK VII 44d-45c 47c 50c BK XII 86b 87c 88a BK XIV 104a 108d *passim* BK XVI 119d BY XIV 138c 142a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d 359d / *Political Economy* 379a 377b esp 372a 373a 375d 379a / *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c BK II 400d 401a BK IV 434b 435a
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 100c 101b 291d
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 93d 94a
- 42 HANT *Pref Metaphysic al Elements of Ethics* 367b = 373b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383a b / *Science of Right* 448d 449c
- 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. AMENDMENTS XLIII 19c d AXI 20b c
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 12 58b c
- 43 MILL *Liberty* 272d 273d 302d 312a *passim* esp 306b 307a 315d 316b / *Representative Government* 336c 337b / *Utilitarianism* 467b 468a
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 222d 223b 301c d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 150 56c 57a par 153 57c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 166b PART IV 333c d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 328c d
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama ol* BK II 30d 32a
- 54 FREUD *War and Death* 758c d
- 760c BK XI 771b 784b *passim* BK VII 784b 786b 791c d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1138³⁰-1131⁹] 378b = CH II [1138 4-13] 386b c / *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d-463c esp [1267² 16] 462c d BK IV CH II [1 95³ 1-] 492c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10-11 611c 619d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 662a
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 139c 144d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 233c c 334b 335a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 6-13 26b 28b
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 271c 273a =
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spiru of Laws* BK XII 85c 86d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364d
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Chapter 47 LIBERTY

INTRODUCTION

LIBERTY and law, liberty and justice, liberty and equality—the familiar connection of these terms breeds neglect of the meaning they confer upon one another through association. A few simple questions may help to restore the significance of these relationships. Are men free when their actions are regulated by law or coercion? Does liberty consist in doing whatever one pleases or whatever one has the power to do, or is one required by justice to abstain from injury to others? Do considerations of justice draw the line between liberty and license? Can there be liberty apart from equality and perhaps also fraternity?

Other questions immediately suggest themselves. Does not the rule of law secure liberty to the governed? Is not slavery the condition of those who are ruled tyrannically or lawlessly? Does it make a difference to freedom whether the law or the constitution is just? Or is that indifferent because government itself is the impediment to liberty? Does liberty increase as the scope of government dwindles and reach fullness only with anarchy or when men live in a state of nature?

Yet are not some forms of government said to be fitting, and some uncongenial to free men? Do all men have a right to freedom or only some? Are some men by nature free and some slave? Does such a differentiation imply both equality and inequality in human nature or is it as a consequence equality and inequality in status or treatment? What implications for law, justice and equality has the distinction between free societies and dependent or subject communities?

As history points out the variety of questions which can be asked about liberty indicates the variety of subject matters or sciences in which the problems of freedom are differently raised. What is man's conception of

which arises from the consciousness of man's freedom? That is a question for theology. What is man's responsibility to society, the conception of which results from the conception of freedom? That is a question for jurisprudence. What is conscience and the perception of right and wrong in actions that follow from the consciousness of freedom? That is a question for ethics. How should the past life of nations and of humanity be regarded—as the result of the free or as the result of the constrained activity of man? That is a question for history.

The great traditional issues of liberty seem to be stated by these questions. From the fact that most perhaps all of these questions elicit opposite answers from the great books, it might be supposed that there are as many basic issues as there are questions of this sort. But the answers to certain questions presuppose answers to others. Furthermore the meaning of liberty or freedom or independence is not the same throughout the questions we have considered. Answers which appear to be inconsistent may not be so when the meanings involved in their formulation are distinguished. We must therefore find the roots of the several distinct doctrines of liberty in order to separate real issues from verbal conflict.

THE HISTORIANS report the age-old struggle on the part of men and of states for liberty or independence. History as a development of the spirit does not begin according to Hegel until this struggle first appears. The History of the world, he writes, is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom which does not reach its climax until freedom is universally achieved. But though freedom is its product, history in Hegel's view is not a work of freedom but involves an absolute ne-

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absolute economic independence is possible for men or even for nations.

The real question here seems to be a metaphysical one. Can any finite thing be absolutely independent? The traditional answer is No. As appears in the chapter on *Infinity* only a being infinite in perfection and power—only the Supreme One of Plotinus, the uncreated God of Aquinas, or the self-caused God of Spinoza—has complete independence. God has the freedom of autonomy which cannot belong to finite things. There is however another sense of divine freedom which Aquinas affirms and both Plotinus and Spinoza deny. That is freedom of choice.

God does not act from freedom of will. Spinoza writes: yet God alone acts as a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his own nature and is determined to action by himself alone. The divine freedom consists in God's self-determination which for Spinoza does not exclude necessity. The opposite view is most clearly expressed in the Christian doctrine of creation. The created world does not follow necessarily from the divine nature. Since the goodness of God is perfect, Aquinas writes, and can exist without other things, inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that for Him to will things other than Himself is not absolutely necessary. This issue of freedom or necessity with regard to God's will and action is more fully discussed in the chapters on *Will* and *World*.

The metaphysical identification of independence with infinity does not carry over into the sphere of political freedom. Yet in one respect there is an analogy. The autonomous is that which is a law unto itself. It admits no superior authority. When in the tradition of political thought states are called "free and independent" their autonomy or sovereignty means that by virtue of which in the words of the Declaration of Independence they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.

Free and independent states do not have infinite power. There is always the possibility of their being subjugated by another state and reduced to the condition of a dependency. But

though their power is not infinite they acknowledge no superior. To be a sovereign is to accept commands from no one.

Since autonomy or sovereignty is incompatible with living under human law or government the independence of sovereign princes or states must be an anarchic freedom—a freedom from law and government. This seems to be the view of Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Hegel, all of whom refer to the anarchy of independent states or sovereign princes to explain what they mean by the state of nature. Sovereigns are in the words of Kant "like lawless savages."

Applying this conception to individual men Hobbes and Locke define natural as opposed to civil liberty in terms of man's independence in a state of nature. In a state of nature man had a limited independence since each man might be coerced by a superior force but it was an absolute independence in the sense that he was subject to no human government or man-made law.

THE NATURAL FREEDOM of man according to Hobbes is not free will. Since every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceed from some cause and that from another cause in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes) they proceed from necessity. Liberty is not of the will but of the man consisting in this that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do. The proper application of the word free is to bodies in motion and the liberty it signifies when so applied is merely the absence of external impediments.

The natural right of every man is the liberty each man has to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature that is to say of his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. This liberty or natural right belongs to man only in a state of nature. When men leave the state of nature and enter the commonwealth, they surrender this natural liberty in exchange for a civil liberty which according to Hobbes, consists in nothing more than their freedom to do what the law of the

cessity Each stage of its development occurs inevitably

Other historians see man as free to work out his destiny and look upon the great crises of civilization as turning points at which free men that is men having free will exercise a free choice for better or for worse. Whether we speak of the migration of the peoples and the incursions of the barbarians or of the decrees of Napoleon III or of someone's action an hour ago in choosing one direction out of several for his walk we are unconscious of any contradiction. Tolstoy declares between freedom and necessity. Our conception of the degree of freedom he goes on to say often varies according to differences in the point of view from which we regard the event but every human action appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability. In every action we examine we see a certain measure of freedom and a certain measure of inevitability. And always the more freedom we see in any action the less inevitability do we perceive and the more inevitability the less freedom.

Accordingly neither necessity which flows from the laws of matter or of spirit nor overhanging and indomitable fate determines the direction of events. If the theologians say that nothing happens which God does not foresee they also say that divine providence leaves the world full of contingencies and man a free agent to operate among them. Though there is for God a certain order of all causes it does not follow, Augustine says that nothing depends on the free exercise of our own wills for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God and is embraced by His foreknowledge for human wills are also causes of human actions.

These matters are further discussed in the chapters on FATE, HISTORY and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. The mention of them here suggests another meaning of liberty—that of free choice or free will—and with it issues other than those involved in the relation of the individual to the state or to his fellow men. Yet the metaphysical questions about liberty and necessity or freedom and causality and the theological questions about man's freedom under God are not without bearing on the politi-

cal problems of man's freedom in society or his rights and powers. The fundamental doctrines of civil liberty certainly seem to differ according to the conception of natural freedom on which they are based. Freedom may be natural in the sense that free will is a part of human nature or in the sense that freedom is a birth-right an innate and inalienable right. It may be natural in the sense in which freedom in a state of nature is distinguished from political liberty or liberty under civil law and government.

THE EFFORT to clarify meanings requires us to look at the three words which we have used as if they were interchangeable—liberty, freedom and independence. For the most part liberty and freedom are synonyms. Both words are used in English versions of the great books. Though authors or translators sometimes prefer one sometimes the other their preference does not seem to reflect a variation in meaning.

In English the word freedom has a little greater range in that it permits the formation of the adjective free. It is also adapted to speaking of freedom from certain restraints or undesirable conditions as well as of freedom to act in accordance with desire or to exercise certain privileges. In consequence the word freedom is more frequently employed in the discussion of free will. Though the traditional enumeration of civil liberties may use the phrasing liberty of conscience or worship as frequently as freedom of conscience or worship, freedom of speech is more usual and freedom from fear or want or economic dependence does not seem to have an alternative phrasing.

The word independence has special connotations which make it equivalent to only part of the meaning of freedom or liberty. Negatively independence is freedom from limitation or from being subject to determination by another. Positively independence implies self-sufficiency and adequate power. When we speak of a man of independent means we refer not only to his freedom from want or economic dependence on others but also to his having sufficient wealth to suit his tastes or purposes. A moment's reflection will show that this is a relative matter. It is doubtful whether

erty is not to be free. The sphere of liberty increases as the scope of stringency of law diminishes.

The opposite view does not regard freedom as freedom from law. "Freedom," Hegel maintains, is nothing but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial objects as Right and Law. "All that matters in the relation between liberty and law is whether the law is just and whether a man is virtuous. If the law is just then it does not *compel* a just man to do what he would not *freely* elect to do even if the law did not exist. Only the criminal is coerced or restrained by good laws. To say that such impediment to action destroys freedom would be to deny the distinction between liberty and license."

Nevertheless, liberty can be abridged by law. That is precisely the problem of the good man living under unjust laws. If, as Montesquieu says, "liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will," then governments and laws interfere with liberty when they command or prohibit acts contrary to the free choice of a good man.

The conception of freedom as the condition of those who are not hindered—who are commanded to do only what they would do anyway—seems to be anachronically present in Aristotle's theory of human bondage and human freedom. It is there accompanied by a denial of the will's freedom of choice.

According to Aristotle human action is causally determined by one of two factors in man's nature—the passions or reason. When man is governed by his passions, he is in bondage for a man under their control is not his own master but is mastered by fortune—whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse although he sees the better before him. "When man is governed by reason he is free, for he does the will of no one but himself and does those things only which he knows are of greatest importance in life and which he therefore desires above all things." The man who acts under the influence of the passions acts in terms of inadequate ideas and in the shadow of error or ignorance. When reason rules, man acts with adequate knowledge and in the light of truth.

So, too, in the theory of Augustine and

Aquinas, the virtuous man is morally or spiritually free because human reason has triumphed in its conflict with the passions to influence the free judgment of his will. The rule of reason does not annul the will's freedom. Nor is the will less free when it is moved by the promptings of the passions. A passion, writes Aquinas, "cannot draw or move the will directly. It does so indirectly as, for example, when those who are in some kind of passion do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their affections. But though the will is not altered in its freedom by whether reason or emotion dominates, the situation is not the same with the human person as a whole. The theologians see him as a moral agent and a spiritual being who gains or loses freedom according as the will submits to the guidance of reason or follows the passions."

On the supernatural level the theologians teach that God's grace assists reason to conform human acts to the divine law but also that grace does not abolish free choice on the part of the will. "The first freedom of the will," Augustine says, "which man received when he was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin. So long as man lives on earth he remains free to sin. But supernatural grace added nature raises man to a higher level of spiritual freedom than he can ever achieve by the discipline of the acquired virtues."

Still higher is the ultimate freedom of beatitude itself. Augustine calls this "the last freedom of will" which by the gift of God leaves man "not able to sin." It is worth noting that this ultimate liberty consists in freedom from choice or the need to choose, not in freedom from love or law. Man cannot be more free than when he succeeds, with God's help, in submitting himself through love to the rule of God.

THE POLITICAL significance of these moral and theological doctrines of freedom would seem to be that man can be as free in civil society as in a state of nature. Whether in fact he is depends upon the justice of the laws which govern him, not upon their number or the matters with which they deal. He is, of course, not free to do whatever he pleases regardless of the well-being of other men or the welfare of the community.

state does not prohibit or to omit doing what the law does not command

Locke agrees that *man's natural liberty* is not the freedom of his will in choosing but the freedom to do what he wills without constraint or impediment. He differs from Hobbes however in his conception of natural liberty because he differs in his conception of the state of nature

For Hobbes the state of nature is a state of war the notions of right and wrong justice and injustice can have no place in it. Where there is no common power there is no law where no law no injustice. The liberty which sovereign states now have is the same as that which every man should have if there were no civil laws nor commonwealth at all. And the effects of it also are the same. For as amongst masterless men there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor so in states and commonwealths not dependent on one another every commonwealth has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge most conducing to its benefit

For Locke the state of nature is not a state of war but a natural as opposed to a civil society that is a society in which men live together under natural rather than under civil law. Men who live in this condition are in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. This is a limited not an absolute freedom or as Locke says though this be a state of liberty yet it is not a state of license. The line between liberty and license is drawn by the precepts of the natural law. The difference then between natural and civil liberty lies in this. Natural liberty consists in being free from any superior power on earth or not being under the will or legislative authority of man. Only the rules of natural law limit freedom of action. Civil liberty or liberty under civil law consists in being under no other legislative power but that established by consent. It is a freedom for the individual to follow his own will in all matters not prescribed by the law of the state

IN THE ARGUMENTS for and against free will one view regards free will as incompatible with the principle of causality natural necessity or

God's omnipotence the other conceives free choice as falling within the order of nature or causality and under God's providence. We shall not consider these alternatives in this chapter since this issue is reserved for the chapter on Will.

Yet one thing is clear for the present consideration of political liberty. If the statement that men are born free means that it is a property of their rational natures to possess a free will then they do not lose their innate freedom when they live in civil society. Government may interfere with a man's actions but it can not coerce his will. Government can go no further than to regulate the expression of man's freedom in external actions.

Nor is the range of free will limited by law. As indicated in the chapter on Law any law—moral or civil natural or positive—which directs human conduct can be violated. It leaves man free to disobey it and take the consequences. But if the rule is good or just then the act which transgresses it must have the opposite quality. The freedom of a free will is therefore morally indifferent. It can be exercised to do either good or evil. We use our freedom properly says Augustine when we act virtuously we misuse it when we choose to act viciously. The will he writes is then truly free when it is not the slave of vices and sins.

Those who conceive the natural moral law as stating the precepts of virtue or the commands of duty and who in addition regard every concrete act which proceeds from a free choice of the will as either good or bad—never indifferent—find that the distinction between liberty and license applies to every free act. The meaning of this distinction is the same as that between freedom properly used and freedom misused. Furthermore since there is no good act which is not prescribed by the moral law the whole of liberty as opposed to license consists in doing what that moral law commands.

These considerations affect the problem of political liberty especially on the question whether the spheres of law and liberty are separate or even opposed. One view as we have seen is that the area of civil liberty lies outside the realm of acts regulated by law. To break the law may be criminal license but to

obey it is not to be free. The sphere of liberty increases as the scope or stringency of law diminishes.

The opposite view does not regard freedom as freedom from law. Freedom Hegel maintains, is nothing but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial objects as Right and Law. All that matters in the relation between liberty and law is whether the law is just and whether a man is virtuous. If the law is just then it does not compel a just man to do what he would not freely elect to do even if the law did not exist. Only the criminal is coerced or restrained by good laws. To say that such impediment to action destroys freedom would be to deny the distinction between liberty and license.

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but that in the moral conception of liberty is not a loss of freedom. He loses freedom in society only when he is mistreated or misgoverned—when being the equal of other men he is not treated as their equal or when being capable of ruling himself he is denied a voice in his own government.

The meaning of tyranny and slavery seems to confirm this conception of political liberty. To be a slave is not merely to be ruled by another; it consists in being subject to the mastery of another *i.e.* to be ruled as a means to that other's good and without any voice in one's own government. This implies in contrast that to be ruled as a free man is to be ruled for one's own good and with some degree of participation in the government under which one lives.

According to Aristotle's doctrine of the natural slave—examined in the chapter on SLAVERY—some men do not have the nature of free men and so should not be governed as free men. Men who are by nature slaves are not unjustly treated when they are enslaved. It is better for them as for all inferiors. Aristotle maintains that they should be under the rule of a master. Though they do not in fact have the liberty of free men, they are not deprived thereby of any freedom which properly belongs to them: *any more than a man who is justly imprisoned is deprived of a freedom which is no longer his by right.*

The root of this distinction between free men and slaves by nature lies in the supposition of a natural inequity. The principle of equality is also relevant to the injustice of tyranny and the difference between absolute and constitutional government. In the *Republic* Plato compares the tyrant to an owner of slaves. The only difference, he writes, is that the tyrant has more slaves and enforces the harshest and bitterest form of slavery. The tyrannical ruler enslaves those who are his equals by nature and who should be ruled as free men. Throughout the whole tradition of political thought the name of tyranny signifies the abolition of liberty. But absolute or despotic government is not uniformly regarded as the enemy of liberty.

The issue concerning the legitimacy or justice of absolute government is examined in the chapters on MONARCHY and TYRANNY. But we

can take it as generally agreed that the subjects of a despot unlike the citizens of a republic do not enjoy any measure of self-government. To the extent that political liberty consists in some degree of self-government, the subjects of absolute rule lack the sort of freedom possessed by citizens under constitutional government. For this reason the supremacy of law is frequently said to be the basic principle of political liberty.

Wherever law ends tyranny begins. Locke writes: In going beyond the law, a ruler goes beyond the grant of authority vested in him by the consent of the people, which alone makes man subject to the laws of any government. Furthermore, law for Locke is itself a principle of freedom. In its true notion, he writes, it is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law. Could they be happier without it, the law, as a useless thing, would of itself vanish, and that ill deserves the name of confinement, which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.

A constitution gives the ruled the status of citizenship and a share in their own government. It may also give them legal means with which to defend their liberties when officers of government invade their rights in violation of the constitution. According to Montesquieu, for whom political liberty exists only under government by law, never under despotism or the rule of men, the freedom of government itself demands, from the very nature of things, that power should be a check to power. This is accomplished by a separation of powers. A system of checks and balances limits the power of each branch of the government and permits the law of the constitution to be applied by one department against another when its officials usurp powers not granted by the constitution or otherwise act unconstitutionally.

Yet unlike tyranny, absolute government has been defended. The ancients raise the question whether, if a truly superior or almost god-like man existed, it would not be proper for him to govern his inferiors in an absolute man-

ner. Mankind will not say that such a one is to be expelled and exiled. Aristotle writes on the other hand he ought not to be a subject—that would be as if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them. The only alternative he concludes is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler according to what seems to be the order of nature and that men like him should be kings in their state for life. Those subject to his government would be free only in the sense that they would be ruled for their own good perhaps better than they could rule themselves. But they would lose that portion of political freedom which consists in self government. Faced with this alternative to constitutional government—which Aristotle describes as the government of free men and equals—what should be the choice of men who are by nature free?

THE ANCIENT ANSWER is not decisively in one direction. There are many passages in both Plato and Aristotle in which the absolute rule of a wise king (superior to his subjects as a father is to children, or a god to men) seems to be pictured as the political ideal. The fact that free men would be no freer than children in a well administered house old does not seem to Plato and Aristotle to be a flaw in the picture. They do not seem to hold that the fullness of liberty is the primary measure of the goodness of government.

On the contrary justice is more important. As Aristotle suggests it would be unjust for the superior man to be treated as an equal and given the status of one self governing citizen among others. But he also points out that democrats never have instituted ostracism as a means of dealing with such superior men. Equality is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracized and banished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much. Because it saves the superior man from injustice and leaves the rest free to practice self government the argument for ostracism. Aristotle claims, "is based upon a kind of political justice in that it preserves the balance within the state and perhaps also because it leaves men free to practice self government among themselves."

Since the eighteenth century a strong tend

ency in the opposite direction appears in the political thought of Locke Montesquieu Rousseau Kant the American constitutionalists, and J S Mill. Self government is regarded as the essence of good government. It is certainly the mark of what the eighteenth century writers call free government. Men who are born free be free it is thought cannot be satisfied with less civil liberty than this.

Freedom, says Kant is independence of the compulsory will of another and in so far as it can co-exist with the freedom of all according to a universal law it is the one sole original inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity. There is indeed an innate equality belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent of being bound by others to anything more than that to which he may also reciprocally bind them. The fundamental equality of men thus appears to be founded in their equal right to freedom and that for Kant at least rests on the freedom of will with which all men are born. The criterion of the good society is the realization of freedom.

Kant's conception of human society as a realm of ends in which no free person should be degraded to the ignominy of being a means expresses one aspect of political freedom. The other is found in the principle of the harmonization of individual wills which results in the freedom of each being consistent with the freedom of all. In institutional terms republican government founded on popular sovereignty and with a system of representation is the political ideal precisely because it gives its citizens the dignity of free men and enables them to realize their freedom in self-government.

Citizenship according to Kant has three inseparable attributes: 1 constitutional freedom, as the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent or approval; 2 civil equality as the right of the citizen to recognize no one as a superior among the people in relation to himself except in so far as such a one is as subject to his moral power to impose obligations as that other has power to impose obligations upon him; and 3 political independence as the right to owe his existence and continuance in society not to the arbitrary will of another.

but to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth and consequently the possession of a civil personality which cannot be represented by any other than himself.

Kant leans heavily on Rousseau's conclusions with regard to political liberty. Rousseau however approaches the problem of freedom somewhat differently. 'Man is born free' he begins and everywhere he is in chains. He next considers two questions. What makes government legitimate, since no man has a natural authority over his fellow and force creates no right? Answering this first question in terms of a convention freely entered into Rousseau then poses the second problem—how to form an association in which each while uniting himself with all may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before. This he says is the fundamental problem of which the *Social Contract* provides the solution.

The solution involves more than republican government popular sovereignty and a participation of the individual through voting and representation. It introduces the conception of the general will through which alone the freedom of each individual is to be ultimately preserved. Like Kant's universal law of freedom the general will ordains what each man would freely will for himself if he adequately conceived the conditions of his freedom. In fact says Rousseau each individual as a man may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest. Nevertheless under conditions of majority rule the members of the minority remain free even though they appear to be ruled against their particular wills.

When a measure is submitted to the people the question is whether it is in conformity with the general will which is their will. Each man in giving his vote states his opinion on that point and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will and it is in that case

that I should not have been free. This presupposes indeed that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority when they cease to do so whatever side a man may take liberty is no longer possible.

J. S. MILL sees the same problem from the opposite side. Constitutional government and representative institutions are indispensable conditions of political liberty. Where Aristotle regards democracy as the type of constitution most favorable to freedom because it gives the equality of citizenship to all *free-born* men Mill argues for universal suffrage to give equal freedom to *all* men for all are born equal. But neither representative government nor democratic suffrage is sufficient to guarantee the liberty of the individual and his freedom of thought or action.

Such phrases as self government and the power of the people over themselves are deceptive. The people who exercise the power Mill writes are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised and the self government spoken of is not the government of each by himself but of each by all the rest. The will of the people moreover practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people the majority or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority.

To safeguard individual liberty from the tyranny of the majority Mill proposes a single criterion for social control over the individual whether by the physical force of law or the moral force of public opinion. The sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self protection.

The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself his independence is of right absolute. Over himself over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign.

Mill's conception of individual liberty at first appears to be negative—to be freedom from externally imposed regulations or coercions. Liberty increases as the sphere of government diminishes and for the sake of liberty that government governs best which governs

least the government no more than is necessary for the public safety. There is a sphere of action Mill writes, in which society as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself or if it also affects others, only with their free voluntary and undecieved consent and participation. When I say only himself Mill continues I mean directly and in the first instance for whatever affects himself may affect others through himself. This, then is the appropriate region of human liberty.

But it is the positive aspect of freedom from governmental interference or social pressures on which Mill wishes to place emphasis. Freedom from government or social coercion is freedom for the maximum development of individuality—freedom to be as different from all others as one's personal inclinations, talents, and tastes dispose one and enable one to be.

It is desirable Mill writes, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Liberty is undervalued as long as the free development of individuality is not regarded as one of the principal ingredients of human happiness and indispensable to the welfare of society. "The only freedom which deserves the name" Mill thinks, "is that of pursuing our own good in our own way so long, as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it for in proportion to the development of his individuality each person becomes

more valuable to himself and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.

Mill's praise of liberty as an ultimate good both for the individual and for the state finds a clearly antiphonal voice in the tradition of the great books. Plato, in the *Republic* advocates political regulation of the arts, where Mill even more than Milton before him argues against censorship or any control of the avenues of human expression. But the most striking opposition to Mill occurs in those passages in which Socrates deprecates the spirit of democracy because of its insatiable desire for freedom. That spirit Socrates says, creates a city full of freedom and frankness in which a man may do and say what he likes. Where such freedom exists the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases.

The democratic state is described by Socrates as approaching anarchy through relaxation of the laws or through utter lawlessness. Under such circumstances there will be the greatest variety of individual differences. It will seem the fairest of states being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. But it is a state in which liberty has been allowed to grow without limit at the expense of justice and order. It is full of variety and disorder and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

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- 1b The independence of men and the autonomy of sovereigns in a state of nature or anarchy
- 1c The relation of liberty to free will the conceptions of liberty as freedom from interference and freedom for personal development
- 1d The supremacy of law as condition of political liberty
- 1e The restriction of freedom by justice the distinction between liberty and license
- 1f The freedom of equals under government the equality of citizenship
- 1g The juridical protection of liberties bills of rights the separation of powers
- 1h Civil liberty under diverse forms of government

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Hume a 12d bk ii [63 253] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P or SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James *Prefatory* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

ARTS or DIVISION One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. Locke BK II [63 253] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCE The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbers of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. Old Testament *Genesis* 1-3 (D) 11 *Exodus* 7-46.

STYLING The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant part of a whole reference "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittingly rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Books* consult the Preface.

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- 50 MARX E. III *Communist Manifesto* 428b-c
- 51 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V
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- 2c Freedom in the sphere of economic enter-
prise: free trade freedom from govern-
mental restrictions
- 33 LOCKE *Civil Government* ch 30b-36a passim
- 34 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* K XX 148d
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- 35 SMITH II *Law of Nations* K I 42a 51-62a
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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 312c 315c / *Representative Gov-*
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- 50 MILL *On Liberty* 421d-422 4-c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* 573a b
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 5 [127-134
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- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d-437c
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- 46 HILL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 243
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- 50 MILL *On Liberty* 138b 366c-368b esp 367c
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- 50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420b-d
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- 3 Moral or spiritual freedom
- 3a Human bondage or the dominance of the
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- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4:16 6:5 9:20-
22 / *Numbers* 11:4 35--(D) *Numbers* 11:4 34
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- 7 PLATO *Republic* 1 0b-c 128a 129c / *Phaedo*
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH I [1119^a 35-315]
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- 12 LACER *On the Nature of Things* BK III [59-63]
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- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* K I CH 10a 106c
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- 12 ALEXANDER *Meditations* BK II SECT 6 2 7d
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- 17 PROCLUS *Third Ennead*, TR I CH 10 82b /
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- 18 ALEXANDER *On the Soul* K I par 15-26
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- 19 AUGUSTINE *Summa Theologiae* PRT I Q 89
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(3) *Moral or spiritual freedom 3a Human bondage or the dominance of the passions*

- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 72 A 2 REP 4 112b 113a Q 73 A 5 123a d Q 77 144d 152a esp A 2 145d 147c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25-45] 7b-c
- 22 CHAUCER *Maniple s Tale* [17 130 141] 490b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 165c 166a 232b c 488b 489b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61-79] 49c d / *Othello* ACT IV SC I 229d 233a / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT III SC XIII [111-116] 335d 336a [195-201] 336d 337a / *Winter's Tale* ACT II SC III [1-192] 498c 500d
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 66c d 78a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 2 SCHOL 397c d PART IV PREF-PROI 18 422b d 429d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [561-594] 244b 245a BK VII [79-110] 321a b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 54 192b c SECT 69 196d 197a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 239b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 233b c PART IV 348d 349b
- 50 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d
- 54 FREUD *War and Death* 760d 761a

3b Human freedom or the rule of reason freedom through knowledge of the truth

- NEW TESTAMENT John 8 31 59 / II Corinthians 3 17 / James 1 esp 1 25
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Phaedo* 230d 234c / *Republic* BK IV 347d 348d BK IV 425c-427b / *Theatetus* 528c 531a / *Laos* BK I 650a b BK III 669b d BK IX 754a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK V CH I [129 10-16] 179a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102^b 1103 3] 348a c BK III CH 12 [1119 35-38] 366a c / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254 33-26] 448a b CH 13 [1260 4 15] 454c BK III CH 16 [1287^a 28 32] 485d
- 12 LACRATIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK V [1117 1120] 75d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 12 118d 120b BK II CH I-2 139 141c CH 18 161a 162b BK III CH 7 182b 184a CH 15 190d CH 22 195a 201a BK IV CH I 213a 223d CH 7 232 235a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b c SECT 16-17 259a d BK III SECT 6 261a c BK IV SECT 24 265c d BK V SECT 9 270b c SECT 26 272c BK VII SECT 55 283b c SECT 68-69 284c d BK XI SECT 18 305b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 646b 648a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 10 82b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 3 344a b

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a CH 34 634b-c BK III CH 5-9 659d 661c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d Q 83 A 1 REP 4 436d-438a Q 95 A 2 507c 508a PART I II Q 24 A 1 727b d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a Q 56 A 4 32b 33c Q 57 A 3 REP 3 37b 38a Q 59 AA 2-3 46c-48c PART II II Q 183 A 4 ANS and REP I 627d 628d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a c
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 58c d
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70a c 184b d 204d 205b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61 91] 49c d / *Othello* ACT I SC III [322 337] 212b-c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71d 72b 78a d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 67 73 444d 447a PART V 451a-463d esp PROP 3-4 453a d PROP 20 SCHOL 457b-458a PROP 42 463b d
- 32 MILTON *Sonnets* VII 65a b / *Paradise Lost* BK VII [79 110] 321a b / *Areopagitica* 404a b 409b 410a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 56-63 36d 38c passim / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 46-54 189d 192c SECT 69 196d 197a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 300b
- 42 HANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b-283d / *Practical reason* 296a d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 97b-c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160c 161c PART II 279d 280b PART IV 315a 348d 349b 350a b 361b c
- 54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 126a 127a // *General Introduction* 625a d / *Ego and Id* 702c d 715c 716a / *New Introductory Lectures* 838c 839b

3c Virtue as the discipline of free choice freedom as the determination of the will by the moral law of practical reason

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 6 [1106^b 1107^a 6] 352c BK III CH I 2 355b d 358a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH 3 190c BK XIV CH II 386b BK XIX CH 20 523d 524a BK XXII CH 30 617c-618a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 83 A 2 ANS and REP 3 438a d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 181 A 4 ANS 627d 628d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a c XXXII 94c 96a esp [139 142] 96a PARADISE XXXI [73-90] 154a
- 32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 391a 392a 394b 395b

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- 45 **HE II. Philosophy of Right** **INTRO**, par 29 13a b **PART II**, par 107 14 40a-42b **PART III**, par 147 57b **ADDITIONS**, 93 132b / **Philosophy of History** **INTRO**, 171a-c **PART IV** 328a 353d 353a
- **DONATIST** **English Kantianism** **RE VI**, 154 155b
- 3d **Freedom from conflict and freedom for individuality as conditions of happiness**
- 6 **THEOPHILUS Philomathesis** **RE II** 398a-c
- 7 **PLATO** **Ly.** 15c 18a / **Gorgias**, 275d 2 6b / **Phaedrus**, 272d 295d 296c
- 9 **AL** **Metaphysics**, **RE III**, ch 9 [1240-1243] 34] 47d-47e
- 12 **LEONARDUS** **Metaphysics**, **RE IV**, [1243-1244] 61a-d
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- 12 **ARISTOTELIS** **Metaphysics** **RE X**, c 1 2 298c-d
- 18 **ARISTOTELIS** **Constitution** **RE VII**, par 10-30 55c-61 / **City of God**, **RE XII**, ch 5 523d 52 **RE XIII**, ch 30 61 618a
- 20 **ARISTOTELIS** **Summa Theologiae** **PART II-II**, Q 1-100 1 REP 2 67b-633d
- 22 **CR** **RE** **Metaphysics** **RE I**, [1243-1244] 490a-b
- 4 **R** **RE** **Metaphysics** **RE I**, [1243-1244] 490a-b
- 25 **ARISTOTELIS** **Elements**, 179a 312a 315b 469a-470a 475b-485b
- 29 **CAR** **ANTE** **Don Quixote** **RE I**, 379d 380a
- 35 **LOCKE** **Human Understanding** **RE II**, ch 2, ch 3 52-53 191d 197b
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- 41 **WILL** **Essay** 269b-c 273d 2 4 293b-302a **INTRODUCTION**, 451d-452a
- 41 **HE II. Philosophy of Right** **ADDITIONS** 1 5 136a b 451a-d / **Philosophy of History** **INT** 1 2 6a-d **PART IV** 370c 373 364d
- 1 **TOLSTOY** **War and Peace** **RE** 221b-d **X** 1 57a 57b **RE XIV** 60 b-d **RE X** 630c 631a
- 11 **M** 1 **Psychology** 199-202a
- 54 **Fa** 2 **Origin and Development of Psychology**, 9a b 27a-d **General Introduction**, 593c 623d-625d 633d-634d 635c
4. **The metaphysics of freedom**
- 11 **AR** **RE** **Summa Theologiae** **PART I**, Q 109 110b-111 8 116a-d 1 10 117d 118b Q 22 17 4 128d 130d 4 131c 132b Q 30 4 3 302b-309a Q 83 436c-440b **RE I** **RE** Q 6,

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- 31 **SPINOZA** **Ethics** **PART I**, DEF 7 35b **PROP** 17 362b-363c **PRO** 32 33 367a-369a **APPENDIX** 369b-372d, **PART II**, **PROP** 45-49 391a-394d **PART III**, 395a-d **DEF** 3 395d 396a **PROP** 1 3 396a-398c **PART IV** **PREF** 421b-d 424a **DEF** 8 424b-c **PROP** 3 430c-d **PROP** 66-73 44c 44 a **PART V** 451a-463d **ESP** **PREF** 451a-52c, **P** OF 40-4 462c-63d
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- 45 **HE II. Philosophy of Right** **PART II**, par 139 48d-9b / **Philosophy of History** 153a-359a-c **ESP** **INTRO**, 156d 190b, 203a 206a-c, **ART IV** 368d 369a-c
- 51 **TOLSTOY** **War and Peace** **EPILOGUE II**, 683a 696d
- 4e **The relation of human liberty to chance and contingency**
- 7 **PLATO** **Republic** **RE X**, 439b-441a-c / **Law** **RE IV** 679a b
- 9 **ARISTOTELIS** **Ethics** **RE III**, ch 3 [1124-1125] 1 348a-c
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- 13 **TACITUS** **Annals** **RE III**, 49c **RE IV** 69a-b **RE VI**, 91b-d
- 17 **PLATO** **Third Friend**, **RE I**, ch 8-10 81d 82b
- 18 **ARISTOTELIS** **City of God**, **RE V**, ch 9 213b-215c
- 19 **ARISTOTELIS** **Summa Theologiae** **PART I**, Q 83, A 432d-433c Q 83, A 1 436d-438a Q 116, A 1 592d 593d
- 21 **THE** **Don Quixote** **PARADISE**, **RE I**, [1243-1244] 132b-c
- 23 **ARISTOTELIS** **Principles** **RE XIV** 35a b
- 42 **HANT** **Intro Metaphysics of Morals** 397d 373c
- 45 **HUGO** **P** **Metaphysics of Philosophy** **INTRO**, par 5 15a b **PART III** par 206 68d-69b **ADDITIONS**, 1 118a-c / **Philosophy of History** **PART IV** 368d 369a-c
- 48 **MELVILLE** **Moby Dick** 158b-159a
- 4b **The opposites of freedom: causality or necessity, nature, and law**
- 8 **ARISTOTELIS** **Metaphysics** **RE III**, ch 5 [1124-1125] 573b-c
- 9 **ARISTOTELIS** **Ethics** **RE III**, ch 3 [1124-1125] 358a-c
- 12 **LEONARDUS** **Metaphysics** **RE II**, [1243-1244] 293] 185

- (3) *Moral or spiritual freedom 3a Human bond age or the dominance of the passions*
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 72 A 2 REF 4 112b 113a Q 73 A 5 123a d Q 77 144d 152a esp A 2 145d 147c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25-45] 7b-c
- 22 CHAUCER *Maniciple's Tale* [17 130-144] 490b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 165c 166a 232b c 488b 489b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61-79] 49c d / *Othello* ACT IV SC I 229d 233a / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT III SC XIII [111-116] 335d 336a [195 201] 336d 337a / *Winter's Tale* ACT II SC III [1-192] 498c 500d
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 66c d 78a d
- 31 SPIVOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 3 SCHOL 397c d PART IV PREF PROP 18 422b d 429d
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [561-593] 244b 245a BK XII [79 110] 321a b
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 54 192b c SECT 69 196d 197a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 239b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 233b c PART IV 348d 349b
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d
- 54 FREUD *War and Death* 760d 761a

3b Human freedom or the rule of reason free dom through knowledge of the truth

- NEW TESTAMENT John 8 31 59 / II Corinthians 3 17 / James 1 esp 1 25
- 7 PLATO *Lyss* 18c 18b / *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Phaedo* 230d 234c / *Republic* BK IV 347d 348d BK IX 425c 427b / *Theaetetus* 528c 531a / *Lysis* BK I 650a b BK III 669b d BK IX 754a b
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK V CH I [129 10-16] 179a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102^b13-1103 3] 348a c BK III CH 12 [1119 35^b18] 366a c / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [12^a 33^b26] 448a B CH 13 [1260 4 15] 454c BK III CH 16 [1287^a 28-3] 485d
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK V [1117-1120] 75d
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 12 118d 120b BK II CH I 2 139c 141c CH 18 161a 162b BK III CH 7 182b 184a CH 15 190d CH 21 195a 201a BK IV CH I 213a 223d CH 7 232c 235a
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b c SECT 16-17 259a d BK III SECT 6 261a-c BK IV SECT 24 265c d BK V SECT 9 270b-c SECT 26 272c BK VII SECT 55 283b c SECT 68-69 284c d BK XI SECT 18 305b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 646b 648a
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 10 82b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 3 344a B

- 18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a CH 34 634b-c BK III CH 5-9 659d 661c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d Q 83 A 8 REP I 436d-438a Q 95 A - 507c 508a PART I II Q 24 A 1 727b d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a Q 56 A 4 32b 33c Q 57 A 3 REP 3 37b 38a Q 59 AA 2-3 46c-48c PART II II Q 183 A 4 ANS and REP I 627d 628d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a B
- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 58c d
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70a c 184b d 204d 205b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61 49] 49c d / *Othello* ACT I SC III [322 337] 212b c
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71d 72b 78a d
- 31 SPIVOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 67-73 444b 447a PART V 451a 463d esp PROP 3 4 453a d PROP 20 SCHOL 457b 458a PROP 42 463b d
- 32 MILTON *Sonnets* VII 65a b / *Paradise Lost* BK XII [79-110] 321a b / *Areopagitica* 404a b 409b 410a
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 56-63 36d 38c *passim* / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 46-54 189d 192c SECT 69 196d 197a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
- 41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 300b
- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b-283d / *Practical Reason* 296a d / *Pref Meta physical Elements of Ethics* 378c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 92b c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160c 161c PART II 279d 280b PART IV 315a 348d 349b 350a b 361b B
- 54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 126a 127a c / *General Introduction* 625a d / *Ego and Id* 702c d 715c 716a / *Neu Introductory Lectures* 838c 839b

3c Virtue as the discipline of free choice free dom as the determination of the will by the moral law of practical reason

- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 6 [1106^b3b-1107^a 6] 352c BK III CH 1-2 355b B 358a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH 3 190c BK XIV CH II 385b BK XIX CH 20 523d 524a BK XXII CH 30 617c-618a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 83 A 2 ANS and REP 3 438a d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 183 A 4 ANS 627d 628d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a c XXVII 94c 96a esp [139 147] 96a PARADISE XXVI [73-90] 154a
- 32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 391a 392a 394b 395b

- 9 AQL 15 *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A
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- 21 D TE *De ne Comedy* 1 ELL VII [61-96]
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- 22 CH LER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA
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- 23 V C AVELL *Prince* CH XXV 35a B
- 24 Ifo = *Leviathan* PAR II 113b-c R IV IV
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- 25 MONT I 2 *Essays* 315a 520b d
- 27 SH 1598 RE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [220-
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- 29 CER KTEL *Don Q ixote* PA T I 408c
- 31 D C RTE *Object ns d Repl* 1 141b
- 31 S ORA *Ethics* RTE P R 369b 372d
- 32 MILTOM *Pa ad se Lost* BK II [80-134] 137a
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- 35 LOCKE *Ca / Government* CH I S CT 6 26b-c
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18 AL LER *City of God* BK C 9-10 213b-
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- 19 AQL 15 *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14
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- 21 D VTE *Divine Comedy* P R ADIS XVII [13
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- 23 HO SES *Levatha* PART IV 271b
- 25 MO TAIGNE *Ess* JS 342a
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80-134] 137a
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- 41 G1 ON *Decline and Fall* 230b
- 44 BOSWELL *Joh s n* 173c 392d 393a
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- 18 ALCL TIVE *Co sessions* BK IX PAR I 61c d
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- 19 AQL 15 *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 23 A
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- 31 SPINOZA *Eth c* BK IV PROP 68 SCHOL 445a b
- 32 MILTON *Pa ad se Lost* BK II [1024 1033]
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- 42 HANT *Pure Reason* 238b
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy f R b* PART II PAR 140
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NEW TESTAMENT *M t* hen 2 1 16 / J h 5:21
/ *Roma* 8:23-9:26 esp 9 15 18 / I *Corinthi*
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- 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk iv 69a b bk vi 91b d
 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr i ch 4 79d 80a ch 8-10 81d 82b
 III AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk v ch 9 io 213b 216c
 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 aa 3-9 110b 117d passim Q 41 A 2 218c 219d Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 59 A 3 308b 309a ii 62 A 8 REP 2 323c 324a Q 83 A 1 436d 438a Q 103 A 1 REP 1 3 528b 529a Q 115 A 6 ANS 591d 592d PART II Q 10 662d 666a c Q 13 A 6 676c 677b
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 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* bk iv stanza 138 154 106b 108b / *Nuns Priest's Tale* [15 236-256] 456b 457a
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 113b c PART III 165c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 216c 219a
 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 7 355b PROF 17 SCHOL 362c 363c APPENDIX 369b 372d
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk iii [80 134] 137a 138a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi SECT 7 27 180a 184c
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 42 KANT *Pure Reason* 133a 140b d 143a 164a 171a 234c 235a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d 265a 279b d 287d esp 283d 285a / *Practical Reason* 292a 293b 296a d 301d 302d 307d 314d esp 310b 311d 331c 337a e / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b 387a c 390b / *Judgements* 463a-467a 571c 572a 587a 588a 607c 609b 610a
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5 The theology of freedom

5a Man's freedom in relation to fate or to the will of God

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 4 HOMER *Iliad* bk vi [342-358] 43c d bk xiv [74-94] 137d 138a bk xxiv [507-551] 176c 177a / *Odyssey* bk xviii [117 150] 285b c
 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [1297 1415] 121b 122b / *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a esp [258 291] 116c d [960-999] 123b c / *Philoctetes* [169-200] 183d 184a [1316-1347] 193d 194a
 5 EURIPIDES *Helen* [711-7 1] 304d 305a / *Electra* [1168 1359] 337d 339a c / *Heracles Mad* [1255 1357] 376a d
 6 HERODOTUS *History* bk i 7b 8c 20a 22a bk ii 77a b bk iii 98b 99a bk vii 218b 220b bk ix 291b c
 7 PLATO *Republic* bk v 439b-441a c / *Letter* bk i 650a b bk iv 679a ii bk v 765d 769c esp 767c 768b
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 12 EPICETUS *Discourses* bk i ch 11 118d 120b bk ii ch 8 147b bk iii ch 22 197c 198b ch 24 209c 210a bk iv ch 1 218d 219c ch 3 224d ch 7 233d
 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk iii SECT 11 262a b bk vi SECT 42 46 278a d bk x SECT 5 296c
 II VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk iii [492-505] 160b 161a bk iv [333-361] 176a 177a
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 15 TACITUS *Annals* bk iv 69a bk vi 91b d
 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr ii iii 82c 97b passim
 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk ii par 14 12a b / *City of God* bk v ch 9-10 213b 216c

- 3 Mo TISQUT V S *int of Laws* BK III 9d 10a
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- 18 ROUSSEU V *Inequa Jy* 324 b / *Social Con-
tract* BK II 402c-d
- 19 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 170c 173b
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- 20 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* II 29c-d 39c-40a
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- 41 G. W. *Decline and Fall* II 92d 166a 167d
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- 42 FEDERALIST NUMB 9 47 c NUM ER 26
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- 43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 268b / *Representative
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- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 383b
- 45 H. L. *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b-
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- Old T S *W. T. Exodus* 1 5 / *Deutero my*
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- 6 H. B. *History* 1 314 c esp K 1 2b-
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- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* 349a 593a c
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- 14 PLUTARCH *Timoleon* 195a 213d / *Aristides*
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- 15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 16b-21b BK II 44d
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- 23 M. CH. *elli Prince* CH V 8a-c
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- 27 SH. *K. L. R. Cymbeline* ACT I I SC I 463c
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- 32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [241 2-6] 344b-
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- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 71b-d 489d-491a
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- 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall*, 51a-67 passim esp
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- Other discussions of freedom of thought or expression see ART 10b EDUCATION 8c KNOWL-
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sions of liberty of conscience and freedom of worship see RELIGION 6c(1)-6e THEOLOGY 4c
- The moral or psychological freedom in the relation of reason and emotion see DESIRE
5-6c EMOTION 4-4b(3) MIND 9d SLAVERY 7 TYRANNY 5d
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- The theological consideration of liberty see FATE 4 GOD 4c 5f-5g 7b 7d 7f SIN 6a 7
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(5) *The theology of freedom 5d The divine freedom the independence or autonomy of infinite being divine choice*

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 5 AESCHYLUS *Agamemnon* [1017-1034] 63a
 8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK V CH 5 [1015b-16] 536a BK XII CH 6-7 601b 603b CH 10 [1075 12-16] 605d
 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 13 188c d BK IV CH 6 230c
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 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 93 A 4 REP 1 218b d PART III Q 21 A 1 ANS 823d 824d PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 1 REP 2 1016b 1017c
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 113b c
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38a
 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228a-c
 37 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 6-7 355b PROP 17 362b 363c PROP 32 35 367a 369a AP PENDING 369b 372d
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [139-173] 220a 221a / *Samson Agonistes* [300-329] 346a b
 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 654 492b
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 50-51 191b c
 35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 57 423d 424a SECT 10b 433c d
 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265b c esp 265b d [in 1] / *Practical Reason* 321b c 324d 325a 325d 328b 342c / *Inero Metaphysic of Morals* 393c
 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160c 161a
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 684c d

6 Liberty in history

6a The historical significance of freedom stages in the realization of freedom the beginning and end of the historical process

- 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 23a B 38b c BK V 175b BK VI 207b 208c BK VII 233a B 238b c
 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 353c d

7 PLATO *Laus* BK III 663d 677a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 51b-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 108 A 1 331a 332b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 24c 32c 34a c esp 33c d 51c 90d 91a 475a 521c 523a c esp 522d 523a 523d 524a

41 GIBBON *De line and Fall* 161c 167a 202a d 300a b 452d-453a

43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 268b 271d 272a / *Representative Government* 339a 341d 346a c / *Utilitarianism* 475d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 4 12d PART I par 57 26b 27a PART III par 340-360 110b 114a c ADDITIONS 36 122b c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a c esp INTRO 156d 190b 203a 206a c PART I 207a 209a 219d 221a 230a c 235d 236c 245d 246c 251c 257a 258a PART II 259a 260c 263d 267a 268b 274a PART III 286c 287a 303c 307b 310d 311d PART IV 315a 319b 321c 331d 333d 348a c 350a c 360c 365c 368d 369a c
 50 MARK *Capital* 35b

6b The struggle for civil liberty and economic freedom the overthrow of tyrants des pots and oppressors

OLD TESTAMENT *I Kings* 12 1-25—(D) *III Kings* 12 1-25 / *II Kings* 9 1 10 11 11 21 18 26—(D) *IV Kings* 9 1-10 11 11 21 18 26 / *II Chronicles* 10—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 10
 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 120b c BK IV 124a d BK V 167a b 171c 175b 177d 180a BK VI 193b-c 201a b 208d 209b BK VII 243b-c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 353c BK VI 523c 524d BK VIII 564a 593a c esp 582a 583c 585d 586b 587a 589a 590a

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14 PLATARCH *Solon* 64b d 77a c / *Poplicola* 77a 86a c / *Poplicola Solon* 86a 87d / *Coriolanus* 174b d 193a c / *Timoleon* 195a 213d esp 206d / *Pelopidas* 232a 246a = / *Caesar* 600a 604d / *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c esp 643a 644b / *Agis* 648b d 656d / *Tiberius Gracchus* 671b d 681a c esp 678b d / *Caius Gracchus* 681b d 689a c / *Demeitrus* 728b 729d *Antony* 752a 755c / *Marcus Brutus* 802b c 824a c / *A Jius* 826a 846a c

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 104a-c BK VII 112: 113b 115d 116b 117a BK XV 169a 176b *Historiae* BK I 195a 201c esp 197a-c

26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT IV SC II 57d 64d / *Richard III* ACT V SC III [23* 27] 146b c / *Julius Caesar* 568a 596a c esp ACT I SC III [72 130] 573b = ACT III SC I 580b 583c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* 351a 392a c

32 MILTON *Lord Gen Fairfax* 68b-69a / *Lor. Gen Cromwell* 69a b

Chapter 48 LIFE AND DEATH

INTRODUCTION

MEN have divided the totality of things in various ways. The three most fundamental divisions rest on the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, between the material and the spiritual, and between the Eternal and the Living.

The same kind of basic question is raised by each of these divisions, and given opposite answers in the tradition of the great books. The question is not always formulated in the same way. It may be a question about the existence of the supernatural order or of immaterial beings. It may be a problem of whether the terms of the division represent a real duality or merely different aspects of one and the same whole. Are God and nature one or are they radically distinct? Is spirituality merely one extension of bodily existence or are there two worlds, a world of bodies and a world of spirits?

These issues are considered in the chapters on GOD, SPIRIT, ANGEL, and MATTER, as well as in the chapter on BEING. The issue raised by the third great division is one of the central topics in this chapter. That issue concerns the difference between the living and the non-living. There is no question here about whether in the order of nature living things exist. The fact of life is not denied at least not as a matter of observation. On the surface the crucial question seems to be a striking difference between the living tree and the stone or between the animal which a moment ago was alive and is now dead.

Yet how this difference is to be understood is the question. Does it signify an absolute break, a discontinuity between the world of living bodies and the domain of inanimate things? Or is the continuity of nature preserved even the line which divides inorganic and organic matter? Is the difference between the

non-living and the living (or the living and the dead) one of kind or of degree?

Those who answer that it is a difference in kind usually formulate a definition of life which draws a sharp line on one side of which are the things that have the indispensable properties of life, while on the other side are things totally lacking in these properties. The crucial point here turns on whether vitality is present in some degree or totally absent. The definition of life may not always be the same. It may not always, for example, postulate the soul as the principle in all living things, or involve the same conception of soul in relation to living organisms. But when life is defined as an essential characteristic of some natures, the definition underlies the existence of natures which are totally lacking in the properties essential to life. It also implies the impossibility of intermediate links between the lowest form of life and the most complex of the inorganic substances.

The opposite answer that there is only a difference in degree between the inanimate and the animate affirms the continuity of nature across the gap between things which appear lifeless and those which seem to be alive. All bodies have the same fundamental properties, though not in the same magnitude. But here there is a further question. It can be asked whether those properties are the powers or functions commonly associated with the appearance of being alive, such as growth, reproduction, sensitive desire, locomotion or whether they are the mechanical properties of matter in motion—properties which vary only with the degrees of complexity in the organization of matter.

According to the doctrine which is sometimes called "animism" and sometimes "panpsychism," everything is alive; every body is besouled, though at the lower end of the scale the

For The issue of freedom and necessity in the philosophy of history see FATE 6 HISTORY 42(1) 42(3) WILL 7b and for the history of man's struggle for civil liberty and economic freedom see CITIZEN 9 LABOR 7c-7c(3) REVOLUTION 5a-5c 6a 7 TYRANNY 8

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Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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IN THE GREAT BOOKS the opposite position with respect to the living, and non-living seems to appear for the first time with Descartes. It might be supposed that Lucretius, since he denies the soul as an immaterial principle, would also tend to reject anything except a difference in degree between animate and inanimate bodies. But this is not the case. According to Lucretius *Enucli* things are not merely more complex combinations of atoms and void. Their construction includes a special type of soul-atom, whose round, smooth shape and speed of movement through all parts of the living body accounts for the powers and activities which are peculiar to that body. Lucretius is recognized as a materialist and a mechanist, yet he sharply separates living from non-living bodies and appeals to a special principle—the soul atom—to explain this difference in kind.

As appears in the chapters on *Vital* and *Soul*, Descartes is at variance not only with Lucretius but also with Aristotle, Galen, and Plotinus in his conception of the soul and of life. The soul is not a body or composed of bodies. Neither in his opinion, is it an immaterial principle conjoined with organic matter to constitute the living body. It is itself an immaterial substance quite separate from the human body to which it is allied.

Descartes tells us how he passed from a description of inanimate bodies and plants to that of animals, and particularly to that of man. He asks us to consider the supposition that "God formed the body of man altogether like one of ours without making use of any matter other than that which I have described and without at first placing in it a rational soul or any other thing which might serve as a vegetative or sensitive soul. He then goes on to say that examining the functions which might in accordance with this supposition exist in this body I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of thought and consequently without our soul—the is to say this part of us, distinct from the body of which it has been said that its nature is to think."

The mechanistic implications of his supposition are explicitly developed by Descartes in his consideration of Harvey's discovery of the motions of the heart and blood. These move-

ments, he says, follow as necessarily from the very disposition of the organs as does that of a clock from the power, the situation, and the form of its counterpoise and of its wheels. In these motions, as well as in the actions of the nerves, brain, and muscles, it is not necessary to suppose any other cause than those operating according to the laws of Mechanics which are identical with those of nature."

This will not seem strange. Descartes adds, to those who know "how many different automata or moving machines can be made by the industry of man, without employing in so doing more than a very few parts in comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins or other parts that are found in the body of each animal. From this aspect the body is regarded as a machine which having been made by the hands of God is incomparably better arranged and possesses in itself movements which are much more admirable than any of those which can be invented by man. Only the functions of reason, only the acts of thinking—not those of living—operate under other than the mechanical laws of corporeal nature. Whether living or not all bodies without reason or a rational soul are automata or machines. Whatever they do can be explained as a kind of clockwork—by the disposition and interaction of their parts.

ANOTHER SOURCE and another version of the view that the continuity of nature is uninterrupted comes from the theory of evolution. Darwin himself in his brief consideration of the origin of life deals mainly with the alternative hypotheses of the divine creation of a single original form or of several primitive forms from which the whole of the plant and animal kingdoms has developed by the natural steps of evolution. He rejects the division of the animate world into more than the two great kingdoms of plant and animal life and holds that man differs from other animals only in degree, not in kind.

As indicated in the chapters on *Animal* and *Evolution*, Darwin questions the discontinuity between plants and animals. He refers to the intermediate forms which seem to belong to both kingdoms. He suggests the possibility that the lowest forms of animal life may have

signs of vitality remain hidden from ordinary observation. Although this theory is usually attributed to a primitive view of nature it appears in a subtle form in certain philosophical developments which make soul or mind a principle as universal as matter. There is one common substance, says Marcus Aurelius, though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual circumscriptions.

The doctrine which in modern times is called mechanism conceives the continuity of nature in terms of the universality of purely mechanical principles. It reduces all phenomena to the interaction of moving parts or particles. No new principle is needed to explain the phenomena of life. The laws of physics and chemistry suffice. Biophysics and biochemistry simply deal with the mechanics of more complex material systems. The apparent differences in function between living and non-living things represent the same functions. They are altered only in *appearance* by the more complex organization of the matter which is called living.

THE CONTROVERSY over mechanistic principles in the analysis of life arose with great explicitness in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continues to our own day. The chief opponents of the mechanists are those who at one time called themselves vitalists to signify their insistence upon an essential difference between vital and mechanical phenomena. The work of Jacques Loeb can be taken to represent the mechanistic side of this controversy; the writings of Bergson, Haldane, Whitehead the vitalist position.

Those who regard the realm of living things as a distinct domain in nature also think that the study of living things has special concepts, principles, and methods as different from those of physics and chemistry as the objects studied are distinct.

Biology is a science of ancient origin. The Hippocratic collection of writings on health and disease, the extensive biological researches of Aristotle, the work of Galen, represent more than a bare beginning of the science. The ancient classification of vital functions establishes

the terms of biological analysis. Ideas which have come to seem obvious because of traditional acceptance were once great discoveries. For example, that all living bodies nourish themselves, grow, and reproduce, that these are the minimal, not the maximal, functions of organic matter, that there is a regular cycle of growth and decay in the normal life span which is itself different for different types of organisms, that in the dynamic equilibrium between the living organism and its physical environment the organism actively maintains itself through a certain balance of exchanges in the biological economy of which breathing is a prime example.

The great books of biological science from Aristotle to Harvey seem to be of one mind on the point that living matter possesses distinctive powers and performs functions which are not present in *any degree* in the realm of the inert or inorganic. For the most part they reflect the theory that the living body possesses a soul which is the principle of its vitality and the source of the vital powers embodied in its various organs.

In ancient and mediaeval theory the soul is not conceived as belonging peculiarly to man; it is not identified with mind or with the intellectual faculties. The word *animal* derives from the Latin name for soul—the principle of animation. It is true that Galen distinguishes between what he calls the *natural* and the *psychic* faculties. The latter for him are the powers of sensitivity, desire, and locomotion. Yet his analysis of the vegetative powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction which are common to plants and animals squares with Aristotle's conception of the vegetative soul.

What has soul in it? Aristotle writes, differs from what has not in that the former displays life. Now this word has more than one sense. Living that may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay, and growth. Hence we think of plants also as *living* for they are observed to possess in themselves an originaive power through which they increase and decrease in all spatial directions. This power of self-nutrition is the originaive power, the possession of which leads us to speak of things as *living*.

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As indicated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLUTION, Darwin questions the discontinuity between plants and animals. He refers to the intermediate forms which seem to belong to both kingdoms. He suggests the possibility that the lowest forms of animal life may have

developed by natural evolutionary descent from plant organisms. But he does not *seriously* consider the hypothesis of an evolutionary transition from inorganic matter to living organisms. Here, on the contrary, he seems to recognize a difference in kind. The most humble organism, he writes, is something much higher than the inorganic dust under our feet, and no one with an unbiased mind can study any living creature however humble without being struck with enthusiasm at its marvellous structure and properties. He questions the notion that living organisms might have originated from inorganic matter by spontaneous generation. Science has not as yet proved the truth of this belief, he says; whatever the future may reveal.

Nevertheless, with the extension of Darwin's theory of the origin of species into a doctrine of cosmic evolution, what James calls the evolutionary afflatus, leads writers like Tyndall and Spencer to talk, as if mind grew out of body in a continuous way. So strong a postulate is continuity. James writes that the evolutionists try to leap over the breach between inorganic matter and consciousness.

In a general theory of evolution, he explains, the inorganic comes first, then the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life, then forms of life that possess mentality, and finally those like ourselves that possess it in a high degree.

We are dealing all the time with matter and its aggregations and separations, and although our treatment must perforce be hypothetical, this does not prevent it from being *continuous*. The point which, as evolutionists, we are bound to hold fast to, is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which chaotically dispersed made the nebula now jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar position form our brains, and the evolution of the brains, if understood, would be simply the account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed. In this story no new *natures*, no factors not present at the beginning are introduced at any later stage.

James is here presenting a theory which he himself rejects. He recognizes the strength of the postulate of continuity in the theories of

Spencer, Tyndall, and other evolutionists, but he thinks the evident contrasts between living and inanimate performances favor the division of nature into two realms. Yet he also seems to regard some degree of intelligence or mentality as an accompaniment of life. Hence his criterion of the difference in kind between an intelligent and a mechanical performance—namely, purposiveness or the pursuance of future ends, and the choice of means—also serves as the mark of distinction between the animate and the inanimate.

It is worth remarking that this criterion is one of the tests Descartes proposes for differentiating man from all the rest of nature, man alone having reason or thought. It is also worth noting that in associating different degrees of mentality or consciousness with life at all levels of development, James himself affirms a continuity in the realm of all living things. He therefore does not go as far in the direction of discontinuity as do those in the tradition of the great books who find an essential difference between the inanimate and the living, between plant and animal, and between brute and human life.

The issues raised by these last two distinctions are further considered in the chapters on ANIMAL MAN and MIND. Here we are concerned only with the fact that those who find genuine differences in kind in the world of animate things also tend to distinguish between the living and the non-living by reference to the most generic properties of corporeal life, that is, the powers or functions shared by plants, animals, and men. The question of origins does not seem to be relevant to the problem of differences. Aquinas, for example, does not seem to regard the hypothesis of the spontaneous generation of living organisms from putrefying organic matter as inconsistent with his assertion that the vegetative functions of plants and animals are not performed—in any degree—by inanimate bodies.

When Aristotle says of natural bodies that some have life in them, others not, and by life we mean self-nutrition and growth, he is aware that the word growth occurs in the description of a certain type of change in inanimate bodies. Other than living things increase in

size. To avoid an equivocal use of the word "growth" he assigns three distinguishing characteristics to the quantitative change or increase in living things: (1) Any and every part of the growing magnitude is made bigger; (2) by the accession of something; and (3) in such a way that the growing thing is preserved and persists.

To exemplify this difference Galen compares the growth of an organism with the expansion of a dried bladder when children blow air into it. The expanding bladder seems to grow but not as it did when it was a part of a living animal and when the growth of the whole involved the growth of each part. "In these doings of the children," Galen writes, "the more the interior cavity of the bladder increases in size, the thinner necessarily does its substance become. But if the children were able to bring nourishment to this thin part then they would make the bladder in the same way that Nature does."

To be distended in all directions belongs only to bodies whose growth is directed by Nature for those which are distended by us undergo this distension in one direction but grow less in the others. It is impossible to find a body which will remain entire and not be torn through whilst we stretch it in the three dimensions. Thus Nature alone has the power to expand a body in all directions so that it remains unruptured and preserves completely its previous form."

Modern biologists sometimes compare the growth of crystals in solution with living growth and reproduction. Or making the point that other systems in dynamic equilibrium show in essence all the properties of living things they say that it is almost impossible to distinguish a candle flame from a living organism. Aristotle considers the latter comparison and rejects it. He observes that the growth of fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply of fuel but no amount of nutriment can increase the size of living things without limit. There is a limit or ratio which determines their size and increase and the limit and ratio are marks of the soul, but not of fire.

The flame is a lively thing but to say that it is alive that it grows or dies is in Aristotle's view a poetic metaphor not a scientific statement. When I have plucked the rose "O, hello says, "I cannot give it vital growth again it

needs must wither. But to the candle burning beside Desdemona's bed he says "If I quench thee thou flaming minister I can again thy former light restore. The flame is lit or extinguished by motions from without but the birth and death the nourishing and growth of the living thing is self movement.

According to Aristotle and Aquinas self movement is the essential mark of being alive.

All things are said to be alive. Aquinas writes which determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind whereas those things which cannot by their own nature do so cannot be called living except by a similitude. He further defines the meaning of self movement by distinguishing between the *transitive* action of one inert body upon another and the *immanent* activity of a living thing whereby the agent itself is perfected. Growing, sensing and understanding are immanent actions because they are activities which affect the growing, sensing or understanding thing. The result of such actions *remains in the agent*. In contrast heating is a transitive action. In heating one thing acts upon another and the hot thing loses its own heat in the process.

As vital operations differ thus from the actions of inanimate bodies so do vital powers differ from the capacities of inert matter through which bodies can act upon or react to other bodies. The power of self movement (or immanent activity) enables living things alone to change from a less perfect to a more perfect state of being as measured by the thing's nature rather than simply to change from one state to contrary as a body changes when it moves locally from this place to that or alters from hot to cold or cold to hot.

FOR THE THEOLOGIAN there is an additional aspect to the problem of defining life. If the realm of corporeal substances is divided into inert and living bodies, what is to be said about incorporeal substances (— the angels) and about God? It is easier to think of the angels as *not* being than to conceive them as *not being* alive. More than infinite or omnipotent or eternal, the ever living God is the phrase which, in the language of religious worship expresses positively the divine nature. But the fundamental activities which distinguish living from

non living bodies (such as nutrition growth reproduction) are essentially corporeal in nature. So too are sensing and locomotion. What common meaning of life then can apply to material and spiritual beings?

Aquinas answers by saying that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another the more perfectly this power is found in anything the more perfect is the life of that thing. By this criterion plants are less perfectly alive than animals in whom self movement is found to a higher degree because of their sensitive faculties and among animals there are grades of life according to degrees of sensitivity, and according to the possession of mobility a power which certain animals seem to lack. In both the higher animals and in man there is purposive behavior but man alone through his intellect and will can freely determine his own ends and choose the means to them hence these faculties give human life an even greater degree of self movement.

But the action of the human intellect is not perfectly self determined for it depends in part upon external causes. Wherefore Aquinas concludes that life in the highest degree belongs properly to God—that being whose act of understanding is its very nature and which in what it naturally possesses is not determined by another. He quotes Aristotle's remark that the perfection of God's life is proportionate to the perfection of the divine intellect which is purely actual and eternally in act. And he goes on to remark that in the sense in which understanding is movement and that which understands itself moves itself. Plato also taught that God moves Himself.

Nourishment growth and reproduction are indispensable features of corporeal life precisely because corporeal things are perishable. They need reproduction to preserve the species. Aquinas writes and nourishment to preserve the individual. Hence the higher powers of life such as sensing and understanding are never found in corporeal things apart from the vegetative powers. This does not hold however for spiritual beings which are by nature imperishable. Spiritual life is essentially immortal life.

Subject to the ravages of time corporeal life at every moment betrays its mortality—in its need for sleep in the enfeeblement of its pow-

ers in disease decay or degeneration. Death is the correlative of life for those who sharply divide the living from the non living. Rocks may crumble into dust bodies may disintegrate and atoms explode—but they do not die. Death is a change which only living matter undergoes.

The transition from life to death accentuates the mystery of life. The notion of spontaneous generation aside life always seems to come from life. Whether by cell division or by germination the living thing that is generated comes from the living substance of another thing. But when a living thing dies it crosses the gap between the living and the non living. As the organic matter of the corpse decomposes nothing is left but the familiar inorganic elements and compounds. This seems to be a change more radical than generation or birth. All the metaphysical problems of form and substance of matter and the soul of continuity and discontinuity in nature which appear in the analysis of life become more intense in the understanding of death.

As appears in the chapter on IMMORTALITY the living are preoccupied with death not predominantly with analyzing it but with facing and fearing it struggling against or embracing it. Death as the great poems reveal is the object of soliloquy in moments of greatest introspection or self appraisal. To die well Montaigne points out requires greater moral stamina than to live well. For him the essence of the philosophical temper as for others the meaning of heroism or martyrdom consists in facing death with an equanimity which reflects the highest qualities of a well resolved life.

Montaigne devotes a long essay to the subject that to philosophize is to learn to die and begins it by quoting Cicero's statement that to study philosophy is nothing but to prepare one's self to die. Socrates then is the prototype of the philosopher for in conversation with his friends in prison while awaiting death he tells them that the true votary of philosophy is always pursuing death and dying. He tries to prove to them by his actions as well as by his words that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die.

Not only death but the dead exercise a profound effect upon the living. The historians describe the various forms which the ceremonials

of death take in every society. Whether the rituals are secular or sacred, they are among the most significant customs of any culture for they reveal the value placed upon life and the conception of life's meaning, and man's destiny. No deeper differences exist among the great religions than those which appear in the practices or sacraments in preparation for death and in the services for the dead.

The moral, social, and religious aspects of death appear to be peculiarly human. Yet on the biological level, the same fundamental instincts and emotions seem to prevail in animals and men. The struggle to remain alive may be presumed to occur in plants. But it is not there as plainly discernible as in the specific patterns of behavior manifested by the animal instinct of self-preservation. Almost in proportion to the degree of vitality the instinct of self-preservation operates with a strength and pertinacity as vigorous as the love for life and arouses as an emotional corollary an equally devouring fear of death.

The instinct of self-preservation is the life instinct. Directed toward the related ends of maintenance and increase, life are the reproductive impulses and the erotic instincts. But according to Freud there is in all living matter a more primitive instinct than these, and one which aims in the opposite direction. That is the death instinct—the impulse of the living to return to lifelessness.

It would be contrary to the conservative nature of instinct," Freud writes, "if the goal of life were as the never-birth-no-death. It must rather be an ancient starting point, with which the life began long ago, and to which it harks back again. If we may assume as an experience admission of no exception that every thing dies from causes within itself, and returns to the unconscious, we can only say 'The goal of all life is death.'

The death instinct, according to Freud, originates with life itself. "At one time or another by some operation of force which compels by itself the conservation of the properties of life were awakened in the physical material matter strove to attain an equilibrium the first instinct was present, that to return to lifelessness." The death instinct acts against the tendency of

the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect living substances together into ever larger unities. The cooperation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end.

Freud's hypothesis of the death instinct has a bearing on the impulse to commit suicide and on the question whether it is natural or perverse for men to choose this escape from the tensions and difficulties of life. The psychological problem here especially with regard to the unconscious forms of the suicidal impulse is not the same as the moral problem. The question whether animals other than men ever commit suicide like the question whether the killing of one animal by another can be called murder indicates the difference between psychological description and moral judgment.

For the moralist the condemnation of suicide seems to rest on the same grounds as the condemnation of murder. With Kant for example it represents the same type of violation of the universal moral law. The categorical imperative requires us to act always as if the maxim of our actual action could be universalized as a rule for all men to follow. But, in the case of suicide as in the case of murder the maxim of the action cannot be universalized without accomplishing a result which no one intends. Further more suicide is not consistent with the idea of the human person as an end in itself. The man says Kant who destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life.

Suicide is also condemned by the theologians as a contravention of the divine as well as of the natural law. Men are God's handwork and therefore as Locke puts it "they are His property made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. Under the natural law a man is not at liberty to destroy himself, nor consequently is he at liberty to sell himself into slavery. Everyone is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station willfully. If further more there is an after life of rewards and punishments suicide is no escape. Death so snatched," Adam tells Eve in *Paradise Lost* "will not exempt us from the pain we are by doom to pay."

There is similar reasoning in pagan antiquity. Suicide is an act of violence and says Plotinus if there be a period allotted to all by fate to anticipate the hour could not be a happy act.

If everyone is to hold in the other world a standing determined by the state in which he quitted this there must be no withdrawal as long as there is any hope of progress. A Christian would add that to relinquish hope as long as life persists is the sin of despair.

But the pagan tradition also speaks with an opposite voice. For the Stoics suicide does not seem to be as reprehensible as murder. To those who complain of life's pains and the fetters of the body Epictetus says: "The door is open. In a doctrine in which all things that affect only the body are indifferent to the soul as well being death too is indifferent. Death is the harbor for all; this is the place of refuge as soon as you choose you may be out of the house."

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Ho 12 *Iliad* bk 11 [65 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1.

PAGE SCHEMES. When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES Psychology 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO Symposium 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

ARTICLES. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH or CT) are sometimes included in the reference. The numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* x 11 [265 283] 12d.

BIBLICAL REFERENCES. The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ the title of book or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay version is indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *1st* *Sam* 11 7-45-(D) *2nd* *Esd* 1 46.

SYMBOLS. The bold italic script calls the reader's attention to one or more especially referable parts of a whole reference. The passage numbers indicate that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style. For general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

- 1 The natural cause of life the soul as the principle of life in organic bodies

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7 PLATO *Cratylus* 1 93c / *Phaedrus* 124b-d / *Phaedrus* 223c-d 223b 244b 246c / *Gorgias* 275d 277b *passim* / *Lysis* bk 1 763a 764a

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9 Аристотель *Parts of Animals* bk i ch 1 [61² 37-64 33] 163 164b / *Genesis* f 1 mal 1 ch 19 [72¹⁵ 29] 266d 267 bk ii ch 1 [3 29-33] 272a b [73¹²⁰⁻⁷³⁵ 275b-d ch 3 [73¹¹³ 34] 278a b ch 5 [74¹⁶⁻³¹ 282a b x iii ch 1 6 3-22] 303b-d

10 G L V *Natural Philosophy* bk i ch 1 167a b bk ii ch 3 185 b

12 L *Things of Nature* bk i [865 1022] 26a 28a x iii [94 116] 32b-35c bk v [83-8 5] 71b d

17 PLATO *Timaeus* *Ennead* tr 1 1a 6b *passim* / *Seco d Ennead* tr ii ch 12 13 46c-47b / *Third Ennead* tr iii ch 3 108b tr viii c 18 133a b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iii ch 8 146c d ch 9 147b c ch 19 151d 152b ch 23 153d tr iv ch 29 173b 174b tr v ch 7 188b-c tr ii ch 2-5 192a 194a ch 14 200b-c / *Fifth Ennead* tr iv ch 1 297b d ch 1 5 th *Ennead* tr iv ch 1 297b d ch 4-6 299a 300b ch 16 305a tr v ch 12 310b d

18 Аристотель *City of God* bk vi ch 25 358b 359 bk xiii ch 360b-361a bk xiii ch 24 609c 610a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i 118 626c-627a

19 Аристотель *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 14b 15b Q 4 A 2 REP 3 21b 22b Q 10 A 1 2 40d-41d Q 18 104b 108c Q 27 A 2 14 25c 253b Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b-276b A 3 27 A 2 8c Q 69 A 2 361 362 Q 7 A 3 A 3 and REP 2-5 365b-367a Q 1-72 367a 369d Q 75 76 378a 399b *passim* Q 97 A 3 515a d Q 1 8 19 600a-608d *passim*

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- 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b PART I 65a PART III 173d 176d PART IV 251a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 138a b
- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 285d 286a 296a d / *Circulation of the Blood* 316a 318b 325d 326d / *On Animal Generation* 384d 390b passim 431b-434a esp 433c d 488d 496d
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- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [6819-7004] 167a 171b [7851-7864] 191b
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 27b 28a 344b 345a
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 145b c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 561b d BK XIV 608a b
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 140a
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- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK IV CH 5 [213 4-9] 292c BK V CH 3 [227 10-17] 307d 308a BK VII CH 2 [44^{b1}-45¹¹] 328b d BK VIII CH 1 [250^{b11}-14] 334a CH 4 338d 340d CH 6 [259 20-31] 345a d / *Heavens* BK II CH 2 [284^{b30}-285 1] 376c / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 1-3 482b d-486a / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 4 [1014^{b17}-26] 534d 535a BK VII CH 16 [1040^{b5} 16] 564c / *Soul* BK I CH 5 [411^{a7}-23] 641a ■ BK II CH I 642a 643a CH 4 645b 647b CH 12 656a d / *Longevity* CH - 3 710b 711b
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VIII CH I [588^{b4} 10] 114d 115a / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [681 12 15] 211d / *Motion of Animals* CH I [698 15-21] 233b CH 4 [700 5 27] 235b c CH 6 235d 236b CH 7 [701^{b1}-CH 8 [702^{b12}] 236d 238a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 1 233 [731 30-38] 271c d BK II CH 4 [740 13-18] 281a BK III CH II [61^{b35} 763^{b15}] 302d 304d
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a BK II CH 3 186c d

- 12 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK I [215 264] 3d-4b BK II [865-930] 26a d
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- 28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 67b-d
- 28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 384a ■ 457a
- 30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 157b-158a APH 40 171a d APH 48 179d 188b
- 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 59a d
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- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217c CH XXVII SECT 3-5 219d 220c passim BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b BK IV CH III SECT 25 321a b CH XVI SECT 12 370c 371a
- 38 POUSSIEU *Inequality* 337d 338a
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- 45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 836d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 341c d
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK X 449b-c
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a 6b 68a 71b passim esp 68a b 85a b 95b 96a
- 54 FREUD *Unconscious* 429c d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d 652d 661b-c / *New Introductory Lectures* 849d 851c

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- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I II 12 20 31 / *Psalms* 8 esp 8 4-8-(D) *Psalms* 8 esp 8 5-9 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 18 22
- 7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 128d passim / *Symposium* 165c 166b / *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d / *Timaeus* 466a c 469d-470a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 8 [199 20 ^{b13}] 276c II / *Heavens* BK II CH 12 383b 384c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 5 417b 420b / *Meteorology* BK IV CH - [379^{b10} 25] 483d-484a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980 22 ^{b27}] 499a b BK II CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c / *Soul* 631a 668d esp BK I CH 5 [410^b 16-411 2] 640d 641a BK II CH 2 3 643a 645b BK III CH 12 13 667a 668d / *Sense and the Sensible* 673a 689a c / *Memory and Reminiscence* 690a 695d / *Sleep* 696a 701d / *Youth Life and Breathing* 714a 726d
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- 42 KANT *Judgement* 579d 580a esp 579b-c 602b d [in 1]
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- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 13a 14b 19b-42b passim esp 40a 41b 51a 52a 705b 706b
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- 7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 377c d / *Timaeus* 469d 470a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH [194^b13] 271a / *Meteorology* BK IV CH I 482b d-483c / *Longevity* 710a 713a c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [48, 14^b5] 8a b BK V CH II [543^b19-31] 70b c CH II 2 [533^b20 23] 80c CH III [557 4 32] 83d 84a BK VI CH II 17 [570^b29 1, 2] 96d BK VIII CH 2 29 115c 132d esp CH 2 13 215c 125b CH 1b 20 127b 129b CH 28 29 131c 132d BK IX CH I [605^b19]-CH I [610^b19] 134a 136b CH II [618^b9 13] 144a b CH 32 [619 27 31] 144d 145a CH 37 [622 3 15] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 8 [694 1 14] 215b CH 12 [693 10 24] 225a / *Causes of Animals* CH 15 [713 3] CH 18 [14^b8] 250d 252a / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 10 [760 2, 2^a] 301b d
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- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* 7a 158d esp BK I CH 1-6 7a 13a BK II CH I 19b d 23d BK IV CH III 59d 62a BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VIII CH I 114b d 115b / *Parts of Animals* 161a 229d passim esp BK I CH 4 167d 168c CH 5 [455^b1-646 5] 169b d / *Causes of Animals* 243a 252a c / *Generation of Animals* 255a 331a = esp BK I CH I 19 255a 268a BK II CH I 272a 276a BK III 290a 304d BK IV CH 4-6 311c 317d BK V 320a 331a =
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 10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par i 1a b
 par 3 1d 2b par 6 2d 3a par 9-11 3b-4b par
 13-22 4c 8d / *Airs Waters Places* par i 10
 9a 14a par 22 17b 18a / *Regimen in Acute
 Diseases* par 9 10 29d 30d APPENDIX par i
 35c d par 3 35d 36a par 5-6 36b 37a par 17
 40d-41a / *Epidemics* bk i SECT I par i 44a b
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 56d 57a par 15 59b / *Surgery* par -o 73d /
Fractures par 31 87a / *Articulations* par iii
 96a b par 58 113a / *Aphorisms* SECT II par
 51 133d SECT III par i 19 134a d SECT V
 par 16-24 138b-c / *Fistulae* par i 150a /
Hemorrhoids par i 152b / *Sacred Disease* 154a
 160d esp 155d 156a 160b d
 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk ii ch 8 9 191b-
 199a c passim bk iii ch 12 208b 209b esp
 208d
 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iii [459-
 614] 36a 38a bk vi [769-8 9] 90c 91b [1090-
 1286] 94d 97a c
 17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IV ch 14 74b d
 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 1
 A1 REP 3 105d 106c Q 72 A 5 ANS 115a 116b
 Q 77 A 3 ANS 147c 148b ■ 85 A 1 ANS 193a
 194b
 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 151b c
 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 330b c 367b 368a
 369d 370a 371c ■ 528c 529b
 28 HARRIS *Motion of the Heart* 296a d / *Corcu-
 lat on of the Blood* 305a d 316c d 321d 322a
 / *On Animal Generation* 386d 387a 407a
 423b 433a c 455d-456a 493a b
 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 52b d
 31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61c
 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk xi [477-548] 309b
 311a
 36 SIFFT *Gulliver* PART IV 155b 157a 161b
 162a

- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 412a-41 a
 37 MONT SOUTHERN *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 106b-110
 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335b-337a 364b-c
 39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 34d 35b
 41 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* On 71a-c
 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 306d 307a
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species*, 9d 10a / *Descent of Man*, 256a 350d 354a passim 356d 357b 358b-c
 50 MARX *Capital*, 115c 118b-124a passim 178a 194b-195b 204a-c 236c 237d 324a 330d
 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 52d BK V 222b BK IX 372a 374d
 53 JAMES *Psychology* 68a b 799a-807a esp 799a 800a, 806a || 815a 892a
 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 4c 3a / *Hygiene* 25a 59d esp 25a 30d, 37d 38d 56b-58c 87a 97b 111 115a esp 114b-115a / *Narcissism* 402d-404a / *General Introduction*, 593b-595b 601b-607b esp 60 b-606a / *Instincts, Symptom and the* 744b-747b esp 746c

6. The life span and the life cycle

6a. The life span of plants and animals and of different species of plants and animals

- 7 PLATO *Timaeus* 475d
 8 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 9 [379^b 3^b 4] 370c-d / *Longevity* 710a 713a-c
 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 14 [615^b 15^b 9] 72b CH 15 [615^b 15^b 11] 74b CH 18 [615^b 15^b 16] 77 CH 22 [615^b 15^b 18] 81b CH 33 [615^b 15^b 16] 84d 85a c 7 CH 4 [615^b 15^b 3] 89b CH 9 [615^b 15^b 2] 90c CH 2 [615^b 15^b 23] 7] 92d 93a CH 17 [615^b 15^b 1] 96d 97a CH 8 [615^b 15^b 16] CH 9 [615^b 15^b 23] 91 90c CH 20 [615^b 15^b 23] 100c CH 2 [615^b 15^b 3] 101 CH 20 [615^b 15^b 4] 102a CH 3 [615^b 15^b 3] 103a CH 24 [615^b 15^b 5] 103c CH 26 [615^b 15^b 5] 103d CH 9 [615^b 15^b 23] 104b-c BK III CH 2 [615^b 15^b 23] 118c CH 9 [615^b 15^b 13] 122a CH 2 CH [615^b 15^b 23] 138d 139a CH 3 [615^b 15^b 23] 147d CH 41 [615^b 15^b 23] 153 b CH 44 [615^b 15^b 31] 155a CH 46 [615^b 15^b 23] 156a / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 2 [615^b 15^b 10] 1] 20 b / *Generation of Animals* BK IV CH 1 319c 370a-c
 L. LACRINIUS *Value of Things* BK V [8 5-8/8] 72 d
 25 MONTAGNE *Essays* 34a
 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXV CT 4 218a b
 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 99b
 50 MARX *Capital* Beyond the Pleasure Principle 652d 655b 657c-d

6b. The human life span

- Old Testament Genesis 5 esp 5^b 5^c 6 3 92b-29 110-32 237 2 257-8 352b-9 4 9 5 26 / Numbers II 35-39 / Deuteronomy

omy 347 / Joshua 24:29-(D) Josue 24:29 / Psalms 90 10-(D) Psalms 89 10

Apocryphal Ecclesiasticus 15:9-10-(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 13 3

5 ECRUPIDES *Sophists* [1080-1113] 267d 268a

6 HE OODOL'S *History* BK I 7b-8a BK III 93d 94b

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 469a 475d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 15 [493^b 15^b 4] 16a / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 10 319c 320a-c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361^b 31 34] 602c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV [693-705] 186a b

25 MONTaigne *Essays* 29c 30 156d 157b 535d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XI [523-548] 310b-311a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 413b-414a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b / *Social Contract* BK III 419c-d

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 33c 34a

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 360b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 324d 325c 327a

50 MARX *Capital* 118b-d 194b-195b passim 229a b 318a b

6c. The biological characteristics of the stages of life

Old Testament Genesis 17 15 19 18:9-15 21 1-8 2 / 1 / Deuteronomy 347 / 1 / Kings

11 4-(D) III Kings 11 4 / Proverbs 29

Apocryphal Ecclesiasticus 14 1 18-(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 14 1-19

New Testament John 1 13

5 Aeschylus *Agamemnon* [1-82] 52d

5 ECRUPIDES *Sophists* [1080-1113] 267d 268a

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 118b

7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 296a-c / *Timaeus* 471d-472a

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK I CH 4 [405^b 18-9] 638c / *Life and Breathing* CH 3 26 724d 726b

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK II CH 1 [600^b 21-30] 23a b CH 2-3 23d 24b BK II 1 [615^b 15^b] CH 12 [615^b 15^b] 42 43d c 18 [615^b 15^b 10] 45b-c CH 9 [615^b 15^b] 20 [615^b 15^b] 46b-c BK I CH 9 [615^b 15^b] 63a b CH 10 [615^b 15^b] 64b BK CH 14 71b-73b CH 19 [615^b 15^b] 78a 79b CH 30 [615^b 15^b] 83b BK CH 3 [615^b 15^b] 82c 88c BK I CH 18-BK I CH 1 97b-114 c

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6 *The life span and the life cycle 6c The biological characteristics of the stages of life*

- 317d CH 8 [776^b15 23] 318d BK V CH I [778^b20-779^b13] 321a d [780 14-9] 3 2b d CH 3 [781^b30-78 19] 324a b CH 3 [783^b2]-CH 8 [780^b21] 325c 331a c passim / *Politics* BK VII CH 16 [1335^a7-34] 540a b / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 1- [1389 2-6] 6.6b CH 13 [1390^a11 16] 637c CH 14 [1390^b9 11] 638a
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Injuries of the Head* par 18 69a b / *Articulations* par 1- 96a b par 29 99c par 41 103c 104b par 52-53 109b 111a par 55 111a c par 60 113b d / *Aphorisms* SECT I par 13-14 131d SECT II par 30 133c par 53 133d SECT III par 3 134a par 18 134d par 24-31 135a b SECT IV par 6 140c par 30 141a par 57 141d SECT VII par 82 144a / *Sacred Disease* 157b 158b
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 8 193a d
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK III [447-458] 35d 36a BK IV [1037-1057] 57d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT I 259b d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. Q 70 A 1 REP 7 893d 895d
- 22 CHAUCER *Retraite Prologue* [3862-3896] 224a b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [6051-6062] 263b 264a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 33b c 156d 158a c 339a d 394a 395b 406c 408b 429d 430a
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT II SC I [1-16] 12d 13a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT I SC II [201-208] 472a b / *Henry V* ACT V SC II [167 174] 565a / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [137 166] 608d 609a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [137 206] 42c d / *King Lear* ACT I SC I [291-312] 247c d ACT II SC IV [148-158] 260a
- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 281a 282c 300b-c / *On Animal Generation* 352c 363d 383c 391a c 449a 454c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VI [527-543] 310b 311a
- 34 NEWTON *Optics* BK I 384b 385b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 127a 128a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 352b 353b
- 38 FOUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 306d 307a 360b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 531-538] 280b
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 11d 12a 219d 225b passim esp 219d 220a 221b 222a 257c 258a 377c 381d passim esp 377d 378c 381c d 511a 525a 562c 563a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 209a c BK VIII 305b 310d passim BK X 391d 394d BK XIII 584c 586c EPILOGUE I 659d 660b 665a d
- 51 JAMES *Psychology* 431b 433a 714a 715b
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis* 15a 16c / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119d 120b / *General Introduction* 572d 576a passim esp 573a b 574a-c 579b 580d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 746c d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 770b

- 7 *The causes and occurrence of death the transition from life to death*
- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK VI [215 224] 245b BK VII [290 327] 280a c
- 7 PLATO *Phaedo* 223c d 225b 246c / *Gorgias* 292d / *Republic* BK V 434c-436a / *Timaeus* 471d 472a
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 13 [435^b4-19] 668c / *Youth Life and Breathing* CH 4 7 715d 726d
- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 4 [480^a20-22] 10b c BK V CH 20 [553 12 16] 79d 80a BK VII CH 12 [588^a7-9] 114c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 7 [653^b1-7] 178d 179a BK III CH 4 [667 32 14] 195c d / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 5 [741^b15 24] 282d
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 2 3 19b 20b par 9 21b = / *Regimen in Acute Diseases* AP 1 EMDX par 9 38b c / *Aphorisms* SECT II p 44 133c SECT VI par 18 140d
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK III [411 829] 35c 40c
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 5 264b BK VI SECT 28 276c
- 17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 6 24a TR IX 34b d
- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 9-11 363c 365c
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 1 REP 4 604c 607b
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 2 A 5 ANS 115a 116b Q 83 A 6 182d 184a Q 83 A 1 ANS 193a 194b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 156d 157b 176c 180b 530a c
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Henry V* ACT II SC III [1 28] 541a b
- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 276d 278a 296a d / *On Animal Generation* 407a b 433a c 493a b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 52d 53a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 12c d
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 4 425b d PROP 39 435b 437a
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368d 369a / *Social Contract* BK III 419c d
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 306d 307a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 351a b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 326b 327a 383d 384c
- 50 MARX *Capital* 122c 124a 194b 195b 228d 229b 318a b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 44b 45b BK IV 180d 183c BK X 406c-410c BK VI 499c 500c BK VII 558a 562d BK XV 624d 625b EPILOGUE I 650d 651a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 149c 150d BK VI VII 170c 177b
- 54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 652b-653a 654c 657d / *Ego and Id* 708d 709a 711d 712a

The concern of the living with life and death

The love of life: the instinct of self preservation; the life inst act

Old T STAME T *Genesis* 3:22 24 / *Job* 2:4 / *Psalms* 21:4 34 12 14 49:6-12 91 6—(D) *Psalms* 20:5 33 13 15 48:7 13 90 16 / *Eccl* 1:2 9:4-6

N & Testament *Matthew* 19 16-30 / *Mark* 1 17 31 / *Luke* 10:25 37 / *John* 12:25 15 13 / *1 Tim* 4:6-7 9 / *1 Peter* 3 10-11

5 EUGENI S *Hippolytus* [189-197] 226c d / *Alexis* 237a 247 = esp [629-746] 242c 243c / *1 Tim* 4:6-7 9 / *1 Tim* 4:6-7 9 / *1 Tim* 4:6-7 9

6 H OODOL *History* BK IX 140d 141a BK VI 191 b BK II 224d 225a BK IX 296c 29 a

6 THECTHO *Platonian* BK VII 5 9b-d

9 ANISTOTLA *Ethics* BK IX CH 9 [1170 13 14] 423d-424b BK X CH 4 [1215 0-2] 429c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [393 3] 637b

12 LA *Phis* *Nature of Things* A III 30 44a-c passim

13 AL *Ethics* *M d* s BK II 8 CT II 258a b 15 T *Crit* *Hicore* K V 301d

18 AL *Ethics* *Co f* *Phis* A IV par 11 21d 22a b vii par 3 57d 58a par 3 60a / *Can f* *God* A XIX c 4 513a

19 AOTI S *Summa Theologica* PARTS Q 5 A 6, 1383c 384c

22 CL *12* A *Priest* T *le* [1292 287] 437b

23 H *111* *Lerula* P RTI 86c 90a PART II 115d 147b-c 155b-c

25 AOTIUS S *Ethics* BK II 32c 384 267b-c 339a d 511d 512

26 SH *Phis* *1st Henry* II CT V BC IV [11 13] 465c

27 S AK *111* *Othello* ACT I SC I [306-369] 212b-d / *Long Lear* CT V C II [34 146] 281b

30 B CO *Advancement f Learning* 51b-c 72c 73a

31 SP *111* *Ethics* T I P 19 11 L *Phis* 25 429a-431

33 P *Cal* *Priest*, 156-157 201b-202a

35 LOCKE *Ca J* *Governments* CH II, CT 6-8 26b-7 CH III s CT 16-8 28d 29b

36 S *111* *G* *111* *111* 124 129a

36 S *111* *111* *111* *111* 238a 239b 459a 460a

37 F *111* *Tom Jones* 250b-d

38 MONTI *111* *111* *111* *111* 2b

38 POES *111* *111* *111* *111* 330d 337b 337c 342d 343 343c

4 K *111* *111* *111* *111* 258b

45 I *111* *111* *111* *111* 127

45b-c 40 111 5 128d 129a

47 GORTIA *111* *111* [602-807] 16b-21 [544 162] 37b-39a P RT II [809-9 26] 216b-221b

48 MEL *111* *111* *111* *111* 144a 344b 345a

49 D *111* *111* *111* *111* 311a b

51 TOLSTO *111* *111* *111* *111* 159d 160a K VI 262d 263a BK X 439b-440a 457a-c

461d-464a BK X 527a b BK XII 549c 551c 558a 562d *111* *111* 665a-d

52 DO *111* *111* *111* *111* BK V 118b 119 BK III 149c 150d

53 J *111* *111* *111* *111* 92a b 198b 208a 209b 700b 709b

54 F *111* *111* *111* *111* 399b / *111* *111* 414d-415b / *111* *111* 591d 592c 607d-608a

615b-616b 623b-c / *111* *111* *111* *111* 651d 662b esp 653a-d, 657c 659a 659d

661c 663c / *111* *111* *111* *111* 708d 712a passim esp 708d 709b 711c 717c / *111* *111* *111* *111* 790a b 791 -d / *111* *111* *111* *111* 846b-c 851c-d

86 The desire for death the death instinct: the problem of suicide

Old Testam *111* *111* *111* *111* 31:4-6—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 31:4-6 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 17:23—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 23 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 10:7-6—(D) / *111* *111* *111* *111* 1:1-6 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 3:13 4 6:8-13 7 13 16 21

10:18-21 4 13 14 16 17 1 17 3 16—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 3:13 22 6:8-13 7 13 16 1

10:18— 14 13 14 16 23 17 3 17 13 16 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 3:16 1:19 21:6 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 4:2 3

6:3-5 7 1 4—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 2:3 6:3-5 7:2-3 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 8:14 18—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 14 18

1:10 8:3 14 18—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 8:3 20 14 18 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 4—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 4

APOTRYM *111* *111* *111* *111* 4:2—(D) *111* *111* *111* *111* 4:1 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 1:12 16 2:23 24—(D)

OT *111* *111* *111* *111* 2:16 2:23 2 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 3:14 3 17 4:23 3—(D) OT

111 *111* *111* *111* 23 18 19 30 1 41 3-5

NEW T *111* *111* *111* *111* 11 16 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 20:24 / *111* *111* *111* *111* 9:6—(D)

111 *111* *111* *111* 9:6

5 SO *111* *111* *111* *111* [1297 1415] 111b-112b / *111* *111* *111* *111* [12 1 248] 125b-c / *111* *111* *111* *111* [126 1353] 141d 142d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [394-365] 146c 150c / *111* *111* *111* *111* [8 4-822] 162c-d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [371 12 3] 177d 181 c / *111* *111* *111* *111* [79-309] 189a b

5 EC *111* *111* *111* *111* [56-76] 209d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [622-633] 375b-d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [252 305] 300c-d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [18-582] 354d 357d / *111* *111* *111* *111* [1 33-1393] 374b-377b

6 H *111* *111* *111* *111* BK I 9d 10a 47c-d BK II 62d-63a K V 160c-d BK I 199c-d BK VII 24d 225a 245d BK IX 303c 304a

7 PLATO *111* *111* *111* *111* 272a 275c / *111* *111* *111* *111* K IX 753b

9 ARI *111* *111* *111* *111* BK V CH II [1138 4 13] 386b-c BK IX CH 4 [166 1 3] 419d

12 LEC *111* *111* *111* *111* *111* [3 -93] 30b-31b

12 EP *111* *111* *111* *111* K I CH 9 114c 116b CH 4 129a-d

- (6) *The life span and the life cycle* 6c *The biological characteristics of the stages of life*
 317d ch 8 [776^b 15 23] 318d bk v ch i [78^b 20-779^b 13] 321a d [780 14-39] 3 2b d ch 3 [781^b 30-78- 19] 324a b ch 3 [793^b 2] ch 8 [789^b 21] 325c 331a passim / *Politics* bk vii ch 16 [1335^b 7 34] 540a b / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 12 [1389 2-6] 636b ch 13 [1390 11-16] 637c ch 14 [1390^b 11] 638a
- 10 HIPPOCRATES *Injuries of the Head* par 18 69a b / *Articulations* par 1- 96a b par 29 99c par 41 103c 104b par 52-53 109b 111a par 55 111a || par 60 113b d / *Aphorisms* sect i par 13 14 131d sect ii par 39 133c par 53 133d sect iii par 3 134a par 18 134d par 24-31 135a b sect vi par 6 140c par 30 141a par 57 141d sect vii par 82 144a / *Sacred Disease* 157b 158b
- 10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* bk ii ch 8 193a d
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iii [445-458] 35d 36a bk iv [1037 1057] 57d
- 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* bk iii sect i 259b d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL. Q 70 A 1 REP 7 893d 895d
- 22 CHAUCER *Reeve's Prologue* [1362-1386] 224a b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [6051-6062] 263b 264a
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 33b c 156d 158a c 339a d 394a 395b 406c-408b 429d-430a
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT II SC I [1-16] 12d 13a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT I SC II [201-208] 472a b / *Henry V* ACT V SC II [167 174] 565a / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [137 166] 608d 609a
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [197 206] 42c d / *King Lear* ACT I SC I [91 312] 247c d ACT II SC IV [148 158] 260a
- 28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 281a 282c 300b c / *On Animal Generation* 352c 363d 383c 391a c 449a 454c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk xi [527-543] 310b 311a
- 34 NEWTON *Optics* bk i 384b 385b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 127a 128a
- 36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 352b 353b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 306d 307a 360b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 531 538] 280b
- 49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 11d 12a 219d 225b passim esp 219d 220a 221b 222a 257c 258a 377c 381d passim esp 377d 378c 381c d 511a 525a 562c 563a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 209a c bk viii 305b 310d passim bk x 391d 394d bk xiii 584c 586c EPILOGUE 659d 660b 665a d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 431b 433a 714a 715b
- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 15a 16c / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119d 120b / *General Introduction* 572d 576a passim esp 573a b 574a c 579b 580d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 746c d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 770b
- 7 The causes and occurrence of death the transition from life to death
- 4 HOMER *Odyssey* bk xi [215 224] 245b bk xiii [290-327] 280a ||
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pilius 55b c / *Poplicola* 80d 86a = / *Corio-*
lanus 192c d / *Pelopidas* 245a d / *Pompey*
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 624d 625b
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 The general issue concerning continuity or hierarchy in nature see ANIMAL 1b-1C 2C
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 The contrast between the powers and activities of living and non-living bodies see NAT 11a
 42 CHANGE 6c 8a-8b 9a-9b 10a-10b and for other discussions of the distinctive powers
 of plant animal and human life see ANIMAL 12(1)-12(4) 1C-1C(2) III MAN 1-1C 42-4C
 SOUL 2C- C(3)
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 operations see ANIMAL 3-3d 4b-4c 52-53 6a- 8b-8c(4)
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 AND IMAGINATION 1 MIND 32-3b SENSE 2b- c
 Other considerations of health and disease see MEDICINE 4 52-5d
 A discussion of the human life cycle see MAN 6c
 Other discussions of man's attitude toward death see HAPPINESS 4b IMMORTALITY 1 and for
 matters relevant to the special problem of the life and death instincts see ANIMAL 1d
 DESIRE 32 HABIT 31
 Another discussion of sleeping and waking see ANIMAL 12(5)
 Another discussion of the relation between the living organism and its environment see
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the
 ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the books cited consult
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 — *Science of Logic* OL CH III CH
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 — *Memories of Madame*
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and Anxiety, 735d 736b / *War and Death*
 761c 766d

8d *The ceremonials of death the rites of*
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 2 33 / *II Samuel* 1 17-27 3 31-36-(D)
II Kings 1 17 27 3 31-36 / *II Chronicles*
 16 13 14-(D) *II Paralipomenon* 16 13 14 /
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 15 1-4 / *Jeremiah* 16 6-(D) *Jeremiah* 16 6
 / *Ezekiel* 7 18 24 16-23-(D) *Ezekiel* 7 18
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 -(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 22 10 13 38 16-22

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 / *Mark* 15 43 16 1 / *Luke* 23 50 41 /
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 157c bk v 160d 161a bk vi 196b c bk vii
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pilius 55b = / *Poplicola* 80d 86a c / *Corio-*
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Chapter 49 LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

In this set of great books the *Organon* of Aristotle, the *Novum Organum* of Bacon, Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* indicate or discuss the nature, scope and divisions of the discipline which has come to be called logic. Though of all the works mentioned the *Organon* is perhaps the most extensive treatment of the subject. Aristotle does not use the word logic to name the science or art of which he seems to be the inventor—certainly the first systematic expounder—in the tradition of western thought.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is indebted to his predecessors for providing him with materials to develop or criticize, to the sophists for the construction of arguments, for the formulation of methods of disputation, and for the discovery of fallacies, to Plato for the theory of classification and definition, for the root notion of the syllogism and a conception of proof or demonstration, for the general outlines of an intellectual method to which Plato gives the name dialectic.

As indicated in the chapter on Dialectic, Aristotle uses Plato's name for the whole method of the mind in the pursuit of truth in order to designate just one part of his method, the part concerned with probability rather than truth. Let us in the Roman and mediaeval tradition, the words logic and dialectic come to be used interchangeably. This is exemplified by the Second Division of the sciences into physical, ethical, and logic or dialectic, and by the mediaeval enumeration of the liberal arts of the trivium as grammar, rhetoric, and logic or dialectic. So used these names designate the whole theory of discussion to be found in Aristotle's *Organon*.

In their opposition to Aristotelian or what they sometimes call scholastic logic, modern

inventors of new methods like Bacon or Descartes, tend to restrict the meaning of logic. For them logic is little more than the doctrine of the syllogism. And thus they judge to be no part of genuinely fruitful method or they hold it to be of use mainly as a critical instrument in disputation rather than discovery. Their identification of logic with dialectic (like their association of both with rhetoric) seems to have an intentionally invidious significance.

But with Kant, who was influenced by the scholasticism of Christian Wolff, logic is generally restored as the name for the whole range of materials in Aristotle's *Organon* of which dialectic again becomes a part. In his own *Introduction to Logic* Kant speaks of Aristotle as the father of Logic. Though logic has not gained much in extent since Aristotle's time, he says, there are two amongst more recent philosophers who have again brought general logic into vogue: Leibnitz and Wolff. Since their day, and certainly since Kant's, as may be seen from the titles listed under Additional Readings, logic prevails as the name for treatises which discuss, in whole or part, the matters treated in Aristotle's *Organon*.

Logic is also used in modern times as the name for an inquiry or study which bears little resemblance to the discipline expounded in Aristotle's *Organon*. What is called modern logic to distinguish it from the traditional Aristotelian or scholastic logic, is purely a science and in no sense an organon, methodology, instrument, or art. It does not restrict itself to stating the laws of thought or formulating the rules of inference. In the words of Josiah Royce it is the science of order, and it is applicable to the order of things as well as the order of thought. So concerned the science of logic is sometimes regarded as having the kind of generality which is traditionally assigned to

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 LOEB *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*
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 OSLER *A Way of Life*
 UNAMULO *Miss*
 D W THOMPSON *On Growth and Form*
 BERGSON *Creative Evolution*
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 UEXKÜLL *Theoretical Biology*
 J S HALDANE and J G PRIESTLEY *Respiration*
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 SCHRODINGER *What Is Life?*

know these things already when they come to a special study and not be inquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it." Here, in Aristotle's view, trains the mind in the ways of science. Its product is a goal as an art is the making of something itself. For this reason, in the medieval period logic comes to be called a "speculative art" or "with grammar and rhetoric, a liberal art."

Even in speculative matters," Aquinas says, "there is something by way of work, e.g., the making of a syllogism, or of a fitting speech, or the work of calculation or measure. Hence what ever habits are ordained to such works of the speculative reason are by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but liberal arts in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such work are called sciences absolutely and no arts."

But then why it may not be a science absolutely merely because it is an instrument of intellectual work, logic, in addition to being an art, may also have some of the characteristics of a science. If it is a science, what is the object of its knowledge?

Aristotle's division of the speculative sciences, which he seems to present as exhaustive, leaves no place for logic. "There are three kinds of theoretical sciences," he writes, "physics, mathematics, theology or metaphysics, as the last came to be called. Each of these sciences, furthermore, seems to have a distinctive subject-matter which is some aspect of reality such as change, or quantity or being. But insofar as logic is concerned with the study of terms, propositions, and syllogisms, it deals with elements common to all sciences."

This suggests that whereas reality is the object of the other sciences, the object of logic as a science is science itself or more generally the whole of discourse. It considers the elements or parts of discourse in a formal manner; that is, it considers them apart from their reference to reality or their real significance as the terms, propositions and syllogisms of particular subject-matters or sciences. Because it separates the forms which discourse in thought takes from the reality or reality it may have, logic is traditionally called a formal science."

Where Aristotle makes his object the elements of discourse (or thought expressed in language) later logicians treat the formal aspect of thought itself. They deal with concepts, judgments, and reasoning instead of with terms, propositions, and syllogisms. This difference results in a definition of logic as the science of thought: the basic formulations of logic are the laws of thought. Thus, for example, Kant says that logic "treats of nothing but the mere forms of thought." Its limits "are defined by the fact that it is a science which has no business to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove all formal rules of thought."

The logical principles of identity, excluded middle, and contradiction, as well as the principles of inference are said to be "laws of thought." James proposes as the most fundamental principle of inference "what he calls the 'axiom of skipped intermediaries,' which states that '*skipped intermediary terms leaves relations the same.*'" That "equal of equals are equal" is a special application of this principle in the sphere of quantities. Because it applies to all subject-matters equally, James regards the principle as "on the whole the broadest and deepest law of man's thought."

In either conception of logic as a formal science, questions arise concerning the relation of logic to other sciences. For Aristotle the question is about logic and metaphysics, because both seem to have an unrestricted scope. If metaphysics considers the being of everything, which is logic, the formal components of discourse about anything, Aristotle says of philosophy in relation to dialectic that both embrace all things, but that "dialectic is merely crucial where philosophy claims to know." The same comparison could apply to metaphysics and logic. Both "embrace all things, but not from the same point of view."

Aristotle also asks whether it belongs to metaphysics as well as to logic to inquire into the truths which are called axioms—especially those which are the first principles of all knowledge or demonstration, not merely the foundations of knowledge, but some limited subject-matter. "Since these truths clearly hold good for all things *qua* being, the science which studies *being qua* being" (i.e., metaphysics) must be concerned with them. It also belongs to

metaphysics as for example by Bertrand Russell in his essay "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy"

But it is mathematics rather than metaphysics with which logic is identified by its modern exponents. Logistic or mathematical logic writes Russell is mathematical in two different senses: it is itself a branch of mathematics and it is the logic which is specially applicable to other more traditional branches of mathematics. Since Boole's *Laws of Thought* which according to Russell initiates the modern development of mathematical logic, logic has become more mathematical and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence he says is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two: in fact the two are one.

ARISTOTLE'S *Organon* stands to the tradition of logic as Euclid's *Elements* stands to the tradition of geometry. In both cases the work of later minds may alter considerably the structure and content of the discipline. In both cases there are modern departures from the earlier tradition. As in the one case we have Descartes' analytical geometry and the various non-Euclidean geometries, so in the other we have Kant's transcendental logic and the various non-Aristotelian logics.

But all these innovations, even when they might be described as anti-Aristotelian rather than simply as non-Aristotelian, bear the marks of their traditional origin. Kant, for example, takes pains every where to indicate the parallelism between the formulations of his transcendental logic and those of Aristotle's logic. Even the various systems of relational and mathematical logic usually attempt to show that the Aristotelian logic of subject and predicate of particular and universal propositions and of syllogisms can be treated as a special case under their own formulations. The proposals of Bacon or Mill with respect to induction and the method of Descartes, though accompanied in each case by a critique of the syllogism, are less radical departures, for they do not apparently reject Aristotle's basic doctrines of predication and proof.

Many of these issues in logical theory are dealt with in other chapters, e.g. in DIALECTIC IN

DUCTION and HYPOTHESIS IN IDEA JUDGMENT and REASONING. Here we are principally concerned with the conception of logic itself, not with the detailed content of the science as much as with its character as an art or science, its relation to other arts and sciences, its major divisions and its leading principles. Though such considerations are more explicitly treated by Kant than by Aristotle, the formative influence of the *Organon* warrants examining it first.

THE PARTS OF LOGIC as Aristotle conceives them seem to be indicated by the subject-matter of the various books which comprise the collection of writings assembled under the title of *Organon*. That title has a bearing on the question whether logic is a science or an art and on its difference from other sciences and arts. The word *organon* has the meaning of instrument or method. That in turn suggests something to be used as rules of art, are used—as directions to be followed to produce a certain result.

Aristotle's own differentiation of the speculative sciences, the practical sciences, and the arts throws light on this view of logic as an art. The end of theoretical knowledge, he writes, is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action. In other words, the theoretical or speculative sciences differ from the practical sciences in that they are knowledge for its own sake, as opposed to knowledge for an ulterior end. According as the ulterior end is the production or making of something as distinct from human action or conduct, art is distinct from the other practical sciences. Making and acting are different. Aristotle says, "the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other, for neither is acting making, nor is making acting." Logic then, if it is an art, will be concerned with the making of something with producing a work or an effect.

The way in which Aristotle himself refers to the *Organon* seems to confirm this view. He regards it as a preparation for work in the theoretic sciences. Due to a want of training in logic, he writes, some men attempt to discuss the criteria of truth in mathematics or physics at the same time that they are considering the subject-matter of these sciences. They should

personal in its result i.e. whether it is knowledge or opinion. The *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* consider the employment of both syllogism and induction. The *Posterior Analytics* treats them in relation to the development and structure of scientific knowledge. The *Topics* discusses them in relation to the dialectical procedures of argument and discovery.

The last book of the *Organon*—which is concerned with exposing the fallacies in sophistical proofs or refutations—serves to protect both scientific and dialectical reasoning from such sophistry. Unlike the philosopher or the dialectician, the sophist does not aim at the truth. Sophistry misuses the weapons of logic—the same weapons used by the scientist or dialectician—to produce a counterfeit of wisdom or, as Aristotle says, “a wisdom which exists only in semblance.” Though the dialectician cannot claim to know he does, nevertheless, deal with opinions critically and respects the canons of logic as much as the philosopher.

The art of logic seems to have three main employers: 1. To this use by the scientist and the dialectician, Aristotle adds its utilization by the orator for the purposes of persuasion. The rhetorician and the dialectician are most closely allied because both deal with probabilities and dialectic is "more concerning which opposite conclusions can be drawn." As in dialectic, there is an action on the one hand and a response on the other so it is in rhetoric. Aristotle says that the end of rhetoric is a rhetorical syllogism, and the end of logic is a rhetorical deduction.

The former suggests that a certain order exists between two of the elements considered and the others. The elements and principles of literature in a sense prior to the study of drama. The art of drama depends on and belongs to the literature that of grammar seems more basic than drama and chemistry. It serves the basis to the use of literary terms and proposals of words, phrases and sentences. It serves the chemistry to be able to make a formulae of literature. The concentration of literature of grammar seems to be closer to the concentration of the study of literature in the writing of the drama to be discussion of literary and dramatic terms, the parts of speech, and the correct - exercises, and the different forms of sentences.

HANT seems to diverge from Aristotle both with regard to the unity of logic and with regard to the nature and relation of its parts. Formal or elementary logic Hant thinks is not the same as an organon of the sciences. He explains in his *Introduction to Logic* that an organon gives instruction as to how some particular branch of knowledge is to be attained.

An organon of the sciences is therefore not a mere logic, since it presupposes the accurate knowledge of the objects and sources of the sciences. Logic on the contrary being the general propaedeutic of every use of the understanding and of the reason, cannot meddle with the sciences and anticipate their matter. Conceding that it may be called an organon so far as it serves, "not for the enlargement, but only for the criticism and correction of our knowledge" Kant insists that logic is not a general art of discovery, nor an organon of truth: it is not an algebra by the help of which hidden truths may be discovered.

Aristotle according to Kant treats the whole of his logic as an organon, dividing it into an analytical and a dialectical part. As Kant sees it, the dialectical part arises from a misuse of the analytical part. This occurs, he says in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when general or elementary logic (i.e., the analytic part) "which is meant to be a mere canon of criticism, is employed as if it were an organon, for the real production of at least the semblance of objective assertions. This general logic," says Kant, "which assumes the semblance of an organon, is called dialectic."

Kan-hsien seems to identify dialectic with what Aristotle calls sophistry. He says of dialectic that "different as are the significations in which the ancients use this name of a science or art, it is easy to gather from its actual employment that what there was nothing but a logic of sophistry. It was a sophistic art of going to one signification, say to one social cause, and then the outward appearance of truth, by utilizing the accepted method which logic always requires." When logic is treated as an organon, it is always an *instrumental* logic, that is, dialectical. For as long as there is nothing with regard to the content of knowledge—any attempt at treating it as an organon in order to extend and enlarge on knowledge—at least in a very loose, old and

metaphysics as well as to logic to inquire into the principles of the syllogism

The principles of identity excluded middle and contradiction belong to both sciences—to the one as the most universal truths about existence to the other as the basic rules of discourse or the laws of thought. This sharing of a common ground does not seem to Aristotle to violate their separateness but Bacon charges him with having corrupted natural philosophy by logic. Of Aristotle's physics he says that it is built of mere logical terms and Bacon adds Aristotle remodelled the same subject in his metaphysics under a more imposing title.

Whereas Aristotle considers the relation of logic to metaphysics Kant considers its relation to psychology. Both logic and psychology are concerned with thinking and knowing. Distinguishing between pure and applied logic Kant says that pure logic has nothing to do with empirical principles and borrows nothing from psychology. Applied logic depends on psychology. In fact says Kant in his *Introduction to Logic* it is a psychology in which we consider what is the usual process in our thought not what is the right one. Applied logic ought not to be called logic at all for logic is the science of the right use of the understanding and the reason generally not subjectively that is not according to empirical (psychological) principles is to how the understanding actually thinks but objectively that is according to *a priori* principles as to how it ought to think.

James also insists upon the distinction between psychology and logic. He even uses Kant's terms in calling logic an *a priori* and psychology an empirical science. What the psychologist calls laws of thought such as the laws of the association of ideas describe the actual flow of thought and connections which depend upon similarity and succession. The laws of logic in contrast state reason's perception of the rational structure of thought itself and the relations which must obtain if thought is to be rational.

RETURNING NOW to the indication of the parts of logic which may be found in the structure of the *Organon* we can see its orders in the books. The first three books—the *Categories*, *On Interpretation* and the *Prior Analytics*—deal with terms propositions and syllogisms with the

classification of terms and their relation to one another with the classification of propositions and their opposition to one another with the analysis of the various types of syllogisms and the formulation of the rules of valid inference. Terms are the elements of propositions terms and propositions are the elements of the syllogism. This seems to determine the order of the first three books.

The first three books as a whole stand in a certain order to the remaining books. Taking the latter as a group their differentiation from what precedes them seems to lie in the fact that they deal with terms propositions and syllogisms not abstracted from all considerations of knowledge and truth about reality but rather with primary emphasis upon the logic of actual knowledge or on the processes of knowing and arguing about what is true or probable. In the traditional development of Aristotelian logic this division between the first three and the remaining books of the *Organon* is sometimes characterized as a distinction between *formal* and *material* logic.

In the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* Aristotle considers the discovery and establishment of either the true or the probable. He distinguishes between induction and syllogism (or reasoning) as modes of learning and arguing. The later division of logic into deductive and inductive—sometimes confused with the distinction between formal and material logic—does not seem to correspond to the difference between the *Prior* and the *Posterior Analytics*. In the *Advancement of Learning* for example Bacon divides the art of judgment which treats of the nature of proof or demonstration into that which concludes by induction and that which concludes by syllogism whereas Aristotle appears to treat induction as that upon which syllogistic demonstration depends for its primary and indemonstrable premises.

The distinction between truth and probability or between knowledge and opinion does not affect the formal character of either induction or syllogism. A syllogism may be scientific (i.e. demonstratively certain) or dialectical (i.e. merely probable) according to the character of its premises. In either case its formal structure remains the same. Similarly the difference between scientific and dialectical induction ap-

personally in its result *i.e.* whether it is knowledge or opinion. The *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* consider the employment of both syllogism and induction. The *Posterior Analytics* treats them in relation to the development and structure of scientific knowledge. The *Topics* discusses them in relation to the dialectical procedures of argument and discovery.

The last book of the *Organon* which is concerned with exposing the fallacies in sophistical proofs or refutations serves to protect both scientific and dialectical reasoning from such sophistry. Unlike the philosopher or the dialectician the sophist does not aim at the truth. Sophistry misuses the weapons of logic—the same weapons used by the scientist or dialectician—to produce a counterfeit of wisdom or, as Aristotle says, a wisdom which exists only in semblance. Though the dialectician cannot claim to know, he does, nevertheless, deal with opinions critically and respects the canons of logic as much as does the philosopher.

The art of logic seems to have three main employments. To its use by the scientist and the dialectician Aristotle adds its utilization by the orator for the purposes of persuasion. The rhetorician and the dialectician are most closely allied because both deal with probabilities and disputable matters concerning which opposite conclusions can be drawn. As in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism on the other so it is in rhetoric. Aristotle says that "the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism and the example a rhetorical induction."

The foregoing suggests that a certain order obtains between two of the three arts traditionally called the *trivium*. The elements and principles of logic are in a sense prior to the rules of rhetoric. The art of rhetoric depends on and uses logic. The third art that of grammar seems to serve both logic and rhetoric. It serves the logician in his task of forming terms and propositions out of words, phrases and sentences. It serves the rhetorician in his effort to make a forceful use of language. This conception of the uses of grammar appears in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in his consideration of style and in the opening books of the *Organon* in his discussion of numerical and equivocal names, the parts of speech, simple and composite expressions and the different types of sentences.

Kant seems to diverge from Aristotle both with regard to the unity of logic and with regard to the nature and relation of its parts. Formal or elementary logic Kant thinks is not the same as an organon of the sciences. He explains in his *Introduction to Logic* that an organon gives instruction as to how some particular branch of knowledge is to be attained. An organon of the sciences is therefore not a mere logic since it presupposes the accurate knowledge of the objects and sources of the sciences. Logic on the contrary being the general propaedeutic of every use of the understanding and of the reason cannot meddle with the sciences and anticipate their matter. Conceding that it may be called an organon so far as it serves not for the enlargement but only for the criticism and correction of our knowledge Kant insists that logic is not a general art of discovery nor an organon of truth. It is not an algebra by the help of which hidden truths may be discovered.

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This general logic says Kant "which assumes the semblance of an organon is called dialectic."

Kant here seems to identify dialectic with what Aristotle calls sophistry. He says of dialectic that "different as are the significations in which the ancients use this name of a science or art it is easy to gather from its actual employment that with them it was nothing but a logic of semblance. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's ignorance nav to one's intentional casuistry the outward appearance of truth by imitating the accurate method which logic always requires. When logic is treated as an organon it is always an illusory logic that is dialectical. For as logic teaches nothing with regard to the contents of knowledge any attempt at using it as an organon in order to extend and enlarge our knowledge at least in appearance can end

in nothing but mere talk by asserting with a certain plausibility anything one likes or if one likes denying it

Yet Kant himself returns Analytic and Dialectic as the major divisions of his own transcendental logic explaining that he employs the title of dialectic not for the misuse of logic but rather to signify that portion of logic which is the critique of dialectical semblance or sophistry. General or ordinary logic takes no account of the content of knowledge and applies to all objects universally because it treats of the form of thought in general. Transcendental logic does not entirely ignore the content of knowledge but only the content of that knowledge which is empirical in origin. If there are transcendental or *a priori* concepts which do not originate from experience then there can be a science which treats of that knowledge which belongs to the pure understanding and by which we may think objects entirely *a priori*.

That is the science Kant calls *transcendental Logic*. It deals he writes with the laws of the understanding and reason in so far only as they refer *a priori* to objects. That part of it which teaches the elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be thought is the transcendental Analytic. The second part of it is the transcendental Dialectic—a critique of the understanding and reason with regard to their hyperphysical employment in order thus to lay bare the false semblance of its groundless pretensions—serving as a protection of the pure understanding against all sophistical illusions.

THE ISSUE between Kant and Aristotle cannot be understood if it is read simply as a dispute about the nature and divisions of logic. Their diverse views of logic must be seen against the larger background of their philosophical differences with regard to the nature of the mind, the nature of reality, the origin of knowledge and the character of its objects. Controversies about logic (and even within logic about this or that theory of judgment or reasoning) usually reflect fundamental issues in psychology and metaphysics. The attack made by some modern logicians for example against the subject predicate logic of Aristotle cannot be separated from their rejection of his doctrine of substance and

accident in physics and metaphysics even as their own relational logic represents a different view of the structure of reality or the constituents of experience.

On the other hand the criticism of Aristotelian logic by Bacon and Descartes seems to be motivated primarily by considerations of method. They do not have a different logic to propose as do Kant and later symbolic or mathematical logicians. Rather for them logic itself—by which they mean Aristotle's logic and particularly his doctrine of the syllogism—appears useless for the purposes of enlarging knowledge, discovering new truths and developing the sciences. Where Kant criticizes Aristotle for regarding logic as an organon or method for acquiring knowledge, Bacon and Descartes complain that logic does not serve that purpose at all and therefore a *novum organum*—not a new logic but a new method—is needed.

The present system of logic is useless for the discovery of the sciences. Bacon writes. It rather assists in confirming and rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar notions than in searching after truth and is therefore more hurtful than useful. The syllogism for example is unequal to the subtlety of nature.

Our only hope is in genuine induction. Induction is the key to an art of discovery and the rules of induction the heart of a fruitful method of inquiry.

The relation of induction to demonstration in Aristotle's logic and the difference between Aristotle's and Bacon's theories of induction are discussed in the chapter on that subject. In Bacon's view the *Novum Organum* departs radically from the old *Organon*. The new can be substituted for the old in its entirety. It may be asked he says whether we talk of perfecting natural philosophy alone according to our method or the other sciences also such as logic, ethics, politics. His answer is that as common logic which regulates matters by syllogisms is applied not only to natural but also to every other science so our inductive method likewise comprehends them all.

Demonstration is opposed not only to induction but to discovery. Accordingly logic conceived as concerned only with the rules of demonstration is opposed to other methods which aim at directing scientific inquiry and research.

The basic contrast is between criticism and construction, or between examining what is offered as knowledge for its validity and developing techniques for adding new knowledge to old. In his *The New Sciences* Galileo says that logic teaches us how to test the conclusiveness of an argument or demonstration already discovered and completed but not to discover correct arguments and demonstrations. It does not, as regards stimulation to discovery, compare with the power of sharp distinction which belongs to geometry.

In the same vein Descartes says of logic that "the syllogisms and the great part of the other teaching serve better in explaining to others those things that one knows than in learning what is new. This made me feel that some other method must be found. The four rules of the method he then states which codify the rules he himself has taken to make discoveries in geometry and physics, seem to him a general procedure for insuring the advancement of all fields of learning.

In his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* in Descartes' method does not omit the intuition of principles and the deduction of conclusions therefrom—the apparent equivalents of induction and demonstration in Aristotle's *Organon*. But he explains why he has omitted all the precepts of the dialecticians even though he is himself concerned with improving our power of deduction, one truth from another. Their style of argument, he says, "contributes nothing at all to the discovery of the truth. It is only possible use is to serve to explain at times more easily to others the truths we have already ascertained hence it should be transferred from Philosophy to Rhetoric."

Furthermore the forms of the traditional syllogism do not seem able to accommodate the connections in mathematical reasoning or the structure of mathematical proof. "Everyone will perceive in mathematical demonstrations," Locke writes, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogisms. Locke identifies logic with the doctrine of the syllogism and, even more explicitly than Descartes, rejects it as an aid to reasoning.

The question whether logic is itself a methodology or includes rules for the discovery as

well as the demonstration of truth is answered in terms of broader and narrower conceptions of the science or art. Those who regard the rules of logic as primarily a canon of criticism, which test the validity of intellectual work, look elsewhere for a method whose rules are productive rather than critical. The question then usually arises whether there is one methodology applicable to all fields of inquiry or as many distinct methods as there are different disciplines or subject matters.

The difference between the traditional Aristotelian and the modern mathematical logic suggests that there may be a plurality of logics. The attempts made by the exponents of each to subsume the other as a special case do not seem to be entirely successful. Though Aristotelian logic appears to give a satisfactory account of the forms of judgment and reasoning in certain types of discourse it cannot in the opinion of symbolic logicians, be applied to mathematics. Mathematics consists of deductions, and yet according to Bertrand Russell "the orthodox accounts of deduction are largely or wholly inapplicable to existing mathematics." Symbolic logic on the other hand may succeed in formulating the relational structure of modern mathematics, but it does not in the opinion of its critics, hold for metaphysics—at least not the sort of metaphysics which treats relation as a category subordinate to substance.

The difference between the kind of thinking that men do in science and in law suggests another type of diversity among logics. The practical or moral judgment seems to involve a special type of predicate. What Aristotle calls the practical syllogism and what Aquinas describes as the process of "determination—quite distinct from deduction—by which positive laws are derived from natural law seem to call for a logic of practical thinking quite distinct from the logic of all the theoretic sciences.

Using the word logic in its broadest sense we must ask whether there is one logic common to all the sciences or a logic which fits mathematics but not physics or metaphysics, a logic appropriate to speculative philosophy but not to experimental or empirical research, a logic peculiar to the nature of the practical or moral sciences such as ethics and politics, or to the work of jurisprudence.

There is evidence in the great books that sciences as different as mathematics and physics or as metaphysics and politics differ in their methods of discovery and demonstration. This may mean that they differ in their logics as well. Yet it also appears to be the case that the principle of contradiction applies in all that fallacious inference is detected by the same criteria in all and to this extent all share a common logic. Where alternative methods have been proposed within a single major field—notably in the case of philosophy—this may reflect different conceptions of philosophy itself rather than alternative routes to the same end.

Because of their relevance to the basic issues about logic (and especially those concerning its scope and unity) the rules of methodology in general and the various methods proposed for particular disciplines are included in this chapter. They are also considered of course in chapters devoted to the special disciplines or subject matters *e.g.* ASTRONOMY HISTORY MATHEMATICS METAPHYSICS PHYSICS THEOLOGY and in the chapters on SCIENCE and PHILOSOPHY. What is distinctive about each of these methods is discussed in those chapters in relation to the type of knowledge or inquiry which seems to require a method of its own.

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 111.

PAGE SETTING. When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J.A. 125 *Psychology* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page; the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PL. T. *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins on the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DATA. One or more of the main designations of a work (such as PARY BK CH 11c7) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad*, BK II [265 33] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES. The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ, a title of books or a number of chapters or verses of the King James version is stated first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT 1. *Genesis* 7-12-(D) 11 *Esther* 7-16.

SYMBOLS. The abbreviation esp. calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*; consult the Preface.

1 Logic & science: its scope and subject matter compared with psychology and metaphysics

7 PL. TO REPUBLIC BK VII 397a 398c / *Sophist* 517a-c / *Phaedrus* 634b-635a

8 ARISTOTLE *Pro Introduction* BK I CH I [2410-1] 39a / *Metaphysics* BK III, CH I [997^b6-1] 514 CH I [997^b6-997^b13] 515b-d BK IV CH I [1004^b13 6] 523d BK 3-5 4b-532d BK CH I [1017^a22 25] 511 d 538a BK XI CH I [1049^a23 6] 58 CH 4-6 589d 592b

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [334^a1 1] 593a CH 2 [335^a31] 597d 598b

12 EMERSON'S *Discourses* BK CH 112b-113d 1 127d 124a

17 PLATO *First Ennead* BK I CH 4 11 c

18 A. V. VAN CLEY *of God*, BK III, CH 4 266d 2^a CH 249c-d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 3 651d 621b

20 ARISTOTLE *Semantic Theoria* PARY BK II Q 3^a 3 337b-35a 11 BK 3 40a-41 Q 94 2 2 271d 223a

21 H. A. L. L. *Logic* BK I, 58a b 7^a d 23 G. L. L. T. *of New Sciences* BK IV 17b-c

20 B. C. *Advancement of Learning* 55b-61d 67 57c 58c 57a-60c

31 D. SCARTON *Rules* BK 3c 3b / *Discourse* PARY 46c d

33 P. SCAL. *Geometrical Demonstrations* 430a 446b esp 445a-446b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XXI 394d 392a 11

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRODUCTION 640 d 406a

39 SMITH *II. alth of Nations* BK V 335d 336a

42 K. T. *Pure Reason* BK 6d 34 37d 59c 210b-c / *Fund. Princ. Metaphysics of Morals* 253a-c 254c-d / *Judgement* 463a 492 d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRODUCTION 182d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 524a 867a 872b-874a 878a 880b 889a b

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4e The logic of practical thinking the methods of ethics politics and jurisprudence

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- 54 ISOPHAN *Clouds* 482a 506d
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- The conception of logic or dialectic as an art, in itself and in relation to other arts see DIALECTIC I 2a(2)-2b LANGUAGE ~ MATHEMATICS 1a RHETORIC 1b
- Other discussions of the laws of thought and the rules of inference see JUDGMENT 7a-7b OPPOSITION 1d(1)-1d() PRINCIPLE 1c, 3a(3) REASONING 2-2c, 4a and for the examination of logical fallacies, see REASONING 3a-3c TRUTH 3d(2)-3d(3)
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- Other statements of the attack on sophistry or logic-chopping see DIALECTIC 6 METAPHYSICS 4a SCIENCE 1b THEOLOGY 5.

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Chapter 50 LOVE

INTRODUCTION

HERE, as in the chapters on God and Man, almost all the great books are represented except those in mathematics and the physical sciences. Even those exceptions do not limit the sphere of love. As the theologian understands it, love is not limited to things divine and human nor to those creatures less than man which have conscious desires. Natural love, Aquinas writes, is not only in all the soul's powers but also in all the parts of the body and universally in all things because as Dionysius says, Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things.

Love is everywhere in the universe—in all things which have their being from the bounty and generosity of God's creative love and which in return obey the law of love in seeking God or in whatever they do to magnify God's glory. Love sometimes even takes the place of other gods in the government of nature. Though he thinks the motions of the world are without direction from the gods, Lucretius opens his poem *On the Nature of Things* with an invocation to Venus: the life gives—without whom nothing comes forth into the bright coasts of life nor waxes glad nor lovely.

Nor is it only the poet who speaks metaphorically of love as the creative force which engenders things and renews them or as the power which draws all things together into a unity of peace preserving nature itself against the disruptive forces of war and hate. The imagery of love appears even in the language of science. The description of magnetic attraction and repulsion borrows some of its fundamental terms from the vocabulary of the passions. Gilbert, for example, refers to "the love of the iron for the load stone."

On the other hand the impulsions of love are often compared with the pull of magnetism. But such metaphors or comparisons are seldom intended to conceal the ambiguity of the word

love when it is used as a term of universal application. Romeo wants Juliet as the filings want the magnet, writes William James, and if no obstacles intervene he moves toward her by as straight a line as they. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built between them, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides—like iron filings separated from the magnet by a card.

THE LOVE BETWEEN man and woman makes all the great poems contemporaneous with each other and with ourselves. There is a sense in which each great love affair is unique—a world in itself incomparable, unconditioned by space and time. That at least is the way it feels to the romantic lovers, but even to the dispassionate observer there seems to be a world of difference between the relationship of Paris and Helen in the *Iliad* and that of Prince Andrew and Natasha in *War and Peace* or Troilus and Cressida, Tom Jones and Sophia, Don Quixote and Dulcinea, Jason and Medea, Aeneas and Dido, Orfeo and Desdemona, Dante and Beatrice, Hippolytus and Phaedra, Faust and Margaret, Henry V and Catherine, Paolo and Francesca, Samson and Delilah, Antony and Cleopatra, Admetus and Alcestis, Orlando and Rosalind, Haemon and Antigone, Odysseus and Penelope, and Adam and Eve.

The analyst can make distinctions here. He can classify these loves as the conjugal and the illicit, the normal and the perverse, the sexual and the idyllic, the infantile and the adult, the romantic and the Christian. He can, in addition, group all these loves together despite their apparent variety and set them apart from still other categories of love: the friendships between human beings without regard to gender, the familial ties—parental, filial, fraternal, the love of a man for himself, for his fellow men, for his

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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In the *Confessions* of Augustine a man who finally resolved the conflict of his loves lets his memory dwell on the torment of their disorder in order to repent each particular sin against the love of God "What was it that I delighted in, he writes, but to love and be beloved? but I kept not the measure of love of mind to mind, friendship's bright boundary but out of the muddy concupiscence of the flesh and the babbings of youth mistis fumed up which beclouded and overcast my heart that I could not discern the clear brightness of love from the fog of lustfulness

Augustine shows us the myriad forms of concupiscence and advance in the lusting of the flesh and of the eyes, and in the self love which is pride of person In no other book except perhaps the Bible are so many loves arrayed against one another Here in the life of one man as tempestuous in passion as he was strong of will his war and peace produce his bondage and his freedom, his anguish and his serenity

In the Bible the history of mankind itself is told in terms of love or rather the multiplicity of loves Every love is here—of God and Mammon perverse and pure the idolatry and vanity of love misplaced every unnatural lust every ecstasy of the spirit every tie of friendship and fraternity and all the hates which love engenders.

These books of poetry and history of meditation, confess on and revelation teach us the facts of love even when they do not go beyond that to definition and doctrine Before we turn to the theory of love as it is expounded by the philosophers and theologians or to the psychological analysis of love we may find it useful to summarize the facts of which any theory must take account And on the level of the facts we also meet the inescapable problems which underlie the theoretical issues formed by conflicting analyses

First and foremost seems to be the fact of the plurality of loves. There are many different kinds of love—different in object different in tendency and expression—and as they occur in the individual life they raise the problem of unity and order Does one love swallow up or subordinate all the others? Can more than one love rule the heart? Is there a hierarchy of

loves which can harmonize all their diversity? These are the questions with which the most comprehensive theories of love find it necessary to begin

Plato's ladder of love in the *Symposium* has different loves for its rungs. Diotima whom Socrates describes as his instructress in the art of love tells him that if a youth begins by loving a visibly beautiful form he will soon of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another and therefore how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same He will then abate his violent love of the one and will pass from being a lover of beautiful forms to the realization that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form Thence he will be led to love the beauty of laws and institutions and after laws and institutions, he will go on to the sciences that he may see their beauty As Diotima summarizes it the true order of love begins with the beauties of earth and mounts upwards from fair forms to fair practices and from fair practices to fair notions until from fair notions [we] arrive at the notion of absolute beauty

Aristotle classifies different kinds of love in his analysis of the types of friendship Since the lovable consists of the good pleasant or useful he writes there are three kinds of friendship equal in number to the things that are lovable for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another Later in the *Ethics* he also considers the relation of self love to all love of others and asks whether a man should love himself most or someone else

Aquinas distinguishes between love in the sphere of the passions and love as an act of will The former he assigns to what he calls the concupiscible faculty of the sensitive appetite the latter to the rational or intellectual appetite The other basic distinction which Aquinas makes is that between love as a natural tendency and as a supernatural habit Natural love is that whereby things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature When love exceeds the inclinations of nature it

country for God. All these other loves are no less than the love between man and woman, the materials of great poetry, even as they are omnipresent in every human life.

The friendship of Achilles and Patroclus dominates the action of the *Iliad* even more perhaps than the passion of Paris for Helen. The love of Hamlet for his father and, in another mood, for his mother overshadows his evanescent tenderness for Ophelia. Prince Hal and Falstaff, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, Pantagruel and Panurge seem to be bound more closely by companionship than any of them is ever tied by Cupid's knot. The love of Cordelia for Lear surpasses, though it does not defeat, the lusts of Goneril and Regan. The vision of Rome effaces the image of Dido from the heart of Aeneas. Brutus lays down his life for Rome as readily as Antony gives up his life for Cleopatra.

Richard III, aware that he wants love's mastery, implies that he cannot love anyone because he is unable to love himself. Why should

I love myself, he asks, for any good that I myself have done unto myself? This element of self-love which, in varying degrees, prompts the actions of Achilles, Odysseus, Oedipus, Macbeth, Faust, and Captain Ahab, finds its prototype in the almost infinite *amour propre* of Lucifer in *Paradise Lost*. This self-love, which in its extreme form the psychoanalyst calls *narcissism*, competes with every other love in human life. Sometimes it qualifies these other loves when, for example, it enters into Pierre Bezukhov's meditations about freeing his serfs and turns his sentiment of brotherly love into a piece of sentimentality which is never confirmed by action.

Yet self-love, like sexual love, can be overcome by the love which is charity toward or compassion for others. True self-love, according to Locke, necessarily leads to love of neighbor, and, in Dante's view of the hierarchy of love, men ascend from loving their neighbors as themselves to loving God. Through the love he bears Virgil and Beatrice for the goodness they represent, Dante mounts to the highest heaven where he is given the Good itself to love.

The panorama of human love is not confined to the great works of poetry or fiction. The same drama, with the same types of plot and

character, the same lines of action, the same complications and catastrophes, appears in the great works of history and biography. The stories of love told by Herodotus, Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon run the same gamut of the passions, the affections, the tender feeling and the sacrificial devotion in the attachments of the great figures of history.

Here the loves of a few men move the lives of many. History itself seems to turn in one direction rather than another with the turning of an emperor's heart. Historic institutions seem to draw their strength from the ardor of a single patriot's zeal and the invincible sacrifices of the martyrs, whether to the cause of church or state seem to perpetuate with love what neither might of arms nor skill of mind could long sustain. History's blackest as well as brightest pages tell of the lengths to which men have gone for their love's sake, and as often as not the story of the inner turbulence lies half untold between the lines which relate the consequences in acts of violence or heroism.

STILL OTHER of the great books deal with love's exhibition of its power. A few of the early dialogues of Plato discuss love and friendship, but more of them dramatically set forth the love his disciples bear Socrates, and Socrates' love of wisdom and the truth. Montaigne can be skeptical and detached in all matters. He can suspend judgment about every thing and moderate every feeling by the balance of its opposite, except in the one case of his friendship with Etienne de la Boetie, where love asserts its claims above dispute and doubt. The princely examples with which Machiavelli documents his manual of worldly success are lovers of riches, fame, and power—that trait of seducers which alienates the affections of men for truth, beauty, and goodness.

The whole of Pascal's meditations, insofar as they are addressed to himself, seems to express one thought: *itself a feeling*. The heart has its reasons, which the reason does not know. We feel it in a thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal Being, and also itself, according as it gives itself to them, and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You have rejected the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you love yourself?

of love and hate toward the same object as a mere vacillation of the mind he does not like Freud develop an elaborate theory of emotional ambivalence which tries to explain why the deepest affections of men are usually mixtures of love and hate

A THIRD FACT which appears in almost every one of the great love stories points to another aspect of love's contrariness. There seems to be no happiness more perfect than that which love confers. But there is also no misery more profound, no depth of despair greater than that into which lovers are plunged when they are bereft, disappointed, unrequited. Can the pleasures of love be had without its pains? Is it better to have loved and suffered than never to have loved at all? Is it wiser not to love than to love not wisely but too well? Is the world well lost for love?

These questions paraphrase the soliloquies of lovers in the great tragedies and comedies of the world. For every praise of love there is in Shakespearean speech or sonnet an answering complaint. All creatures in the world through love exist and lacking love lack all that may persist. But thou blind fool love what does thou make eyes that they behold and see not what they see? The greater castle of the world is lost says Antony to Cleopatra we have kissed away kingdoms and provinces. But in Juliet's words to Romeo "My bounty is as boundless as the sea, my love as deep; the more I give to thee, the more I have for both are infinite."

Love is all opposites—the only reality the great illusion, the giver of life and its consumer, the benign goddess whose benefactions men beseech and—to such as Hippolytus or Dido—the dread Cyprian who wreaks havoc and devastation. She is a divinity to be feared when not propitiated, her potions are poison, her darts are shafts of destruction. Love is itself an object of love and hate. Men fall in love with love and fight against it. *Omnia vincit amor* Virgil writes—love conquers all.

In the dispassionate language of the moralist the question is simply whether love is good or bad, a component of happiness or an obstacle thereto. How the question is answered depends upon the kind of love in question. The love

which consists in the best type of friendship seems indispensable to the happy life and more than that to the fabric of any society, domestic or political.

Such love Aristotle writes is a virtue or implies virtue and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live though he had all other goods. Friendship seems too to hold states together and lawmakers care more for it than for justice. When it is founded on virtue it goes further than justice for it binds men together through benevolence and generosity. When men are friends Aristotle says they have no need of justice.

But Aristotle does not forget that there are other types of friendship based on utility or pleasure-seeking rather than upon the mutual admiration of virtuous men. Here as in the case of other passions the love may be good or bad. It is virtuous only when it is moderated by reason and restrained from violating the true order of goods in conformity to which man's various loves should themselves be ordered.

When the love in question is the passion of the sexual instinct some moralists think that temperance is an inadequate restraint. Neither reason nor law is adequate to the task of subduing—or as Freud would say of domesticating—the beast. To the question Socrates asks whether life is harder towards the end, the old man Cephalus replies in the words of Sophocles when he was asked how love suits with age: "I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master."

In the most passionate diatribe against love's passion Lucretius condemns the sensual pleasures which are so embittered with pain. Venus should be entirely shunned for once her darts have wounded men the sore gains strength and festers by feeding and day by day the madness grows and the misery becomes heavier. This is the one thing whereof the more and more we have the more does our heart burn with the cursed desire. When the gathering desire is sated the old frenzy is back upon them nor can they discover what device may conquer their disease in such deep doubt they waste beneath their secret wound. These ills are found in love that is true and fully prosperous but when love is crossed and hopeless

nor can they discover what device may conquer their disease in such deep doubt they waste beneath their secret wound. These ills are found in love that is true and fully prosperous but when love is crossed and hopeless

does so by some habitual form superadded to the natural power and this habit of love is the virtue of charity

Freud's theory places the origin of love in the sexual instincts and so for him the many varieties of love are simply the forms which love takes as the libido fixes upon various objects. The nucleus of what we mean by love he writes naturally consists in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. We do not separate from this he goes on to say on the one hand self love and on the other love for parents and children friendship and love for humanity in general and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. All these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities. They differ from sexual love only because they are diverted from its aim or are prevented from reaching it though they always preserve enough of their original nature to keep their identity recognizable. Sexual love undergoes these transformations according as it is repressed or sublimated infantile or adult in its pattern degraded to the level of brutal sexuality or humanized by inhibitions and mixed with tenderness.

All of these classifications and distinctions belong to the theory of human love. But the fact of love's diversity extends the theory of love to other creatures and to God. In the tradition of biology from Aristotle to Darwin the mating of animals and the care of their young is thought to exhibit an emotion of love which is either sharply contrasted with or regarded as the root of human love. Darwin for example maintains it is certain that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other which is not felt by non social adult animals.

At the opposite pole the theologians identify God with love and see in God's love for Himself and for His creatures the principle not only of creation and of providence and salvation but also the measure of all other loves by which created things and men especially turn toward or away from God. Beloved let us love one another. St. John writes for love is of God and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God for God is love. In this was manifested the love of God toward us because that God

sent his only begotten Son into the world that we might live through him. Herein is love not that we loved God but that he loved us. And we have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God and God in him.

In the moral universe of the *Divine Comedy* heaven is the realm of love pure light. Beatrice says light intellectual full of love love of true good full of joy joy which transcends every sweetness. There courtesy prevails among the blessed and charity alone of the theological virtues remains. The beatitude of those who see God dispenses with faith and hope but the vision of God is inseparable from the fruition of love. The Good which is the object of the will Dante writes is all collected in it and outside of it that is defective which is perfect there. Desire and will are revolved like a wheel which is moved evenly by the Love which moves the sun and the other stars. Hell is made by the absence of God's love—the punishment of those who on earth loved other things more than God.

THERE IS A second fact about love to which poetry and history bear testimony. Love frequently turns into its opposite hate. Sometimes there is love and hate of the same object sometimes love inspires hate as it occasions jealousy of the things which threaten it. Anger and fear too follow in the wake of love. Love seems to be the primal passion generating all the others according to the oppositions of pleasure and pain and by relations of cause and effect. Yet not all the analysts of love as a passion seem to agree upon this point or at least they do not give the fact the same weight in their theories.

Hobbes for example gives primacy to fear and Spinoza to desire joy and sorrow. Spinoza defines love as joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause and he defines hatred similarly in terms of sorrow. Nevertheless Spinoza like Aquinas and Freud deals more extensively with love and hate than with any of the other passions. He like them observes how their fundamental opposition runs through the whole emotional life of man. But he does not like Aquinas regard love as the root of all the other passions. Treating the combination

living well may grow and the other which leads us to evil may decrease until our whole life be perfectly healed and transmuted into good. Only a better love a love that is wholly virtuous and right has the power requisite to overcome love's errors. With this perfect love goes only one rule Augustinus says *Dilege et quod iussit* — love and do what you will.

This perfect love which alone deserves to be a law unto itself is more than fallen human nature can come by without God's grace. It is according to Christian theology the supernatural virtue of charity whereby men participate in God's love of Himself and His creatures—loving God with their whole heart and soul and mind and their neighbors as themselves. On these two precepts of charity according to the teaching of Christ depends the whole law and the prophets.

The questions which Aquinas considers in his treatise on charity indicate that the theological resolution of the conflict between love and morality is in essence the resolution of a conflict between diverse loves a resolution accomplished by the perfection of love itself. Concerning the objects and order of charity he asks, for example whether we should love charity out of charity whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity

whether a man ought to love his body out of charity whether we ought to love sinners out of charity whether charity requires that we should love our enemies whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbors whether out of charity man is bound to love God more than himself whether out of charity man ought to love himself more than his neighbor whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body

whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another whether we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us whether a man ought out of charity to love his children more than his father whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother whether a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited

chologist the moralist the theologian. The ancient languages have three distinct words for the main types of love *eros philia agape* in Greek *amor amicitia* (or *dilectio*) and *caritas* in Latin. Because English has no such distinct words it seems necessary to use such phrases as sexual love love of friendship and love of charity in order to indicate plainly that love is common in all three and to distinguish the three meanings. Yet we must observe what Augustinus points out namely that the Scriptures make no distinction between *amor dilectio* and *caritas* and that in the Bible *amor* is used in a good connection.

The problem of the kinds of love seems further to be complicated by the need to differentiate and relate love and desire. Some writers use the words love and desire interchangeably as does Lucretius who in speaking of the pleasures of Venus says that Cupid [i.e. desire] is the Latin name of love. Some like Spinoza use the word desire as the more general word and love to name a special mode of desire. Still others use love as the more general word and desire to signify an aspect of love. Love Aquinas writes is naturally the first act of the will and appetite for which reason all the other appetitive movements presuppose love as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything except as a good that is loved.

One thing seems to be clear namely that both love and desire belong to the appetitive faculty—to the sphere of the emotions and the will rather than to the sphere of perception and knowledge. When a distinction is made between desire and love as two states of appetite it seems to be based on their difference in tendency. As indicated in the chapter of DESIRE the tendency of desire is acquisitive. The object of desire is a good to be possessed and the drive of desire continues until with possession it is satisfied. Love equated with desire does not differ from any other hunger.

But there seems to be another tendency which impels one not to possess the object loved but to benefit it. The lover wishes it well being of the beloved and reflexively wishes himself well through being united with the object of his love. Where desire devoid of love is selfish in the sense of one's seeking goods or

THE DOMINANT of love seems to be both the law, fact and the basic problem for the psy-

there are ills which you might detect with closed eyes ills without number so that it is better to be on the watch beforehand even as I have taught you and to beware that you are not entrapped For to avoid being drawn into the meshes of love is not so hard a task as when caught amid the toils to issue out and break through the strong bonds of Venus

In the doctrines of most moralists however the sexual passion calls for no special treatment different from other appetites and passions Because it is more complex in its manifestations perhaps and more imperious in its urges more effort on the part of reason may be required to regulate it to direct or restrain it Yet no special principles of virtue or duty apply to sexual love Even the religious vow of chastity is matched by the vow of poverty The love of money is as serious a deflection from loving God as the lust of the flesh

WHAT IS COMMON to all these matters is discussed in the chapters on DUTY, EMOTION, VIRTUE and SIN But here one more fact remains to be considered—the last fact about love which the poets and the historians seem to lay before the moralists and theologians

When greed violates the precepts of justice or gluttony those of temperance the vice or sin appears to have no redeeming features These are weaknesses of character incompatible with heroic stature But many of the great heroes of literature are otherwise noble men or women who have for love's sake deserted their duty or transgressed the rules of God and man acknowledging their claims and yet choosing to risk the condemnation of society even to the point of banishment or to put their immortal souls in peril The fact seems to be that only love retains some honor when it defies morality not that moralists excuse the illicit act but that in the opinion of mankind as evidenced by its poetry at least love has some privileged status Its waywardness and even its madness are extenuated

The poets suggest the reason for this Unlike the other passions which man shares with the animals characteristically human love is a thing of the spirit as well as the body A man is piggish when he is a glutton a jackal when he is craven but when his emotional excess in

the sphere of love lifts him to acts of devotion and sacrifice he is incomparably human That is why the great lovers as the poets depict them seem admirable in spite of their transgressions They almost seem to be justified—poetically at least if not morally—in acting as if love exempted them from ordinary laws as if their love could be a law unto itself Who shall give a lover any law? Arcite asks in Chaucer's *Knight's Tale* Love is a greater law he says than man has ever given to earthly man

To a psychologist like Freud the conflict between the erotic impulses and morality is the central conflict in the psychic life of the individual and between the individual and society There seems to be no happy resolution unless each is somehow accommodated to the other At one extreme of repression the claims of our civilization according to Freud make life too hard for the greater part of humanity and so further the aversion to reality and the origin of neuroses the individual suffers neurotic disorders which result from the failure of the repressed energies to find outlets acceptable to the moral censor At the other extreme of expression the erotic instinct would break all bounds and the laboriously erected structure of civilization would be swept away Integration would seem to be achieved in the individual personality and society would seem to prosper only when sexuality is transformed into those types of love which reinforce laws and duties with emotional loyalty to moral ideals and invest ideal objects with their energies creating the highest goods of civilization

To the theologian the conflict between love and morality remains insoluble—not in principle but in practice—until love itself upplants all other rules of conduct The good man according to Augustine is not he who knows what is good but who loves it Is it not then obvious he goes on to say that we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever we love? For there is also a love wherewith we love that which we ought not to love and this love is hated by him who loves that wherewith he loves what ought to be loved For it is quite possible for both to exist in one man And this co-existence is good for a man to the end that this love which conduces to our

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pleasures for oneself without any regard for the good of the other be it thing or person love seeks to give rather than to get or to get only as the result of giving Whereas nothing short of physical possession satisfies desire love can be satisfied in the contemplation of its object's beauty or goodness It has more affinity with knowledge than with action though it goes beyond knowledge in its wish to act for the good of the beloved as well as in its wish to be loved in return

Those who distinguish love and desire in such terms usually repeat the distinction in differentiating kinds of love The difference between sexual love and the love which is pure friendship for example is said to rest on the predominance of selfish desires in the one and the predominance of altruistic motives in the other Sexual love is sometimes called the love of desire to signify that it is a love born of desire whereas in friendship love is thought to precede desire and to determine its wishes

In contrast to the love of desire the love of friendship makes few demands In true friendship wherein I am perfect Montaigne declares I more give myself to my friend than I endeavor to attract him to me I am not only better pleased in doing him service than if he conferred a benefit upon me but moreover had rather he should do himself good than me and he most obliges me when he does so and if absence be either more pleasant or convenient for him it is also more acceptable to me than his presence

These two loves appear in most of the great analyses of love though under different names concupiscent love and fraternal love the friendship based on pleasure or utility and the friendship based on virtue animal and human love sexuality and tenderness Sometimes they

are assigned to different faculties the love of desire to the sensitive appetite or the sphere of instinct and emotion the love of friendship to the will or faculty of intellectual desire capable of what Spinoza calls the *amor intellectualis Dei*—the intellectual love of God Sometimes the two kinds of love are thought able to exist in complete separation from one another as well as in varying degrees of mixture as in romantic and conjugal love and sometimes the erotic or sexual component is thought to be present to some degree in all love Though he asserts this Freud does not hold the converse that sexuality is always accompanied by the tenderness which characterizes human love The opposite positions here seem to be correlated with opposed views of the relation of man to other animals or with opposed theories of human nature especially in regard to the relation of instinct and reason the senses and the intellect the emotions and the will

As suggested above romantic love is usually conceived as involving both possessive and altruistic motives the latter magnified by what its critics regard as an exaggerated idealization of the beloved The theological virtue of charity on the other hand is purely a love of friendship its purity made perfect by its supernatural foundation One of the great issues here is whether the romantic is compatible with the Christian conception of love whether the adoration accorded a beloved human being does not amount to deification—as much a violation of the precepts of charity as the pride of unbounded self love Which view is taken affects the conception of conjugal love and the relation of love in courtship to love in marriage These matters and in general the forms of love in the domestic community are discussed in the chapter on FAMILY

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1a Conceptions of love and hate as passions and as acts of will

1b Love and hate in relation to each other and in relation to pleasure and pain

1c The distinction between love and desire the generous and acquisitive aims

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) II *Esdra*s 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

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1a Conceptions of love and hate as passions and as acts of will

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 23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 61c 63a
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67 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
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68 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
69 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
70 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
71 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
72 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
73 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
74 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
75 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
76 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
77 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
78 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
79 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
80 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
81 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 198d
c act ii 176a 181d
82 SENECA *Letters* bk i *Text Antiquarius* 170a 19

(1 *The nature of love*)1/ *The power of hate*

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4 1-9 37 / *II Samuel* 13 15-39-(D) *II Kings* 13 15 39 / *Ezra* 3 2-5 5 9-14 / *Proverbs* 10 1

NEW TESTAMENT *I John* 2 9-11 3 12-15 4 1-10
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* 212a 224a esp [465 66-] 216a 217c

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 34a b BK III 100b 101b BK VII 258d 259a

7 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 403c 404a

8 PLATO *Apology* 205c d / *Phaedo* 237b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VII CH 7 [1328 1-16] 532b / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 4 [1381 1-16] 628a

10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 29 A 3 746b 747a

11 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH V 8c CH XIX 26a 30a

12 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART II 141a b

13 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT I SC III 73d 74b ACT III SC II [146-195] 87d 88a ACT V SC VI [61-93] 103d 104a / *Richard III* 105a 148a esp ACT I SC I 105b d 107b ACT V SC III [119-206] 144d 145d / *Merchant of Venice* ACT IV SC I [35-62] 425d-426a

14 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* 205a 243a c esp ACT II SC I [1 81] 213b 214b [295-321] 216c / *Coriolanus* ACT IV SC V [70-152] 380b 381a / *Timon of Athens* 393a 420d esp ACT IV SC I 409c d SC III 410c 416d / *Cymbeline* ACT III SC V [70-150] 469d-470c

15 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [91-105] 95a b / *Samson Agonistes* [819-842] 357b 358a

16 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 30a 37a 124d 237b c

17 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 119a 121a 134b 136a

18 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312b d [fn 27]

19 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* ■ IV 183d 186c 188a 190c

20 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 137c 142c BK VII 393a 394a

21 JAMES *Psychology* 717a 720b

22 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 328a b / *Group Psychology* 677c 678a / *War and Death* 764d 765d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787a 788d 790a 791d esp 791b-c

2 *The kinds of love*

3 PLATO *Symposium* 153b 155c 165b-167d / *Lysis* BK VIII 735c 736c

4 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V 100c 106b / *Sixth Ennead* TR IX CH ■ 359b ■

5 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 380c 381c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 661c 662a

6 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A 1-2 REP 3 121b 122a Q 60 AA 1-3 310b 312b Q 82 A 5 REP I 435c-436c PART I-II Q 26 733d 737a esp AA 3-4 735c 737a Q 7 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 28 AA 1-2 740b-742a

7 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 66

A 6 REP 2 80c 81b PART II Q 23 A 1 ANS 482d 483d A 4 ANS 485d-486b

8 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [8 139] 79b d

9 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK II STANZA 128 38a

10 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 63a

11 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 83a 85a 399a II 424d 425c

12 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 381c 382a

13 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XIX XX 449a

14 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-617] 243a 245b BK IX [990-1189] 269a 273a

15 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 522a 525a

16 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 14c d 167c 169c 198d 199a

17 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d 346b 348d

18 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 289c 290b 303c 305c 309a

19 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 50a BK VI 269c d BK VII 276c 277a BK XI 520a 521b

20 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 27c d

21 FREUD *Group Psychology* 673b d 681c 682a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783b c

2a *Lustful sexual or selfish love concupiscent love*

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 39 6-2b / *Exodus* 20 14 17 / *Leviticus* 18 / *Numbers* 25 1-9 / *II Samuel* 11 13 14-(D) *II Kings* 11 13 14 / *Proverbs* 5 1 20 6 20-35 7 23 26-35 / *Ecclesiastes* 7 26-(D) *Ecclesiastes* 7 27 / *Ezekiel* 23-(D) *Ezekiel* 23

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 11 21-23 12 11 20 16 7-9-(D) OT *Judith* 11 19-21 12 10-20 16 8 11 / *Ecclesiasticus* 9 3-9 25 21 47 19 20-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 9 3-13 25 28 47 1 22 / *Susanna*-(D) OT *Daniel* 13

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 27-3 / *Romans* 6 12-13 7 14 25 13 13 14 / *I Corinthians* 6 9-7 11 / *Colossians* 3 5 / *I Thessalonians* 4 4-5 / *Hebrews* 13 4 / *James* 1 13 16 / *I Peter* 2 11 / *I John* 2 15-17

4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK VIII [266-366] 224d 225d

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* 1a 14a c esp [776-835] 11a d [980-1073] 13b 14a c / *Agamemnon* [681-781] 59b 60b / *Choephoroe* [582-621] 75d 76b [892-930] 78d 79b

6 EURIPIDES *Electra* [938-1122] 336a 337b

7 HERODOTUS *History* BK IX 311b 312d

8 PLATO *Charmides* 2b c / *Phaedrus* 117a 122a / *Symposium* 153b 155c / *Republic* BK III 326c 327b 333b 334b BK IX 417b-418a / *Timaeus* 474b-d 476b-d / *Lysis* BK VIII 735b 738c

9 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 22 [68 25-27] 89d 90a / *Topics* BK VI CH 7 [146 3-13] 199d BK VII CH I [152 6-9] 207c

- 9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* bk vi ch 18
b 15 v 197b-c
- 12 LUCAS *The Nature of Things* bk i 1037
2 157d 58d [119-1208] 59d 60a bk v
106-107 73c
- 13 ACHILLES *Amend* bk i 165-56 121a 123b
- 15 T CIRCUS *Amend* bk iv 64b-c bk xi 103b-c
107b-108c bk xii 137b-c
- 17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* tr v ch 2 100c
102a
- 18 AUGUSTIN *City of God* bk i par 25 26 7a-c
bk i par 1-8 9a 10d bk iii par 1-5 13b-14b
bk iv par 2 19d bk v par 15-26 40d-43a /
City of God bk xii ch 8 346d 347b bk xiv
ch 16-18 390a 391 ch 26 395d 396c bk
xv ch 22 23 416a-418c / *Christus Doctrina*
bk i ch 1 661-662 ch 18-21 664d 666b
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART I Q 95
2 ANS and REP 3 517d 519a PART II QQ
26-5 733d 744d
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* PART II Q 105
a 433c-434c Q 46, a 3 604d 605a-c P RT III
Q 65 A 2 5 879c-881d
- 21 D VIZ *De me Corred* i 111, v 7a-8b xi
[6-90] 18a PER TOAY vi [67-84] 65a
xvi [157-159] 79d xiv [1-60] 81c-82a xxv
[109]-xxvi [143] 92 94c *Uranian* vi 11
116d 120a esp 11 [10] 101d 119d
- 22 CHALCANT *Tro usend Crada* bk i 157 124
17a 219 77a-83a / *V. Her T le* 212b-223b /
Rene 225a 232a / *Sq n s Tale* [10 813
943] 34 a 349a / *Physician s Tale* 356a 371a /
Waverley s T le [17 085-103] 490a / *Parson s*
T le par 19 507b-508b par 7-4-86 535b-544a
- 23 H B L *Let athian* v 1 63a
- 24 R EL H *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk ii
106a 107c bk 164d 166a 183d 193c
- 25 V VIZ 10 2 *Essay* 6a b 36c-40a 83d-83a
297d 299c 398c 399c 406a-434d
6 51c 2 *Tu Andron cus* 170a 198d
esp 11 176a 181d
- 27 S HIZ 15 *Hamlet* act 2 c 5 [40-9]
37b-d ct 1 civ [40-96] 55a-c / *Tro i s nd*
Cressida 103a 141a-c esp 11 ac 1 6 791
126b-c s [3-63] 130a-c ct v ac 1 134c-
14c / *Waverley* 174a 204d esp act
11 ac 1 [23] 25 181a b c [12 197] 183d
184 / *Othello* ct 1, ac 1 [306-343] 212b-
213a / *King Lear* act v s 1 [109 135]
374c-d ct ac 1 277d 278d / *Pericles*
ct 1, b 1001 11 421b-423c act 1 c
-vi 441a-443b / *Somerset* cxx 1 606a
- 31 S IVORA *Elites* P T III PRO 35 406d
407b TH AFFECTS DEF 45 421b-d PART IV
APP VOIZ, XIX 849a
- 32 ALFRED *Practical Law* bk [443 45] 185a
bk i [500-643] 243a 246a bk ix [900-
1 33] 269a 272a esp [1004 096] 269a 271a /
Somerset Apo des 13 3-4 9] 347b-348b [766-
842] 356b-358a
- 33 P AL *Penide* 4 2 403 241 451 461 253b-
255a

- 36 ST RNE *Tristram Shandy* 513a 516a 521a b
525a 526a 554b-5 6a
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 9b-c 58b-59b 130b-c
138b-d 289b-90b 321b-322a 352d 353a
- 38 MONTY ORIEL *Spirit of Laws* bk xiv 103c
104a bk xvi 118a b 119a b 119d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *I equ Lys* 345d 346b 348d
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 92c-d 649d-650c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 301c-d
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III, par 162
58b-d
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* II RT I [1605 677] 63b-65a
- 49 D RAY *Descent of Man* 371c 372c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 15b-16a bk
ii 76a b 86b-87b bk iii 111a 118d esp
113d 115a 122b-c bk iv 201a-c 204a 206c
passim bk vii 318a 341a bk xi 476c-480a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii
20a b 39a-40a bk iii 46a 87a-c esp 53c 54b
- 53 FREUD *Il Lf Psycho-Analysis* 128d 129a /
Lacanian 399a-411a-c esp 404d-406c, 409b-
410d / *Instincts* 418c-471a-c esp 420b-c /
General Introduction, 569c 585a esp 569d
570a, 574c-d 580a 581b 615b-618a esp
616d-618a / *Group Psychol* gy 573b-674a
681c-683d 693a-695b / *On the History and Its
Discontents* 782a b.d [in i] 783c 784a 785a
esp 785a b [in i] / *New Introductory Lectures*
854a 863d esp 862b-863c
- 2a(1) The sexual instinct: its relation to other
instincts
- 7 PLATO *Symposium* i 7b-159b 165b-c /
Timaeus 476c-d / *Levi* bk i 685a-c k
7 712b
- 9 ARI TOTLE *History of Animals* bk v ch 8
[542 1-4] 68d-69a bk vi c 118-bk vii ch
2 97b-103c passim esp bk vi ch 8 97b-99c
bk vii c 1 106b-d 108a / *Generatio f*
Anim li bk iv ch 1 [644 7] 305c / *Rhetoric*
bk ii ch 7 [385a 23] 631d
- 11 LACR TUS *Nature of Things* bk iv [1037-
1057] 57d
- 22 CH TCEB *His of Bath* Prologue [569-
574] 258a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 414d-416c 424d-425b
- 28 HARVEY *On the Generation*, 346a-347d
349a 350a 402a-d 400c-406a 476c-477a
- 36 STERN *Tristram Shandy* 555a 556a
- 38 ROE 2 AL *Ineq ality* 345d 346d
- 49 D RAY *Descent of Man*, 287d
- 53 JAMES *Psychol gy* 734b-735b
- 54 FREUD *Lacanian*, 401a-402c / *Instincts*
414d-418c esp 414d-415d / *General I ntroduc*
tion, 574 576a esp 574a 574a-d 587d 588b
590a 593b 613b-618b 618d-619a / *Beyond*
the Pleasure Principle 651d-662b esp 633b-d
654c-d 657c-659a 662b-d [in i] / *Ego a d*
It 708d 709c 710c 712a / *Civilization and*
Its Discontents 789c 790c / *New Introductory*
Lectures 846a 851d esp 847b-d 849c-850c
851b-c

(2a) Lustful sexual or selfish love concupiscent love)

2a(2) Infantile sexuality polymorphous perversity

- 54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 15a 18a esp 15d 16c / *Hysteria* 113d 114b / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119d 120b / *General Introduction* 530d 531d 572d 576d 578b 585a esp 578c 580d / *Group Psychology* 693a b / *New Introductory Lectures* 847c 848d 855d 861c

2a(3) Object fixations identifications and transferences sublimation

- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* bk iv [1058-107] 57d 58a
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 66b d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 10b 11b 191c 192d 398c 399d
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [123-195] 87c-88a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 13-17 400c 402a PART IV PROP 6 426a PROP 44 SCHOL 437d-438a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d 346a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 734b 735b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 16b 20d esp 17b c 19a c 20a d / *Narcissism* 399a-411a c esp 399d-400b 404d 406c 409d-410d / *Instincts* 414b / *General Introduction* 551a 589c passim esp 574c d 581b c 583c d 587d 588a 589a b 594d 597b 599d 600d 616d 622c 627b-630d 634b d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 644d 645d / *Group Psychology* 678d 681a 681b d [in 4] 685c 686a 691c 692a 693a 694b / *Ego and Id* 703c 706c esp 704d 705c 711b c 712b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 832b 834b esp 832d 833b 847a 849b 856a 863d esp 856b d 862d 863c

2a(4) The perversion degradation or pathology of love infantile and adult love

- OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 19 4 13 38 6-10 / *Exodus* 22 19 / *Leviticus* 18 20 13 16 / *Deuteronomy* 27 21 / *Judges* 19 22-30
NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 1 24-7
7 PLATO *Symposium* 170b 171c / *Laus* bk i 645d 646a bk viii 735d 736a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk vii cii 5 399a d passim
13 VIRGIL *Eclogues* vi [45-60] 20a b / *Aeneid* bk vi [23-30] 211b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk iii par 1 13b c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL vi-xvi 21a 23d PURGATORY xvi [25-87] 93b d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 36c-40a 84b-85a 225a 427b-d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Pericles* 421a-448a c esp ACT I PROLOGUE SC I 421b-423c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 349b-c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 44 SCHOL 437d-438a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* bk ii [629-870] 125a 130a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 163b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spiru of Laus* bk vii 87c-88a bk vii 117d bk xvi 219d 221c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 93d 94c 169a

42 KANT *Science of Right* 419b [in 1]

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [ii 676-843] 284a 288a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk i 24a 25a bk iv 177c d bk vi 271c d bk vii 292b-296a bk viii 305b-307d 322c bk ix 355c-d 357a b 357d 358b bk xi 520a d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* bk i 4a d bk ii 39a-40a bk iii 46a 82a c esp 53c 54b 58d 59b 69d 70c bk iv 95b-100c bk viii 200c 201c bk x 282b 283c bk xi 324a b bk xii 366a 368c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 735a b 802b 804a 805b

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 14b 15a 16d 17a 18a b / *Hysteria* 84a 86c 90d 96a 97d 106c esp 97d 99d 111a 118a c esp 111b 115a / *Narcissism* 409c 410d / *Instincts* 415d-418c / *General Introduction* 547b 549d esp 548d 549a 569c 573a 577a 578c 583d 591d 593d 599b 604c 606a 611a d 619b 622b esp 620d 622a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659b d / *Group Psychology* 680c-d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 718b d 724a 728b esp 725d 726c 728a b 733c 735a / *Curious and its Discontents* 789d 790c / *New Introductory Lectures* 847c 850c 859c d 861c-862a

2b Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love

- OLD TESTAMENT *Leviticus* 19 17 18 33 34 / *Deuteronomy* 10 18-19 / *I Samuel* 18 1 4 19 1-7 20 23 15-18-(D) / *I Kings* 18 1 4 19 1-7 20 3 15 18 / *II Samuel* 1-(D) / *II Kings* 1 / *Psalms* 133-(D) / *Psalms* 132 / *Proverbs* 17 17 18 18 19 24 27 6
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 13 17 7 18 19 9 10 25 1 27 16 21 29 10 15 37 1-6 40 23 24-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 13 1 7 20-21 9 14 15 25 1-27 17 24 -9 13 19 37 1 2 6 40 23 24
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 21-26 19 19 22 39 / *Mark* 12 31 / *Luke* 10 27 / *John* 15 13 / *Romans* 13 9 / *Galatians* 5 14 / *Colossians* 4 7 18 / *I Thessalonians* 4 9-10 / *II Timothy* 4 9-22 / *James* 2 8 / *I Peter* 3 5 / *II Peter* 1 5 7 / *I John* 3 11 17
4 HOMER *Iliad* bk iv [153-183] 25c d bk vi [212-236] 42b c bk vii 112a 121d bk viii 130a 136d bk ix [276-368] 139d 140c bk xiii [1 261] 161a 163d / *Odyssey* bk viii [581-586] 228c
5 SOPHOCLES *Ajax* [666-683] 148d 149a

- 5 ELIENORIS *Iphigenia Among the Taur* 578-6 61416a b [674 715] 416d-417b
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Protagoras* 52b / *Phaedrus*, 1 4a 129d esp 128d 129c / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Lysis* bk viii 735c 738c
- 9 A ISOTHEL *Ethics* bk viii ix 406b-d 426a c / *Rhetoric* bk i 114 4 626c 628b
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* k 1 1122 167d 170a
- 13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* bk ix [165-449] 283b 291a
- 14 PLUTARCH *Alcibiades* 156c 158b / *Pelopidas* 233b-d
- 18 A GUSTINE *Confessions* bk iv par 7 14 20d 23a bk vi par 11 26 38b-43a passim / *City of God* bk xix c 17-8 515 516a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* bk ii ii q 23 33 482c 558d passim
- 21 DANTS *Dumme Comedy* well, 11 20-4a xv 21a 22c *PLAATON* x ii [1]-xv [31] 71d 76a xvii [8a 139] 79b-d xxi [1]-xxii [129] 83a-87d xxx xxxi 99b-107b
- 22 CHURCH *Augustine's Tale* 174 211a esp [109a 118b] 178a 179b [154 162] 186a b
- 23 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b-88d 396a 398c passim 46d-448c 472a-473b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE 3 d *Henry 5* act v sc vi [61-93] 103d 104a / *Richard II* act ii sc iii [46-49] 333a b / *Merchant of Venice* act i sc i [119-60] 407c-408a act iii sc ii [-330] 422b-423b / *As You Like It* act ii sc vii [1 300] 609a b act iv sc iii [1 0-133] 620c-d
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ct 1, c 110 [62-63] 35a ctm, sc ii [50-95] 49c-d [1 06-22,] 51b [350-359] 82d 33a / *Troilus and Cressida* act iii, c 1 [110-111] 116d / *Othello* ctm, c 1 [12 41] 223c / *Antony and Cleopatra* act v c 1 [13 45] 345b-c / *Coriolanus* act iv sc iv [12 23] 379b / *Timon of Athens* act 2, c 1 [91 107] 398a b / *Henry VIII* act ii, sc 2 [15-131] 559b-c / *Somerset* bk vi 580a-604a
- 29 CECIL *Don Quixote* part ii, 428b-c
- 31 SPINOSA *Ethics* pt iv prop 13, schol 479a-d prop 27-40 431c-437a, prop 3 466c 44
- 35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* bk ii, ch 12 ct 5 1 6d 17a
- 42 RANT *Fred. Phil. Metaphysics of 3 vols*, 159a 251a-d / *Practical Physics*, 251a-b / *Phil. Metaphysics Elements* / *Ethics*, 155a-36b
- 44 BOWWELL *John*, 20c 36a
- 45 HILTON *Philosophy of the Affections*, 153b *Philosophy of the Affections*, 153b
- 48 A LITTLE *Man's Own* 37b-38a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk 1, 12b 22c 31a 49a, 1 11a 11c 11d 11e 11f 11g 11h 11i 11j 11k 11l 11m 11n 11o 11p 11q 11r 11s 11t 11u 11v 11w 11x 11y 11z 11aa 11ab 11ac 11ad 11ae 11af 11ag 11ah 11ai 11aj 11ak 11al 11am 11an 11ao 11ap 11aq 11ar 11as 11at 11au 11av 11aw 11ax 11ay 11az 11ba 11bb 11bc 11bd 11be 11bf 11bg 11bh 11bi 11bj 11bk 11bl 11bm 11bn 11bo 11bp 11bq 11br 11bs 11bt 11bu 11bv 11bw 11bx 11by 11bz 11ca 11cb 11cc 11cd 11ce 11cf 11cg 11ch 11ci 11cj 11ck 11cl 11cm 11cn 11co 11cp 11cq 11cr 11cs 11ct 11cu 11cv 11cw 11cx 11cy 11cz 11da 11db 11dc 11dd 11de 11df 11dg 11dh 11di 11dj 11dk 11dl 11dm 11dn 11do 11dp 11dq 11dr 11ds 11dt 11du 11dv 11dw 11dx 11dy 11dz 11ea 11eb 11ec 11ed 11ee 11ef 11eg 11eh 11ei 11ej 11ek 11el 11em 11en 11eo 11ep 11eq 11er 11es 11et 11eu 11ev 11ew 11ex 11ey 11ez 11fa 11fb 11fc 11fd 11fe 11ff 11fg 11fh 11fi 11fj 11fk 11fl 11fm 11fn 11fo 11fp 11fq 11fr 11fs 11ft 11fu 11fv 11fw 11fx 11fy 11fz 11ga 11gb 11gc 11gd 11ge 11gf 11gg 11gh 11gi 11gj 11gk 11gl 11gm 11gn 11go 11gp 11gq 11gr 11gs 11gt 11gu 11gv 11gw 11gx 11gy 11gz 11ha 11hb 11hc 11hd 11he 11hf 11hg 11hh 11hi 11hj 11hk 11hl 11hm 11hn 11ho 11hp 11hq 11hr 11hs 11ht 11hu 11hv 11hw 11hx 11hy 11hz 11ia 11ib 11ic 11id 11ie 11if 11ig 11ih 11ii 11ij 11ik 11il 11im 11in 11io 11ip 11iq 11ir 11is 11it 11iu 11iv 11iw 11ix 11iy 11iz 11ja 11jb 11jc 11jd 11je 11jf 11jg 11jh 11ji 11jj 11jk 11jl 11jm 11jn 11jo 11jp 11jq 11jr 11js 11jt 11ju 11jv 11jw 11jx 11jy 11jz 11ka 11kb 11kc 11kd 11ke 11kf 11kg 11kh 11ki 11kj 11kk 11kl 11km 11kn 11ko 11kp 11kq 11kr 11ks 11kt 11ku 11kv 11kw 11kx 11ky 11kz 11la 11lb 11lc 11ld 11le 11lf 11lg 11lh 11li 11lj 11lk 11ll 11lm 11ln 11lo 11lp 11lq 11lr 11ls 11lt 11lu 11lv 11lw 11lx 11ly 11lz 11ma 11mb 11mc 11md 11me 11mf 11mg 11mh 11mi 11mj 11mk 11ml 11mm 11mn 11mo 11mp 11mq 11mr 11ms 11mt 11mu 11mv 11mw 11mx 11my 11mz 11na 11nb 11nc 11nd 11ne 11nf 11ng 11nh 11ni 11nj 11nk 11nl 11nm 11nn 11no 11np 11nq 11nr 11ns 11nt 11nu 11nv 11nw 11nx 11ny 11nz 11oa 11ob 11oc 11od 11oe 11of 11og 11oh 11oi 11oj 11ok 11ol 11om 11on 11oo 11op 11oq 11or 11os 11ot 11ou 11ov 11ow 11ox 11oy 11oz 11pa 11pb 11pc 11pd 11pe 11pf 11pg 11ph 11pi 11pj 11pk 11pl 11pm 11pn 11po 11pp 11pq 11pr 11ps 11pt 11pu 11pv 11pw 11px 11py 11pz 11qa 11qb 11qc 11qd 11qe 11qf 11qg 11qh 11qi 11qj 11qk 11ql 11qm 11qn 11qo 11qp 11qq 11qr 11qs 11qt 11qu 11qv 11qw 11qx 11qy 11qz 11ra 11rb 11rc 11rd 11re 11rf 11rg 11rh 11ri 11rj 11rk 11rl 11rm 11rn 11ro 11rp 11rq 11rr 11rs 11rt 11ru 11rv 11rw 11rx 11ry 11rz 11sa 11sb 11sc 11sd 11se 11sf 11sg 11sh 11si 11sj 11sk 11sl 11sm 11sn 11so 11sp 11sq 11sr 11ss 11st 11su 11sv 11sw 11sx 11sy 11sz 11ta 11tb 11tc 11td 11te 11tf 11tg 11th 11ti 11tj 11tk 11tl 11tm 11tn 11to 11tp 11tq 11tr 11ts 11tt 11tu 11tv 11tw 11tx 11ty 11tz 11ua 11ub 11uc 11ud 11ue 11uf 11ug 11uh 11ui 11uj 11uk 11ul 11um 11un 11uo 11up 11uq 11ur 11us 11ut 11uu 11uv 11uw 11ux 11uy 11uz 11va 11vb 11vc 11vd 11ve 11vf 11vg 11vh 11vi 11vj 11vk 11vl 11vm 11vn 11vo 11vp 11vq 11vr 11vs 11vt 11vu 11vv 11vw 11vx 11vy 11vz 11wa 11wb 11wc 11wd 11we 11wf 11wg 11wh 11wi 11wj 11wk 11wl 11wm 11wn 11wo 11wp 11wq 11wr 11ws 11wt 11wu 11wv 11ww 11wx 11wy 11wz 11xa 11xb 11xc 11xd 11xe 11xf 11xg 11xh 11xi 11xj 11xk 11xl 11xm 11xn 11xo 11xp 11xq 11xr 11xs 11xt 11xu 11xv 11xw 11xx 11xy 11xz 11ya 11yb 11yc 11yd 11ye 11yf 11yg 11yh 11yi 11yj 11yk 11yl 11ym 11yn 11yo 11yp 11yq 11yr 11ys 11yt 11yu 11yv 11yw 11yx 11yy 11yz 11za 11zb 11zc 11zd 11ze 11zf 11zg 11zh 11zi 11zj 11zk 11zl 11zm 11zn 11zo 11zp 11zq 11zr 11zs 11zt 11zu 11zv 11zw 11zx 11zy 11zz

- 597a 598a 600d bk xv 617b 618a 625c 626d 631c 633a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karama* bk vii 180a 189a bk x 281b 297d *epilogue* 408a 412d
- 54 FARUD *Group Psychology* 673b-c 681d 682b 693b 694b / *Civilis atio* and *its Discontents* 783a =
- 28(1) The relation between love and friendship
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Ajax* [666-683] 148d 149a
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Phaedrus* 115 118c / *Lysis* bk vii 736 -c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* bk ii ch 22 [68 25 7] 89d 90a
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk iv ch 6 [1126²⁰-25] 373d bk vi ch 2-3 407a-408c ch 5 [1157²⁰-28-37] 409c-d ch 8 413b-d bk ix ch 4-5 419a-420c passim ch 10 [171 11 5] 4 4d 425a ch 12 425d-426a c / *Politics* bk vii ch 7 [1337⁴⁰-3 8 11] 532a b
- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* bk ii ch 22 167d 1 0a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* bk iv par 7 14 20d 23a
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* part 1 q 0 a 2 REP 3 121b-122a q 60 a 3 ans 311d 312b part 1-41 q 26 a 4 736b-737a q 27 a 3 738c 739c q 28 a 1 740b-741 a 2 ans 741 742a a 3, ans and REP 2 3 742a d a 4 742d 743c q 29 a 3 REP 2 746b-747a
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologiae* part 1 q 65 a 5, ans 74c 15a q 66 a 6 RE 2 80c 81b part ii-ii q 9 a 6 469a d q 23 a 1 482d 483d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b-88d esp 83d-85a 410a-413a 472b-473b
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 291d 292a
- 42 RANT *Prof. Meta. Physical Elements of Ethics* 3 5d 3 6b
- 44 BOWWELL *John*, 257b 392b-c
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* bk viii 339d 341a-c bk ix, 373c 374a bk xii 555a-c bk xi 617b-d
- 54 FARUD *Group Psychology* 693d-694b / *Confessions* and *its Discontents* 783b-c
- 28(2) Self-love in relation to the love of others
- OLD TESTAMENT *Leviticus* 19:19 33 34
- NOOTHEM *Exhortation* 1457-1458 OT
- Exhortation 1457
- 10 I TAMENT *Matthew* 5:35 19 9 21:39 / *Mark* 12:31 / *Luke* 6:27 35 10:27 / *Romans* 13:9 / *Galatians* 5:22 / *James* 2:3
- 11 *Exhortation* *Leviticus* [1 4-5] 1112c 243c
- 2 PLATO *Lysis* bk vi 736
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* bk vii, ch - [1157²⁰-29-31] 411a 412a ch 12 [11 15-33] 41 a-b bk ix, ch 4 419a-420c ch 5 421d-424b esp ch 9 [1157²⁰-29-31] 422d-423b ch 12 [1171 33 1172] 425d / *Politics* bk ii, ch 5 [1257²⁰-29-31] 425d-426a

(2b) *Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love* 2b(2) *Self love in relation to the love of others*

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c BK II CH 17 158d 161a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV PAR 7-14 20d 23a BK X PAR 58-64 86a 87d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 18 397a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 27 629b-631d CH 35 634c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A 1 REP 3 120a 121b A 2 REP 1 121b 122a 60 AA 3-5 311d 314c Q 63 A 2 326c 327b PART II Q 7 A 3 738c 739c 28 A 1 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 3 742a d A 4 ANS and REP 3-2 742d 743c Q 29 A 3 REP 2 746b 747a A 4 747a c Q 3 AA 5-6 762a 763c 40 A 7 797a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 62 A 4 ANS and REP 3 62b 63a Q 66 A 6 REP 2-3 80c 81b Q 73 A 1 REP 3 119c 120c Q 77 A 4 148b 149a Q 84 A 2 175b 176a PART II-II Q 23 A 1 482d 483d Q 25 AA 4-5 503c 504c A 7 506a d A 1 509c 510b Q 26 AA 3 13 511d 520d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [82-139] 79b d

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 83c PART II 104d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 486b 489b

26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC VI [80-84] 104a / *Richard III* ACT V SC III [177-206] 145c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* ACT I SC V [97-104] 5b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 46 438c d PROP 48-49 439a b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 100 191a 192b 455-457 253b 254a 471-477 256a 257a 492 259b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 5 26a b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 70b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 58d 59a 167c 170a esp 169d 170a 291d 292a 305d 330b-c 354c d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331b 343d 345c

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a d 268d 270a / *Practical Reason* 297a 314d esp 298a 300a 304d 307d 321b 327d esp 325a 327d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376b c

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 70 212a

43 MILL *Representative Government* 367d 368a / *Utilitarianism* 451b-c 453a-c

44 BOSWELL Johnson 169d 170b 310d 311a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 101 133b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308d 309a 310a d 316d 317a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 31a-32a BK II 146d 147c 159d 160a BK VI 251b-c 267d 268c BK VIII 323b 324b BK IX 354a 355c BK XII 545b-547a BK XV 617b d EPILOGUE I 651d 652a 656d 657a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b-211a

54 FREUD *Narcissism* 399a-411a c esp 404d 406c 409b-411a e / *General Introduction* 528d 616c 618a esp 617c-618a / *Group Psychology* 677d 678c / *War and Death* 758c d

2b(3) The types of friendship friendships based on utility pleasure or virtue

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 14:20 17:17 18

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* II 1-17 9:10 12:8-9 37:1-9 40:24-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 6:1 17 9:14-15 12:8-9 37:1-11 40:24

5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [319-478] 206a 207b / *Heracles* Mad [55-59] 365c d [1214 1228] 375c / *Orestes* [375-806] 397b-402c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [334-401] 427d-428b

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c

7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Gorgias* 285d 286b / *Republic* BK I 299b c / *Seventh Letter* 805b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 2-8 407a-411d CH 13-14 414d-416d BK IV CH 1 416b d-417c passim CH 5 [1167^a10-0] 420b c CH 9 [1167^b22-1170^a12] 423b d CH 10 424c-425a passim esp [1170^b3-31] 424c CH 11 425a d esp [1171^a20-33] 425a b CH 12 [117 2-8] 425d-426a BK V CH 3 [1173^b32 1174 1] 428a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361^b35 40] 602c BK II CH 4 [1380^b34-1381^b38] 626d 627d CH 12 [1389 35-3] 636d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 22 161d 170a BK III CH 16 191a d BK IV CH 2 223d 224b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II PAR 16-17 12c 13a BK IV PAR 12-14 22a 3a PAR 21 23 24c 25a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 4 A 1 ANS 636a-c Q 26 A 4 REP 3 736b-737a Q 27 A 3 738c 739c 31 A 1 REP 3 756d 757c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 23 A 1 REP 3 482d-483d A 3 REP 1 485a d A 5 ANS and REP 3 485b-487a

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* PAR 20-21 409a b

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24a b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 77b-c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b 88d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT II SC VI 239a 241c ACT I SC I 245b-246b / *Richard II* ACT V SC I [55-0] 345d / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT III SC II [192 219] 364d 365a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC V 501b-502c / *Julius Caesar* ACT IV SC II [10-2] 587d / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [174-190] 609a b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [57-99] 49c 50a [206-25] 51b [360-389] 52d 53a / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC III [110-111] 116d / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT I SC II 397a-400a ACT IV SC I 409c-d SC III [464-543] 415d-416d

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- 30 B co *Advancement of Learning* 84a ■ 89a
 31 Sm oz *Ethics* PART IV PROP 0-71 445c
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 36 S Wt G *Water* PA T IV 165b-166a
 37 Field G *Tom Jo* ■ 167c 170a esp 169d
 170 364d 365
 40 CIBOT *Decl ne and Fall* 92a-c
 42 YAT *Fund Prin Meta hysc of Morals*
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 44 Boswell *Johnson* 193a 423c d 533b
 45 Tolstoy *War nd Peace* AK I 28c 29d K
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 23(4) P the os of lo e and friendship to the
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 21 9-21 22 I 19 24 25-21 34 esp 25-28 27
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 d 21-8 / Judg 11 30-40 / Ruth 1 3 18 /
 I Sam 11 1-8 18 31-(D) / As 9 11-8
 18-7 / I Samuel 13 1 20 34 18 33-(D)
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 T his passim esp 4 1-5 / Eccles i 12 25 I
 4 23-(D) OT Eccles II 25 I 2 4 23
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 5 19 29 / 11a 4 3 31 35 13 21 / Luke 6 19-
 2 12 51-53 14 26 15 12 3 18 29-30
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 515 159c 160d v XVII (1-9-804) 172d 179d
 / Odyssey AK I 188a 192d AK XI 145b-540
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 361 370a d
 5 Aeneid Seven Against Tb bes [956-1078]
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 170 181a c
 5 El mides *Mides* 212 224 c esp [9 6-1270]
 220b-222d / *Alex is* 237a 247a c esp [614
 740] 242 243c / S ppla I 258a 269 c esp
 [970-1113] 267a 268a / *Trojan Women* [740-
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 ache* [309-42] 318a-d / *Elektr* [698-112]
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Heraclis Mad [562-584] 369d 370a [632
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 I *hprus ae tulus* 425 -439d
 611 *Agostola History* AK I 7a b 8a 10
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 9 d 96c 100b-101b 114d 115 118a AK IV

- 143b-144b AK VI 194d 195b 212c 213a AK
 IX 311b-312d
 6 Thucydides *Peloponnesia War* AK II
 398c d
 7 Plato *Republic* AK I 296d 297a AK V
 360d 365d
 9 Ari totle *Generation of Animals* AK III
 c 12 [727 715] 294 b / *Li ces* AK VII CH 4
 [1157-26-4] 398d AK VIII CH I [1155 16-21]
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 453d-455 c AK II CH 3 4 456c-458a
 12 Lu a tics *Nat re of Things* AK V [1011
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 12 Epictetus *Discourses* K I CI 23 128c-d
 13 Virgil *Elog ci* IV (60-64) 15b / *Aeneid*
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 14 Plu act *Lycargu Numa* 62d 63c / *Solon*
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 634 / *Agri* 654c-655 / *Demetrius* 727a b
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 15 Tacitus *An li* BV I 10c d AK XI 107b-
 108c AK XII 115a c 118d 119b 128a 131b
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 AK I 22d d
 18 A USTI E *Confes ii* / AK III par 19-21
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 66a 71b / *Cary f God* AK XIX CH 14 520a d
 19 Aquila *Summa Theol gica* PART Q 60 A
 4 ANS 312c 313b Q 96 A 3 REP 2 512a II
 20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 26
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 21 Dante *Du ne Com d* W LL XXX I [1-
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 22 Ch uc R II fe of II th s Prologue [593
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 23 M cu vella *Prince* CH XII 24b-c
 23 Hon es *Le zathan* PART I 155b
 24 Rabel i *Carga tua d Panagru l* AK
 8c d AK I 81a 83b AK I 144b-c 196b-d
 AK IV 243b-244d 248d 250
 25 M *etastase* *Ess* 31 56c 67a 83a 84b 181
 192d esp 184a d 358b 362a 409d-434d esp
 410a-422b 472a-473a
 26 S I KE a *Li Henry I* ACT IV SC V VII
 23d 6a / *3 d Henry I* ACT I SC V [5 113]
 82b-d / *Rocha d II* ACT I SC III [1 41] 322d
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 T II SC I [34 309] 577a-c

(2b) *Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love 2b(2) Self love in relation to the love of others*)

- 12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c BK II CH 17 158d 161a
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV PAR 7 14 20d 23a BK X PAR 58-64 86a 87d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 28 397a II / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22-27 629b 631d CH 35 634c d
- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A 1 REP 3 120a 121b A 2 REP 1 121b 122a Q 60 AA 3-5 311d 314c Q 63 A 2 326c 327b PART II Q 7 A 3 738c 739c Q 28 A 1 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 3 742a d A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 742d 743c Q 29 A 3 REP 2 746b 747a A 4 747a c Q 32 AA 5-6 762a 763c Q 40 A 7 797a-c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 62 A 4 ANS and REP 3 62b 63a Q 66 A 6 REP 2 3 80c 81b Q 73 A 1 REP 3 129c 120c Q 77 A 4 148b 149a Q 84 A 2 175b 176a PART II-II Q 23 A 1 482d-483d Q 25 AA 4-5 503c 504c A 7 506a d A 12 509c 510b Q 26 AA 3-13 511d 520d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [82-139] 79b d
- 22 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART I 83c PART II 104d
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 486b 489b
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC VI [80-84] 104a / *Richard III* ACT V SC III [177-206] 145c d
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* ACT 1 SC V [97-104] 5b
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 46 438c d PROP 48-49 439a b
- 33 PASCAL *Pensées* 100 191a 192b 455-457 253b 254a 471-477 256a 257a 492 259b
- 35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 5 26a b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 70b
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 58d 59a 167c 170a esp 169d 170a 291d 292a 305d 330b c 354c d
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331b 343d 345c
- 42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a d 268d 270a / *Practical Reason* 297a 314d esp 298a 300a 304d 307d 321b 327d esp 325a 327d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376b-c
- 43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 70 212a
- 43 MILL *Representative Government* 367d 368a / *Utilitarianism* 451b c 453a c
- 44 BOSWELL Johnson 169d 170b 310d 311a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 101 133b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308d 309a 310a d 316d 317a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 31a 32a BK III 146d 147c 159d 160a BK VI 254b c 267d 268c BK VIII 323b 324b BK IX 354a 355c BK XII 545b-547a BK XV 617b d EPILOGUE I 651d 652a 656d 657a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b 211a

54 FREUD *Narcissism* 399a-411a c esp 404d 406c 409b-411a = / *General Introduction* 528d 616c 618a esp 617c 618a / *Group Psychology* 677d 678c / *War and Death* 758c d

2b(3) The types of friendship / friendships based on utility, pleasure or virtue

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 14.20 17 17 18

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 17 9 10 12.8-9 37 1-9 40-4- (D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 17 9 14-15 12 8-9 37 1-11 40-24

5 CURPIDES *Rhesus* [319-478] 206a 207b / *Heracles Mad* [55-59] 365c d [1214 1228] 375c / *Orestes* [356-806] 397b-402c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [334-401] 427d-428b

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c

7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Gorgias* 285d 286b / *Republic* BK I 299b = / *Seventh Letter* 805b c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 2-3 407a-411d CH 13-14 414d-416d BK IX CH I 416b d 417c passim CH 5 [1167 10-20] 420b c CH 9 [1169-22-1170-12] 423b d CH 10 424c-425a passim esp [1170-23-31] 424c CH 11 425a d esp [1171-20-33] 425a b CH 12 [117 2-8] 425d-426a BK X CH 3 [1173-32 1174 1] 428a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361-33 40] 602c BK II CH 4 [1380-34-1381-35] 626d 627d CH II [1389 35-3] 636d

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [57-99] 49c 50a [206-25] 51b [360-389] 52d 53a / *Trout and Cressida* ACT II SC III [110-111] 116d / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT I SC II 397a 400a ACT IV SC I 409c-d SC III [464-543] 415d-416d

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- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC III [5-51] 34c d [84-136] 35b d ACT IV SC V [115-216] 60d 62a / *King Lear* 244a 283a c / *Coriolanus* ACT I SC III 355b 356b ACT II SC I [110-220] 362a 363b ACT V SC III 387a 389b
- 30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 84b c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [720-775] 168a 169a / *Samson Agonistes* [1476-1507] 371b 372b
- 36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 165b 166a
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 17d 19a c 22d 25a 44b d 65b e 126c 127c 235b 238d 304a c 405a c
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVI 117c BK XIV 140a e
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326c d 327c d 350b 364d 365b / *Political Economy* 368b c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
- 40 GIBSON *Decline and Fall* 92d 93a
- 42 HANT *Science of Right* 419a-420b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 57a 57d 58a 90c 305b 424d 425a 510b c
- 46 HEBEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 158 58a ADDITIONS 110 134d 112 135a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d PART I 211d 212c PART III 288c 289b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3620-3775] 88b 92a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 387a 388b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 2c 3a 7d 8d 13a 14b 25a 31a 37d-47b 55c 59a BK III 119a 131c BK IV 165a 168d 179b 180d 183d 184b 192b 193d BK V 203a d 210b 211a BK VI 247a 248a 251a b 252d 254c 270b 274a c BK VII 276b 277a 290b 291a BK VIII 305b 310d 314c 316a 326b 329c BK IX 357a b BK X 406c-410c 412d 414b 416c 417b BK XI 485a-486d BK XII 553c d BK XV 614a 618b EPILOGUE I 650d 674a c
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK IV 90b 92b 100c 109a c BK V 117c 121d 137a c BK VI 148d 150d BK X 285a 297d EPILOGUE 408a 412d
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 189a 190a 717b 735b 736b
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- 2c *Romantic chivalric, and courtly love the idealization and supremacy of the beloved*
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 15c d 18b
- 12 LUCRETIVS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141-1191] 59a d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL II 2c-4a v 7a 8b PURGATORY II [106-133] 55c d XIV [91 126] 74c 75a XXIV [49-63] 90a b XXX XXXI 99b 102b
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* 1a 155a / *Knight's Tale* 174a 211a esp [109-1186] 178a 179b [1574-1627] 186a b / *Tale of the Wife of Bath* 270a 277a esp [6832-6846] 276b 277a / *Franklin's Tale* [11 099-125] 352b [11 754 766b] 363a / *Sir Thopas* 396a-400a
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 106a b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b 88d esp 84b 85d 307a 416d-419b 426c 431c
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* 199a 228a = esp ACT I SC I [151-181] 204a b ACT II SC I [115 326] 209b 211c / *Two Gentlemen of Verona* 229a 253a = esp ACT II SC IV [1 6-177] 237c 238a ACT III SC I [169-187] 242b SC II [66-98] 245a b / *Love's Labour's Lost* 254a 284d esp ACT IV SC III 268b 272c ACT V SC II [762-888] 283a 284b / *Romeo and Juliet* 283a 319a c esp ACT II SC II 294b 296b / *Midsummer Night's Dream* 353a 375d esp ACT I SC I [128 179] 353d 354b / *Much Ado About Nothing* 503a 531a = esp ACT III SC I-II 514b 516d / *Henry V* ACT V SC II [98-306] 564b 566a / *As You Like It* 597a 626a,c esp ACT II SC IV [2 -56] 605c d ACT III SC V 615c 617a ACT IV SC I [93 103] 617d 618a ACT V SC II [3 -45] 622b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* 1a 28d esp ACT I SC I [1 15] 1a b / *Hamlet* ACT I SC III 34b 35d [5-51] 34c d [84-136] 35b d / *Troilus and Criseida* 103a 141a = esp ACT III SC II 120b 122c, ACT IV SC IV 128b 129d ACT V SC II 134c 137a / *All's Well That Ends Well* 142a 173d esp ACT I SC I [88 244] 143b-144c / *Othello* ACT I SC III [158-169] 210c d / *Cymbeline* ACT I SC IV [36-185] 453a-454b / *Tempest* ACT III SC I 537b 538b / *Sonnets* CXXV CXXVI 606a b
- 29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 3a b 32c 34d 43d 45a 80b 89c 94a 98a PART II 317a 331a
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 33 36 406c 407c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [172 340] 156a 159b
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 14b 16b 55d 68d 69a 72a 73a = 76c 77b 84a c 108c 111c 124d 199b 200a 400a-402d
- 38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXVIII 244a-c
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 107a 291a 409c
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 323b-c
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 56 A. R. S. *Splendid Ma dens* 1a 14a c /
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 5 A. ST. L. *Lysistrata* 583 599 c esp
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 6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 139a b BK VI
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 2b c 14b 16b 17a b 30a 32a 118d 124a 125b 130b c 167c 168d 230a 231c 283b = 289b 291a 321b 322a 332a 333a 349b 350b 352d 353a 360b d 405a c
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364d 365b
- 40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c 93a 649c 652a
- 42 KANT *Science of Right* 419a-420b
- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 22a 57a 64a 107a 160b 194a 291a 294d 295a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 158 58a par 161 168 58b 60c ADDITIONS 101 108 133b 134c
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [4243-4250] 104a PART II [9356-9944] 227a 241b
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 3a-c BK III 122b e BK IV 177a 179d BK VI 245d 249d 269c d BK VII 287a 291a passim 301b 302d BK VIII 311a 313a EPILOGUE I 660d 661b 669d 672a
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 4a 5b BK II 21b 24d 39a
- 53 JAMES *Psychology* 735a b
- 54 FREUD *Narcissism* 404d 406b / *Group Psychology* 694b-695a / *New Introductory Lectures* 862d 863c
- 3 The morality of love
- 3a Friendship and love in relation to virtue and happiness
- 5 SOPHOCLES *Ajax* [666-683] 148d 149a
- 5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [955-1164] 266d 268c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [543-589] 429d 430a
- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 19d 24b / *Symposium* 152d 155c 164c 167d / *Republic* BK I 299b c 308b 309b BK III 333b 334b BK IX 417b 418a / *Cratylus* 485c d / *Seventh Letter* 804c 805b-c
- 8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK III CH I [116^a 31 39] 162d [116^b 36-117^a 4] 163c CH 2 [118 1-7] 164d CH 3 [118^b 5-9] 165c
- 9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH II 346c 347a BK IV CH 6 373d 374b passim BK VIII CH I [1155^a 1-32] 406b d CH 2 [1155^b 16-26] 407a b CH 3 [1156^b 6-32] 408a = CH 4-5 408c-409d CH 6 [1158^a 1-28] 410a b CH 7 [1158^b 29-1159 12] 410d 411a CH 8 411b-d esp [1159^b 2 10] 411c CH 13 414d-415d passim BK IX CH I [1164 33-46] 417b CH 3 418c-419a passim CH 4 419a 420a CH 6 [1167^b 5-15] 420d-421a CH P 12 421d-426a c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360^b 19-30] 601a b [1361^b 35 40] 602c BK II CH 4 [1381 36-39] 627b c
- 11 LUCRETIVUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1058 1191] 51d 59d
- 12 FRICTIVUS *Discourses* BK II CH 22 167d 170a BK III CH 16 191a d BK IV CH 2 223d 224b
- 12 AURELIUS *Mediations* BK XI SECT 9 303b
- 14 PLUTARCH *Alcibiades* 156c 158b / *Pelopidas* 233b d / *Cato the Younger* 623a b
- 18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par I 13b c BK IV par 7-14 20d 23a BK VI par II 26 38b 43a passim / *City of God* BK XIX CH 3 510d CH 5-9 513d 516c CH 13 14 519a 520a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 27 30 631d 633b
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- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 23 AA 3-8 485a 489c Q 31 A 1 REP 3 536d 537c
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VI [13-90] 15b 16a PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XVII [82] XVIII [75] 79b 80c
- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK II STANZA III II. 36a STANZA 119-128 37a 38a BK III STANZA 241-247 86a b STANZA 24 25 87b 88a
- 23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24b
- 24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
- 25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b-88d 396a 398c passim 431c 432d 478b c
- 26 SHAKESPEARE *Love's Labour's Lost* ACT IV SC III 268b 272c / *Richard II* ACT II SC III [46-49] 333a b / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT I SC I [67-78] 353a b
- 27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [57-99] 49c 50a / *Othello* ACT IV SC II [47-64] 233c d / *King Lear* ACT V SC III [1-26] 279a b / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT I SC II [91-107] 398a b ACT III SC II [71-94] 404c d SC III [27-42] 405b ACT IV SC I 409c d SC III [249-305] 413c 414a / *Sonnets* XXV 590a CXXVII-CLII 607a 609c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 46 438c d PROP 70-73 445c 447a APPENDIX IX 448a XX 449a
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- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 17a b
- 38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 343d 345c / *Political Economy* 373c 374a
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- 44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 83b-c 107a 423c d 490a
- 46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 101 133b
- 47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3125 313^f] 76a b [3374-3413] 82b 83a PART II [9356-9573] 227a 232a
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 36b 39b
- 49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312a 314b 317c d 592d 593a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 15b 16a BK III 116c 117a 122b c 127d 128d BK IV 183d 186c BK V 201a-c BK VI 266c 267c BK VIII 311a 313a 327a 329c 340c 341a c

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- 7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b-d 154 b / *Rhetoric*
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- 12 ACRILIUS *Melancholia* bk iii, sect 11 252a-b
- 14 PLETO *Athenia*, 21 24d / *Lucius* 32a
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- 18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* bk ix, ch 24 528b-c
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- 38 ROCKE *Law* [prop law] 330d 331b 343d
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- 54 F. CO. *Grown Psychology* 672a-695d esp
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- 4a Love between equals and unequals like and
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- 5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [1063 1084]
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- 6 HARODOTUS *History* bk ii 87c-88a bk vii
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- 6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 395d
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- 7 PLATO *Lysis* 19d-21b / *Protagoras* 52b /
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- 9 ARI. TOTIE *Ethics* bk viii ch i [1155^a 28]
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35 LOCKE *Toleration* 2a 2c
37 FI LDI O *Tom Jones* 26a 27a
H1 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 214c 218b

5c God's use of Himself and of creatures

- OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 7-6-15 10 15 18
/ *Psalms* *passim* / *Proverb* 3 12 / *So g of*
Solom -(D) *Canticle of Canticles* / *Isaiah*
43 637-9 -(D) *Isaia* 43 637-9 / *Jeremiah*
13 11 35 -(D) *Jeremias* 13 11 31 / *Ezekiel*
16 -(D) *Ezekiel* 16 / *H 160* -(D) *Osee* /
Jonah 4 -(D) *Jonas* 4
APOCRYPH. *Wisdom of Solomon* 7 23 11 22a-
26 12 13 16 16 20-9 -(D) OT *Bouk f*
Wisdom 7 23 11 23 27 12 13 16 16 20-29
/ *Ecclesiasticus* 11 14 17 16 11 17 32 33 10-
15 -(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 14 17 16 12-
17 31 33 10-15
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 25 31 7 1
10 29-31 / *Luke* 11 3 12 6-7 22 28 /
/ *John* 3 6-21 13 3 17-6 / *R mans* 2 4
5 5 8 29-39 / *11 Corinth* us 13 11 / *Ca*
launs 2 2 / *Ephesians* 3 14 0 5 1 2 /
/ *1 Timothy* 1 13 / *Titus* 3 3 7 / *H breu* 1 12 6
/ *1 Joh* 3 2 6 47-5 5 / *Re lation* 3 19-
21 -(D) *Apocalypse* 3 19-1
7 PLA O *Immaeu* 447c-448a
16 HEP ER *Harmonie of the World* 1050a b
1071b

- 18 AUGUSTIN *Co fession* BK VII par 16 48d
BK XIII par 1 2 110d 111b / *City of God* BK
V CH 3 261d 262 BK XII CH 9 347b-348b
BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a BK XX H 2 16
5 2c 274a c 18 574c 575b CH 24 577b-
579d A XX I CH I 586b d 587b CH 24
609 612a / *Christian Doctrine* K CH 31-
3 633b-d

(5a God as the primary object of love 3a(1)
Man's love of God in this life respect for
the moral law.)

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xv [40-81] 75d 76a xxx xxxi 99b 102b PARADISE iii [91-108] 110b-c xi 122a 123c xxvi [1-81] 145d 146c

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseida* BK I STANZA 263-267 154b 155a / *Parson's Tale* par 31 517b 518b

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 240d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80b 81a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* iii 88d 89a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II APPENDIX IV 447b c PART V PROP 15-16 456c

32 MILTON *Sonnets* xiv 66a / *Paradise Lost* BK V [153-208] 178b 179b

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 78b 80b / *Pensées* 430 245a 247b 463-492 255a 259b 544 266a 556 270b 272a

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 321b-329a esp 326b 327a / *Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 370a b 375a b / *Judgement* 504b 505a 509a c 593a d 611a c

46 HEDEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 307b 308a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 525c 526b BK XII 560a 561c BK XIV 608a b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b 137c *passim*

5a(2) Beatitude as the fruit of love

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 23-5 68a c / *City of God* BK XVII CH 29-30 614b 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 15 628b-c CH 32-33 633c 634b CH 38 635c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 62 AA 7-8 322d 324a A 9 REP 1 324a 325b PART I-II Q 2 A 6 621c 622b Q 4 AA 1-3 629d 631d A 8 esp REP 3 636a-c Q 5 A 4 639a 640b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 65 A 5 ANS and REP 1 374c 75a Q 67 A 6 87a c Q 114 A 4 373a d A 8 376a d PART II II Q 23 A 1 REP 1 482d-483d Q 24 A 6 REP 1 493d-494b A 7 REP 1 494b-495b A 8 ANS and REP 1 495b-496a A 9 ANS and REP 3 496a d A 11 ANS 498b-499a Q 25 A 10 508b Q 26 A 13 519d 520d Q 28 A 3 528d 529c Q 184 A 2 ANS and REP 1-2 629d 630d PART III SUPPL Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 93 1037c 1040c esp A 3 1039d 1040c QQ 95-96 1042c 1066a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xv [40-81] 75d 76a PARADISE 106a 157d esp III [34-90] 109d 110b IV [115]-V [12] 111d 112b XXI [19-102] 138c 139b XXIII [61-69] 140b XXVI [1-81] 145d 146c XXVIII 148d 150b XXX [34-45] 152a b XXXIII 156b 157d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX IV 447b-c PART V PROP 21-42 458a 463d esp PROP 32 37 460b-461c, PROP 42 463b d

32 MILTON *Sonnets* xiv 66a

47 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347c

5b Charity or supernatural love compared with natural love

NEW TESTAMENT I *Corinthians* 13

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 3 A 50b 51a BK VIII par 10-30 55c 61c *passim* BK X par 38-70 81a 89b BK VIII par 8 112b-c / *City of God* BK XV CH 2 416a-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 662a

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q 6 A 3 ANS and REP 3 61c 62b Q 65 A 5 REP 1 74c 75a Q 109 A 3 340c 341b Q 110 A 1 347d 349a PART II II Q 24 AA 2 3 490b 491d A 10 496d 498a Q 25 AA 7-8 506a 507c Q 26 A 3 ANS 511d 512c A 5 513b d A 6 ANS 514d A 8 516a 519a Q 31 A 3 538b 539c Q 32 A 9 548c 549b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY xv [40-81] 75d 76a xxx xxxi 99b 102b PARADISE IV [115]-V [12] 111d 112b VIII IV 116d 120a

23 HOBBS *Leviathan* PART III 240d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2 4c 80b 81a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [5, 6-605] 331b 332a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 793 326b-327a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 26a 27a

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 392b-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 50a BK III 128c d BK V 214c 218b BK X 465a-c BK XI 525c 526b BK XII 560a 561c BK XV 617d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 121d 122d *passim*

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 691d 692a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 786a d

5b(1) The precepts of charity: the law of love

OLD TESTAMENT *Leviticus* 19 17-18 33 34 / *Deuteronomy* 6 5 10 12 18-19 11 13 22 13 4 19 9 24 19-22 30 6 16 / *Proverbs* 10 12 25 21 22

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 9 6 17 18-19 (D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3 9 6 18-19 / *Ecclesiasticus* 4 1-10 13 14 28 1-8 29- (D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 4 11 13 18 25 1 11 9

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 20-26 38 48 19 19 22 34-40 / *Mark* 12 28-34 / *Luke* 6 27-38 10 25-37 / *John* 13 34 17 26 *passim* / *Romans* 8 35-39 12 9-21 13 8 10 / *Corinthians* 8 1 3 13 16 14 / *I Corinthians* 2 4-11 6 8 7-8 / *Galatians* 5 / *Ephesians* 1 4

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

- I Works by authors represented in this collection.
- II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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ACCURSI. Of Continence

— Of Marriage and Concubinage

AQUINAS. Quaestiones Disputatae De Caritate

— *Sermons Theological* PART II-II QQ 106-107

114-119, 151-154

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— *Amor Amoris*

— On Love

F. H. D. Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex

— *Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Anarchism*

— Contributions to the Psychology of Love

II

CATULLUS. The Poems

CICERO. *Letters to de Amicitia* (Of Friendship)

OTTO. *Amores*

— The Art of Love

— *Amor and Amicitia*

Song of Roland

FLETCHER. ALPHONSE. *Diary of a Cleric* 115-117

— (Concerning the Corrupt Friends)

BRETT. *On the Love of God* 115-117

— *Amor and Amicitia*

WILLIAM OF SAINT THIERRY. *De Natura et Dignitate Amoris*

— *Amor and Amicitia*

CHRISTIAN D. T. *Arthurian Romance*

ANDRÉ LE GALL. *The Art of Courty Love*

— *Love and Love*

The Romance of the Rose

FRANCIS OF ASSISI. *The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi* CH 1-22

PETER. *Recl. Sonnets*

— *The Triumph of Love*

BOCCACCIO. *Il Filocolo*

— *Decamerone*

SAINT GERMAIN. *The Green Knight*

GOWER. *Confessio Amantis*

ALBIO. *The Book of Princes* (Sefer ha Ikkaron)

BK III CH 35

THOMAS A. KEMPIS. *The Imitation of Christ* BK II

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B. 20. *The Anatomy of Melancholy* PART III

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C. 11. *A Rapture*

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CH 5-13

RACINE. *Andromaque*

— *Phèdre*

LA FAYETTE. *The Princess of Cleves*

DRYDEN. *Amor and Love*

CONGREVE. *The Way of the World*

(5 *Divine love* 5c *God's love of Himself and of creatures*)

- 19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 1 14b 15b Q 6 A 4 30b d Q 19 A 2 ANS and REP 2-4 109c 110b A 4 ANS and REP 1 111c 112c Q 20 119d 124a Q 27 A 3-4 155c 156d Q 37 197c 200c Q 74 A 3 REP 3-4 375a 377a c Q 82 A 5 REP 1 435c-436c Q 93 A 4 ANS 494c 495b PART I-II Q 28 A 3 CONTRARY 742a d A 4 CONTRARY 742d 743c
- 20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 65 A 5 ANS and REP 3 74c 75a QQ 109-114 338a 378a c esp Q 110 A 1 347d 349a A 4 ANS 350d 351d PART II Q 23 AA 1-2 482d 484d Q 24 AA 2-3 490b-491d A 8 ANS 495b 496a A 12 499c 500d Q 184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d
- 21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL I [37-40] 1b c PURGATORY III [103-145] 57a-c v [2-45] 67c d xi [1-30] 68d 69a xv [40-81] 75d 76a xxviii [91-96] 97a PARADISE III [34-90] 109d 110b vii [1-120] 115a 116b v [1-27]

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- 22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK III STANZA 1-7 54b 55b STANZA 250 253 87a b BK V STANZA 263 267 154b 155a / *Tale of Melibeus* par 78 431b-432a
- 31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 229c
- 31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 17 COROL 456d PROP 19 457a PROP 35 36 460d-461c
- 32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [56 343] 136b-143a BK IV [411 439] 161b 162a
- 35 BERNARDINI *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 3 405b c SECT 154 444a b
- 37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c d
- 42 KANT *Judgement* 592a c
- 48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 381a
- 51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 271d 272b BK IV 373b 377b *passim*
- 52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 24a c BK V 127b 137c *passim* BK VI 153a d BK VII 189a 191a c *passim*

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- Other considerations of conjugal love and its components see FAMILY 7a
- For the moral problems raised by love see DUTY 8 JUSTICE 3 OPPOSITION 4d PLEASURE AND PAIN 8b SIN 2b TEMPERANCE 6a-6b VIRTUE AND VICE 6c
- The role of friendship in the life of the individual the family and the state see FAMILY 7c HAPPINESS 2b(5) STATE 3c VIRTUE AND VICE 6c and for other discussions of the brotherhood of man and the world community see CITIZEN 8 MAN 11b STATE 10f WAR AND PEACE 11d
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